STATE OF FLORIDA OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY POLICY REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS CORRECTIONAL OFFICER STAFFING

Transcription

1 REPORT NO STATE OF FLORIDA OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY POLICY REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS CORRECTIONAL OFFICER STAFFING January 10, 1996

2 The Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability was established by the 1994 Florida Legislature to play a major role in reviewing the performance of state agencies under performance-based budgeting and to increase the visibility and usefulness of performance audits. The Office was staffed by transferring the Program Audit Division staff of the Auditor General s Office to the Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability. The Office is a unit of the Office of the Auditor General but operates independently and reports to the Legislature. This Office conducts studies and issues a variety of reports, such as policy analyses, justification reviews, program evaluations, and performance audits. These reports provide in-depth analyses of individual state programs and functions. Reports may focus on a wide variety of issues, such as: Whether a program is effectively serving its intended purpose; Whether a program is operating within current revenue resources; Goals, objectives, and performance measures used to monitor and report program accomplishments; Structure and design of a program to accomplish its goals and objectives; and Alternative methods of providing program services or products. The objective of these reports is to provide accurate, reliable information that the Legislature or an agency can use to improve public programs. Copies of this report in print or alternate accessible format may be obtained by contacting Report Production by voice at (904) or (800) or (904) /FAX. Permission is granted to reproduce this report.

3 OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY JAMES L. CARPENTER INTERIM DIRECTOR January 10, 1996 The President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Legislative Auditing Committee I have directed that a policy review be made of the Department of Corrections Correctional Officer Staffing. The results of the review are presented to you in this report. This review was made at the request of the Joint Legislative Auditing Committee. This review was conducted by Charles Barrett and Sabrina Hartley under the supervision of D. Byron Brown. We wish to express our appreciation to the staff of the Department of Corrections for their assistance. Respectfully yours, James L. Carpenter Interim Director 111 WEST MADISON STREET ROOM 312 POST OFFICE BOX 1735 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA / SUNCOM FAX 904/

4 OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS AND GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY JAMES L. CARPENTER INTERIM DIRECTOR January 10, 1996 The President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Legislative Auditing Committee I have directed that a policy review be made of the Department of Corrections Correctional Officer Staffing. The results of the review are presented to you in this report. This review was made at the request of the Joint Legislative Auditing Committee. We wish to express our appreciation to the staff of the Department of Corrections for their assistance. Respectfully yours, James L. Carpenter Interim Director Review supervised by: D. Byron Brown Review made by: Review reviewed by: Charles F. Barrett Gloria I. Berry 111 WEST MADISON STREET ROOM 312 POST OFFICE BOX 1735 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA / SUNCOM FAX 904/

5 Contents Summary i CHAPTER I BACKGROUND 1 CHAPTER II CURRENT STAFFING LEVELS 4 Finding 1 Although maintaining an adequate level of staffing is one way the Department of Corrections protects the public from incarcerated felons, the Department operated its prisons during the fiscal year with about 80% of its officer posts filled. The prisons were frequently staffed with the minimum number of officers needed to ensure public safety. 4 Finding 2 When the institutions operate at or near their critical complement, the Department s ability to ensure that inmates follow institution rules and the safety of the public, officers, and inmates is diminished. The Department also must rely on inexperienced or fatigued staff. Furthermore, recent policy changes place additional demands on correctional officers efforts to manage inmates. 9 Finding 3 The primary cause for operating at lower staffing levels appears to be the Department s inability to retain correctional officers. When officers must be replaced, the Department often hires non-certified candidates who are not available to staff the institutions for 13 or more weeks during training. Other factors that cause low staffing are an underfunded relief factor and the practice of intentionally maintaining position vacancies. 15

6 Contents (Continued) CHAPTER III DETERMINING THE NEED FOR CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS 25 The Department relies on an informal process to determine its officer staffing requirements and has not developed written criteria specifying the factors used in determining its staffing needs. Without a more systematic process for assessing the need for correctional officers, the Legislature and other decision makers cannot determine the reasonableness of staffing levels or evaluate the Department s requests for additional staff positions. 25 APPENDICES 27 A. General Information on Major Correctional Institutions 28 B. Response From the Department of Corrections 30

