SUBMISSION ON. White Paper on Defence, Planning and Organisation Branch, Department of Defence, Station Road, Newbridge, Co. Kildare.

Transcription

1 SUBMISSION ON White Paper on Defence, Planning and Organisation Branch, Department of Defence, Station Road, Newbridge, Co. Kildare. BY TIMOTHY F MURPHY 10 OCTOBER 2013 Page 1 of 13

2 1. To give appropriate underpinning to Ireland s engagement in international bodies particularly the United Nations and the European Union 1.1 The Triple lock is an example of political failure to adequately explain Defence Policy, why we have a Defence Force (DF), why we deploy it overseas, why we should defend our European Union, why the DF must interoperate with other armies ( in and out of NATO). 1.2 Two stages of the infamous Triple lock are in fact one in reality, a Government decision and approval of Dail Eireann (given Government majorities). The debate on this issue alone should be taken to the public on using every available means of communication and persuasion to convince them that with Dail approval, it is consistent with our international obligations to send the DF on missions not mandated by the UN. 1.3 The recent inability of UN to defuse the posturing of the super powers over Syria is an example of why we should break with the preoccupation with UN mandates. 1.4 Dail Eireann is elected by all entitled to vote and the Article 28.3 of the Constitution gives to Dail Eireann the power to assent to the participation of this State in a war. Presumably the agents of that participation would be the DF. 1.5 Most of the Dail and Dail Committee debates on Defence seem to be consumed with self congratulatory speeches with little informed discussion or debate that engage and inform the public on the choices made and the cost implications. 1.6 The Defence Organisation needs to engage proactively to inform and influence public opinion and win friends. It lacks the public regard and bond evident with the DF in the UK. But then, their DF are a very public part of British life exploited primarily through ceremonial opportunities and they excel at that. It also has a positive effect on their tourism. 1.7 While here the prevailing DF house view is that ceremonial engagements are a burden interrupting their busy lives, (constantly expressed by senior and junior officers), which is a pitiful example of lack of leadership at all levels. 1.7 With the reduction in RDF numbers to below 4000, the most visible and public face of the Defence Organisation is gone. So who promotes the DF now and how? 2. To guide and underpin decisions relating to the capacity of the Defence Organisation to include resourcing, corporate skills, organisation, force composition and equipment acquisition over the next ten years, building on recent reorganisation measures for the Permanent Defence Force and the Reserve Defence Force; 2.1The optimal Defence Forces Organisation would be defined by the actual tasks undertaken and those likely to occur, not by outdated rigid organisations (such as Brigades) which have never been deployed since WWII. The last exercises conducted at that level were in the last century and even then were restricted to part unit participation. 2.2The EAG in 1994 proposed a Single Brigade Structure but Governments delayed for many years in implementing decisions to streamline DF structures, numbers and occupied posts and this continued right up to This resulted in significant overspend on pay Page 2 of 13

