Establishing the Full Operational Capability of the East African Standby Force: Challenges and Opportunities

Transcription

1 Article Establishing the Full Operational Capability of the East African Standby Force: Challenges and Opportunities Insight on Africa 8(1) African Studies Association of India SAGE Publications sagepub.in/home.nav DOI: / Kasaija Phillip Apuuli 1 Abstract In December 2014, countries contributing to the East African Standby Force (EASF) conducted the last exercise to test the validity of the functioning of the force. The exercise heralded the full operationalisation of the force. This article discusses the attainment of full operational capability (FOC) of the EASF, one year before the full operationalisation of the African Standby Force. The main conclusion is that whilst the attainment of FOC of the force should be celebrated with the member states actually validating their troops and equipment contributions, there are outstanding challenges including ongoing crises in the region and lack of resources among others that it must overcome before it can actually be deployed in a conflict situation. Keywords African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises, African Union, African Standby Force, East African Community, East African Standby Force, full operational capability, rapid deployment capability Introduction In mid-november 2014, elements of troops civilian and police drawn from the member states of the East African Standby Force (EASF) conducted the final exercise called Command Post Exercise (CPX) (code-named EASF CPX 1 Department of Political Science, Makerere University Kampala, Kampala, Uganda. Corresponding author: Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, Department of Political Science, Makerere University, Kampala, P.O. Box 7062, Kampala, Uganda. s: apuulik@gmail.com; phillip.kasaija@chuss.mak.ac.ug

2 2 Insight on Africa 8(1) MASHARIKI SALAM 2014 ) in the Ethiopian town of Adama as the last stage to test the readiness of the multidimensional regional force for deployment in case of any emergency in any of the member states (EASF, n.d.). More than 300 participants from the 10 EASF member states underwent a two-week intensive simulation exercise (EASF, n.d.), with the main objective of practising integrated mission planning, command, control and execution of a complex peace support operation. The establishment of the EASF has been gathering steam with the 10 1 contributing members being capable of mobilising troops for immediate deployment in crisis situations (Oluoch, 2013). Earlier, the heads of state and government of the EASF region held their third extraordinary meeting on the sidelines of the 23rd Ordinary African Union (AU) Summit meeting in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea on 26 June In the ensuing communique, the leaders, inter alia, reaffirmed their commitment to attain full operating capability of the EASF by December In an effort to boost the swift operationalisation of the force, Rwanda pledged to contribute a motorised battalion of 850 soldiers, 10 armoured vehicles and 35 doctors, and Uganda promised to contribute a battalion of 736 soldiers (Kagwanja & Wesonga, 2014). The EASF is meant to be a part of the ASF, a component of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It should be recalled that the attainment of the Full Operational Capability (FOC) of the African Standby Force (ASF), which was first mooted for the year 2008, was first pushed to 2010, and again to the end of The ASF is to comprise five standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components based in their respective countries and ready for fast deployment in conflict zones anywhere in Africa and possibly even outside the continent. Of the five regions, it is only East and West Africa regions that currently have their forces ready. Central, North and South Africa regions are yet to catch up. This article discusses the development and actual attainment of FOC of the EASF, one year before the full operationalisation of the ASF. As crises engulf the countries of the greater Horn of Africa region, it becomes imperative that the EASF begins operating. In this regard, the EASF member states have pledged forces and equipment towards the final establishment of the force. Based on the interviews conducted with persons who have been involved in the process of constructing the force, the article concludes that whilst there are a number of challenges that remain to be overcome before the EASF can actually be deployed in a conflict situation, opportunities for EASF abound with the validation of troops and equipment meant for the force. Methodologically, this article is a product of reviews of primary and secondary documents on the establishment of the ASF, in general, and EASF, in particular. In addition, I conducted interviews with officials responsible for the development of Uganda s rapid deployment capability (RDC) 2 which is part of the EASF, based in the town of Jinja, and the Secretariat staff of the EASF, based in Nairobi, Kenya. Conceptual Context As the 2009 Chairperson of the AU, the then Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, advocated an African military to defend Africa (Ajayi & Oshewolo, 2013, p. 9).

