Archived Content. Contenu archivé

Transcription

1 ARCHIVED - Archiving Content ARCHIVÉE - Contenu archivé Archived Content Contenu archivé Information identified as archived is provided for reference, research or recordkeeping purposes. It is not subject to the Government of Canada Web Standards and has not been altered or updated since it was archived. Please contact us to request a format other than those available. L information dont il est indiqué qu elle est archivée est fournie à des fins de référence, de recherche ou de tenue de documents. Elle n est pas assujettie aux normes Web du gouvernement du Canada et elle n a pas été modifiée ou mise à jour depuis son archivage. Pour obtenir cette information dans un autre format, veuillez communiquer avec nous. This document is archival in nature and is intended for those who wish to consult archival documents made available from the collection of Public Safety Canada. Some of these documents are available in only one official language. Translation, to be provided by Public Safety Canada, is available upon request. Le présent document a une valeur archivistique et fait partie des documents d archives rendus disponibles par Sécurité publique Canada à ceux qui souhaitent consulter ces documents issus de sa collection. Certains de ces documents ne sont disponibles que dans une langue officielle. Sécurité publique Canada fournira une traduction sur demande.

2 March-April 1978

3 EMERGENCY n PLANNING in Vol. 5, No. 2 March-April 1978 Contents Earthquake Study in Quebec America's Electrical Lifelines The Day After Doomsdas German CEP Concept 1977 DR. G. BUCHBINDER. R. B. CLANAHAN B. D. CLAYTON P. MENKE-GLOCKERT Published by: EMERGENCY PLANNING CANADA Ottawa, Ontario Director General: Victor J. Walton The EMERGENCY PLANNING DIGEST publishes six editions annually to provide current information and reference material on a broad range of subjects dealing with civil emergency planning. Copies may be received regularly by written request to Emergency Planning Canada, Ottawa, Ont. K1A OW6. In addition to publishing articles which reflect Canadian policies Digests may also publish articles by private individuals on subjects of interest to emergency planning programs. Such DIGEST articles and views expressed by contributors are not necessarily subscribed to by the Government of Canada. Editor: Alex. M. Stirton Minister of Supply and Services Canada 1978 ISSN K1 A OS9 EMERGENCY PLANNING DIGEST / March-Apri

4 EARTHQUAKES IN A QUEBEC HYDRO DEVELOPMENT Earthquates induced by reservoir filling: The first documented in Canada by Dr. Goetz Buchbinder* Thanks to the great number of seismograph in use in the Manic dam area, more than a thousand other earthquakes have been recorded. In this article it is shown that all these earthquakes were generated, by the waters of the reservoir, which leads us to the conclusion that these are the first earthquakes to have been induced in this way in Canada. On October 23, 1975, a magnitude 4.1 e,arthquake occurred 10 km upstream from the Manic 3 dam beneath the reservoir. Although earthquakes of this magnitude are not uncommon in eastern Canada, this one was important for three reasons: it was the second largest event to occur in this region; it happened while the reservoir was being filled; it was predicted by an Earth Physics Branch seismologist. It was, in fact, the first documented example in Canada of an earthquake induced by reservoir filling. Since the hydroelectric development of the Manicouagan River in Québec began in 1960, two dams of over 100 m in height have been built, and two very large reservoirs filled. The Manicouagan River flows into the St. Lawrence River at Baie Comeau, and the two big dams, Manic 3 and Manic 5, are about 500 km north east of Québec City. The general region around Baie Comeau has shown seismic activity in the past. At the time of the construction of the Manic 5 dam in 1967, it was known that a small number of large reservoirs elsewhere in the world had induced earthquakes, although it was unclear what caused this. The 214 m high Manic 5 dam at the head of the Manicouagan was completed in 1968 and the impounding of the reservoir continued for the next 10 years. In 1974 it became possible to install a seismograph station (MNQ) near the dam. The signal from the seismograph was sent by telephone line to the Seismological Service's Data Laboratory in Ottawa where it was recorded. By the time the station was installed, it was too late to monitor the *Dr. Goetz Buchbinder is a section head in the Division of Seismology and Geothermal Studies of the Earth Physics Branch of the Dept. of Energy Mines and Resources. He has written numerous scientific papers, most on seismological topics, seismicity of the empty Manic 5 reservoir, but the data did show that the full reservoir did not generate any earthquakes. In 1970 the 108 m high Manic 3 dam 90 km south of the seismograph station MNQ was begun. During the construction period a large number of construction blasts were set off in the vicinity of the dam, and most of these were recorded by MNQ. Since such blasts look very similar to shallow earthquakes on a seismogram, they had to be carefully identified. Hydro-Québec supplied a list of all blasts to Earth Physics Branch (EPB) seismologists, who compared the lists very carefully with the events recorded on the seismograms. It was established that no earthquakes occurred during this time near the dam or reservoir areas. This tranquility was upset in mid-september when EPB seismologists recognized for the first time that small signals were appearing on their records that were not explained by the blasts listed by Hydro-Québec. The new events were small earthquakes about 80 km from MNQ. Consultation with Hydro-Québec officials revealed that the Manic 3 reservoir had started filling on August 5. The seismologists immediately suspected that the new small earthquakes were being caused by the rising water behind the dam. Throughout September and October EPB seismologists carefully monitored the seismic signals coming from Manic 5, and noted with concern that the number of earthquakes continued to increase rapidly. Early in October, the seismologists became convinced that the sequence was a typical case of induced seismicity. Hydro-Québec officials were informed daily, and on October 20, Dr. Gabriel Leblanc, the EPB seismologist in charge of the project, became sufficiently concerned to write to Hydro-Québec formally advising them of 2 EMERGENCY PLANNING DIGEST / March-April 1978

5 Aerial photo of the earthfilled Manic 3 darn. The dam height is108m. his opinion and of the possible risk of more serious earthquakes to come. EPB decided to deploy additional portable stations around the reservoir as soon as the field and logistic arrangements could be made. In consultation and cooperation with Hydro- Québec personnel three other portable seismic stations were deployed near the area of seismicity on October 24. Because of servicing needs, the new stations had to be installed near roads, to the west and south of the region showing the recurring earthquakes. Unfortunately the largest earthquake of the sequence, a magnitude 4.1 event, occurred just the day before on October 23, while the field installations were underway. A magnitude 4.1 earthquake would not normally be expected to do any damage; nevertheless, Aerial photo of concrete Manic 3 dam, looking north. EMERGENCY PLANNING DIGEST / March-April

