THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

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1 NWC 2061G THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT A Primer for: The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) System, and Global Force Management (GFM) by Professor Michael McGauvran 15 July 2017

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3 Table of Contents Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) Theater and Functional Campaign Plans Security Cooperation Assessment Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Global Force Management (GFM) iii

4 The purpose of this primer is to provide an unclassified overview of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Regional and Functional Campaign Plans, the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) System, and Global Force Management (GFM). The Joint Strategic Planning System The JSPS provides the structure for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to interact with National, Congressional, and DoD processes; it encompasses how the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff carries out statutory responsibilities assigned in Titles 6, 10, 22, and 50 of the United States Code. The Chairman s primary roles within the JSPS, listed in figure 1, are to Direct, Execute, Assess, and Advise. This primer will focus on the Direct and Execute roles of the Chairman. Figure 1: The Chairman s Statutory Roles and Responsibilities The Chairman assists the President and SecDef in providing unified strategic direction to the Armed Forces by linking the President s and SecDef s national strategic objectives to the military strategy, plans, and resources needed to achieve them. The Chairman s strategic guidance is issued in the National Military Strategy (NMS), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, and Joint Training Guidance. For execution, the Chairman assists the President and SecDef by translating their direction into coordinated military missions, tasks, and activities. These missions, tasks, and activities include Global Force Management, producing the SecDef s Orders Book, 1

5 validating Joint requirements via the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and conducting strategic analysis. Figure 2 illustrates how the Chairman s statutory requirements and associated processes align with SecDef and National Security Council (NSC) processes. Figure 2: JSPS in Relation to OSD and the NSC Please keep in mind that the JSPS is a four-year cycle beginning with the President s inauguration. By law, the President must produce a National Security Strategy within 150 days of inauguration. This new document drives the publication of major OSD and JSPS strategy documents (to include the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), NMS, Unified Campaign Plan (UCP), GEF, and JSCP) in the President s second year in office. 1 These strategic-direction documents are then reevaluated and, if required, updated in year four. The assessment and advice documents are generated annually (see CJCSI C for a notional four year schedule of these processes). Moreover, while the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the NMS are two major national strategies, strategic guidance may also be found in several other documents in the ever-expanding library of national guidance documents. These include the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, the National Strategy to Combat WMD, and 14 other similar documents. The JSPS is how the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff carries out statutory responsibilities assigned in Titles 6, 10, 22, and 50 of the United States Code. Once the documents required for Strategic Direction are available, the Chairman and the Joint Staff 1 Although these processes/steps (Figure 2) are linearly depicted, they are often developed concurrently. Additionally, though OSD, the Joint Staff, or the NSC are depicted as the approval authority, most of the documents are developed with formal (or informal) collaboration with the Service Chiefs, CCDR s, DoD agencies and the Joint Staff. 2

6 then produce documents which guide joint force employment and management. The first document, developed by the OSD staff and approved by the SecDef, is the Guidance for the Employment of the Force, or GEF. Background Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) In previous years, OSD strategic guidance to combatant commanders and their staffs were contained in five separate documents. As these documents were released independently and at different times, one could characterize the coherency of the collective strategic guidance as sub-optimal. Recognizing the inefficiencies, these five separate guidance documents, listed below, were consolidated and integrated in 2008 into a single, comprehensive strategic directive known as the Guidance for Employment of the Force. Security Cooperation- Tasks combatant commanders with developing theater Campaign plans to illustrate how all steady-state activities in their respective AORs contribute to strategic end states. Provides focus areas and tools for combatant commanders (CCDRs) to integrate into their peacetime military engagement activities on a regional basis, thereby gaining efficiency through the coordination of engagement activities, theater end states, and objectives. Contingency Planning- Directs and guides the development of contingency plans, which will be branches to the campaign plan. Global Posture- Provides DoD-wide global defense posture realignment guidance, to include DoD s broad strategic themes for posture changes and overarching posture planning guidance, which inform the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) theater posture planning guidance. It establishes the requirement for combatant commanders to submit theater posture plans annually. Global Force Management- Enables global sourcing regardless of the command or Service to which the force is assigned. Provides a decision framework for making assignment and allocation recommendations to the SecDef and apportionment recommendations to the CJCS. The Force Allocation Decision Matrix provides the framework for prioritizing CCDR force sourcing requirements with finite forces. Allows for the SecDef to make proactive, risk informed force management allocation decisions. Nuclear Weapons Planning- Self-explanatory.. Melding multiple sources of strategic planning guidance into one document minimized the possibility of conflicting guidance. It also resulted in a more expansive document directing Combatant Commanders (CCDR) to develop theater (or functional) strategies to meet GEF objectives and, in turn, create and execute a Campaign Plan (CP) to obtain these objectives. The overarching CP would integrate steady-state events, for example, ongoing operations and security cooperation activities and contingency plans (developed through contingency planning) were to be linked to the CP as branches and would be executed should the CP fail to achieve desired results (e.g., maintain the peace). 3

