Finding the Optimal Organizational Structure. for Civil Military Cooperation in Land Force Western Area. Brian Roach. APRJ 699 Applied Project

Transcription

1 Finding the Optimal Organizational Structure for Civil Military Cooperation in Land Force Western Area Brian Roach APRJ 699 Applied Project Applied Project Supervisor Dr Gordon Hollis July 10, 2009

2 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION... 3 RESEARCH PURPOSE, QUESTION, AND DESIGN... 5 Research purpose... 5 Research Scope... 5 Research Question... 6 Research Design... 6 LITERATURE REVIEW... 8 Strategic Environment... 8 Reserve Force Considerations... 9 Military Organizational Structure Developing the Civil Military Cooperation Capacity Organizational Review Organizational Structure and Design Theory Team and Matrix Structures Virtual Organizations Communities of Practice Information Technology FINDINGS RECOMMENDATIONS CONCLUSION... 39

3 roachb-aprj Page 3 Introduction Design engineers, sales clerks, administrative personnel, truckers, managers, CEOs and a host of other positions of various responsibilities are organized in groups and teams to support the mission, goals and aims of the business. The organizational structure provides the functional and specialist workers a means to manage the processes and procedures that drive the business to its annual results. The organization s structure provides the division of labour to its separate tasks, and it provides for the coordination of the labour. Grant (2005) tells us that successful firms are reliant on being efficient in the organization of economic activity. Their need to address specialization, coordination, and cooperation, he says, drives the creation of hierarchal structures for the creation of efficiency. The interdependence of structure and strategy has neither as lead, but as mutually supporting elements of a firm s success. Dessler, Strake and Cyr (2001) agree that a company s strategy drives its organizational structure. Public institutions are not profit motivated, but are to provide social value for the tax dollars expended. The Canadian Forces component Environments 1, Directorates, and institutions, as part of the Department of National Defence, share this fiscal responsibility while achieving the Government of Canada s strategic goals for defence and projection of will internationally. The Army is a key Canadian Forces partner in Department and Government defence strategy success. Its organizational structure is based on a development of 19 th century Europe, which at that juncture provided an organizational design to manoeuvre massed ground armies in times of war, and for management in peace. The global environment has, arguably, changed since that structure was developed, as has the employment of military resources to deal with global and regional threats. The end of the cold war may have reduced the possibility of massed army manoeuvre to counter aggression, but regional conflict has added challenges requiring the development of new divisions of labour within the Army structure. One such development is Civil Military Cooperation, which is defined as a military function that supports the commander s mission by establishing and maintaining 1 Navy, Army, Air Force, and Special Forces

4 roachb-aprj Page 4 coordination and cooperation between the military force and civil actors 2 in the commander s area of operation (GoC 2008). The mission support is provided by three core divisions of labour; liaison with civil actors, coordination of civil support to the commander s task force, and coordination of task force support to the civil actors (GoC, 2008). The commander s mission is delivered in the expeditionary operational theatre, which is that mission area defined by the Government of Canada to which resources, including the Canadian Forces, are deployed to achieve specific, strategic goals. To accomplish its function of Influence Activity 3 in the expeditionary theatre, Civil Military Cooperation Operators 4 must be generated, trained, and be prepared for deployment. Land Force Western Area represents an operational level headquarters within the Army hierarchal organizational structure. Within the Area, Civil Military Cooperation is lead and managed by a small staff. The traditional Army hierarchal structure is used to provide command, control, and coordination over the resources assigned. The organizational structure presents a number of challenges. The majority of the human resources are not assigned to Civil Military Cooperation on a permanent basis. Personnel are selected from established Units, where they remain on that establishment for development and part-time employment, and volunteer for additional training in Civil Military Cooperation. The leadership of Civil Military Cooperation within Land Force Western Area is at a cross roads. The capability has been embedded in international deployments, requiring a longer term outlook on human resources for sustainability 5. Civil Military Cooperation will also face change due to planned command and control reorganization initiatives at operational and strategic levels, and might best prepare for this by setting its organizational foundation. Determining how best to develop the mission enabling capability depends on two primary factors; the strategic roles and tasks assigned to Civil Military Cooperation, and the capacity of the Reserve in Land Force Western Area to generate Civil Military Cooperation Operators. In general terms, those factors are fixed in that the Commander Land Force Western Area has little control over them. Defining competency and capacity, and accepting the anticipated 2 Civil Actors is NATO terminology that includes the civilian populace, business and commerce stakeholders, government officials and civil service, and any other non-combatant or non-insurgent elements in the mission area of operations. 3 Influence Activity, in contrast to the kinetic operations of combat forces, includes Civil Military Cooperation activity. 4 Operator designates a person who has been trained in the Civil Military Cooperation capacity. 5 For a discussion on the Canadian Army evolution to capability development, see