3 and infrastructure running costs simply for political expediency and was contrary to attaining the objectives set out by the EAG. (the difference between policy and implementation not now Lord) 2.3 To quote this as a model for Civil Service reform (Green Paper Para. 3 ) is to completely ignore the essential elements required in change management. That critically requires leadership by a team who deliver from beginning to end and adherence to a rigid timeframe measured against clear KPIs. The real delivery time should was from 1995 to 2012 ie 17 years and is still not complete, instead of starting in It is apparent that there was an absence of political will to deliver on all the fine plans and use the the local barracks as a political football. This encouraged the PDF to think it will not happen or not during my watch. 2.5 All the Studies, Reviews and plans for both the DF and RDF had one hallmark : many of the PDF officers initially appointed were rotated in and out of the relevant boards resulting in both a lack of corporate knowledge, continuity,ownership and responsibility to deliver. This started with the EAG/PW review in 1993 and repeated again and again including the recent VFM review of the RDF. 2.6 That indicates a lack of Management and Leadership Skill, and a commitment to embrace change, at the highest levels of the Military Authorities which is a serious deficit in an organisation so focussed on leadership training including the ability to react decisively and quickly under fire. 2.7 The hierarchical structure is a severe impediment to high lighting deficiencies given the top down culture. 2.8 There is an obvious conflict between training for the Primary Role (Defence of State against armed aggression) and actual routine daily tasks arising from the subsidiary roles. 2.9 The conventional 2 Brigade all arms structure never deployed but is de facto operating as a Gendarmerie both at home and abroad. The UN deployments (GP page 42) and ATCP operations listed on pages 40/41 of GP conflict with developing capabilities consistent with doctrine for use of Military Force ( Waging war) Mechanised Infantry Battle Groups offer the optimal configuration for the future with organic Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements in flexible sized organisations adapted to each mission requirement. This would permit further Hqs reductions in the current structure and realign the force capability with its priority and non priority roles What role exists for Cavalry with the deployment of UAVs for reconnaissance or Artillery with the greater sophistication of aerial ( manned and unmanned) delivered weapons either at home or abroad even if operated by other EU forces. (Pooling and Sharing?) 2.12 That Infantry biased force could be augmented by Reservists more readily We cannot afford the luxury of an army training for war and a second armed force (inside or outside the Gardai) to meet security demands. Yet the Military view is that ATCP operations contradict doctrine used in combat training and that high combat readiness does not translate easily into police type deployment The Humanitarian aspect is a distraction and is best provided by civilian organisations with support from military personnel where required The Air Corps is tasked with Ministerial Air Transport, Fishery protection, ATCP and ATCA tasks. These are not consistent with the primary DF role. Page 3 of 13

4 2.16 The Naval Service is primarily tasked with Fishery protection, ATCP and ATCA tasks and we have a separate Coast Guard structure and even the Customs Service operate two cutters based in Kinsale Co. Cork. Surely the solution for this small population is a National Armed Coast Guard to provide all sea related tasks under one command (including Customs). That should remain within the Defence Organisation With a one Minister now in Defence and Justice, it presents an opportunity to examine all the ATCP activities from both sides and consider if the current arrangements are the financial optimum and most efficient use of manpower or are simply legacy of separate empire protection Two examples come to mind: THE PRESIDENT Article 13.4 of the Constitution refers: The supreme command of the Defence Forces is hereby vested in the President. The personal security of the President (including drivers) could simply be transferred to the Military Police, releasing Gardai for reassignment. Military Police provide security in the houses of the Oireachtas so what is the issue. They could also provide the security and transport needs of the Minister for Defence CASH IN TRANSIT ESCORTS and EXPLOSIVE ESCORTS: The duplication of forces on these is ridiculous. The presence of unarmed Gardai contributes nothing to the task and if there was an attempt to rob the cash, they could impede the military response or even be caught in crossfire. This has cost millions in Garda costs and vehicles. Military police are trained in traffic control, have all the HiVis jackets, blue lights etc. and are soldiers and could support the deployment of the actual escort in the event of attack. If all this is too radical, why not put a token Garda in one of the military vehicles The use of blue lights by marked military police vehicles permitted in S.I 695/2011 should be extended to all military vehicles used on ATCP escort tasks and EOD vehicles. This would clearly identify to other road users both the urgency and security aspects of the tasks Governments across the world constantly adapt the size of their standing forces to perceived need and financial realities. They are a contingency force after all. At all levels of Government and Civil service, we seem to specialise in ten year plans, totally removed from the ever reducing time scales in which major change takes place elsewhere Contingency planning is still in its infancy as is apparent from the structure of the Office of Emergency Planning supporting a Government Task Force and providing oversight. Page 4 of 13