7 The 2015 GEF The 2015 GEF is greatly changed from previous editions. First, the timeframe has shrunk from a previous 10-year to a two to five year horizon. In short, the GEF is now less strategic ; it has gone from an aspirational strategy-central document with strategic endstates to a more achievable threat-based document listing specific, resource constrained campaign objectives. Secondly, it introduces a planning construct designed to address threats as larger problem sets rather than piecemeal through individual contingency plans. This approach recognizes that many threats (e.g., non-state actors, WMD) or missions (Cyber, Global Deployment Operations, etc.) cross UCP-directed boundaries and emphasizes the need for CCDR s to plan collaboratively. Finally, the 2015 GEF, recognizing increasing resource constraints, introduced new readiness and availability priorities to improve DoD s ability to balance force allocation between regional engagement and surge response to a major contingency. While the GEF s time horizon has shortened, the CCDR s campaign plan remains the central mechanism for integrating DoD steady-state activities. Campaign plans should focus on defusing strategic problems before they become crises and resolve crises before a large scale contingency response is needed (see Figure 3). At the same time, CP s should also set the conditions for success should contingency operations be required. The Figure 3: Campaign Planning focus on CCDR collaboration and prevention reflects OSD s expectation that continued resource limitations will require different methods to attain near-term objectives with fewer resources (this subject is discussed in more depth later in the Global Force Management section). Finally, the 2015 GEF s shorter time horizon drove a corresponding reduction in the number of chapters. From the previous ten chapters, the GEF now contains six chapters; Contingency Planning Guidance and NUWEP are located in separate annexes: Chap 1. Introduction: Self-explanatory. Chap 2. Global Priorities and Assumptions: Discusses global security priorities based on near-term threats, lists the top priority planning (problem sets) requirements (and three lesser priorities), and provides 2-5 year strategic-level assumptions. Again, Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), once folded into the GEF, is now located in a separate annex. Chap 3. Resource Planning Guidance: Provides direction and planning factors for the resources available to support CCDR steady-state theater campaign objectives and respond to emerging threats given a two to five year horizon (resources include forces, security cooperation, contingency and operations and maintenance funding). This chapter further states that DoD must have a global view of the Joint Force to include 4

8 current forces and commitment, availability and readiness. To accomplish this, the GEF requires development and implementation of a centralized, automated system for Joint Force reporting to replace the Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS). This system will assist decision makers in force allocation decisions to better balance the need / ability to surge against the need for global engagement. This chapter also provides CCDR s a minimum or baseline force and requires CCDR s to identify and justify the forces and capabilities required to support then in steady-state activities. One assumes this is to assist CCDR s in resource allocation given the reduction of DoD resources and the need to shift forces from region to region based on emerging threats. Finally, many plans that didn t require a Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) now require a force closure estimate. Chap 4. General Campaign Planning Guidance: Provides broad planning guidance for the development of CCDR (both theater and functional) campaign plans. Given the lesser time horizon, campaign objectives are prioritized and are designed to be militarily achievable with in a five-year period. CCDR s responsible for CP s will establish Intermediate Military Objectives (IMO) that directly and measurably contributes to the achievement of each GEF campaign objective. Chap 5. Implementation Guidance: Levies the requirement for campaign plans to be assessed annually (bi-annually once the plan is approved). Discusses the plan approval process (In-Progress Reviews (IPR s) (see CJCSI s and ), and coordination instructions for plan coordination with allies and partners. Requires that Level 1, 2 and 3 contingency plans be reviewed annually or as directed, and given the new focus on collaborative planning and problem sets, plans dealing with the same threat will normally be reviewed together to better understand the force and risk dynamics. This chapter also requires each CCMD to use APEX for planning and produce an annual assessment of how well the CCDR s campaign plan is meeting the GEF directed objectives. To support this assessment requirement, a list of questions to be answered is provided. Finally, guidance is provided on CCMD interaction for planning with other departments / agencies: informal action officer contact can be made with other departments / agencies, but SecDef approval is needed before formalizing plans. Chap 6. Steady-State Planning Guidance: This final chapter, subdivided by regional and functional Combatant Command, provides strategic context, U.S. goals and DoD priorities for each combatant command. It lists strategic-level (broad) campaign objectives, assumptions, and regional posture planning guidance. Despite the shorter time-frame and the threat-centric vice strategy centric approach, the GEF s focus remains on the steady-state campaign plan as the central mechanism to achieve assigned campaign objectives. The GEF, together with the NSS, NMS (and Dense Planning Guidance, if issued) are then used by the Joint Staff and Chairman to provide CCDR s more specific guidance and tasking via the JSCP. 5