5 roachb-aprj Page 5 influence of those factors, should allow the Land Force Western Area Civil Military Cooperation leadership the opportunity to shape its future. Research Purpose, Question, and Design Research purpose Civil Military Cooperation in Land Force Western Area operates business on a foundation that was developed within a decade. In reacting to the changing environment, the organization responded to the ever increasing demands for Civil Military Cooperation Operators in the Afghan theatre of operations, Operation Athena. It is often said during training sessions that the capability is maturing to the point that its utility in the battle space is becoming increasingly noticed by command and leadership at all levels 6. While the focus has been on generating a sufficient number of Operators to deploy, the organizational structure supporting that effort has been insufficient. Recent changes to force structures for the Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan s Kandahar province, which embeds Civil Military Cooperation teams into the command and control structure, support the concept that Influence Activity is a war winning capability. Sustaining the Civil Military Cooperation capacity in Land Force Western Area is imperative to supporting Canadian Forces expeditionary operations. Leveraging the correct Land Force Western Area resources through a logical, sustainable organizational structure is considered to be a key Civil Military Cooperation enabler. Research Scope The project will concentrate on the Land Force Western Area Civil Military Cooperation organizational structure. That structure must support the goals dictated to Civil Military Cooperation by higher headquarters and leadership. The fact of the Civil Military Cooperation employment in expeditionary operations is not in question. This study also accepts that Civil Military Cooperation Operators will continue to be drawn from the myriad military occupations resident in the Reserve Force units across Land Force Western Area, and will not delve into the concepts of unique occupation specialities or common occupational qualifications. Whether Civil Military 6 Anecdotal.

6 roachb-aprj Page 6 Cooperation is its own, unique occupation or is a speciality common to the majority of Canadian Forces unique occupations 7 should not affect the organizational structure, since the human resource assigned to the capacity must still be organized to achieve what its mandated tasks. Research Question The question to be answered is whether the organizational structure for the Civil Military Cooperation capacity in Land Force Western Area is supporting its assigned mission, tasks and role. By extension, we have to question whether the organizational structure can provide for a trained Civil Military Cooperation capacity that is sustainable, and that can absorb near term change to the capability required in Canada s operational and expeditionary theatres. The optimal organizational design should provide the solutions to the problems the questions reveal. Research Design Civil Military Cooperation is a relatively young institutional capacity and has yet to settle into any lasting, national organizational structures or standards. The Civil Military Cooperation capacity has, thus far, been guided by the normal organizational and cultural influences of the Army. A qualitative project, then, would seem unsuitable as the research would likely arrive at a narrowly conceived result. Quantative research, although some data would have to be analyzed to determine human resource capacity and sustainability, would be too remote a process for finding results that need to link the human elements of an optimal structure to organizational strategy A conceptual research paper is more appropriate. The conceptual research is not restricted to a literature review since the research and its analysis in this project is designed to arrive at an organizational structure solution. The research conducted for this project is exploratory in nature and will draw together Department of National Defence, Canadian Forces, Army, and Land Force Western Area orders, directives and policies to more clearly define the strategic environment within which Civil Military Cooperation is expected to undertake its mission, roles and tasks at home, in Canada. Any classified material must be excluded to assure public 7 Unique occupations within the military are easily defined, such as pilot, artilleryman, or medic and they are trained specifically to perform within those skills sets as a military career. Common qualifications are

7 roachb-aprj Page 7 access to the research documents. Additionally, Civil Military Cooperation working groups, seminars, and internal directives and papers will provide insight into the greater organizational hierarchal and cultural realities. Contemporary sources such as academic papers, text books, the internet, and similar sources will be used to support the themes found in the internal institutional documents. Further, as the Civil Military Cooperation capacity is assigned to the Reserve Force, the level and availability of that human resource is an integral part of any sustainable organizational structure. Research in this realm might not be directly accessible to the public. The project will need to summarize a number of data sources to provide a general picture of the human resource capacity available to Civil Military Cooperation in Land Force Western Area. Military organizations have a reputation for being rife with acronyms, which can cause confusion to those not initiated to the culture. The project, then, will choose to not use acronyms in order to assure clarity It must also be noted that Civil Military Cooperation fills two lexicons. The first is a noun that signifies a capability. The second is a noun that is an organization. In essence Civil Military Cooperation, the organization, provides Civil Military Cooperation, the capacity. The capacity is delivered by the Operator. It also loosely constitutes a verb, in that the Operators are said to do Civil Military Cooperation in training and when deployed. The later use is not prevalent in this project. The research, finding and recommendations, are designed to achieve a number of steps, or stages or learning, in determining the optimal organizational structure. Examine the corporate strategy and the operating environment. Civil Military Cooperation for Land Force Western Area is an Army capability. The Army operates within the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence. The Department, the Forces, and the Army strategies, along with that of Land Force Western Area, have influence on the roles, mission and tasks of Civil Military Cooperation. Those influences should be a major consideration in how the Civil Military Cooperation organization is structured Define the internal strategy. The deployment of Civil Military Cooperation within Canadian Forces deployments is not in question, and its strategic and tactical use is determined by the commander s mission. The strategy to accomplish the institutional operations must be determined. These operations include, but are not limited to generating new Operators, training and development, and supporting the Army institutions that train basic Operators and develop higher level leaders who require knowledge of Civil Military Cooperation aims and objectives in the mission context.

