AUSTRALIAN PEACEKEEPER & PEACEMAKER VETERANS ASSOCIATION NATIONAL EXECUTIVE P.O. BOX 552, TORQUAY, VIC, 3228

Transcription

1 The Australian Peacekeeper & Peacemaker Veterans Association Inc, National Executive, Submission for the Retrospective Reclassification of OPERATION PALLADIN, United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation, Middle East, To Warlike Service. A Dutch UN Military Observer inspects the damage of Team Sierra s Patrol Base, Located at Khiam, Israeli-Lebanese and Syrian Border region, after being destroyed by Israeli Bunker Buster bomb, killing all 4 UNMOs July 2006.

2 Copyright APPVA 2008 The material and information contained in this document constitutes Copyright and has been developed for use by the Australian Peacekeeper & Peacemaker Veterans Association. You may download, display, print and reproduce only one copy of this material, in unaltered form only (retaining this notice) for your personal, non-commercial use or use within your organisation. Apart from any use as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968 (as amended) all other rights are reserved. Requests for further authorisation should be directed to: The Australian Peacekeeper & Peacemaker Veterans Association Inc, P.O. Box 552, TORQUAY, VIC, 3228

3 AUSTRALIAN PEACEKEEPER & PEACEMAKER VETERANS ASSOCIATION NATIONAL EXECUTIVE P.O. BOX 552, TORQUAY, VIC, 3228 (INCORPORATED IN VICTORIA) ABN Patron Major General John Pearn AM, KStJ, RFD (Ret d) Telephone & Fax: (03) Mobile: Website: Also caring for Veterans of Iraq, Afghanistan and Peacetime Service. Commemorating 60 Years of Australian Peacekeeping Operations Executive Summary Thursday, 1 May This submission has been written with the input of two former United Nations Military Observers (UNMO), who served on OPERATION PALLADIN, with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), in the Middle East; namely Major Matti Stanfield and Mr Ray Williams, during two different wars or conflicts. 2. The aim of this submission is to convince the reader that there is a requirement for the investigation of retrospective reclassification of the Conditions of Service and/or the Classification of the Prescribed Operation of OPERATION PALLADIN within the context of the argument presented in this paper. 3. Notwithstanding the above, it has been noted that a number of Australian Defence Force members have or may have been involved in a number of short and violent conflicts during the Arab/Israeli conflict since the first Australians arrived in the region in Research conducted on the subject of war within the Area of Operations of UNTSO has indicated seven (7) major conflicts that potentially involved Australians. 5. Both veterans have submitted that they were under intense danger and that they satisfy the Incurred Danger Test for the purposes of the Veteran Entitlement Act 1986 (VEA), of which is normally used to gauge Warlike Service (WLS) from Non-Warlike Service (NWLS). 6. This paper clearly demonstrates that within the auspices of the conflicts that these veterans were involved, that they are more than eligible for WLS or Allotted for Duty for WLS, during their service of the conflicts that they were present. 7. The end state of this paper is to provide retrospective reclassification for Australian UNMO who was involved in the seven listed wars from NWLS to WLS for the periods of the conflicts served. P.A. Copeland, National President Looking After Our Own UNTSO Reclass Executive Summary iii 5/1/2008

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5 Table of Contents Section Title Page Cover Page i Copyright Notice ii Executive Summary iii Blank iv Table of Contents v Blank vi 1. UNTSO Historical Background 1 2. UNTSO Mandate 1 3. UNTSO Fatalities 2 4. Extract from the Veteran Entitlement Act 1986 (VEA) 2 5. Australian Service with UNTSO 3 6. Aim 4 7. General 4 8. Periods of Arab-Israeli Wars 5 9. UNDOF UNDOF Fatalities UNIFIL UNIFIL Fatalities Veteran Entitlement Law (Veteran Entitlement Act Length of time of Warlike Service Interpretation of the Military Rehabilitation Act NOS Draft Paper Conclusion Recommendations 13 Bibliography 14 Attachments: 1. UNTSO Mandate. 2. UNTSO Background. 3. UNTSO Map. 4. UNDOF Mandate. 5. UNDOF Background. 6. UNDOF Map. 7. UNIFIL Mandate. 8. UNIFIL Background. 9. UNIFIL Map. 10. Submission by Major Mattina Stanfield. 11. Submission by Mr Ray Williams. 12. APPVA Peacekeeper Magazine article: IN FOCUS: OP PALLADIN MIDDLE EAST. v

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7 Submission toward the Retrospective Reclassification of Service of Non-warlike Service to Warlike Service OPERATION PALLADIN The United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) Australian Army United Nations Military Observers During the Arab/Israeli Wars, 1956 to UNTSO Historical Background. 1.1 In November 1947, The United Nations General Assembly endorsed a plan for the partition of Palestine, providing for the creation of an Arab State and a Jewish State, with Jerusalem to be placed under international status. The plan was not accepted by the Palestinian Arabs and Arab States. On 14 May 1948, the United Kingdom relinquished its mandate over Palestine and the State of Israel was proclaimed. On the following day, the Palestinian Arabs, assisted by Arab States, opened hostilities against Israel. 1.2 On 29 May 1948, the Security Council in resolution 50 (1948), called for a cessation of hostilities in Palestine and decided that the truce should be supervised by the UN Mediator, with the assistance of a group of military observers. The first group of military observers, which has become known as the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), arrived in the region in June In 1949, UNTSO military Observers remained to supervise the Armistice Agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbours, which were for many years the main basis of the uneasy truce in the whole area. UNTSO s activities have been and still are spread over territory within five States, and therefore it has relations with five host countries Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syrian Arab Republic. 1 A copy of the UNTSO Background is attached. 2. UNTSO Mandate. 2.1 The UNTSO Mandate is to assist the United Nations Mediator and the Truce Commission in supervising the observance of the truce in Palestine. A copy of the UNTSO Mandate is attached. 2.2 Since May 1948, UNTSO has performed various tasks entrusted to it by the Security Council, including the supervision of the General Armistice Agreements of 1949 and the observation of the ceasefire in the Suez Canal area and the Golan Heights following the Arab-Israeli war of June It is understood that this has since changed to four States, with Jordan withdrawing from the Truce. APPVA Reclass Submission UNTSO Apr 08 1

8 2.3 At present, UNTSO assists and cooperates with the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights in the Israel-Syria sector, and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in the Israel-Lebanon sector. UNTSO is also present in the Egypt-Israel sector in the Sinai Peninsula. UNTSO has maintained offices in Beirut and Damascus. 3. UNTSO Fatalities. 3.1 The reported fatalities within the AO of UNTSO have been the following: UN Troops Killed; UNMO Killed; International Staff; and Local Civilian Staff. 3.2 These fatalities total 49 people who have served or seconded to UNTSO since Extract from the Veteran Entitlement Act 1986 (VEA) 4.1 The functions of the military observers have altered over time, to meet the changed conditions caused by wars in 1956, 1967 and 1973 but observers have stayed in the area to act as a go-between for the hostile parties and so prevent isolated incidents from escalating into major conflicts. 4.2 In early 1972, tension heightened on the Israel-Lebanon border as a result of Palestinian attacks across the border into Israel and reprisals by Israel in Southern Lebanon. At the request of the Lebanese Government, UNTSO observers were stationed on the Lebanese side from April Five posts were established with a strength of 34 observers and, since UN observers are never armed, the Lebanese army established a check-post next to each UN post. 4.3 In 1975, civil war broke out in Lebanon and the Lebanese army disintegrated, leaving the observers manning the posts on their own in an increasingly dangerous situation. The UN secretary-general asked the observers to continue to operate as before in spite of the changed conditions. On a number of occasions, observers' vehicles were hijacked and their observation posts were forced into one faction or another but, on the whole, the fighting factions respected the status of the observers. Reports by the observers made no mention of the Lebanese civil war since they were only concerned with the cease-fire between Israel and Lebanon. The UNTSO observers remained at the border until March 1978 when they were withdrawn after Israel invaded Lebanon. APPVA Reclass Submission UNTSO Apr 08 2

9 4.4 The UNTSO headquarters is in Jerusalem with UNTSO military observers attached to the Peacekeeping Forces in the area. Observers are attached to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force on the Golan Heights and, in Southern Lebanon, to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. When United Nations Emergency Force II was withdrawn in July 1979, five observation posts were established in the Sinai and manned by UNTSO observers and a liaison office opened in Cairo in an arrangement that continues to the present. 4.5 In 1982, the Observation Group Beirut was formed with 50 observers. This was reduced to 18 observers in In addition to helping Peacekeeping Forces in the Arab- Israeli area, UNTSO helped organise the United Nations forces in the Congo in 1960, in Yemen in 1963 and also with the UN Protection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNPROFOR) in Seventeen countries presently provide military observers to UNTSO which has an authorised strength of 298. Australian Army officers have served with UNTSO since 1956 and today thirteen are currently serving with the Operation, including the Chief of Staff (Force Commander), Australian Major General Ian Gordon, AO. 4.7 UNTSO is listed in VEA Schedule 3, Item 7, Peacekeeping Forces, 2 with 1 st June 1956, as the date Australians commenced with that Peacekeeping Force In addition to the commentary from the VEA, is the noted absence of the conflicts of concern that are represented in this paper. It is highly probable that Australian UNMO were involved in a number of high intensity combat situations. 5. Australian Army Service with UNTSO. 5.1 The Australian Contingent to OPERATION PALLADIN, aka UNTSO, was committed by the Australian Government on 30 th June 1956, where four selected Australian officers landed in Beirut, Lebanon. The officers were Majors A.A.C. Carter and J.D. Connell and Captains B.W. Lott and H.J. Simmonds. 5.2 UNTSO is deployed by Observer Groups and is commanded by the UNTSO (Chief of Staff) HQ in Jerusalem. Observer Groups relate to the areas of coverage. In all the main Observer Groups that Australian UN Military Observers (UNMO) are deployed are the following: UN Liaison Office in Beirut (UNLOB), formerly Observer Group Beirut (OGB); Observer Group Golan Heights (OGG); 2 Also refer to s68(1) Peacekeeping Force. 3 Consolidated Library of Knowledge (CLIK), The History Library, [P1/C7S2], Part 1, Section 2, United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO). 3 APPVA Reclass Submission UNTSO Apr 08