3 Apuuli 3 The idea of a pan-african force predates the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (Fasehun, 1980, p. 309; Imobighe, 1980, p. 241). Kwame Nkrumah, President of Ghana, successfully pushed for the adoption of a resolution recommending the formation of an African High Command at the All African Peoples Conference which he sponsored in 1958 (Olajide, 1976, p. 127). Nkrumah was dissatisfied with the way in which the United Nations (UN) [...] was being manipulated by the big powers against the interests of [ ] Africa as a whole (Olajide, 1976, p. 127). His idea was to establish a supranational army involving all independent African states pooling their resources to advance the liberation of the continent and to protect Africa from external intervention (Apuuli, 2013, p. 64). At the formation of the OAU in 1963, Nkrumah s idea was not accepted due to differences in vision among the political leaders of Africa. After the end of the Cold War, there was much debate as to how best African security could be assured (Robinson, 2014, p. 20). The indifference of the international community combined with the growing awareness of the inefficiency and inadequacy of the OAU to the new post-cold War security environment ignited heated discussions among African political elites (Tlalka, 2013 n.d.). Because of the ancillary crises spawned by civil conflicts, regional and subregional organisations in Africa initiated diverse mechanisms to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts including the OAU mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution in 1993 (also called the Cairo Mechanism; Aning, 2001). The initial idea to create an early response force to deal with the various crises affecting the continent was presented in the recommendations of the second meeting of the African Chiefs of Defence Staff held at Harare, Zimbabwe, in 1997 (Tlalka, n.d.). It was envisaged that such a force based on five sub-regions would be able to react in crisis situations before the UN would engage (Bachmann, 2011). The adoption of the Constitutive Act of the AU marked a fundamental shift in many aspects, inter alia, in the values and principles concerning political, economic and social activities on the African continent (Tlalka, 2013 n.d.). The African leadership was, inter alia, motivated to respond to the multifaceted challenges to stability, security and cooperation in the continent (Alusala, 2004, p. 113). It is in this context that the Constitutive Act of the AU in Article 4(d) calls for the establishment of a common defence policy for the African continent. This was followed up with the adoption of two key documents: the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (in July 2002; the PSC Protocol) and the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy (in February 2004). The APSA is the policy and institutional framework that the AU established to ensure that it has the requisite capacity to address the scourge of conflicts on the continent and to ensure that Africa, through the AU, plays a central role in bringing about peace, security and stability on the continent (Maru & Dersso, 2013, p. 158). The APSA is, as such, the institutional and policy manifestation of the AU s political principles, enshrining the mantra of African solutions to African problems. As Maru and Dersso (2013, p. 158) have observed, [T]his is also the principle that gives Africa both ownership of, and a high stake in, the process for resolving problems facing its peoples.

4 4 Insight on Africa 8(1) The birth of the PSC led to a reversal of one of the key principles of the OAU, national sovereignty, by replacing the principle of non-interference with the principle of non-indifference. Article 2(2) of the PSC Protocol defines the components of the APSA that support the works of the PSC as: the AU Commission, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, the ASF and a Special Fund. The different components of the APSA are to play significant roles in the process for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. Within the framework of the APSA, the ASF comes into action in cases where violent conflicts are about to erupt or have already erupted, and/or to intervene in respect of grave circumstances (Batware, 2011). In this respect, it is clear that the ASF is one of the most critical elements of the APSA. It enables the PSC first to prevent and manage conflicts among others by containing their spread or escalation, second to support its peace processes as a peace support mission and third to enforce its decisions in cases of grave circumstances or to intervene. As envisaged in the PSC Protocol, the ASF is to be prepared for rapid deployment for a range of operations. 3 The role of the ASF is to provide peacekeeping forces on a high-level readiness capable of rapid deployment in response to a request by the UN, the AU or a given region. It is conceived from the outset as a mechanism that will undertake a whole range of modern peacekeeping and peace-building activities (Batware, 2011). In general, in establishing the ASF, the AU intends to achieve more in terms of integrating African defence forces and reducing the overall costs that individual African countries have to bear on many African peacekeeping operations. Unfortunately, the operationalisation of the ASF has been lagging behind the schedule. Whilst its establishment had first been slated for between 2005 and 2008 (ISS, 2012), the date was pushed to 2010, as a result of serious capability gaps identified during Exercise AMANI AFRICA The ASF Roadmap III seeks to address these gaps, especially regarding the police and civilian dimensions of the ASF. In this respect, a special Police and Civilian Focused Exercise (POLCIVEX) was conducted in October/November 2012, aimed at enhancing the capacities of these two components (ISS, 2012). It should be remembered that whilst the ASF was envisioned as a multidimensional force, its initial development focused predominantly on the military component. It is now anticipated that the ASF will become fully operational at the end of 2015 (AU, 2013a). Development of the EASF The EASF was mooted as a regional mechanism to provide capability for the rapid deployment of forces to carry out preventive deployment, rapid intervention, peace support/stability operations and peace enforcement. Generally, the EASF has to operate with the vision to contribute to regional and continental peace and stability, through a fully operational and multidimensional joint and integrated EASF ready for deployment by 2015, with an initial operational capability by Its establishment followed the decision of the summit of the AU held in July 2004 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to create the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG; Bayeh, 2014). To show the existence of multidimensionality, the