8 roachb-aprj Page 8 Examine structures that support the environment and strategy. Organizational structure theory and design, within and outside of the military, can provide insight and direction with regard to determining an optimal structure that best enables Civil Military Cooperation to its mandated work. The research must allow for the capability to be viewed outside of the military context. Viewing the work to be accomplished in a corporate context may allow a broader range of theory and practical applications of organizational design to be directed to the problem. Remaining within the relatively narrow scope of military staff and Unit organizations might not be conducive to finding the optimal civil military cooperation structure solution. Develop structure options. It is anticipated that more than one organizational structure will become evident as a result of the research and findings. These will have to be measured against the strategy and human resource factors to result in the better organizational structure solution. Present recommendations. Any number of organizational structures might support Civil Military Cooperation in its conduct of its institutional aims and tasks. The research is intended to arrive at an optimal organizational structure. The research will allow for narrowing the options to those that would be the most practical in Civil Military Cooperation achieving its aims and providing sustainment of the capability. The research materials will, for the most part, be drawn from web-accessible sources. Some of the military sources might not be published for public consumption, but would still be subject to access to information requests. No protected or classified sources of information are required for this project, nor can any be used. No information reviewed for the project will have been generated for the sole purpose of the applied project, nor will interviews or any other source generate identifiable research sources. The author fills a staff position within the Land Force Western Area Civil Military Cooperation organization, and is therefore aware of a wide variety of anecdotal facts and arguments within the capacity, the Area and the Army environments. Footnotes will be used where documentary reference is not readily available. Literature Review Strategic Environment Corporations are guided by strategy, which greatly influences their organizational structure (Dessler, et al. 2001). Robert M. Grant in Contemporary Strategy Analysis

9 roachb-aprj Page 9 (2005), notes the Tom Peter s dictum of Strategy is Structure. Chapter 6 in particular identifies that strategy and structure are inseparable. What business the organization is in and what the organization is to achieve have considerable influence on the structure that should best allow the company to be successful. Grant (2005), contends that strategy provides for decision support, coordinates business activities, and provides a way to guide the current organization while encouraging future aspirations for the organization. Civil Military Cooperation, as a military capacity, exists within the strategies of the Army and the Canadian Forces. Strategy 2020 (GoC, 2006), echoes Grant in its foreword; highlighting the Department of National Defence strategy as a decision-making guide as the Department and Canadian Forces adapt to the rapidly evolving, global environment. The publication considers the assessment of the environment at the highest, National level, and the implementation of Canada s Defence Policy in emerging, global defence challenges. The Civil Military Cooperation capacity is delivered at the tactical level, but it is still guided by the corporate strategy provided by Strategy The principles of Strategy 2020 must be examined if the The Civil Military Cooperation organization is to fit within the larger, corporate context (Grant, 20005). The majority of Strategy 2020 provides analysis, assessment and guidance is well beyond the scope of the Civil Military Cooperation organization, given that The Civil Military Cooperation is wielded at the tactical level. However, the notable themes that recur that have relevance to guiding the Civil Military Cooperation organizational structure are Manage resources prudently; resource stewardship Keep pace with concepts, doctrine, and technological change Adaptability and innovation will outperform those institutions unable to integrate new information technologies and management practices Reliant, affordable force structures These four themes, in particular, should be a guiding influence on the Civil Military Cooperation organizational structure if Strategy 2010 is to be respected at the ground level of the Canadian Forces. Reserve Force Considerations