9 The 2015 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) Figure 4: National Strategic Direction Integrating separate OSD-level guidance documents into the GEF reduced the possibility of conflicting strategic guidance. To minimize guidance conflicts between the SecDef s GEF and the Chairman s JSCP, these documents were envisioned to be developed concurrently; the OSD staff and the Joint Staff would work on the documents in tandem. That said, the JSCP is driven by the requirements within the GEF (see Figure 4). The JSCP (CJCSI J) also leverages the GEF; rather than restate portions of the GEF, it refers readers to the GEF for campaign objectives and other guidance. The JSCP, with the GEF, provides guidance to the CCDRs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Services, and specific DoD agencies to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. The 2015 JSCP reflects the changes in the 2015 GEF vis-à-vis resource informed planning, near-term campaign plan prioritized objectives, and integrated problem set planning. The GEF s transformation from a strategic 10-year to a two to five year look reduced the need for JSCP specificity somewhat. For example, the previous GEF listed the required contingency plans and the JSCP assigned the plans to specific CCMDs. Today, the GEF assigns CCMD leads for the listed mission and problem sets in the CPG Annex, eliminating the need for the JSCP to do so (though the JSCP, mirroring the GEF, also moved CPG guidance to a separate, TOP SECRET supplement). As a result, the 2015 JSCP, like the GEF, is shorter than previous versions and is now organized into six enclosures (see Figure 5). Despite being shorter, the JSCP still provides additional, more specific planning guidance to the CCMDs. In broad terms, the GEF can be considered what needs to be done; the JSCP is more Figure 5: JSCP Enclosures how the GEF requirements should be met. Sometimes the additional JSCP guidance is little more that coordination instructions, e.g., what office and when to contact members 6

10 of the Joint Staff to schedule GEF required IPRs, provide required assessments of CP s and so forth. Other guidance is definitional and / or provides additional direction; for example, the 2015 JSCP added an appendix and chapter to clarify OSD policy on security cooperation and integrated planning respectively. Directive guidance is seen in the JSCP s guidance to CCDR s on meeting the GEF s requirement to develop an overarching strategy and Campaign Plan. The 2015 JSCP provides additional guidance on what a CCMD strategy is and what it does and suggests how to develop a strategy to meet the GEF tasking. Finally, the JSCP provides additional, more focused direction on the campaign plan the CCDR needs to meet to obtain the GEF directed campaign objectives (Enclosure D provides each CCMD campaign plan intent, followed by more specific requirements). The GEF, for example, has a half-page of prioritized campaign objectives for one CCMD; the JSCP s more specific directives span two pages. The JSCP is the Chairman s document. It is informed by the NSS, the NMS (and other strategic documents) and nests with the GEF to provide CCDR s additional, more specific guidance and direction to meet SecDef requirements. Theater and Functional Campaign Plans Perhaps the greatest change created by the 2008 GEF / JSCP guidance is the requirement for CCDRs to develop campaign plans to support their theater (or functional) strategies. The intent of the campaign plan is to operationalize CCDRs strategies and to transition planning from a contingency centric focus to a strategycentric design with an eye towards identifying all steady-state force and resource requirements. Figure 6: Joint Phasing Construct While CCDRs have been given latitude in how the campaign plan might be constructed, they are expected to include: A comprehensive integration of steady-state activities (security cooperation and other shaping activities) with the Phase 0 of combatant command contingency plans. Phase 0 refers to shaping in joint doctrine (see Figure 6). o Theater posture plans are annexes to the theater campaign plans. 7