7 Summary No Policy Review of the Department of Corrections Correctional Officer Staffing Purpose Our review addressed four primary questions: What is the current correctional officer staffing level at the state s correctional institutions? What are the consequences of current Department correctional officer staffing levels? What are the causes of current Department correctional officer staffing levels? Does the Department have a process for determining the number of correctional officers needed at its correctional institutions? Conclusions Institutions Operate Below Their Authorized Staffing Levels Consequences of Low Staffing Levels Florida s prisons are operating with a level of officer staffing significantly below the number of staff authorized by the Legislature. The institutions frequently operate at or near their critical complement level of staffing which is intended for short-term situations, when there is a staffing shortage. When an institution has only a critical complement of staff on duty, there are a limited number of officers available to resolve problems or emergencies that arise. As a result of operating at low staffing levels, the Department does not always have enough staff to ensure that inmates are following institution rules, which can increase the danger for staff, other inmates, and the public. We also found that the Department is managing its institutions with a high number of inexperienced officers, who can potentially be manipulated by inmates to break rules; and officers are often asked to work double shifts, a practice that can result in fatigue and diminished alertness. Furthermore, as Florida implements policies designed to increase the punitive effect of incarceration, the burden on -i-

8 officers to maintain control is increased. Although Florida s prison system has been relatively free of major disturbances and escapes, we observed that current staffing levels create numerous situations which could be potentially dangerous for staff, for inmates, and ultimately for the public. Department officials that we interviewed were aware of the potential risks associated with operating institutions at or near their critical complements and were making attempts to increase the security of the institutions. State level officials were monitoring the frequency of escapes and assaults, and, in the statewide security assessment conducted in early 1995, had attempted to identify security needs. The Department has made efforts over the past two years to enhance the perimeter security of its institutions through the installation of additional physical barriers, such as layers of razor wire, at many institutions. Major Causes of Low Officer Staffing Levels Department Does Not Have Written Criteria to Determine Officer Staffing Needs The Department s inability to retain the correctional officers it hires is the primary cause for the low staffing levels of correctional officers in Florida s prisons. A second cause is the use of an outdated relief factor that does not provide enough staff to cover officer absences from work. When combined with these two causes, the practice of some institutions to intentionally maintain vacancies in order to balance institutional budgets creates an ongoing problem of low staffing levels. Although we identified several potential adverse consequences that result from the current level of staffing, we cannot determine whether increasing staff beyond presently authorized levels is necessary to allow the Department to achieve its mission. It is possible that having all authorized positions filled may adequately address the current security needs of the Department. Recommendations Funding the Relief Factor The Department must maintain an adequate level of staffing to ensure the security and safety of its correctional institutions. Therefore, we believe that the Legislature should address those factors that have contributed to the current low levels of staffing. We recommend that the -ii-

9 Legislature establish as a high priority the funding of the relief factor to reflect changes in correctional officer absences since 1968 so that enough authorized positions will be provided to adequately staff all 7-day posts. Reduce Officer Turnover To reduce the rate of officer turnover, the Legislature and the Department should focus efforts on improving the retention of correctional officers. We believe this could be addressed through three primary efforts: Revising policies to discourage newly certified officers from leaving the Department for local government positions after the state has paid salaries and benefits during their certification training period. The Legislature and the Department should consider options that would increase the incentive for trained officers to stay with the Department and reduce the up front costs incurred by the Department to train new officers; Addressing correctional officer working conditions. We recommend the Department increase its efforts to identify and address the working conditions that contribute to officer turnover, in order to increase the retention of correctional officers; and As resources are available, providing funds for the step pay plan. To provide increased incentive for experienced officers to stay with the Department, we recommend that the Legislature consider providing funds to allow the Department to compensate experienced correctional officers in accordance with the step pay plan negotiated by the Department of Management Services and the correctional officers union. Develop Written Criteria to Define Officer Staffing Needs For the Department to efficiently accomplish its mission it must have sufficient staff to provide a safe environment and protect the public, institution staff, and inmates. Written criteria will enable the Department to define its staffing needs and allow decision makers to evaluate the reasonableness of staffing requests. To ensure consistency and to provide a measure for evaluation, we recommend the - iii -

10 Department develop written criteria to determine the number of correctional staff needed. In addition, as conditions, inmates, and institutions change, we recommend the Department conduct assessments of its staffing requirements on a routine basis in order to ensure that security staffing needs are accurately identified. Response to this Review The Secretary of the Department of Corrections agreed with the issues raised in our preliminary and tentative report and described actions the Department is taking to address our concerns. -iv-

11 Policy Review of the Department of Corrections Correctional Officer Staffing CHAPTER I Background The Department of Corrections is responsible for the supervision, protective care, and control of inmates who are sentenced to the Florida prison system. The Department s mission includes the protection of public safety and the provision of a safe and humane environment for staff and inmates. To meet this mission the Department has developed several objectives that include establishing security components commensurate with standards, physical security, and mission requirements; reducing the rate of felony crimes committed by offenders while incarcerated; compensating correctional officers equitably when compared to other state law enforcement officers; and reducing correctional officer turnover. Correctional officers serve as the security force for the institutions and assume charge of inmates. During the fiscal year, the Department operated or had under construction a total of 53 major correctional institutions supervising an average inmate population of 45,303 inmates. 1 The institutions are assigned to one of five regions whose staff serve as advisors and provide oversight to the institutions. The Department operated in fiscal year with an annual budget of $652 million appropriated to its major institutions. The major correctional institutions have approximately 17,000 authorized positions, of which approximately 15,000 are correctional officers. These officers include the ranks of correctional officer, sergeant, lieutenant, captain, major, and colonel. 1 Florida s prison system also includes other correctional facilities such as work camps, community correctional centers, and drug treatment centers. -1-

