Persian Gulf Campaign for DCS: F-14A

Transcription

1 Persian Gulf Campaign for DCS: F-14A The Persian Gulf map presents a wonderful opportunity to merge existing or pending assets within DCS to create a compelling Naval warfare campaign centered on the F-14A. This campaign aspires to recreate and build upon true events of during which the US Navy fought an undeclared war against Iran. While the player will view these scenarios through the lens of a Naval aviator, operations in the Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz involved a wide range of USN units and capabilities. Combat missions associated with Operation Earnest Will during 1987 and 1988 offers an excellent opportunity for creating realistic DCS campaign scenarios for the DCS: F-14A and the DCS: Strait of Hormuz map. It combines a real operation (largest USN operation since WWII) with an available DCS map and a DCS module placed into the correct era for the operation. Iran is also an interesting opponent for the US Navy during the late 1980s. On one hand, the Iranian Air Force and Navy have an intimate, if slightly outdated, understanding of American equipment and tactics. Nearly every piece of military hardware that they possess was American made and the majority of their senior military staff were either trained in the US or by American personnel. However, my their military was generally quite depleted. The precise number of operational aircraft is unclear, but evidence suggests that only 20-35% of their aircraft were operational with an unclear supply of remaining missiles and ammunition. Iran did manage to obtain parts and missiles as part of the Iran-Contra scandal, but demand still managed to outstrip supply (most likely). The Iranians, especially the IRIAF leadership, regarded their aircraft as precious resources. They would not willingly commit their aircraft to suicide missions or engage with a clear disadvantage. That said, there was quite a divide between the Clerics and formal military. As an example, there were instances where the Iranian Navy swept for mines laid by the IRCG. Similarly, leadership was at time compelled to respond to events with force even when a loss seemed certain, such as the loss of multiple warships during Operation Praying Mantis. Ultimately, military commanders must obey the clerics and the members of the Iranian Oligarchy had little affection for the Iranian military as they viewed it as the ultimate symbol of the Shah s Iran even as they depended on the military to accomplish their objectives. One characteristic that made Iran dangerous as an opponent was the fact that it was undergoing a revolution. Such countries benefit significantly from serious external threats as a uniting force for the population and to take attention away from internal events, loss of life, and economic conditions. When Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, Iraq assumed that the war would be short lived, even if Iran managed to respond and halt Iraq's offensive. But Iran continued to fight, even after if retook its lost territory. Iran continued to fight because the Iraqi threat served the new Revolutionary government very well, allowing them to squash any internal conflicts and limit freedoms in the name of protecting the population. The government attempted to carefully walk a line between maintaining external enemies, responding to threats in a manner that served their propaganda, but avoid completely depleting their resources.