5 It is patently clear from various major events that this is a cumbersome model lacking in a defined Directorate with overall command. That is not a criticism of the Military but is identifying an obvious diffusion of authority The Military would be well placed to devise and train a (civilian?) command structure which would order all necessary responders to deploy and report directly to it. Coordination is a substitute for avoiding responsibility. The ambiguity evident in civil and public servant answers trying to explain to a Dail committee who exactly was in charge of major events such as (flooding in Cork and elsewhere, Ice effects on roads etc), who could press the button and who should take OVERALL COMMAND indicates that throwing everyone into a room solves nothing. 2.22The Departmental responsibility for Civil Defence should be transferred to the Department of the Environment and Local Government. It is an unarmed volunteer organisation with no legally enforceable liability of service and not governed by the Defence Acts. The role is to provide a Second Line Emergency Response under civilian control in conjunction with other responders under civilian control. 3. DEFENCE FORCE ESTABLISHMENT AND STRENGTH. The strength of the PDF at 30 April 2013 was 9163: Army 7355 Air Corps 780 Naval service The Army strength is now at about the same level as in It is a very different Army now, but overnight a requirement to rapidly deploy large numbers to address the threat arising from the Northern Ireland situation overwhelmed the DF in The corporate memory of that time is nonexistent but the need to provide a surge could occur anytime due to a variety of external or internal events or our DF participation in international deployments. 3.2 The only readily available and legally compellable response to that now as in 1969 is the Reserve Defence Force.In 1969/1970 The First Line Reserve (FLR) was Called Out under section 88 of the Defence Act (members had a legally enforceable liability to respond). 3.3 The FLR strength on was 264 and it had not trained since It is probable that none of the FLR are trained on the personal weapons or communication systems now in use and so are not readily deployable on the most basic military duties. That is a critical difference with the situation in That leaves the Army Reserve which replaced the FCA (AR) and the Naval Service Reserve (NSR) which replaced the Slua Muiri in the reorganisation of October These are referred to as RDF in the rest of this submission and are the only legally compellable Force available to the DF to respond to a surge demand. 3.4 Following from the VFM review 2012, the Strength/ Establishment was set at c.4069 but in reality strength is now heading towards compared to c in So the only usable and legally compellable surge capability is fast diminishing driven no doubt by the prevailing Military View that the PDF is capable of meeting all (known?) tasks without recourse to using RDF. Page 5 of 13

6 3.6 This is extremely short sighted and requires policy directive by the Minister to ensure that the RDF is central to the total force requirement of the DF. 4. THE RESERVE DEFENCE FORCE --- A DIFFERENT VIEW. 4.1 BACKGROUND TO POLICY AND CONSIDERATIONS IMPACTING DIRECTLY ON RDF. a. The White Paper 2000 b. RDRIP 2004 c. VFM RESERVE REVIEW 2012 d. The Implementation of all or parts of the above. 4.2 The reserve Defence Force has been subjected to almost 19 years of experiments, reviews, studies and re organisations all driven exclusively by the what appears as attempt to retain and support an extremely large PDF structure of appointments with no defined outputs. ( appx 2) 4.3 The RDFRA submission to the EAG in 1994 included the following: a Single Army Concept ( now the official position eventually in 2013) a single reserve titled RESERVE DEFENCE FORCE ( eventually adopted in Oct 2005) Be an integral part of the DF and fulfil Roles set by Government in 1993 ( as eventually out in White paper 2000) Radical changes to recruitment, training methods and courses for promotion. Reduce the cadre numbers (then c. 800+) by rationalisation of unit administration in occupied posts shared by multiple RDF units ( took from 1994 to 2012) Disestablish the PDF Command level staffs ( implemented 2013) Integrate RDF into PDF units ( Implemented 2013) Integrate all Combat and Service support units and co locate with PDF to ensure high training standards prevailed. ( Implemented in 2013) 4.4 It took only 19 years to implement even some of this. 4.5 The significant to note that EAG/PW report in 1994 proposed the full integration of the reserve with the PDF. 4.6 The Role of the RDF seemed to present a huge challenge in the various policy documents. There are clear inconsistencies between the White paper emphasis on Training for the Role and RDFRIP (and several reports) proposing using RDF on routine tasks. (appx 3). 4.7 The critical imperative in RDFRIP to co locate RDF units with PDF units was not implemented in the 1st southern Brigade, why? 4.8 While the official Military Website contains a similar Role and tasking (appx. 4) no actual use has been made of the RDF in recent years and so capability, effectiveness ( on the job) suffered. 4.9 The actual tasks likely to arise for RDF are already performed by PDF in ATCP/ATCA operations. These should be the focus of RDF training as it is realistically achievable within the training and cost limitations imposed The RDF can be a means of providing specialists in various niche areas (Cyber) under Military Command Page 6 of 13