12 The primary responsibility of correctional officers is to maintain the security and safety of the correctional institution and its staff and inmates. These officers are responsible for the supervision, custody, care, control, and physical restraint of inmates. Depending on their particular duty assignment they are required to supervise inmates in housing units and instruct them in housekeeping and sanitation; supervise inmates performing unskilled and semi-skilled work; counsel inmates regarding institutional, domestic, and emotional adjustment problems; assist in maintaining security by participating in searches to prevent the introduction of contraband; and maintain proficiency in firearms, emergency measures, communication equipment, and other security equipment. To meet the requirements of a correctional officer an individual must be at least 19 years of age, have a high school diploma or its equivalent, be of good moral character, complete training in a certified training program, and pass the state s standardized certification exam. 2 The Department s 53 institutions differ in their inmate population, custody level, and housing design. These differences affect the requirements for resources to efficiently and effectively operate the institution. In reviewing correctional officer staffing, we visited 12 major correctional institutions to observe operations, interview staff, and obtain data relating to correctional officer staffing. 3 A description of the 12 institutions is included in Exhibit 1 and a description of all 53 correctional institutions in included in Appendix A. 2 The requirement to pass a certification exam became effective for officers certified on or after May 15, Other training requirements were established in We also visited Franklin Work Camp and Brooksville Drug Treatment Center but confined our analysis to the major correctional institutions. -2-

13 Exhibit 1: General Information on Major Correctional Institutions 1 Correctional Institution Lawful Capacity Number of Authorized Security Officers June 30, 1995 Ratio of Inmates Per Security Officer Highest Custody Level 2 Housing 3 Apalachee 1, Close Dorms Brevard Close Mixed Broward Close Mixed Cross City Close Mixed Glades 1, Close Open Bay Gulf 1, Close Mixed Jackson 1, Close Mixed Martin 1, Close Cells Polk Close Mixed South Florida Reception Center 1, Close Mixed Tomoka Close Mixed Union 1, Close Mixed 1 The figures presented here do not include work camps, road prisons, or forestry camps. 2 Close custody is the most secure of the Department s three primary custody classifications (minimum, medium, and close). All but four of the state s major correctional institutions house all three classifications of inmates. 3 The Department uses a variety of housing designs within its institutions, which can be labeled either dormitories or cells. Most of the Department s inmates are housed in open bay dormitories, where 75 or more inmates sleep in bunks lined up in a large room. Some institutions have dormitories with smaller rooms. Cell housing units typically place inmates in one or two person cells which can be locked to restrict inmate movement. Most of the state s major institutions in Florida have dormitories with a limited number of cell units. Source: Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability analysis of data provided by the Department of Corrections. -3-

14 CHAPTER II Current Staffing Levels Our review addressed four primary questions: What is the current correctional officer staffing level at the state s correctional institutions? What are the consequences of current Department correctional officer staffing levels? What are the causes of current Department correctional officer staffing levels? Does the Department have a process for determining the number of correctional officers needed at its correctional institutions? (See Chapter III.) Finding 1 Although maintaining an adequate level of staffing is one way the Department of Corrections protects the public from incarcerated felons, the Department operated its prisons during the fiscal year with about 80% of its officer posts filled. The prisons were frequently staffed with the minimum number of officers needed to ensure public safety. Staffing Levels Maintaining an adequate level of officer staffing to manage violent offenders is essential to protecting the safety of the public, as well as the safety of staff and other inmates. When a sufficient number of officers are not available to supervise offenders and to manage prison operations, violence or other criminal activity can occur, and inmates will try to escape. We found that the institutions rarely operate at their authorized security staffing levels. Our analysis of staffing levels showed that, during fiscal year , institutions operated with an average of 80% of their authorized officer posts filled. Furthermore, approximately 31% of the shifts in our sample were staffed with the minimum number of officers needed. -4-