10 5.2.3 Observer Group Golan Damascus, Syria (OGG-D); Observer Group Golan Tiberius (OGG-T); Observer Group Lebanon (OGL); HQ UNTSO Chief of Staff, Jerusalem, Israel; and Observer Group Egypt (OGE). 5.3 Australian UNMO are also deployed to Egypt (Ismailia) this is in order to maintain a UN presence in the Sinai Peninsula; Damascus, Syria; and UNTSO HQ (Government House) in Jerusalem. UNMO from UNTSO are also attached to Peacekeeping Forces in the region with UNDOF; and UNIFIL (Londey). 5.4 The Australian Army contribution of UNMO has averaged around 11 Australian Officers for over 50 years of operation toward the commitment of peace and stability for the Middle East Region (Londey). 5.5 When fighting was in progress, UNTSO observers would attempt to affect a Ceasefire between local commanders, thus playing an important role in minimising casualties and preventing fighting from spreading. A precarious but vital job. 5.6 During the past 50 years, there have been noted seven (7) significant wars that Australian UNMO have been involved. They have had to continue their vital job as Observers and incurred severe dangers that has resulted in UN Team members from other nations being killed. Therefore the risk is inherent and evident during periods of hostilities, whilst serving with UNTSO. 6. Aim. 6.1 The aim of this paper is to convince the reader that reclassification of service in UNTSO be retrospectively reclassified to the periods of the identified Arab/Israeli Wars during the period of service for Australian UNMO from Non-warlike Service (NWLS) to Warlike Service (WLS). 7. General. 7.1 The Australian Peacekeeper and Peacemaker Veterans Association Inc (APPVA), represents the interests of current and ex-serving members of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), with focus on Post 1975 ADF Peacetime service; Peacekeeping Operations since 1947; War Service since 1989; and Police Overseas Veterans. 7.2 The APPVA was successful in lobbying for the retrospective reclassification of service for the Australian Medical Support Force to the Second UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR II), from NWLS to WLS on 13 Feb APPVA Reclass Submission UNTSO Apr 08 4

11 7.3 The APPVA has also been involved in consultation to see other changes of classification for other Operations, including the Australian Training Support Team in East Timor (ATST-EM), which was approved by PM John Howard on 17 October The APPVA has been approached by Major Mattina Stanfield and Mr Ray Williams in relation to their service with UNTSO, of which they believe that retrospective reclassification for their service in a number of Arab-Israeli wars would satisfy the Incurred Danger Test, thus presenting cover under the Veteran Entitlement Act 1986 (VEA) under Schedule 2 (Allotted for Duty Operational Service). 7.5 In addition would be the inclusion on and after 1 st July 2004, under the auspices of the Military Rehabilitation & Compensation Act 2004 (MRCA), under the classification of Warlike Service (WLS). Inclusive of this would be the award of the Australian Active Service Medal ( & 1975-) Clasp MIDDLE EAST, in addition to the member s Australian Service Medal ( & 1975-) Clasp MIDDLE EAST for such service on NWLS. 8. Periods of Arab-Israeli War. 8.1 Attached to this paper is Major Stanfield s and Mr Ray Williams accounts of service during periods of hostilities in the Middle East as UNMOs, whilst serving on NWLS with UNTSO. 8.2 There have been seven periods of war service that are identified for the purposes of this submission, which are the following: The Suez Crisis during the period 29 October 1956 to mid-march Egypt attacked Israel. Australia had approximately 4 Observers in the field on 30 June The Six Day War 5 June to 10 June 1967 (15 UN Soldiers killed in Gaza), the war included the areas of the Sinai Peninsula; the Golan Heights, Air Battles over Damascus (Syria), the West Bank (Jordan). MAJ Keith Howard was slightly wounded in the UN HQ in Jerusalem In 1973, another full-scale war erupted on 6 October 1973, of which the Egyptians called the The War of Attrition, or alternatively named by the Israelis as the war of Yom Kippur, where Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal; the Syrians attacked Israeli positions on the Golan Heights. In the Suez Sector 2 UN Observers were killed. Ceasefire agreed under UN Security Council Resolution 340, of which the ceasefire was affected on 25 October Therefore the period of WLS for those Australian UNMO within the AO of the war would be during the period 6 October 1973 to 25 October This is with the exception of the Golan Heights. APPVA Reclass Submission UNTSO Apr 08 5

12 8.2.4 The situation in the Golan Heights took longer to arrange an agreement between belligerents and establish a Peacekeeping Force (PKF). An agreement was signed on 31 May 1974, where both sides agreed to a ceasefire and the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) is established. Australian UNMO were operating within the area at the time of hostilities. Therefore it is suggested that the retrospective reclassification satisfies WLS conditions for those Australian UNMO, during the period 6 October 1973 to 31 May Mar Israel invades Lebanon, with Australian UNMO involvement. Further description of this war is detailed in this paper In early 1984, a war was conducted within Lebanon, of which Australian UNMO were caught in the middle thereof. This is detailed in the attached paper from former Officer, Ray Williams, who was in the company of Major John Cazey. In addition Australian Army Officer David Lewis was in Beirut during the time of the outbreak of the war, due to an operational visit from UNTSO HQ. It is therefore suggested that up to three (3) Australian UNMO were assigned to the Beirut War Zone. The period sought for WLS is from the upsurge in hostilities against the UN on 21 st December 1983; and an escalated campaign in Beirut around the 4 th of February A Ceasefire agreement was signed by the opposing forces on 16 th February 1984, however the level of fighting and violence continued to the end of fighting in mid-march The Israeli/Lebanese War 12 July August This war was very brutal, with a team site where an Australian Officer was operating was destroyed by an Israeli Bunker Buster, killing all 4 UN Observers near Khiam on the Syrian/Lebanese/Israeli Border. Captain (now Major) Mattina Stanfield has submitted a paper on her experiences during this conflict. 8.3 The number of Australian UNMO posted to the various regions of conflict are unknown, however suffice to say there is documentation that Australians have been involved with wartime service, or during periods of hostilities as UNTSO UNMO. (Londey 4 ) 8.4 It is contested that the service rendered by Australian UNMO on NWLS during the periods of war or hostilities, within the Middle East should be upgraded to WLS for the documented period of the conflict. 4 Other People s Wars A History of Australian Peacekeeping, Peter Londey, Allen & Unwin Sydney, APPVA Reclass Submission UNTSO Apr 08

13 8.5 The Incurred Danger test is contested as being satisfied in this paper, for the dates identified by the APPVA, consistent with the Arab-Israeli wars. The Incurred Danger Test will be further explained in this paper. It should also be noted that Australian UNMO have also served with UNDOF and UNIFIL as further detailed. 9. UNDOF. 9.1 It has been known that Australian UNMO attached to OGG, were caught in the Syrian-Israeli war of March 1974 until UNSCR 350 (1974), dated 14 May The OGG, which had Australian UNMO attached from UNTSO would also be considered to be in great danger within the execution of their duty and Mandate under the UNTSO UNSCR 50 (1948). Coverage for WLS of Australian UNMO serving within the Syrian- Israeli war of 1974 is also sought. 9.2 UNDOF was established on 3 June 1974, with 90 UNTSO UNMO as part of its composition. Four Australians are recorded to have being in location with UNDOF, one being Major George Mayes. 5 These members operated in dangerous circumstances, particularly with the large amount of landmines killing both Syrians and UN Soldiers. 9.3 In 1979 UNMO formed the Observer Group Golan (OGG), under administrative command of UNTSO, but under Operational Control of UNDOF. 9.4 UNDOF Fatalities: 41 Military Personnel and 1 International Civilian Staff have been killed in the Israel-Syria Sector since 1974 to the present, totalling 42 UN people. 10. UNIFIL The Mandate and Background of UNIFIL from the UN Website is attached to this Submission. Australian UNMO have been attached to UNIFIL at various times, including in the early establishment of UNIFIL in 1978, when on 11 Mar 1978 a Commando attack by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) killed and wounded many Israelis In retaliation, Israel invaded Lebanon, as the PLO had moved from Syria into Lebanon. Lebanon thus protested strongly to the UNSC, of which UNSCR 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), dated 19 March 1978, established UNIFIL to fulfil a number of tasks. Further information of the UNIFIL Mandate and Background is attached to this submission Four Australian Officers serving with UNTSO were called on short notice to assist UNIFIL to establish its HQ in Southern Lebanon. The Australian UNMO would interpose and liaise with the warring factions. The Senior Military Observer with UNTSO, Australian LTCOL Mal Peck initially became the Operations Officer of UNIFIL, before being appointed as Humanitarian Officer. 5 Ibid p.99 APPVA Reclass Submission UNTSO Apr 08 7

14 10.4 The latter meant that Peck s role would involve working with the local population which had been hard hit by Israeli bombing and at times meant digging up bodies, or recovering bodies which Israelis had impaled on stakes Whilst there is no evidence of conflict, but of high risk categories during the establishment of UNIFIL and the occasional Australian UNMO involvement with the Force, it would appear that there is potential that Australian UNMO would have been involved and exposed in between the Israeli, PLO and Lebanese combat forces, prior to the UNSCR establishing UNIFIL and potentially thereafter UNIFIL Fatalities. 259 UN Troops; 2 UNMO; 5 International Civilian Staff; and 4 Local Staff have died on service with UNIFIL since March 1978, totalling 270 UNIFIL Fatalities. 11. Veteran Entitlement Law (The Veteran Entitlement Act 1986 (VEA) s7a (1) of the Veterans Entitlement Act 1988 (VEA), determines incurred danger from hostile forces of the enemy, however in this case it would be pertinent to note that hostile forces within the context of this case would relate to the Hezbollah Forces sponsored by Syria; Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO); Israeli Defence Force (IDF); and the Egyptian forces contributed toward an incurred danger to Australian UNMO during the noted wars In the case of Williams and Stanfield, the threat of death was most probable with the various conflicts with the Hezbollah; Lebanese Forces and the IDF, where the intensity and vigour encountered by both sides placed Australian UNMOs in great danger, particular within discriminate and indiscriminate bombardment from artillery and high tech bombs used by the IDF. This was evident with Stanfield s UNMO Team Site in Khiam being destroyed by an IDF Bunker buster, killing all four UNMO, within 24 hours of Major Stanfield s departure from that Team Site after relief in place by an Austrian Officer, of which there was initial confusion as to the nationality of the victim being confused with Australian UNMO Major Stanfield The test for danger is objective, rather than subjective. On appeal to the Repatriation Commission v Thompson (1988), the Full Federal Court stated what has become the most cited test for incurred danger : The words incurred danger therefore provide an objective, not a subjective, test. A serviceman (or woman) incurs danger when he encounters danger, is in danger, or is endangered. He incurs danger from hostile forces when he is at risk or in peril of harm from hostile forces. A serviceman does not incur danger by merely perceiving or fearing that he may be in danger (at 9 AAR 203) 7. 6 Londey, p Veterans Entitlement Law, Creyke, Sutherland and Ridge, The Federation Press and Softlaw Community Projects, 2000, p APPVA Reclass Submission UNTSO Apr 08