5 Apuuli 5 Figure 1. Map of Member States of the EASF Source: AU 2010, para 114. name EASBRIG was changed to EASF in June 2010 by the Extraordinary Council of Ministers meeting held in Nairobi, Kenya (AU, 2010). The memorandum of understanding (MoU), establishing the EASF as a constituent organisation of the ASF, was signed on 11 May 2005 and entered into force on the same day (AU, 2010). However, the MoU was not legally binding. 4 The absence of one regional economic community (REC) covering all the 10 countries contributing to the EASF led the heads of state and government of the region during their meeting on 28 January 2007 to authorise the creation of an independent coordination mechanism, The East African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM) to serve as the new Secretariat for the EASF. However, in March 2007, the Council of Ministers of Defence and Security established a coordination mechanism called EASFCOM (East African Standby Force Coordination Mechanism; formerly EASBRICOM). Structures East African Standby Force Coordination Mechanism The East African Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM) is located in Nairobi, Kenya, and serves as the Secretariat for all EASF policy organs,

6 6 Insight on Africa 8(1) structures and activities. It coordinates the activities of the EASF in consultation with relevant authorities of the member states and the AU. Led by a director and heads of departments appointed by the Council of Ministers of Defence and Security, its mandate includes: implementing EASF policies; developing and reviewing EASF policy documents for approval by the Council of Ministers; mobilising resources in collaboration with the AU, RECs and other sources; managing the EASF Fund; disseminating information and public relation activities as well as liaising with AU, RECs and other organisations on matters relating to EASF. The Planning Element The Planning Element (PLANELM), located in Nairobi, is composed of military and civilian staff on secondment from member states, just like the EASF headquarters 5 staff. It serves as a multinational, multidimensional, full-time planning headquarters of EASF (military, police and civilian components fully operationalised) with all the 10 EASF members represented. Coordinating with the police and civilian components, the PLANELM plans, trains and monitors EASF in order to ensure the readiness of the different units. Generally, the PLANELM seeks to establish a force capable of planning and preparing for complex peace support operations (PSOs) that include reconnaissance, mounting, deployment and employment of up to a brigade size force including police and other civilians components in a theatre of operations to address the six scenarios defined within the policy framework for the establishment of the ASF. In this regard, the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC; also in Nairobi) has ensured that all pledged military, police and civilian personnel are being trained properly. The military component of the PLANELM has been in operation since It is responsible for force preparation and pre-deployment planning of the EASF. The police component, which has been in existence since 2008, is EASF s instrument to develop a police component for PSOs in Eastern Africa and across the African continent. In the same vein, the civilian component, which was established in 2008, undertakes substantive and supportive civilian functions in a PSO mission including political affairs, planning and coordination, legal advice, public information, human rights, electoral management and observation, civil affairs, child protection and protection of civilians. Logistical Base The Logistic Base (LOGBASE), located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, serves as the central regional base for sub-depots and for maintenance, storage and management of the logistical infrastructure of the EASF. The LOGBASE receives personnel, material and other resources to be maintained and supplied for training and operations of EASF. It coordinates all activities involving logistics of EASF including, but not limited to, performing functions mandated by the AU. But as the AU assessment study observed in 2010, the LOGBASE remains to be operational, as there is presently no storage available (AU, 2010).