15 The Department uses two terms to describe levels of correctional officer staffing at its institutions: "post pattern" and "critical complement." Post pattern refers to the authorized level of officer staffing assigned to each institution by the Department. The post pattern for each institution is developed by Department central office staff based upon such factors as the design and mission of the institution. The post pattern includes the listing of officer assignments for each shift at an institution. Officers are assigned to posts, such as the institution s control room, inmate dormitories, vehicle gates, and perimeter towers. The number of officers assigned to various posts is determined by informal criteria such as staffing plans for specific types of housing units, maintaining equitable staffing among institutions, experience, and the professional judgment of Department officials. Officers are divided among three 7-day shifts and one 5-day administrative shift. (See Exhibit 2 for an example of a post pattern.) Each institution has set a critical complement, or minimum number of officer posts that are to be filled on each shift. Each institution determines its critical complement with approval from the Department. The critical complement is intended for short-term situations in which there is a staffing shortage due to vacancies, leave, training, or other staffing obligations. The critical complement varies for each institution by shift and is based on determining the posts that must be staffed on each shift. For example, instead of three officers in each dorm as called for by the post chart, the critical complement may call for one officer in each dorm with another officer roving between two dorms. Generally, about 75% of the positions in the post pattern are designated critical. In Section 2 we discuss the consequences that result from institutions operating at their critical complement. -5-

16 Exhibit 2: Sample Post Staffing Pattern 7-Day Posts Tomoka Correctional Institution Post Staffing Pattern June ,131 Inmates 210 Authorized Staff [Critical Complement is indicated in parenthesis - (#)] 1st Shift 12 AM -- 8 AM 2nd Shift 8AM--4PM 3rd Shift 4PM--12AM Shift Captain 1 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1) Control Room 2 (2) 2 (2) 2 (2) Internal Security 2 (2) 3 (1) 2 (1) Perimeter Security 6 (6) 6 (6) 6 (6) Housing (7 dorms) 21 (13) 21 (12) 22 (19) Confinement Unit 2 (2) 2 (2) 2 (2) Protective Management Unit 1 (1) 4 (2) 4 (1) Services Building 0 1 (1) 1 (1) Utility Vehicle Gate 0 1 (1) 0 Escorts 0 4 (2) 0 Total Official 7-Day Posts Total Authorized Officer Positions (1.573 positions for each 7-Day post) 35 (27) 46 (30) 40 (33) 121 = 7-Day posts for all three shifts = Authorized positions to cover 7-Day posts 5-Day Administrative Posts - (19 total): Colonel (Chief Correctional Officer); Administrative Lieutenant; Environmental/Safety Sergeant; Property/Orientation Sergeant; Protective Management Sergeant; Key and Lock Sergeant; Canine Sergeant; Arsenal Sergeant; Headquarters Security Officer; Utility Officer; Mail Room Officer; Security Officer for Industries Area; and Work Squad Sergeant and 6 Work Squad Officers. Source: Daily duty rosters and security post chart from Tomoka Correctional Institution. To review the actual staffing levels at Florida s institutions, we obtained data from the Department and all of the institutions, visited 12 institutions to interview administrators and officers, and interviewed regional and central office staff. We compiled data provided by the Department on the post patterns and the critical complements for all of the institutions operating in fiscal -6-

17 year In addition, we compiled data on a selective sample of staffing daily rosters for 14 days at 44 correctional institutions (50 facilities) for the same period. 4 We then compared the actual staffing patterns to the post patterns and critical complements for each of the institutions to identify to what extent the institutions operated below their authorized staffing levels (post patterns) and at or close to their critical complements. Florida s prisons rarely operate at the authorized level of staffing for the institution. We found that the average number of authorized positions (post pattern) for each shift for the 50 correctional facilities was about 34 officers, but the average number of staff on post duty was less than 28 officers, or about 80% of the authorized posts. Of the 2,055 shifts in our sample, all authorized posts were filled on only 58 shifts, or 2.8%. 5 Twenty-nine facilities were not fully staffed for any of the shifts in our sample. Institutions frequently operate with the minimum number of officers that can safely staff the institution. In our sample, the institutions operated at or below their critical complement on 31% of the shifts. 6 Forty-five of the 50 facilities had at least one shift in our sample that operated at or below the critical complement. (See Exhibit 3 for comparison of post pattern, critical complement and actual staffing at selected institutions.) When an institution is at or near its critical complement, most officers are assigned to posts that they should not leave, and thus are not available to resolve problems or emergencies, such as breaking up fights or escorting inmates to the clinic. Such a situation creates a risk for officers who may not receive prompt assistance from other officers in attempting to subdue an inmate. In addition, because of the temptation 4 Some institutions have two major units that operate somewhat independently from each other. For example, Apalachee Correctional Institution consists of East and West units, and the South Florida Reception Center consists of Main and South units. For the purposes of our analysis, we considered these units separately, and therefore refer to 50 facilities. 5 We did not include 5-day administrative shifts in our review. 6 An institution may operate below the official critical complement in special situations where a position designated as critical may not have been needed. Examples include: closed confinement areas, closed dormitories, or medical escorts not needed. -7-

