Infantry Tactical Doctrine Volume 1 The Infantry Company Group

Transcription

1 D/HQT/18/28/137 Army Code No Infantry Tactical Doctrine Volume 1 The Infantry Company Group Pamphlet No. 2 Infantry Company Group Tactics 1998

2 COPYRIGHT This work is Crown copyright and the intellectual property rights for this publication belong exclusively to the Ministry of Defence (MOD). No material or information contained in this publication should be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form outside MOD establishments except as authorized by both the sponsor and the MOD where appropriate. SECURITY This document is issued for the information of such persons who need to know its contents in the course of their official duties. Any person finding this document should hand it into a British Forces unit or to a British police station for its safe return to the MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, D MOD SY, LONDON SW1A 2HB, with particulars of how and where found. THE UNAUTHORIZED RETENTION OR DESTRUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT COULD BE AN OFFENCE UNDER THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACTS OF AUTHORITY This publication is issued under the overall direction of the CGS. It is an MOD Approved Code of Practice (ACOP). Where issues of health and safety are concerned it takes into account the provisions of the Health and Safety at Work Act STATUS The contents provide clear military information concerning the most up to date experience and best practice available for commanders and troops to use in their operations and training. If you are prosecuted for a breach of health and safety law, and it is proved that you have not followed the relevant provisions of the ACOP, a court may find you criminally liable unless you can show that you have complied with the requirements of health and safety legislation since it is a breach of this legislation which renders a person criminally liable. Breaches or omissions of the ACOP could result in disciplinary action under the provisions of the Army Act. AMENDMENTS Amdt No. Date Amdt No. Date Amdt No. Date DISTRIBUTION (See page vi) FOR THE ATTENTION OF ALL SCALE HOLDERS Units requiring an increase or decrease to their scale should apply to DGD&D, Publications who will arrange for a revised distribution. Any request to exceed the scale must be supported by a written justification which is to be referred by DGD&D to HQ Infantry for approval. ii

3 Army Code No D/HQT/18/28/137 Infantry Tactical Doctrine Volume 1 The Infantry Company Group Pamphlet No. 2 Infantry Company Group Tactics Prepared under the direction of the Chief of the General Staff Ministry of Defence April 1998 Crown Copyright Reserved 1998

4 The Infantry Mission is to close with and engage the enemy in all operational theatres and environments, in order to bring about his defeat. iv

5 FOREWORD 1. The development of doctrine is a continuous process and the information contained in the series of Infantry Doctrine Publications will naturally be subject to change. This change will either be driven from higher level developments or from field experience. Any person wishing to propose amendments to the pamphlets in Volume 1 is strongly encouraged to write to SO2 TD, Force Development Branch, Headquarters Infantry, Warminster Training Centre, Warminster, Wiltshire, BA12 0DJ. All proposals will be considered for submission to the Infantry Doctrine Working Group. Other queries should be made to Infantry Publications (same address), ATN Warminster Mil ext 2325/ Infantry Doctrine forms part of a coherent hierarchy of doctrine publications. Associated publications are: British Defence Doctrine; The British Military Doctrine; ADP Volume 1 Operations; ADP Volume 2 Command; AFM Volume 1 Part 2 Battlegroup Tactics; Army Unit SOPs, and the Tactical Aide Memoire. British Army Review, Army Training and Doctrine News and The Infantryman provide current thought and discussion on doctrine matters. 3. Individuals should first read the Introduction on page xi which explains the aim, layout and scope of this pamphlet as well as the structure and breakdown of Infantry Tactical Doctrine Publications. 4. This is a new pamphlet and should be issued with its own binder. v

6 DISTRIBUTION (1) HQs Commands, Divisions, Brigades and Directorates (less HQ Infantry) 5 copies each Infantry HQ Infantry/Infantry Reps and LOs 10 copies Regular and TA Battalions (2) 35 copies each Independent/Detached Infantry Companies 5 copies each Home Service Battalions 5 copies each Training Team Brunei 5 copies ITDU One copy SAS Regiments 10 copies each Infantry Training Centres Warminster 185 copies Catterick 10 copies Wales 10 copies Army Training Regiments/Training Depots 2 copies each Royal Military Academy Sandhurst 10 copies CATC 2 copies CACTG 5 copies CAS 70 copies HQ TSC (Germany) 2 copies BATUS 2 copies DGD&D LW1 2 copies JSCSC 20 copies AJD (JSCSC) 20 copies Royal Marines HQ Royal Marines 2 copies Commandos 10 copies each CTC RM 10 copies RAF Regiment Squadrons 2 copies each Other Arms and Services Major Units only One copy each Notes: 1. General. a. The previous system of A to F scaling is being phased out for GSTPs as new or revised publications are issued. Units will in future receive a specific initial entitlement as decided by the sponsor. b. Requests for additional copies must be fully justified and are to be made to DGD&D, Publications in the first instance. Requests will fall into one of three categories and are to be specified: (1) Replacement Issue. To bring units back up to entitlement as a result of loss or damage. (2) Supplementary Issue. This applies when a unit s role or circumstance changes necessitating an increase to the original entitlement. (3) New Issue. This is where a unit has not previously been scaled for a particular publication. c. Units are reminded that all publications are accountable documents and their issue and receipt should be the responsibility of a nominated officer or SNCO. 2. Specific. Distribution of this pamphlet to Regular and TA Infantry Battalions allows for one copy per officer. vi

7 CONTENTS Page Foreword... Distribution... Contents... List of Illustrations... Introduction... v vi vii ix xi CHAPTER 1. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS Section 1. Fundamentals Section 2. Forces and Tasks Section 3. Organization Section 4. Planning and Preparation Section 5. Conduct Section 6. Command and Control Section 7. Combat Service Support Annex A The Night Attack... 1A 1 Appendix 1. Marking a Company Night Attack FUP and LD... 1A1 1 Annex B Infiltration... 1B 1 CHAPTER 2. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS Section 1. Fundamentals Section 2. Forces and Tasks Section 3. Planning and Preparation Section 4. Conduct Section 5. Command and Control Section 6. Combat Service Support Annex A Reserved Demolitions... 2A 1 Appendix 1. AF W A1 1 Annex B Routine in Defence (24 Hour Period)... 2B 1 Annex C UK Mine Warfare Doctrine... 2C 1 vii

8 Page CHAPTER 3. DELAY OPERATIONS Section 1. Fundamentals Section 2. Forces and Tasks Section 3. Organization Section 4. Planning and Preparation Section 5. Conduct Section 6. Command and Control Section 7. Combat Service Support CHAPTER 4. TRANSITIONAL PHASES DURING OPERATIONS Section 1. Introduction Section 2. Advance to Contact Section 3. Meeting Engagement Section 4. Link-Up Operations Section 5. Withdrawal Section 6. Relief of Troops in Combat CHAPTER 5. OTHER OPERATIONAL TASKS Section 1. General Section 2. Patrolling Section 3. Raids Section 4. Ambushes Section 5. Observation Posts (OPs) Section 6. Fire Planning Section 7. Battlefield Illumination Section 8. Protection and Security Section 9. NBC Warfare (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical) Annex A Splinter Distance Chart for Fire Planning... 5A 1 CHAPTER 6. OPERATIONS IN SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS Section 1. Introduction Section 2. Crossing and Breaching of Obstacles Section 3. Fighting in Built-Up Areas (FIBUA) Section 4. Operations in Forests Section 5. Operations in Conditions of Limited Visibility viii

9 ILLUSTRATIONS Figure No Page 1 Forms of Manoeuvre in the Attack Frontal Forms of Manoeuvre in the Attack Penetration Forms of Manoeuvre in the Attack Envelopment Forms of Manoeuvre in the Attack Turning Movement Forms of Manoeuvre in the Attack Infiltration Separate FUPs Stages of an Attack Envelop Flank Support Rear Support Possible Layout of a Company Night FUP (not to scale)... 1A 3 12 Approach Using One Route... 1A 7 13 Approach Using Platoon Routes... 1A 7 14 Mutual Support: Interlocking and Overlapping Fire Delay from Successive Positions Delay from Alternate Positions (Platoon Level Delay) The Company Group in the Advance Layout of a Company Deliberate Area Ambush ix

10 x

11 INFANTRY TACTICAL DOCTRINE VOLUME 1 THE INFANTRY COMPANY GROUP Pamphlet No. 2 INFANTRY COMPANY GROUP TACTICS INTRODUCTION Aim 1. The aim of Pamphlet No. 2 is to provide a firm doctrinal base to allow company commanders to train their companies for operations, plan those operations and then successfully lead their companies in war. Layout Contents CHAPTER 1. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS CHAPTER 2. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS CHAPTER 3. DELAY OPERATIONS CHAPTER 4. TRANSITIONAL PHASES DURING OPERATIONS CHAPTER 5. OTHER OPERATIONAL TASKS CHAPTER 6. OPERATIONS IN SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS 2. The pamphlet is structured closely on the format of ATP 35(B). Sections within the chapters therefore generally follow this sequence: a. Section 1. The Fundamentals. b. Section 2. Forces and Tasks. c. Section 3. Organization. d. Section 4. Planning and Preparation. e. Section 5. Conduct. f. Section 6. Command and Control. g. Section 7. Combat Service Support. Scope 3. While Pamphlet No. 1 provides the theory and background knowledge, this pamphlet provides the doctrine for the tactical practices and procedures at company group level. Platoon level tactics are covered in the new Pamphlet No. 3 which is an updated version of the old Pamphlet No. 45, Part 2. xi

12 4. The organizational setting for the tactical doctrine is the light role company group. The light role company has been chosen as its practices and procedures provide the tactical default setting for the Infantry and have general applicability. Procedures which are particular to a type of battalion (e.g., armoured infantry) are described in subsequent pamphlets in Volume I. The company group is defined as a rifle company, or part of a company, with its headquarters and one or more combat attachments to its normal establishment. A company group could, therefore, range in size from a company with a MFC to a company supported by the full range of combat and combat support assets. The tactical doctrine described does not assume a task organization and considers the employment of the company and its likely combat support assets in high intensity warfare. Tactics 5. Tactics is the art of using your resources to their best advantage, taking into account the composition of your force, the ground over which it has to operate, the strength and disposition of the enemy and his likely reaction to your moves. It is part flair and part knowledge which, after study and practice, add up to experience and confidence. It is essentially the application of firepower at the right time and place. 6. Tactical ability not only saves lives but in husbanding resources lengthens the odds in your favour. A calculated risk is always acceptable in war but the aim should be, by study and practice, to eliminate the risk and allow calculation to predominate. Structure of Infantry Tactical Doctrine Publications 7. The Doctrine Hierarchy. The doctrine hierarchy ensures that Army doctrine cascades from policy and principles to practical applications and procedures. There are three elements to the hierarchy: a. Principles. Principles are the guiding doctrine that is concerned with operational art and the British outlook on operations contained in British Defence Doctrine (JWP 0 01). From this overarching publication is derived the British Military Doctrine (BMD), Army Doctrine Publications (ADPs) and various Joint publications. b. Practices. Practices encompass the tactical doctrine that provides guidance appropriate to specific levels of command. The practical application of tactical doctrine for field commanders at formation and battlegroup level are contained in the Army Field Manuals. Infantry practices at company level and below are contained in a new range of pamphlets in the Infantry Tactical Doctrine series. c. Procedures. Procedures are a common set of drills for the effective exercise of command and are the mechanics that ensure the success of xii

13 operations. At Army level procedures are detailed in publications such as AFSOPs, AUSOPs and TAM. Infantry procedures are contained in the Infantry Tactical Doctrine series. 8. Infantry Doctrine Development. The Director of Infantry is charged by the Chief of the General Staff with the development of Infantry tactical doctrine at company level and below. Development of this doctrine is the responsibility of the Infantry Force Development Committee (IFDC) whose aim is to integrate the five functional areas of Infantry Fighting Power: doctrine, equipment, structures, training and manpower and logistics. Each of these functional areas is represented by a Working Group whose aim is to provide advice and guidance to the IFDC in their area, in conjunction with the Force Development branch of Headquarters Infantry. 9. Infantry Tactical Doctrine. Infantry tactical doctrine is defined as tactical doctrine to provide guidance to commanders by detailing practices and procedures appropriate to their level of command. Tactical doctrine cannot remain stationary and must evolve in line with changing threats, new concepts, organizations, weapons and systems, operational reports, observations from training and feedback from units. However, it will be noted that although it has been updated and now embraces the manoeuvrist approach and mission command the doctrine contained in this first issue of the Infantry Tactical Doctrine series is current but not new. This is for two reasons: first, the Army s and the Infantry s force development work is still maturing; and secondly, company level doctrine has not previously existed and the aim of this first issue, therefore, is to provide a common, coherent basis from which future changes can be made. Breakdown of Infantry Tactical Doctrine Publications 10. Infantry tactical doctrine is contained in two volumes: a. Volume 1 The Infantry Company Group. b. Volume 2 The Tactical Employment of Infantry Weapons and Systems. 11. The detailed breakdown of the pamphlets is as follows: a. Volume 1 The Infantry Company Group. Pamphlet No Title The Infantry Company Group The Fundamentals Infantry Company Group Tactics Infantry Platoon Tactics xiii

14 Pamphlet No 4 5 Title Armoured Infantry Company Group Tactics Infantry Company Group Jungle Tactics b. Volume 2 The Tactical Employment of Infantry Weapons and Systems. Pamphlet No Title 1 Infantry Tactical Doctrine Notes 2 The Medium Mortar 81 mm L16 3 Anti-Tank Guided Weapons MILAN xiv

15 Chapter 1 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS SECTION 1. FUNDAMENTALS General Ultimate success in battle is achieved by offensive action. Even in the defence, a commander must take every opportunity to seize the initiative and carry the battle to the enemy. Offensive operations are the decisive operation of war. The principles and procedures covered in this chapter apply not only to offensive operations; they are equally applicable to counterattacks launched as part of defensive operations or in a meeting engagement, when the commander decides to attack the opposing forces in order to seize the initiative. `çåíéåíë Page SECTION 1. FUNDAMENTALS 1 1 SECTION 2. FORCES AND TASKS 1 13 SECTION 3. ORGANIZATION 1 21 SECTION 4. PLANNING AND PREPARATION 1 24 SECTION 5. CONDUCT 1 30 SECTION 6. COMMAND AND CONTROL 1 43 SECTION 7. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 45 Annexes: A. The Night Attack B. Infiltration Principles The following principles are of particular importance in offensive operations: a. Intelligence. The commander requires all available intelligence on the enemy and information on the ground, including details of approach routes, the objective and areas in depth. b. Surprise. The attacker has the initiative and can achieve surprise in his selection of the timing and direction of the attack. c. Concentration of Combat Power. Sufficient combat power must be concentrated quickly to overcome the enemy s defence and penetrate through his defences. Forces should be concentrated where the enemy is weakest or where the terrain offers the best opportunity to make maximum use of mobility and fire. d. Maintenance of Momentum. Manoeuvre should avoid enemy strengths and create opportunities to increase the effect of friendly fire. The generation of echelons and reserves are essential to the maintenance of momentum. 1-1

16 e. Security. The attack must be launched from a secure base, across a secure line of departure. Attention must be paid to flank security. f. Manoeuvre. As the forces will move quickly it is essential that there is close coordination between the fire of all weapons. Firepower destroys, neutralises and suppresses; it is essential in defeating the enemy s ability to fight. When combined with movement it allows a force to manoeuvre into a position of advantage in respect of the enemy from which force can be threatened or applied. g. Deception. Deception seeks to manipulate the enemy s perception of the situation and is used in the offence to: (1) Provide security to the deploying force. (2) Give the offensive commander the opportunity to exercise some influence over the enemy s course of action. h. Terrain. The best use of the terrain should be made in order to: (1) Improve observation. (2) Obtain cover and concealment. (3) Obtain better fields of fire. (4) Enhance manoeuvre. (5) Secure approaches. (6) Improve security of forces. (7) Hamper enemy movement. (8) Establish a base for launching further operations. Purpose The purpose of offensive operations is to defeat the enemy by the application of focused violence. Manoeuvre in depth poses an enduring and substantial threat to which the enemy must respond. The attack must, therefore, focus not only on the enemy s forward positions but throughout his depth. This will force the enemy to react rather than take the initiative. Physical destruction of the enemy is a means of creating paralysis and confusion. This destroys the coherence of the enemy s defence and fragments and isolates his combat power Specific purposes of offensive action might be to: 1-2

17 a. Destroy an enemy force. b. Seize ground. c. Gain information (reconnaissance in force). d. Deprive the enemy of resources. e. Deceive the enemy or divert him from friendly forces Main Effort. f. Fix the enemy to prevent him from regrouping or repositioning his forces. g. Pre-empt to gain the initiative. h. Disrupt enemy offensive action. Tactical Techniques in Combat In planning and executing offensive operations the company group commander should seek to avoid bludgeoning it out with the enemy in a fair fight. Rather than dissipating the company group s forces against the enemy s defences, which are likely to be on ground of his own choosing, the company group commander should use every means at his disposal, and every technique available, to compel the enemy to react in such a way that he exposes himself to destruction with minimal attrition to the company group s combat power. The true aim of the company group offensive operations, therefore, is not to fight the enemy in his defensive position, but to destroy him during exploitation and pursuit, on ground which does not suit his forces. This may be achieved by the application of all of the tactical techniques in combat, employed in combination with carefully selected forms of attack and manoeuvre Seizing the Initiative. During offensive action initiative implies never allowing the enemy to recover from the initial shock of the attack. This is achieved through the use of surprise, identifying the enemy s weaknesses and consequently selecting the time and place of the attack. Manoeuvre, closely integrated with firepower, is then employed to create a fluid situation in which the enemy is forced to react to events. As this occurs, friendly forces must act quickly to exploit the situation. Retaining the initiative throughout the operation necessitates looking ahead beyond the initial attack and anticipating events that may occur. Once contact is made with the enemy it should be maintained and not readily given up Synchronization. Synchronization is the focus of resources and activities to produce maximum combat power at the decisive time and place. Synchronization maximises economy of force, with every resource being used where it will make the greatest contribution to success. In attack, it concentrates the manoeuvre force and firepower at the decisive point. 1-3

18 0108. Tempo. Tempo is the rate of activity relative to the enemy. Tempo involves the imposition of threats to which the enemy is unable to react; his responses are made inappropriate in terms of either time or space. He reacts too late or in the wrong place. Tempo consists of three elements: speed of decision, speed of execution and the speed of transition from one activity to another. This requires fast thinking and quick decisions. It also necessitates the ability of all elements of the company group to achieve rapid execution. To a large extent this will depend on the ability of company and platoon commanders, troop leaders and MILAN section commanders to conduct independent action within the commander s intent. Success will be gained if this action is achieved at a quicker rate than the enemy who, although he may know what is about to happen, will not be able to do anything about it. As a result he will lose the cohesion he requires to continue the fight Main Effort. The company group commander must designate a Main Effort in order to provide a focus for the activities of all elements of the company group. The activity designated by the Main Effort must then be supported by the whole company group. The identification of the Main Effort permits initiative and freedom of action for subordinate commanders. If necessary, to ensure success, the company group commander must be prepared to shift the Main Effort Surprise. Surprise makes a major and often disproportionate contribution to the defeat of the enemy. Surprise will be achieved by doing the unexpected and thereby creating and exploiting opportunities. Its effect can be enhanced through the use of speed, secrecy and deception Deception. Deception is a vital part of offensive operations. It serves to mask the real objectives of the attack and in particular the Main Effort. It delays effective enemy reaction by misleading him about friendly intentions, capabilities and objectives. Any company group level deception plan must be coordinated with higher level deception through battlegroup HQ so that plans reinforce rather than cancel each other. A sound deception plan should be simple, believable and not so costly that it diverts significant resources from the Main Effort. Because a deception plan seeks an enemy response, it must be targeted against the enemy commander who has the freedom of action to respond to it as the company group commander requires. The deception plan is more likely to be successful if it encourages the enemy to pursue the course of action he has already chosen, i.e., it reinforces his expectations. Every company group operation should include a deception plan Echeloning and Reserves. Forces must be held in reserve to deal with the unexpected and to maintain the momentum of the attack by quickly exploiting success when the opportunity is presented. Reserves should not be confused with forces specifically designated for any subsequent phase in the attack, or pre-planned task. These are echeloned forces, and will lack the freedom required by reserves Integrating Combat Service Support. Tactical plans will not succeed without fully integrated Combat Service Support. The company group commander must ensure that his attack can be sustained at every stage of its execution. 1-4

