Authority, Command and Control of UN Peacekeeping

Transcription

1 Authority, Command and Control of UN Peacekeeping Operations Dr Alexandra Novosseloff, Senior Policy Adviser, Directorate for International Relations and Strategy, Ministry of Defence, France Dr Istifanus Zabadi, Dean, African Centre for Strategic Research and Studies, National Defence College, Nigeria

2 Background Why AC2? The complex nature of modern peace operations demands a clear and strong authority, command and control framework to guide and direct activities at both the mission headquarters and the UN HQ level. An effective UN AC2 framework is critical to the successful planning and conduct of operations, as well as for maintaining the confidence of Member States in peace operations. General lack of understanding of how UN AC2 works and low level of confidence in UN AC2. Western countries often refer to the UN s weakness of command & control to avoid contributing more to UN PK (souvenirs of Bosnia).

3 Background Challenges Initiative Specificity of the UN where those who decide are not the same as those who contribute ( NATO, EU, AU). Dilution of responsibilities Historical heritage: weakness of military structures at the UN HQ (no real military committee), lack of planning culture, diversity of TCCs (lack of interoperability). But good AC2 is critical to UN s efforts to improve efficiency of UNPKOs; identified as such in the 2009 New Horizon reform initiative. 2008: Following the Capstone Doctrine, initial directives for C2 given by DKPO Military Division.

4 Background Challenges Initiative 2011 = internal evaluation undertaken by DPET on AC2 but no policy emerged out of it. New challenging PK environment calls for clear/stronger AC2 mechanisms. All this led the Challenges Partnership to contribute to the reflection on better AC2 mechanisms, keeping in mind the specificity (decentralised structure) and nature (politicalmilitary) of UNPKOs. 11 June 2014: the SG identified Ensuring effective command and control as a key challenge. He pointed out: We need cohesive and unified command structures, and we count on our troop and police contributors to work towards this common objective.

5

6 Methodology

7 Field Visits Haiti / MINUSTAH (December 2012): France/Co-Chair of C2 Challenges Project CAECOPAZ, Argentina PKSOI, United States Challenges Forum Secretariat Côte d Ivoire / ONUCI (April 2013): France, Co-Chair C2 Challenges Project United Services Institute, India Senior Adviser Challenges Forum Challenges Forum Secretariat South Sudan / UNMISS (May 2013): France / Co-Chair of C2 Challenges Project Nigeria / Co-Chair C2 Challenges Project Challenges Forum Secretariat Representative from Chinese Partners

8 A Series of Small Papers Undertaken by Various Partners AU C2 mechanisms Nigerian perspective on how the UN commands, controls and conducts PKOs Argentinean perspective on how the UN commands, controls and conducts PKOs Chinese perspective on how the UN commands, controls and conducts PKOs US perspective on how the UN commands, controls and conducts PKOs The relationships between the military and the police Indian perspective on how the UN commands, controls and conducts PKOs Pakistani perspective on how the UN commands, controls and conducts PKOs

9 Studies Undertaken by External Researchers Direction, Command and Conduct in UN Peacekeeping operations, Patrice Sartre. Intelligence, Information and Peace Operations: Some observations and Some Proposals, David Chuter. EU C2 mechanisms and structures when deploying operations/missions, Joachim Koops. NATO C2 mechanisms and structures when deploying operations, Alexander Mattelaer.

10 Main Findings

11 Scope of the Present Study Three levels: AC2 at UN Headquarters AC2 btw UN Headquarters and the field AC2 btw the components of a mission Challenges identified by DPET evaluation: the need for a better understanding and communication of the C2 framework to all stakeholders; ensuring that a clear strategic vision is cascaded down from the Security Council to the heads of all components in mission; the need for better leadership, and its concomitant training and preparation, both in UNHQ and in the field; the need to strengthen planning at both HQ and mission levels; improved clarity in roles and responsibilities within missions.

12 AC2 at UN Headquarters (Security Council + Secretariat + Member States) UN HQ is both the grand strategic and the strategic level of command for UN peace operations. The need for improved triangular relationship (SC, Secretariat, TCCs/PCCs). The need for the Secretariat to find a more inclusive way to deal with TCCs/PCCs and mechanisms to share key strategic documents. DPKO/DFS only provides a light back-stopping to missions: a weakness. A lack of crisis management center. A lack of unity/proper interactions between the SC and the GA 5th Committee, and the Secretariat can t bridge that gap.