6 Hydro-Québec undertook a careful inspection of their dam and hydroelectric installations. No damage was found. As far as we can determine the earthquake was only felt out to 15 km from the source. This itself is unusual; events of that size are generally felt more widely. The magnitude 4.1 earthquake was followed by a large number of smaller events, many of which were located with the help of the three new stations. All were about 10 km upstream from the Manic 3 dam under the reservoir and were only one to four kilometres deep. This information made it very likely that the earthquakes were being induced by the water in the reservoir. Although a magnitude 4.1 earthquake is too small to cause damage, because of seismic activity related to other large dams, it caused great concern. In 1939 the reservoir behind the 221 m high Hoover Dam in Arizona caused a magnitude 5 earthquake, about three years after the impounding began. A more recent example is the 103 m high Koyna Dam in India. Continuous seismic activity began after the impounding of its reservoir with a magnitude 6.3 earthquake occurring unexpectedly four years later. This extensively damaged the hydroelectric facilities, killed about 200 people and left thousands homeless. In all, about 10 per cent of large reservoirs with dam heights over 100 metres have produced seismic activity. Unfortunately at present it is still not possible to determine ahead of time which sites will be safe from reservoir induced earthquakes and which will not. The Manic 3 example of induced seismicity is already unique. The activity started when the water level was only 55 m high and the largest event occurred when the level was at just 80 m. Although obviously no prediction as to future activity can be made, two extreme scenarios were envisioned. In the worst case, the 4.1 event would be only a forerunner of more and larger events to come. In that case all that can be done is to watch the seismic activity closely and to hope that a large event will be foreshadowed by an increase in the number of small events. The other extreme scenario was that the 4.1 magnitude event was the largest that would be produced, that it relieved most of the stresses under the reservoir, and that it would be followed by both gradually decreasing numbers and magnitudes of earthquakes. Initially it was not possible to distinguish between these alternatives, but after almost two years of field work and analysis, it appears at present that the latter scenario is the one that the reservoir is following. The Earth Physics Branch has recorded more than 1,000 induced earthquakes under the reservoir, but such earthquakes are now widely separated in time and remain very small. The three portable seismic stations continued to operate until the end of March 1976, with a one month break in mid-december to mid-january. Their data have permitted locating the earthquakes reasonably well; if a station had been on the east side of the reservoir the results would have been much better, but because of the absence of roads this was not possible. Other geophysicists in the EPB became interested in this example of induced seismicity and planned experiments in the Manic 3 reservoir area, in the hope of learning more about the nature of earthquakes. They decided to re-run some old leveling lines to search for possible changes in elevation, magnetotelluric stations were installed, and the Geodetic Survey undertook a precise triangulation survey around the reservoir where the earthquakes were occurring. For this purpose several hilltops were cleared to give access by helicopter. These little landing pads were also ideal for an expanded seismograph array, with seismometers installed on six hilltops and the seismic information transmitted by radio to a base station where all six channels were recorded magnetically. The Geodetic Survey established the triangulation points to a precision of about 3 cm. Thus if an earthquake of magnitude 5.5 or larger occurred it would produce displacements larger than this, which resurveying of the net would delineate. The magnetotelluric stations ran for a year, but no anomalies were observed. The level line also revealed no changes in elevation. The telemetered seismic station net of the Seismological Service has now operated for a year and permitted the small earthquakes to be located with confidence and precision. One station had been operating on an island in the reservoir, practically in the centre of the cluster. This has permitted the depths to be calculated to within one half a kilometre and confirmed that they are indeed shallow, between 0.5 and 4 km deep. As a result of all the seismological data that have been collected at Manic 3, EPB seismologists conclude that the earthquakes have occurred mostly near and under the reservoir. Their frequency is still decreasing. And they are unusually 4 EMERGENCY PLANNING DIGEST / March-April 1978

7 shallow, from 0.5 km to 4 km deep, spread out over an area of about 6 km in diameter. Since the faults in the area have not yet been mapped in detail, a correlation between earthquakes and faults is not yet possible. Satellite photos of the region show, however, a band of lighter shades trending East North East crossing the reservoir just where the earthquakes occur. Future studies may show this to be of significance in relating the earthquakes to geologic structure. There is not yet enough data to make statements about the orientation of the faults on which the events occur. However, the absence of earthquakes before filling the reservoir, and the extremely shallow depth of the events, lead seismologists to conclude that the earthquakes were induced by reservoir filling, the first documented example in Canada. Since the earthquakes started when the water level was only at 55 m, it appears that the pressure due to the load is not responsible, but rather the availability of water at pressure, that is fluid injection, is responsible for the earthquakes. The conventional wisdom that a head of at least 100 m of waters is needed to induce earthquakes has clearly been proved false, The realization that induced seismicity is a potential risk in Canada is a vital piece of knowledge. In the future, reservoirs that may be candidates for induced seismicity should be closely monitored. A current cooperative project between the Baie James Corporation and the Earth Physics Branch is the monitoring of seismicity in the vicinity of the LG 2 damsite. This first dam of the vast hydroelectric project on the east shore of James Bay will have a height of 150 m. So far as is known, the region is one of low seismicity, but nonetheless one in which the stresses in the crust are rather high. Whether the region will experience any induced earthquakes with the filling of the dam is something only time and the seismometers will tell. Reprinted from GEOS, a quarterly concerned with earth's resources produced by Energy, Mines and Resources Canada. EMERGENCY PLANNING DIGEST / March-April

8 AMERICA'S ELECTRICAL LIFELINES by Russell B. Clanahan United States De fense Civil Preparedness Agency The material in this article is based on information supplied by Lori O'Neill, Industrial Mobilization Specialist with the Defense Electric Power Administration, interviews with various electric power industry and Federal Government officials, and printed source materials available industry-wide. Some things never change. We Americans like it that way, and basic optimists that most of us are, we tend to take things for granted. Like electric power at the snap of a switch. And reliable electrical communications. And most of all, the security and convenience of living in the most powerful and technologically advanced nation on earth. These comforting assumptions, and many more, could end in a flash - the flash of a nuclear attack on the United States, producing blast and heat damage, radioactive fall-out, and a nuclearproduced electrical impulse called EMP which could knock out key electrical equipment throughout the Nation. Without proper planning and preparations, this nuclear electrical blow could cripple power and some telecommunications systems in much of the United States - right down to the TV and electrical appliances in your home. Blast or fire would destroy or damage equipment in or near areas of detonation, radioactive fallout could keep repairmen from venturing outside to fix less damaged faciliiies, and EMP, or Electromagnetic Pulse, could knock out sensitive components of electrical networks over vast areas far from any detonation. What is the electric power industry doing to cope with the nuclear threat, and maintain vital service? What agencies are helping to coordinate emergency planning efforts? Small Agency,l3ig Job The key coordinating role is held by the Defense Electric Power Administration (DEPA), a tiny agency in peacetime within the U.S. Department of Interior with a very big war-time mission. Its job is to provide leadership, recruit and train skilled war-emergency personnel, and crosspollinate essential information within electric companies and cooperatives nationwide to help prepare some 3,500 electric utilities to operate in a nuclear war environment. The agency also monitors major peacetime disasters to coordinate the maintenance or restoration of electrical service to stricken areas. To do this job, DEPA is organized into nine geographical power areas whose boundaries roughly correspond to the power pools of the continental United States, plus personnel in Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Volunteers in each power area who are regularly employed in the electric power industry also serve as "special Government employees" without compensation. They would become fulltime Federal employees in DEPA if the United States were attacked or if a civil defense or other major emergency were declared by the President. Each power area is headed by a volunteer DEPA Power Area Director and deputy directors. Volunteer Regional Power Liaison Representatives work with the regional offices of the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency and the Federal Preparedness Agency (nuclear and wartime civil preparedness functions), and with regional representatives of the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (peacetime disaster relief activities). The Director of DEPA appoints State Power Liaison Representatives to work with each state civil emergency organization. Major Utility Representatives are appointed by each Area Director to represent major electric utilities in his power area. Through this network, preparedness activities or power companies and cooperatives and the federal, state, and local governments are closely coordinated. Utility Industry Involvement Is Essential The use of volunteer personnel from electric utilities by DEPA reflects the agency's origin. 6 EMERGENCY PLANNING DIGEST / March-April 1978