19 Types of Offensive Operations The company group may participate in the following types of offensive operations: a. Reconnaissance in force. b. Raid. c. Feint and demonstration. d. Counterattack and spoiling attack. e. Quick attack. f. Deliberate attack Reconnaissance in Force. The purpose of a reconnaissance in force is to compel the enemy to disclose the location, size, strength, disposition or intention of his force by making him respond to offensive action. The enemy s reaction may reveal weaknesses in his defensive system. A company group is most likely to conduct reconnaissance in force as part of a battlegroup operation, utilising either the whole company group or one or more of its elements. The force employed for this task must be sufficiently strong to force a reaction by the enemy. The reconnaissance force commander must always seek opportunities for wider exploitation. Unless such an opportunity is presented, the force conducting the operation must aim to avoid more decisive engagement. The reconnaissance force may be directed to fix the enemy, attack or withdraw once the primary task is complete Raid. The purpose of a raid is to disrupt the enemy, by destroying or capturing a vital asset, such as a command post, OP or logistic group. A raid is likely to require the committal of the complete company group, either acting independently or as part of a larger force. A raid will be based on detailed intelligence. It will require swift movement into hostile territory and will end with a planned withdrawal. Opportunities for wider exploitation must be sought during the course of a raid, although the probable lack of combat service support accompanying a raiding force is likely to preclude protracted operations. Further details are in Chapter Feint and Demonstration. Feints and demonstrations are deception operations, with contrasting aims: a. Feint. The purpose of a feint is to distract the attention of an enemy force by seeking combat with it. To achieve the required effect, a feint is likely to require the complete company group in attack, either independently or, more likely, as part of a battlegroup operation. b. Demonstration. The purpose of a demonstration is to distract the enemy s attention without seeking combat. A company group s task within a demonstration is likely to involve movement to deceive the enemy. 1-5

20 c. As with all deception operations, feints and demonstrations will be most effective when: (1) They support the enemy s expectations. (2) They appear as a definite threat to the enemy. (3) The enemy has in the past demonstrated a tendency to commit reserves early. (4) The action would be a realistic option for attack Counterattack and Spoiling Attack. a. General. Counterattacks and spoiling attacks are both aimed at enemy offensive action. Both forms of attack are likely to require the full combat power of the company group, acting either independently or as part of a battlegroup operation. b. Counterattack. The counterattack is an attack by all or part of a defending force against an enemy attacking force for such purposes as regaining lost ground or cutting off or destroying enemy advanced elements. The company group is likely to conduct or take part in a counterattack when it is a reserve, or when it is a forward element uncommitted at the time. c. Spoiling Attack. A spoiling attack is an attack aimed at disrupting an enemy force which is in the preliminary stages of an attack. It aims to strike the enemy while he is most vulnerable. This is likely to be while he is on the move, in an assembly area or attack position. Although the spoiling attack is normally limited to disruption, the commander must always seek the opportunity for wider exploitation, such as the total destruction of the enemy force Hasty Attack. a. A hasty attack is an attack in which preparation time is traded for speed in order to exploit an opportunity. The hasty attack seeks to take advantage of the enemy s lack of readiness. As much information about the enemy as possible is required, but there will be little time for reconnaissance. The company commander must issue the briefest of orders. b. The hasty attack must be conducted as rapidly as possible in order to increase the chances of surprise, and deny the enemy time to improve his defences and prepare his position and reaction. To achieve this, the aim should be to violently assault the enemy continuously from the time of first contact until he has been destroyed or surrenders. c. The enemy is attacked by direct fire from whatever elements can be brought into contact immediately, reinforced subsequently by further assets and 1-6

21 by indirect fire. Concurrently with this action, information is collected about the enemy. It may be possible to overrun the enemy position immediately, or following some attrition of his combat power Deliberate Attack. A deliberate attack is an attack which requires the massing of combat power to destroy or penetrate a well-prepared enemy defence. Time will be required to plan and coordinate such an attack. Preparation will include detailed orders and rehearsals. A company group may conduct a deliberate attack independently, but is likely to be employed within such an attack as part of a battlegroup operation. This is because the operation is likely to include breaching and crossing obstacles, may be highly complex and may require considerable combat power. The night attack is described at Annex A. Exploitation Exploitation is the rapid follow-up of gains to take full advantage of success in battle. Commanders must plan to exploit success and retain the ability to exploit unforeseen opportunities. The transition from the coordinated attack to an exploitation may be so gradual that it is hardly distinguishable, or it may be abrupt. Commanders initiate an exploitation when the enemy has recognizable difficulty maintaining its position. Although local exploitations may appear insignificant, their cumulative effects can be decisive and commanders at all levels must act quickly to capitalize on local successes Opportunities for exploitation are indicated when the following occur: a. The enemy is having difficulty maintaining his position. b. The number of prisoners being captured increases rapidly. c. Enemy forces disintegrate after initial contact. d. The enemy lacks an organized defence. e. Reports confirm the capture of or absence of enemy leaders. f. The amount of abandoned material increases. g. Enemy fire decreases in intensity and effectiveness. h. Enemy command posts and materiel dumps are captured Once exploitation has begun the enemy must be given no respite. Ground must be held only as necessary to accomplish the mission and combat power must not be dissipated in achieving minor tactical success or in reducing irrelevant enemy forces. The following points will need to be noted: 1-7

22 a. Exploitation should be decentralized with the company commander maintaining sufficient control to alter the direction of the exploitation or prevent its over extension. b. Subordinates find the fastest way to their objectives. c. When an exploitation has become exhausted the commander must seek ways to push through a fresh force to replace it. d. Security will primarily be provided by speed of movement and enemy disorganization. e. The term limit of exploitation must be used with care in orders and should only be used to prevent the likelihood of blue on blue incidents with flanking forces. Forms of Manoeuvre in the Attack Forms of Manoeuvre. There are five basic forms of manoeuvre. It should be noted, however, that they are not mutually exclusive and a company group might employ different forms during stages of the same operation. The forms of manoeuvre in the attack are: a. Frontal. b. Penetration. c. Envelopment. d. Turning movement. e. Infiltration Frontal (see Fig 1). In a frontal attack the main action is directed against the front of the enemy forces. It may be used to overrun him in position or to fix him in position. The frontal attack is likely to be the approach that the enemy is expecting and will therefore engage the enemy s strongest defences. It will be difficult to distract the enemy s attention away from a frontal attack. This form of attack should, therefore, be avoided whenever possible. It should only be considered when there is no better alternative and when the following preconditions apply: a. The enemy is weak or disorganized. b. The company group has overwhelming combat power. c. The time and situation require immediate action. d. The mission is to fix the enemy in position, deceive him or assist the main attack. 1-8

23 Objective Fig 1. Forms of Manoeuvre in the Attack Frontal Objective Fig 2. Forms of Manoeuvre in the Attack Penetration 1-9

24 Objective (-) Fig 3. Forms of Manoeuvre in the Attack Envelopment Fig 4. Forms of Manoeuvre in the Attack Turning Movement 1-10

25 Objective FUP Fig 5. Forms of Manoeuvre in the Attack Infiltration Penetration (see Fig 2). Penetration seeks to break through the enemy s defensive position and seize objectives in depth. Penetration will be conducted on a narrow front. Successful penetration requires the concentration of superior combat power at the point selected for breaching the enemy s defence. Penetration may be tried at one or several points depending on the forces available. However, a company will usually focus combat power at one point and attack with echeloned platoons Envelopment (see Fig 3). An envelopment attack is directed to the enemy s flank or rear. Forces pass round one or both (double envelopment) sides of the enemy s principal defensive positions. The attack is accomplished by avoiding the enemy s main strength, thus striking him from an unexpected direction. A company group conducting an envelopment should secure its flanks to avoid exposure to an envelopment itself. The envelopment manoeuvre can be accompanied by demonstrations or feints to fix the enemy s attention the wrong way Turning Movement (see Fig 4). A turning movement is a variation of the envelopment. The attacking force passes around the enemy s principal defensive position to secure objectives deep in the enemy s rear. Faced with a major threat in his depth the enemy is forced out of his defensive position. For a turning movement to be successful it must attack a target that the enemy will fight to save and pose a significant threat. A flank screen may be needed to cover the open flanks of the manoeuvre and direct and indirect fire used to suppress defilade enemy positions. 1-11

26 0129. Infiltration (see Fig 5). Infiltration is considered further in Annex B. Infiltration may be used in conjunction with any of the other forms of attack. It is a form of manoeuvre in which a force moves through or around enemy positions without detection. Infiltration may involve part of or the whole company group, either mounted or dismounted. Depending on the situation and terrain, infiltrating forces may need to move in small groups Reserved. 1-12

27 SECTION 2. FORCES AND TASKS Employment of Combat Forces General. a. The infantry company group normally participates in offensive operations within a larger force. This will usually be as part of a battlegroup, although an infantry company group may be employed as a formation reserve or on other special tasks. Within the battlegroup, the infantry company group may play a part in a synchronized battlegroup operation. Alternatively it may conduct its own offensive operations, supported by other battlegroup assets; such independent operations will normally be against an unprepared, moving or weak enemy force. b. Whether the company group is attacking as part of a synchronized battlegroup operation, or conducting independent offensive action, it may be supported by tanks. Some tanks may be grouped with it, while other tanks may participate in the operation under battlegroup control. c. The company group commander will normally divide his force into a number of components; these could include: Reconnaissance, Direct Fire Support, the Assault Force, Protection, and Echeloned Force or Reserve Reconnaissance. a. The company group commander should base his attack plan on the concept of reconnaissance pull. The information obtained should pull the company group toward and along the path of least resistance. This helps the company to seize the initiative and increases its agility. This concept applies not merely to the actions of any specific reconnaissance forces, but to information provided by all elements of the company group, throughout the operation. b. Reconnaissance, both before and during the attack, determines: (1) Which routes are suitable for manoeuvre by providing information on terrain and enemy obstacles which will help the rapid execution of the attack. (2) Where the enemy is strong and weak by acquiring information on enemy dispositions. (3) Where gaps exist, thereby helping to guide the attacking forces against enemy weaknesses. c. Reconnaissance will be continuous and aggressive prior to and during offensive operations. This process may be conducted by the initial reconnais- 1-13

28 sance element, or taken over by other elements. It is essential that continuous visual contact is maintained with the enemy. In this way the maximum possible details of the enemy s dispositions and capabilities will be obtained. Enemy movement, reaction and activity can be monitored, resulting in changes to plan and seizure of opportunities. Such monitoring may lead to critical decisions, including: (1) To bypass the position if it has been rendered ineffective by direct or indirect fire. (2) To follow up aggressively without the necessity of assaulting the enemy s position, if the enemy has decided to withdraw. (3) The reconnaissance force will find the enemy, establish enemy strengths and dispositions and maintain contact with the enemy during planning and preparation for offensive operations. Battlegroup reconnaissance elements may carry out this task. Alternatively, the reconnaissance task may be conducted by the leading elements of the company group. In close terrain, reconnaissance patrols may be required. (4) Before the attack, the company group commander must deploy sufficient reconnaissance assets to establish the enemy s weakest points. It is not sufficient merely to locate the enemy if his strength is to be avoided, and the attack directed against his weakness. (5) If a deliberate attack is to be conducted, more extensive reconnaissance of the position may take place, including air reconnaissance and the insertion of observation posts. (6) No matter how effective the reconnaissance force, it is unlikely that the full extent of the enemy position will be identified, particularly in a hasty attack where time and assets for reconnaissance will be more limited. In particular, reserve and depth positions may not be immediately identified. Attack forces must, therefore, be prepared to encounter unexpected enemy. (7) When the attack has commenced, the reconnaissance force may manoeuvre around the objective, to gain information on the enemy s depth, redeploy to flank security, or be assigned other missions Direct Fire Support. a. Direct fire is applied to the objective before the attack begins in order to commence the destruction of the enemy and to fix him in position. Direct fire during the attack continues the process of destruction, distracts the enemy from the assaulting force and neutralizes his weapon systems. 1-14

29 b. By using a series of static fire positions, a fire support group will be able to fire with greater accuracy, and will have better observation of the battlefield, than assaulting elements. However, in deciding task organization, these advantages must be weighed against the reduced number of forces available for the assault. c. The fire support group operates from a fire base, or a series of fire positions. The fire support group should be positioned and make subsequent moves to permit maximum use of its weapon range. The fire support group will ideally engage the enemy from a position or positions which allows a wide enough angle for the assaulting force to get as close to the enemy position as possible before it is necessary to lift its fire, or switch to depth positions. d. The fire support group should not be regarded as a static force. It keeps pace with the attack by using fire and manoeuvre. It moves forward on the flank of the attack, firing directly at the positions being attacked, and destroying or suppressing depth positions. e. The fire support group may also guard the flank of the attack. It may also be required to act as a reserve. f. The fire support group may consist of one or more of the following components, dependent on task organization and terrain: (1) Tanks. (2) MILAN. (3) Reconnaissance vehicles. (4) GPMG (SF) and/or.50 in HMG. (5) Snipers. (6) LAW. (7) LSW Assault Force. The assault force is the element of the company group which closes with the enemy in order to destroy him. Assault forces may all be committed together, or in echelon. Subsequent echelon elements may be required to deal with enemy depth positions, to secure terrain gained by the initial echelons, to destroy bypassed pockets of resistance, and to block enemy reinforcements into the area of the assaulting force. The assault force is likely to be supported by MILAN and may have tanks allocated to it. Employment of these elements will be as follows: a. Tanks. The primary task of the tanks is to destroy enemy armour on the position, supporting the position or threatening the attacking force. They also 1-15

30 destroy or suppress enemy dismounted forces on the position, both in direct support of dismounted infantry action, and in depth. If sufficient tanks are available, they may be divided into the following functions. (1) Fire Support. Tanks which provide direct fire support onto the objective from a selected position, usually to a flank, are known as the Fire Support Group. (2) Assault Tanks. Those tanks which provide the initial shock action as they move out of the FUP and around an objective. They move with the intimate support tanks in the initial stages of the assault. They thus provide direct fire support onto the objectives and protect the infantry and intimate support tanks, whilst they are fighting through the objective. As these tanks close with the objective they have three options: (a) To envelop the objective to engage any withdrawing enemy and to prepare to continue the advance. (b) To swing out to fire positions on the flanks to support the fight through the objective. (c) When the position is impassable to tanks and no suitable fire positions exist on the flanks, to halt short of the objective and provide fire support from the rear. (3) Intimate Support. Intimate support tanks provide close fire support to dismounted troops during the break in and fight through. They destroy enemy armoured vehicles not killed by the fire support group or the assault tanks. They use main armament firing high explosive and armour piercing shells to destroy bunkers and strong points, and machine guns to kill enemy infantry. b. MILAN. As part of the assault force, MILAN may fulfil the assault tanks role of security against counterattack, if assault tanks are not available Protection. a. Protection preserves the fighting potential of the company group so that it can be applied at a decisive time and place. Protection can be achieved by fixing the enemy, and if necessary destroying him, before he can attack effectively and seize the initiative. b. The main considerations for protection in offensive operations are: (1) Maintaining mobility of the company group to prevent vulnerability to enemy fire. 1-16

31 (2) Carrying out countermobility tasks to protect flanks and fix enemy counterattack forces. (3) Enhancing survivability through the use of such measures as: (a) Operational security (including emission control measures and the use of smoke). (b) A deception plan. (4) Providing adequate protection against enemy air attack. Passive security measures such as good camouflage and use of ground play a vital part in protection, especially during the preparatory and consolidation stages. (5) Ensuring that the attack is launched from a secure base across a secure line of departure. c. Components of Protection. Security groups protect the attacking forces against enemy counter action. Security groups are likely to be double tasked. One or more of the following elements may be tasked to provide security tanks, reconnaissance troops, MILAN and indirect fire controllers. Security groups may have the following tasks: Reserve. (1) Flank Protection. The flank protection element must cover open flanks and gaps with neighbouring sub units. Flank protection troops may also be required to provide firepower, to deal with bypassed enemy forces. They must be prepared to provide early warning of enemy counter moves, and block enemy counterattacks. (2) Approach Routes/Assembly Area/Attack Position Security. Security may be required to counter enemy spoiling attacks against the assembly area, attack positions and approach routes. a. The reserve primarily aims to exploit opportunities which are presented during the attack. It also deals with the unexpected, including unidentified enemy depth positions, and takes on the role of assaulting elements if necessary. Once the original reserve has been committed, another one should be constituted if possible. Reserves should be positioned so that they can be deployed swiftly in any direction but are able to avoid becoming engaged prematurely. When possible, the reserve should be mounted. b. When the attacking force has insufficient forces to permit the company commander to retain an uncommitted reserve, double tasking will be required. In this case the company commander must accept a reduction in his capability 1-17

32 to rapidly exploit opportunities and deal with unforeseen situations. One or more of the following elements may constitute the reserve: (1) Tank troops. (2) Reconnaissance troops. (3) MILAN. c. In a battlegroup operation, in some situations it may not be possible for a company group to provide its own reserve. In this case, the reserve will be a battlegroup asset. d. It will not normally be possible to maintain a reserve at platoon level, as the full platoon is likely to be required as a single force for the assault. The reserve function is maintained at company level. Employment of Combat Support Forces Fire Support. a. The term fire support is used rather than firepower as this section considers only the use of combat support assets to provide firepower. The remaining elements of firepower available to the company group (the direct fire resources) are examined in the first part of this Section under the heading Direct Fire Support. b. The success of the attack depends upon the close coordination of indirect fire support to destroy and demoralize the enemy, to fix him before and during the attack and to neutralize his weapon systems during the attack. The weight of fire is switched, as necessary, during the attack in accordance with the company commander s plan. If the attack is to use surprise, fire support may be withheld until enemy resistance is encountered, unless it forms part of the deception plan. Some enemy positions may be neutralized or masked by smoke in accordance with the attack plan. Whenever possible, an attack should be preceded by preparatory fire, to destroy as much of the enemy force as possible before the start of the attack. c. Specific considerations for the use of indirect fire support in offensive operations include: (1) Where possible, dividing indirect fire controllers between overwatch and movement with the assault force. In general, when a forward observation officer and a mortar fire controller are grouped with the company group, the forward observation officer is best employed in overwatch. The mortar fire controller may move with the assault force, to direct immediate fire missions. 1-18