11 o Contingency plans become branches to the campaign plan with associated triggers to review these plan should execution appear likely. Identification of supporting force providers, that is, Services, CCMDs, and select defense agencies and field activities which will develop campaign support plans. Another critical element of this new strategy-centric paradigm is a forcing mechanism to synchronize functional campaign plans with theater campaign plans. As the title implies, functional campaign plans impact multiple theaters; therefore, supporting CCDR s must develop subordinate plans in support of the lead or supported CCDR s functional campaign plan. These subordinate plans are then embedded in the CCDR s own theater campaign plan (see Figure 7). The 2015 GEF / JSCP, as touched on earlier, expand this collaborative / integrated planning to the regional CCDRs with the use of problem sets. This broader review of challenges acknowledges that more than one regional or functional CCMD s resources can be brought to bear against a problem to meet the SecDef s strategic objectives. Again, an emphasis on the need for a global perspective. Figure 7: Generic Campaign Plan Construct Since the CCDR s theater campaign plan operationalizes the commander s theater strategy, one should expect to find a theater campaign plan containing the common characteristics seen in Figure 7. First and foremost, the campaign plan should flow from the commander s strategy (see Figure 8). This expectation could be problematic, however. A CCDR may choose to publish an unclassified strategy after all, a CCMD has a broad audience. Communicating a strategy to regional partners and adversaries (much like an unclassified NSS and NMS) has its own intended outcomes. This messaging strategy could deprive the planners of the clarity found in unvarnished concerns and expectations that would be more closely held sharpness that would likely prove useful to campaign planners. As such, the commander s classified theater 8

12 campaign plan will likely require a bit of reverse engineering to ensure the CCDR s objectives are free of ambiguity. While each combatant command s campaign plan may approach the task differently, a GEF directed campaign plan will ultimately address the commander s Area of Responsibility (AOR) in an interconnected manner (problem sets and integrated planning) and seek to avoid a myopic focus on one or two stove-piped contingency plans developed during contingency planning. While directed contingency plans must be linked to the campaign plan, they are branch plans in the event of campaign plan failures. In addition, the theater campaign plan must include and support the CCDR s Theater Posture Plan. The Theater Posture Plan uses three interdependent posture elements to define the need, plan for, and assess U.S. overseas military presence. The nature of host-nation relationships, including associated legal arrangements. The footprint of facilities, personnel, force structure, and equipment. The steady-state and surge activities of U.S. military forces. One aspect of the theater campaign plan which should support greater cohesion is the requirement to closely integrate security cooperation objectives into the theater campaign plan. In theory, the very nature of many security cooperation activities, which often span multiple objectives and outcomes, will assist in the campaign plan s goal of a cohesive framework. Security Cooperation (SC) Security cooperation activities, which are integrated into the CCDR s campaign plan, are grouped into ten focus areas. Human Capacity/Human Capital Development Facilitate activities which enhance and/or develop Partner nation s military members and civilian security officials capacity to sustain their defense sector over time. Operational Capacity and Capability Building Build usable, relevant, and enduring Partner capabilities while achieving U.S. and Partner objectives. Institutional Capacity Strengthen Partner nation s security sector long-term institutional capacity and capability through Security Force Assistance (SFA). Support to Institutional Capacity/ Civil-Sector Capacity Building Strengthen Partner nation s non-security civil sector capacity and capability to deliver services to its own population through stable and effective civil sector institutions. Combined Operations Capacity, Interoperability, and Standardization Develop operational and technical capabilities, doctrine, and tactics, techniques and procedures with Partner nations to enable effective combined operations or improve a collective defense capability. Operational Access and Global Freedom of Action Gain unfettered access to and freedom of action in all operational domains. Support global defense posture realignment and larger U.S. political and commercial freedom of action and access needs. 9

13 Intelligence and Information Sharing Gain and/or share specific kinds of intelligence or information and develop shared assessments of common threats. Assurance and Regional Confidence Building Assure Allies and Partners, enhance regional stability and security, reduce the potential for inter- or intra-state conflict and international consensus building, and/or expand community of likeminded states dedicated to more peaceful and secure international order. International Armaments and Space Cooperation Encourage armaments and space activity cooperation activities with allies, Partner nations and alliances (e.g., NATO to increase efficiencies, leverage expertise, and enhance relationships. International Suasion and Collaboration Build cooperative political-military relationships with key security influencers and offset counterproductive influence in key regions and international organizations The CCDR s campaign plan integrates and synchronizes current activities and future shaping operations with contingency plans and provides Service components and operational-level commander s strategic objectives and goals. The Maritime Security Cooperation Policy: an Integrated Navy-Marine Corps-Coast Guard Approach (2013) prescribes a planning framework for the Navy-Marine Corps-Coast Guard headquarters, regional components, force providers, and SC enabling providers to achieve an integrated maritime approach to SC to support the CCDR s campaign plan. Navy Component Commanders (NCCs) balance their naval service policy/strategy with the theater campaign plans (TCP) of CCDRs and provide guidance to the fleet in the form of Maritime Security Cooperation Plans (MSCPs). MSCPs provide resourcing guidance and maritime capabilities to the tactical maritime commanders for further planning and execution that support achievement of the CCDR s theater objectives. Maritime staffs utilize higher headquarters guidance and country-specific information normally resident in appendices to the TCP and can leverage two key publications, the NWP 5-01, Navy Planning, and the NTTP (2010), Navy Component Commander Support to Theater Security Cooperation, to develop the MSCP. As can be seen in Figure 10, a close nesting of a component s security cooperation activities/actions will support the combat commander s theater campaign plan and its Figure 10: Nesting of Security Cooperation Activities with CCDR s Strategy 10