9 The Canadian Situation - National Energy Board Survey This article deals with EMP, the brief electromagnetic pulse of radiation emitted by the detonation of a nuclear device, and its potential effects on electric power systems in the United States. At the request of Emergency Planning Canada, a staff member of the National Energy Board conducted a telephone survey of selected major Canadian power utilities to determine what steps, if any, they were taking to guard against this hazard. Some Canadian utilities were aware of the problem, some were not. Several respondents mentioned that the growing use of solid-state control devices would render power systems increasingly vulnerable to disruption by electromagnetic pulse. No Canadian power utility, however, reported having taken any specific steps to guard against EMP. Some utility representatives were of the opinion that normal shielding and lightning protection should be at least partially effective against it. In general there seemed to be a need for additional technical information on EMP. DEPA was created in 1950 and reactivated in 1959 at the request of the power industry to help it do the preparedness planning to survive a nuclear attack which the utilities recognized they could not do by themselves. It also reflects the Federal Government's conviction that it could not operate or rebuild electric systems without the aid of the industry, thus making cooperation a vital necessity. This close cooperation with government in planning to cope with emergencies is an extension of a longtime power industry tradition and practice of mutual aid to one another. Although the power reliability of the industry as a whole is better than 99 percent, the utilities know that electric power generation - and especially distribution - are peculiarly vulnerable to dangerous weather or other disaster situations. By working closely with governments through DEPA, the utilities make sure their own survival planning is compatible with that of other power companies and with the overall planning of governments. Skills are sharpened, information exchanged, and planning objectives re-examined at special training workshops for electric utility personnel held by DEPA several times each year in various American cities. Federal, state, and local personnel with emergency preparedness and civil defense assignments usually attend these sessions, and often participate with power personnel in simulated exercises to test decision-making and problem-solving under pressure. At a policy level, DEPA and the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency have joined in research into the vulnerability of the electric power industry to nuclear weapon effects, and the level of preparedness of the industry to meet the situation. The two agencies have also produced a study entitled The Prototype Plans for Production and Maintenance of Electric Power in Crisis Relocation. This study, which deals with DCPA's major Crisis Relocation Planning program to move people out of major target areas to safer locales if nuclear attack threatens, concluded that electric power would be adequate in any such population dispersal. Built-In Emergency Preparedness Individual electric utilities vary considerably in the sophistication of their disaster planning and facilities. Most all of them have disaster procedures to cope with the type of emergencies they would normally expect in their service area, though smaller systems usually plan to rely party on outside help in a big emergency. Larger systems usually have redundant land-line and radio backup control circuits for their key switching facilities, EMERGENCY PLANNING DIGEST / March-Apri

10 with special communications to the civil defense and public safety elements of the local and State governments in their service areas. Often they have protected and self-sustaining alternate company headquarters at a site remote from wellpopulated areas. Perimeter security is included at some key facilities such as power control centers and nuclear generating stations. Their personnel are trained to use radiation detection instruments and decontamination procedures in case some radioactive products should escape. Generally, electric power industry spokesmen believe the electrical capacity of their systems would continue to meet Americans' need for electricity - with some interruptions - even if a nuclear attack should occur, They point out that the same nuclear detonations that knock out parts of their systems would also reduce their electrical load, so remaining capacity would probably be more than adequate. Radioactive fallout would likely delay outside repairs where lines were down or substations knocked out. Where distribution equipment was undamaged, however, switching and use of alternative circuits, such as occurs after storms or other peacetime crises, are believed to be capable of maintaining service. There is one big "if" in the electric utilities' generally "can-do" view of the nuclear threat. This is EMP. Widespread Threat of EMP Electromagnetic Pulse is produced over wide areas when a high-yield nuclear weapon is detonated just outside the atmosphere. (Those detonated within the atmosphere would have an effect over a much more limited area.) The electromagnetic radiation, which is crudely similar to the waves radiated by local lightning or a broadcast station, is radiated downward from the upper atmosphere to the earth's surface. The waves are not considered dangerous to any living thing, and, in fact, represent only about one-millionth of the energy in a nuclear detonation. Why, then, all the fuss? First, the EMP waves extend over a far wider area than any other nuclear effects. For example, a nuclear burst 80 kilometres high (49.7 miles) roughly over Omaha, Nebraska, would have a radius of EMP effects extending approximately from Detroit on the east to Salt Lake City on the west. A similar burst 200 kilometers high (124.2 miles) would result in an Electromagnetic Pulse affecting the entire continental United States and far into Canada, Mexico, and out to sea. Second, the EMP from a high altitude burst would occur and then disappear more quickly than lightning - a tiny fraction of a second. Though it would involve less electrical energy than a single lightning stroke, the EMP would test the weakest components of power systems throughout the United States, and disable the more susceptible parts (unlike lightning, which causes only localized damage). Because it is faster than lightning, EMP might knock out even components protected by some lightning arrestor devices, particularly older types unable to activate themselves fast enough. Engineers now believe, however, that most lightning arrestors would be able to prevent serious EMP damage to most units of typical power nets. Consequently, power companies are building in additional EMP protection to their generating and distribution networks only when normal replacement of equipment is scheduled. This is because of the cost involved to do otherwise, and the degree of partial protection which exists naturally. The main EMP problems are in the circuits, computers, and transistorized (solid state) devices used to control the generation and distribution of power in a modern system, and the interchange of power with other companies or cooperatives in a pool. To understand the hazards to such devices, it is necessary to know how EMP works. EMP normally is induced in power or communications systems via long conductors, such as antennas or overhead power lines which act like antennas. Even such structures as metal guy wires, structural steel building supports, buried pipes and cables, building wiring, power conduits, metal fencing, and railroad tracks can serve as conductors for EMP. When these conductors are hooked to sensitive power control devices - by design or unintentionally - EMP can produce a split-second power surge far exceeding the design capacity of the devices. Less sophisticated equipment, such as older types using vacuum tubes or electro-mechanical devices, is less affected or completely unaffected by EMP. Basic Views on EMP Protection Electric utilities vary considerably in the degree to which they have faced up to EMP. Generally, the following observations can be made, based on 8 EMERGENCY PLANNING DIGEST / March-April 1978