33 (2) Suppressing, neutralizing and destroying enemy defences and direct fire systems through preparatory fire. (3) Suppressing bypassed enemy, enemy depth positions, and other positions supporting the main objective, and counterattack forces, to limit their ability to affect the attack. Pre-designated targets should be planned to cover likely enemy supporting or reserve positions and possible counterattack routes and attack positions. d. Components of Fire Support Artillery. Artillery will be controlled by the forward observation officer. The forward observation officer must be involved in the planning of the attack with the company commander at the earliest stage, in order to conduct the procedures necessary to obtain artillery support at the time required. Tasks for the artillery during the attack will include: (1) Preparatory Fire. (a) (b) (c) Neutralize or destroy enemy indirect fire assets. Mask enemy observation by smoke. Suppress enemy air defence. (d) Illuminate the battlefield. (UK artillery no longer has an illumination capability.) (2) Covering Fire. (a) (b) Isolate the enemy position against reinforcement. Neutralize the enemy at the point of break-in. (c) Give fire support to the assaulting troops as they fight through the enemy in depth. (d) Destruction of enemy armour. (e) Plan and prepare to support exploitation and pursuit at any time during the attack. (f) Be on call during consolidation/reorganization. (g) Mark enemy positions by smoke or illuminating shells delivered onto the ground, to guide assaulting troops. (3) Defensive Fire. (a) Neutralize threats from the flanks. 1-19

34 (b) (c) Engage enemy spoiling of counterattack forces. Block through the use of scatterable mines. e. Components of Fire Support 81 mm Mortars. 81 mm mortars are ideal for close-in targets, targets on reverse slopes and those in areas difficult to reach with low angle fire. They are particularly effective in providing smoke. 81 mm mortar fire will be controlled by the mortar fire controller, who will operate in close coordination with the artillery forward observation officer. The mortars are the only guaranteed indirect fire support within the battlegroup. Mortars can fulfil or complement the functions of artillery fire, except they do not have the capability to destroy enemy armour or deliver scatterable mines Close Air Support. Close air support is air action against enemy positions in close proximity to attacking forces. It requires detailed integration with ground manoeuvre including positive identification of friendly forces and positive control of aircraft. Close air support is controlled by Tactical Air Control Parties. Close air support targets can also be designated by the battlegroup reconnaissance platoon and the artillery forward observation officer. Their inclusion in the offensive support plan is usually coordinated through the forward observation officer, or indirect with the battlegroup battery commander Aviation. Helicopters may be used to: a. Assist command and control, including indirect fire control, in an attack. b. Assist flank security, by providing reconnaissance and surveillance of flanks. c. Destroy enemy armour Air Defence. Air defence cover may be provided for assembly areas and approach routes and for protection of forces during the attack. Air sentries should be deployed to provide warning of air attack Engineers. a. Mobility and Countermobility. Engineer and assault pioneer support may be required to maintain momentum in the attack by allowing mobility. Maintaining momentum will not only assist manoeuvre, but also provide protection to the company group. Countermobility tasks, particularly the protection of flanks and rapid protection against counterattacks, may also be required. Engineers and assault pioneers may be required to support the company group by any or all of the following actions: (1) Breaching, marking or opening minefields (own and enemy). (2) Crossing rivers and other obstacles. 1-20

35 (3) Securing flanks by means of minefields, demolitions and other obstacles. (4) Supporting the consolidation on the objective by digging and laying minefields and creating obstacles. b. Survivability. Engineer and assault pioneer assistance during offensive operations may be required to assist with construction of fighting positions during consolidation on the objective EW/Operational Security. Operational security prior to an attack is preserved by emission control measures, in which use of radios and active surveillance devices may be restricted. This will normally apply only prior to a deliberate attack. Radio traffic should be protected by encoding as appropriate before both deliberate and hasty attacks. Smoke, produced by artillery or mortars, may assist the operational security of a unit in movement and other activity both before and during attack Reserved. SECTION 3. ORGANIZATION General. It must be remembered that the control measures for offensive operations exist solely for the purpose of assisting control. They need not be rigidly employed or adhered to in all operations. If they do nothing to aid control, or indeed threaten to hamper tempo and momentum, they should be discarded Objective. The doctrinal definition of the objective is: The tactical feature that must be captured or seized to achieve the commander s mission ; but this definition does not fit into manoeuvre warfare theory which focuses on the enemy not ground, and so will not be used in this section. The only real objective is the enemy. (Basil Liddel Hart). The objective in an attack is the aiming point for the attack; it is the point to which the company group directs its efforts in order to best use the terrain to accomplish the destruction of the enemy. The objective may be a terrain feature, or an enemy force or installation. Because the objective is merely a control measure, it may be subject to change during the course of an attack Intermediate Objectives. Intermediate objectives are closely related to the importance of terrain and enemy locations and are also used to coordinate the movement of attacking forces with regard to time and space. Their capture must not cause the attack to lose momentum Assembly Areas. Whenever time permits, the company group should be brought together in an assembly area prior to the attack. They should remain in this area only for as long as required for administrative preparation and regrouping. The assembly area will also allow the company group to pause, should it be necessary to do so, while artillery or other supporting elements are made available. The assembly area requires the following characteristics: 1-21

36 a. It should be sited a sufficient distance away from the objective to avoid detection by the enemy. b. It should be large enough to disperse the entire force. c. It should be capable of effective defence Approach Routes. Approach routes from the assembly area to the attack position should be concealed from the enemy and permit smooth movement Forming Up Place(Attack Position). a. The Forming Up Place (FUP) is the location from which the assault forces launch the attack. (The FUP is sometimes also referred to as the Attack Position.) If the company group does not enter the FUP in assault formation, then it should deploy into formation in the FUP. It is occupied for as short a time as possible. Ideally, assaulting troops should move straight through the FUP without pausing. If possible, the FUP should be the closest area of ground to the enemy position which can be entered in dead ground from the enemy, and which is large enough to deploy the assaulting force in assault formation while remaining in dead ground. The closer the FUP is to the objective, the shorter the time the assaulting force is exposed to enemy direct fire as it assaults. b. All assaulting forces need not attack from the same FUP. For example, infantry and intimate support tanks could assault from one FUP, while assault tank troops assault from separate FUPs (see Fig 6). The advantages of this system are: Objective Infantry Assault with Intimate Support Tanks (FUP 1) Assault Tanks (FUP 2) Fig 6. Separate FUPs 1-22

37 (1) The initial attack of the assault tanks will divert the enemy s attention from the infantry FUP, assisting surprise for the main attack. (2) Attacking from a number of different directions may confuse the enemy as to the strength of the attack, and present him with the psychological dilemma that he is being attacked from all directions, causing panic. (3) Enveloping assault tanks may avoid passing between the direct fire support group and the objective, which permits the fire support group to continue to fire onto the objective until the infantry reaches the enemy Fire Support Position. The fire support position is the area from which the fire support group suppresses and fixes the enemy in position. The maintenance of a right angle (1,600 mils) between assault troops and the fire support position is key to aiding momentum during the approach and fight through Line of Departure (LD). The LD is positioned at the forward edge of the FUP. This line coordinates the movement of the attacking force at the start of the attack. Synchronization of indirect fire support, direct fire support and assaulting elements of the company group is achieved by the leading elements of the assaulting force crossing the LD at H Hour Boundaries. Boundaries between sub units facilitate coordination and establish responsibility for movement, fire, reconnaissance and movement. There will not necessarily be a requirement to establish boundaries between attacking platoons and troops at company level, although this control measure may help prevent confusion during operations in limited visibility Axes and Routes. Axes and routes are used to indicate the course of the movement to be followed and the degree of freedom of movement en route to the objective. Axes establish only the general direction of movement. The company group commander is free to manoeuvre within his boundaries. Designation of a route establishes the specific direction or course which movement will follow. Other than in operations of limited visibility, designation of routes should be avoided in order to permit maximum freedom of manoeuvre to platoon and troop commanders Limit of Exploitation. The limit of exploitation will normally be designated by reference to a terrain feature. Designation of limits of exploitation should only be made to prevent the company group from over-extending, or avoid clashes with friendly forces. In order to permit maximum freedom of action by subordinates, limits of exploitation should not be automatically designated Reserved. 1-23

38 SECTION 4. PLANNING AND PREPARATION Introduction The planning of the attack will have commenced either at the time the company group commander received orders to attack or, especially in a hasty attack, from the first sighting or contact with the enemy. Orders will be given during the preparatory stage Although more time is generally available for planning and preparation before a deliberate attack than a hasty attack, these procedures should be conducted as rapidly and with as much concurrent activity as possible in order to enable momentum to be maintained, and to be prepared for unexpected events which may bring planned H Hours forward without warning Battle Procedure. Battle procedure, including orders and estimates, is fully covered in Chapter 4 of Volume 1, Pamphlet No. 1, The Infantry Company Group The Fundamentals. Planning Information and Intelligence. a. Timely and accurate information and intelligence is critical to the success of offensive operations. Information requirements will include: (1) Exact locations of trenches, bunker systems and other strongpoints. (2) Approximate strengths of enemy infantry occupying these positions. (3) Types and quantities of enemy weapon systems, especially antiarmour weapons. (4) Number, type and location of enemy AFVs and other vehicles. (5) Locations of security elements, e.g., standing patrols, observation posts, flank guards. (6) Details of enemy defences. (7) Confirmed or possible depth of supporting positions. (8) Confirmed or possible locations of reserves. (9) If the enemy force is moving (for example, when a spoiling attack is to be mounted) the extent of dispersal, position of each element, direction and speed of movement. 1-24

39 (10) Terrain information, including going, dominating features, approach routes, potential assembly areas, FUPs and locations for direct fire support. (11) Natural and man-made obstacles. (12) Terrain features or obstacles which might affect exploitation. (13) Critically, weaknesses in the enemy s defence. b. Sources of Information and Intelligence. Although assessments may be based on previous contacts by the company group it is more likely that information on enemy weapon system capabilities, enemy intentions, and probable reactions will be available only through battlegroup HQ. The following is a list of sources that may provide information and intelligence: (1) Battlegroup HQ. (2) Reconnaissance helicopters and fixed wing aircraft. (3) Indirect fire controllers. (4) Engineer reconnaissance. (5) Battlegroup reconnaissance platoon/troop. (6) Tanks. (7) Own and friendly forces patrol activity, including observation posts and standing patrols. (8) Prisoners of war (PW), particularly through immediate tactical questioning of those captured during the attack. c. Achieving Surprise. Surprise must be considered as a major factor during planning and both active and passive measures taken to secure it. These could include: (1) Passive Measures. (a) Meticulous concealment of reconnaissance activity. (b) Concealment of deployment of the main body, for example by moving only in darkness or poor visibility, or by filtering forward in small packets. (c) (d) Imposition of CSCMs. Disguising or curtailing indirect fire adjustment prior to H Hour. 1-25

40 (2) Active Measures. (a) Mounting feints or demonstration attacks. (b) The use of artillery fire, smoke and vehicle movement to draw the enemy s attention away from the area of the attack. (c) The use of smoke to conceal final deployment and the attack itself. Preparation The extent of troop preparation required will depend on the time available and the situation. Replenishment of combat supplies and issue of special equipment (e.g., FIBUA stores) may take place during this stage. Such action is unlikely to take place in the case of a hasty attack Concurrent Activity. As far as possible, all activities during the preparatory stage should be conducted concurrently. This will only be possible through the early issue of warning orders During the preparatory stage the company group commander is conditioning the enemy and preparing, grouping and positioning his own forces. Preparations may include: a. Reconnaissance (Find). The reconnaissance process is likely already to be in progress, especially if the attack follows an advance to contact. Initial sighting or contact with the enemy will have begun the process. Collection of information about the enemy and the ground by reconnaissance troops or forward elements of the company group must continue throughout the preparation stage, with frequent updates provided to the company group commander. The company group commander may move forward to view the enemy position and approaches. In a deliberate attack, platoon and troop commanders may also be able to reconnoitre the position. It may, however, not be possible for the company group commander to get forward, especially in a hasty attack, and he may have to depend upon information provided by forward troops by radio, combined with map reconnaissance. b. Preliminary Movement. In a hasty attack, preliminary movement will bring the company group rapidly forward to or near the assembly area or FUP. In a deliberate operation, preliminary movement will take the form of a controlled move to the assembly area. Even before the plan has been fully constructed, those elements of the company group not in contact should move as far forward as possible without depriving the commander of attack options, i.e., not becoming committed to any one attack route or direction. This movement may be led by the company group 2IC if the company group commander is for- 1-26

41 ward conducting reconnaissance. The company group commander may designate a holding area for these troops to occupy while deciding on the attack plan. c. Preliminary Deployment. During preliminary deployment the elements of the company group will come together into an assembly area. The company group commander may need to task troops to clear and secure the assembly area before occupation. In the assembly area, the company group will regroup into the task organization for the attack as required, and disperse into a formation to enable rapid and efficient movement from the assembly area. This formation should be organized to allow the company group to deploy from the assembly area in assault order. The company group may have to wait in the assembly area until indirect fire support or other assets are available for the attack. Such a delay at this location is much preferable to any delay in the FUP. It is possible that some or all infantry may dismount in the assembly area, if the plan calls for dismounted action beyond this stage. All elements may not move into the assembly area. For example, troops involved in collecting information and fixing the enemy are likely to maintain contact to continue the process, remaining poised to provide direct fire support if ordered. d. Infiltration. Infiltration can be used, under favourable conditions, for reconnaissance, attacks in depth, the capture of specific terrain features or the disruption of communications. Infiltration, however, requires accurate intelligence and is time consuming. It is more likely that a company group will be tasked specifically as part of the battlegroup or brigade plan, rather than conduct infiltration as part of its own operation. Infiltration is considered more fully at Annex B to this chapter. e. Conditioning the Enemy (Fix and Strike). (1) Conditioning of the enemy will include fixing him in position using direct and indirect fire. The aim is to deny him freedom of action, both to redeploy and to improve his defences. It should also aim to deny the enemy access to information on the activities of attacking forces. The fixing process should begin on initial contact or sighting of the enemy. The fixing operation may be delayed if it is intended to conduct a deliberate attack, or if the enemy force is moving, and it would be advantageous to attack in a different area. Fixing may be conducted by the reconnaissance force, or by indirect fire observers, or both. Additional assets may also be brought forward to fix the enemy. The most suitable system for this purpose is tanks. In close terrain infantry, perhaps including GPMG (SF) and LAWs, may be used for fixing. The force used for fixing may have the subsequent task of providing direct fire support for the attack. (2) If the attack is conducted during an advance to contact, the leading elements establishing contact will probably maintain contact, provide information required and fix the enemy. 1-27

42 (3) The fixing process will also begin the destruction of the enemy. The force establishing initial contact, and then the fixing force, should destroy enemy armour, dismounted anti-armour weapons and any other obvious targets as quickly as possible and then move to positions of observation. They must not waste ammunition, or unnecessarily expose themselves, by putting down suppressive fire in the target area. Every shot must be aimed to destroy a pinpoint target. (4) Indirect fire controllers should begin to adjust fire onto the objective as soon as possible. Dispersed AFVs are best left for destruction by direct fire; concentrated or dug-in enemy should be engaged by concentrated indirect fire. (5) From initial contact, company group elements in conjunction with indirect fire support, should continuously threaten and engage the position. This will have the effect of causing attrition to the enemy, resulting in the reduction of his ability to resist attack. It may even lead the enemy to abandon his position, thus exposing himself to pursuit and rendering him more vulnerable. (6) In addition to fixing the enemy and commencing his destruction, the conditioning process may involve blinding him by locating and destroying observation posts with reconnaissance assets and by screening his observation with smoke. Preparation for Infantry/Tank Attacks Careful preparation is essential before every attack. This should include: a. Reconnaissance. b. Planning and coordination. c. Orders. d. Marrying up. e. Rehearsals (if time permits). Planning and Coordination In the planning and coordination phase the following points must be decided: a. The method of attack. b. The routes to the objective for tanks and for infantry. 1-28

43 c. The formations to be used and where changes in formation may be necessary. d. Speed of movement of tanks and of infantry. e. Timings. f. Distance between tanks and infantry. g. Fire plan, including where and when direct and indirect fire will be lifted or shifted. h. Communications and control. i. LD, which must be clearly defined, should preferably be square to the axis of the attack and must be secured by our own troops. j. FUPs. k. Position of tanks during reorganization. l. How long after the completion of the attack tanks are to remain with infantry. Forming up Place Tanks should have a separate FUP. However, if this is not possible and the same FUP must be used, infantry should occupy first. Marrying Up As part of the marrying up process, the tanks must know the infantry plan for the assault and the infantry must know how the tanks intend to work and where they are to be located. Unless both Arms are clear about these details, cooperation cannot be really efficient and could lead to unnecessary casualties. Radio communications and call signs should also be checked Reserved. 1-29

44 SECTION 5. CONDUCT General Basic Offensive Functions. An attack is conducted as a synchronized effort of firepower and manoeuvre. Reconnaissance troops, infantry, tanks and MILAN are manoeuvred to positions of advantage to destroy the enemy. The firepower of these forces is used in conjunction with supporting artillery, mortar, aviation and close air support to isolate, suppress and destroy the enemy forces. When fire is concentrated, superiority over the enemy will facilitate the manoeuvre. Manoeuvring brings the assaulting forces into new, more advantageous positions to defeat the enemy. Procedures Stages of an Attack (see Fig 7). An attack can be divided into a number of distinct, but closely related, stages. These stages will tend to merge into each other. They must not be seen as distinct breaks in the action. Momentum will only be maintained if there is no attempt to unnecessarily pause between each stage of the attack. To the participants in the attack, the stages are unlikely to be clear cut. These stages are: a. Preparatory (see Section 4. Planning and Preparation). b. Approach. c. The Attack. (1) Final approach. (2) Break in. (3) Fight through. (4) Reorganization and Consolidation. d. Exploitation Approach. a. The commander may assign a security group to clear and secure the FUP. This group may be assigned from the reconnaissance force. It should not occupy the FUP but secure the area using maximum observation and weapon ranges. If multiple FUPs are employed, then more than one security group may be needed. 1-30

45 Exploitation Reorganization and Consolidation Objective Fight Through Final Approach and Break in Approach LD LD FUP Preparatory Assembly Area Fig 7. Stages of an Attack 1-31

46 b. The approach stage may include the requirement to cross or breach obstacles. This is more likely in the case of a deliberate attack. Obstacle crossing procedures are covered at Chapter 6. Operations in Specific Environments. c. The necessary closeness of the FUP to the enemy position will often result in a loss of surprise to the assaulting force. Noise and movement in particular can give away the assaulting force s location and intentions. This risk can be reduced by engaging the enemy with indirect fire as the force approaches the FUP. Slow movement into the FUP to preserve security and achieve surprise must be balanced against the advantages of speed directed to the same ends. If it is not possible to enter the FUP in dead ground, the entry may be screened by smoke. d. The enemy is likely to have covered potential FUPs with observation posts, standing patrols or other surveillance systems, and ambushes, supported by pre-planned indirect fire targets. Spoiling attack options may also have been prepared. The minimum possible time should therefore be spent in the FUP. Where possible, the aim should be to move straight through and across the LD into the assault. This will require careful synchronization, to ensure movement from the assembly area to the FUP permits movement across the LD by leading elements at H Hour. The alternative to this is a responsive fire plan, with the H Hour serials commencing on call as the leading elements cross the LD. e. Terrain constraints may prevent the attack force from deploying into attack formation before moving into the FUP; a brief pause may be necessary to redeploy. f. Terrain constraints may also prevent crossing the LD in attack formation. If this is the case, the assault force should cross the LD deployed to as great an extent as possible, rapidly moving into attack formation on the move as soon as the terrain permits. g. All elements need not necessarily meet in the FUP. Some of the company group s forces may remain in contact with the enemy as other elements move to the FUP. Others, particularly tanks, may conduct their tasks without entering the FUP. h. Careful use of ground is vital in order to avoid casualties and ensure surprise The Attack Final Approach. a. General. The attack must be organized in depth and, at company group level, will normally be on a narrow front. Once break-in is achieved, the assault force must extend laterally to produce an ever widening penetration and an increasing number of targets for the enemy to address. Momentum must be relentlessly maintained. 1-32