15 11.4 The Actual or potential danger has been tested with the case of the Repatriation Commission v Thompson (1988); the Full Federal Court held that there must be actual danger. The Full Federal Court referred to the word danger and substantial. But the word danger stands for itself. If a serviceman incurs danger from hostile enemy forces, that circumstance is sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement (at 355) Following from the definition mentioned in 11.4, the Court commented: Danger is not incurred unless the serviceman is exposed, at risk of or in peril of harm or injury. (at 356). And further, the Court commented [Danger] must arise as a direct result of the activities of hostile forces of the enemy.. There must be established an actual risk of physical or mental harm (at ) The Length of time danger is incurred has been interpreted in the case of Crawford and Repatriation Commission (1987), The Tribunal noted that the Act did not state, nor was it necessary to determine, whether danger needed to be measured in minutes, hours, days or even longer. That view would be preferable to the view Re Howlett and Repatriation Commission (1987) in which the Tribunal found that danger must be faced during a substantial (or, at the very least, a not insignificant) period of time In terms of this submission it would be reasonable to accept that Australian UNMO were exposed to highly dangerous situations during the listed conflicts within this paper, and would be more than probable to have been exposed to a high degree of physical and mental harm. The period of time of these conflicts, whilst not necessarily substantial, were periods of hostilities, of which danger to Australian UNMO was to a high degree of actual risk of physical or mental harm. It is contended that the period of conflict or hostilities is sufficient enough to provide for a start date and cut-off date for each war listed in this paper The VEA as it stands, provides an appropriate mechanism for coverage, but may not be sufficiently responsive in certain circumstances. This is because there is some uncertainty as to whether a declaration of NWLS, by the Minister for Defence, could be extended to cover those members of a Peacekeeping Force who are may be involved in WLS conditions, satisfying the Incurred Danger Test and further satisfying the Director General Nature of Service Review (DG-NOSR), Decision Support Tool (DST) It is suggested that the Harm levels on the DST Risk Matrix would be sufficient to cover those UNTSO Australian UNMO exposed to WLS Conditions during the period of time of hostilities, which may have been incurred by belligerent forces of either of the Arab States and/or the Israeli Defence Force (IDF). 8 Ibid p Ibid p125. APPVA Reclass Submission UNTSO Apr 08 9

16 12. Interpretation of the Military Compensation & Rehabilitation Act 2004 (MRCA) Within the terms of MRCA, s5 determines non-warlike service (NWLS) has the meaning given in paragraph 6(1)(b); and warlike service (WLS), having the meaning within paragraph 6(1)(a) 12.2 WLS is determined as service with the Defence Force that is of a kind determined in writing by the Defence Minister to be WLS for the purposes of this Act (MRCA); and NWLS means service with the Defence Force that is of a kind determined in writing by the Defence Minister to be NWLS for the purposes of this Act (MRCA) Within the Consequential Effects of the Military Rehabilitation and Compensation (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Act 2004 (CTPA) s111 (196KA) is inserted with the meanings of the type of service: s196ka (f) for the purposes of paragraph 196B (2) (ca), non-warlike service does not have the meaning given by this Act but instead has the same meaning as in the MRCA; and s196ka (g) for the purposes of paragraph 196B (2) (ca), warlike service does not have the meaning given by this Act but instead has the same meaning as in the MRCA Further to the CTPA, is the reference toward the types of service interpreted within the MRCA to the VEA. Therefore, the VEA is the principle document for the determination of the types of service (WLS; NWLS; and Peacetime Service). These definitions are noted within the MRCA under s5 and further amplified within MRCA s6(1)(a) WLS; and s6(1)(b) NWLS. 13. NOS Draft Paper The APPVA received the UNCLASSIFIED DRAFT of the NOS Definitions of Security Operations and Warlike and Hazardous Service. This was by courtesy of Brigadier David Webster who is the DG-NOSR It is noted within the paper that there are various definitions of Warlike Operations, which is of particular note toward the intent of this paper. We refer to the Recommendations of the Draft paper Warlike Operations, paras 131 to The Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2004, No. 51, 2004, Chapter Schedule 1 Amendment of the Veterans Entitlements Act 1986 Part 1 Main amendments relating to transitional and application issues APPVA Reclass Submission UNTSO Apr 08 10

17 13.3 The Draft document from NOS details various scenarios and NOS classification to apply once the Minister for Defence has given the necessary approval. In particular we note para 138, of the recommendations which states inter alia: Warlike operations can encompass but are not limited to: a. operations conducted during a state of declared war; b. operations to combat an armed adversary; c. Peace Enforcement operations in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace between belligerents who may not be consenting to intervention and may be engaged in combat activities. Normally but not necessarily always they will be conducted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, where the application of all necessary force is authorised to restore peace and security or other like tasks; or d. other similar or like operations In addition is in the section Warlike Operations, para 7, which also states inter alia: A warlike operation is defined as a military activity in which deployed forces are: a. required to pursue specific military objectives in defence of the nation and its security interests; b. exposed to the risk of harm arising out of the need to confront or react to hostile forces or belligerent elements (people) that have been assessed as having the capability and intent to use force or offer violence to achieve their objectives; c. required to deploy into or within a specified area of operations within a specified time frame; and d. assigned for duty to, with or as part of a warlike operation by the relevant authority to be eligible for the relevant benefits package In the context of this paper, it is contended that those Australian UNMO that were serving in war-zones during their tour of duty with UNTSO, that the Warlike Operations definition would be ideally suited to those on NWLS with UNTSO at the time of the various Arab/Israeli Wars. APPVA Reclass Submission UNTSO Apr 08 11

18 13.6 Whilst passive within the meaning of WLS, the UNMO would have been unarmed and not operating in the sense of a belligerent or combat force. Rather, the UNMO were reporting ceasefire violations; monitoring and reporting to the UNTSO HQ of the military and combat operations of belligerent or opposing forces during the periods of war. In some documented cases Australian UNMO were targeted by belligerent forces of either Arab State or IDF. These attacks included reported kidnapping of Australian UNMO, deaths of UNMO from other countries, working closely with Australian UNMO In the case of Major Stanfield, the UN Team Site in Khiam experienced high levels of artillery, rocket, and aerial bombing within close proximity of the Observation Post (OP). Intimidatory Artillery attacks were focussed on her UNIFIL convoy and within 24 hours of departing her OP, it was destroyed by an IDF air strike with a bunker buster bomb, killing all 4 UNMO. Stanfield s story was well documented and recorded on a digital camera The NOSR Team also compiled a proposed Categories of Harm, which specifies various harm levels within three matrices. These matrices are classed as: Physical Harm from battle casualties; Physical Harm from environmental hazards; and Psychological Harm It is suggested that within the previously mentioned matrix system, that the Ratings provided would be ideally set in an objective manner toward that of a high level of risk in similar circumstances to violent and modern warfare, within the wars or periods of hostilities mentioned in this paper. 14. Conclusion There is significant evidence to suggest that Australian Army Officers, serving as UNMO with UNTSO have been caught in the middle of combat between belligerents, namely the Arabs and Israelis as they struggle to grapple control of the former Palestine. This is perceived as an ongoing, volatile and delicate political environment, which has the potential to ignite into war with very short notice Given the volatility of the Middle East, particularly within the AO of UNTSO, it would be difficult to monitor the conditions of service for Australian Army Officers deployed to OPERATION PALLADIN. Past evidence has vindicated the need for retrospective investigation of the conditions of service, particularly toward the Entitlements under the VEA 12 and MRCA, 13 as WLS. 12 VEA was effective 22 May 1986, after the repeal of the Repatriation Act MRCA was effective 1 st July APPVA Reclass Submission UNTSO Apr 08 12

19 14.3 Given that most Wars that the ADF has served (For example Gulf War 1, INTERFET, IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN), the qualifying period for such service to be classified as WLS has normally been given at 24 hours within the AO of the War Zone. This means one day of service, one sortie or one day in the waters of the AO War Zone, has been deemed as Qualifying Service (QS) for the purposes of WLS Considering such precedents, particularly toward the severity of war that has been exposed to these veterans, it is strongly suggested that the same criterion is applied for retrospective awarding of the AASM Clasp MIDDLE EAST, as a prescribed operation that meets the WLS Criterion This is suggested to be made in addition to the NWLS rendered by Australian UNMO within UNTSO as classified within Schedule 3 (Peacekeeping Forces) of the VEA and indeed NWLS within the context of MRCA, with the awarding of the Australian Service Medal (ASM) Clasp MIDDLE EAST. Therefore, the veterans would be entitled to both AASM and ASM Clasp MIDDLE EAST The APPVA strongly supports the Beneficial Approach toward Australian UNMO serving with UNTSO during periods of hostilities. This not only brings recognition of WLS, it will also provide eligibility for QS, which allows for Income Support in the form of War Service Pension (WSP) WSP is determined after eligibility of the veteran from QS for the following circumstances: That the veteran is in receipt of the Special Rate of Pension; That the veteran has reached the age of 60; and That the veteran is incapacitated and unable to work more than 8 hours of remunerated work per week, regardless if the incapacitation is service caused The Repatriation Health Card For All Conditions (aka The Gold Card), will also be available to those veterans with QS who turn the age of 70 years. Therefore, the benefits from QS as a result of being exposed to WLS in the Arab/Israeli wars will be commensurate to those who have served on WLS or Active Service. 15. Recommendations: 15.1 It is therefore recommended that the Director General of the Nature of Service Review (DG-NOSR), investigate the retrospective reclassification of Warlike Service of Australian Officers, who have served in UNTSO and exposed to war for the following dates: The Suez Crisis: 29 October 1956 to mid-march 1957; APPVA Reclass Submission UNTSO Apr 08 13

20 The Six Day War : 5 June to 10 June 1967; Attachments: The War of Attrition or Yom Kippur : 6 October 1973 to 25 October 1973, with the exception of the Golan Heights; Israel-Syria War: 6 October 1973 to 31 May 1974; Israel invasion of Lebanon: March 1978; Israeli battles in Beirut: early February mid March 1984; Israel-Lebanon War: 12 July August 2006; and 1. UNTSO Mandate. 2. UNTSO Background. 3. UNTSO Map. 4. UNDOF Mandate. 5. UNDOF Background. 6. UNDOF Map. 7. UNIFIL Mandate. 8. UNIFIL Background. 9. UNIFIL Map. 10. Submission by Major Mattina Stanfield. 11. Submission by Mr Ray Williams. 12. APPVA Peacekeeper Magazine article: IN FOCUS: OP PALLADIN MIDDLE EAST. APPVA Reclass Submission UNTSO Apr 08 14