7 4.11 The RDF currently provides a capability of trained personnel who have passed security clearance, Medical examinations are attested and therefore legally compellable to respond. They are the only Reserve the DF could use today. The new RDF ORGANISATION should reflect these realities: 5.1 The total RDF cannot be trained to interoperable levels given the training arrangements and through flow. 5.2 While the RDF Role shares all the PDF roles, the priority should be training RDF to effectively carry out all the routine tasks of the PDF identified in GP page The overseas service is a non event given the failure by the Department and Military Authorities to make the necessary legislative and regulatory changes since RDFRIP The Military Authorities do not want a reserve and apparently say so openly. Yet it is the PDF who failed to lead, train and engage the volunteers who placed themselves as the disposal of the State under legally enforceable terms of service. 5.5 The RDF can be trained to provide surge capability for the PDF for the day to day operational tasks provided they are given hands on experience with the PDF. 5.6 The VFM painted gave very distorted analysis of the RDF which obviously derived from the imperative to re assign the Cadre. The failures identified are entirely the responsibility of the Military Authorities who gave up when they realised a long time ago that the Cadres were facing extinction the only question was when. 5.7 The RDF are the only volunteers in the State who serve under the Statutory provisions of compellability contained in sections 86 to 92 of the Defence Acts. Failure to comply is an offence under section 242 and under section 243 (both permit Military arrest or Garda arrest and trial by court martial in the case of 243). 5.8 It is peculiar that such an extensive document (VFM) which took two years to complete is silent on this critical power available to the State especially given that it compared the RDF to two unarmed bodies, the Civil Defence and the Garda reserve neither of which can be compelled to serve. 5.9 It avoided recording that the RDF have responded in unpaid capacity for thousand of man days of training and unarmed assistance to various civilian organisations who sought military help. Departmental directives issued in the 1980s sought to curtail or end this activity entirely Using the RDF volunteers for ATCA operations never required the Minister to invoke section 90 of the Act. (contrary to statements made in the Dail to that effect) DFR R5 refers: Aid to the Civil Authority 42. With the approval of the General Officer Commanding a Brigade or the Flag Officer Commanding the Naval Service, members may, with their own consent, be employed in Aid to the Civil Authority, at such times and at such places as the Officer Commanding the Brigade RDF or Officer Commanding Shore Operations Naval Service may determine. Payment only arises under ATCP operations, there is no such provision for ATCA. This was not highlighted either in the VFM report. Page 7 of 13

8 5.12 The RDF should consist of Infantry, CIS ( IT,Programmers, System specialists, Project Managers), Medical ( Doctors, Dentists and EMTs), Transport ( Drivers, Technicians), Logistical and Legal specialists, Engineers ( graduate Structural, Civil, Electrical, Engineering Technicians), and Military Police, All co located in Barracks with relevant PDF unit. These can be trained within the time and cost constraints to carry out all the Security tasks of the PDF under ATCP and provide personnel for ATCA operations The key required standards: Skill in personal weapon. Trained to Pte 3*, NCO and Junior Officer for Infantry with collective training to platoon level. Trained on all equipment used by PDF at this level. CS and CSS pers trained in appropriate Corps skills. Recruit professionals who should be commissioned at comparative PDF level or appoint as Warrant Officer specialists as used in US Forces The RDF must be co located with a PDF unit. Infantry Units should be established in barracks currently without an Infantry Unit. Cavalry & Artillery RDF if required at all should be located in the Curragh In the greater Cork Area (for example) there are many Pharmachem plants that present the potential to seriously health and public safety if they were attacked for that purpose. These did not feature in They have very special restrictions on electrical equipment (radios) of any type (battery watches) torches, etc and the actual use of guns would require clear knowledge of the consequences and MOU with the operators. This would be an ideal task for local RDF who generally stay in the one location for most of their military service unlike their PDF counterparts. Airports are another challenge for many similar reasons In summary, focus RDF training at a level which can be attained and which provides the limited Military skills for ATCP and ATCA. They should be used with parent PDF personnel in these tasks to build up knowledge and skills. This could be unpaid for training during the year. Trained personnel could also provide holiday relief (paid). The RDF element of each PDF unit should be tasked with building corporate knowledge of the potential Vital Installations or potential high security risk s in their area and developing MOU to permit safe deployment and contact protocols DFRIP proposed a cadre of c.320 for the Command,Training and administration of the RDF. The recent VFM report catalogues the failure of the Military Authorities to implement its own plan for over 17/18 years resulting in a distortion of the cost of PDF vis RDF (effective strength reducing each year in size from 2000 on ) and loss of capability. The current reorganisation will result in the disappearance of the RDF because the distances between rural sub units and the PDF parent units are impractical for RDF without independent transport and even then the attendant cost wil leventually deter thyem The RDF in occupied urban posts may survive but only with continuous recruitment to prevent numbers falling below critical mass for training and use. The PDF parent units have no relevant experience because they do not recruit at unit level The reassignment process is a repeat of the shambles in 2005 with RDF assigned to units across provincial boundaries and evidently major difficulty in locating personnel despite the large cadre (who were required to update contact information) Page 8 of 13