47 b. Terrain. (1) Open. In open country the assault will be led by the assault tanks, if present. They will fire on the move and move tactically over a broad front as the ground and enemy dispositions dictate. This may involve the use of fire and movement. The infantry and intimate support tanks, if present, should assault as soon as possible after the assault tanks, to gain maximum advantage from their shock effect. (2) Close. In close or difficult country, infantry will lead the assault. Tanks, if present, will move tactically from bound to bound and not present an easy target by crawling forward with the infantry. Tanks will move behind the infantry, destroying targets located by the troops. c. Infantry Assault. (1) Fire and Manoeuvre. The techniques of fire and manoeuvre used in the assault and fight through cannot be laid down in a pamphlet any more than drills be used as a template for all attacks. The only certain fact is that good use of ground and effective, controlled suppressive or covering fire will ensure that casualties are kept to a minimum. The selected method of fire and manoeuvre results from the commander s estimate and must be based on the ground, the enemy and available supporting fire. It must also feature in his orders. The technique of fire and manoeuvre in a company group attack scenario described below is one method by which troops can move quickly across the ground to close with the enemy after coming under effective enemy fire. It is descriptive and does not take into account the effect of enemy fire or the shape of the ground, both of which might preclude fire and manoeuvre taking place at platoon level. (2) Assault Formation. Having moved through the FUP, the company group will more often than not cross the LD in a standard assault formation with two platoons forward and one in reserve. Formation within the platoons and sections will vary according to the ground and the situation. Company group headquarters would if possible be in the centre but to the rear of the forward platoons; and platoon headquarters would be slightly to the rear of their assaulting sections in a good position to control them. The advance would continue in this formation until effective enemy fire is encountered. (3) Effective Enemy Fire. Once under effective enemy fire, fire and manoeuvre will be necessary; at what level fire and manoeuvre takes place will depend on the distance troops are away from the enemy. The point where enemy fire is effective cannot be pre-determined; it will be dictated by: 1-33

48 (a) The assaulting infantry coming into line of sight and within small arms range of the enemy. This moment can be delayed by troops adopting a crouching posture when reaching a crest in front of an enemy position. (b) The effectiveness of supporting fire including provision of smoke. (c) When the enemy chooses to open fire. (4) Safety Distances. If supporting fire is accurate and effectively neutralizes the enemy, assaulting troops should be able to close within 250 metres of the enemy and often closer, before effective enemy fire is encountered. Safety distances for our own troops to our own supporting fire are a commanders decision. (5) Suppressing the Enemy. Once under effective enemy fire the assaulting troops should take cover, adopt fire positions and win back the initiative by adding their small arms fire to any other supporting fire being directed onto the objective. All enemy positions will need to be effectively suppressed by fire, before any manoeuvre forward will be possible. (6) Fire and Manoeuvre by Platoons Controlled by the Company Commander. At a pre-arranged signal given by the company commander, one of the two forward platoons will move forward as an entity and as quickly as possible to the next available cover, probably no more than 30 metres away; during this time, the other forward platoon continues to bring covering fire to bear on identified targets across the whole width of the enemy position. When the platoon providing covering fire hears similar fire being provided by the platoon which has just moved forward, it will move forward until it is roughly level with the first platoon. This process is repeated and should continue until the company group is so close to the enemy position that movement by one platoon masks the covering fire of the other. This distance will vary depending on the ground but will normally be no more than metres from the objective. (7) Fire and Manoeuvre by Sections Controlled by the Platoon Commander. At this stage platoons start fire and manoeuvre by sections, with the company group commander retaining responsibility for keeping the two assaulting platoons level. One section provides suppressive fire across the whole width of the platoon objective, whilst the other moves forward. The process of fire and manoeuvre at section level continues until once again the stage is reached where the movement of a section masks the covering fire of the supporting sections. Sections would then split into fire teams and continue to fire and manoeuvre forward on the signal given by the platoon commander; this would probably occur no more than metres from the objective. 1-34

49 d Assault Tanks. Assault tanks should try to remain outside hand held antiarmour weapon range. As they near the objective, the assault tanks can adopt one of the following courses, depending on the ground and on the effectiveness of enemy anti-tank defences: (1) Envelop (see Fig 8). If the objective presents an obstacle to movement or contains unsuppressed anti-armour weapons the assault tanks should envelop it. Enveloping tanks may move on either or both flanks of the objective, depending on the enemy and the ground. The purposes of the envelopment are: (a) To get tanks beyond the objective so that the assaulting infantry and intimate support tanks are secure against counterattack. (b) To cut off enemy withdrawal. (c) To provide direct fire from an unexpected direction onto the rear of the position. (2) Flank Support (see Fig 9). If the objective is not fully suppressed, assault tanks swing out to fire positions on the flanks of the objective, with the aim of supporting the assaulting infantry and intimate support tanks as they fight through. Some tanks must, however, look outwards to guard against counterattack. (3) Rear Support (see Fig 10). If the objective is impassable to armour, and no fire positions exist to the flanks, assault tanks halt in positions short of the objective and shoot in the assaulting infantry from the rear. e. Indirect Fire Support. As assaulting troops cross the LD, indirect fire support will be intensified. Last safe moment must be determined by the company group commander in advance of or during the assault, and ordered by the forward observation officer on the artillery fire control net. The company group 2IC should also call last safe moment on the battlegroup command net as a fail safe measure in case the forward observation officer becomes a casualty during the assault; this message should then be acted on by the battlegroup battery commander and mortar platoon commander as appropriate. Fire should be shifted into depth as assaulting forces approach the objective. f. Direct Fire Support. The fire support group may be engaging the enemy during the approach. As the assault force crosses the LD, the fire support group will also intensify its fire. It will also provide information to the assault force concerning enemy action and guide the assault force onto the objective. It will continue to engage the enemy position until friendly forces mask its fire. It will then either: 1-35

50 Flank Guard Enemy Counter Attack Objective Assault Tanks Fig 8. Envelop Flank Guard Objective Fig 9. Flank Support 1-36

51 Objective Fig 10. Rear Support (1) Move into new positions to fire in depth. (2) Act as a reserve. (3) Concentrate its efforts on flank protection or redeploy to assist with the isolation of the position. (4) Be prepared to join, echelon through or conduct fire and manoeuvre with, the assault force The Attack Break-in. Having reached a line some metres from the objective the assault platoons will break into the forward enemy trenches. This will be a section-level battle. Fire teams will move forward until the fire support team is sufficiently well positioned to be able to cover effectively an assault by the assault fire team on the nearest enemy trench. One trench is a big enough objective for a section; the fire support team can concentrate sufficient effective covering fire to allow the assault fire team to reach the trench and kill the occupants. This may be done in a number of ways; a grenade into the trench, shooting, physical assault with bayonet or the enemy may surrender. It may be possible or necessary for a fire team operating in two pairs, rather than a section, to neutralize a trench but covering fire will not be so effective. At this stage, the forward enemy positions have been reached; the assault is over and the fight through of the position starts. 1-37

52 0177. The Attack Fight Through. a. Once the break-in has been achieved, it is vital to maintain the pressure of the attack, not only when assaulting immediate enemy positions but also when thrusting to take objectives in depth. The infantry must employ coordinated fire and manoeuvre between sections, platoons and intimate support tanks to fight through and clear the objective. b. The fight through is likely to be a confused series of minor actions. Each trench or weapon position in turn must be neutralized and its occupants either killed or forced to surrender. Intimate support tanks make a significant contribution to the momentum of the fight through. No opportunity should be lost to reinforce and exploit success, thus preventing the enemy from regaining his balance. c. With the assault sections established on the enemy forward position, platoon commanders should move up to a position between them and carry out a quick combat estimate. Section commanders should brief on the situation in their areas while the fire teams continue to engage identified enemy targets in depth; at the same time ammunition redistribution and magazine replenishment should be carried out. All the above actions take place simultaneously and should not be allowed to break up the momentum of the attack. Snap orders are quickly issued and the fight through commences. d. Action in the Fight Through. (1) Factors. The following factors will affect the fight through: (a) Flanking movements by platoons and sections will generally not be possible as they could open flanks to enemy positions in depth; furthermore flanking friendly forces may be endangered by the fire of the assaulting troops. (b) Enemy trenches will be mutually supporting, so effective covering fire must be directed onto them before movement can take place. (c) Sections must be kept roughly abreast of one another in order to prevent flanks being opened to the enemy; furthermore, the company group commander must be kept informed of progress so that he can keep platoons generally in line. (d) The whole position must be cleared systematically and areas must not be disregarded simple because the enemy has not opened fire from them. However, success should be reinforced and a successful platoon should not be unduly held back unless it is outreaching the support of the rest of the company. 1-38

53 0178. Reserves. (e) Clear boundaries between sub-units must be given to ensure that the position is thoroughly cleared and to avoid confusion between enemy and friendly forces. (2) Continuing the Action. Platoon commanders should organize their platoons to provide covering fire while assault sections either assault the next objective or move to the next selected piece of ground. A whole series of section attacks involving fire and manoeuvre at fire team level, will now take place within the framework of the platoon attack until the position is cleared. As the action continues, enemy should be confirmed as dead, or disarmed and ordered to lie in the open with hands on heads; a comprehensive formal clearance of the position including searching of bodies should only take place once the complete objective has been taken and the order for reorganization given. Furthermore, own casualties should only be treated during a pause so that momentum is maintained. Reserve sections and platoons may be tasked to deal with casualties, PW, ammunition resupply, etc. During the fight through the vital aim is to destroy all the enemy. If soldiers stop to tend to casualties, further unnecessary casualties will be caused, and the overall mission prejudiced. (3) Intimate Support Tanks. During the fight through the infantry must work closely with the intimate support tanks using the tanks weapons to destroy enemy positions, whilst at the same time protecting the tanks from enemy short range anti-tank weapons. With tanks in intimate support the fight through should take less time. However, the enemy position must still be thoroughly cleared. If the fight through begins to lose momentum and becomes unduly prolonged, tanks may have to redeploy, either to a flank or behind the assaulting infantry. They must not remain static for too long and become easy targets for enemy armour, ATGW and aircraft. (4) Fire Support Group Tanks. When tanks are used only in a Fire Support Group, the infantry assault as usual but take full advantage of the long range, rapid rate of fire and accuracy of the tank weapons to cover the gap between the time the indirect fire support lifts and the time the infantry arrive on the objective. a. General. (1) As the attack progresses the enemy is likely to react violently with fire support and local counterattacks. He may seek to commit reserves held in depth or, alternatively, he will endeavour to break contact and withdraw. Whatever his actions, the company group commander must be ready to commit his own reserves to defeat the enemy s counterattacks, or seize opportunities to exploit the enemy s decision to withdraw. 1-39

54 (2) The company group commander must also be waiting for the point at which the leading platoons are no longer able to sustain momentum. At this point the company group is at its most vulnerable. The company group commander may need then to commit his own reserves or echeloned platoons, or request reinforcement from the battlegroup. (3) The company group commander must be prepared to shift his Main Effort in order to exploit success or commit echeloned platoons or reserves earlier than expected. (4) If the leading platoons bypass resistance in order to maintain momentum, or miss enemy positions, reserve or echeloned platoons, or the fire support group, will take on these positions, if necessary keeping them suppressed or under surveillance pending subsequent destruction. b. The Reserve Platoon. (1) The company group will often fight with two platoons, keeping the third as a reserve. If a three tank troop is operating in intimate support, all three should operate initially with the two assaulting platoons. One or more of the tanks should be prepared to lead the reserve platoon to any depth, flanking or other objective that might be discovered. (2) The reserve platoon commander may move forward, perhaps with the company group commander, into a position where he can observe the action and be prepared to lead his platoon directly to exploit, deal with a depth position or meet an unexpected situation. (3) If the reserve platoon is tasked to attack enemy depth positions, whichever of the forward platoons can observe the enemy should provide fire support and assist in guiding the reserve to its objective. It is likely that the company group Main Effort will now switch to the action by the reserve. (4) The reserve platoon may be required to: (a) (b) (c) Protect the flanks or rear of the company. Secure the FUP and/or LD. Maintain contact with adjacent units. (d) Clear a position which has been overrun or bypassed by the assaulting platoons. (e) Take over the mission of an assault platoon which requires relief or rest. 1-40

55 (f) Attack from a new direction. (g) Protect or assist the consolidation and reorganization on the objective. (h) Act as a carrying party of reserve ammunition. (i) Be prepared to give medical assistance to wounded personnel from the forward platoons during lulls in the fighting. (j) Deal with PW as required. c. Once used in any of the above tasks they are no longer a reserve and the company group commander must attempt to reconstitute another reserve, regardless of its size Consolidation. a. Consolidation will either follow the destruction of the enemy on the initial objective, exploitation, pursuit or encirclement. In the event of exploitation, pursuit or encirclement, if it is necessary also to secure the initial objective, the company group commander may leave elements of the company group (e.g., MILAN, one platoon) to carry out this task, possibly under the company group 2IC. b. Unless the mission is to secure the initial objective, the company group commander should not become preoccupied with consolidation there. Assuming he retains sufficient combat power, his first aim must be to exploit the results of the attack; any pause will lead to loss of momentum, reduction in pressure on the enemy and lost opportunities. c. Once effective action is complete, the consolidation must begin immediately and must be completed in the shortest possible time to ensure that the company group is prepared to meet counterattacks. Unless contact has been taken over by other elements of the battlegroup, the company group commander must aim to retain contact with the enemy. Consolidation consists of two actions: (1) Security Against Counterattack. The company group commander must coordinate a defensive layout against both ground and air action. Tanks should be immediately deployed to the front and flanks, where they can guard against counterattack. If the assaulting tanks were able to break-through or envelop the objective, these tanks will already be in position. If obstacles make this impossible, the first task will be to find a route which will allow it. As rapidly as possible MILAN and the platoons will be deployed into a defensive posture. Each element must be allocated arcs and target priorities. This should be an SOP action, adjusted as nec- 1-41

56 0180. Exploitation. essary. The defensive layout should ensure that ground adjacent to the position is dominated by fire to prevent the enemy carrying out close reconnaissance. The company group commander will develop a new fire support plan and, if necessary, form a fresh reserve. Engineers or assault pioneers may be required to construct obstacles to assist security against counterattack and to clear any obstacles to permit defensive deployment and mobility. (2) Reorganization. The consolidation will include a final clearance of the objective, collection and treatment/processing of casualties and prisoners, regrouping if necessary and replenishment. Ammunition and POL will be brought forward by A1 Echelon vehicles. These vehicles may also have to assist with casualty and PW evacuation on the return journey. The actions of ambulances and A1 Echelon packet should be controlled by the company 2IC. If the company group has sustained a significant number of casualties, personnel are to be redistributed as required on reorganization, pending the issue of battle casualty replacements. The manning of priority weapon systems, such as MILAN, must be taken into account on redistribution. As soon as it is reorganized, the company group must be prepared to move on to further tasking without delay. a. As the enemy s resistance weakens the offence moves into exploitation. Momentum must not be lost. Exploitation is characterized by a rapid advance against lessening resistance. The aim is to retain the initiative by preventing the enemy from reorganizing his defence or from conducting an orderly withdrawal. The key to success is speed as any delay will afford the enemy the opportunity to regroup and mount counterattacks or to establish delaying positions in depth. The psychological effect of an exploitation creates confusion and apprehension throughout the enemy force, reducing his capability to react and lowering his morale; this may in itself be decisive. b. Pursuit (Strike). The pursuit is designed to catch, cut off or destroy the enemy force attempting to escape. Pursuit may develop from a successful exploitation, or during the attack when the enemy has lost his ability to operate effectively and attempts to disengage. The primary objective is the destruction of the enemy force, although a terrain objective may also be given. In the pursuit, the company group must direct relentless pressure against the retreating enemy. Elements of the company group, or other battlegroup forces, should be deployed to envelop the enemy and sever his lines of escape. c. Encirclement (Strike). The aim of encirclement is to cut off the enemy force in a particular area, with a view to destroying it there or forcing its surrender. It often results from exploitation or pursuit when the pursuing force overtakes the enemy and blocks his escape. 1-42

57 Reserved. SECTION 6. COMMAND AND CONTROL Command General. While planning and conducting the attack, the company group commander must be sufficiently far forward to both observe the action at the critical point and personally influence the Main Effort. Control Orders. The orders process is covered in detail in Volume 1, Pamphlet No. 1, Chapter 4. However, the following points are particularly relevant for offensive operations: a. To ensure a complete understanding of the company commander s concept of operations and to allow detailed coordination to take place, orders are best delivered personally at an orders group. This will normally only be possible in a deliberate attack. b. In a hasty attack, orders will normally be given by radio. Unless the attack is conducted immediately, these orders must be given using secure orders cards. Only the minimum number of instructions to enable a sufficient understanding of the plan should be given. Specific orders should be issued by exception, with such matters as attack formations being SOP where possible. Only the following orders are normally required: (1) Information on the enemy. Much of this may have been passed in sighting reports, contact reports and situation reports provided by elements in contact or observing. It may, however, be necessary for the company commander to confirm details of the enemy. (2) Company group mission and Main Effort. (3) Platoon/troop missions. (4) Locations of assembly area and FUPs and any route restrictions. (5) Axis/axes. (6) Essential coordinating instructions, e.g.: (a) Time of H Hour. 1-43

58 (b) (c) (d) Fire plan. Exploitation. Adjustments to SOPs. c. To maintain momentum, orders for the hasty attack will often be given on the move. They may be given in a number of parts, with information being filled in as it becomes available Control Measures. The organization for combat provides for coverage of the area of the attack from well behind the LD to the objective and beyond. It will include the designation of a number of measures (assembly area, LD, axes, etc.) to assist with the controlling of the attack. The number used will very much depend on the type of attack and on how the commander wishes to control his forces. These various measures are discussed in detail at Section 3. Organization Drills. In a hasty attack, the requirement for speed will dictate the necessity to make maximum use of drills. Slavish adherence to drills must, however, be avoided. Full account must be taken of the specific enemy dispositions and the ground, and in particular the need to achieve surprise. It is unlikely that a template solution will be appropriate. In a deliberate attack, much more detailed analysis and planning is possible, and the drills solution is rarely applicable. Communications Effective radio communications are critical to the success of the company group in offensive operations. Radio procedure must be slick and sharp and all commanders must constantly monitor nets to ensure that they keep up to date with the situation and are able to respond immediately to orders, information concerning situations which could be exploited and warnings of developing threats Careful thought must be given to optimising use of radios, including rebroadcasting of the reconnaissance platoon net onto the company group net to keep all commanders informed; and rebroadcasting the battlegroup net onto the company group net when orders are given, to speed up battle procedure and increase responsiveness While effective communications will help ensure success, the company group must be able to continue operations when nets are jammed or otherwise inoperable. This can only be achieved through mission command, good training and well understood drills and SOPs Reserved. 1-44

59 SECTION 7. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT General. Combat service support (CSS) assets in the offence should be organized to maintain the momentum of attack. The CSS plan should enable the company group to achieve its objectives and then continue the attack, exploit and pursue Considerations. The main CSS considerations in offensive operations are as follows: a. Maximum forward self sufficiency should be achieved by the carriage of optimum loads of combat supplies within F echelon. Overburdening, however, must be avoided. b. Arrangements should be made with battlegroup HQ to provide forward positioning of CSS elements to ensure that the momentum of the company group is not impeded. This includes replenishment, collection of casualties and reception of PW. c. Ammunition will have the highest replenishment priority. d. Plans should be made in anticipation of exploitation, pursuit and consolidation. e. Plans should be made to counter the vulnerability of the company group s CSS assets, especially when deploying forward for replenishment, repair or recovery Medical. It is unlikely that there will be scope to treat or evacuate casualties until the consolidation stage of the attack. The company 2IC must, however, attempt to monitor casualty levels so that additional assets can be warned or deployed forward when required. It is unlikely that the company ambulance will be sufficient to evacuate all casualties. Plans should be in place to use vehicles to assist in casualty evacuation when necessary, including the evacuation of wounded PW. If possible, casualties should be centralised at platoon locations or company HQ on reorganization, to increase efficiency of collection Prisoners of War. During the course of the attack, PW must be disarmed, subjected to immediate tactical questioning as necessary and may then have to be left until the reorganization. On reorganization, PW should be evacuated. When possible the same transport should be used to evacuate casualties and PW. The company 2IC should monitor PW levels in order to warn off battlegroup HQ of additional transport requirements. 1-45