21 Bibliography Publications: Other People s Wars A History of Australian Peacekeeping, Peter Londey, Allen & Unwin Sydney, The Australian Peacekeeper Magazine, The Australian Peacekeeper & Peacemaker Veterans Association Inc., Classic Printing Pty Ltd, Torquay, Victoria, Summer 2005, p.44. The Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2004, No. 51, 2004, The Commonwealth Government Printer, The Military Rehabilitation and Compensation (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Act 2004 (CTPA), No. 52, 2004, The Commonwealth Government Printer, Veterans Entitlement Law, Creyke, Sutherland and Ridge, The Federation Press and Softlaw Community Projects, Submissions: Lebanon War July 2006, by Captain Matina Stanfield, Details obtained from Captain Stanfield s War Diary 12 July 01 August THE INCIDENT Hezbollah Israeli War July 2006, Captain Stanfield War Injury (Wounded on Duty), dated 7 November Submission by: Mr Ray Williams, For the Retrospective Reclassification of service from Non-warlike Service to Warlike Service, During the Period Early February Mid March 1974 Observer Group Beirut, Lebanon, The United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation, 25 January Electronic: Consolidated Library of Knowledge (CLIK), The History Library, [P1/C7S2], Part 1, Section 2, United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), The Department of Veterans Affairs, 1/2008. Schedule 1 Amendment of the Veterans Entitlements Act 1986 Part 1 Main amendments relating to transitional and application issues, The Veteran Entitlement Act, The Department of Veterans Affairs, 1986.

22 The Veteran Entitlement Act 1986 (VEA), CLIK, The Department of Veterans Affairs, 1/2008. Electronic (Internet): UNTSO: 13/04/ /04/2008 Map: UNTSO Deployment as of July 1997; Department of Field Support Cartographic Section DPKO UNDOF: 13/04/ /04/2008 Map: UNDOF DEPLOYMENT December 2007; Department of Field Support Cartographic Section DPKO UNIFIL: Source: UN Website /04/2008 Source: UN Website UN DPKO Website: Map: UNIFIL Deployment March 2008; Department of Field Support Cartographic Section DPKO

23 UNTSO: United Nations Truce Supervision Organization -Mandate Page 1 of 1 Middle East - UNTSO - Mandate UNTSO-Home Background Mandate Facts & Figures UNDocuments Map (PDF) United Nations Truce Supervision Organization Established in May 1948 to assist the United Nations Mediator and the Truce Commission in supervisingthe observance of the truce in Palestine. Since then, UNTSO has performed various tasks entrusted to it by the Security Council, including the supervision of the General Armistice Agreements of 1949 and the observation of the ceasefire in the Suez Canal area and the Golan Heights following the Arab-Israeli war of June At present, UNTSO assists and cooperates with the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights in the Israel-Syria sector, and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in the Israel-Lebanon sector. UNTSO is also present in the Egypt-Israel sector in the Sinai. UNTSO maintains offices in Beirut and Damascus. Maintained by the Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping United Nations /04/2008

24 UNTSO: United Nations Truce Supervision Organization -Background Page 1 of 1 Middle East - UNTSO - Background UNTSO -Home Background Mandate Facts & Figures UN Documents Map (PDF) United Nations Truce Supervision Organization In November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly endorsed a plan for the partition of Palestine, providing for the creation of an Arab State and a Jewish State, with Jerusalem to be placed under international status. The plan was not accepted by the Palestinian Arabs and Arab States. On 14 May 1948, the United Kingdom relinquished its mandate over Palestine and the State of Israel was proclaimed. On the following day, the Palestinian Arabs, assisted by Arab States, opened hostilities against Israel. On 29 May 1948, the Security Council, in resolution 50 (1948), called for a cessation of hostilities in Palestine and decided that the truce should be supervised by the UN Mediator, with the assistance of a group of military observers. The first group of military observers, which has become known as the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), arrived in the region in June In 1949, UNTSO military observers remained to supervise the Armistice Agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbours, which were for many years the main basis of the uneasy truce in the whole area. UNTSO's activities have been and still are spread over territory within five States, and therefore it has relations with five host countries -- Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syrian Arab Republic. Following the wars of 1956, 1967 and 1973, the functions of the observers changed in the light of changing circumstances, but they remained in the area, acting as go-betweens for the hostile parties and as the means by which isolated incidents could be contained and prevented from escalating into major conflicts. UNTSO personnel have also been available at short notice to form the nucleus of other peacekeeping operations. The availability of UNTSO's military observers for almost immediatedeployment after the Security Council had acted to create a new operation has been an enormous contributory factor to the success of those operations. In the Middle East, groups of UNTSO military observers are today attached to the peacekeeping forces in the area: the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). A group of observers remains in Sinai to maintain a United Nations presence in that peninsula. In addition, UNTSO maintains offices in Beirut and Damascus. Maintained by the Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. (C)United Nations un.org/depts/ dpko/missions/untso/background.html 13/04/2008

25 Jordan m E m N Bur - Sa'id - (Port Said) Bur - Fu'ad - 31 Suez Canal 0 0 s Al Qantarah Al Isma'iliyah (Ismailia) Great Bitter Lake UNTSO Deployment as of July 1997 Observation post International boundary Boundary of former Palestine Mandate Armistice Demarcation Line National capital Town Main road Secondary road Railroad Airport MEDITERRANEAN OGE UNLOB 36 Bayrut - (Beirut) Zahlah SEA 100 km 60 mi EGYPT Abu - 'Ujaylah Bi'r Hasanah Khan - Yunis - Al 'Arish - Netanya Qalqilyah - Herzliyya Tel Aviv-Yafo Ghazzah (Gaza) Al Qusaymah Ashdod GAZA Hadera _ Ramla Be'er Sheva' (Beersheba) Qiryat Gat Hefa _ (Haifa) Al Khalil (Hebron) ISRAEL Mizpe - Ramon NEGEV LEBANON Sayda- (Sidon) Janin - Tulkarm - Nabulus - Dimona Nazerat _ (Nazareth) Dead Sea Irbid Jerusalem Madaba - - Al Karak As Safi - - Ma'an - Al Mafraq Jarash Dar'ā WEST BANK Az Zarqa' - Ram - HQ UNTSO 32 Allah - Ariha - 'Amman - (Jericho) (Amman) Bayt Lahm (Bethlehem) JORDAN UTM GRID ZONE DESIGNATION 36 OGG-D Al Qatranah - UTM GRID ZONE DESIGNATION ODD Dimashq (Damascus) UNIFIL 370 HQ Sur - s OGG Camp Faouar OGL (Tyre) Qiryat s s Shemona s UNDOF An Naqurah - - s s s s s Al Qunaytirah Nahariyya GOLAN ss 33 OGG-T 365 'Akko Lake s s SYRIAN Tiberias ARAB Teverya s s REPUBLIC (Tiberias) 31 Al Jafr m N Gulf of Suez As Suways (Suez) Ra's Sudr SINAI An Nakhl Al Kuntillah Ath Thamad Yotvata Elat Taba - - Al 'Aqabah Ra's an Naqb The designations employed and the presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities or Gulf concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. of Aqaba 35 SAUDI ARABIA 36 Map No UNITED NATIONS July Department of Public Information Cartographic Section

26

27 UNDOF: United Nations Disengagement Observer Force -Mandate Page 1 of 1 Galan Heights - UNDOF - Mandate UNDOF-Home Background Mandate Facts & Figures UN Documents Map(PDF) United Nations Disengagement Observer Force The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established by Security Council resolution 350 (1974) of 31 May 1974 to maintain the ceasefire between Israel and Syria, to supervise the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces, and to supervise the areas of separation and limitation, as provided in the Agreement on Disengagement. The mandate of UNDOF has since been renewed every six months. In recommending the extension of the mandate, the Secretary-General observed, as on previous occasions, that, despite the present quiet in the Israeli-Syrian sector, the situation in the Middle East was very tense and was likely to remain so, unless and until a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem was reached. In the prevailing circumstances, he considered the continued presence of UNDOF in the area to be essential. Maintained by the Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping United Nations /04/2008

28 UNDOF: United Nations Disengagement Observer Force -Background Page 1 of2 Golan Heights - UNDOF - Background UNDOF-Home Background Mandate Facts & Figures UN Documents Map (PDF) United Nations Disengagement Observer Force On 6 October 1973 war erupted in the Middle East between Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Suez Canal area and the Sinai, and between Israeli and Syrian forces on the Golan Heights. On 24 October, as fighting between Egypt and Israel reached a critical stage, the Security Council decided to set up a second United Nations Emergency Force UNEF 11. The Force was immediately moved into place between the Israeli and Egyptian armies in the Suez Canal area, and its arrival effectively stabilized the situation. In the Israel-Syria sector tension remained high, and from March 1974 the situation became increasingly unstable. Against this background, the United States undertook a diplomatic initiative, which resulted in the conclusion of an Agreement on Disengagement (S/11302/Add.1, annexes I and 11)between Israeli and Syrian forces. The Agreement provided for an area of separation and for two equal zones of limited forces and armaments on both sides of the area, and called for the establishment of a United Nations observer force to supervise its implementation. The Agreement was signed on 31 May 1974 and, on the same day, the Security Council adopted resolution 350 (1974) by which it set up the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). The Force has since performed its functions effectively, with the cooperation of the parties. The situation in the Israel-Syria sector has remained quiet. Both parties cooperate fully with the mission and for a number of years there have been no serious incidents. Activities of UNDOF In order to carry out its mandate, UNDOF maintains an area of separation, which is some 80 kilometres long and varies in width between approximately 10 kilometres in the centre to less than one kilometre in the extreme south. The terrain is hilly and is dominated in the north by Mount Hermon. The highest United Nations position is at an altitude of 2,800 metres. The area of separation is inhabited and is policed by the Syrian authorities. No military forces other than UNDOF are permitted within it. UNDOF is entirely deployed within and close to the area of separation, with two base camps, 44 permanently manned positions and 11 observation posts. The headquarters of UNDOF is located at Camp Faouar and an office is maintained at Damascus. In addition, the Force operates patrols by day and night. The Austrian battalion, which includes a Slovak company, is deployed in the northern part of the area of separation, while the Polish battalion is deployed in the southern part. Its base camp is Camp Ziouani. Mine clearance is conducted by both battalions under the operational control of UNDOF headquarters. The Force is assisted by the military observers of UNTSO's Observer Group Golan. The Canadian and Japanese logistic units, which are based in Camp Ziouani, with a detachment in Camp Faouar, perform the second-line general transport tasks, rotation transport, control and management of goods received by the Force and maintenance of heavy equipment. First-line logistic support is internal to the contingents and includes transport of supplies to the positions. From its.various positions and through its patrols, the Force supervises the area of separation and intervenes whenever any military personnel enter or try to operate therein. This is effected by means of permanently manned positions and observation posts, by foot and mobile patrols operating at irregular intervals by day and night on predetermined routes. On each side of the area of separation there is one area of limitation with three zones, one o to 10 kilometres, one 10 to 20 kilometres and one 20 to 25 kilometres wide. UNDOF inspects these areas every two weeks in order to ascertain that the agreed limitations in armaments and forces are being observed. UNDOF continues to assist the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRG) with facilities for mail and the passage of persons through the area of separation. Within the means available, medical treatment is provided to the local population on request. 13/04/2008