9 5.20 The RDF Officer course needs radical overhaul and the course is capable of being completed in 6 months followed by appointment in the rank of LT or PDF equivalent rank for professionals DFR R5 needs radical and rapid updating specifically providing for wider terms of service other than TRAINING. The promotion procedures introduced in 2005 have proved a major impediment to timely promotion at junior officer rank and should be identical to PDF RDF will accept more onerous legal accountability if the current situation is considered unsatisfactory although section 120 of the Defence Act applies Section 90 of Defence Act 1954 should be amended to read. (1) The Minister may,at anytime when occasion appears to require, direct that all or so many reservists as he thinks necessary be called out in aid of the civil power or civil authority. Page 9 of 13

10 APPENDIX 1 The actual SURGE Contribution by the FCA. ( Long forgotten) The numbers in the PDF (Army) now approach the strength in early 1969 but the reserve ( EST.22300) was training about per annum. Suddenly a Black Swan event took place The North exploded. The DF was overwhelmed in responding to real or perceived threats. Army units were rushed to border areas while Government designated critical infrastructure as Vital Installations, requiring armed guards, all over the country. That coupled with guarding the legacy of colonial military installations resulted in the Government using Section 87 of the Defence Act to call up the First Line Reserve with serious consequences for the jobs of those compelled to respond. In October 1969 requests went out to FCA units to provide personnel for paid armed Security Duties in Barracks and at Vital Installations with minimal induction time. The writer with a colleague following a ten minute brief, were the first armed patrol to protect the Marina Power station in Cork. These duties expanded to mobile armed patrols to Inniscarra and Carrigadrohid Dams, and Kilbarry Switching Station (which controlled most of Cork Area network). My unit provided 15 Military Police NCOs each Friday at 1900 to Sunday at 1800 each week end from 1969 to we were collocated with PDF MP in the Detention Barracks in Cork. All relevant MP duties ( investigation, statements, arrests and trials) were performed. Other units provided Guards, Stand To, Orderly Officers in barracks and permanent guards on Vital installations. This was replicated all over the country and FCA local knowledge was particularly vital in border areas for PDF units moved there. In 1972 increasing PDF numbers reduced the FCA involvement although a whole new category of FCA service called Fulltime Security Duties were initiated. This required FCA to volunteer to make themselves available fulltime to the DF. Over the following years many enlisted and some FCA officers were commissioned into PDF. The FCA volunteered to carry out specified periods of paid duty and section 90 never had to be used. The surge demand was met and all the duties performed with minimum preparation. These duties were the daily tasks of PDF so the limited FCA training sufficed. The long term outcome of the rapid build up to in the PDF resulted in the waste that was all catalogued in the EAG report 1994/5. It required a VER package to redress the over staffing with all the long term pension costs. No effort was made to shut down legacy barracks until the mid 90s. Page 10 of 13