60 0196. Combat Supplies Replenishment. a. During the Attack. There may be a requirement to conduct battle replenishment during the attack, especially replenishment of ammunition. Running replenishment may also be possible during the transition from attack to exploitation. Plans must be made for these requirements. Combat supply levels, especially ammunition, should be monitored by the company 2IC, who must anticipate the requirement for replenishment. Redistribution of ammunition is an alternative measure to maintain momentum. Distribution and redistribution within the company group should be coordinated by the CSM. b. On Reorganization. Ammunition and fuel must be replenished as SOP at the conclusion of the operation. To save time and maintain the company group s responsiveness, the company 2IC must anticipate the earliest opportunity for this and, if possible, have the CQMS packet moved forward into a safe holding area prior to reorganization. The immediate danger of counterattack during the consolidation phase of offensive operations must be taken into account when planning replenishment. 1-46

61 ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 1 THE NIGHT ATTACK General 1. Night attacks may be silent or noisy but even in the case of a silent attack a preplanned fire plan starting at H hour will be on call. Silent attacks may well unnerve an inexperienced enemy and his reactions may well be too slow to use his support weapons and artillery effectively. On the other hand, night surveillance devices may allow him to locate us at an early stage and then maximum fire support will be required to manoeuvre onto his position. The command decision as to whether to go silent or noisy will be based on the ground, enemy reactions to patrols and state of training of our own troops. Mounted From Within the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) 2. The increasing use of night fighting devices such as battlefield illumination, observation devices, driving aids and individual weapon sights will make it far more difficult for the attacker to achieve surprise. Provided weather conditions are favourable the defender will be able to: a. Obtain early warning of troops deploying against him. b. Detect active enemy devices. c. Engage the attacker with aimed or observed fire. d. Deploy his patrols more efficiently. e. Locate the attacker if he moves across open country. 3. However, the attacker will be able to move faster and navigate with greater ease. He will be able to detect and observe enemy movement, use aimed fire and observe indirect fire. The stages and conduct of a night attack by a platoon are basically the same as those for a daylight operation. However, three aspects require particular attention: a. Simplicity of plan to assist control which will be more difficult at night. b. Thorough reconnaissance, both by day and night, if possible. c. Detailed preparations, including rehearsals. 1A-1

62 4. The introduction of night fighting aids and observation devices will not solve all the difficulties of control, but it will give the attacker more scope to manoeuvre in the approach and assault. 5. The present methods of control are still applicable and modifications to the set piece night attack will depend upon the training of the troops taking part and the night fighting aids available to the attacker and the defender. 6. The phases of the night attack will be dealt with as follows: a. Movement to FUP and LD. b. Assault. c. Fight through. d. Reorganization. 7. Movement to FUP and LD. In a company attack the LD, the FUP and routes to it may be marked by tapes, defile markers, and/or lamps. Guides are provided to move platoons into their exact forming up positions. In a platoon attack, section guides who have been rehearsed if possible, both by day and night, will lead sections from the assembly area to their exact positions in the FUP. These should be marked simply, for night identification. The night vision of the platoon must not be impaired by using lights before the attack. Those leading columns must remember to move slowly enough for those at the back to keep up. In future beta lights may be available down to platoon level for route and other marking tasks at night. A possible layout for a company night FUP is at Fig The Assault. Aids to keeping direction are compass bearings, pace checkers, use of tracer ammunition to mark an axis, use of prominent landmarks, skyline features and the moon. Leaders may wear white or luminous objects on their backs. Changes in direction after leaving the LD should be avoided. Sections must maintain contact with the sections on their inside flanks. Depending on the ground and cover, it is better for control if the assault formation is adopted in an FUP as close as possible to the enemy position. This tactic allows troops to make maximum use of covered approaches at night to minimize the risk of exposure to surveillance devices prematurely. It is also used over difficult ground where initially it may be easier to move in file before deploying into assault formation the move into assault formation will require rehearsal. Rates of advance will depend on the degree of darkness, then need for silence, the fire plan, obstacles, vegetation and the state of the ground; usually it will be about half the daylight rate. Men must move at a steady pace and know the action to be taken if the enemy uses flares or other means of illumination. Even when surprise has been lost, it is still best to exercise control with the minimum of shouting; by listening assaulting troops can gain valuable information of the enemy s whereabouts; furthermore, a silent approach can be unnerving for the enemy. One advantage of the night attack is the psychological effect upon the enemy whose 1A-2

63 Obj LD Pl HQ Pl HQ Coy HQ Reserve Pl KEY: Protection Patrols Coloured Lights Tape or Cable Marker for beginning of FUP Coy Checkpoint Dimensions vary according to ground Note: Occupation will normally be from the base of the T. Depending on the ground, occupation can be from any point of the T in which case sub-unit order of march in the occupation will vary, and need to be carefully considered. Fig 11. Possible Layout of a Company Night FUP (not to scale) 1A-3

64 doubts and fears are magnified by the unknown. The move to the objective requires the attacking troops to reach the FUP without being discovered. If the attack is discovered before this stage, the following action should take place: a. The company commander will call for pre-arranged supporting fire on the objective to neutralize enemy fire. Planned illumination will be called for to permit better control and more rapid movement. b. Platoons should attempt to continue in their previous formations. If this is impossible, they must move forward using fire and manoeuvre. If they are close to the objective, the final assault can begin as soon as the attack is discovered. c. Scattered fire by small elements of enemy must not be taken as loss of surprise and consequently as the signal to begin the assault. 9. Fighting Through the Objective. Fighting through will be the most difficult stage of a night attack. It requires detailed training and rehearsal and must be done systematically to avoid confusion and to retain control. Particular points to be avoided are: a. Converging on enemy weapon flashes. b. Use of grenades above ground level. 10. Reorganization. The details for reorganization on the objective will be similar to the procedure used in daylight; however there will often be confusion resulting from the fight through and mopping up on the objective. Coordinated defence may be difficult initially. In the darkness there is a tendency for sections to lay out their positions too close together; this can be avoided by giving clear orders for reorganization; by careful liaison by section commanders; and by thorough and early coordination by the platoon commander. Commanders should pace out distances between trenches. Commanders should know pre-arranged DF, and FPF tasks and who can call for them. All members of the platoon should know the pre-arranged success signal. Any tanks or support weapons and their detachments which join the platoon during darkness must be protected and will need guides. Mounted Forward of the FEBA 11. Both the defender and attacker have gained many advantages by the introduction of surveillance devices, therefore the well tried and recognized techniques will have to be adjusted to meet these new aids. 12. The attacker must: a. Assess the enemy s likely surveillance plan. b. Make greater use of deception. 1A-4

65 c. Make better use of ground. d. Decentralize the control and execution of movement to company or platoon level. e. Use more stealth in the initial deployment. 13. Companies will be allotted objectives and boundaries and separate start points. Objectives will be smaller than by day and more clearly defined. Companies will move to their FUPs along routes selected by the battalion commander. Platoons may use the same route, moving at intervals or they may use separate routes to a company RV/check point (see Figs 12 and 13). 14. When the FUP and LD are more than metres from the objective and/or the enemy is using surveillance devices and/or the route forward from the LD is across broken country, it may be appropriate to keep in close formation until troops are much nearer the objective. In this case a line, the Final Assault Position (FAP), will be laid down. This should not necessitate a formal halt and momentum must be maintained as sub-units shake out into their assault formations to close with the enemy. This technique not only requires a high degree of training and control but also preferably, some rehearsal. 15. Routes forward should be cleared and protected by fighting or standing patrols. A fighting patrol of about platoon strength may be ordered to clear and safeguard the routes ahead of the rest of the company. This patrol could also undertake some or all of the following tasks: a. Marking and lighting routes. b. Protecting the company RV and check point. c. Guiding platoons forward to the LD. This will require some previous reconnaissance and must be carefully conducted (see Appendix 1). d. Observing the objective and if possible giving aimed fire support to the assault. 16. H-hour will still be the time that assaulting platoons cross the LD which normally will be the forward edge of the FUP. Within the battalion, companies may have a common H-hour or separate ones. 17. Night attacks may be silent or noisy but fire planning will be related to the illumination plan, the requirement to destroy or neutralize enemy night fighting devices and the deception plan. 18. By using observation devices it will be possible to allot platoons a separate, definable part of the objective, such as a corner of a wood or a particular group of buildings. 1A-5

66 19. A company will not necessarily have to attack as a coordinated whole. General principles of, and variations from the traditional night attack are: a. Companies can allot objectives and boundaries within which platoons will move. b. Within their allotted boundaries, company commanders can select their own routes to a company release point, at which platoons may diverge on separate routes, to their own platoon FUPs. c. The FUP and LD should be as close to the enemy as possible but out of his effective fire. d. The use of CWS permits LSWs to deliver observed covering fire for the final stages of the assault. e. During reorganization, platoons will find it easier to site positions and weapons than in the past. 20. The co-ordination of illumination is vital if assets are not to be wasted. A strict light plan must be enforced with the 51 mm mortars either under command of platoon sergeants or centralized at company level. If possible, the firing of illuminants should be rehearsed; this will allow for continuous light cover and no firing of fresh rounds before those in the air have started to fade. 21. In summary, the requirements for all successful night attacks are: a. A high standard of training. b. Information. c. Detailed planning. d. Simplicity. e. Surprise. f. Rehearsals. 1A-6

67 Objective FUP LD Objective LD Company Check Point FUP Company Check Point Company RV KEY: Protection Patrols One Pl One Pl & Coy HQ Company Release Point FEBA Company Start Point FEBA Company Start Point Forward Assembly Area Forward Assembly Area Fig 12. Approach Using One Route Fig 13. Approach Using Platoon Routes 1A-7

68 1A-8

69 APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 1 MARKING A COMPANY NIGHT ATTACK FUP AND LD 1. Marking and securing the FUP and LD for a company night attack is likely to be a platoon operation, probably that of the reserve platoon. 2. The operation should be mounted as a platoon-sized patrol. As far as possible, section grouping should remain as for the reserve platoon task. 3. A possible grouping is: a. Command group Platoon commander Radio operator Runner One rifleman b. Final Rendezvous Platoon sergeant (FRV) group No. 51 mm Mortar c. Protection groups Two sections d. Marking group One section, less one rifleman detached to command group 4. The procedure should be as follows: a. The platoon moves to an FRV short of the FUP area. b. From the FRV, the platoon commander leads a reconnaissance group to the selected FUP area. This group comprises the platoon commander, his runner and the two section commanders of the protection groups. The platoon sergeant remains in command of the FRV. Tasks of the reconnaissance group are: (1) To check the area is clear of enemy and/or obstacles (i.e., wire or mines). (2) To site the FUP and LD in detail. (3) To select positions for the flanking protection groups. 1A1-1

70 c. On return to the FRV, the platoon commander will issue confirmatory orders as necessary. The protection group sections will then deploy to the flanks of the FUP, to protect the marking party. d. The FRV party, commanded by the platoon sergeant, provides a firm base at the rear of the FUP area. e. Once the protection groups report they are in position, the platoon commander and the marking group begin to lay out the FUP as at Fig 11. f. The axis of the FUP will be laid first, on a compass bearing to ensure correct alignment. The platoon commander will position one man from the marking group at each light point. The rifleman from the marking group section attached to the command group will be responsible for laying white tape or cable as required. g. Once the FUP is laid out to the platoon commander s satisfaction, he returns to the FRV and reports by radio to his company commander. If on radio silence a runner will have to be used to report verbally. h. The company may occupy the FUP in one of two ways: (1) Two guides may be sent back to the company s assembly area. They bring the assault platoons forward to the base of the FUP, torches are switched on and the FUP occupied using the manned light points as reference points. (2) The section providing the marking party leave their positions with the marking torches switched on. They regroup as a section at the FRV, move back to the company assembly area under command of the section commander and bring the assaulting platoons forward into the FUP. Each man of the marking group is then responsible for guiding a particular section or sections of the assaulting platoons to his allocated sector of the FUP. i. As soon as the assaulting platoons are secure in the FUP, the company commander will order the marking platoon to withdraw to the FRV, reorganize and occupy the reserve platoon position in the FUP. Alternatively, it may be necessary to leave the flank protection groups in position until after H-hour. The reserve platoon could then collect flank protection groups as it moves forward or they could regroup at the FRV. 5. If the enemy attack the FUP during the marking operation, the protection group section should defend the area. The company commander may then decide: a. To occupy the FUP in contact and attack as planned. b. To withdraw the marking platoon from the compromised FUP, using fire and manoeuvre by sections, and attack from the assembly area using the assault platoons. 1A1-2

71 ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 1 INFILTRATION General 1. Infiltration is a form of manoeuvre in which a force moves through or around enemy positions without detection. Infiltration may be conducted either by the company group with its armoured vehicles, or using only the dismounted elements. If successful, an infiltration attack is likely to achieve considerable surprise, and unnerve the enemy. Aims 2. A company group may conduct infiltration in order to support a subsequent attack. Other possible aims of infiltration attacks are: a. Reconnaissance. b. Attack in depth, including key enemy positions. c. Support of a main attack. d. Securing obstacle crossing sites. e. Capture of specific terrain features. f. Disruption of communications. Conditions 3. Infiltration will usually take place at night, in poor visibility, in close country or when the enemy s defences are widely dispersed. A detailed and accurate knowledge of the enemy s strengths and dispositions will improve the chances of success. Planning and Preparation 4. Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance must be thorough and carefully planned: a. To locate enemy defences, observation posts and surveillance devices in the area of the attack so that suitable routes can be selected. b. To confirm suitable infiltration routes and FUPs. 1B-1

72 5. Infiltration Plan. Major considerations in the infiltration plan will be: a. The Infiltration Force. The strength of the infiltration force should be sufficient to achieve its tasks and defeat subsequent enemy counter-attacks. Subject to the mission and terrain, assault pioneer and engineer assets and engineer reconnaissance may be key elements of the force. b. Fire Support. The infiltration force should include MILAN and 81 mm mortars. To compensate for a lack of immediate heavy firepower: (1) All objectives should be within artillery range. (2) Plans must include the rapid reinforcement of the infiltration group as soon as possible after the attack begins. c. Infiltration Routes and Groups. Routes should be secure from enemy observation and fire. Small parties using multiple routes are preferable to larger groups moving on only one or two routes. d. Security and Control. Reconnaissance vehicles or dismounted patrols should be tasked to screen the advance and cover the flanks of the infiltration force. Behind this screen, guides may be deployed to critical points, RVs and FUPs. Simple reception arrangements are important to prevent confusion and clashes between infiltrating groups. e. Surprise and Deception. All possible passive and active measures should be taken to ensure surprise. In addition to any other deception plan, light and artillery fire should be on call to distract or confuse the enemy if any infiltration group is detected. Conduct 6. Security elements will move immediately ahead of the infiltrating force to prove its routes clear or report any opposition to be avoided, and secure the FUPs. Planned alternative FUPs may have to be used if those originally selected prove to be untenable. 7. Every effort must be made to reach the FUP by stealth. This will require accurate navigation and a high standard of light and noise discipline throughout the force. 8. If the enemy is located or contact established on the route to the FUPs, the company group commander must decide between: a. Attempting to work round the enemy or diverting to another route. b. Withdrawing the group using that route and continuing with a reduced force. 1B-2

73 c. Fighting through the enemy, with the probability of losing surprise. 9. From the FUPs, the operation will continue on conventional lines. 1B-3

74 1B-4

75 Chapter 2 DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS SECTION 1. FUNDAMENTALS General Defensive operations are usually undertaken when the enemy has the initiative to prevent him from seizing terrain or breaking through into a defended area. Defensive operations aim to break the enemy attack, destroy his forces and stop him from accomplishing his aim. In doing so, they create the circumstances for offensive action. This is fundamental to the defensive battle which must not drift into a situation where the defending force merely reacts to enemy moves. Every opportunity should be taken to grasp the initiative and force the attacker to react to the defensive plan. `çåíéåíë Page SECTION 1. FUNDAMENTALS 2 1 SECTION 2. FORCES AND TASKS 2 8 SECTION 3. PLANNING AND PREPARATION 2 11 SECTION 4. CONDUCT 2 24 SECTION 5. COMMAND AND CONTROL 2 28 SECTION 6. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 2 30 Annexes: A. Reserved Demolitions B. Routine in Defence (24 Hour Period) C. UK Mine Warfare Doctrine Reserved Demolitions. Although the tactical doctrine for reserved demolitions is associated with the doctrine for the delay and the withdrawal, it is more closely connected with the doctrine for area defence and is therefore included in this chapter. The particular requirements for the deployment of the demolition guard and the control of the demolition make the reserved demolition an operation with unique characteristics. Full details can be found at Annex A. Principles The following principles are of particular importance in defensive operations: a. Depth. Depth in defence is necessary to achieve freedom of action, to give time for reaction and to absorb the enemy s momentum. Positions in depth will surprise and unbalance the enemy thus providing opportunities for counterattacks. Some gaps may have to be accepted but these must be covered by observation and fire. Depth should not be sacrificed in an attempt to cover a given frontage in strength. Depth is obtained by the allocation of sufficient space for: (1) Employment of protective elements. 2-1

76 (2) Employment of longer range weapons to destroy, defeat, disrupt or delay enemy elements throughout the depth of the company group s area of influence. (3) Use of battle positions, obstacles and defensive fire throughout the area. (4) Positioning and movement of reserves and combat support elements. b. Mutual Support. Mutual support exists when positions are able to support each other by direct fire, thus preventing the enemy from mounting an attack against any one position without being subjected to direct fire from one or more adjacent positions. There will often be a conflict between the need for depth and for mutual support across a wide front. Depth is more important and in creating depth, the company group can also cover gaps between dug-in positions, enhancing mutual support. In the less dense battlefield, gaps must be accepted, but they should only exist between companies. Mutual support must always be achieved between platoons within companies. Arcs should interlock between platoons within a company group or across a boundary, but true mutual support will only be achieved if key weapon arcs overlap (see Fig 14). When the threat is primarily an armoured one, mutual support between anti-armour weapons is essential. c. All Round Defence. Although a defensive position is likely to be sighted in accordance with the IPB against an attack from a particular direction, the defender must be capable of repelling attack from any direction. Platoons must be fully prepared to fight when outflanked or attacked from different directions. d. Offensive Spirit. Energetic offensive action is fundamental to the successful defence. Defensive operations must be aggressive, harassing and dangerous to the enemy. Plans must focus on the enemy and commanders at all levels within the company, working to the company mission and main effort, must seek to grasp the initiative and dictate to the enemy the way in which the battle will be fought. Immediate counterattacks can be launched to exploit gaps in the enemy attack formations or pauses in his plans. Assaults launched by small groups of determined men can have results out of all proportion to the effort. e. Reserves. Reserves are essential at all levels for immediate counterattack tasks and to deal with the unexpected. Within an infantry company group reserves will be small and will normally be provided by a depth position. Once employed, every effort should be made to reconstitute a reserve regardless of its size or make up. 2-2