14 associated Intermediate Military Objectives (IMO) and/or strategic objectives. When planning security cooperation activities, staffs must be able to identify the ultimate objective of a given activity and be able to assess the results of said activity. Assessment A critical requirement in the planning construct and the requirement is often repeated in the 2015 GEF is the need for regular assessments to provide annual, or as directed, feedback to the SecDef on: Change in the strategic environment To what extent did CP implementation shape the environment Implications of executing strategic outcomes Program execution and output Critical points of the assessment process include: The CJCS is responsible for building an annual comprehensive assessment and for providing an independent analysis The assessment focuses on more than security cooperation That all CCDR s are responsible for establishing baselines, IMO s, and metrics that support achievement of their respective campaign objectives. That CCDR s and other defense agencies / departments that administer global security cooperation initiatives must provide assessments of program execution and output (to include the execution of campaign support plans). Adaptive Planning Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) GEF directed (or CCDR directed) contingency plans are developed using the Joint Planning Process (JPP). Contingency plans typically address a possible future crisis and are therefore often conceptual in nature. Uncertainty of when the plan will be executed requires planners to make assumptions across the DIME, e.g., who will be the political / military leaders and what are their objectives? Who are the allies, both friendly and enemy? What are the enemy (and friendly) force composition and locations? Many assumptions are made so detailed planning may continue. A large number of assumptions, however, can result in a less than executable plan if many of the planning assumptions prove incorrect. Contrast this with crisis planning for emergent or unforeseen events where there is less ambiguity and fewer assumptions, yet also less time to understand the complexities of the operational environment or explore alternative course of action. Leveraging time is one advantage of contingency planning. With the potential conflict on a distant horizon, CCMD planning staffs have the time to investigate multiple courses of action. They also have time to shape the environment through the campaign plan to 11

15 either avoid the crisis or shape the environment to better support the contingency plan should it be executed (example: War Plan Orange and the development of U.S. amphibious doctrine to support the plan s island-hopping strategy). But time can also be a weakness; many large-scale contingencies in the past, e.g., DESSERT STORM, were contingency planned yet when the crisis came, conditions were not as expected. Assumptions were often invalid and a multi-month, around-the-clock effort to produce a new plan began. The Adaptive Planning initiative was designed to close the gap between the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System s 2 (JOPES) former deliberate and crisis action planning processes to avoid the oft-seen, time-intensive need to re-plan contingency plans (APEX, as well as the 2017 JP 5.0, have removed the terms deliberate and crisis action planning. Since they both use the Joint Planning Process, they fall under the umbrella term contingency planning ). The intent of AP is to produce relevant contingency plans more quickly, and then update them annually (or as needed) to ensure the assumptions upon which the plan was based remained valid. If the assumptions changed, the plan would be updated. This, in theory, would keep these plans current and therefore more executable. Tightening the time line could make these plans more relevant, but CCMD planning staffs, especially the J-5, were already overwhelmed with the tasked number of plans and the planning detail required (annexes, TPFDD, etc.). Adding a requirement to develop contingency plans in one year (it usually took two to three years) and then review these plans at annually was not possible without major change. Since adding manpower was not an option, OSD leadership chose to 1) review and reduce the number of contingency plans required; 2) prioritized the remaining plans, and then; 3) reduced the fidelity requirement of the lesser priority plans (see Figure 11). For example, if a potential crisis was a high risk to U.S. security AND likely to occur, this would be identified as a high priority plan and require more detail in this case a Level 4 plan. Figure 11: Plan Levels Reducing both the number and level of plans decreased the overall work load for planning staffs, but level three and four plans still required a lot of time and effort to develop especially those plans requiring a TPFDD. OSD personnel assisted planning coordination by developing collaborative tools allowing planners to meet virtually with members of their joint planning group and to review and update plans in secure, shared folders. These tools reduced travel time and increased productivity. OSD personnel also understood that TPFDD development was a lengthy process, and again leveraged 2 JOPES is an integrated joint conventional command and control system used to support military operation monitoring, planning (deliberate and crisis action), and execution activities. JOPES is transitioning to APEX. 12