7 Apuuli 7 Figure 2. Governing Structure of EASF Source: AU 2010, para 114. Challenges Some writers such as Bayeh (2014), Robinson (2014) and Tlalka, 2013 (n.d.) have discussed at length some of the conceptual and doctrinal challenges that the process of establishing the EASF has continued to face. Nevertheless, their works have been based on their own observations and from third-party pronouncements. The challenges that I present below have been identified by persons involved in the process of establishing the EASF. Regional Rapid Deployment Capability Embedded within the broader ASF concept is a specific attempt to develop an RDC that would allow the AU and/or RECs to field boots on the ground within 14 days of the decision to deploy (Williams, 2014, p. 154). As a result, establishing an RDC has been part of the building of the EASF. According to a senior official at Uganda s RDC, Uganda is one of only three countries that have an operational RDC among those contributing to the EASF (interview with Gureme, 20 December 2013). The others are Ethiopia and Rwanda. All the national RDCs are supposed to be pooled into one regional RDC under the EASF. Unfortunately, the regional RDC has been sabotaged by some countries contributing to the EASF. For example, Ethiopia has not been enthusiastic to contribute towards building the regional RDC due to a number of reasons (interview with Gureme, 20 December 2013). First, it does not agree with the idea of the coordinating mechanism of the EASF being in Nairobi, Kenya, as it wanted to host it. Second, Ethiopia already has an operational RDC in the form of troops and militias who can be mobilised very easily. Thus, it views the operationalisation of a regional RDC as an attempt to undermine this capability. Lastly, political interests among the countries contributing to the EASF have failed the operationalisation of the regional RDC.

8 8 Insight on Africa 8(1) In this regard, whilst the LOGBASE of the EASF is located in Addis Ababa, the coordination mechanism is in Nairobi, creating a dissonance between the two components. Ethiopia, which wanted to coordinate the regional RDC but failed due to the lukewarm support from the other members, has become indifferent to the RDC idea. In the end, the development of a regional RDC, which is a critical component of the EASF, has not taken off the ground. African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises At the 21st Ordinary Session of the AU held in May 2013, African heads of state and government announced that they were establishing a force called the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), which would act as a rapid deployment force to deal with the numerous conflicts that continue to break out on the continent. The ACIRC is intended to bridge the gap pending the coming into operation of the ASF. The immediate reason for the call to establish ACIRC seems to have been AU s inability to operationalise the RDC and with specific reference to the failure of African states to rapidly deploy troops in Mali in early 2013 (Williams, 2014, p. 154). Following a military coup d état in Mali in March 2012 mainly precipitated by the failure of the government of President Amadou Toumane Toure to deal with the Tuareg rebellion in the north of the country, the UN Security Council authorised the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA; UN Security Council, 2012). However, the AU procrastinated to deploy the force, and in January 2013, the rebels launched an attack aimed at capturing the capital, Bamako. The interim president of Mali, Diancounda Traore, addressed a letter to the French President Francois Hollande pleading for international support to push back the jihadists before it was too late. Subsequently, France launched Operation Serval to push back the Islamists and help Mali regain its territorial integrity. 6 The French offensive against the Islamists were joined by troops from other countries of the region including Chad, Nigeria and Togo under the AFISMA framework. But the fact that it had to take the intervention of France to save Mali was not lost on the African leadership. The Malian crisis, more than any other, exposed serious shortcomings in the APSA and, thus, led to calls to establish the ACIRC. ACIRC s main aim is: to provide Africa with a strictly military capacity with high reactivity to respond swiftly to emergency situations upon political decisions to intervene in conflict situations within the continent. [This is to be achieved through the establishment of] an efficient, robust and credible force, which can be deployed very rapidly, able to conduct operations of limited duration and objectives or contribute to creating enabling conditions for the deployment of larger AU and/or UN peace operations. (AU, 2013a) Drawing from a reservoir of 5,000 troops, the plan is for the ACIRC to comprise tactical battle groups of 1,500 military personnel deployed by a lead nation or a group of AU member states, and that would be sustainable for 30 days (Williams, 2014, p. 154). To date, the ACIRC has attracted voluntary commitments from