77 f. Deception and Concealment. The attacker must be continually delayed and confused by the defensive layout. This can be achieved by early destruction of enemy reconnaissance, good concealment and dummy positions. Other measures include EMCON, close control of movement and a high standard of camouflage of vehicles, positions and combat supplies. However, concealment should not be sacrificed in favour of longer fields of fire. Concealment at night is as important as by day and care must be taken to minimize and conceal heat emissions. LSW LSW Rifles Rifles Note: Rifle arcs at their battle range will just meet (interlock). LSW arcs with their greater battle range will overlap. Fig 14. Mutual Support: Interlocking and Overlapping Fire 2-3

78 Purpose The purpose of defence will include one or more of the following: a. To wear down the enemy s offensive capability in order to cause his attack to fail. b. To hold ground to prevent an enemy breakthrough. c. To gain time in order to prepare for subsequent operations. d. To fix the enemy to allow offensive action elsewhere. e. To force the enemy to concentrate so that he is more vulnerable to attack. Types of Defensive Operations Defensive operations can be divided into two broad categories: mobile and area. The categories are not mutually exclusive in that area defence can take place within a framework of a mobile defence and vice versa. Both categories can then be further sub-divided into deliberate or hasty. The fundamental difference between mobile and area defence is that mobile defence seeks to defeat the enemy s attack by attacking his cohesion whereas area defence seeks to defeat the enemy by denial. Regardless of the category of defence, due to its lack of mobility the company group will apply the tactical doctrine of area defence. a. Mobile Defence. Mobile defence focuses on the destruction of the attacking force by permitting it to advance to a position which exposes it to a counterattack and envelopment by a mobile reserve. The company group will act as the fixing force in mobile defence. b. Area Defence. In an area defence the bulk of the defending forces are deployed to retain ground using a combination of defensive positions and small mobile reserves. The defence will be organized around a static framework of defensive positions which will seek to destroy the enemy by inter-locking fire or by local counterattack against enemy penetrating between defensive positions. Stages of the Defence The defensive battle can be divided into a number of stages which in practice are unlikely to be clearly defined. These stages are: a. Preparatory Stage. During the preparatory stage planning of the defence, reconnaissance, liaison, rehearsals and counter-reconnaissance activities will take place. Maximum emphasis will be placed on concurrent activity. 2-4

79 b. Covering Force Action. The covering force will fight what is essentially a delay battle. It will be a battle of movement with little time to establish or fight from positions. Maximum destruction is inflicted on the enemy so that he arrives at the main defensive position dislocated and with his cohesion undermined. c. Battle Handover. Forces in the main defensive position will assume responsibility for the battle at the handover line. Direct and indirect fire assets from the main defence force will provide support to cover the withdrawal of the covering force. The withdrawal will involve rearward passage of lines. d. Main Defensive Battle. The decisive battle is fought in the main defensive area where the effects of deep and covering force operations, coupled with the sustaining efforts of the rear area, combine with the operations of the main defence force to defeat the enemy. Much of what occurs will depend on whether the formation commander has planned for a mobile or area defence. e. Employment of Reserves. Forces will be earmarked as reserves for offensive tasks which are integral to the defensive concept. The primary purpose of a reserve is to preserve the commander s flexibility of action. Secondary purposes are to reinforce the defence of committed forces, block enemy forces that have penetrated the FEBA, react to rear area threats and relieve depleted units and provide for continuous operations. Glossary of Tactical Terms The following tactical terms are associated with defensive operations: a. Deliberate Defence. Defence organized when out of contact with the enemy. It normally includes an extensive fortified zone incorporating pill boxes, forts and communications systems. b. Hasty Defence. Defence organized while in contact with the enemy or when contact is imminent and time available for organization is limited. It is characterized by improvement of the natural defensive strength of the terrain by utilization of foxholes, emplacements and obstacles. c. Vital Ground. Ground of such tactical significance that its loss will make the defence untenable. It is normally identified by a superior commander and given out in his orders. Subordinate commanders have to base their estimates accordingly. The definition of ground as vital in defence will usually imply that counterattack plans must be made to regain it if it is lost to the enemy. A platoon commander would not normally choose his vital ground. Any vital ground in his area would be designed by superior commanders. d. Key Terrain. Any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either combatant. This is ground which it is highly desir- 2-5

80 able to hold, rather than essential to hold. Although Key Terrain will not be abandoned lightly and steps will be taken to recapture it, if it can be done economically (without committing too much of the reserve), a commander may be prepared to concede it. A formation or battlegroup commander normally will select his own Key Terrain. e. Area of Interest. The area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objective of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardise the accomplishment of the mission. f. Area of Influence. A geographical area wherein the commander is directly capable of influencing operations, by manoeuvre or fire support systems normally under his command and control. g. Primary Position. The main position from which a unit intends to fight. It may have reconnoitred or prepared another position to which it might move if the primary position becomes untenable. This other position is called a secondary position. h. Secondary Position. A completely new position, normally prepared but certainly at least reconnoitred, to which a sub-unit or unit will move once its primary position has become untenable or when its primary position has become ineffective because of the flow of battle. A unit may remain in a hide until the main enemy thrust has been identified. It will then be called forward to man its primary or secondary position. i. Alternative Position. A position in the immediate area to which a sub-unit, tank, GPMG(SF), fire team etc., may move once it has been located by the enemy in order to continue the engagement. Equally, if time allows, sub-units may prepare two positions and select once of these alternative positions for occupation once the enemy is identified. j. Counterattack. An operation to recapture lost ground or to destroy an enemy. Counterattacks will either be immediate or deliberate. k. Blocking. A move to block incursion into a defended area, or to divert the enemy into a pre-planned killing area. Blocking tasks will be planned before the battle is joined and positions will be reconnoitred and, if possible, prepared. l. Defensive Fire (DF). Pre-arranged artillery, mortar or GPMG(SF) fire to assist and protect a unit engaged in a defensive action. DFs may be sub-divided into: (1) DF in Depth. The aim is to disorganize the enemy s preparation for an attack or counterattack, and to inflict casualties on his reserves during 2-6

81 an assault. They are usually 2 4,000 metres from our own positions. DFs in depth are usually selected by the battlegroup commander on advice from his BC. (2) Close DF. The aim of a close DF is to break up an enemy attack by engaging the enemy while he is either in the FUP or assaulting. Close DFs are usually out to 2,000 metres from our own positions and are selected by company commanders in consultation with FOOs and MFCs but are coordinated at battlegroup level. A company would normally be allocated 3 4 artillery close DF targets. (3) Priority DF. A priority DF is located where the brigade commander wants to first engage the enemy. STA assets must be able to observe this location. Guns will be laid on the priority DF when not on other tasks. m. Final Protective Fire (FPF). A defensive fire (DF) target to cover the most vulnerable approaches, usually close in to a position. Artillery will not be allocated to a battalion FPF. The FPF will therefore be the responsibility of the mortars and such direct fire assets that can engage it. Ideally all FPFs should be adjusted. GPMG(SF) will also have FPF tasks on which they are laid when not firing other tasks. n. Enfilade/Defilade. Enfilade fire is fire which strikes the side of the enemy. It is a principle for the siting of anti-tank weapons but GPMG(SF) should also be sited if possible to fire along a line of advancing enemy from one end. A defilade position is a position at an angle to the enemy which enables engagement of the enemy s flank. Thus from a defilade position, enfilade fire is produced. o. Killing Area. An area in which the commander plans to force the enemy to concentrate, so as to destroy him. p. Free Fire Area. An area in which everything is considered hostile and need not be positively identified as such before being engaged. q. Destroy. To kill the enemy or to neutralize his vehicles. To destroy the enemy within boundaries removes any concern for a specific piece of ground provided that the enemy is neutralized or killed. r. Deny. To prevent the enemy establishing himself upon a piece of ground. Disruption and dislocation of access from the ground and air are important elements in fulfilling such a mission. Ground can be denied either by holding it or by covering the area by direct or observed indirect fire. To deny without holding requires surveillance. s. Hold. To maintain or retain possession of a position or area by force. A unit holds ground when it is physically in possession of that ground. Invariably this requires some form of digging. It is normal to hold vital ground. 2-7

82 t. Screen. A screen is a security element whose primary task is to observe, identify and report information and which fights only in self-protection. u. Guard. A guard is a security element whose primary task is to protect the main force by fighting to gain time, while also observing and reporting information. v. False Front. A false front is the positioning of forces and/or dummy positions forward of a defensive position in order to deceive the enemy as to the location of that position. w. Interlocking Fire. Interlocking fire is achieved when the boundaries of individual arcs of fire meet. x. Overlapping Arcs of Fire. Overlapping arcs are achieved when one weapon system is capable of engaging targets within the arc of fire of its neighbour. y. Reverse Slope. A reverse slope position is a position on ground not exposed to direct fire or observation. z. Forward Slope. A forward slope position is a position which is exposed to direct fire and to observed indirect fire Reserved. SECTION 2. FORCES AND TASKS Employment of Combat Forces General. The infantry company group is capable of mounting an effective defence only from prepared positions and will, therefore, be employed primarily in a static role as a fixing force. Defensive positions should make the best use of barriers and be located where the ground offers scope to employ the fire power and the full range of anti-armour weapons; it is, therefore, particularly suitable for use in close country such as wooded and built-up areas. The positions selected should be covered from observed fire for as long as possible, thus enabling the position to retain its effectiveness. The position will need to be well supported by armour and combat support assets. 2-8

83 0211. Reconnaissance. Early location of the enemy is a fundamental requirement for successful defence. Battlegroup resources will be allocated to locate and identify the enemy and then to assess his intentions. At company level standing patrols and OPs should be deployed forward to provide early warning, particularly at night or when visibility is limited, and by the use of indirect fire to achieve early attrition and disruption. Location of these patrols and OPs will be driven by the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) and the Surveillance and Target Acquisition Plan (STAP) that is subsequently produced from the IPB Artillery and Mortars. The roles of artillery and mortars in defence are: a. To commence attrition beyond the range of direct fire weapons. b. Pre-planned DF tasks for engagement on call. These targets will be planned and coordinated at battlegroup level. c. Fire plans in support of counterattacks. d. The engagement of opportunity targets. e. The provision of illumination (mortars only) and smoke The mortar platoon is the battlegroup s own intimate indirect close support weapon. Artillery is allocated as follows: a. Direct Support (DS). The support provided by a unit or formation not attached or under command/control of the supported unit or formation, but required to give priority to the support required by that unit or formation. Artillery in DS gives both the provision of artillery observers, commanders and communications and a guarantee of fire which cannot be overruled. b. General Support (Gen Sp). That support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular sub-division. Artillery in Gen Sp is retained under control of the formation artillery commander to influence the battle at formation level. c. Reinforcing. A tactical mission in which one artillery unit augments the fire of another artillery unit. The fire of reinforcing artillery is guaranteed. d. General Support Reinforcing (GSR). General Support Reinforcing artillery has the mission of supporting the force as a whole and, on a secondary basis, of providing reinforcing fire for another artillery unit FOOs and MFCs. When considering firepower the company group commander must not focus solely on his direct fire weapons, leaving the planning of indirect fire to his FOO. If he does so then this tends to leave no clear concept of the way in which fire support in general and indirect fire support in particular are to be employed in the overall company plan. Company group commanders must not leave 2-9

84 their battlegroup commander s O Groups without being familiar with the battle group s fire plan. The company group commander, with his FOO, must plan the indirect fire support to complement and reinforce the direct fire plan. As with obstacles, fire support priorities should support the main effort. Fire support can also be used to engage the enemy in areas that a company group cannot cover with direct fire weapons. The following items must be addressed as part of the fire support plan: a. The location of the FOO and MFCs. They should be located where they are best able to direct and adjust indirect fire missions to support the main effort. b. The artillery target list is the initial battlegroup fire support plan with the key DFs to support the company group. The company group commander should, with his FOO, develop the target list based on the indirect fire plan. The fire plan should include targets in front of, on top of, and behind the main company group position. c. Close air support and armed helicopter tasks, if issued Armour. Although armour can in certain circumstances be dug-in on a company position and integrated into the direct fire plan, it is far more likely to be used as a mobile reserve where tanks can exploit their firepower and mobility. Tanks will be used for counterattack and blocking operations Anti-Armour Weapons. The main threat to the company group is likely to be posed by enemy armoured forces. The success of the defence will, therefore, depend fundamentally on the deployment, coordination and control of the variety of anti-armour weapon systems within the company group s area of influence. While battlegroup level anti-armour weapons will be coordinated at battlegroup HQ level to destroy enemy armour in designated armour killing areas, the company group commander will need to tie in the company s light anti-armour weapons to supplement the battlegroup plan. The company will provide protection for the anti-armour weapons, help in preparing their positions and give administrative support as necessary GPMG(SF). The deployment of the GPMG(SF) platoon will be coordinated at battlegroup HQ level and will be linked to the anti-armour plan. It is therefore likely that a GPMG(SF) section will form part of a company group task organization in defence. The section should be sited as three guns, each in defilade position, thereby making best use of enfilade fire and the beaten zone Engineers. The company group commander must plan how to use the time and engineer resources available to prepare positions, routes and obstacles. He must prioritize the tasks so that the most important are done first; no defensive position is ever finished. The company group must continue to develop the defensive preparations until interrupted by the enemy s advance. Engineer tasks will be as follows: 2-10

85 a. Counter-Mobility Tasks. Counter-mobility tasks serve to disrupt, turn, fix or block enemy forces. They will be closely coordinated with the direct and indirect fire plans. Tasks will consist of development of barriers combining natural obstacles and minefields and demolitions. The completion of counter-mobility tasks is of greater importance than the completion of survivability tasks. b. Survivability Tasks. Survivability tasks will involve construction of tank scrapes, trenches, weapon pits, command posts; development of dummy positions; and providing protection for combat supplies. c. Mobility Tasks. Engineers will reconnoitre, improve and open routes, for both supply and counterattacks and ensure that minefield lanes are kept open Reserved. General SECTION 3. PLANNING AND PREPARATION Even in a deliberate defensive battle there will never be unlimited time for reconnaissance and preparation. Early warning orders, sensible anticipation and the well practised application of unit SOPs are essential to achieve concurrent activity. When time is limited battle procedure can be reduced by measures such as the issue of FragOs based on map estimates and concurrent reconnaissances. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) The rationale for the layout of a defensive position will be driven by the IPB. This process is designed to help commanders at all levels identify possible enemy courses of action, suitable killing areas, decision points and surveillance targets and OP locations. Further details on IPB are at Volume 1 The Infantry Company Group The Fundamentals, Chapter 4. Reconnaissance Following attendance at the battalion O Group the company group commander will conduct a reconnaissance of his company s area of operations. The aim of the reconnaissance is to confirm the IPB and carry out detailed siting. For this task he will need the trace of the battalion s defensive layout and relevant IPB traces. Particular attention will need to be paid to the armour killing areas in the anti-armour plan. Prior to setting out, a map appreciation should be conducted to select likely vantage points for observing the area. Time is likely to be in short supply and must not be wasted in unnecessary travel. Whenever possible the ground should be looked at from the enemy point of view and the broad details of the IPB confirmed, or otherwise, by detailed analysis. Particular attention should be paid to likely 2-11

86 approaches, natural obstacles and chokepoints, concealment, dead ground, fields of fire, going and possible counterattack routes. The company group commander should be accompanied by the FOO and/or MFC, MILAN section commander and if possible an engineer. The party may require protection and will need communications. If time is short platoon guides may also need to be taken. Where to Kill the Enemy Planning and Siting Principles. To ensure maximum coordination of fire the principle of planning two down is applied when planning the defence. This principle should not, however, be applied to siting which is the responsibility of platoon and section commanders. The company group commander s primary responsibility is, therefore, to allocate centre of mass for each section position and the arcs of GPMG(SF), LSW and LAW. Once siting has been completed he will then conduct detailed coordination of arcs on the ground to ensure that mutual support is achieved to the best possible effect Enemy attacks are based on two principles speed and mass. Enemy forces win by sustaining a high rate of advance (12 to 20 kms in the hour) and pushing considerable combat power forward in a short period of time. A company group commander planning a defensive position must take advantage of existing natural obstacles and must place barriers to block the enemy s forward movement, aiming to separate his forces. The company group commander should plan to concentrate enough indirect and direct firepower into a KA to kill the enemy in large numbers quickly. The company group must not plan to pick off enemy vehicles one at a time as they roll towards them, because they would swiftly over-run the position. The company group plan should aim instead to compress enemy vehicles and crews into a small KA, then attack with all the firepower available. An effective defence will either force the enemy to dig in and establish a hasty defence or withdraw from combat The company group commander must study the ground and analyse how the terrain can help to defeat the enemy. If possible, he should reconnoitre the terrain from both his and the enemy s view. The avenues of approach will be the most important factor to consider to determine where to position assets. All avenues of approach that affect the position must be covered. OPs, sensors and any other surveillance assets must be deployed, so that forces can be manoeuvred to cover avenues where enemy elements appear. The company group commander should: a. Work out what the terrain will allow the company to do and what it will allow the enemy to do. b. When the enemy is an armoured/mobile enemy, work out where the terrain will slow the enemy down or force him into tight column formations. 2-12

87 c. Identify the places where the enemy will be most vulnerable to fire (choke points along the avenues of approach, or open areas lacking cover and concealment), with enough space and fields of fire to concentrate the available firepower. These areas are potential KAs, which for anti-armour fire should be from 1,000 to 2,500 metres from friendly positions and which for dismounted infantry should allow for overlapping fire of all available weapon systems, including LAW and GPMGs. Given the threat, work out which are primary, alternate and secondary fire positions. d. Find the best covered and concealed positions dominating likely enemy avenues of approach. Position tanks where they can cover mounted avenues of approach. e. When possible, avoid positioning vehicles in terrain that allows the enemy to anticipate the company group s actions. f. Select positions for the group to survive the enemy s initial heavy concentrations of indirect fire. Use reverse slopes whenever possible and do not position infantry where they will be exposed to indirect and long-range direct fire long before they are able to fire at the enemy. g. In positioning the forces, locations should be sought where the weapons can engage the attacking enemy from the flanks and rear. h. Select the best terrain for OPs forward of the defensive positions to observe likely avenues of approach. The STAP will establish OPs to provide surveillance on the primary avenues of approach and to observe secondary avenues of approach. Also plan for passive and active air defence, perhaps tasking OPs to observe air avenues of approach. Ensure that OPs are provided with mutual support, either directly by GPMG(SF) or indirectly by mortars or artillery. i. Decide where obstacles can be placed and tied in with natural obstacles to slow, disrupt, confuse, and turn the enemy, with the intention of giving more time to fire and better opportunities for flank and rear engagements. When appropriate, endeavour to secure obstacles, particularly during periods of limited visibility. Obstacles that are not covered by direct fire or observed indirect fire are not obstacles. j. Work out from where to control the battle Having worked out which key terrain offers the weapons and troops cover, concealment, favourable fields of fire, and passable manoeuvre routes, the company group commander must concentrate his primary positions on the avenues of approach he considers the enemy are most likely to use. He should make sure that the primary positions can cover the KAs with overlapping fire from mutually supporting positions. He must strive to find defilade positions from which enfilade fire can be 2-13