18 for officers to leave assigned posts to provide assistance to a fellow officer, there is a potential breach of security. Exhibit 3: Comparison of Post Pattern, Critical Complement, and Actual Staffing at Selected Institutions, Fiscal Year Correctional Institution Average Post Positions Per Shift Average Critical Complement Per Shift Average Actual Staff Per Shift Staffed at Post Pattern Percent of Shifts Staffed at or Below Critical Complement Statewide % 30.7% Glades % 58.3% Tomoka % 52.4% Broward % 47.6% Apalachee East % 28.6% Cross City % 26.2% Brevard % 21.4% Martin % 14.3% Apalachee West % 9.5% Polk % 7.1% Gulf % 0.0% South Florida Reception Center (Main) % 0.0% Jackson % 0.0% Union % 0.0% Source: Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability analysis of data provided by the Department of Corrections. Conclusion Florida s prisons are operating with a level of officer staffing significantly below the number of staff authorized by the Legislature. The institutions frequently operate at or near their critical complement level of staffing which is intended for short-term situations, when there is a staffing shortage. When an institution has only a critical complement of staff on duty, there are a limited number of officers available to resolve problems or emergencies that arise. We discuss the consequences of current staffing levels in Section 2, and the primary reasons why the -8-

19 institutions are frequently operating at their critical complement in Section 3. Finding 2 When the institutions operate at or near their critical complement, the Department s ability to ensure that inmates follow institution rules and the safety of the public, officers, and inmates is diminished. The Department also must rely on inexperienced or fatigued staff. Furthermore, recent policy changes place additional demands on correctional officers efforts to manage inmates. Consequences of Current Staffing Levels To determine the consequences of Department staffing levels, we visited 12 correctional institutions to interview all levels of security staff and conduct focus group discussions with correctional officers and sergeants. We conducted visits during weekend and evening hours as well as during the weekdays in order to observe and obtain comments from staff on multiple shifts. Based on these interviews and our observations we identified three major problems associated with the institutions continuously operating at or close to their critical complement: The Department s ability to ensure that inmates follow institution rules, and the safety of officers, inmates and the public is diminished; At some institutions, the Department provides staff coverage that is inexperienced and includes some officers working 16-hour days; and Recent correctional policy changes by the Legislature place additional demands on correctional officers efforts to manage inmates. -9-

20 Operating at Critical Complement Diminishes the Department s Ability to Ensure That Inmates Follow Institution Rules and That Staff, Inmates, and the Public Are Protected Requiring inmates to follow institution rules is integral to maintaining discipline and ensuring the safety of staff, other inmates, and the public. Examples of incidents that could threaten safety include escape attempts, assaults on staff, and assaults on other inmates. Officers try to prevent such incidents by following standard correctional practices designed to minimize the opportunity for their occurrence. The Department has increased the safety to the public by reducing inmate escapes with the addition of security enhancements to the institutions. However, staff and inmates continue to be at risk as indicated by the increases in the number of reported assaults over the past two years. (See Exhibit 4.) Exhibit 4: Reported Incidents at Correctional Facilities Calendar Year Escapes (Major Institutions Only) 1 Inmate Assaults (At All Correctional Facilities) 2 Staff Inmates ,002 1 Escapes in 1992 were annualized based on July-December 1992 data and 1995 escapes were annualized based on January-October 1995 data. 2 Assaults in 1995 were annualized based on January-September 1995 data. Source: Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability analysis of data provided by the Department of Corrections. At current Department staffing levels, we noted several factors that restrict the ability of officers to effectively enforce Department rules and to protect staff and inmates, and ultimately the public, from danger. For example: At 6 of the 12 institutions we visited, one correctional officer supervised 100 or more inmates in an inmate housing unit. In such a setting, officers have difficulty effectively enforcing discipline among inmates, regulating inmate movements and activities -10-

21 within dormitories, and ensuring that inmates follow rules; Correctional officers are required to conduct frequent searches of buildings, inmates, and inmate property to detect the presence of contraband such as drugs, alcohol, and weapons within the prison. At 7 of the 12 institutions we visited, officers told us that such searches are done less frequently when staffed at or close to critical complement; When an institution is staffed at or near its critical complement, there are a limited number of officers who are available to respond to emergencies. If officers respond to a disturbance in one part of the institution, then that typically leaves other parts of the institution vulnerable. As a result, there may not be enough correctional officers to promptly respond to inmate fights, disturbances, or attacks upon staff. As shown in Exhibit 4, the number of assaults by inmates on staff and other inmates has been increasing. Department officials indicated that an individual officer should not attempt to break up fights between inmates until additional officers arrive; and Officers working alone at a post rely on equipment such as radios and telephones to maintain contact with other officers. At 9 of the 12 institutions we visited, we observed or were told of equipment that did not work, such as radios that could not communicate with the control room, or fence motion sensors that did not detect movements. Inexperienced Officers and Officers Working Double Shifts May Affect the Institution s Ability to Carry Out Its Security Responsibilities, Especially When Operating at Critical Complement During our interviews with institution officials and focus groups with officers, officer inexperience and the practice of working double shifts were two issues raised that may affect the security of the institution. Institution officials stated that these factors can diminish the effectiveness of correctional officers in performing their duties. Inexperience can create a problem because many inmates have been in the institution much longer than the officers. The inmates are often more familiar with an officer s -11-