2 With this background, campaign missions against Iran during the late 1980s would not be major aerial battles with a dozen IRIAF fighters facing off against sections of USN Tomcats. Even if that were to happen, the IRIAF could only manage (most likely) to field enough aircraft for a few battles, especially since they were still fighting an active war against Iraq to the North. However, Iran would respond to USN actions, both to sustain the threat for their benefit and create outcomes that play well with their propaganda machines (such as shooting down enemy aircraft over Iranian territory). This may facilitate interesting missions and air combat. The case was largely the same in Vietnam where North Vietnamese fighters would diligently avoid US fighters and focus on the strike aircraft. Also like Vietnam, Iran had an extensive and well-developed SAM network, largely composed of US SAMs (many of which were recently obtained via Iran-Contra). As painfully learned during the Vietnam conflict, smaller militaries utilizing ambush tactics could present a serious threat. Therefore, the aim of this campaign is to create an interesting and highly plausible set of combat missions based on historical events. Campaign overview and storyline From 1987 until the end of 1988, the US Navy waged an undeclared war against Iran in the Persian Gulf. This conflict began in response to ever growing regional tensions in one of the most critical bodies of water on earth: the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. The Iran-Iraq war took an enormous toll participating nations and their people. The ground war was always the dominant part of the conflict, but the war would swell to encompass both air and sea. Iraq was initially hopeful that it could reach a rapid victory in chaotic, post-revolution Iran. With most of Iran s military completely disorganized and lacking its senior leadership, Saddam Hussein seized a remarkable opportunity to conquer territory and expand his nation. However, Iran rapidly halted Iraqi progress despite its military deficits. Iran would manage to effectively rebuild its Army and critically, its Air Force. The IRIAF would come to play a critical role in the defense of Iran s populace against increasingly punishing strikes against civilians. In the war of cities, Iraq s air force began targeting specific urban centers, including schools, in an attempt to break the will of Iranian citizens. The IRIAF proved its worth time again as it repelled numerous raids and shot down scores of Iraqi fighters. Despite being significantly outnumbered, the IRIAF managed to maintain a remarkably good exchange rate against the Iraqi Air Force. Iraq had the benefits of international funding and a steady stream of equipment from Russia. Despite these advantages, Iraq was losing scores of aircraft and failing to win the war. After several years of relative stalemate, the Iraqi s sought ever more creative means of pressuring the Iranians into surrender. During 1984, Iraq began targeting Iranian oil shipments in the Persian Gulf. Iraq had the benefit of an overland oil pipeline, but all Iranian oil shipments must pass through the gulf and Strait of Hormuz. This made Iran particularly vulnerable to maritime strikes. Iraq leased 10 Etendard fighters with Exocet capability while awaiting delivery of their Exocet capable Mirage F1s. In March 1984, the first IrAF maritime attacks with Exocet missiles. Their first missile was a dud and struck a misidentified Greek tanker carrying Kuwaiti oil, but things would change. The IrAF would complete a total of 53 strikes in

3 1984 with Iran beginning its counter attacks in May of that year. Iraq exports very little oil via the Persian Gulf, so Iran began targeting the shipments of Iraq s Arab neighbors and allies, primarily Kuwait. Iranian strikes were initially carried out with aircraft, but Iranian Navy surface ships joined the assault in Fortunately for the targeted ships, the Tankers proved to be highly resilient targets, but within a year the repair facilities in Dubai were completely saturated with damaged merchant ships. Within 2 years of launching the Tanker War, oil companies were refusing to sail to Kuwaiti ports and Kuwaiti government tankers were frequently out of service. Facing serious economic consequences without the ability to export its oil, Kuwait became increasingly desperate and approached both the US and USSR for assistance. The US initially showed little interest while the USSR saw an opportunity to expand its influence in the Middle East. It offered to lend Kuwait 3 Soviet Oil Tankers, but minimal military assistance. However, when a Soviet ship entered the Strait of Hormuz a short time later, it was raked with machine gun fire from IRCG gunboats. There was no loss of life, but the Soviet ship retreated. Days later, the USSR issued a reminder to Iran when a flight of 50 Soviet aircraft crossed the Northern border of Iran in a show of force. Still looking for real military assistance, the Kuwaiti government approached every member of the UN Security Council, but none were willing to help. With the USSR offering to provide tankers, the US became concerned that the Soviets would gain further control in the Middle East. With the US already reeling from the loss of one of its closest allies (the Shah s Iran) and Iran s recent capture of the Al Faw peninsula in Iraq; the Reagan administration moved to honor Kuwait s request and created a proposal for the largest Maritime escort operation since World War II. The operation involved reflagging 11 Kuwaiti tankers and creating scheduled convoys with USN escort. USN escorts would consist of a steady presence of Frigates, Destroyers, and LPHs with CVBGs and Iowa class battleships on a rotating basis. Operation Earnest Will was a known, if minimally advertised program. But in addition to Earnest Will, a secret supplementary operation was also underway Operation Prime Chance. Prime Chance involved moving two SEAL platoons, the 160 th SOAR (equipped with AH-6s, MH-6s, and MH-60s), and creating a pair of Mobile Sea Bases in the Persian Gulf as a base of operation. Members of the 160 th SOAR would also be deployed onto Frigates and Destroyers for specific operations they only operated at night and their presence was kept secret from the majority of ships crew. The Middle East Force was bolstered in preparation for Operation Earnest Will, but the environment in the Gulf was becoming increasingly dangerous. For most of the 1980s, the Middle East Force (MEF) was regarded as a relatively sleepy posting. Tensions had risen since the start of the Tanker war, but the real dangers would literally hit home on May 17 th, 1987 when a pair of Iraqi Exocet missiles struck the USS Stark. The USS Stark was severely damaged with the loss of 37 sailors with another 21 injured. Iraq was a nominal ally during the Iran-Iraq war, primarily in its role as the enemy of the enemy, but the Iraqis would prove to be much less than a friend. The IrAF made no deliberate effort to attack USN ships, but their haphazard weapons employment and mosaic command and control structure made mistakes common. The Exocet missiles were fired by Mirage F1 fighters that took solo flights through the center of the Persian