11 talks with utility officials and the staff and contract personnel of DEPA and DCPA: The utilities are doing no retrofitting, which would involve going back and placing EMP protective devices in existing power lines, substations, and similar field facilities. No reliable estimates even exist of the astronomical cost of such a program if it were undertaken on all American power systems. It is generally agreed that the power generating stations are not at serious risk from EMP. Since the transformers on electric poles which step down power voltage for normal household use are not very effective barriers against EMP, it is probable that consumer appliances and industrial equipment might be extensively damaged. This is especially true of delicate motors and solid state devices, such as stereos and televisions (which might also pick up EMP from their outside antennas). If there were enough nuclear attack warning time, disconnecting this equipment from antennas and pulling master switches might save it. Electric utilities are becoming very familiar with the EMP threat. The larger companies, especially if they have computer control equipment, are studying or have already installed EMP protective devices in their control circuits. For the most part, however, they rely on their manufacturers of electrical equipment to research and improve its EMPprotective characteristics. Thus, vulnerability to EMP will be only gradually reduced as new equipment is installed. The Defense Communications Agency and the military services have made special provisions to protect their power and telecommunications circuits against EMP, and to provide backup power facilities for strategic facilities. Much of the more recent data on EMP remains theoretical because the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty forbids nuclear detonations in the atmosphere which could verify the data. EMP can be simulated for some testing purposes, however. EMP would also have some effect on various forms of telecommunications, but, again, much of the data are not fully verified. Bell Telephone Laboratories has done extensive work on EMP's effects on land-line and microwave telephone communications. The Bell System has tentatively concluded that the protective devices already built into its system are sufficient to protect against EMP as well. Broadcast stations, with their large antennas, would also be subject to severe EMP damage. The Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, which has provided fallout protection and auxiliary power for some 600 key broadcast stations in the United States to assure that survival instructions could reach the public in a nuclear emergency, is also starting a program to protect these stations against EMP. Ten prototype stations are now being equipped with EMP protection. In addition, DCPA has a $200,000 contract with the Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory to build EMP protection into 50 more broadcast stations in Fiscal Year 1977 as part of a program to protect all 600 stations. Electrical disruptions of whatever kind, if significantly lengthy, would severely test Americans' traditional ingenuity in facing emergencies. The economy, industry, our daily mode of living, the general recoverability of modern America, and the technological edge we enjoy over potential opponents - all are closely tied to our electrical lifelines. If, as Napoleon once said, armies march on their stomach, it is equally true that modern societies mobilize with communications and electric power to meet an adversary. How well the partnership of the utilities and government manage to keep these vital services operating in a war emergency could determine whether we would prevail. EMERGENCY PLANNING DIGEST / March-April

12 PLANNING FOR THE DAY AFTER DOOMSDAY Abandoning hope that nuclear war can be prevented may be the only hope for prevention by Bruce Douglas Clayton" If you examine the cover of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists magazine, you will find in the upper left corner the Bulletin Clock, "symbol of the threat of nuclear doomsday hovering over mankind." Currently, the clock stands at nine minutes to midnight. Should this clock ever strike twelve, it will mean that the thermonuclear destruction is raining down on the world, and possibly civilization as we know it is coming to an end. And then what? The design of the Bulletin Clock clearly implies that after midnight there is nothing. There is no dot to mark one o'clock, and no room on the clock's face to accommodate the hands if they swing past the twelve. In this the clock not only symbolizes the threat of nuclear doomsday, but also the mind-numbing assumption that nothing, and no one, can survive a full-scale thermonuclear war. bulleti OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS a magazine of science and public affairs This assumption, which I will call the no survivors myth, is one of two paralyzing prejudices which have afflicted the disarmament community for many years, and which I believe are responsible for the utter lack of success of disarmament efforts to date. The second prejudice, the prevention myth, in company with the no survivors myth has locked the disarmament community into a position of mental rigidity to which the public will no longer listen and the government cannot respond. By the no survivors myth I refer to the widelyheld belief that a nuclear war will mean the utter *Bruce Douglas Clayton is working on his Ph.D. in ecology at the University of Montana. Reprinted by permission of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Copyright 1977 by the Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science. destruction of the warring powers, the annihilation of their populations, the poisoning of the biosphere with lethal radioactive contaminants, and a high probability of the extinction of Homo sapiens. I also use the term to refer to variants of this theme, usually phrased in terms of "The survivors will envy the dead," or "Who wants to live like a savage in a radioactive wasteland?" The prevention myth is the assumption that it will somehow be possible' to end the arms race, put a stop to nuclear proliferation, dismantle all existing weapons, and thereby eliminate the threat of nuclear doomsday. This is very closely allied to a third myth, the deterrence myth, which is adhered to most strongly by Defense Department strategists. Both are natural corollaries of the no survivors myth, since if the no survivors myth is true our only hope lies in somehow avoiding the war. These myths are usually presented in the form of the classic arms control argument, "There will be (no survivors myth) if we don't (prevention myth)." This is certainly a simple and compelling argument at first glance, but it rests on the unstated assumption that the myths can be backed up by facts if necessary. This assumption has been questioned all too rarely. Unfortunately, these myths are so universally accepted that they amount to articles of faith within disarmament circles. To dispute them is to invite denunciation of such an angry nature it makes the ancient habit of burning heretics at the stake seem mild by comparison. For instance, when the National Academy of Sciences published its report on the long-term effects of nuclear warfare last year, they were reviled for concluding that there is no single effect of such a war which could be relied upon to exterminater mankind.l A public information letter from the Federation of American Scientists ex- 1National Academy of Sciences, Long-Term Worldwide Effects of Multiple Nuclear-Weapons Detonations (Washington, D.C.: The Academy, 1975). 10 EMERGENCY PLANNING DIGEST / March-April 1978