22 responsibilities than are new and inexperienced officers. This gives the inmates the opportunity to manipulate new and inexperienced staff to violate or ignore institution rules. We identified shifts at critical complement in which as many as 8 of the 24 officers on duty were trainees. We were also told by officers that trainees are occasionally asked to perform duties that should be performed by certified officers, such as working the dorm alone, or accompanying inmates as a medical escort. Correctional officers and sergeants cited the number of inexperienced staff as a problem. Personnel data as of June 30, 1995, shows that of the 13,369 correctional officers and sergeants, 22.4% have less than one year experience and 43.7% have five or more years experience. (See Exhibit 5.) In contrast, the state s Annual Workforce Report for calendar year 1994 shows 61% of career service personnel with more than five years of continuous service. 7 Exhibit 5: Experience Levels of Correctional Officers and Sergeants, as of June 30, 1995 Length of Service with the Department Number Percent Less than 1 year 2, % At least 1 year but less than 2 1, % At least 2 years but less than 3 1, % At least 3 years but less than % At least 4 years but less than 5 1, % 5 years or more 5, % Totals 13, % Source: Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability analysis of COPES data. 7 State of Florida Annual Workforce Report. Calendar Year Department of Management Services. -12-

23 Fatigue may cause officers to perform their jobs less diligently. The alertness of officers working double shifts may be diminished, and officers may become indifferent to inmate actions. In order to meet the critical complement, the Department sometimes requires officers to work double shifts (16 straight hours). Although the frequency of such double shifts could not be determined from most of the daily rosters in our sample, we did note at least ten institutions in which officers were working double shifts. At one institution, we noted one 4 p.m. to 12 midnight shift in which 12 of the 21 officers on duty were on their second shift of the day. Recent Legislative Changes in Correctional Policies Place Additional Demands on Correctional Officers Efforts to Manage Inmates One of the primary concerns of corrections officials is the potential for violence that exists within the institutions. Florida s institutions have largely avoided incidents such as group violence, hostage taking, or arson, that endanger staff and the public. However, recent legislative changes have placed additional burdens on the Department. Legislative policy changes in the last few years have: Increased the legal capacity of correctional institutions to 150% of design capacity, potentially placing larger numbers of inmates in areas supervised by each correctional officer; Required offenders to serve a minimum of 85% of their imposed sentences, limiting the amount of gaintime that the Department can use to encourage good behavior; and Restricted the use of Inmate Welfare Trust Fund monies to purchase recreational equipment, potentially limiting the use of recreation as an inmate management activity. Based upon the concerns that we identified at Florida s prisons at current staffing levels, our review suggests that the combined effect of these changes may make it more difficult for the Department to safely and effectively manage institutions with low staffing levels. (See Exhibit 6.) -13-

24 Exhibit 6: Potential Effects of Legislative Policy Changes Policy Change 150% of Design Capacity Serve 85% of Sentence Cannot Use Inmate Welfare Trust Fund to Purchase Recreational Equipment Desired Effect Enable state to house more prisoners in existing space without having to release inmates from prison early to avoid prison overcrowding. Require offenders to serve bulk of sentence without early release. Direct the use of those funds obtained from profits of canteens and inmate phone calls to more beneficial activities such as education and substance abuse treatment. Potential Adverse Effects on Safe Management of Institutions Increases the number of inmates that officers must supervise. Awarding and rescinding gain-time earnings is one of the primary tools for managing behavior; reduced awards may diminish the effects of gain-time. It is easier for officers to supervise large numbers of inmates when the inmates are engaged in recreational activities. Source: Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability. Conclusions Department officials that we interviewed were aware of the potential risks associated with operating institutions at or near their critical complements and were making attempts to increase the security of the institutions. State level officials were monitoring the frequency of escapes and assaults, and, in the statewide security assessment conducted in early 1995, had attempted to identify security needs. The Department has made efforts over the past two years to enhance the perimeter security of its institutions through the installation of additional physical barriers, such as layers of razor wire, at many institutions. Despite these efforts, institutions continuing to operate with correctional officer staffing at or near the critical complement creates several potentially adverse consequences for the institutions. The Department does not always have enough staff to ensure that inmates are following institution rules, which can increase the danger for staff, other inmates, and the public; the Department is managing its institutions with a high number of inexperienced officers, who can potentially be manipulated -14-