4 Gulf, looking for ships carrying Iranian oil. Many of these Exocets were launched at extreme range based on a radar contact with no attempt to identify the target. Once US forces began to occupy the Gulf in real numbers, a system was worked out to avoid friendly fire. The Iraqis would use preset radio frequencies so that US ships could communicate with Iraqi aircraft in the area. The US would also inform the Iraqis of impending operations and provide some intelligence. Even with these precautions, there were plenty of near-incidents, though IrAF aircraft would quickly realize their mistake once radar locked by US Frigates and Destroyers. By July 1987, the USN was mobilized and prepared for its first Earnest Will mission through the Strait of Hormuz. The plan was to escort the SS Bridgeton (the reflagged Al-Rekkah) from the entry of the Strait to the northern gulf. The passage through the Strait was uneventful, but just west of Farsi Island in the northern gulf; the SS Bridgeton struck a mine. The SS Bridgeton was an immense ship and it suffered relatively mild damage. After the mine strike, it was able to proceed at normal speed to its destination. Because of the risk of mine strikes to the USN ships, the elected to use the SS Bridgeton as a screen for the USN vessels. This wasn t the appearance the USN was hoping for on its first convoy mission, the appearance of US Warships hiding behind a Kuwaiti tanker. This first Earnest Will mission exposed several limitations of the US Navy, limited capacity for dealing with mines and a long-standing doctrine emphasizing blue-water combat operations over littoral operations. Though coastal operations against belligerent nations would quickly supplant blue water combat as the primary role of the USN, operational plans were not well developed at this point. The lessons from Earnest Will would influence many future littoral operations. To address the mine threat, RH-53D Sea Stallion minesweepers were deployed to the Gulf along with small, wooden hulled coastal minesweepers from the USN Reserve. These minesweepers were quite obsolete, but the best available at the time. The USN had originally hoped to lean on NATO allies for Minesweeper operations, but no other nations were willing to assist in the short-term. Mines would prove to be one of Iran s primary weapons in the Gulf and Strait against USN and allied ships, along with the Silkworm missile. Iran would strongly favor these weapons in lieu of direct air strikes, though several direct air strikes were attempted prior to the USN s arrival. In fact, a pair of Saudi F-15s (with a US instructor on the back seat of one) shot down an IRIAF F-4E as the pair of Phantoms attempted to attack an oil tanker in However, in mid-august and early September, several Iranian mines detonated in the southern Tanker anchorage off Khor Fakkan UAE, killing several US, British, and Italian merchant marines. These events did convince other NATO allies to deploy minesweepers to the region and assist with clearing mines throughout the region, especially the commercial hotspots of the southern gulf and strait. Ever concerned about the Silkworm threat, USN VPU units, specifically the West Coast unit of VPU-2 stationed in Oman, began flying routine patrols through the Strait providing electronic intelligence and searching for the electronic/radar emissions of the Silkworm sites. The IRIAF would sometimes launch in response to these P-3s, but generally stayed over land. However, during the second Earnest Will mission in early August 1987, IRIAF F-4Es proceeded aggressively and got close enough to a VPU-2