9 Apuuli 9 about 15 states (Williams, 2014, p. 154). 7 Nevertheless, the ACIRC idea has attracted criticism due to the fact that some believe that the idea will lead to the African leadership taking its eyes off the full operationalisation of the ASF. According to Gureme, the ACIRC idea is inimical to the full operationalisation of the EASF as some countries, such as Uganda which has hitherto committed itself to contribute troops to the EASF, have also joined the ACIRC bandwagon (interview, 20 December 2013). To him, the ACIRC might still distract Uganda to fully meet its obligations in the EASF. Crises in the Region Somalia The collapse of the Somali government and State was occasioned by the overthrow of the late dictator, Siad Barre, in January In September 2006, the AU decided to send a peacekeeping mission to Somalia which should have been under the auspices of the sub-regional organisation, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD; Seifert, 2008, p. 36). The mandate of the mission was spelled as: to provide support to the TFG in order to ensure its relocation to Somalia, guarantee the sustenance of the IGAD peace process and assist with the re-establishment of peace and security (IGAD, 2005). IGAD could not deploy the mission due to, among other reasons, the lack of authority under its founding agreement to undertake a peace support mission in a member state (Apuuli, 2010, p. 266). In December 2006, the UN Security Council gave a greenlight to the IGAD and the AU to deploy a peacekeeping force in Somalia (UN Security Council, 2006). In January 2007, the AU PSC formally authorised the deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with a mandate of: providing support to the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) in their efforts towards the stabilization of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation; facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance; and creating conducive conditions for long-term stabilization, reconstruction and development in Somalia. (Apuuli, 2010, pp ) In March 2007, the first elements of the AMISOM force composed of a contingent from Uganda started arriving in Somalia, followed by those from Burundi in December As of January 2015, several countries including Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya were part of the AMISOM force. The establishment of a peacekeeping force for Somalia was mired in wrangles with the IGAD attempting to take the lead initially. However, the sub-regional organisation could not do so because of internal weaknesses in part arising from Eritrea s objections to the organisation undertaking the mission, arguing that it in effect was attempting to invade a member state. 8 By the time the peacekeeping mission was first contemplated for Somalia, the ideas of the ASF, in general, and EASF, in particular, were just being planned. In the event, it has been argued that

10 10 Insight on Africa 8(1) had the EASF been in existence then, it would have been the perfect vehicle to carry out the peacekeeping mission in Somalia (Mwesigwa, 2014, p. 29). This point has been emphasised by the EASF Commander, Brigadier General Jack Bakasumba, of the 2013 Field Training Exercise (FTX) conducted in Jinja, Uganda, who intimated that the EASF will [now] undertake any mission assigned by the UN or the AU (Bayeh, 2014, p. 202). South Sudan The conflict in South Sudan broke out in the night of 15 December 2013 when fighting erupted between units of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SSHRC, 2014; UN Security Council, 2014). The following day, President Salva Kiir Mayaradit addressed the nation and announced that there had been an attempted military coup d état (Sudan Tribune, 2013). He accused his former Vice President Riek Machar Teny of being behind the attempted putsch. In turn, Machar, speaking from his hiding place, denied that he had been behind the insurrection, and that there had not been an attempted coup d état but rather in his own words, There was no coup. What took place in Juba was a misunderstanding between presidential guards within their division. It was not a coup attempt. I have no connection with or knowledge of any coup attempt (Sudan Tribune, 2013). Meanwhile, the fighting although initially confined to Juba subsequently spread to the states of Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile. Rebel soldiers took control of the towns of Bor and Bentiu, and parts of Malakal, which they held for a while, before troops loyal to President Kiir took them back under government control. On 16 December 2013, the Government of South Sudan requested Uganda in stabilising the situation in the country. 9 On 19 December 2013, Uganda deployed troops of the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF) to South Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 2013). Uganda s intervention was a unilateral military undertaking by the government. Neither the regional nor the international communities sanctioned the intervention (Apuuli, 2014, pp ). 10 Uganda s intervention in the South Sudan conflict has raised critical reviews, with some regional countries like Ethiopia questioning the UPDF s participation in the fighting (Daily Monitor, 2014, pp. 4 and 14). 11 According to a senior UPDF officer, Uganda should have intervened in South Sudan under the EASF arrangement, thus making the deployment more credible and legal (interview with Gureme, 20 December 2013). To him, the EASF deployment would fall under scenario number 4 of the ASF deployment plan. Nevertheless, Uganda exploited the absence of a fully functioning EASF to unilaterally intervene in a conflict which seems to have no end in sight. But even when the EASF has attained its full operation capability, nobody is suggesting that the UPDF be replaced by this force. South Sudan is not yet a member of the EASF. Resources As it has been observed, for an organisation to successfully conduct a peace support operation, a huge amount of funding is required (Bayeh, 2014, p. 201). Hull, Skeppström and Sörenson (2011, p. 60) have noted that financial problem [ ] has been a major challenge to the development of EASF from its inception.

