SCUSA 64 Leading in Lean Times: Assuring Accountability and Assessing American Priorities in an Age of Austerity

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1 1 SCUSA 64 Leading in Lean Times: Assuring Accountability and Assessing American Priorities in an Age of Austerity Costless Wars? Drones, the All-Volunteer Force, and Challenges to Political Accountability War makes the state and the state makes war. Charles Tilly 1 The relationship between the state, society, and the soldiers who fight wars is a study of the tensions between military effectiveness, political accountability, and the attachment of the soldier to society. States seek to build the most effective military that they can buy or afford. An effective military force is a symbol of national pride, a deterrent to potential adversaries, and a malleable tool for the pursuit of policy objectives abroad. 2 Political accountability is at least as important as military effectiveness. The American military is accountable to its elected and appointed civilian leaders through a clear chain of command. Both Congress and the President share responsibility for the military: Congress raises an Army and maintaining a Navy, and the President employs them. Ultimately, the electorate holds these officials accountable. The bond between the armed forces and the society they serve also helps to maintain political accountability. American citizens influence national security policy through their interaction with the military, their elected officials, and the attitudes they express in support or opposition to these policies. This textbook portrayal of contemporary American civil-military relations is, however, idealistic at best and naïve at worst. Tensions between military effectiveness and political accountability are significant, and they have the potential to grow in the years ahead. A confluence of issues exacerbates these tensions. Despite diminishing coverage by television news networks and shrinking column space in national newspapers, the war in Afghanistan is far from over. Its outcome remains uncertain. Over a year in, the Arab Spring has led to a diverse array of outcomes, from peaceful transitions of power to the ongoing Syrian Civil War. The American military s role in this conflict and its aftermath is unclear. In the Far East, the Obama Administration s strategic pivot towards Asia remains ill-defined. The Global War on Terror is over in name only; President Obama has overseen an expansion in targeted drone attacks throughout the greater Middle East. Overshadowing all of these concerns are the challenges associated with budget uncertainty brought on by the looming threat of sequestration. Members of Congress may yet negotiate an agreement to avoid mandatory across-the-board defense cuts. Yet even if a grand bargain is reached, it is unlikely that military expenditures will grow under the next administration. 1 Charles Tilly, Reflections on the History of European State-Making, in The Formation of National States in Western Europe, ed. Gabriel Ardant and Charles Tilly (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), Amos A. Jordan et al., American National Security, vol. 6th (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).

2 2 Given these issues, how can policymakers best manage civil-military tensions in the years ahead? This paper examines the relationship between the American state, society, and soldier. It pays particular attention to the relationship s historical antecedents and examines how it has changed over time. The paper proceeds as follows. First, the paper provides policymakers a brief overview of the formal institutions and informal norms that govern American civil-military relations. Next, the paper delves more deeply into the concepts of military effectiveness and political accountability. It also considers a third tension in understanding civil-military relations the military s attachment to the society that it serves. The paper then considers the issue of drone strikes overseas as an illustrative example of these tensions. To what extent does the transition to robotic warfare alter the civil-military paradigm? More broadly, how can policymakers assuage the tensions between military effectiveness, political accountability, and the military s attachment to society? Three Tensions: Effectiveness, Accountability, and Attachment Military institutions face unique challenges. On the one hand, formal rules and informal practices must maximize military effectiveness, understood as the armed forces ability to accomplish any assigned goals to their civilian leadership s satisfaction. These goals, articulated as a portion of a national military strategy, give military leaders a benchmark for capabilities and qualities that the military must possess. A military that cannot contribute to a state s national security interests in a meaningful way undermines the confidence of its population and ultimately jeopardizes the state s future. 3 Political accountability can be viewed from several perspectives. This paper considers two of them. The first involves the military s responsiveness to civilian authority. In the American context, this accountability comes in two forms. First, the American military is accountable to the country s elected officials. Presidential leadership, exercised through appointed officials in the Department of Defense, provides the orders and guidance that the military must follow. Second, Congressional direction, in the form of authorization and appropriations bills, funds the military and directs military policy and procurement. Another important perspective regarding political accountability is the relationship between the president and the public. The president, as commander-in-chief, is also accountable to the American public for the way in which he deploys the military. Gary Jacobson argues that public support for wars depends on their origins (i.e., defensive or preemptive), scale, intensity, and salience to the public. 4 Another form of accountability involves Congress. Given the more frequent elections in the House of Representatives and the power of the purse, Congress represents a considerable check on presidential power. Over time, this check has eroded. Since World War II, presidential decisions to deploy the military without congressional approval have increased markedly, ranging from the Korean War to campaign in Kosovo 5. 3 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State; the Theory and Politics of Civil-military Relations (Cambridge,: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957). 4 Gary C. Jacobson, A Tale of Two Wars: Public Opinion on the U.S. Military Interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, Presidential Studies Quarterly 40, no. 4 (2010): Louis Fisher, Costly Presidential Wars, in The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence, ed. Eugene R. Wittkopf and James M. McCormick, 5th ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2008),