10 roachb-aprj Page 10 Civil Military Cooperation is one of a handful of unique capabilities assigned to the Canadian Army Reserve. The Army Reserve encompasses approximately 16,000 personnel and is composed of personnel enrolled for service that is not continuing or full-time 8. The Army Reserve is the citizen-soldier; those who volunteer to receive military training through 137 Units across 110 Canadian towns and cities, to augment and sustain Regular Force (full time Army) operations and training. Reserve Force members are not subject to all of the liabilities of their Regular Force colleagues. Of primary concern to this paper is that the Reserve Force existence is based on the capacity of the community in which its members live. The Reserve Force member is not liable for being removed to a new geographic location to fill an employment vacancy within the Army. The deployment of Civil Military Cooperation Operators to expeditionary operations requires a specified number of skills that require specific and ongoing training that is not germane to Civil Military Cooperation, but identifies the general soldier skills required of every individual soldier who deploys (GoC, DAOD yr). The Land Force Western Area Annual Operating Plan indentifies that every military unit, both Regular and Reserve, are responsible for their soldiers achieving this minimum level of skills ability prior to beginning the training for a specific expeditionary operation. Civil Military Cooperation restricts its volunteers by military rank. The capacity requires a certain level of military experience, training, and maturity within the institution. Senior non commissioned members may volunteer if they are in the rank of Sergeant though Chief Warrant Officer. Officers may volunteer if they are above the rank of Captain. Exceptions can be made, but they are not usual and require extensive review prior to the volunteer being accepted for screening and selection. Or officers especially, the usual high rank is Major, except for the few, specific deployed staff appointments in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel. Since the Reserve Force is a volunteer organization, it is possible that the recorded strength of personnel is greater than the number of personnel who report for work on a continuing basis. Human Resource Management Service clerks record attendance at unit level of unique individuals for the purpose of part-time pay and benefits utilizing the Revised Pay System for the Reserve. The Pay System data can be queried in various ways, to include the determining of the actual number of individuals who had reported for work for at least one day of in every calendar month. In Land Force Western Area, the Army Reserve units had a combined average effective 9 strength of 3197 part-time personnel in This value is +/- 10% of the past three years. Table 1 shows that of 8 There are Reserve Force members on full-time contract service, which is maximized at 3 year intervals.

11 roachb-aprj Page 11 the average effective strength, an aggregate of 498 are employed in the rank of Sergeant through Chief Warrant Officer, and an aggregate of 303 are in the rank of Captain and Major. That 800 personnel, 498 Senior Non Commissioned Members and 303 specified Officer ranks, is indicative of the human resource capacity of Land Force Western Area that is capable of providing volunteers to become Civil Military Cooperation Operators. Land Force Western Area Effective Strength BGEN COL LCOL MAJ CAPT LT 2LT OCDT CWO MWO WO SGT MCPL CPL PTE Total Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Strength Average 3197 Specified Ranks Average Table 1 - Land Force Western Area Effective Strength, 2008 Civil Military Cooperation is not the only expeditionary capacity assigned to the Reserve Force. Practically every Reserve occupation provides augmentation to their Regular Force comrades. During the deployment to Afghanistan in 2007, and for the upcoming deployment 2009/2010, Land Force Western Area will have deployed 646 and 531 Reserve Force soldiers to each rotation 10, respectively. The recent Land Force Western Area Fourth Quarter Report 11 reveals that the investment in the Reserve force is toward a base for mobilization. This must be tempered by the fact that the Reserve Force is a volunteer organization, with no 10 Rotation refers to the usual 6 month employment duration in the expeditionary operation. 11 An internal report compiled for leadership that measures and analyses activities, budget, and projects progress against the annual operating plan.

12 roachb-aprj Page 12 member able to be compelled to deploy on expeditionary operations 12. Table 1 shows that the capacity of the Reserve Force in Land Force Western Area is sufficient to providing the required level of Civil Military Cooperation Operators. The Fourth Quarter Report also reveals that only 4% of the Reserve Force strength is on expeditionary operations at any one time. Applied to the available resource calculated at Table 1 would provide for 32 specified officer and senior non-commissioned members. Applying the deployed percentage to a particular segment of the resource is not accurate, however. If we look at two deployments most recently assigned to Land Force Western Area the number of officers and senior non-commissioned members who deployed, as illustrated at Table #, far exceeds the number available as implied from the Quarterly Report Reserve Force Deployment for Specific Ranks Source Rank ROTO 5 ROTO 8 TOTAL LFWA Maj Capt CWO MWO WO Sgt Table 2 - Deployment by Rank Military Organizational Structure The modern military organizational structure is based on a system originally employed by Napoleon s Grande Armee, which identified staff positions by letter and number to identify specified roles. Military units are organized in a hierarchal structure that is rooted in the operations of the ancient Roman Armies. Both systems have been refined over the centuries to provide a template framework from which the military institutionally designs its organizational structures. It is usual, then, for military units to adopt hierarchal structures, supported by command and control authority. Command in Land Operations provides the framework for command throughout the Army. The publication states intent to contribute a more dynamic style of conducting 12 In time of conflict or National emergency, the Reserve Force can be activated for full time service by an Order in Council; an unlikely action for expeditionary and peace support operations which force structures are tempered by