11 Apuuli 11 Put simply, member states of the EASF are not in a position to effectively finance the project annually (Bayeh, 2014, p. 201). The financial woes of the EASF were highlighted in the interviews with a senior official at Uganda s RDC and the chief of staff of the EASF (interview with Gureme, 20 December 2013; interview with Kinalwa, 18 December 2014). According to the EASF s activity plan for 2015, the total amount that the multidimensional force requires for this year is US$11,644,296 (EASF, 2014a). Considering the fact that the Secretariat has been unable to pay salaries to staff due to lack of funds (interview with Gureme, 20 December 2013), my guess is that this amount (most likely the bulk of it) will come from donors. Second, the EASF s strategic financial plan ( ) indicates that the force requires US$3,051,265,553. This figure was revised downwards to 1,207,902, at the 13th Extra-ordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers to Defence and Security held at Khartoum Sudan in April 2015, to fund its activities including: political, diplomatic and advocacy; maintenance of a fully operational standby force and operational capability; and institutional capacity and sustainability among others (EASF, 2014b). In the past, external funds that have been made available to the EASF have been between US$3,500,000 5,000,000 annually (Hull et al. 2011, p. 61). Given the fact that the EASF region comprises countries that are generally classified as poor, it is anybody s guess where this amount will come from. Other Emerging Collective Security Arrangements in East Africa Since the revival of the East African Community (EAC) in the late 1990s, 12 the countries constituting the EAC have been exploring ways to deepen their economic and political integration. Under the EAC Treaty, the partner states have agreed to cooperate in the areas of regional peace and security 13 and defence. 14 In furtherance of the decision to deepen their cooperation, the countries of the EAC concluded a Protocol on Peace and Security in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in 2013, which provides for their cooperation in peace and security matters and collaboration with international and regional organisations to promote peace and security in the region (EAC, 2013), and a Protocol on Co-operation in Defence Affairs (EAC, 2012). The latter Protocol in Article 2(2) provides for the partner states to, among others, cooperate in the areas of military training, joint operations, technical cooperation and visits and exchange of information. The Protocol also provides for the partner states to undertake, negotiate and conclude a mutual defence pact within one year upon entry of the Protocol under Article 17. A common pact on the establishment of the mutual defence, peace and security was signed in Kigali, Rwanda, on 8 January 2014 by the Ministers of Defence from Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda providing for the formation of a single defence territory for the participating countries. At the time of writing, it was only Rwanda that had ratified the pact before it came into force in August 2015 (Ligami, 2015). Whilst the Protocol on Co-operation in Defence Affairs, under which the Pact on Mutual Defence has been concluded, provides that it shall not affect the rights and obligations of any partner state deriving from the existing regional and international arrangements, 15 meaning the signatories commitments under the

12 12 Insight on Africa 8(1) EASF arrangements are not affected, there is a danger of the signatories overcommitting themselves in matters of defence. The failure of the Ministers of Defence of Burundi and Tanzania to sign the Pact on Mutual Defence means that there was no consensus among the partner states on the issue. The competing defence demands on the members of the EAC who at the same time subscribe to the EASF may result in the failure to build any of the several defence initiatives. Opportunities There are a number of opportunities that the attainment of FOC of the EASF presents. First, all the member states of the EASF have, through a MoU signed in Kigali, Rwanda, on 21 August 2014 pledged personnel and equipment for the force (EASF, 2014c). The memorandum provides the legal framework under which equipment and troops under the EASF will be raised and equipped. The signing of the MoU is in accordance with the recommendation made by the Panel of Experts that assessed the ASF in 2013 (AU, 2013b). 16 Apart from Djibouti, Ethiopia and Sudan, all the other members of the EASF signed the MoU that is supposed to come into force within 30 days after attaining a simple majority of the signature of the members (EASF, 2014c). 17 Table 1 provides the details of the pledged forces and equipment. As can be observed, it is only Sudan among the member states of the EASF that has not pledged either troops or equipment to the force. Member states of Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda have validated their pledged troops and equipment (New Vision, 2014). The challenge that remains, according to a senior official of the EASF, is to build and equip the EASF force headquarters, which is necessary for coordination purposes (interview with Kinalwa, 18 December 2014). Second, the actual validation of the troops being availed for the EASF project is another opportunity. In early December 2014, Uganda unveiled to the public its contribution in troops, police and equipment to the EASF (New Vision, 2014). The motorised infantry battalion of 869 troops includes 30 infantry fighting vehicles, 10 tanks, air defence and artillery assets, a fully fledged level-one military hospital, an engineering component, logistics equipment and a signal component. This provides concrete evidence of the establishment of the force. Conclusion The establishment of the FOC of the EASF seems to have been achieved with the member states conducting the CPX Mashariki Salam 2014, and the signing of the MoU pledging human elements and equipment for the force. Since 2004, the establishment of the force has been a work in progress. Thus, the validation of the force in December 2004 came one year before the final establishment of the FOC of the ASF. In the end, whilst the attainment of FOC of the EASF should be celebrated, there are outstanding challenges that it must overcome before it can actually be deployed in a conflict situation.