11 The moral of the story is that PDF are an expensive (but necessary) investment but the daily security tasks are well within the capability of the RDF and that is where training should be focussed. The RDF are a necessary and cost effective way of meeting our Defence demands and are legally compellable. APPENDIX 2 The Reserve (FCA) has been the subject of almost continuous review and reorganisation since its establishment. The following are milestones of that : a Established under Military Command as FCA. Establishment of b Integration new Brigades formed with PDF and FCA units. c De Integration separate organisation at Command and DFHQ levels from PDF. d Training Manday Restrictionsof per year introduced and a Permitted Establishment of c e Price Waterhouse Review of Defence Forces set out recommendations for Ist Tier Reserve of 1910 and Second Tier of 5250 total 7160 f April Chief of Staff announces that all FCA can contribute to a Special Study of the Reserve through their units. g. Late 1996 preliminary Military Boards convened by OC FCA ( in each command) h Jan Command Special Study Boards convened by GOCs and FOCNS to report by i Oct. Chief of Staff convenes Special Study Board to report by June 1998 j January Steering Group for Special Study of RDF convened by Minister for Defence. k MAY COS Board Report (h) published. Proposes a 9 year implementation plan l AUGUST Steering Group report to Minister. Proposes 6 year implementation plan and a restructuring of units and Integrated and Non Integrated reservists. Cadre reduced to in addition to normal duties. m JULY Launch of RDFRIP. Establishment with Integrated 2656 and non integrated Units amalgamated and reservists re assigned. n OCTOBER implementation of RDFRIP starts. FCA & SM disestablished and RDF AR and RDF NSR launched. o October Integrated Reserve pilot commenced with a target of 470 but actual figure was 280 over 2007/2008 p Integrated Reserve pilot suspended. Failed to meet targets. q March Moratorium on Public service recruitment includes RDF. r FEBUARY VFM on RDF Commences s September VFM reports. Proposes Re Organisation t April Re Integration of RDF into a SINGLE ARMY CONCEPT with all RDF subsumed into PDF units with a strength of c Page 11 of 13

12 That is hardly a model of Change Management and effective use of scarce resources. The priority from 1994 to 2013 was to preserve PDF appointments at the expense of reducing RDF training allocations and the DFRIP (1995) figures for cadre ( c 319) were never implemented. That there are any RDF at all remaining after this amateurish shambles is a miracle. APPENDIX 3 Roles of the Reserve RDFRIP2004 The RDF will have the same roles as assigned to the Defence Forces: Defence against armed aggression. Aid to the Civil Power. Participation in Peace Support Operations. Fishery Protection. Other duties which may be assigned by Government. Tasks will be assigned to the RDF to support the PDF in fulfilling these roles. These will include: Augmentation/reinforcement of the PDF. Security of Vital Installations. Provision of logistic support. Provision of armed escorts. Participation by selected Reserve personnel in Peace Support Operations. Augmentation of Naval Service on fishery protection patrols. Staffing of Military Posts during periods of PDF deployment. Radiological Monitoring. Ceremonial Duties at national and local events. I recognise that support will be required. As Director of Reserve Forces it is a major part of my job to see that such support is provided. In particular, the requirement that each RDF unit should have a direct working and support relationship with a designated PDF unit ( Never implemented) is critical to the success of the new organisation. I am committed to working to ensure that this mutually supporting relationship becomes a reality to the benefit of the Defence Forces as a whole. Page 12 of 13

13 M O Dwyer Col Director of Reserve Forces APPENDIX 4 DEFENCE FORCES WEBSITE Roles The Reserve Defence Force roles are those assigned to the Defence Forces: Defence against armed aggression. Aid to the Civil Power. Participation in Peace Support Operations. Fishery Protection. Other duties which may be assigned by Government. Tasks are assigned to the RDF to support the PDF in fulfilling these roles. These include: Augmentation/reinforcement of the PDF. Provision of logistic support. Provision of armed escorts. Augmentation of Naval Service on fishery protection patrols. Staffing of Military Posts during periods of PDF deployment. Radiological Monitoring. Ceremonial Duties at national and local events. Current Military Authority view is that we do not require any RDF involvement. It may that converging troops in fewer locations due to Barrack Closure has challenged the Military in keeping them occupied. Page 13 of 13