13 Editor's note: Ever since the aborted fallout-shelter boom of the early 1960s, the subject of civil defense has been confined to the fringes of the discussions on defense policy, arms control and national security in the United States. Recently, however, there has been a revival of discussion of the issue, based mainly on the assertion of the existence of a very vigorous civil defense program in the Soviet Union, involving massive underground relocation of industry, widespread shelter construction, underground food storage, and planning for almost instantaneous evacuation of major urban centers. Although the evidence cited, to the extent that it goes beyond simple assertion, bears striking resemblance to the literature, manuals and exhortatory statements that were issued some 15 years ago in the United States by retired generals and civil defense organizers, the prevailing public mood today is one which seems inclined to pay more attention to such warnings of Soviet preparations for possible nuclear war. Thus, it is likely that the issue of civil defense is destined to be revived once again in the early days of the Carter administration. On the other hand, there are serious students of international affairs who believe that "building nuclear weapons without an equal amount of R&D on how to survive their effects is like test flying an untried plane without a parachute." At this level, the argument revolves around issues of national priorities and on the dangers of the enshrinement of a selffulfilling prophecy. It seems particularly useful toward the airing of arguments on the civil defense issue to open the discussion with a paper representative of this approach. - Bernard T. Feld Editor-in-chief Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists pressed dismay at the "optimistic" tone of the report: It is clear that the uncertainties and dangers could as easily have been emphasized as this possibility that the species would survive.... The problem seems to be that somewhere in the Academy people lose track of either what is worth doing, or why they are doing it.2 What is worth doing? Why did they do it? The letter seems to imply than any effort not directed at substantiating the no survivors myth is worthless. It criticizes the Academy report for reaching an independent evaluation of the facts rather than reiterating the established dogma. These objections carry with them a strong sense of religious outrage and very little to suggest that they are offered in a spirit of impartial scientific criticism.3 Could a nuclear war at this time utterly destroy mankind? It is doubtful. Barring some totally unknown mechanism, the effects of total warfare 2The letter is on the letterhead of the Federation of American Scientists, 307 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C , dated Oct. 4, lnterestingly, this letter also accuses the Academy of substituting faith for science, while admitting that the author(s) had not yet read the report they were criticizingl today, or at any other time over the past 25 years, would be unpleasant in the extreme but hardly terminal. In fact, to realize the type of nuclear tragedy as depicted in the book On the Beach, it would be necessary to invoke levels of destructiveness roughly ten times greater than what is now available.4 Why then do we insist on spreading the myth that "pushing the button means the end"? Lulling the World Given the history of human behavior with regard to weapons, nationalism, territoriality, militarism, disputes, armed confrontations, and war-making in general, is it reasonable to expect the nuclear powers to disarm themselves? Will total brotherhood be achieved within the next few years? It has never been achieved before, Will the nuclear nations voluntarily lay down their arms and swear never to build any more? It would be unprecedented. Why then do we insist on lulling the world with the vague notion that somehow the arms race can be turned around? The Consequences of Nuclear War, "Bulle- 4Bernard T. Feld, tin", June EMERGENCY PLANNING DIGEST / March-April

14 The answer to these questions lies in the mindlimiting inflexibility of the myths. If the no survivors myth is true, then survival of a nuclear war is impossible and there is no hope for the human race except through prevention. Prevention being our only hope, we do not question whether or not it can be accomplished. We simply hope that something unprecedented will happen, because we perceive it as the only hope we have. This mental framework has paralyzed the thinking of defense strategists and arms control activists alike, and has led to the curious position we occupy now: the weapons stockpiles grow ever larger, the risks contine to increase, and yet no serious consideration is being given to the increasingly likely possibility that the war will actually take place. Instead the deterrers mutter "they wouldn't dare try anything," while the disarmers piously incant "we hope we can stop this madness." These attitudes lead to some strange contradictions. The deterrence myth insists on an unmistakable degree of overkill capability, reasoning that the greater the overkill the safer we are - unless the weapons are used, of course. If the weapons are used, the extreme overkill will not serve any military end, but will make recovery much, much harder. (Some say impossible.) At the same time, the prevention myth has developed the corollary that any kind of civil defense preparation would lull the nation's leaders into a false sense of security and therefore increase the likelihood of war. But if war comes and no civil defense measures are taken, millions will die unnecesbarily. Both sides paradoxically maintain that we are safest when in the most vulnerable possible situation! Note the circular and self-reinforcing nature of this kind of reasoning. If a nuclear war would be so terrible that no one could survive it, then it must be prevented. To do so we develop a fantastic overkill capacity and staunchly oppose any civil defense measures. Having achieved this state, we examine our chances of survival and conclude that under these circumstances a war would be so terrible that no one could survive it! This is an excellent example of a prophecy which tends to fulfill itself.6 We have allowed our fears to coerce us into a situation which rapidly grows more and more frightening. SHerman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 205 et seq. This is not the only way in which the myths of nuclear war have been detrimental to our chances of surviving this period of our history. For years the disarmament movement has tried to motivate the public and the government with the "no hope but prevention" argument, and after two decades it should be apparent that this approach has failed. In fact. the effort has been markedly counterproductive. The effect of the disarmament myths, proclaimed loudly and repeatedly over so many years, has been to equate nuclear war with death in the mind of the public.' And thus nuclear war has become a taboo subject. This is quite natural, since it is human nature to ignore the specter of death as much as possible. To do otherwise indicates a questionable state of mental health. As a result, most people will not listen to the argument of despair any longer, nor will they trespass on their friends' good will by discussing the subject. I agree with the position advocated by Herman Kahn in Thinking About the Unthinkable, which is simply that avoiding unpleasant thoughts is a sensible thing to do unless it makes unpleasant realities more likely to occur.' The present unwillingness of the public and of politicians to discuss the threat of nuclear warfare seems to me to be the single largest factor favoring the conclusion that war is inevitable.$ If the public would talk about it, and if politicians would make a political issue of it, the outlook for prevention might be much brighter. How can this aversion to the subject of nuclear war be overcome? Clearly, there is no way to make it entertaining, attractive, or funny,' but if the myths can be set elouis Jolyon West, "Some Psychiatric Aspects of Civil Defense," in NAS Disaster Study No. 16, Behavioral Science and Civil Defense (Washington, D.C.: The Academy, 1962), pp West presents a discussion of how otherwise normal people frequently show signs of obsessional phobias, panic reactions, hysteria and depression when asked to discuss nuclear war. These reactions would be considered unhealthy or maladaptive except that in the case of nuclear war the reactions are so widespread they are "normal." 7Herman Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable (New York: Horizon Press, 1962). 8Tho Montanans for Nuclear Disarmament, concerned over Montana's 200 Minuteman silos, recently polied the state's political leaders on their views of the arms race. For the most part they were brushed off. Governor Tom Judge contributed the most constructive comment: "We must pray." A report on the survey appeared in the Missoulian, June 6, 1976, under the title "Candidates Not Interested in Nuclear Arms Race." ealthough an attempt is being made in the form of "Ark II," a Saturday morning children's program on CBS. 12 EMERGENCY PLANNING DIGEST / March-Apri11978