13 roachb-aprj Page 13 operations and training. The scope of the publication includes a chapter committed to a discussion on the theory of command organization. It presents theoretical content and the practical implementation of the theory. The simple definition of an organization is presented; two or more people working together in a coordinated manner so as to achieve group results, which is similar in contemporary literature, such as Dessler, Stark, Cyr (2001). The organization must have a clear role with some degree of discipline within a defined structure. The organizational structure provides the chain of command, which Dressler et all define as the path a directive should take in travelling from the president to the employees at the bottom of the organization chart, or from the bottom to the top of the organization chart (2001). The organization chart should show that chain of a command, or line of authority with an accurate depiction of the path for decision-making authority. The Army publication describes five fundamentals that apply to command, with command providing for the effective achievement of objectives; synonymous to leadership. Unity of Command. Being accountable to one superior is considered important to ensuring clarity and unity of effort, timely and effective decision making, and avoids conflicting information. Unity of command is defined as achieved through a clear chain of command, whereby command at each level is focussed on one commander Cooperation. A principle of war, cooperation complements unity of command. It entails the coordination of individual and group activities to achieve an optimum combined effect for the common good. The basis of cooperation is teamwork, trust and mutual understanding, based upon a common understanding of the commander s intent and developed through training. Three further elements contribute to cooperation: a common aim (reflecting unity of effort); mutual goodwill; and, a clear division of responsibilities. Mutually agreed doctrine and clearly defined command relationships formalize military cooperation. Balanced Structure. This fundamental presents that a commander can only manage a limited number of subordinates to command effectively. This span of control issue is linked to the shape of the organization. Flat organizations will have a broader span of control by each supervisor, whereas a tall organization will have a much narrower span of control for supervisors. Overall, wide spans are considered more efficient, since they use fewer human resources in supervisor positions, but at some point they become less effective (Dessler, Stark, Cyr. 2001). The Command in Land Force Operations publication reflects that premise in describing that a balanced and capable overall structure is

14 roachb-aprj Page 14 achieved by adjustment of the pan of command the width of an organization or number of direct subordinates Responsive Procedures. Procedures must be simple, efficient and flexible in order to be responsive, and so assist the development and maintenance of tempo within a command. Dynamic Organization. While this subparagraph of the publication focus migt be read to infer an organization on deployed or expeditionary operations, the basic premise is that the Army organization must adjust to changing situations and technology. While it is stated that change for change sake must be avoided, responsiveness to the environment is encouraged. Civil Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War (GoC, 1999), reflects the same principles of Command and Control but from the perspective of the Canadian Forces Operations manual; the strategic level overseeing the Army. The principles are similar, though the nomenclature varies. In general terms, the section on principles of command and control suggest that there be limits on how much any one person is charged to effectively manage, and that the command and control options retain the intent of the principles while being flexible in dealing with the environment in which Civil Military Cooperation organization operates. Developing the Civil Military Cooperation Capacity The Chief of the Land Staff (the Army Commander), in August 2000, provided direction to raise the Civil Military Cooperation capability for the Army from the Reserve Force. The decision provided for leveraging the civilian skills of the part-time soldier and officer while addressing an identified operational deficiency at a low cost (GoC, 2000). In standing up the Army Civil Military Cooperation capability, the Army Commander directed geographically dispersed detachments be created and be placed under command of the Land Force Area Headquarters; Atlantic, Quebec, Central, and Western. An Army Civil Military Cooperation Staff was established to coordinate issues such as training, employment on operations, and managing the number of Civil Military Cooperation Teams in each Land Force Area (GoC, 2000). Land Force Western Area choose to develop the normal, military hierarchal structure for Civil Military Cooperation. The Land Force Western Area Commander directed the component teams align with the in-place Reserve formations structure based on

15 roachb-aprj Page 15 geographic boundaries. The directed command and control relationship allowed the Reserve formation practically full control of the missions and tasks assigned to the team allocated to them. In addition, the Reserve formations were given responsibility for administration of their allocated team (GoC, 2000). Figure 1 illustrates the LFWA Civil Military Cooperation structure, and notes the Reserve formations that defined its organizational nomenclature. Figure 1 - Civil Military Organization Cooperation organizational structure The organizational structure places the component elements in a usual, hierarchal chain of command arrangement. The Detachment 13 Commander filled the secondary role of the G9 staff officer for the Commander Land Force Western Area. The Detachment Commander retained responsibility for man management of the Detachment, manning the Detachment, and conducting and coordinating training with the Reserve formations. In the Civil Military Cooperation implementation directive of December 2000 (GoC, 2000), the Commander Land Force Western Area directed roles, missions and tasks for the Detachment. In general terms, the language of the direction given leans toward the development of the Civil Military Cooperation capability, which is to be expected given this was a new capability being raised from within in-place resources. There is direction 13 An organizational designation for the basic employment structure for Civil Military Cooperation forces in operations. The Detachment structure is the foundation of the Organizational structure directed by the Land Force Western Area Commander in December, 2000.