29 UNDOF: United Nations Disengagement Observer Force -Background Page 2 of2 In UNDOF's area of operation, especially in the area of separation, minefields continues to pose a threat to UNDOF personnel and local inhabitants. In consultation with the Syrian authorities, UNDOF instituted a minefield security and maintenance programme in the area of separation to identify and mark all minefields. The Force also supported the activitiesof the United NationsChildren's Fund to promote mine awareness among the civilian population. Another priority for the mission is to address the environmental consequences of the Force's activities and presence in the area of operations. The Force is taking steps to ensure that its presence does not contribute to further environmental pollution of the area. Maintained by the Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping United Nations /04/2008

30 N o 25' 33 o 20' LEBANON Shab'ā MOUNT GOLAN HEIGHTS HERMON 'Arnah Bayt Jinn 1381m Hadar SLOVAKIA m Majdal Chams m Harfā o 15' AUSBATT Taranjah Camp 30 Faouar Mas'adah Jabata - al Khashab 1226m m 32A Buq'ata m 72 - Khan - Ufaniyah m 32 Arnabah 1036m Baath Line 25 City m 33 o 10' "Alpha 1" 56 Jabā 756m Mazra'at Bayt Jinn Mansoura Hamidiyah Wasit - AUSTRIA 22 Masharah POLAND A m 1002m 60 Al Qunaytirah Umm Batinah - LOG INDIA - JAPAN (-) D 51 Camp Ziouani 60A Umm Tinah 1016m 'Ayn Ziwan - 836m MP "A" POLAND 33 o 05' MP "C" 1072m Nab as Sakhr Ar Ruwayhinah o 00' 420m 32 o 55' 400m E m 35 o 45' 35 o 50' 35 o 55' 1841m 36 o 00' 36 o 05' 36 o 10' 806m 36 o 15' 832m HH Kafr Naffakh - 554m Line "Alpha" Fazarah Trans-Arabian Pipeline 498m 1841m AUSTRIA 2269m 981m HS 12 HB 2201m 2224m m Bi'r al 'Ajam Burayqah 69 Kudnah Al Khushniyah 758m 82A Al Asbah 82B POLAND POLBATT 929m 80 Ar Rafid Butmiyah 57 Jukhadar - - Line "Bravo" m m 810m 1123m Hinah - HQ HQ 1096m 989m Baytimā - UNDOF 1012m 730m Sa'sa' AUSTRIA - SLOVAKIA (-) HQ Reserve LOG INDIA - JAPAN MP "B" OGG Al Harrah - SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC 708m Kafr Nasij - Nawá 903m 892m Kafr Shams Qasim - 851m Artuz - Kanakir - Rwag Zakiyah - 797m 719m As Sanamayn 834m Al Kiswah 815m DEPLOYMENT An Nakhl UNDOF December 2007 OGG observation post UNDOF position 'Alpha' line or 'Bravo' line Inter-battalion boundary PALESTINE BELT GRID 33 o 20' 33 o 15' 33 o 10' 33 o 05' 33 o 00' 32 o 55' N N m Yarmouk Khisfin - 85A Map No Rev. 64E UNITED NATIONS December 2007 (Colour) Raqqad Aalane 637m 32 o 50' Line Tasil Ash Shaykh Miskin - "Bravo" The designations employed and the 32 o 50' presentation of material on this map Al 'Al do not imply the expression of any Kefar el Ma 58 opinion whatsoever on the part of the 483m Secretariat of the United Nations Line concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area of its "Alpha" authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Saham al Jawlan- Fiq Umm Sharq Ash Sajarah 55 Da'il - 32 o 45' 80A 32 o 45' 461m 35 o 45' JORDAN 35 o 50' 35 o 55' 36 o 00' Tafas 36 o 05' 36 o 10' 36 o 15' E Abram Thahab km 5 mi Department of Field Support Cartographic Section N 240

31 UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon -Mandate Page 1 of 1 According to Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, UNIFIL was established to:. Confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon;. Restore international peace and security;. Assistthe Governmentof Lebanonin ensuringthe returnof its effectiveauthorityin the area. According to Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) of 11 August 2006, UNIFIL, in addition to carrying out its mandate under resolutions 425 "and426, shall:. Monitor the cessation of hostilities;. Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the South, including along the Blue Line, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from Lebanon;. Coordinate its activities referred to in the preceding paragraph (above) with the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel;. Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons;. Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL deployed in this area;. Assist the Government of Lebanon, at its request, in securing its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related materiel. By this resolution, the Council also authorized UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind; to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council; and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers and, without prejudice to the responsibiiity of the Government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. 13/04/2008

32 UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon -Background Page 1 of2 Background In the early 1970s, tension along the Israel-Lebanon border increased, especially after the relocation of Palestinian armed elements from Jordan to Lebanon. Palestinian commando operations against Israel and Israeli reprisals against Palestinian bases in Lebanon intensified. On 11 March 1978, a commando attack in Israel resulted in many dead and wounded among the Israeli population; the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) claimed responsibility for that raid. In response, Israeli forces invaded Lebanon on the night of 14/15 March, and in a few days occupied the entire southern part of the country except for the city of Tyre and its surrounding area. On 15 March 1978, the Lebanese Government submitted a strong protest to the Security Council against the Israeli invasion, stating that it had no connection with the Palestinian commando operation. On 19 March, the Council adopted resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), in which it called upon Israel immediately to cease its military action and withdraw its forces from all Lebanese territory. It also decided on the immediate establishment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The first UNIFIL troops arrived in the area on 23 March Resolution 425 (1978) established two requirements. First, the Security Council called for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries. Second, the Security Council called upon Israel immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory. The Security Council also decided, in the light of the request of the Government of Lebanon, to establish immediately a United Nations interim force for southern Lebanon. This interim force was created for three broadly defined purposes: a. Confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces; b. Restoring international peace and security; c. Assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area In resolution 426 (1978), the Security Council approved the report of the Secretary- General on the implementation of resolution 425 (1978). That report contained, inter alia, guidelines for the operations of UNIFIL. In June 1982, after intense exchange of fire in southern Lebanon and across the Israel- Lebanon border, Israel invaded Lebanon again, reaching and surrounding Beirut. For three years, UNIFIL remained behind the Israeli lines, with its role limited to providing protection and humanitarian assistance to the local population to the extent possible. In 1985, Israel carried out a partial withdrawal, but it retained control of an area in southern Lebanon manned by the Israel Defence Forces (ldf) and by Lebanese de facto forces (DFF), the so-called "South Lebanon Army" (SLA). Hostilities continued between Israeli and auxiliary forces on the one hand, and Lebanese groups who proclaimed their resistance against the Israeli occupation on the other. Over the years, the Security Council maintained its commitment to Lebanon's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, while the Secretary-General continued his efforts to persuade Israel to leave the occupied zone. Israel maintained that the zone was a temporary arrangement governed by its security concerns. Lebanon demanded that Israel withdraw, viewing the occupation as illegal and contrary to United Nations resolutions. Although UNIFIL was prevented from fulfilling its mandate, the Force used its best efforts to limit the conflict, contribute to stability in the region and protect the population of the area from the worst effects of the violence. Despite the impasse, the Security Council has repeatedly extended the mandate of UNIFIL at the request of the Government of Lebanon and on the recommendation of the Secretary-General. A tragic event happened in UNIFIL's area of deployment in April 1996 when more than 120 Lebanese civilians were killed by Israeli fire and an estimated 500 were wounded. Most of these casualties occurred on 18 April as a result of the shelling of a UN compound 13/04/2008

33 UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon -Background Page 2 of2 at Qana. Four UN soldiers were also wounded and there was extensive damage. This incident was the subject of an investigation by the Secretary-General's Military Adviser, whose report was conveyed to the Security Council on 7 May /04/2008

34 New Crisis Erupts From the UN DPKO Website: New hostilities on the Israeli-Lebanese border started on 12 July 2006 when Hizbollah launched several rockets from Lebanese territory across the Blue Line towards IDF positions near the coast and in the area of the Israeli town of Zarit. In parallel, Hizbollah fighters crossed the Blue Line into Israel, attacked an Israeli patrol and captured two Israeli soldiers, killed three others and wounded two more. The captured soldiers were taken into Lebanon. Subsequent to the attack on the patrol, a heavy exchange of fire ensued across the Blue Line between Hizbollah and the IDF. While the exchange of fire stretched over the entire length of the Line, it was heaviest in the areas west of Bint Jubayl and in the Shabaa farms area. Hizbollah targeted IDF positions and Israeli towns south of the Blue Line. Israel retaliated by ground, air and sea attacks. In addition to air strikes on Hizbollah positions, the IDF targeted numerous roads and bridges in southern Lebanon, within and outside the UNIFIL area of operations In his July report on UNIFIL, covering the period from 21 January through 18 July 2006, the Secretary-General noted that situation in the UNIFIL area of operation remained tense and volatile, although it was generally quiet during most of the reporting period. But, the start of the new hostilities on 12 July had radically changed the context in which the mission operated. In the current environment, circumstances conducive to United Nations do not exist, he said, adding that the Force was restricted from carrying out even basic activities, such as the ability to resupply its positions and to conduct search and rescue operations on behalf of its personnel. With UNIFIL s mandate expiring on 31 July, the Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council extend it only for one month pending consideration of other options for future arrangements in South Lebanon. The Council agreed with the Secretary-General s recommendation and, by its resolution 1697 of 31 July, extended UNIFIL s mandate until 31 August The Council also expressed the deepest concern at the escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and Israel since 12 July, urged all concerned parties to avoid any action that might endanger UN personnel, and called on them to allow the Force to resupply its positions, conduct search and rescue operations on behalf of its personnel and undertake any other measures that it deemed necessary to ensure the safety of its personnel. Security Council Calls for End of Hostilities; UNIFIL's Strength Increased, Mandate Expanded As conflict between Israel and Hezbollah erupted in southern Lebanon, the Secretary-General maintained regular contact with the Prime Ministers of Lebanon and of Israel, as well as other relevant actors and concerned parties. He also dispatched a number of high-level missions to the region. In the mean time, UNIFIL continued to occupy all of its positions and played an active and constructive role under its mandate. Despite being severely impeded by ongoing violence, UNIFIL peacekeepers conducted military observations, assisted in humanitarian efforts and provided medical assistance, all at great risk. The intense fighting in July and August injured 16 United Nations staff, and tragically caused the death of five. On 11 August 2006, the Security Council, following intense negotiations, passed resolution 1701 calling for a full cessation of hostilities in the month-long war based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hizbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations in Lebanon.