13 The Security Council and the Secretariat need to do more to keep Member States informed of the strategic direction of missions; The Security Council needs help with assuming its strategic responsibilities and carrying out its planning and oversight functions effectively; Member States need to ensure that their representatives in New York are fully and effectively prepared for consultations with the Security Council and the Secretariat; The Secretariat needs to improve its crisis management capacities and stronger mechanisms need to be in place to create a unity of command and purpose to support missions in the field at the strategic level.

14 AC2 between UN Headquarters and the Field UN AC2 structure: flat, decentralised and flexible SRSG/HoM becomes the bridge btw the strategic & operational levels. Selection, training and preparation of senior leaders are central to a mission s success: this issue has been neglected for a long time. UNHQ and MHQ do not look in the same direction, monitoring culture + lack of consultation and communication btw the two. The splitting-up of DPKO/DFS has complicated the mounting of operations.

15 UNHQ and field missions are very different worlds, with different structures, responsibilities and operational concerns, none of which are as mutually reinforcing as they should be. Questions remain as to where the high level-planning is being done once a mission is deployed, and whether DPKO s crisis management structure is sufficiently robust to command and control more than one mission in crisis at a time. To achieve this there is an apparent need for the DPKO to develop more robust structures, procedures and assets to enable detailed and continuous emergency planning at both the strategic and the operational levels, in order to give the needed command support to the field, especially in times of crisis.

16 AC2 between the Components of a Mission Mission Leadership Team and Integrated Joint institutions (JOC, JLOC, JMAC) all vary according to missions. Civilian Missions CoS has a critical coordinating role. Lack of communication between the different components that are working with different structures, cultures, deployments and responsibilities. There is stovepipe culture. The Role of the DMS, that can report directly back to DFS. The military in general do not understand why they do not have C2 over military means especially in high tempo operations A lack of planning culture backed by a culture of accountability for delivery. A lack of UN C4I (Command, Control, Communication, Coordination & Information Systems) that can convey a real-time mission picture of events to all relevant stakeholders.

17 A general picture of AC2 at the mission level emerges of weak institutional structures prone to personalities and improvisation. This results in component stovepipes, which lack the integrating benefits of joint planning and high technology information exchange.

18 Recommendations AC2 at UN Headquarters The UN Secretariat should, in close cooperation with member states, revise the existing DPKO/DFS AC2 policy in accordance with the evaluation and recommendations put forward in the 2011 DPET report, thereby making it an integrated policy document that classifies military, police and civilian relationships. And the document should be widely disseminated to Member States. The UN Secretariat should develop stronger crisis management structures within DPKO/DFS. Enhancement of the role of the UNOCC. The Senior Leadership Appointment Section (SLAS) should be empowered in order to improve the selection, training, preparation and mentoring of senior leaders.

19 Recommendations Peace operations should adopt fit-for-purpose tools and technologies, and Member States should provide adequate resources to do so. The UN Secretariat should develop enhanced policy guidelines for integrated mission police and military command mechanisms that ensure effective planning and communication, and support clear command and control in high tempo joint operations. Strategic level mechanisms in UN HQ should be reviewed to achieve an improved level of triangular cooperation between the Security Council, the Secretariat and TCCs/PCCs. To make better use of the SC WG on PKOs Budget sheets to be submitted to the SC before any new PKO

20 Recommendations AC2 between UN HQ and the field The Security Council and the Secretariat should do more to keep Member States informed of the strategic direction of missions. Stronger mechanisms needed to create a unity of command and purpose to support missions in the field. The UN should improve the planning culture within UN HQ and missions by developing and implementing accountable UN-wide planning tools and systems, and by training and practicing selected personnel in all PK components in their use To consider extending the role and responsibilities of the new Directorate of Strategic Partnership from that of purely military and police oversight to mission-wide oversight of leadership, accountability and crisis management training.

21 Recommendations AC2 between the components of a mission Standardise and institutionalize mission structures and responsibilities; Develop mil/pol C2 guidelines for high tempo operations and test them at mission level through crisis management exercises; Make participation in senior mission leadership training mandatory for senior leaders; Improve planning culture and develop UN wide planning tools and practice peacekeepers in them; Review and modernise Mission C4I infrastructure; Systematically visit and evaluate missions and put them through crisis management training.

22 Possible Next Steps This report should be widely studied and considered by stakeholders in UN peacekeeping with a view to incorporating its recommendations into a new policy that is required. It should be considered by the INdependent High-level Panel on the Review of UN Peace Operations. This report could serve as a basis for discussion between the Secretariat and Member States on ways forward and improved procedures.

23 Questions?