16 roachb-aprj Page 16 to be prepared to augment internationally deployed forces, as at this point in time the Civil Military Cooperation role for Canadian Forces deployment was assigned to select officers from the Battle Groups on Peace Support Operations in the Balkans. It was anticipated that the role would be taken by the Land Force Western Area Civil Military Cooperation organization in October of 2002 and April 2003 with a section of twelve Operators (GoC, 2001). Terms of reference were also provided to the employment positions by the Deputy Commander in February of 2001 (GoC, 2001). The highlights of these, less administrative and logistic support duties, are G9/Detachment Commander. o Prepare selected personnel for Civil Military Cooperation duties on overseas deployment and domestic operations o Coordinate, monitor, and control the activities of all Civil Military Cooperation Teams o Conduct professional development and training program for al Civil Military Cooperation Detachment members o Be prepared to provide Teams in support of Battle Group exercises (training) o Operate within assigned budget and resources o Conduct an annual Civil Military Cooperation teams training exercise G9 Operations Officer o Organize detachment training o Coordinate professional development o Develop and conduct the annual training exercise o Coordinate and disseminate pertinent information through (Reserve formations) to the..teams G9 Plans Officer o Assist in drafting the annual training exercise plan o Coordinate soldier skills training for the Detachment command section, and monitor soldier skills training for team members

17 roachb-aprj Page 17 Team Leader 14 o Report to G9, but responsive to (respective Reserve formation) Commander o Advise respective Commander on Civil Military Cooperation matters o With reasonable notice, and if available, be prepared to provide (support) to Domestic Operations Detachments 15 o Ensure completion of own team (soldier skills) training each year o If available, prepare for overseas deployment with adequate notice Team Member o Familiarize self with Domestic Operations procedures o If available, assist on Battle Group exercises (training) o Complete (soldier skills) training each year with the remainder of the team o Attend the annual..detachment training exercise o If available, prepare for overseas deployment with adequate notice Organizational Review Since the promulgation of the Army and Land Force Western Area implementation directives of January and December 2000, respectively, Civil Military Cooperation in Western Area seems to have absorbed modifications and change as the situation and environment required, but without any formal process or direction 16 In March of 2004, a review of the organizational structures for Civil Military Cooperation was completed. Its stated aim was to provide the Commander Land Force Western Area with an overview of the capability in a National context (GoC, 2004). The study takes an individual look at Civil Military Cooperation in each Land Force Area and provides recommendations on what it determines are six key problem areas. The later are, in general, a long list of things that should be done rather than provide any workable solutions to address the six key problem areas defined by the study. 14 Team Second in Command is practically the same 15 Domestic Operations Detachments are a one or two person liaison staff in each provincial capital to coordinate Canadian Forces support in time of crisis or emergency. 16 This is an anecdotal statement. The author is aware that the current organization is not operating as was directed in 2000 by the Area Commander, and no documents can be found that support the current chain of command relationships. That said, it is working.

18 roachb-aprj Page 18 Organizational design is not a topic of the study. Despite its deficiencies with regard to fully developed recommendations, the review does provide a snap shot in time of the challenges being experienced by Civil Military Cooperation in working toward reaching success. All of the Civil Military Cooperation elements across Canada are indentified as being geographically dispersed. The dispersion is a fact of the location of the Reserve Force Units from which Civil Military Cooperation draws its Operators. and other electronic means are indentified as being the main communication link between Operators on a weekly basis to overcome the dispersion. Face to face interaction is possible on no greater than a monthly basis due to time and space, and the necessary funding to support travel and accommodations. There are a variety of command and control structures discussed, with none seeming consistent with the stated relationship. For example, two of the Civil Military Cooperation organizations are identified as having a formal command and control relationship between elements of the organization and their respective Reserve Force Brigade Headquarters. The discussion on information and direction goes on to describe, however, that the Civil Military Cooperation leader continues to operate as if the formal command and control relationship did not exist. Reasons cited include that information is not passed in a timely manner, and that the priority that Civil Military Cooperation meters are deemed to have are not reflected in the Brigade Staff efforts. It is also important to note that the command and control relationships indentified between eh Civil Military Cooperation elements and their respective Brigade Headquarters are not necessarily appropriate according to the Army publication Command in Land Operations for two reasons; the first is that one of the relationships indentified is for specific missions of limited function, time, or location. The other is usually designated to manoeuvre arms, such as infantry or armour. The command and control relationships between the Brigade and their respective Civil Military Cooperation attachment would, by the very nature of it being due to geographic collocation or proximity, be constant. The civil military cooperation capacity does not have the battlefield weight and structure of the combat arms 17, nor that of other such formed units The Civil Military Cooperation organizations all have a reasonably sized full time staff to maintain the required level of administrative and logistic support to their part-time manned organizations. Some of the organizations state that Operators are posted to their Civil Military Cooperation organization, rather than remaining on a parent unit The Combat Arms are comprised of artillery, armour, infantry, and engineers. These are capable battlefield entities within their own logistically sustainable capacities. 18 Parent Unit is a term synonymous to Department or Section in the civilian context. It defines where the person usually works, to the inclusion of Unit insignia, badges, and military cultural identity