25 by inmates to break rules; and officers are often asked to work double shifts, a practice that can result in fatigue and diminished alertness. Furthermore, as Florida implements policies designed to increase the punitive effect of incarceration, the burden on officers to maintain control is increased. Although Florida s prison system has been relatively free of major disturbances and escapes, we observed that current staffing levels create numerous situations which could be potentially dangerous for staff, for other inmates, and ultimately for the public. In the next section, we discuss why staffing levels are below authorized levels. Finding 3 The primary cause for operating at lower staffing levels appears to be the Department s inability to retain correctional officers. When officers must be replaced, the Department often hires non-certified candidates who are not available to staff the institutions for 13 or more weeks during training. Other factors that cause low staffing are an underfunded relief factor and the practice of intentionally maintaining position vacancies. Causes of Current Staffing Levels Inability to Retain Correctional Officers To determine why actual staffing patterns were so consistently below the authorized levels, we interviewed institution administrators, officers, and personnel directors at the 12 institutions we visited, and the fiscal and security staff at each of the five regional offices. We identified three major factors that contribute to the operation of most shifts at or close to their critical complements: the inability to retain correctional officers, an underfunded relief factor, and correctional officer vacancies. The primary cause of low officer staffing levels is the Department s inability to effectively retain the correctional officers it hires. The turnover rate for correctional officers is among the highest turnover rates for employment classes in Florida. The Department of Management Services reported that the annual turnover for correctional officers in 1994 was 22%; the state average for all positions was 13.4%. Furthermore, of 5,087 officers hired in fiscal years -15-

26 and , only 56% (2,861) were still employed by the Department of Corrections as of June 30, Additionally, 35% of the 5,087 officers had left the Department within one year of being hired. (See Exhibit 7.) Exhibit 7: Separations of Officers Hired From July 1992 Through June 1994 (n = 5,087 Officers Hired) Months Until Separation Number Officers Separated Percent Cumulative Percent Separated within 6 months after hiring 1, % 21.3% Separated from 6 to 12 months after hiring % 34.7% Separated after 12 months, but before June 30, % 43.8% Total Separations by June 30, , % 43.8% Source: Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability analysis of COPES data. This inability to retain officers affects staffing levels by creating short-term vacancies. These vacancies lead to extended absences from post assignments if non-certified officers are hired and sent through the 13-week state correctional officer training program. Because of the lack of available certified officers many of the state s institutions hire non-certified trainees and send them to the training program. During this time, trainees occupy authorized officer positions, but are not usually available to perform shift work. The daily rosters of some institutions indicated that up to 19 positions were occupied by non-certified trainees that were attending certification training. According to the Department, the cost for training a new correctional officer averages approximately $9,600, -16-

27 8 including tuition, salary and benefits. Currently, s , F.S., requires that persons hired as officer trainees who leave the employment of the Department on their own initiative within 12 months are required to repay the Department for the cost of tuition. 9 The Department hired over 2,200 trainees in the fiscal year, and thus expended approximately $21 million, or 5% of its salary budget, to train these officers. (See Exhibit 8.) Exhibit 8: Training for Correctional Officers Fiscal Year Number of Correctional Officers Hired for Training Number of Trainees Who Left the Department Prior to 6 Months Prior to 12 Months Number Percent Number Percent Estimated Total Cost of Training Correctional Officers % % $ 7,600, , % % 11,674, ,214 N/A N/A N/A N/A 21,221,190 Source: Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability analysis of data provided by the Department of Corrections. Furthermore, beginning in 1994, individuals seeking correctional officer certification are required to pass a certification examination upon completion of training. Failure of this examination results in immediate termination by the Department. The Department reported that, of the 1,684 candidates taking the exam from October 1994 to March 1995, 312 candidates (18.5%) failed the exam. We estimate that the Department expended at least $3 million on these trainees who were terminated after failing the examination. We identified two factors that appear to 8 Tuition for correctional officer training is set by the community colleges and schools, and can cost up to $800 per officer. Officers in trainee status receive salary (10% below entry level salary) and benefits. 9 The Legislature has made a special appropriation to the Department for use in paying the tuition for officer trainees, and for the purchase of ammunition needed by officers to maintain their certifications. In fiscal year , institutions requested reimbursement for payments of $478,187 for tuition and ammunition, of which $355,360 was reimbursed from this special appropriation. The Department s central office reported that $1,706 was returned to this account from officers who left the employment of the Department prior to serving one year. Institutions may have received additional repayments that were not forwarded to central office. -17-