88 given. He should select alternate positions in case the enemy suppresses the primary positions. He should plan for secondary positions to cover secondary avenues of approach, especially to the flanks and rear of his positions. He should make sure that his company group has good routes between these positions, preferably covered and concealed If there are more than enough dismounted infantrymen to cover dismounted avenues of approach and to secure critical obstacles, the company group commander should position those remaining to cover possible enemy dismounted assaults along mounted avenues of approach or use them as a reserve to conduct local counterattacks. He should also maintain platoon integrity when possible. If the estimate leads him to employ tanks alone or in pairs, then he may do so, but not before carefully considering the loss of mutual support and the inability to concentrate fire Siting Requirements. When siting positions the company group commander must start at the impact area of the weapons under his control. He must then work out arcs of fire which converge on the selected killing areas. This will then dictate the areas where his positions must be located. LAWs and LSWs provide the framework around which the defence of the platoon positions is built and these weapons should be sited first. It is likely that positions will have to be sited to give local protection to MILAN or GPMG(SF) detachments and LAWs sited to cover gaps in the MILAN arcs of fire. Overlapping LSW arcs should be coordinated and the arcs for each section designated. Trenches must have good fields of fire, 100 metres should be considered the minimum, and be close enough for section commanders to be able to control their sections by voice during battle Firepower Integration. The integration of all available weapon systems is vital. For example, artillery and mortar DFs must not obscure killing areas; LAW should be sited to cover areas within MILAN s minimum range; 51 mm mortars could be centralized for maximum effect; and GPMG(SF) can cover MILAN positions outside the close protection of the company. Sequence and Timing of Fire and Manoeuvre The company group commander must determine the sequence in which he expects the battle to occur. His first consideration is how he is to take over the contact battle from battlegroup elements who are forward of the FLOT. One method is to establish a coordination point at which briefing can take place. The effectiveness of the STAP will be critical to maintaining contact with the enemy. He should then determine where and when his subordinates must initiate actions to achieve the intended results. He should consider how long it would take those subordinates to react and the movement rate of the enemy The company group commander should work out how and where he will control or trigger the initiation of each critical action. A point on the ground could be selected, which triggers the action when the enemy reach it. Or a specific event will 2-14

89 automatically trigger the action to be executed. He must confirm with his subordinates the location of physical trigger points or the events which will trigger action, and he must then physically time the critical actions during rehearsals. Critical actions may also be controlled by issuing quick battle orders. These are used when the situation is unclear, unexpected and the action has not been rehearsed. In this case, he must give himself reasonable time to make a decision, react, and issue orders The enemy will try to mass his forces where the company group least expects it and will aim to create at least a three-to-one (soldiers and equipment) advantage over it. To defeat the enemy, a company group must generate enough combat power to reduce those odds wherever enemy forces are committed. To do this, there are two crucial requirements: a. First, see the enemy well forward of the company group s main defensive position. b. Second, the platoons must be skilled in manoeuvre, well rehearsed to respond immediately to pre-determined deliberate counterattack options or quick battle orders initiating quick counterattacks, and able to move rapidly when necessary. If these requirements are satisfied and the company group hits the enemy when he is vulnerable, the company group will win the battle Ideally, when engaging an attacking force, a company group commander should manoeuvre his platoons into positions that force the enemy to turn and fight in two directions, so keeping the enemy s flank exposed Company group commanders must not plan to stand passively in position exchanging fire with the attacking enemy. They should plan to draw the enemy into their group s KAs and counterattack by fire, or use fire and movement from an exposed flank to finish off the enemy. Security Security. There are many ways to protect the company group from being found or attacked by surprise. Some are passive, others are active; all must be considered in the defensive plan and will be issued as Counter Surveillance Control Measures (CSCM). A few examples of passive and active security measures are shown below: PASSIVE Disperse vehicles and platoons Use camouflage, concealment and cover ACTIVE Establish OPs. Deploy patrols. 2-15

90 Impose radio-silence Turn heat sources off and keep them cold Reduce noise. Place early warning devices. Deploy NBC alarm equipment. Deploy air and ground sentries. Do not move around positions. Use no lights. Keep antennas low. Use defilade positions. Do not use likely artillery target areas Deception. Company group commanders should aim to deceive the enemy, however achieving this aim will not be easy. For example the effort needed to construct a credible dummy position must not be underestimated. Where time and resources are short, mixing real and dummy positions can achieve good results Dispersion. A company group commander should spread his platoons as far apart as possible, without losing control or the ability to concentrate firepower against the enemy. Dispersion makes it harder for the enemy to find and hit the company group, both with direct fire and with massed indirect fire. Camouflage and Concealment Basic Drills. Good camouflage and concealment are vital in defence and must be practised regularly in training. Natural camouflage must look right. False colour infra-red photography and even TI can detect, and see through, old natural vegetation AFV Scrapes. The company group commander faces the dilemma of having his tanks camouflaged under nets and so risk them being unable to fire their weapons, or, having the tanks without camouflage netting, which would enable them to go into action rapidly, but which would risk them being compromised. A solution, if the engineers have the time and resources, is to dig stepped vehicle scrapes. In this way tanks can be concealed below ground until required to fire, when they would move up onto the fire step. Camouflage nets would be used to cover spoil rather than the AFVs. This solution will also help to conceal AFVs from enemy ground based thermal image detection equipment Spoil. As with any dug-in defensive position, there is always the problem of what to do with the spoil from infantry trenches and AFV scrapes. This problem is multiplied when alternative and secondary positions are taken into account. No solution is offered to overcome this problem, but company group commanders must not ignore it and must come up with a plan to cope with it. 2-16

91 0242. Defence Stores. Defence stores tend to be dumped on the main defensive position at an early stage during its preparation. If they are then left lying around in the open they will compromise the position, especially reflective items. Defence stores must be hidden and covered Movement Around the Position. Movement around the position almost invariably increases the chances of the enemy reconnaissance, particularly air reconnaissance, locating the defensive position. AFVs leave distinctive tracks, particularly in wet conditions, whilst in the summer they throw up clouds of dust. Company group commanders must anticipate this problem and make plans to limit its effects. Routes, conforming to the battlegroup track plan, must be carefully selected and incorporated into the track plan. Movement around the position must be limited and strictly enforced. At the same time, however, company group commanders must also ensure that all withdrawal plans, moves from battle hides to battle positions, moves from main positions to alternate or secondary positions and deliberate counterattack plans are fully rehearsed. Those rehearsals must be coordinated so that movement is controlled and kept to the minimum. Defence During Limited Visibility At night and in poor visibility, observation and weapons effective ranges reduce and gaps between defended localities become more difficult to cover. Furthermore, the enemy may change his tactics in such conditions and the movement of reserves will be slower and more difficult to control. Plans must be made to ensure security of positions and provide information of enemy movements. This may require the deployment of patrols, standing patrols and additional OPs and the redeployment of surveillance equipments and some weapon systems. At night the illumination plan must be carefully controlled to avoid masking passive systems of which friendly forces may be at an advantage; stages of the night visibility plan will be laid down in SOPs. To gain the best effects, preparations should be made before darkness falls or poor weather closes in The company group commander must plan to fight effectively in limited visibility. Thermal sights and other night observation devices increase the company group s capability to fight in limited visibility, but for these systems to be effective their use must be properly planned. The following techniques are useful during limited visibility: a. Adjust the positions and fire control measures before the onset of limited visibility, if possible. b. Plan and rehearse required movements to limited visibility positions. c. Redeploy tanks along high speed mounted avenues of approach. The enemy is most likely to use roads and tracks for easy movement, navigation, and control during limited visibility. 2-17

92 d. Under extremely limited visibility conditions (such as thermal defeating smoke, freezing or dense fog, or extremely heavy rain), adjust the fire plan to cover the mounted avenues of approach. Adjust vehicle fighting positions to cover KAs at closer ranges OPs should be positioned far enough forward and to the flanks of friendly positions to provide early warning. OPs must be given night observation capability, a means of communication, and sufficient weapons to provide for self defence. When appropriate OPs should deploy early warning devices and small protective minefields to give warning and slow the enemy Reconnaissance patrols should be deployed to reconnoitre the areas that the OPs cannot observe. Patrol routes must be coordinated both with the battlegroup operations officer and with all adjacent friendly units. The Obstacle and Anti-Armour Plans IPB will produce the enemy s likely avenues of advance, from which the battlegroup obstacle, anti-armour and Surveillance and Target Acquisition Plan (STAP) will be produced. The overall battlegroup defence plan (and from it the company group plan) will evolve from those plans The Obstacle Plan. The obstacle plan must be coordinated at battlegroup level and must be a logical product of IPB. Considerable ingenuity is required to create obstacles to slow down the enemy s rate of advance. The ground must be made to work for the defenders, so natural obstacles must be incorporated into the defensive layout, even if they do not conveniently run straight across the enemy s predicted axis of advance. Artificial obstacles should be sited to protect vital and important ground, and to guard flanks. They should also be used to deflect and channel the attacker into favourable killing areas Obstacles must play a part in the company group commander s plan. If commanders intend to engage the enemy from a flank then they must force the enemy to present that flank. Failing to do so can lead to infantry positions being overrun easily by frontal assaults. Whilst engineers could do much of this, infantrymen can do much to help themselves. For example a simple surface laid minefield can be produced in a relatively short time. Whenever possible, obstacles must be covered by direct fire weapons, but when this cannot be achieved they must at least be covered by observed indirect fire. Obstacles will be needed for alternate and secondary positions and should be considered for a 360 /6,400 mils threat The company is likely to be involved in the construction of wire obstacles and protective minefields: a. Wire Obstacles. Wiring is a quick way of providing an obstacle to enemy infantry. The object of wiring is to slow down the enemy s advance and increase 2-18

93 the chance of killing him with fire. Wire must be sited so as to check the enemy outside grenade throwing range of the platoon positions. Wire should be sited, as far as possible, to achieve surprise. For this reason, it should be well hidden in such places as sunken lanes, hedgerows and long grass. Wire not covered by fire is virtually useless. b. Mines. Well sited and carefully concealed minefields covered by fire are an effective obstacle to men and vehicles. A minefield may consist of anti-tank mines, anti-personnel mines or a mixture of both depending on its aim. The notes governing the laying and control of minefields and other victim operated devices are subject to the provisions of the UN Weaponry Convention (UNWC) Protocol II. Details are at Annex C. There are four types of minefields: (1) Tactical. A minefield which is part of a formation obstacle plan and is laid to delay, channel or break up an enemy advance. (2) Protective. These are for the close protection of a unit. Their purpose is to slow down an enemy attack in its final stages. They should be well concealed to achieve surprise and should be covered by small arms and anti-tank fire. They are sited by the battlegroup commander and coordinated at divisional level, but laid by units. (3) Nuisance. Laid by all arms to delay and disorganize the enemy, particularly reconnaissance patrols, by introducing a sense of uncertainty and a need for caution, which will have a subsequent effect on morale. All types of mines may be used. (4) Phoney. An area free of live mines used to simulate a minefield or section of a minefield, with the objective of deceiving the enemy. They are marked in exactly the same way as a real minefield The Anti-Armour Plan. In an armoured battle, the battlegroup anti-armour plan must be the basis for the destruction of the enemy armour. It involves the coordination of armoured squadron fire lines, MILAN killing areas and the areas of influence of LAW, to ensure that the maximum amount of anti-armour weapons are brought to bear on the enemy to achieve the destruction intended by the battlegroup commander. The battlegroup anti-armour plan must be tied in with the engagement areas, identified after carrying out IPB, the obstacle plan and the artillery fire plan. Likely roles for the infantry company group are to either fix the enemy or channel him into a specific killing area. Both of these will involve the destruction of enemy armoured vehicles and it is therefore imperative that the anti armour defence is not only sufficiently strong to carry out the task, but is also coordinated to ensure maximum destruction of the enemy Anti-Armour Coordination at Company Group Level. If available, armour is the primary tank killer within the battlegroup, followed by MILAN, but if their respective capabilities are to be exploited to the full then their deployment and use 2-19

94 must be coordinated with LAW. An accurate and well coordinated anti-armour plan, supported by a good trace, is essential Deployment of MILAN. MILAN are ideally suited to form the basis of antiarmour ambushes deployed forward of the main position, as well as forming the core of the anti-armour plan in the main positions. However, if MILAN positions are detected then they will invariably be subject to an infantry assault. Therefore, whenever possible, MILAN positions should be protected by mutually supporting rifle section positions. Reserves The company group commander must have a reserve regardless of its size. This should, whenever possible, be uncommitted to the current battle. This could, therefore, be a complete platoon supported by armour or only a rifle section. The provision of the reserve will be based on the company group commander s assessment of which of his platoons is least critical to the integrity of the defence. The intention to commit the reserve must always be notified to battlegroup HQ as this is a significant event in the conduct of the defensive battle and may well indicate to the battlegroup commander where the enemy main effort is located The Counterattack. a. The reserve will need to be allocated a FUP near its most likely area of commitment. This should be a position which affords cover from view and direct fire. The company group commander will need to know how long it will take for the reserve to reach this position as timing of the launch of a counterattack is a critical factor in the conduct of the defensive battle. b. The objectives of the counterattack are the destruction of the enemy and seizure of the initiative. The company group commander plans counterattacks to meet the predicted course of enemy action. Each counterattack must be a complete plan with routes, a FUP, LD, direction of attack and an assessed objective. Each counterattack should be rehearsed in order of priority. When initiated the counterattack becomes the main effort and receives priority for all available combat support The following additional tasks can be given to a reserve: a. Blocking. A reserve can block a penetration by fire or by manoeuvre. This may create the conditions for the launch of the battalion reserve into the flank of the blocked enemy force. Indirect fire should be used to contain and reduce the penetration. b. Secure Flanks and Rear. The reserve can prepare secondary positions to secure the company group s flanks and rear. These positions must be tied 2-20

95 into the mutual support plan. The reserve may have to secure a flank if a flanking company has been penetrated. c. Support Forward Positions by Fire. The reserve can be positioned where it can fire into gaps between forward positions and on their flanks and rear. d. Other Tasks. The reserve can also assist with other tasks not related to its primary role such as resupply, reconnaissance, liaison and provision of troops for OPs and standing patrols. However, the company group commander must ensure that the reserve has enough preparation and rehearsal time for its probable missions and is immediately available when required. STAP The company group commander will be required to comply with the STAP generated at BG HQ level by the IPB s Event Template. The characteristics of the various surveillance and target acquisition (STA) devices that may be found in the company area of operations can be found in the TAM. There are two types of device: a. Passive. CWS, MILAN MIRA, Spyglass and TOGS. b. Active. MSTAR, hand-held laser range finder (HHLRF) and mortar illumination rounds In the quest for information the STA devices must not be risked unnecessarily. The counter surveillance control measures (CSCM) plan is the mechanism for protecting the devices and the assets that they cue. There are six subject areas for control: radio equipment, non-communications equipment (e.g., MSTAR), white light, fire control orders, vehicle lights and heat and light. These subject areas are then subjected to three levels of control: Measure 1 no use; Measure 2 emergency use only; Measure 3 unrestricted use. Preparation of the Position Commanders in a company group must generally accomplish the following tasks when preparing their positions: a. Physically site each weapon in its fighting positions. b. Establish fire control measures. c. Camouflage positions using natural foliage and netting. d. Clear fields of fire. e. Construct fighting positions to improve available cover and concealment. 2-21

96 Infantry positions must have overhead cover. (If engineer resources are available, tank fighting positions must also be constructed.) f. Reconnoitre and prepare routes between weapon positions. g. Establish Combat Service Support and conduct replenishment during preparations. Prestock ammunition and other needed supplies in platoon and section loads near the fighting positions, with good concealment and overhead cover if possible. h. Coordinate with higher, adjacent and supporting units. Coordinate the locations of platoons, boundaries and fire control measures. i. Conduct rehearsals to practise planned manoeuvres. Digging-In Infantrymen must dig-in even in hasty defence. There is, however, no such thing as The Infantry Trench and the siting and concealment of the trench is more important that its conforming to a standard design. The design must, however, take into account the ground, threat, materials available, equipment, construction time available and the expertise of the troops. Overhead protection should be built for shelter and fire bays whenever possible There is also no standard manning for trenches. The fire team concept lends itself to the construction of four man trenches, and this manning level helps maintain discipline and morale and simplifies sentry and duty rosters. However, the situation will dictate how many trenches are required to cover the task given to the company The shell scrape offers no substitute for a trench. Except in the direst of emergencies, trenches should always be dug. Secondary Positions Secondary positions may be necessary to cover gaps between sub-units, an exposed flank, or possible enemy axes. If time and engineer resources permit, these positions may be pre-dug. The company group commander must ensure that such battle positions and routes to them are reconnoitred, keeping in mind the need to maintain camouflage and concealment. Positions must be prepared beforehand. Snipers Well trained snipers can play a significant role in the defensive battle, but experience has shown that ad hoc sniper teams achieve little. Good snipers will cause a demoralising psychological effect on the enemy, as well as being useful intel- 2-22

97 ligence gatherers. Their deployment and tasks should be coordinated at the highest possible level in order to maximize their effect. NBC The enemy will try to undermine the plan for defence by attacking key battlegroup assets with chemical weapons, probably as part of a preliminary fire plan. Battlegroups should produce coordinated NBC defence plans that take into account vulnerable areas such as key terrain and choke points. Groups must ensure that their NBC equipment is correctly deployed and that basic NBC pre-attack precautions are taken. Battle Cards and Traces In area defence, it is vital that the company group defence is fully coordinated. The easiest way of achieving this throughout the structure of the company group is to use talc gridded battle cards similar to those issued to the MILAN platoon (AF B 9922). These can be used at levels of command from individual fire trench to platoon commander and allow information to be easily copied. To achieve effective coordination, information will need to flow upwards and downwards during their compilation. The company group commander will need to extract and disseminate information (such as TAIs, Decision Points and the STAP) produced as a result of the battlegroup IPB as well as being supplied platoon level information such as weapon arcs, dead ground or problems with covering obstacles with fire. The process of extraction of relevant information and copying can then be repeated down to fire trench level. The company 2IC should compile a company level trace incorporating the information from the platoon battle cards. Cards should also be produced for primary and secondary positions and, if time allows, for any other positions likely to be used. The trace should include the following details: a. Trench locations (with call-signs). b. Obstacles. c. Key weapon system locations e.g., tanks, MILAN, GPMG(SF). d. Counterattack routes. e. Reference points. f. OPs and standing patrol locations. g. DFs and FPF. h. Boundaries. 2-23

98 i. Dead ground. j. Location of trip flares, Claymores, Classic, etc Reserved. SECTION 4. CONDUCT Routine in Defence It is possible that there will be a period of time before battle is joined. During this period strict attention will need to be placed on the routine of defence in order to maintain readiness, combat effectiveness and health. a. Information. There will be a continuing requirement to gain information on the enemy while at the same time denying information to him. The company group will be required to execute the battlegroup STAP within its area of influence by mounting reconnaissance, fighting and standing patrols and OPs. Information is denied by constant attention to camouflage and concealment, strict control of movement and EMCON. b. Communications. Line must be tested regularly. Radios can only be tested within the control measures extant at the time. c. Weapons, Equipment and Inspection. High standards of personal discipline must be demanded. The following activities will need to take place: (1) All personal kit must be kept packed and stored. (2) Weapon inspections should take place regularly on a staggered system. (3) Foot inspections, particularly in extreme weather conditions. (4) Inspection of weapon system and surveillance device functionality. (5) Inspection of ammunition, rations, water supply, personal cleanliness, latrines and refuse pits. d. Rest. Rest must be taken and organized on a duty basis. e. Stand-To. Although stand-to can be ordered at any time, e.g., when an attack is imminent, it is routinely ordered at dusk and just before dawn to cover the change of routine from day to night and vice versa. It normally lasts 30 minutes. Company group commanders should ensure that they check positions in addition to the checks that will be completed by platoon commanders. The 2-24

