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Office of Intelligence 10 November 2011 Warning: This document is (U//FOUO).

policy relating to FOUO information and is not to be released to the public, the media, or other personnel

1 Office of Intelligence 10 November 2011 Warning: This document is (U//FOUO). It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information and is not to be released to the public, the media, or other personnel who do not have a valid need-to-know without prior approval of an authorized DHS official. State and local Homeland security officials may share this document with authorized security personnel without further approval from DHS

2 1 (U) Scope (U//FOUO) The Transportation Security Administration Office of Intelligence (TSA-OI) is reissuing this product, originally released on 2 September 2011, in advance of the upcoming holiday season to remind stakeholders of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used worldwide to attack high speed rail. (U//FOUO) This TSA-OI assessment analyzes the threat to high-speed rail networks worldwide in advance of the possible construction of new high-speed rail lines in the United States. The Department of Transportation classifies high-speed rail and intercity passenger rail into the following categories 1 : (U//FOUO) High-Speed Rail Express: Frequent express service between major population centers miles apart, with few intermediate stops. Top speeds of at least 150 mph on completely grade-separated, dedicated rights-ofway (with the possible exception of some shared track in terminal areas). (U//FOUO) High-Speed Rail Regional: Relatively frequent service between major and moderate population centers miles apart, with some intermediate stops. Top speeds of mph, grade separated, with some dedicated and some shared track (using positive train control technology). (U//FOUO) Emerging High-Speed Rail: Developing corridors of miles, with strong potential for future high-speed rail Regional and/or Express service. Top speeds of up to mph on primarily shared track (eventually using positive train control technology), with advanced grade crossing protection or separation. (U//FOUO) Conventional Rail: Traditional intercity passenger rail services of more than 100 miles with as little as one, to as many as 7-12 daily frequencies; may or may not have strong potential for future high-speed rail service. Top speeds of up to 79 mph to as high as 90 mph generally on shared track.

3 2 (U) Key Judgments (U//FOUO) TSA s Office of Intelligence (TSA-OI) assesses that although counterterrorism pressure has weakened al-qa ida (AQ) and al Qa ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), both organizations represent an enduring and evolving threat and remain committed to attacking the Homeland, including the transportation sector. Both organizations have targeted commercial aviation and AQ has repeatedly plotted to attack mass transit. TSA-OI also remains concerned about the threat posed by homegrown violent extremists (HVE) or lone offenders inspired by AQ s violent extremist ideology to launch attacks against less secure targets, such as passenger rail systems. 2,3 (U//FOUO) TSA-OI has no credible or specific intelligence indicating terrorists are currently planning an attack against high-speed rail in the United States. Violent extremists, however, likely remain interested in attacking the U.S. mass transit system, which includes passenger rail. (U//FOUO) Terrorists continue to express interest in future attacks against highspeed rail overseas. (U//FOUO) Improvised explosive devices remain the preferred method of attack. Seventy-five percent of attacks overseas since 2004 involved an explosive device planted or placed on the rail line, probably in an attempt to derail the train, although most attacks launched against high-speed rail failed. Track security and alert railway personnel played a key role in disrupting attacks.

3 (U) TSA-OI Assessment (U) Overview (U//FOUO) One high-speed rail line currently exists within the U.S. mass transit system Amtrak s Acela Express service.

(U) Figure 1: Acela Route Map (U) The Acela Express runs along the United States northeast corridor, from Washington, D.C., to Boston, Massachusetts.

4 3 (U) TSA-OI Assessment (U) Overview (U//FOUO) One high-speed rail line currently exists within the U.S. mass transit system Amtrak s Acela Express service. Plans are, however, in the works for other high-speed rail networks, which may begin emerging as early as 2015, according to the Association of High Speed Rail. (U) Figure 1: Acela Route Map (U) The Acela Express runs along the United States northeast corridor, from Washington, D.C., to Boston, Massachusetts. Acela trains have a maximum speed of 150 mph along two sections of track in Massachusetts and Rhode Island, and a maximum speed of 135 mph on (U) certain sections south of New York. However, the average speed for Acela trains is around 80 mph. 4 The new high-speed rail development in California will cover about 800 miles of track from Sacramento to Los Angeles and will reach top speeds of 220mph. (U) Figure 2: Proposed California high-speed rail line, Source: California High-Speed Rail Authority