35 From the UN DPKO Website: Aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution to the conflict, the Security Council created a buffer zone free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL between the United Nations-drawn Blue Line in southern Lebanon and the Litani river, and called for both Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and comprehensive solution to the crisis. The adoption of this resolution capped a week of intense debates on the French and United States-negotiated text, which had been introduced on 5 August but met with stiff resistance from Arab leaders, who said it disregarded key Lebanese concerns in favour of Israel. It sparked an urgent visit to New York by senior Arab League officials who pleaded Lebanon 's case in a closed-door meeting with the UN Secretary-General and presented to the Council an Arabbacked deal which, included the Lebanese Government's demand for a broad ceasefire and, among other things, called for a prisoner exchange between Israel and Hizbollah. In an address ahead of the Council's action, the Secretary-General said he was greatly relieved that the resolution provided for a full and immediate cessation of all hostilities. It is absolutely vital that the fighting now stop, he said, adding: Provided it does, I believe this resolution will make it possible to conclude a sustainable and lasting ceasefire agreement in the days ahead. And I hope that this could be the beginning of a process to solve the underlying political problems in the region through peaceful means. The Secretary-General said he was profoundly disappointed that the Council had not reached this point much earlier, and that he was convinced that his disappointment and sense of frustration were shared by hundreds of millions of people around the world. For weeks now, he had been calling repeatedly for an immediate cessation of hostilities, for the sake of the civilian population on both sides. All members of this Council must be aware that this inability to act sooner has badly shaken the world's faith in its authority and integrity, the Secretary-General said, adding that War is not politics by other means, but represents a catastrophic failure of political skill and imagination. The new resolution emphasized the need for an end of violence, but at the same time emphasized the need to urgently address the causes that had given rise to the crisis, including the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers. Mindful of the sensitivity of the issue of prisoners, the text also encouraged the efforts aimed at urgently settling the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel. It also called for Israel and Lebanon to support a long-term solution based on, among others, full respect for the Blue Line by both parties; full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords; no foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its Government; no sales or supply of arms and related materiel to Lebanon except as authorized by its Government; and provision to the United Nations of all remaining maps of landmines in Lebanon in Israel's possession. Welcoming the 7 August decision of the Lebanese Government to deploy 15,000 armed troops in Southern Lebanon, the Council extended the mandate of UNIFIL through the end of August 2007, and increased its troop strength (about 2,000 troops as of August 2006) to a maximum of 15,000. In addition to carrying out its original mandate under Council resolutions 425 and 426 (1978), UNIFIL would, among other things, monitor the cessation of hostilities; accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy throughout the South; and extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons (see Mandate section for more details). The text emphasized the importance of the Government of Lebanon extending its control over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of Council resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), and called upon that Government to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent

36 From the UN DPKO Website: Outcome of the war According to the 12 September 2006 Secretary-General s report, as of 31 August 2006, official Lebanese figures showed that 1,187 people had died and 4,092 had been injured in Lebanon as a result of the conflict. Many of these victims were children. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that one million Lebanese were displaced between 12 July and 14 August, with some 735,000 seeking shelter within Lebanon and 230,000 outside. The cessation of hostilities on 14 August triggered a massive and speedy return of internally displaced persons and refugees back to their areas of origin. According to UNHCR, within days of the ceasefire some 90 per cent of those displaced in Lebanon during the hostilities around 900,000 or one quarter of the population returned to their homes or were staying nearby. At the end of August, it was estimated that between 100,000 and 150,000 people remained internally displaced. In Lebanon, OCHA estimated that the conflict caused physical damage amounting to $3.6 billion, including the destruction of 80 bridges, 600 km of roads; 900 factories, markets, farms and other commercial buildings; 31 airports, ports, water- and sewage-treatment plants, dams and electrical plants; and 25 fuel stations. Unemployment is currently as high as 75 per cent in some parts of the country. An estimated 15,000 homes were destroyed. On the Israeli side, from 12 July until 14 August, 43 Israeli civilians and 117 IDF soldiers were killed. In addition to large numbers of people treated for shock and anxiety, 33 Israelis were wounded seriously and 68 moderately. During that time, 3,970 rockets landed in Israel, 901 of them in urban areas; 300,000 residents were displaced and more than a million were forced to live for some of the time in shelters, according to official Israeli figures. Since the cessation of hostilities went into effect, the nature of the humanitarian response in Lebanon has seen a rapid transition to early recovery activities and short-term intervention to provide assistance to the large numbers of returnees. The revised United Nations flash appeal, launched in Stockholm on 31 August, put the emphasis on the clearance of mines and unexploded ordinance, emergency health and education needs, and water and sanitation, with the vast part of project implementation to take place in the coming six weeks.

37 N E E E E E E E HQ East MTF EUROMARFOR FRANCE - 1 vessel (1 frigate) GERMANY - 4 vessels (1 frigate, 2 patrol boats, 1 auxiliary) The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Litani I S R A E L Wadi al-assal Harat al Hart Shwayya 4-23 GREECE - 2 vessels 7-2 Marjayoun Hebbariye (1 frigate, 1 patrol boat) Ibil A ITALY - 2 vessels as Saqy Kafr Hammam 4-7 (1 frigate, 1 patrol boat) 4-14 Shaba TURKEY - 1 vessel Zawtar 4-7C (1 frigate) ash Kafr Shuba Al Qulayah N Sharqiyat Al Khiyam Halta 3690 L E B A N O N 000 N KHIAM Mediterranean Tayr (OGL) SYRIAN Falsayh SECTOR Sea Shabriha Bastra Arab Tura Shhur Kafr Mine Action HQ QRF (+) HQ INDONESIA EAST Kila 4-28 Republic Coordination HQ KOREA Barish Frun Cell (MACC) Metulla Marrakah 9-10 Al Ghajar Majdal Shams HQ ITALY-1 At Tayyabah 9-64 HQ UNIFIL Sur Qabrikha Mughr Shaba (Tyre) Yahun Tayr Kafr Addaisseh Misgav Am LOG POLAND Tulin 9-63 Jwayya Markaba N Ar Rashidiyah Zibna Dunin Khirbat Kefar Gil'adi Dan Mas'adah ITALY HQ BELGIUM Silm LUXEMBURG Majdal & N Ayn Bal 8-18 Silm HaGosherim Dafna TURKEY SECTOR MAR MP TANZANIA Qana Margaliyyot HQ West BELGIUM 2-4 Dayr WEST HQ NEPAL 8-33 INDIA Qanun BELGIUM Qiryat Shemona HQ ITALY Houla Al Qulaylah Shaqra CHINA 6-43 Manara Tibnin 8-32A ITALY HQ ITALY-2 Al Hinniyah Kafra Brashit HQ OGL Al Mansuri Haris Mays al Jabal 2-2 Haddathah 1-26 Zibqin HQ FRANCE Yatar Al Bayyadah Bayt Yahun UNIFIL 2-3 Majdal Zun N Rshaf FRANCE Blida N Shama HQ GHANA 6-44 Deployment PORTUGAL Bayt Lif 2-45 At Tiri Aynata Yiftah Tayr 2-45A 8-36 Harfa 5-66 Shihin Dibil Bint Jubayl Aytarun March 2008 Naqoura HIN Ramot Alma 5-21 Ramyah 3-1 (OGL) 1-0A Naftali ash Shab 1-21 RAS 9-10 UNIFIL position OP 5-42 Ayta ash Shaab 6-52 Yarin (OGL) 1-32A LAB 1-31 Marwahin Zarit 5-20 OGL patrol base Yarun Rosh Shomera Rmeich Avivim Adamit Shetula Dishon Operational boundary Hanita Yesud HaNiqra Yir'on Yara Even Hamaala Inter-battalion boundary Shelomi Eilon Menahem Baram Alma Nahariyya km N Dovev Sede Fassut Rihaniya Eliezer mi E E E E E E E HQ SPAIN POLAND CHINA Litani 4-23 MALAYSIA Hasbayya HQ INDIA km mi N Map No Rev. 19 March 2008 (Colour) UNITED NATIONS Department of Field Support Cartographic Section

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39 Lebanon War July 2006 Captain Matina Stanfield Details obtained from Captain Stanfield s War Diary 12 July 01 August 2006 Captain Stanfield was one of 11 Australian Officers selected to represent Australia and serve on Operation PALADIN with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) as an unarmed UN Military Observer (UNMO). Captain Stanfield and three of the Australian contingent were stationed with Observer Group Lebanon (OGL) which conducts patrols on the Lebanese side of the border between Israel and Lebanon. Captain Stanfield was a member of Team Sierra which manned Patrol Base Khiam (PB Khiam). She was serving on PB Khiam on the 12 th July 2006, when the Hezbollah crossed the border to capture two Israeli solders, sparking retaliatory fire from Israel and resulted in a large scale war. PB Khiam is located at the junction of the three countries Lebanon, Israel and Syria (now occupied Golan), Refer to annex A for map of area (Not attached for Submission). During the first week of the conflict, UNMOs on PB Khiam observed intense military action as the Hezbollah Head Quarters is located in the same town as PB Khiam. Captain Stanfield was the only Australian serving in Team Sierra. During the first week of the war, Captain Stanfield and her four team mates (Officers from Canada, China, Finland & Ireland) reported hundreds of violations of the UN peace agreement and over 50 firing close (near misses) and two firing on (direct hits from artillery fragments) of Patrol Base Khiam from high caliber Israeli and Hezbollah ammunitions including; a.) Israeli 155mm High Explosive (HE) artillery b.) Israeli F15 jets delivering laser guided 1000 pound aerial bombs c.) Israeli Cobra Attack Helicopters firing hell fire missiles and rockets d.) Israeli Merkava tanks, and Page 1 of 5