16 technology to automate TPFDD development, reducing an often six-month effort to 30 days or less. These efforts, when combined, made the goal of one-year plan development more achievable. 3 Another challenge contingency planning timelines faced was strategic guidance. As discussed earlier, there were multiple and sometime conflicting sources of OSD-level guidance. The result was that many CCMD plans, when reviewed by the SecDef or designated representative, did not meet expectations and had to be revised; thousands of man-hours were wasted. Guidance consolidation the GEF and JSCP helped mitigate many of these misunderstandings. To minimize any other guidance challenges in the future (and understanding that GEF and JSCP guidance could be overcome by events), the Initial Progress Review (IPR) concept was instituted (see Figure 12). CCDR s tasked with contingency plans would meet regularly with OSD to discuss the tasked plan before the plan was submitted for approval, thus minimizing the possibility the plan would be rejected. Figure 12: Initial Progress Reviews Yet another challenge to executable contingency plans was a lack of interagency (IA) cooperation. The reason for this varies, but it often comes down to priorities. Contingency plans might get executed, whereas IA personnel have jobs and crises to deal with today. Couple IA indifference with the past requirement to get JS approval to discuss plans with IA personnel and it was not unusual to find plans tasking the IA without IA coordination; execution became problematic. To improve interagency cooperation the Promote Cooperation (PC) program was instituted. PC is the forum where CCDRs coordinate their plans with other agencies. An OSD and JS approved program, PC generates collaborative development of DoD plans with civilian agencies and non-dod entities up front to encourage buy-in and support. PC events provide CCDRs with a means of directly engaging USG Departments and Agencies to better inform plan development and identify intergovernmental policy issues to advance plan development. In many cases, DoD personnel go to these agencies to discuss what each can bring to the table to meet mission objectives. 3 TPFDDs have a short shelf life as units are constantly rotated. To assist planners in keeping the TPFDD current (or aware of force readiness / availability changes), OSD requested the development of an automated common operating picture for joint forces that provides decision makers (and planners) timely information on force readiness, location and availability; this requirement is repeated in the 2015 GEF. 13

17 Taken together, these multiple improvements to JOPES made it possible to realize the goals of the AP initiative. The AP initiative has since developed into a broader, overarching construct known as the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) system. 4 JOPES is gradually transitioning to APEX; APEX has now has replaced the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) as the DoD planning and execution system. 5 APEX is now a system of joint policies, processes, procedures, and reporting structures supported by JOPES communications and information technology. JOPES enables the Joint Planning and Execution Community to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations. Even this technology segment of JOPES is transitioning to APEX; it will be referred to as APEX System Technology. APEX, again, is the joint capability to create, revise, and execute situational relevant plans rapidly and to a high level of quality. APEX seeks to leverage: Near-continuous collaboration Frequent senior-subordinate consultation Parallel multi-level and multi-functional planning Expeditious plan reviews Web-based data networking Integrated or interoperable tools APEX s comprehensive end-to-end approach includes the streamlining of strategic guidance (GEF / JSCP) as the up front piece to planning as well as the backend plan assessment piece. Additionally, APEX integrates various systems, processes and tools such as Global Force Management, the Defense Readiness and Reporting System, Logistics, Transportation, and Intelligence to inform CCDR Living Plans (see Figure 13). Figure 13: APEX integrates several processes that influence 4 This introduction to APEX was taken from Robert M. Klein s, Adaptive Planning: Not Your Great Grandfather s Schlieffen Plan, Joint Force Quarterly (2 Qtr, 2007): 84-6; and the Adaptive Planning Roadmap II (March 2008). 5 JOPES is now defined as an APEX system technology. The JOPES volumes (CJCSM 3122 series of publications) are being replaced by the APEX family of publications (CJCSM 3130 series). Many of the changes are significant (as discussed in this primer), but many are also cosmetic, e.g., message formats were not changed. 14