19 roachb-aprj Page 19 establishment. For each of these, however, it is apparent that administrative arrangements are made to allow the individual Operators to continue to parade at their parent unit in order to achieve annual basic levels of soldier skills training. For Land Force Western Area, the concept of operations states that basic soldiers skills training would remain under the auspices of the individuals parent unit (GoC, 2001). The study indicates time and space, and the requisite funding to support gathering the personnel together for soldier skills training, seem to be the foundation for having personnel parade with parent units 19. The challenges facing Civil Military Cooperation organizations in all four Land Force Areas are not clearly defined in the March 2004 study, but can be derived from the conclusions and recommendations recorded in the document. They are Civil military cooperation is not put to use in Reserve Force unit training or exercises. Training of the Civil Military Cooperation Operator must have a better focus to improve standards of delivery and measurement. Recruiting and selection practices might not be reaching the full spectrum of persons capable of being employed as an Operator. There is little information gathered from persons who have been deployed as Civil Military Cooperation Operators, resulting in a dearth of valuable lessons that could be leveraged for training and development. The passage of Civil Military Cooperation technical and doctrinal information is not robust, due to the inconsistencies within each Land Force Area with regard to command and control relationships and structures. The records of individual Operators training and deployments are not consistent within each respective Land Force Area. This is likely due to the inconsistencies in command and control relationships and structures. No commitment from Civil Military Cooperation organizations on the continual review and development of doctrine. No commitment from Civil Military Cooperation organizations on the evaluation and measures of basic and ongoing training. 19 Considering that there are a multitude of unique occupations that volunteer for the capacity, it would be very difficult to impossible for the Civil Military Cooperation organization to provide ongoing training for each of those occupations so that individuals would still progress within their part-time career path.

20 roachb-aprj Page 20 No commitment from Civil Military Cooperation organizations on the evaluation and development of battle task standards. Difficulty in the Land Force Area s ability to provide Operators for instructional duties for scheduled Civil Military Cooperation courses 20. Despite command and control relationships with Reserve Force Brigade headquarters, the lack of any relationship with the Regular Force formations causes difficulty with regard to the civil military capacity being integrated into expeditionary operations deployment training, which is further exacerbated by the Operators being from outside of the deploying organization. The focus of the Civil Military Cooperation staff is to provide the necessary support to allow for the recruitment, training and preparation for deployment the number of Civil Military Cooperation Operators required to meet the mandated level of human resource to support the deployed operation (GoC. 2009). The lines of operation to meet the demand were a topic of discussion during a Land Force Western Area Civil Military Cooperation Working Group in 2009 (GoC. 2009). That Working Group analyzed the current and expected levels of demand for trained Civil Military Cooperation Operators in the current operational context and the near future. It was determined that Civil Military Cooperation Operator demand would not decrease, and would likely modestly increase over the coming five to seven year term. In finding alternatives to recommend action to meet the demand, the Working Group validated the three lines of operation, or functions, the Civil Military Cooperation organization was required to conduct to meet the human resource demand. They are Force Generate (recruit, select, provide civil military cooperation capability training, ensure required minimum soldier skill sets are met) Operators for expeditionary operations at the tactical and staff level. Conduct collective training for Operators to prepare them for deployment training. Support development of the Civil Military Cooperation capacity, within the scope of training development, supporting doctrinal reviews, and liaison with Land Force Western Area formations. 20 At the time of the study, the Basic Operator course was scheduled three times per year, and remains so. Recently, the Staff level course was added and scheduled for two times per year. A July 2009 serial of the Staff course is without instructors and will be cancelled.