15 aside for a moment there does emerge one aspect of nuclear war in which the public shows some signs of being interested. This is the question of how to prepare to survive it. This spark of interest shows up routinely at disarmament question-and-answer sessions in the form of a single individual who innocently asks for information about what they can do to insure their own survival. There is normally only one such question per evening because the subject is usually put down and dismissed by the speakers. For instance, here at the University of Montana, a young woman asked George Kistiakowsky, where she could move to within the United States to reduce the likelihood of one day being caught in a heavy rain of fallout. Kistiakowsky replied, "The north slope of Alaska." On another occasion, Bert Pfeiffer (a professor of zoology at Montana and a disarmament activist) was asked what he would do if the bombs started to fall that very moment? "Do?" said Pfeiffer. "What could I do? Nothing." In both cases the line of questioning was brought to an immediate close. Such questions, rather than being dismissed out of hand, should be encouraged. There are two reasons for this. First, any topic which attracts the public's attention, draws people in, and interests them in learning more about the nuclear threat serves a vital purpose. Second, due to the effects of the myths, progress in the field of survival planning over the last decade has been almost nonexistent. A renewal of interest in the subject at this time could have beneficial results, particularly in case the war cannot be avoided. The difficulties of life in the post-attack environment - immediately after the war to a period of decades - are not unknown, nor are they insurmountable. They are, however, routinely overestimated for the sake of the disarmament argument, making any effort to overcome them appear to be futile. For this reason, the research necessary for humanity to be prepared at any level - individual, family, local, national, or world - for the stresses of a nuclear war is either out of date, incomplete, or has never been attempted in the first place. This can be illustrated in part by the present state of the nation's civil defense system. The nationwide civil defense effort of the early 1960s was attempted as an official defense against the threat of a Soviet surprise attack. It involved the construction and stocking of public and private shelters designed to support occupants for about two weeks after the outbreak of hostilities. The effort was opposed at the time as being shortsighted and insufficient, and as the nation became preoccupied with the situation in Vietnam the fallout shelter "craze" slipped into obscurity. Today, although civil defense directors still map out the location of radiation-proof buildings, these are not routinely marked, nor are they stocked with provisions. The stockpiled food of the 1960s has been cycled off the shelves and not replaced. There is probably no point in trying to return to an official nationwide shelter program like that of the Kennedy era, and yet over the last few years substantial numbers of people have begun to approach the civil defense field with various versions of do-it-yourself disaster planning. A brief look at the back-to-the-land movement reveals that one of the reasons for the current preoccupation with self-sufficient living is the fear of a collapse of society, and nuclear war is frequently cited as a forerunner to this collapse. Homesteading is certainly not a comprehensive solution to survival under such circumstances, but it is an expression of a growing unease and lack of faith in the ability of the government to carry out its functions.io In addition to the homesteaders are the relatively new crisis insurance groups, or "retreat groups." Although the retreaters tend to be highly secretive and security conscious, enough information has leaked into the literature to indicate that such groups are becoming more and more common." Typically a retreat group consists of 10 to 50 people who have cooperated in preparing to leave their urban residences at the first sign of danger. These groups have planned to form what amounts to tribal survival teams in remote rural or wilderness areas. They generally cite war, famine, or 101f a government's function is to protect a citizen's rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, the effectiveness of a government which allows a nuclear war to occur is open to serious question. 1YMe1 Tappan, Survival Guns (Los Angeles, Ca.: Janus Press, 1976). The first and last chapters contain considerable information about retreaters. See also Mother Earth News (vol. 40, p. 137) for a classified advertisement placed by a couple seeking a retreat group to join. There have even been rumors in the popular press about "rent-a-shelter" type commercial firms in California and Colorado. EMERGENCY PLANNING DIGEST / March-April

16 revolution as the source of the danger, with nuclear war as a leading consideration. These people apparently are well informed on the subject of defending their retreats against interlopers; but the quality of the strategic, radiological, meteorological, ecological, agricultural and medical information available to these people is open to question. For instance, I doubt that these groups are aware of the critical importance of which thermonuclear destruction of the ozone layer may play in their plans.12 It is this information gap which the disarmament community could be particularly effective in filling if it was not for the immobilizing myths. The disarmament message could easily be expressed in terms of survival planning, or in the form of a related topic. Prevention, is, after all, the purest expression of the ideal of survival preparation - zero casualties. I suggest the following topics as being possible vehicles for the disarmament message: Ways in which a nuclear war could start. A seminar on this topic could cover a variety of smaller topics, such as flaws or changes in nuclear policies, proliferation, nuclear terrorism, and a survey of the scenarios which could project us into a nuclear conflict. Such scenarios can easily be assembled from fiction, history and think-tank projections.i3 A discussion of the 19 times the United States has made threatening motions with its nuclear weapons, but not quite used them, would be of value here.'4 This does not sound radically different from a routine disarmament discussion. A simple re-orientation of the discussion to emphasize warning signs and the possibility of predicting the outbreak of a nuclear war would convert it into a survival 12The National Academy of Sciences' report (n. 1) predicted that the detonation of 10,000 megatons of nuclear warheads could cause a 30 to 70 percent reduction in the ozone column, which in turn would allow severe levels of ultraviolet light to reach the Earth's surface. This high ultraviolet irradiation would be sufficient to scald some crops, and produce a blistered sunburn on a healthy Caucasian after 10 minutes exposure. 13Kahn, in On Thermonuclear War, presents 13 basic situations which could lead the United States into a thermonuclear conflict, such as "false pre-emption," "escalation," "ambitious third nation," etc. 12Sidney Lens, "The Doomsday Strategy," The Progressive, Feb Lens mentions 12 such situations and lists 6. See also the 1976 Brookings report by Barry M. Blechman and Stephens S. Kaplan ("The Use of the Armed Forces as a Political Instrument") which describes 215 incidents that have occurred since 1946 in which the United States has threatened to use military force, 19 of which involved nuclear weapons. planning session and greatly increase audience interest. A seminar or presentation on how to go about preparing a several-year food and necessities stockpile. This would be of interest to people whose primary worry is famine, either natural or induced by war." The design of the stockpile could be based on a discussion of the ecological effects of a nuclear war, such as climate disruption and ultraviolet damage to crops. Both the amount and kind of food to be stockpiled could be related directly to the nuclear threat: Strategies for working and living in a radioactive or high-level ultraviolet environment. This topic could be treated in terms of standard civil defense procedures for avoiding fallout contamination, with new emphasis on ways to avoid serious sun exposure for the first few post-war years. Nocturnal farm labor would be a possibility, as well as Arab-like protective clothing. The problems which a nuclear war would precipitate for farmers and gardeners. This would receive a lot of attention if presented in the right light. A discussion of which crops tend to concentrate radioisotopes and methods of minimizing this kind of uptake would be useful. The passage of fallout particles through the soil profile in relation to using shallow-rooted versus deeprooted crops could be discussed. Which crops are susceptible to the high ultraviolet exposure expected after the war could be crucial information to anyone planning on growing their own food. In particular, the point should be raised that many domestic crops which cannot be expected to survive the ultraviolet exposure will have to be maintained in protected greenhouse environments until the ozone layer recovers, since the seeds or tubers of these crops will in many cases not survive five to seven years of storage. One topic which would be completely novel is the subject of radiation-proof housing. Recently there has been a flurry of interest in underground "ecology" homes, built of prestressed concrete and buried under two to three 15That the public is interested enough to take civil defense into their own hands is illustrated by the activities of the members.of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormon), who have adopted a policy of having a year's supply of food on hand at all time. The May 1976 issue of The Ensign, a Mormon publication, contains three articles describing the Mormon effort to make each family self-sufficient and prepared to survive a year without any kind of support from the rest of society. 14 EMERGENCY PLANNING DIGEST / March-April 1978