5 (E)P-3C that CAPing F-14s of VF-21 fired upon them. The F-14s were ordered to immediately disengage and the missiles failed to guide as the F-14s turned away. Two separate incidents in the first two missions marked a dubious start to the operation. In addition to Operation Earnest Will, USN Surface ships operating in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz would be supplemented by another covert operation: Prime Chance. Operation Prime Chance was a joint special operations mission between US Navy SEALs and the US Army s 160 th SOAR unit. Prime Chance started shortly after Earnest Will, but was kept secret. 160 th SOAR Helicopter operated from USN Warships (operating at night) and a pair of mobile sea bases was eventually positioned in the northern Persian Gulf, near Farsi Island. These mobile sea bases were reconfigured Oil Rig maintenance barges leased by the USN. These mobile sea bases (MSBs) were the idea of MEF Commander, Admiral Bernsen, who needed a base of operation for the 160 th SOAR to monitor activity in the northern Persian Gulf. The northern gulf was proving to be a prime location for Iranian minelaying and posed one of the greatest threats to US operations in the theater. In contrast, the southern gulf and Strait of Hormuz could be effectively monitored and interdicted by aircraft of the CVBG on GONZO station or by Reef Point flights from Masirah Island in Oman. In contrast, the northern gulf was far to long a distance for carrier based aircraft and stationing loan frigates in the area was deemed both too risky and lacking the necessary scope of capabilities. Frustratingly, the US Arab allies who requested the escort operations, were refusing to allow US aircraft to operate from their bases, even for covert operations. These Arab allies still feared serious retaliation by Iran, especially if the US presence proved fleeting. The MSBs were staffed by both Navy SEALS and members of the 160 th SOAR and allowed the 160 th SOAR s helos to operate independently of USN warships and stay within close distance of Iranian territory something otherise not possible without a land base in the region. By fall of 1987, the larger of the two barges, Hercules, had begun operations in the Northern Gulf. Wimbrown 7 remained in the Southern Gulf as work-ups completed and the Admiral of the 7 th fleet gained confidence in the self-defense capabilities of the MSBs. However, these MSBs also represent an appealing target for the Iranians as they carry a fairly large complement of soldiers with self-defense capabilities that were less than that of warships. While the first two Earnest Will missions were marked by significant events, the next three Earnest Will missions were more straightforward with all vessels reaching their intended destination without incident. USS Ranger and CVW-2 reached GONZO station on 8/26/87 and officially turned over with USS Constellation. While on GONZO station, CVW-2 would provide CAP coverage in addition to the Surface to Air capability of Ranger s escorts during Earnest Will missions. USS Ranger would periodically leave GONZO station in between Earnest Will missions for replenishment, training missions, and to stand down from flight operations. As part of preparations for their first Earnest Will mission, CVW-2 provided escort for planned Reef Point (E)P-3C missions and TARPS recon missions. On August 28-29th, CVW-2 covered their first Earnest Will mission with a mix of F-14A CAP missions, A-6E SUCAP missions, EA-6B Electronic surveillance missions, and E-2Cs providing Early Warning support. USAF and RSAF E-3As also provided EW support for the Persian Gulf north of the Strait of Hormuz. This first mission creates interest with the IRIAF, which dispatches a C-130 observer and several F-4E sorties from Bandar Abbas, though the Phantoms stay over the Iranian

6 exclusion zone. Besides these IRIAF observers, the first Earnest Will mission is not eventful. CVW-2 remained active with routine training and missions besides Earnest Will as well. In the evening of September 18th, an A-6E of VA-145 went down in the Gulf of Oman while returning from a mission to the USS Ranger. USS Bunker Hill had tracked the A-6 on radar and gave the search team relatively precise track data. An additional F-14 CAP was launched to secure the airspace during the search and rescue operation.