13 Table 1. EASF Member States Pledged Troops 2014 Force Person (Nos) Requirement (Qty) BUR COM DJ ETH KEN RW SO SU SEY UG Hq Coy Coy 1 Coy Force Hq CIS Coy 1 Tp (24) 1 Sqn (46) 1 Tp (24) Motorised Bn Bns 1 Bn (800) 1 Bn 1 Bn Mechanised Bn Bn (800) 1 Sqn (tanks-arty Tp Light Infantry Bn Bn 1 Bn Recce Squadron Sqn 1 Sqn 10 Pers Military Police Coy 48 1 Coy 1 Pln Aviation Unit 80 4 Hel Air TBD Maritime TBD Special Forces 1 Sqn 1 Sqn Cbt Engineering Unit 505 Unit of Coys 1 Coy 1 tp Light Multi-Role Log Unit 190 Level 2 Medical Unit MILOBS Police-FPUs Units Police-IPOs Civilians tbc Source: EASF (2014c).

14 14 Insight on Africa 8(1) Notes 1. Since April 2013, South Sudan has had an observer status in the EASF. 2. Note that the ASF policy framework and the roadmap for the operationalisation of the ASF called for the establishment of an RDC capable of intervening, within 14 days, in cases of genocide and gross human rights abuses under ASF Scenario 6. The RDC was framed as a part of the regional standby forces, and as such, would be constituted from lead elements of the regional standby forces. 3. The six ASF deployment scenarios and timelines as developed are: (a) attachment of an AU/regional military advisor to a political mission; (b) an AU/regional observer mission deployed within a UN mission; (c) a stand-alone AU regional observer mission; (d) deployment of a regional peacekeeping force under the auspices of a Chapter VI mandate within a timeframe of 30 days or less; (e) a multidimensional AU peacekeeping force deployed within 90 days with the military component within 30 days and (f) a robust AU intervention force in response to grave circumstances, such as genocide and deployment within 14 days. 4. Note that a legally binding protocol on the establishment of the EASF has now been concluded. 5. This is another structure of the EASF serving as a command headquarters for force preparation and operational command of the Standby Brigade. 6. France advanced four objectives for its intervention: (a) to prevent the progress of the terrorist groups by means of air strikes or by ground support to Malian forces; (b) to destroy the rear bases of the terrorists; (c) to ensure the security of Bamako, that of the institutions, the population and the French nationals and (d) to prepare and assist in structuring and organising the Malian forces to enable AFISMA to regain control over all Malian territory. 7. These include: Algeria, Chad, Ethiopia, Senegal, South Africa and Uganda. 8. While serving with the IGAD Secretariat, I was part of a regional delegation that travelled to Asmara, Eritrea, to have discussions with President Isaias Afewerki in August In our meeting, the President lambasted the organisation for attempting to invade a member state. 9. Agreement between the Government of Uganda and the Government of South Sudan regarding the provision of military assistance to the Republic of South Sudan, Kampala, 23 May 2014 (on file with the author). 10. The Government of Uganda later claimed that its intervention had been sanctioned by the regional organisation IGAD, but this is not correct. 11. A spokesman of Ethiopia s Prime Minister was quoted observing that Ugandan troops engagement in combat in South Sudan is absolutely unwarranted. 12. The original members of the EAC are Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Burundi and Rwanda joined the community as full members on 1 July 2007 after acceding to the EAC Treaty. 13. Treaty for the establishment of the EAC (as amended), Article Article Article The Panel recommended that the RECs/ Regional Mechanisms (RMs) enter into legal agreements with their member states that clarify the respective roles and obligations of the PLANELMs and the Troop/Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs), in terms of pledges and as regards deployments. 17. See Articles 15 and 16.

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