17 feet of topsoil. These homes can be easily "slanted" to provide fallout protection factors of 1,000 or more without sacrificing comfort or convenience in any way,16 In addition, since underground architecture relies frequently on buried concrete arches, such houses are roughly 50 times as resistant to blast effects as are standard woodframe houses. This kind of house is also cheaper and easier to build than a conventional home, is 25 percent cheaper to heat, is fireproof, and requires no external maintenance whatsoever.i' Each of these topics, although survival-oriented, can be used to educate the public to the realities we face if it finally proves impossible to stop the arms race. The importance of the disarmament effort can be demonstrated simply by presenting the background information necessary for survival discussions, and each presentation could easily be followed by a brief arms control talk to underline the message..,l Y.y: As paradoxical as it sounds, the best hope for preventing a nuclear war may lie in abandoning the hope that a war can be prevented - at least not by the means currently being employed. These means are restricted and confined by a series of myths, which are widespread but not strictly factual pictures of nuclear war and the nuclear threat. Survivalism, which avoids the death's head image of the standard disarmament argument, could serve as a medium through which to reeducate the public to this subject. Only through such a reactivation of public interest can the political action necessary to a successful disarmament effort be achieved. And, if prevention finally proves to be a futile effort, an increased emphasis on survival research and preparation now will save lives later on. This alone would be worth doing. 1<jThe age of the vault-like fallout shelter is past. The Defense Civil Preparedness Agency publishes a number of booklets on techniques of architectural "slanting," which involve the altering of a building design to unobtrusively obtain a high radiation protection factor. These techniques can be applied to underground buildings with great success. 17For more information about underground homes, see V. Elaine Smay, "Underground Houses - Energy-saving, Private and Secure," Popular Science, April 1977, p. 84; and Malcolm Wells, "Underground Architecture," CoEvolution Quarterly, Fall 1976, p. 85. EMERGENCY PLANNING DIGEST / March-April

18 GERMAN CIVIL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CONCEPT 1977 An outline of tenets presented at the NATO Civil De fence Committee meeting in Rome, Italy, October 1977 by Ministerialdirektor Peter Menke-Glückert The Ministry of the Interior TENET ONE - Civil Emergency Preparedness in Addition to Military Defence Will Remain an Indispensable Element of Overall Defence The long-term objectives set forth in the 1972 White Paper on Civil Emergency Planning in the Federal Republic of Germany will be maintained. This is done not in spite of, but precisely because of, new threats and crisis situations in the eighties. The civil emergency preparedness concept continues to focus on the following: -Protection for the survival of the population against the threats and crisis situations most likely to occur, including the part of the crisis spectrum below an armed conflict, -Maintenance of government control, -Control and provision of supplies and services essential for sustenance and defence, -Support of the armed forces from the civil sector, -Use of all means and resources (foreign policy, defence preparedness, economy) for peacetime planning and crisis management in order to prevent any escalation to a state of tension and to a state of war. Efforts aimed at providing funds and manpower for military national defence are inadequate if they are not complemented by preparations in the field of civil emergency preparedness. Overall defence will always be only as strong as its weakest element. TENET TWO - The Requirement is for Consistent Crisis Management for Peacetime and War In order to prevent the escalation of numerous new threats and crisis situations to a state of tension or a state of defence, consistent crisis management for peacetime and war which has been coordinated at all decision-making levels of the Federal and Land governments, is required. In this connection, not only deterrence within the Alliance (NATO), a high level of military defense preparedness and efficient civil emergency planning, but also economic productivity, foreign policy action coordinated within the Alliance or the EC, moral/ psychological factors and the clear manifestation of the will to defend ourselves and to survive must be used as elements of overall defence for preserving peace and for averting imminent dangers in the light of the particular situation at the time ("political flexible response"). This presupposes that any imbalance in the development of overall defence (lagging behind of civil emergency preparedness) and thus the lack of congruity of measures for controlling actual threats must be stopped. For reasons of maximum efficiency and economy, it is necessary to simplify administrative procedures and to reduce duplicity of existing capabilities. Coping with large-scale disasters in peacetime requires continuous basic and advanced training and rehearsals of crisis scenarios at all levels and implies that overal defence preparedness will be strengthened at the same time. TENET THREE - Civil Emergency Planning Must Be Prepared to Meet New and Unfamiliar Crisis Situations in the Eighties In the past, all approaches to the problem started out from the concept of "full protection" against the threats posed by a war. Due to the high costs involved, proposals, concerning civil emergency preparedness were reduced to absurdity. New threats and crisis situations more likely to occur were not caught up on and were not met with a determined overall defence concept. To a large extent, honest and matter-of-fact public information was lacking. At the NATO Summit in London on May 10, 1977, the Federal Chancellor, referring to the third phase of NATO strategy, made the following point: "... the political and military role of nuclear 16 EMERGENCY PLANNING DIGEST / March-Apri11978