3 3 The third tension, the military s attachment to society, is perhaps the most difficult to define and measure. 6 At the individual level, soldiers are attached to society through their civilian friends and family. 7 The military s decreasing size, however, puts fewer and fewer citizens in proximity or contact with service members. 8 Interaction between soldiers and the broader public varies based on where one is assigned. Many military bases are in remote parts of the country; few are in close proximity to major population centers. This is due in part to the post-cold War military drawdown. For example, as a consequence of the Base Realignment and Closure process, there are no active duty military installations in New England with combat units assigned to it. This lessens the opportunities for contact and familiarity between the armed forces and society in this region, among others. From an institutional perspective, the military s attachment to society also has changed. A smaller, more sophisticated military places increasing demands on a few while masking the military burden from society at large. Historical Roots of Contemporary American Civil-Military Relations The tensions between military effectiveness, political accountability, and the military s attachment to society predate the nation s founding. The Founding Fathers understood that their military was simultaneously a guardian of liberty and a potential instrument of tyranny. 9 Authority over the military was a particularly contentious issue as the Founders framed the American regime. On the one hand, the Republic owed its existence to the Continental Army and the colonial militia. The Federalists, notably Alexander Hamilton, argued that the Army must be made strong enough to dissuade European states from meddling in the new nation s affairs. On the other hand, the history of these same European states provided cautionary tales in the dangers of standing armies. The Anti-Federalists therefore viewed the creation of a large, peacetime army as an intolerable threat to liberty. 10 In designing the Constitution, the challenge was to both centralize military power while limiting the potential for its misuse. 11 The Constitution contained provisions for both sides to support and to criticize. It began by fracturing military power horizontally and vertically. The Constitution divided political authority over the armed forces between the executive and legislative branches. It also created a bifurcated command structure, enmeshing the state militia and the standing army into the new nation s defense structure. 12 According to Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, the militia would remain under state control unless called into federal service by the Congress and placed under the President s command. Congress alone would have the authority to raise an army (and maintain a navy), limiting opportunities for the President to 6 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, a Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, Ill.,: Free Press, 1960). 7 Pew Charitable Trusts, The Military-Civilian Gap: Fewer Family Connections, Pew Social & Demographic Trends, n.d., 8 Sabrina Tavernise, Civilian-Military Gap Grows as Fewer Americans Serve, The New York Times, November 24, 2011, sec. U.S., 9 Alexander Hamilton et al., The Federalist Papers (New York, N.Y.: Signet Classic, 2003). 10 Brutus, The Anti-Federalist Papers, October 18, 1787, 11 Richard H. Kohn, The Constitution & National Security: The Intent of the Framers, in The United States Military Under the Constitution of the United States, , ed. Richard H. Kohn (New York: New York University Press, 1991), William H. Riker, Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy (Washington DC: Public Affairs Press, 1957); Martha Derthick, The National Guard in Politics, Harvard Political Studies (Cambridge,: Harvard University Press, 1965).