40 e.) Hezbollah Katyusha rockets. Captain Stanfield narrowly escaped several attacks from Israeli F15 jets delivering 1,000 pound aerial bombs in close proximity. On day one of the war, Captain Stanfield and three of her team mates were observing from the Observation Platform of PB Khiam. An F15 Israeli Jet fired a 1000 pound aerial bomb past PB Khiam and impacted SP1, a Hezbollah position, located only 75m away. The explosion on impact sprayed PB Khiam with shrapnel and the blast wave and flames went over the top of the Team Sierra personnel observing from the platform (PB Khiam observation platform has no over head protection, refer to annex B for picture of PB Khiam). (Not attached for Submission). The UN classify a firing close from a 1000 pound aerial bomb as one km from impact. Fortunately there were no casualties on PB Khiam from the firing close. A picture displaying the remains of the Hezbollah position SP1 after the firing close is located at annex C. (Not attached for Submission). Video footage of the 1000 pound aerial bomb firing close is available on request. During night two of the war, PB Khiam came under Israeli artillery bombardment and sustained two direct hits of 155mm High Explosive (HE) Artillery round fragments. Captain Stanfield and her Canadian Team mate, Major Hess Von Kruedner, had an extraordinary escape when one of the 155mm HE artillery rounds dropped short and landed only 20m in front of them (impacting one metre from the perimetre fence of PB Khiam). This round should have severally injured or killed both members, however on inspection the following day, the round was a blind as it had not fully detonate. Refer to annex D for pictures of the blind 155mm HE artillery round. (not attached to submission) Captain Stanfield had already served a week on PB Khiam prior to the war commencing. She was scheduled to rotate from the position 13 July, the day after the conflict started, to proceed on leave in Egypt. A team rotation was attempted every day of the first week of the war however due to the intensity of battle surrounding PB Khiam could not be conducted until the afternoon on day six of the conflict. Captain Stanfield conducted a Page 2 of 5

41 team rotation from PB Khiam to Tyre (a town in Southern Lebanon where OGL rear duty HQ was located) using two SISU s (large UN Armoured Personnel Carriers) operated by United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) soldiers from Ghana and India. Refer to annex E for a photo of the SISU convoy (not attached to submission). As the senior UNMO Captain Stanfield was required to command the convoy, navigate and maintain communication with the UN HQ. Captain Stanfield s SISU was narrowly missed by a Hezbollah Katyusha rocket that sparked an exchange of fire from Hezbollah and Israeli forces. The transit from PB Khiam to Tyre should have taken approximately two hours to complete, but due to the heavy exchanges of fire between the Hezbollah and Israeli forces, the convoy was required to take cover over night at a UNIFIL position approximately half way between Khiam and Tyre and complete the rotation the following day. The road networks surrounding the city of Tyre were significantly damaged and impassable by Israeli bombing in an attempt to prevent the Hezbollah moving the two captured Israeli soldiers north and potentially out of Lebanon. Captain Stanfield had attempted to gain entry into Tyre over several hours and had exhausted all roads entering the city on her UN issued map. Captain Stanfield had completed the Basic Arabic Language Course at the ADF School of Languages prior to commencing her UN service in August She called upon these language skills to obtain information from a local Lebanese Policeman in regards to whether or not any road was still passable into Tyre. The Police advised to direct the convoy along a farmers track through a banana plantation and follow the Litani River which would ultimately meet the Mediterranean Sea North of Tyre. Whilst traversing the single lane dirt track Captain Stanfield received a phone call from UN HQ informing her that a concentrated Israeli aerial bombardment of Tyre was about to commence and the convoy was in the bombing zone. Due to the size of the SISUs, the steep embankment on the left hand side of the road and the estimated twenty meter drop off into the Litani River on the right hand side of the road, Captain Stanfield was unable to organise for the vehicles to be turned around to return to the UN position Page 3 of 5

42 she had departed from some four hours prior. Approval was granted by UNIFIL to push the convoy on into Tyre despite the aerial bombardment. Shortly after, Captain Stanfield was severely injured when the SISU took evasive action to avoid road damage from aerial bombing approximately 15 minutes out of the township of Tyre. The UN SISUs do not have seat belts and Captain Stanfield was thrown into the bullet proof windscreen of the armoured vehicle. Medical investigation later revealed that Captain Stanfield had sustained damage to five vertebrae (three fractured vertebrae, two wedged vertebrae and associated nerve damage) as a result of the incident. The convoy eventually reached the UN Rear Headquarters in Tyre where Captain Stanfield received limited treatment from a UN doctor. It was requested that Captain Stanfield be moved to a Lebanese Hospital for further treatment, however, due to Tyre being under intense Israeli bombing (refer to annex F for picture), (Not attached to Submission), the UN could not get a window of opportunity from the Israeli Defence Force to safely move Captain Stanfield to a hospital. Additionally, the UN medivac helicopter pilots from Italy refused to fly due to risk and danger from aerial bombings. Captain Stanfield remained on a tiled floor for two days until she was moved on a stretcher by ambulance to a ship hired by the Australian Embassy and the UN to evacuate civilian foreign nationals and UNTSO families from Lebanon to Cyprus, some 20 hours by boat away. Following initial medical treatment in Cyprus and the prognosis of a spinal injury, the Australian Defence Force requested Captain Stanfield be relinquished by the UN and coordinated her return to Australia. Captain Stanfield remained on a stretcher during the flight from Cyprus to Germany, Singapore and Australia. Several days after Captain Stanfield rotated from Patrol Base Khiam the position again came under Israeli artillery fire and was completely destroyed by an Israeli F15 jet which delivered an aerial bomb direct hit on PB Khiam s bunker - killing all four UNMOs from Team Sierra manning the position. Refer to Annex G for pictures. (Not Attached Submission). Page 4 of 5

43 Captain Stanfield is being medically discharged from the Army, with a proposed separation date 23 rd March 2008, due to the injuries sustained in Lebanon. Page 5 of 5

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45 THE INCIDENT Hezbollah Israeli War July 2006 Captain Stanfield was one of 11 Australian Officers selected to represent Australia and serve on Operation PALADIN with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) as an unarmed UN Military Observer. Captain Stanfield and three of the Australian contingent were stationed with Observer Group Lebanon which conducts patrols on the Lebanese side of the border between Israel and Lebanon. Captain Stanfield was a member of Team Sierra which manned Patrol Base Khiam. She was serving on the Patrol Base on the 12 th July 2006, when the Hezbollah crossed the border to capture two Israeli solders, sparking retaliatory fire from Israel and resulted in a large scale war. During the first week of the conflict Patrol Base Khiam which is located at the junction of the three countries Lebanon, Israel and Syria (now occupied Golan) observed the majority of military action as the Hezbollah Head Quarters was located in the town of El Khiam. Captain Stanfield and her team mates reported thousands of violations of the UN peace agreement and over 100 firing close (near misses) and two firing on (direct hits) of Patrol Base Khiam from high callibre ammunitions from Israeli artillery fire, F15 jets dropping aerial bombs, attack helicopters firing missiles and rockets, Merkava tanks, and Hezbollah Katusha rockets. Captain Stanfield narrowly escaped from several attacks of Israeli F15 jets dropping 1,000 pound aerial bombs in close proximity (only 75m away UN classify a firing close as 1km). During night two of the war Patrol Base Khiam came under Israeli artillery attack and sustained two direct hits of 155mm High Explosive Artillery rounds. Captain Stanfield and her Canadian Team mate, Major Hess Von Kruedner, had an extraordinary escape when one of these rounds landed 20m in front of them. This round should have Page 1 of 3

46 killed or severally injured both members however on inspection the following day the round was a dud and did not fully detonate, saving them from certain injury. During the afternoon on day six of the conflict, Captain Stanfield conducted a planned team rotation from Patrol Base Khiam to Tyre using two SISU s (large UN Armoured Personnel Carriers operated by UN soldiers from Ghana and India). As the senior UNMO Captain Stanfield was required to command the convoy, navigate and maintain communication with the UN Headquarters. This transit should have taken approximately two hours to complete but due to the heavy exchanges of fire between the Hezbollah and Israeli forces the convoy was required to take cover over night at another UN position approximately half way between Khiam and Tyre, and complete the rotation the following day. The road networks surrounding the city of Tyre were significantly damaged by Israeli bombing in an attempt to prevent the Hezbollah moving the two captured Israeli soldiers north and potentially out of Lebanon. Captain Stanfield had completed the Basic Arabic Language Course at the ADF School of Languages prior to commencing her UN service in August She called upon these language skills to obtain information from a local Lebanese Policeman in regards to whether or not any road was still passable into Tyre. Captain Stanfield was advised to direct the convoy through a banana plantation and follow the Litani River which would meet the Mediterranean Sea North of Tyre. UN procedures are not to drive off road however Captain Stanfield assessed the risks and directed the convoy along the farmers track through the banana plantation as it was higher risk to remain in the bombing area. Captain Stanfield was severely injured when the APC took evasive action to avoid road damage from aerial bombing approximately 15 minutes out of the township of Tyre. The UN vehicles do not have seat belts and Captain Stanfield was thrown into the windscreen of the armoured vehicle. She sustained three fractured vertebrae, two wedged vertebrae and associated nerve damage as a result of the incident. The convoy eventually reached the UN Rear Headquarters in Tyre where Captain Stanfield was treated by a UN doctor. Page 2 of 3

47 However due to Tyre being under intense Israeli bombing the UN could not get approval for Captain Stanfield to be moved to medical treatment until two days later when the only option was a 20 hour boat ride to Cyprus. Following initial medical treatment in Cyprus and the prognosis of a spinal injury, the Australian Defence Force requested Captain Stanfield be relinquished by the UN three weeks short of her twelve month posting and coordinated her return to Australia. Captain Stanfield remained on a stretcher during the flight from Cyprus to Germany, Singapore and Australia. Several days after Captain Stanfield rotated from Patrol Base Khiam the position again came under Israeli artillery fire and was completely destroyed by an Israeli F15 jet which delivered an aerial bomb direct hit on the UN bunker - killing all four of the UN personnel manning the position. Captain Stanfield is posted on promotion to Major to the Army Logistic Training Centre where she is the Staff Officer Grade Two of Transport Corp Development. She is still undergoing medical treatment and is on sick leave (as at 07/11/2007). Page 3 of 3