19 weapons will be reduced... as a result of the parity achieved at the level of strategic nuclear weapons." In the eighties, fuller provisions will have to be made against other types of conventional threats and crisis situations more likely to occur, but also against supply crises, the effects of international terrorism and large-scale disasters in peacetime. For years, the Warsaw Pact's arms build-up has also included the continuous promotion of civil emergency preparedness at the risk of counteracting nuclear parity. Therefore, an American-Soviet Working Group on Civil Emergency Preparedness has been established for the further SALT II negotiations; the American Senate more than doubled the funds for civil emergency preparedness. Threats and crisis situations in the eighties will not require "all-out" provision of hardened shelters for our population - which is also the view taken within NATO. Such a concept would convey to the Warsaw Pact nations a misleading signal which could step up the arms race, stand in the way of the policy of détente and convey - even to our Allies - the impression of an isolated German initiative arousing the suspicion that the Federal Government has no confidence in the protection offered within the Alliance and that it pursues a "warfare strategy" on its own hook. Therefore, it is not only for budgetary reasons that any civil emergency preparedness concept must be an undramatic minimum concept coordinated within the Alliance (the risk of giving the wrong signal being a preoccupation of the Nuclear Planning Group.) In any case, the minimum concept comprises the following: more efficient organization of infrastructure for wartime and large-scale disasters, shelters for at least 300/0 of the population, encouraging self-protection and fostering the awareness of the requirements arising from disasters (also as regards the susceptibility of industrial society to disruption), evacuation measures on a strictly limited scale, arrangements for the homeless, decentralized system for the treatment of the seriously injured (e.g. centres for the treatment of burns and emergency hospitals food reserves.) TENET FOUR - Every Citizen Must Take a Share in the Burden Imposed by Overall Defence The costs incurred for civil emergency preparedness can no longer be met in full with public funds. The private sector and each citizen must contribute their share (with appropriate adjustments being made for the underprivileged). Compulsory military service alone is not enough. Democracy also implies cooperation in community tasks in case of disasters and obligatory self-protection (including basic training of the population in first aid and instructions on what to do in case of largescale disasters). TENET FIVE - Civil Emergency Preparedness Must Become a Normal Matter-Of-Course Precept in Public Life There must be continuous development of civil emergency preparedness - without any dramatization, without any tinge of Cold War, with the emphasis on consistent crisis management for peacetime and war. In this way, civil emergency preparedness will become a normal feature of public life and of all levels of administration. Every level of administration, every individual in the public service must get practice in specific parts of the plans for disaster control and, when they are called upon in the real event, they must be given guidance and direction by the full-time disaster control operational commands. The costs of this minimum concept do not run into billions. In fact, an additional sum exceeding the presently budgeted amount by 100 million is under discussion for appropriation beginning in fiscal year The decisions taken in September 1975 on economy measures must be reversed at once as regards shelter construction and food reserves. TENET SIX-The Level of Financial Resources Remaining the Same, The Performance of Disaster Control Services Can Be Improved Considerably Without quadrupling financial resources, it is not possible to achieve the target set in availability in peacetime of 600,000 helpers equipped for employment under wartime conditions. By simplifying administrative procedures, making full use of all commandeering possibilities, determining the kind and level of services and resources provided at Federal level in the light of wartime requirements and restructuring existing capabilities, Extended Disaster Control can be streamlined and rationalized, including the limitation of the number of types used: the Laender being responsible for fire-protection and medical services, and the responsibility for special services, EMERGENCY PLANNING DIGEST / March-April

20 large equipment and training for supraregional operations lying with the Bund. Provision of equipment can thus be concentrated on the real exigencies resulting from emergency situations. The provision of Federal resources will be geared specifically to the requirements of 519,000 helpers. A new model of disaster control management is to ensure immediate operational readiness when required. TENET SEVEN - Wider Involvement in Shelter Construction Only Possible by Making the Installation of Shelters Compulsory If only because of the military-geographical situation of the Federal Republic of Germany, shelter construction is required since any conceivable war scenario in Central Europe will be staged on our territory lessons learnt from the I<orean and Vietnam wars show that without a minimum of shelter protection (minimum protection) casualties among the civil population will be ten times as high as the losses suffered by the military the NATO forward defence and stay-put concept is pointless without shelter construction the strategy of preventing war by means of deterrence would be incredible (will of the population to survive as the most important element of deterrence would be lacking) measures taken by warning and alert services and by disaster control services in wartime will not be enough ("What is the use of warning to those who don't know where to go; what is the good of disaster assistance if help comes too late?") shelters are needed also in cases of likely largescale emergencies (e.g. chemical accidents, area conflagrations, terrorist actions, attacks on nuclear plants, covert warfare, civil war type situations short of a state of war). So far, only 1.8 million new shelter spaces have been installed, though in part they are provided with relatively expensive equipment which will not be required for the more probable acute emergencies. When spaces existing in old shelters, natural tunnel, etc. are included in the count, shelter spaces and protective cover exist for approx. 10 /o of the population (the figures for Sweden and Switzerland are 72 and 751/o respectively). Full protection against a strategic nuclear attack will not be possible; apart from that, the attempt to build nuclear protected shelters on a large scale could give the wrong signal (counteracting nuclear parity: survival possible after second strike). Therefore, the following is important: honest renunciation of full protection against nuclear effects, reduction of technical requirements to minimum protection against limited tactical nuclear attacks as well as against conventional and chemical attacks, including the protection in case of large-scale emergencies below a state of defence. In order to achieve adequate protection for the population, particularly in conurbations, at least 30 /o of the population should be provided with sheltering facilities. This target can be met only by compulsory shelter construction within 10 years; parallel to this, the public shelter construction programme should be continued to the tune of 30 million per year (in this respect, the decisions taken in September 1975 on economy measures must be reversed). In future, all newly-constructed one-family and duplex houses are to be provided with shelters measuring 10 square metres, and all three-family and multi-family houses with shelters of 25 square metres. The costs per shelter space amount to DM and thus to less than 1 /0 of the total building costs of a one-family or duplex house. Financial incentives are given for improving shelter capabilities in existing old structures; for public shelters, a shelter maintenance and shelteree welfare service of the Technische Hilfswerk (THW - Technical Aid Service) will be established, which will be employed for training purposes at the same time. TENET EIGHT - Warning and Alert Service Must be Made More Efficient and Cost-Effective The technological outfit and procedures of the Warning and Alert Service must be adapted with the view of ensuring the rapid transmission of information to the population, and their costeffectiveness must be increased. The aim should be to make greater use of broadcasting, to accelerate the alerting procedure and to back it up by additional safeguards. TENET NINE - The Emphasis in Civil Emergency Preparedness Lies on Basic and Advanced Training Overall planning for all threats requires continuous practice in coping with crisis scenarios. This implies participation of policy-makers, of directing 18 EMERGENCY PLANNING DIGEST / March-April 1978