4 4 become a despot of his own accord. When the United States had a standing army, it would be small and temporary. A citizen army, called to arms in times of domestic or foreign strife, was intended to a safeguard to prevent the new nation s chief instrument of security from becoming an instrument of oppression. Yet as the epigraph for this paper articulates, war and conflict places increased demands on the state. The expandable citizen army was unable to fend off the British during the War of Washington burned for wont of an effective army. Inexperience and inefficiency with modern war fighting may have contributed to the war s length and lethality. Eight decades later, the Spanish American War, seen by many citizens as a tremendous victory, proved disastrous in terms of mobilization and military preparedness. 13 In the wake of the Spanish American War, however, Progressive-era reforms introduced by Secretary of War Elihu Root began to professionalize the American military. Root s initiatives gave the military a general staff system similar to those found in European armies. 14 The reforms also represented a marked shift from dependence on a citizen-army to a growing, full-time force buttressed by a more disciplined militia the modern-day National Guard. 15 Federal oversight and authority over the Guard expanded considerably, shifting the militia s loyalties from political actors at the state level to the U.S. Army at the federal level. Root largely met the goals of improving military effectiveness and political accountability while maintaining the military s ties to American society. The post-world War II era saw significant changes in the relationship between the soldier, the state, and society. The emerging Cold War mandated a much larger military force than maintained previously after a conflict. Nuclear and ballistic missile technologies eroded the oceanic barriers separating the United States from its adversaries. Even as the state and the solider drew closer in the face of these tensions, however, the United States did not become a garrison state. 16 Instead, the relationship between the soldier, state, and society reached a new equilibrium as the nation grew accustomed to a large, professional standing military. The Vietnam War era altered this balance. At best a stalemate and at worst a devastating blow to the national psyche, the war marked a nadir in civil-military relations. Class and racial tensions exploded. The conscription of young men into the armed forces grew increasingly unpopular. The war abroad and the military s role in policing civil unrest at home made the military a lightning rod for widespread public dissatisfaction with America s political trajectory. 17 As the war drew towards its conclusion, the Nixon Administration ended the draft. This represented a fundamental shift in American military policy. 18 The last vestige of the massbased citizen s army, which had served the republic since WWII and in some sense since the Founding itself, was, on July 1, 1973, replaced with an All-Volunteer Force (AVF). The AVF 13 Jerry M. Cooper, The Rise of the National Guard: The Evolution of the American Militia, , Studies in War, Society, and the Military V. 1 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997). 14 Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 15 Michael Doubler, I Am the Guard a History of the Army National Guard, (Washington DC: Army National Guard; For sale by the Supt. of Docs. U.S. G.P.O., 2001). 16 Harold D. Lasswell, The Garrison State, The American Journal of Sociology 46, no. 4 (1941); Aaron L. Friedberg, Why Didn t the United States Become a Garrison State?, International Security 16, no. 4 (1992): Robin Higham, Bayonets in the Streets : the Use of Troops in Civil Disturbances, 2. enl. ed. (Manhattan, Kan.: Sunflower Univ. Press, 1989). 18 Stephen M. Duncan, Citizen Warriors: America s National Guard and Reserve Forces & the Politics of National Security (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1997),

5 5 ended some tensions associated with military service while raising others. Although unpopular at the time, the citizen army drew its soldiers from a broad cross-section of America. It tied society to its soldiers in a way that the AVF does not. Some have argued that eroding the bond between state and society reduces political accountability over presidential decisions regarding the use of force. 19 Civil-Military Relations in Context: Drone Strikes Like the decision to employ an All-Volunteer Force, the president s increased use of armed drones to combat terrorism raises important questions. The American military s pattern of development demonstrates the changing balance between military effectiveness, political accountability, and the military s attachment to society. The military that emerged in the post- Cold War period, and particularly since 1973, has exhibited increased effectiveness on the battlefield. The extent to which the military has remained politically accountable and attached to the society it serves, however, are open questions. The rising prominence of drone warfare has made these tensions particularly acute. Building off of Bush Administration initiatives, President Obama has made extensive use of armed drones to target al-qaeda and Taliban leaders abroad. These attacks have been seen as at once a militarily effective, precise method to disrupt al-qaeda terrorist networks and as a threat to political accountability. Some argue that deploying armed drones against terrorist organizations is within President Obama s purview as the commander in chief. His goal is to employ the military in the most effective manner possible. Al-Qaeda s decentralized and resilient command structure demands a more rapid, offensive response than in the pre-9/11 world. Drone strikes may also prove less costly than manned missions in terms of both lives and dollars no small concern given the fiscal pressures that the next administration will face. A compelling counterargument can also be made that drone strikes reduce political accountability. Drone strikes represent a fundamental shift and further centralization of executive power over the military. Members of Congress have little recourse but to investigate the drone strike program post-hoc. Cutting funding for drones may not be a viable option, since drones provide valuable support to troops in Afghanistan. Legislating where the military or the intelligence community can and cannot use drones is also problematic, since threats are unpredictable. Drone programs depend heavily on support from civilian contractors, eroding the state s monopoly over military force. 20 Perhaps most importantly, the relationship between drone strikes and security is not entirely clear. There is no way to know if the short term gains that drone strikes provide translate into significant improvements in American national security. We do not know if drone strikes are creating more terrorists than they kill. Armed drones have important implications for the use of force abroad. Drones lower the cost of military intervention by removing an important human dimension to warfare. Their development and increased use signals the most significant recent shift in warfare s factors of production from labor to capital. The costs of war, borne by fewer and fewer service members in harm s way, may give the public impression that war is an antiseptic affair. Capital has replaced labor as the chief factor of production in modern warfare. This may also decrease the propensity 19 Rachel Maddow, Drift : the Unmooring of American Military Power, 1st ed. (New York: Crown, 2012); Thomas Ricks, The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society, The Atlantic. 280, no. 1 (1997): Deborah D. Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