21 roachb-aprj Page 21 Organizational Structure and Design Theory Organizations have purpose, structure, and a division of labour (Dessler, et al. 2001) The corporate strategy should have influence over the decisions made with regard to the functions that must be performed and how the functions are coordinated. Slack, Chambers, and Johnston, in their textbook on operations management (2004), note that all organizations have three core functions; Marketing (including sales), product and service development, and operations. They accept that the core function names and responsibilities will vary as a result of the organization s aim, but that the functions are applicable. Strategic infrastructure decisions influence the workforce organizational structure and planning and control. These decisions include determining the roles and responsibilities of the employees. The discussion in the text provides the linkage between corporate strategy influencing organizational structure, which provides the ability of the organization to conduct the three core functions. Dessler et al (2001) describe the organizational chart; the result of the structural decisions. The lines connecting titles and positions are indicative of who is in charge of what department and illustrates the chain of command within the organization. Their definition of department is the process through which an enterprise s activities are grouped together and assigned to managers. The text provides four options for creating departments; Functional, Product, Customers, Marketing Channels, and Geographic Areas. Since Civil Military Cooperation is not a competitive company, the options of Customer, Product, and Marketing Channel options have no value to the organizational structure decision. The customer is always the expeditionary operation to which Operators must be provided. There is lack of differentiation in the knowledge product provided by the Operators, who are, trained and developed in a similar manner for any deployment. There is also no requirement to market Operators within the military, nor would such activity to external markets or customers be feasible. The result is a choice between Functional and Geographic departments. As we discussed in the organizational review, the Civil Military Cooperation implementation directives imposed a geographic structure. The Dessler et al text describes that this departmental structure allows the separate departments of an enterprise to conduct business in their respective territories. The departments are usually self- contained, providing for each of the organization s core functions. The main advantage of the geographic structure is the timeliness in response and service to the needs of the customers, buyers, and clients in each respective territory. Its major disadvantage is enterprise-wide duplication of effort required to attend to the organizations core functions in each. Separate geographic department.

22 roachb-aprj Page 22 The task assigned by the Commander Land Force Western Area to his Civil Military Cooperation enterprise centres on providing Operators to any operational deployment (GoC, 2009). As discussed in the previous section, there are three key functions to achieving that assigned task. Functional departmentalization would produce an organizational structure that groups the activities that form the component parts of each elemental function. Dessler et al note several advantages to the functional structure. Building departments around functions makes sense; it is simple, straightforward, and logical. Functions aren t duplicated as they would be in other organizational structures, and employees can become more proficient from the focus on a single, unique function. Managers also have the advantage of focussing on providing a narrower range of output since they don t have to administer several functions. The enterprise should expect greater efficiency. Dependant on size and diversity, the functional departmentalization could prove difficult to coordination the elemental functions managers are centralized on fewer, or one, person. Responsiveness could suffer, especially as managers become more specialized and possible loose a general breadth of knowledge of the enterprises operations. The advantages and disadvantages of both the Geographic Area and Functional departmental groupings are shown at Table 2. Geographic Area Departmentalization Advantages Self-contained focus on buyers, customers, and clients of each respective territory Timeliness of response within territories Disadvantages Duplication of effort on elemental functions Requires managers with general management skills to cover elemental functions Functional Departmentalization Advantages Managers specialized and more efficient Less duplication of effort Proficient employees Simplified training Simple, straightforward, logical Better executive control Disadvantages Coordination difficult increases with size and diversity Could slow responsiveness Less attention to products, markets, or territories (where organization resides) Functionally specialized managers with fewer general manager skills Table 3 - Geographic and Functional Departmentalization. Adapted from Dessler et al. 2001

23 roachb-aprj Page 23 Schlesinger and Schlesinger (1993) examine organizational structures that balance influential factors while responding the problems companies face. They consider organizations as systems. The system is comprised of the organizational design, the people in the organization, the jobs that need to be done, and the environment. Influencing the system are contextual factors, which are those which effect the organization but toward which the organization has little influence. In making decisions, managers produce functional and dysfunctional effects as the system reacts and seeks balance. For example, although a human resource administration was directed to be conducted through the Reserve Force formations, the Civil Military Cooperation system found other ways and means of managing the resource. The three main design factors cited by Schlesinger and Schlesinger are the people in the jobs, the tasks they perform, and the formal organizational structure and operating systems in pace that must fit together to produce the desired results and outcomes. Team and Matrix Structures The Military is a top-down organization. Implementation or transformation staff are assigned to the problem of developing the solutions to strategic and operational capability and capacity problems. Their work is usually conducted outside the normal command and control structures of enterprises to which they apply recommendations for command direction. Strategies developed by external influence such as by consultants often fail because the organization's capability is not aligned correctly. As success is realized, the organizational structure, policies and practices become fixed. Eisenstat and Beer in making that finding (1994) suggest that the changing environment overcomes past structures, systems, policies, and procedures and thus fosters behaviour that is dysfunctional. This adequately describes Civil Military Cooperation in Land Force Western Area, where the structure and its operations are not necessarily that dictated by the implementation directives, even though success might be being achieved. To realign the organization with strategy, Eisenstat and Beer (1994) suggest that management must develop organizations that have the capacity to realize competitive opportunities. They recommend that employee involvement is necessary so that the process does not exist only at the policy level, but that it is also is integrated into practice. Because the employees know who they must coordinate their efforts with, they usually have better knowledge of where the opportunities and barriers reside with regard to the work within the organizational structure. This seems to be the case of the Civil Military Cooperation Working Group results on discussing the topic of the organizational structure (GoC, 2009). To be successful in realigning the organization to