99 CSM can be a valuable assistant. The following should be checked before stand-to: (1) Every man is present, alert and properly equipped and dressed, including state of NBC equipment. (2) All weapons are manned, properly aligned, bayonets fixed and night sights on or off as appropriate. (3) Ammunition is to scale and readily available. (4) Range cards, arcs of fire and orders for opening fire are in place and understood. (5) Sentries are posted Routine in a 24 Hour Period. A suggested routine for a 24 hour period is at Annex B Once battle is joined the company group commander has two means of influencing events: a. The control and direction of fire. b. The committal of reserves The success of the battle will depend largely on the extent to which the company group commander succeeds in using these resources offensively to impose his own will on the enemy rather than merely reacting to the enemy s initiative. All ranks within the company must be imbued with offensive spirit and be prepared to use their initiative and seize fleeting chances. Control and Direction of Fire Although the fire plan must allow for communications failure and delegated control, the company group commander should control fire whenever possible to conform to his overall plan of battle. Economy of fire must be achieved in low priority areas if the necessary concentration of fire is to be achieved at critical times and places. Fire must not automatically be brought to bear whenever the enemy is seen. Control must be applied: a. To avoid compromising positions unnecessarily. b. To ensure that scarce ammunition, particularly anti-tank natures, is not wasted on unproductive targets. 2-25

100 c. To reinforce the canalizing effect of the obstacle plan and defensive positions; not to halt the enemy everywhere, but to lure him forward into pre-selected killing areas Particular attention will need to be paid to the artillery fire plan to ensure that artillery fire does not obscure other weapon systems. This can be achieved by selective artillery engagement areas. Counterattacks There are two forms of counterattack which will involve the company group: a. Counterattacks involving the use of the complete company group as the battalion reserve. This will usually be when the company group is the depth company of the battalion defence. b. Local counterattacks mounted within the company group s area of operations either by the formal committal of the company group s reserve or on the initiative or subordinate commanders Counterattacks will employ the principles and most of the tactical techniques described in Chapter 1. Offensive Operations. The emphasis will be on speed and momentum, surprise and audacity to wreak maximum damage on the enemy and throw him off-balance. A successful counterattack at the local, company level may well create the circumstances for the launch of a more powerful attack by the battalion reserve Planning. Counterattacks which are key to the defence of the company group s area of operations requiring planning, coordination and rehearsal. The defensive plan should be organized to force the enemy into a position where the counterattack has the best possible chance of success. The timings, responsibilities and the fire plan must be clearly explained in the company group commander s orders. The time and space of the attack is a critical factor and the counterattack force will require minimal movement to begin the assault. The greater the distance the attacking force must move, the more likely the enemy will be able to identify them and react (see Reserves at Section 3 to this Chapter) Timing. The timing of the launch of a counterattack is critical and is probably the single most important decision for the company group commander to take during the conduct of the battle. Launched too early the counterattack force will be vulnerable to enemy action; launched too late the force will have missed its opportunity and the enemy will be able to absorb the attack. To be decisive the counterattack is launched when the enemy is over-extended, dispersed and disorganized. Judging when he is in this state will depend on good information from the company group and the fingerspitzengefuhl of the company group commander. 2-26

101 Reorganization During pauses in the battle reorganization must take place automatically. The following actions will need to occur: a. Re-establish Security. As soon as possible OPs should be re-deployed to maintain visual contact with the enemy and provide early warning of enemy intentions. Liaison should take place with adjacent companies to assess the integrity of the defence across boundaries. b. Man Key Weapons. Losses among crews of key weapon systems must be replaced. c. Treat and Evacuate Casualties. Casualties should receive first aid. If they can continue to fight the lightly wounded should be returned to their positions; all others should be evacuated. The dead should be evacuated or receive field burial as soon as possible to minimise their damaging effect on morale. d. Redistribute Combat Supplies. Ammunition must be redistributed and stockpiled, combat supplies issued. Ammunition should be removed from casualties. e. Positions. During the attack, positions will have been compromised and the activation of secondary and alternative positions should be considered. This may require further adjustment of other positions to ensure mutual support. f. Re-establish C 2. The chain of command must be re-established as a high priority and new commanders appointed to replace those evacuated or killed. If communications have failed, a SITREP must be sent by whatever means to battlegroup HQ. Field telephone wire and communication cords may need repair. g. Repair of Positions and Obstacles. Positions will need to be repaired and camouflage replaced or renewed. Although gaps in wire and minefield breaches should, if possible, be closed they also offer new chokepoints for future enemy manoeuvre and the defensive fire plan should be adjusted accordingly Reserved. 2-27

102 SECTION 5. COMMAND AND CONTROL Command Command Post (CP) Siting. The company group commander must site his CP from where he can best control the battle; communications and security requirements will also impact on this decision. Where possible the CP should be in defilade and concealed from air and ground observation. Routes will need to be allocated and fighting positions prepared in its vicinity. If time allows an alternate CP should be prepared in the event of the primary CP being destroyed or proving ineffective for the exercise of command Position of Commanders. Although the CP will have many C 2 advantages, it may well prove difficult for the company group commander to have a feel for the ebb and flow of battle if he remains in it. The construction of a battle CP should, therefore, be considered from where he can observe events and command more directly. This position should be small and capable of holding the commander, his FOO/MFC, a signaller and a rifleman. Control Orders. The orders process is covered in detail in Volume 1, Pamphlet No. 1, The Infantry Company Group The Fundamentals. Due to the complexities of defensive operations, attendance at O Groups should be maximized to ensure a complete understanding of the company group commander s concept of operations and to allow detailed coordination to take place. The following points are of particular importance: a. Maximum information needs to be given on the enemy so that his tactical doctrine, weapons and equipment, strength and intentions are widely known and understood. b. Intent of superior commander. c. Company group mission and main effort, usually expressed in terms of vital ground. d. Timings. e. Control measures. f. The fire plan and the coordination of fire including priorities, authority for opening fire, arcs and killing areas. g. Deception and security including the STAP. 2-28

103 0286. Control Measures. Control measures are a key component of the defensive plan: a. Fire Control. Fire control measures must be simple or confusion will ensue. These measures can be broken down into, where to fire, when to fire and what to engage. (1) Where to Fire. Range cards must be carefully made out with arcs and areas of responsibility. Each weapon system crew must know precisely within which area it can engage. These areas should overlap, particularly where the ground is broken or visibility is difficult, to avoid any area being left uncovered. Range cards must be related to the ground not a map. Arcs must be tied in with flanking callsigns. (2) When to Fire. The control of fire is of vital importance, both to avoid jeopardising security and to cause maximum impact on the enemy. Enemy targets can be engaged successively by the various weapon systems when they cross certain visible lines on the ground or on order. Fail safe arrangements need to be considered such as use of coloured signal flares. (3) What to Engage. Once the order to fire has been given, weapon systems should engage all enemy within their area of responsibility in accordance with the laid down priorities. Eventually the intensity of battle, target obscuration and the immediate proximity of the enemy will preclude all but opportunity engagements. b. Liaison. Liaison is effected from front to rear and from left to right. c. Other Measures. Other control measures are: (1) Boundaries following clearly defined features. (2) Coordination Points. (3) No fire lines. (4) Minimum safety distances for indirect fire weapons. (5) Clearly defined routes. Communications Communication in its broadest sense will be vital to a successful defence. Unless the company group commander is able to communicate effectively to control fire and launch counterattacks his defence will be short lived. 2-29

104 0288. For most of the preparation period it is likely that radio silence will be imposed in order to preserve security. Maximum use must be made of line. Once in contact with the enemy radio silence may be progressively lifted. Authority for lifting will come from battlegroup HQ. Orders will need to be explicit on the circumstances under which radio silence may be broken, such as by a standing patrol or OP Although line will continue to be used, once battle is joined this method of communication will be progressively cut and radio communications will be the primary method of controlling the battle. Enemy indirect fire is likely to destroy antennas and spares will be needed at all levels Reserved. SECTION 6. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT General A defensive battle can be prolonged and demands a high degree of determination and the will to fight. This requires, in addition to good leadership and equipment, adequate supplies of ammunition, food and water, defence stores, rest and medical care. The main problems associated with combat service support in a defensive battle are likely to stem from the heavy demand for mines, defence stores and ammunition, the vulnerability of echelons to ground and air attack, and the difficulty of movement, particularly by day Although the company group will be supported by the battalion logistic plan there will still be a requirement for commanders at all levels to be logistically resourceful and adaptable. It is unlikely that all the combat supplies needed will be forthcoming and extemporization using local materials is likely to be the order of the day. Work Priorities There will always be a conflict between operational tasks, the work to be done to prepare the position, the time available for the preparation and the troops available to do it. This conflict will require company group commanders to lay down clear work priorities. Although the sequence of work will vary according to the situation and work can occur concurrently, the following table is an example of possible priorities: 2-30

105 Serial Task Comment Dig trenches to Stage 1 Dig CP Clear immediate fields of fire Wiring and mining Help prepare combat support weapon positions Dig trenches to Stage 2 Dig latrines Clear full fields of fire To be completed by 1200 hrs Med wh tcr aval 1000 hrs Collection pty to A1 Ech 1430 hrs Asslt Pnrs 1630 hrs Ammunition The provision and resupply of ammunition will be a critical factor. Consideration will need to be given to forward storage and the protection of such stocks. Resupply once battle is joined will be difficult as ammunition parties will be exposed and thought will need to be given to this aspect during the planning stage. If time allows, crawlways may need to be dug to offer ammunition parties a measure of protection. Defence Stores The collection and distribution of defence stores and the provision of mining and wiring parties will place heavy demands on manpower during the preparation stage. Use will need to be made of local materials such as doors, timber and steel sheeting to supplement supplied defence stores. Close attention will need to be paid to trench construction as this skill is rarely practised. Movement The requirement for movement of stores and supplies will conflict with the requirement for security. Although planning for logistic movement should be based 2-31

106 on replenishment at night, the proliferation of surveillance devices make the cover of dark apparent rather than real. Movement must therefore be minimized and unnecessary traffic, on foot or by vehicle, avoided. Medical Plan Casualty evacuation is likely to be difficult once battle is joined and maximum reliance will have to be placed on first aid at the point of injury. A casualty collection point will need to be sited with cover from direct fire weapons as a minimum requirement. 2-32

107 ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 2 RESERVED DEMOLITIONS Introduction 1. In the formation commander s concept of operations, a number of important terrain features will be critical to the movement of his formation. These features may be bridges, routes or minefield lanes which he decides must be denied to the enemy until they are no longer of use to his own scheme of manoeuvre. The formation commander will reserve the demolition at these points to himself, and will task subordinate commanders to guard them. His staff must then coordinate all aspects of the operation to guard, use and fire each reserved demolition. 2. The guarding and firing of a reserved demolition demands a high degree of judgement by commanders. The demolition guard commander must receive clear orders and must be kept fully informed on the tactical situation at all times. He must be given the maximum available troops, the right task organization and guaranteed communications to be successful in his task. The Threat 3. The enemy must be assumed to have conducted his own IPB and will have selected and possibly reconnoitred his main axis of advance. He will have a shrewd idea of our tactical doctrine and will have made an educated guess as to our likely withdrawal routes and the points at which they cross obstacles. Enemy combat reconnaissance patrols will close rapidly on these points, closely followed by the first echelon forces. At the same time, or in advance, the enemy may mount an airborne or heliborne assault on them. The demolition and its guard will be subjected to artillery and air attack and is a likely target for chemical munitions. Sabotage may also be used. Glossary of Tactical Terms 4. The following terms are used in connection with reserved demolitions: a. Reserved Demolition. A reserved demolition is a demolition which must be controlled at a specific level of command because it plays a vital part in the tactical plan, or because of the importance of the structure itself, or because the demolition may be executed in the face of the enemy. It must, therefore, be protected and its firing controlled. 2A-1

108 b. Authorized Commander. The authorized commander is the commander who has the authority to order the firing of the demolition. He may delegate his authority to a subordinate commander as the battle progresses, in which case the subordinate becomes the authorized commander. c. Demolition Guard. A demolition guard is a force positioned to ensure that a demolition is not captured or sabotaged by an enemy before it has been successfully fired. The demolition guard commander is responsible to the authorized commander for the operational command of all troops on the demolition site, including the demolition firing party. d. Demolition Firing Party. A demolition firing party is technically responsible for a demolition. It is normally an engineer party and is required for all reserve demolitions. e. Uncharged. This is the state of a reserved demolition when it has been prepared to receive charges. These charges are packaged and stored in a nearby, safe place. f. Charged. This is the state of a reserved demolition when charges have been placed. The charges are maintained at one of the following states of readiness: (1) State of Readiness 1 (Safe). The charges have been placed and secured, but are not yet armed. (2) State of Readiness 2 (Armed). The charges have been placed and armed and are ready to fire. The danger of premature firing (caused by the close explosion of a bomb or a shell when the charges are armed) must be balanced against the time required to change from State of Readiness 1 to State of Readiness 2. g. Completion. This means that the demolitions were fired, were effective and that all related tasks in the area, such as mining the approach to the target, have been completed. It is incorrect to think, however, that the firing of the demolitions necessarily completes the intended destruction. Engineers must ensure that the demolition was effective before reporting that the mission is complete. In the event of a misfire, or only partial destruction of the target, the demolition guard must continue to provide protection while the charges are reset or more charges are placed on the target and fired. h. Contact Point. This is the place where withdrawing friendly units make initial contact with the demolition guard and make their final approach to the site. i. Road-Block. This is a position occupied by a friendly unit that controls access into the area. 2A-2

109 j. Firing Point. This is the location from which the demolition firing party commander physically executes the demolition. k. Bridge Guard. This is the unit stationed on and around the bridge to protect it against sabotage or an enemy attack. Forces and Tasks 5. There are two elements to a reserved demolition force: a. Demolition Guard. The task of the demolition guard is to ensure that the enemy does not capture the demolition before it has been successfully blown. The guard will normally consist of an infantry company group and include tanks, an ARV, Javelin, MILAN, FOO and an MFC party. A tank bridge and provost may also be allocated. b. Firing Party. The firing party, usually of section strength, is responsible for the placing and firing of the demolition and will be provided by Royal Engineers. Depending on the engineer effort required elsewhere, the engineers may place the demolitions and circuits and handover detonation to the guard force. Planning and Preparation 6. The demolition guard commander will need to employ the tactical doctrine of the defence in planning the deployment of his guard. The guard must be deployed to give all round protection to the demolition and must include the constant close defence of the demolition itself against sabotage, for example by refugees or special forces, such as frogmen. 7. Once he has assessed the most likely enemy approaches for land, airborne and heliborne attacks, the demolition guard commander must deploy troops forward to cover these approaches and give early warning of attack. He must also consider the coup de main attack. Wherever possible, close air defence weapons should be deployed to cover the threat from both fixed wing aircraft and helicopters. Obstacle plans must be designed to disrupt all means of attack. 8. Any high ground which dominates the demolition from either bank should be occupied. However, in allocating troops to this task the demolition guard commander must ask himself whether the high ground is of such importance that he should spare troops to occupy it. 9. The maximum number of anti-tank weapons should be deployed forward of the demolition. However, the deployment of any vehicles on the far bank of a water obstacle must be carefully considered, especially in anti-armour weapons can give effective anti-tank cover from the home bank. 2A-3

110 10. The guard commander must be aware of the artillery support he can expect at every stage in the defence, but in particular against a coup de main attack. FOOs and MFCs must be deployed to cover likely approaches and possible helicopter landing sites should be adjusted. 11. In conditions of reduced visibility, and by night, it will be necessary to adjust the demolition guard positions to concentrate the force in close protection of the bridge to avoid infiltration. However, this concentration must be balanced against the danger of vacating dominating ground. Some element of the guard equipped with STA devices must be left on the vital ground to ensure that the enemy are not in possession of it when visibility improves. STA devices must also remain deployed on the far bank to give warning on the most likely approaches. 12. A reserve must always be held, in a hide on the home bank, near to the demolition. Its tasks are to counter-attack, to counter heliborne or parachute landings and to reinforce. It must be held ready for immediate counter-attack. Clear orders must also exist for the deployment of any other reserves in support, but not under direct command, of the demolition guard commander. 13. Critical Timings. From the outset the demolition guard commander must be aware of the time it takes: a. To go from State of Readiness 1 (Safe) to State of Readiness 2 (Armed). b. To complete the demolition. To close a minefield lane, cratering and mining will take some time, and he must continue to guard the position until the lane is closed. Conduct 14. Firm control must be imposed on vehicle and foot movement, to keep the route through the demolition clear. The ARV s recovery cables should be pre-laid across the demolition so that any blockage can be cleared with the minimum of delay. 15. A checkpoint is always necessary and it must be sited so that all withdrawing units pass through it. Each withdrawing unit must provide an LO who is in communication with his unit. He must know what sub-units are withdrawing over the demolition, when, and in what order. The checkpoint must be in communication with the guard commander, although not collocated. 16. A road block should be established to ensure that the enemy do not bounce the crossing. In addition, it will probably be required for the control of refugees. Groups of refugees may contain saboteurs. Refugee numbers are likely to be considerable and beyond the immediate resources of the guard commander. A provost detachment and civilian police assistance will almost certainly be necessary, but may not always be available. 2A-4

111 17. Communications between the authorized commander and the demolition guard commander must be guaranteed and, wherever possible, duplicated. Their provision is the responsibility of the authorized commander. Duplication can be achieved by LOs, the engineer net, the artillery net via the FOO, or civilian telephone. 18. Changes of State. Reserved demolitions are normally prepared to State 1 (Safe). They are normally changed to State 2 (Armed) some time before the anticipated time of firing in the interests of a prompt reaction when firing is ordered. Changes of state must be ordered by the authorized commander. 19. Time to Fire. It takes time for the firing party to implement changes in states of readiness. It is the responsibility of the demolition guard commander to ascertain these timings from the firing party commander and to pass them to the authorized commander. He must also make the authorized commander aware of any likely delays between receiving the order to fire and completing the demolition. When issuing the sequence of orders for the firing, the authorized commander can thus allow adequate time for technical procedures on the ground to take place. 20. Firing the Demolition. The demolition will normally be fired upon receipt of a codeword from the authorized commander. This codeword will have been recorded on the AF W9811 on their issue to the demolition guard commander. A proviso may be added to the AF W9811 stating that the demolition may be fired by the demolition guard commander without the receipt of the codeword if the enemy is in the act of capturing the demolition. Once the demolition has been fired, the success or otherwise of the demolition must be passed to the authorized commander. Command and Control 21. If a company group is tasked as a demolition guard, the company group commander is the demolition guard commander. He is under the command of, and reports directly to, a senior commander who will be designated as the authorized commander. The senior man in the demolition firing party is the demolition firing party commander. However, the demolition guard commander has overall responsibility regardless of rank. 22. The HQ initiating the demolition guard mission prepares and provides an order to the demolition guard commander and an order to the demolition firing party commander. It also prepares and provides the demolition firing party commander with a target folder. This normally contains a description of the target, its location and the technical data needed for the placement of charges. The demolition guard commander must be familiar with the information in the target folder and use it when inspecting the demolitions. 23. Orders. Orders for the firing of reserved demolitions are recorded on AF W9811 (STANAG 2107). These forms are prepared by the authorized commander s G3 staff and contain all the necessary orders and coordinating instructions for the 2A-5

112 demolition guard commander and the firing party commander. They also contain the procedures to be used for the delegation of the power of authorized commander. An example of an AF W 9811 is at Appendix Position of HQs. The demolition guard commander, the commander of the firing party and the liaison officer of the authorized commander must be collocated in the same CP. The demolition guard commander must be sufficiently close to the demolition to exercise control and to have unimpeded view from the home side over the demolition site. An alternative CP must be sited and prepared, usually on the far side of the obstacle in case firing has to be from there. 2A-6

113 AF W 9811 APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 2 2A1-1

114 2A1-2