28 impair the Department s ability to retain officers and contribute to high turnover rates: the competition by local government agencies for correctional officers and certain adverse working conditions within the Department of Corrections. Due to the rapidly growing correctional agencies within the state, local governments compete with the Department of Corrections for the correctional officer labor pool. To compete with salaries offered by local governments, the state provides a competitive area differential (CAD) in those geographical areas where starting salaries for local correctional facilities are high. (See Exhibit 9.) Although state starting salaries appear competitive with most local correctional agencies, those agencies with funded step pay plans for its officers may have a competitive advantage over the Department of Corrections. The Department s step pay plan for correctional officers has never been funded, so that officers with multiple years of experience receive similar pay as newly hired officers. Furthermore, as incarcerated populations grow, there are additional competitive opportunities for correctional officers with the federal government and with private prisons. Correctional officers cited several aspects of the working conditions within the Department as a factor in the high rate of turnover among correctional officers. Based on discussion groups with correctional officers at each of the institutions we visited, we identified the following areas of concern: Apprehension regarding personal safety that is enhanced by the problems associated with low staffing and inexperienced correctional officers; A perceived lack of respect for state correctional officers in comparison with certified law enforcement officers and local correctional officers; The requirement that officers work double shifts to meet critical complement decreases their effectiveness with inmates; -18-

29 The practice of flexing-out overtime hours within the pay period rather than paying overtime disrupts personal schedules without providing compensation for the officers; and Institutional equipment such as radios, vehicles, phones, locks, and alarms is inadequate and in a state of disrepair. Exhibit 9: Comparison of Department of Corrections and County Certified Correctional Officer Minimum Salaries (as of March 1995) Region Number of Institutions Department Minimum Starting Salary County Starting Salary Ranges I Institutions Without CAD1 16 $18,109 Institutions With CAD $11,500 - $18,920 II Institutions Without CAD 15 18,109 $14,500 - $21,283 Institutions With CAD III Institutions Without CAD 4 18,109 $16,000 - $22,526 Institutions With CAD 2 21,909 IV Institutions Without CAD 2 18,109 Institutions With CAD ,109 24,409 $17,917 - $26,556 V Institutions Without CAD 6 18,109 $16,500 - $24,002 Institutions With CAD 2 20,909 1 Competitive Area Differential (CAD) - a pay incentive applied to specific employment classes at select institutions aimed at improving the Department s competitiveness with local law enforcement agencies. Source: Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability analysis of data provided by the Department of Corrections. -19-

30 Underfunded Relief Factor A second major cause of low officer staffing at the institutions is an underfunded relief factor. The relief factor is a mathematical calculation used to determine the number of full-time officers that are required to fill each 7-day post. During the fiscal year, institutions were staffed using a relief factor that was calculated in 1968 and did not allow for absences due to administrative leave, disability leave, leave without pay, and training. The 1968 relief factor had determined that positions were required to fill each 7-day post, based on a 40-hour work week adjusted for officer absences due to holidays, annual leave, and sick leave. (See Exhibit 10.) Exhibit 10: Calculation of the Relief Factor 1968 and 1994 Year Days Not Working Days Off (2 per week) Holidays Annual Leave Sick Leave Other Leave (administrative, disability, leave without pay) Training Not Included 3.95 Not Included 5.00 Total number of days per year not working Total number of days per year working Relief Factor (365/Total number of Days Working) Source: Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability analysis of data provided by the Department of Corrections. -20-

31 For the fiscal year, the Department calculated a relief factor of that included an allowance for all correctional officer normal leave time. This relief factor represents an average increase of nine positions per institution when compared to the relief factor. In 1995, the Legislature provided funds and authorized positions to increase the relief factor from to 1.60, at a cost of $6.2 million. While this adjustment will provide an average of three additional officer per institutions, institutions will still be short by an average of six officers per institution. Vacancies The third major cause of low officer staffing is that some institutions intentionally maintain vacancies for long periods of time. Personnel directors and superintendents at 6 of the 12 institutions we visited stated that their institutions intentionally maintain vacancies in order to balance their budgets. These administrators stated that two funding issues create the need to maintain vacancies: the lapse factor reduces the amount of salary dollars available, and the need to reserve salary dollars to pay overtime. The lapse factor represents an adjustment for staff attrition in annual legislative appropriations for state agencies. For , the Department s appropriation for authorized positions was subject to a lapse factor, reducing the salary dollars available to fill officer positions by 2.7%. Salary dollars available to fill officer positions are also reduced by the overtime payments to officers who are required to work in excess of 80 hours per pay period. Overtime is necessary to meet the critical complement or to respond to crises such as inmate disturbances or escapes. In fiscal year , the Department expended approximately $10 million for overtime, or 2.2% of the total salary amount for 52 facilities. (See Exhibit 11.) The combined effect of the lapse factor and overtime is that institutions have approximately 95% of the total dollars needed to maintain all authorized positions, which equates to approximately nine officer positions per institution. -21-