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49 Submission by Mr Ray Williams, For the Retrospective Reclassification of service from Non-warlike Service to Warlike Service, During the Period Early February Mid March 1974 Observer Group Beirut, Lebanon, The United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation. Please find enclosed a submission to have part of my UNTSO service; recognised as War-Like Service under the Veterans Entitlement Act 1986 (the Act). Section 68 of the Act classifies UNTSO Service as Peacekeeping and/or Observing service and it is my understanding that UNTSO was meant to be an Observer Mission. The majority of my UNTSO service (Operation Paladin Middle East) did involve the expected Peacekeeping and Observation duties. However, there is a specific period of my assignment which, in my view, did not conform to the guidelines of the Act. It was then that my service became war-like. It seems plain to me that the war-like circumstances of my service in 1984 were not foreseen when the Act was initially drafted to cover the intended Peacekeeping duties of Australia s first involvement in1956. (Please consider the attachment, an article taken from the Australian Peacekeeper & Peacemaker Veterans Association magazine, September 2005 issue titled In Focus: Operation Paladin Middle East p.44.) I enlisted in the Australian Army on 5 May 1971 and was discharged on 5 July I was commissioned on 7 October 1971 and served in the Australian Army Aviation Corps as a pilot helicopter. During the period from 28 March 1983 to 15 April 1984 I was posted to UNTSO Palestine and subsequently, in turn, was assigned to two UN stations. First, the Observer Group Golan (OGG) and second the Observer Group Beirut (OGB) Lebanon. The OGB assignment was from November 1983 to March Submission I request that the portion of my UNTSO Service, from early February 1984 to mid March 1984 during service as a member of OGB (Observer Group Beirut), be re-classified as war-like, via an individual allotment, for the following reasons: 1. In November 1983 I was assigned to OGB (Observer Group Beirut). I served with OGB until the end of March Beirut was divided by the old Green Line running roughly north from the harbour to Kalda Junction in the south. 2. For UNTSO (OGB) purposes the city was divided into four patrol areas and a series of known report points were used as locators as we conducted mobile patrols within our assigned sectors.

50 3. A harrowing experience that still remains with me today is my first walking patrol through the Shabra and Chatilla Refugee Camps where some 12 months prior an infamous massacre of Palestinians had occurred. 4. The massacre remained apparent in the faces of the survivors. Allegedly, all bodies interred in the mass graves had been recovered, but our noses told us different; especially on warm days. It was later revealed that the area was then being used as a dumping ground for the bodies of those caught in various religious, political or family disputes. 5. The upsurge in hostilities started on 21 December when a car bomb was detonated near one of the French MNF positions. Less than an hour later another large charge was detonated (One French trooper was killed and several wounded). As this was in our area, we were tasked to investigate and report on casualties. Later in the day a heavy fire fight took place in the Schouf near Souk El Garb, resulting in numerous casualties. 6. On the 22nd of December, the French and American Forces were ordered, by Amal, to immediately leave Beirut or the world would shake under their feet No reaction from them or indeed from Israel after this threat was reported. Little wonder as the Lebanese were angry with everybody. The concept of UN impartiality was long gone as both the Americans and the French were actively and overtly involved in training, equipping and supporting the Lebanese Army. 7. This made UN patrols and data/intelligence gathering hazardous as the Neutral aspect of the UN was disregarded by the many local militia gangs who controlled their own check points. 8. We were regularly harassed, searched and had guns pointed into our faces. I was personally subjected to this treatment on many occasions and it caused me to fear for my life. (It was later to take its toll on my health and well being.) This was unnerving to say the least. 9. We were constantly reinforcing our Australian nationality; or some other nationality never US Observers! The hatred of US personnel was a significant factor, such that US Observers were seldom sent out on patrols but worked as HQ Staff in operations and communications areas. 10. As the situation deteriorated, a night patrol vehicle carrying Nordic Personnel/Observers was raked by machine gun fire. While only cuts and scratches were sustained and nobody was killed, the attack had the desired effect; as from then on some observers refused to do night patrols. 11. The attitude of some Observers became one of self-preservation and to hell with the UN requirements and mission. 12. As a result, it was mainly Australian, Canadians, French and a few other Observers who conducted night patrols, a situation which I endured for several months.

51 13. Night patrols became most distressing as OGB members (including myself) were subjected to unjustifiable harassment and life threatening situations at the many checkpoint crossings manned mainly by militia gangs. 14. On numerous occasions I was afraid for my life and personal safety at these crossings. 15. War-like fighting broke out early February 1984 and Ras Beirut (previously considered relatively safe) came under intense shelling. This was the trigger for the local gangs/militia groups to go on rampages, looting, shooting indiscriminately, detonating car bombs and arson attacks; not particularly directed at any one group, but at anyone who got in the way or challenged their actions/authority. 16. As a consequence, I and some other Observers became isolated from our unit (causing a loss of radio and land line contact). Movement, even on foot, became hazardous and curfews meant that it was a shoot first ask questions later policy. With the rival gangs/militia and the LAF all opposing each other, civil war seemed a real possibility. 17. Realising the gravity of the situation for myself and my colleagues and given my isolation, I took it upon myself to venture out and make contact with other Observers and our Civil contacts who were also isolated, to ensure their well being and safety. At the same time I also gathered Intel realising it would be needed once contact was re-established with OGB Headquarters. During these foot patrols my life was threatened when I was: (i) (ii) (iii) Indiscriminately shot at on several occasions; Came under sniper fire at irregular times; and I was threatened by the various groups on looting and other attacking rampages. 18. In addition, my apartment block was shelled, sustaining several hits, resulting in numerous casualties and a loss of water, sewerage and electricity. (The latter was only available on one or two days a week.) 19. The outbreak of War in Beirut resulted in the evacuation of the Australian Embassy staff (led by Ambassador R Burns) to Damascus, Syria, from where Australian interests in Lebanon were monitored and serviced. Other nationalities, including British, USA, Canadians and Italians also left, mostly to Cyprus. 20. As the situation in Beirut City was considered untenable due to the numerous militia/gangs that controlled the streets; we were advised soon after contact was re-established with HQ, that the Observers who lived in

52 Ras Beirut were to move to Broummana, on high ground outside the city limits. We then resumed limited duty patrols due to restrictions imposed by the warring factions on movement. 21. OGB HQ, located in the outer suburbs was assumed to be relatively safe from where to continue operations. However, within two weeks the HQ and compound area was shelled on several occasions, sustaining several hits causing damage to several vehicles; on one such an occasion whilst I was doing a first parade service on one of the vehicles. 22. Fortunately, there were no deaths or casualties in the compound and the only damage was to vehicles and facilities. (I was within metres of the fall of the mortar fire and some times as close as metres to the shell fire.) 23. Although the intensity of the fighting subsided within a period of about three weeks, during that period our movements and patrols became extremely dangerous. 24. During this period of intense hostilities, there were only 2 Australians assigned to OGB, Major John Cazey and myself. Service Summary I believe that my Military Service with OGB in Lebanon from November 1983 to March 1984 and in particular the period between February and mid March 1984, should be considered War-Like Service; because during that UNTSO service: a. I was subjected to intense shelling and mortar fire and witnessed damage to my accommodation complex and work place by shellfire; b. I was shot at, including by sniper fire; and I was threatened with weapons thrust in my face and held at gun point on many occasions; c. I was isolated from my parent unit and support for a period of five (5) days and feared for my life and personal safety when threatened by warring factions and militia gangs; d. I saw many civilian casualties and was exposed to dismembered and rotting corpses and the gruesome sights and smells of the appalling conditions at Shabra & Shatila camps; e. I also witnessed many maimed, wounded and dying victims of the ongoing civil unrest and warlike activities in Beirut; f. I participated in the frantic evacuation of foreign nationals from Beirut City and the Port area; who were terrified that they would be trapped;

53 g. On many occasions I have to admit that I was frightened and in fear for my life; h. I witnessed destruction on a large scale; i. My UNTSO service changed from Observing and Peacekeeping to War-Like Service in the War zone that Beirut genuinely became. In August of 2006, I was reminded of this war-like service when a number of UN Observers were killed during the brutal conflict between Israel and Lebanon. These circumstances were referred to by governments and reported by media as War and were vividly reminiscent of my service in Lebanon during You will no doubt be aware that there are precedents for re-classifying service in the manner I now request. Both small and larger groups of service personnel have had their service re-classified to war-like service following reasoned approaches to relevant determining authorities concerning the changed and unexpected nature of that service. Let me cite two cases as precedents providing support for submission, namely: 1. The 1975 service of RAAF Airfield Defence Guards (ADGs) during the evacuation of Australian Embassy personnel from Saigon. That service is now considered to be war-like service, that is the ADGs were taken to have been allotted for duty, in terms of the Veterans Entitlements Act As a result of representation, similar to mine, an individual allotment was made covering those ADGs and their service was re-classified as war-like service. (On 23 December 1997, service in the ADF in Vietnam from 12 January 1973 to 29 April 1975 was identified as war-like service.) 2. The service of 657 Australians with UNAMIR 11 (Rwanda) from July 1994 to June 1995 was re-classified as war-like under the Veterans Entitlements Act Following a decision by the Australian Government, ADF personnel who served in Rwanda as part of Operation Tamar during , had their service recognised as war-like. Previously, this service was classified as non-warlike. This change to Rwanda service eligibility took effect from 13 February The Rwanda service was a grey area because of functional limitations within the definitions. The determination of UNAMIR 11 to be non warlike was made before the realities of the service situation became apparent. A portion of my UNTSO (OGB) service also falls into that grey area. By that I mean that the war-like nature of my service was equally not anticipated and I have described in detail above the actual war-like nature of my service. Mr Secretary, my submission seeks recognition of my war-like service and I submit this information for your consideration and that of appropriate authorities. My submission does not address the service or circumstances of all UNTSO Peacekeeping forces. Rather, from time to time instances such as mine arise and deserve consideration for individual allotment. I look forward to an early decision in my favour that finds my UNTSO (OGB) service to be War-like Service.

54 Should you require any additional information, please do not hesitate to contact me. Yours faithfully, Mr R.C. Williams 1A Loatta Road, LINDISFARNE TAS 7015 Ph: Enclosure: APPVA Magazine, September 2005, In Focus Operation Palladin, Middle East Page 44

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