18 Assumptions used in developing the APEX process include: Planning never stops until a plan / OPORD is rescinded and/or the operation is terminated. Execution requires the comparable categories of information as planning, but with greater detail, refined fidelity and speed. To achieve the essential unity of action in execution, early and continuous dialogue between DoD planners and those from other Depts. and Agencies is essential to successful planning and execution. The speed of planning during execution for continuing and potential operations is critical. Operations and intelligence officers, logisticians and planners are closely integrated. Information Technology (IT) will assist in collection of disparate data to form actionable information. Where applicable, automated flags will assist in: o Plan update and maintenance to form living plans (this requires force visibility). o Confirmation and/or replacement of planning assumptions with current intelligence and operational Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops and support available Time available, Civil Considerations (METT-TC) factors. In conclusion, JOPES transition to APEX s end-to-end approach is designed to make contingency plans relevant and executable. In many ways the promise of APEX is still that a promise. The computer tools have yet to materialize and since 2008, the trend in GEF s is to require an increasing number of priority (and level) of plans. IPR s are now prioritized and delegated; review for lesser level plans are now done at lower levels than the SecDef, and CCDR s are advised not to stop planning and wait for IPR s that seem increasingly difficult to schedule. With these changes, plans are rarely approved within the one year goal and there appears to be little demand for CCDR s to meet this goal. Finally, the once consolidated GEF is less consolidated in 2015, and the OSD and Joint Staff developed the recent GEF and JSCP serially vice in parallel. The campaign plan focus remains, however as well as the need for relevant living plans. Global Force Management (GFM) As noted in the previous section, resource-informed planning and decision-making requires timely visibility on U.S. force readiness, location and availability. Such information is a key requirement for ensuring high-level contingency plans remain relevant and executable which, in turn, reduces strategic and operational risk. Put simply, contingency plans relying on rapid force flow into a region will utilize a TPFDD to assist in the smooth and efficient flow of forces into a region. The TPFDD, however, will be less useful if the scheduled forces are neither ready or near the expected point of embarkation (e.g., deployed). The APEX goal of making contingency plans relevant and executable requires a realistic understanding of what forces will be available and when. 15

19 To meet this need, Global Force Management 6 (GFM) was born; its main elements are found in Figure 14. Figure 14: GFM Elements The Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG), at the center of Figure 14, is a critical source document for force planning and execution. As mentioned earlier, the SecDef is required to balance global demand for steady-state and current operations against the needs of the services (e.g., training and testing), while also maintaining a surge capability against contingencies. This SecDef-approved document integrates establishes guidance for assignment, apportionment, and allocation of forces in support of GFM framework. The definition of each category follows: Assignment Service Secretaries assign forces to CCDRs (COCOM authority) per SecDef direction to meet UCP directed responsibilities; these forces are available for employment unless allocated to another CCDR. The GEF requires, and GFM clarifies the floor, or the # of forces available forward to a CCDR for that should not be reallocated. More detail on this concept will be provided in the 2016 GFMIG. Unassigned forces - Forces not assigned to a CCDR IAW Title 10 USC, section 162 and instead retained under Service control in order to carry out function of the 6 GFM is a Department of Defense process to align force apportionment, assignment, and allocation methodologies to support joint force availability requirements, enable comprehensive insight into global availability of U.S. military forces, and provide senior decision makers a vehicle to quickly and accurately assess the impact and risk of proposed allocation, assignment, and apportionment changes. 16

20 Secretary of a Military Department IAW Title 10, USC, sections 3013(b), 5013(b), and 8013(b). Service retained forces - AC and RC operational forces under the administrative control of respective Secretaries of the Military Departments, and not assigned to a CCDR. Allocation Forces transferred from the assigned CCDR by the SecDef (and approved by the President). Command relationship is specified (normally OPCON) and forces are available for employment during specified dates. Allocation is done: 1) in the annual GFM cycle; 2) Bi-weekly for emergent force requests (SecDef Orders Book) or 3) a special process for emergent, urgent requests that can t wait for the bi-weekly cycle (Special SecDef Order Book). Allocation tables are updated in the GFM Allocation Plan (GFMAP) 7 located on the JS J3 GFM website. Apportionment Quantities of forces reasonably expected to be available globally for planning purposes. This information can be found in the GFMIG or the JS J8 website. As seen in Figure 15, assignment, allocation, and apportionment are interrelated. Figure 15 shows the entire DoD force pool (every military unit, Soldier, Sailor, Airman, and Marine) within the Service Institutional Forces (recruiters, instructors, Service Title 10 type forces man, train, and equip) and Operational Forces boxes. This force pool is further divided by assigned (Forces For) to a CCDR, unassigned forces, and Service Retained forces. Figure 15: DoD Forces In the past, planners were rarely limited in the scope and type of forces available for contingency planning. The unspoken assumption was that the plan would be the only contingency plan executed and receive the appropriate. The concept behind Figure 15 s framework acknowledges today s resource constrained environment and attempts to limit the forces contingency planners use in developing their plan (the blue box: apportioned forces). This limiting, in theory, makes these contingency plans more feasible/executable as the forces listed in the plan would more likely be available. Limited availability of forces, however, especially specialized forces, may require planners to require/assume 7 The GFMAP is a global DEPORD. It is a message with five annexes. 17