5 4 (U) Threat to High-Speed Rail in the United States (U//FOUO) While TSA-OI assesses that violent extremist groups are interested in conducting attacks against mass transit in the Homeland, the office is not aware of any credible or specific intelligence indicating terrorists are planning an attack on any rail system, to include high speed rail, in the United States. (U//FOUO) Calls for attacks against mass transportation targets by al-qa ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) AQ spokesperson Adam Gadahn USPER, as well as Najibullah Zazi s USPER disrupted plot against Homeland mass transit systems, demonstrate the desire of AQ and its affiliates to attack the Homeland and the U.S. mass transportation sector. (U//FOUO) March 2010: In a video entitled A Call to Arms, Gadahn emphasized how even unsuccessful attacks on Western mass transportation systems can bring cities to a halt and cost billions in increased security measures. 5 (U//FOUO) February 2010: Zazi, a legal permanent resident of the United States from Afghanistan, admitted to bringing triacetone triperoxide (TATP)-based explosives to New York City in September 2009 as part of a plan to attack New York City s subway system. Zazi had previously traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan to join the Taliban and fight against the United States and allied forces, and was recruited by AQ to return to the United States to conduct suicide operations. 6 (U//FOUO) TSA-OI is not aware of any reporting indicating that terrorists are interested in attacking companies or suppliers associated with high-speed rail components. (U) Threat to High-Speed Rail Worldwide (U//FOUO) According to information found in open source reporting and the National Counterterrorism Center s Worldwide Incidents Tracking System i (WITS), violent extremists conducted at least 12 attacks clearly targeting high-speed rail overseas between 1 January 2004 and 1 July 2011 ii. Only three of these attacks were successful; the others (75 percent) were disrupted or unsuccessfully executed. The lack of success has not deterred violent extremists; however, as they continue to express interest in future attacks against high-speed rail overseas. i (U//FOUO) The Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS) data is provided for statistical purposes only. The statistical information contained in WITS is based on reports from a variety of open sources that may be of varying credibility. Any assessment regarding the nature of the incidents or the factual circumstances thereof are offered only as part of the analytical work product of the National Counterterrorism Center and may not reflect the assessments of other departments and agencies of the United States Government. Nothing in this report should be construed as a determination that individuals associated with the underlying incidents are guilty of terrorism or any other criminal offense. As with all entries in WITS, the statistical information will be modified, as necessary and appropriate, when and if the underlying incidents are finally adjudicated. ii (U//FOUO) The total number of attacks only includes attacks in which high-speed rail was a clear and specific target. Attacks on multi-modal stations, and general targeting of rail infrastructure, is not included.

6 5 (U//FOUO) August 2011: According to open source reporting, a group has been charged with planning to derail the Sapsan high-speed train traveling between Moscow and St. Petersburg. The group bought fertilizer made of ammonium nitrate, wire and batteries, and planned to plant a bomb at an isolated place and derail the train. 7 (U//FOUO) September 2010: According to press reporting, security on highspeed Eurostar trains in France was stepped up following a warning of a possible suicide attack on transport systems. 8 (U) Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (U//FOUO) Of the 12 attacks on high-speed rail during the reporting period, nine (75 percent) involved an explosive device planted or placed on the rail line, probably in an attempt to derail the train. Other tactics included tampering with the rail lines and overhead catenary systems, and arson targeting tracks and signals. TSA-OI assesses an attack against high-speed rail in the United States may involve an IED or tampering with the track in an attempt to derail a high-speed train. (U//FOUO) November 2009: An IED exploded under a section of railroad track as the Nevsky Express passed by in Novogorod, Russia. The explosion derailed the train, killing 39 people and injuring 95. Russian authorities blamed militants from the Caucasus region (U//FOUO) April 2006: Authorities located and defused an IED planted along the Paris-Nantes railway line near Saint-Sylvain-d Anjou, France. The IED consisted of a plastic pipe, a chlorate-based explosive, and a timer. French authorities assessed that the IED was powerful enough to damage the track and cause a passing train to derail, and could have been planted anytime within the previous 10 days. 11 (U//FOUO) April 2004: Assailants placed a bomb on the tracks of the Madrid- Seville high-speed train line. Police safely defused the bomb, which was discovered by a railway worker. Spanish authorities stated that the explosive was identical to that used in the 11 March Madrid bombings. No group claimed responsibility. 12 (U//FOUO) Other attacks included tampering and arson conducted against tracks, signals, and a catenary system. (U//FOUO) November 2008: In four attacks between 8 November and 9 November, assailants inserted hooked metal into the 25,000-volt power cables of the Train Grande Vitesse (TGV) line. The attacks took place on lines north, east, and south of Paris, causing widespread delays in national traffic, Eurostar services to Brussels and London, and routes to the Netherlands and northern Europe. More than 20,000 passengers and 160 trains were disrupted as a result of the attacks. 13