6 6 for dialogue between policymakers and the electorate regarding national security goals and decisions. The fabric of contemporary civil-military relations may grow increasingly threadbare. Assuaging Civil-Military Tensions: The Way Ahead How can the U.S. government maintain military effectiveness, improve political accountability, and keep the American military tied to the society that it serves? Within this overarching question are two different sets of issues that policymakers must consider. First, what is the relationship between technology, the use of force, and civil-military relations? Have new technologies made it too easy for policymakers to use military force overseas? In what ways do American political institutions need to change to maintain accountability over decisions to use force? Second, how does the military relate to American society more broadly? The traditional citizen army in America has long since transformed into a professional force. The results of this change are evident in Afghanistan, where a very small fraction of the American populace has served under arms. After over a decade at war, how can the United States government best connect out military to the nation it serves? Does the United States need to reinstate a military draft? Given the nation s looming budget cuts, what initiatives are sustainable over time?

7 7 Recommended Readings Eliot Cohen, The Unequal Dialogue: The Theory & Reality of Civil-Military Relations & the Use of Force, in Soldiers & Civilians, edited by Peter D. Feaver & Richard H. Kohn, MIT, Peter Feaver, Civil Military Relations, Annual Review of Political Science 1999, Vol. 2: pp Hamilton, Jay, and Madison, The Federalist Papers: 3, 4, 7, 8, 24, 26, 34, 41. Ole R. Holsti, A Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society?: Some Evidence, , International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter, ), pp Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Richard H. Kohn, The Constitution & National Security: The Intent of the Framers, in The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, , edited by R. Kohn, NYU Press, Suzanne Nielsen and Don Snider, American Civil-Military Relations, Johns Hopkins University Press, Mackubin Thomas Owens, US Civil-Military Relations after 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil- Military Bargain. New York: Continuum, 2011.

8 8 Additional Readings Deborah D. Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) Political Institutions and Military Effectiveness, in Creating Military Power : the Sources of Military Effectiveness, ed. Risa Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007), Andrew J. Bacevich, Whose Army? Daedalus, Volume 140, Issue 3 (Summer 2011), pp Beth Bailey, America s Army : Making the All-volunteer Force. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009). Congressional Budget Office, The All-Volunteer Military: Issues and Performance, July 2007, pp Charles Dunlap, The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012, Parameters, Winter , pp The Military Industrial Complex, Daedalus, Volume 140, Issue 3 (Summer 2011), pp Robert L. Goldich, American Military Culture from Colony to Empire, Daedalus, Volume 140, Issue 3 (Summer 2011), pp Robert Griffith, The U.S. Army s Transition to the All-volunteer Force, (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1996). Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, a Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, Ill.,: Free Press, 1960). Peter Singer, Wired for War : the Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-first Century (New York: Penguin Press, 2009). George C. Wilson, This War Really Matters: Inside the fight for Defense Dollars. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1999).

AN3016MA AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN WAR Spring, 2017

AN3016MA AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN WAR Spring, 2017 Time: Wednesday, 12:00-14:00 Venue: 119 Tutor: Paul Mayle. (pmayle@mvnu.edu.), Room 118; phone 06 306 582 619 Office hours: Wednesday 10:00-11:00; Thursday