21 availability of forces outside this box. Such use is allowed, though it raises the risk of mission failure if the force(s) required prove not to be available if the plan is executed. The GFMIG also references Preferred Forces ; or specific forces identified (and assumed available) by planners to continue employment, sustainment, transportation planning (TPFDD / transportation feasibility) and to assess risk. These forces are planning assumptions only, they are not considered "sourced" units; there are no guarantees that these specific units/forces will be available. CCMD service / functional components are encouraged to work with Joint Force Providers (JFP) and their components to make the best possible assumptions with respect to identifying preferred forces for planning. The OSD goal of developing an automated sourcing tool to assist both planning and execution sourcing is evidenced in the Preferred Force Generation tool (see Figure 16). When the tool becomes reality it will, in theory, provide an automated capability to rapidly identify candidate forces. This will enable planners to make more informed assumptions when identifying the preferred forces required by their operational design. Figure 16: Preferred Force Generation More informed assumptions during planning offers the opportunity to improve plan feasibility, enabling a quicker transition to execution. Additionally, the tool can assist planners by allowing faster and more accurate updates to TPFDDs (and risk) should execution of contingency plans prove likely. The overall GFM process can be seen in Figure 17. In short, strategic guidance sets the requirement, GFM prioritizes forces to meet said requirements and assesses risk, and, in the end, forces are assigned and allocated. In a way, the overall process has 18

22 similarities to the contingency and crisis planning in APEX the red arrow can be seen as a deliberate force assignment/allocation process taking place over a year; the Emergent allocation process provides the flexibility to react to any unforeseen crises for which rapid action is required. One item in Figure 17 not yet discussed is the Global Force Management Board (GFMB). This role of this board is oversight; the board is chaired by the Joint Director of the Joint Staff (DJS) and is comprised of representatives from OSD, the Joint Staff, Services, CCMDs, and DoD Agencies. The GFMB assesses and prioritizes CCDR requests for annual capabilities, provides a prioritized list of CCDR requests to the Joint Force Coordinator (JFC) and Joint Force Providers (JFP) to use in identifying joint solutions for military capabilities among the Services, and frames any contentious issues for decision by the SecDef. As a final note, it is important to note what is NOT included in GFM yet can assist the DoD mission across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO). These include Contract Support (CCDRs can contract via their Service Components rather than request additional forces), other government agencies, and Coalition & NGOs. The Force Allocation Process Force allocation, or acquiring the additional forces the commander needs to accomplish an assigned task, is often not well understood by military staffs. The next section discusses this process in more detail. Using the numbering in Figure 18 as a guide, the force allocation process is as follows: 1, 2. Combatant commanders submit a Request for Force or capability (RFF/C) to support annual or emerging operational requirements to the SecDef via the Joint Staff. 3 & 4. The Joint Staff validates the request and assigns the request to a JFC and /or JFP to determine a recommended sourcing solution. Figure 18: Force Allocation Process 5 & 6. The JFC/JFP develop sourcing recommendations in coordination with the Services via their assigned global-look Service Components. The recommendations will include any associated risks and other information considered germane to the 19

23 sourcing recommendation. The recommendation must conform to existing OSD policy; any deviations must be accompanied with a detailed explanation for SecDef approval The Joint Staff receives the JFC/JFP sourcing recommendations and the JS J3 briefs recommendations via the SDOB. 9 Combatant commanders and Service chiefs may communicate to the CJCS their assessment of risk or other issues associated with the JFC/JFP s recommended global sourcing solution. The Joint Staff coordinates w/ OSD, agencies, Services, or combatant commands with issues or equity to either articulate or adjudicate (if possible) issues that would result in a non-concurrence or reclama. 10 The Joint Staff will, as required, convene an off-cycle GFMB, or Operations Deputies Tank or JCS Tank to address and attempt resolution of contentious issues. 8. The CJCS recommends solution to SECDEF with the non-concurrence, if not adjudicated in the GFMB, to the SecDef for approval. 9. Upon SecDef approval, the JS publishes SECDEF approval in GFMAP. The GFMAP is a consolidated order that allows all SecDef allocation decisions be complied into one order. Supporting and Supported CCDRs publish Deployment Orders (DEPORDs) implementing the orders in the GFMAP. 8 Each Service maintains Service Red Lines and Service Polices that govern how forces will deploy. The SecDef may order the Services to exceed these polices. 9 J35 (N), the Global Force Management Division, validates CCMD requirements and manages the SecDef Orders Book (SDOB) process. 10 This action does not relieve the JFC/JFP of the requirement to coordinate its recommended sourcing solution with combatant commands and Services. Instead, it provides a means as required for combatant commanders and Service chiefs to provide an additional assessment if they feel one is required. 20