7 6 (U//FOUO) November 2007: Arsonists burned tracks and signals of TGV lines running out of Paris, France, causing delays in service and damaging signals, affecting 18 miles of track. 14 (U//FOUO) May 2004: Saboteurs bolted metal plates to the tracks in an attempt to derail the German high-speed ICE train between Cologne and Berlin. The driver was able to slow the train and roll over the plates, and avoided a possible derailment. 15 (U) Impact of Security (U//FOUO) Existing security measures particularly track security and alert railway personnel played a key role in disrupting many of the attempted attacks on high-speed rail included in the above time frame. Authorities found and defused IEDs on the tracks in seven of the incidents. In two other instances, alert train engineers were able to adjust their speed in time to avoid derailments. 16,17 (U) Outlook (U//FOUO) TSA-OI is not aware of any credible or specific intelligence indicating terrorists are planning an attack on high-speed rail in the United States. AQ and its affiliates have expressed interest in conducting attacks against mass transit in the Homeland, and TSA-OI assesses terrorist groups may view high-speed rail as an attractive target as more high-speed rail systems develop in the United States. TSA-OI further assesses that an attack on high-speed rail in the United States would involve an IED placed on the track or tampering with the track in an attempt to derail a train. From a review of previous attacks against high-speed overseas, it appears appropriate security measures and alert personnel can be successful attack deterrents. (U//FOUO) Prepared by the TSA Office of Intelligence, Functional Assessments Branch. For dissemination questions, contact TSA Production Management, TSA- OI_Production@tsa.dhs.gov. (U) Tracked by: HSEC ST-2009; HSEC ST (U) DOT; (U) Vision for High Speed Rail in America 2 (U) SITE Monitoring Service, Jihadist Threat; ; 13 May 2011; (U) Jihadist Urges Lone-Wolf Attacks, Hacking in Revenge for bin Laden; (U) 3 (U) SITE Monitoring Service, Jihadist Threat; ; 14 October 2011; (U) Jihadist Urge Muslims in the West to Avenge Awlaki Killing; (U) 4 (U) American rail.com 5 (U) SITE Intelligence Group; (U) Al-Qaeda s American Spokesman Praises Fort Hood Shooter; 7 March 2010; (U) 6 (U) DOJ Press Release; (U) Najibullah Zazi Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Use Explosives Against Persons or Property in the U.S., Conspiracy to Murder Abroad and Providing Material Support to Al- Qaeda; 22 Feb 2010; (U) 7 (U) CEP ; (U) FSB Prevented Bombing of High-Speed Train; 15 August 2011 (U)

8 7 8 (U)thisislondon.co.uk; (U) Eurostar boosts security as French fear al Qaeda attack; 21 September 2010; (U) 9 (U) BBC News; (U) Bomb Caused Russian Train to Crash; 28 November 2009; (U) 10 (U) BBC News; (U) Rail Crash Revives Russian Fears; 28 November 2009; (U) 11 (U) NCTC; WITS; 18 April 2006; (U) 12 (U) NCTC; WITS; 2 April 2004; (U) 13 (U) Spiegel Online; (U) Train Sabotage in France: Terror Officials Explore Possible Germany Link; 11 November 2008; (U) 14 (U) BBC News; (U) Sarkozy Vows to Punish Saboteurs; 21 November 2007; (U) 15 (U) Mineta Transportation Institute; (U) The Attempted Derailing of the French TGV (High Speed Train and a Quantitative Analysis of 181 Rail Sabotage Attempts; (U) 16 (U) Mineta Transportation Institute; (U) The Attempted Derailing of the French TGV (High Speed Train and a Quantitative Analysis of 181 Rail Sabotage Attempts; (U) 17 (U) NCTC; WITS; 1 July 2011; (U)

DHS Form 6001 (7/10) - OMB CONTROL NUMBER: 1601-0013 CLASSIFICATION: Office of Intelligence OI Customer Survey Product Title: ASMT-83706 High Speed Rail Threat REISSUE 10 Nov 2011 1.

Very Satisfied Somewhat Satisfied Somewhat Dissatisfied Neither Satisfied Nor Dissatisfied Very Dissatisfied 3. How did you use this product in support of your mission?

9 DHS Form 6001 (7/10) - OMB CONTROL NUMBER: CLASSIFICATION: Office of Intelligence OI Customer Survey Product Title: ASMT High Speed Rail Threat REISSUE 10 Nov Please select the partner type that best describes your organization. Select One 2. Overall, how satisfied are you with the usefulness of this product? Very Satisfied Somewhat Satisfied Somewhat Dissatisfied Neither Satisfied Nor Dissatisfied Very Dissatisfied 3. How did you use this product in support of your mission? Integrated into one of my own organization s finished information or intelligence products Shared contents with federal or DHS component partners If so, which partners? Shared contents with state and local partners If so, which partners? Shared contents with private sector partners If so, which partners? Other (please specify) 4. Please rank this product's relevance to your mission. (Please portion mark comments.) Critical Very important Somewhat important Not important N/A 5. Please rate your satisfaction with each of the following: Very Satisfied Somewhat Satisfied Somewhat Dissatisfied Very Dissatisfied N/A Timeliness of product or support Responsiveness to your intelligence needs 6. How could this product or service be improved to increase its value to your mission? To help us understand more about your organization so we can better tailor future products, please provide: Name: Position: Organization: State: Contact Number: (Please portion mark comments.) Submit Feedback Privacy Act Statement Paperwork Reduction Act Compliance Statement CLASSIFICATION: REV: 28 June 2011

(U//FOUO) Security Awareness Reminder for the 2011 Holiday Season

(U//FOUO) Security Awareness Reminder for the 2011 Holiday Season 23 November 2011 (U) Scope (U//FOUO) This Joint Intelligence Bulletin provides law enforcement, public, and private sector safety officials