NORTH COUNTY FIRE AUTHORITY POLICY & PROCEDURE MANUAL OPERATIONS

Transcription

1 PURPOSE: To provide a comprehensive overview for Fire Department Personnel with accepted procedures for the recognition and response to Hazardous Materials, USAR, and Multi- Casualty Incidents (MCI) arising from a terrorist event. GENERAL: 1. Terrorist attacks have created a new responsibility for the First Responder whose mission statement includes the protection of life and property. As the First Responder continues to be called to emergency incidents (i.e., explosions, hazardous material spills, medical responses, fires, etc.), they must now recognize that each of these types of incidents has the potential for being the result of a terrorist attack. Therefore, the First Responder must now enter each incident with that potential in mind and look for signs that may indicate a terrorist attack in order to recognize the danger and take appropriate defensive measures. 2. In general, terrorist attacks will present themselves as a hazardous materials or USAR (Urban Search and Rescue) incident possibly coupled with a Multi- Casualty Incident (MCI). Whether a particular incident is terrorist induced may not actually be established until hours or even days after the initial danger has passed. As such, first responders should refer back to their First Responder Operations (FRO) training for their initial actions at such incidents. This training also provides excellent general guidelines for any questionable type of incident. 3. Terrorists have a variety of weapons at their disposal. The acronym B-NICE is used to remember: Biological, Nuclear, Incendiary, Chemical and Explosive devices. a. The probability of terrorists using these various devices vary according to their accessibility, transportability, ease of use, etc. b. The favored device of terrorists is explosives. The most difficult and least likely device to be used by terrorists is nuclear. The least expensive device is DATE DATE PAGE 1 of 23 PPO 3-48

2 chemical/biological (C/B) through an efficient means of distribution for these substances is the key to their successful use. 4. The greatest difficulty that a terrorist must overcome is in the delivery/dissemination of whatever B-NICE agent they choose. The three main devices used for dissemination of Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical (NBC) agents are: a. Breaking devices are the easiest to make and use. They are most often constructed from common containers (i.e., thermos bottles, glass jars, balloons, light bulbs, etc). The agent is sealed in the container and simply thrown to break and disseminate the agent. b. Bursting/exploding devices are those that use explosives to break the agent container and any incident where a small explosion has occurred. c. Spraying devices use pressure rather than an explosion to disseminate an agent from the container (i.e., garden sprayers, crop dusters, mosquito control trucks, building ventilation system, or water system). 5. While it may seem that a terrorist has the upper hand, the use of these B-NICE agents and delivery devices have limitations: a. All Uniform Personnel: shall understand the Fire Department s Policy and Procedures regarding potential terrorist incidents. They shall take appropriate actions to ensure their personal safety and the safety of the public while preserving crime scene evidence. b. The First Arriving Company: responsible for providing the initial size-up, initiating the Incident Command System (ICS), and taking the necessary actions, as appropriate for the incident. c. The Incident Commander: responsible for the overall coordination of Fire Department operations, with command representatives from other agencies, until the emergency has ended and order has been restored. DATE DATE PAGE 2 of 23 PPO 3-48

3 d. Hazardous Materials Team: responsible, when a NBC agent is suspected or has been identified, for the complete assessment of the immediate hazard, providing the Incident Commander with technical assistance, and conducting and/or coordinating procedures to minimize the effect of the hazard on personnel, the environment, and property. e. USAR Companies and Personnel: responsible, when an explosive device or building collapse has been identified, for providing the Incident Commander with technical information, conducting and/or coordinating procedures to minimize the effects of the hazards, and providing technical assistance and abilities as required to accomplish the mission objectives. f. Fire Cause/Arson Investigators: responsible, when an incendiary device has been identified, for providing the Incident Commander with technical assistance, and conducting and/or coordinating procedures to minimize the efforts of the hazard on personnel and the public. g. Incident Dispatch Team (IDT) and Communications Personnel: responsible for the notification of the proper agencies upon the request from the field. h. County Environmental Health and HazMat Personnel: responsible for overall coordination of remediation efforts for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) terrorist incidents resulting in a release of NBC or hazmat agents. These members are able to provide technical assistance to the Incident Commander in the identification, mitigation, and cleanup of a hazmat agent. They can also provide assistance in the decision to evacuate or quarantine an area or building. 6. It is the policy of the Fire Department to provide for the mitigation of threat and damage to life, property, and the environment while ensuring the safety of Department personnel. Personnel sent to any incident involving an explosion with fire or structure collapse, hazardous materials release, or multiple casualties must watch for signs that these incidents may be the result of a terrorist act. Personnel shall take all necessary precautions to reduce exposure to hazardous materials DATE DATE PAGE 3 of 23 PPO 3-48

4 and secondary devices and shall take steps to preserve any evidence of the crime of terrorism as fire, rescue, Emergency Medical Services, and HazMat tactics permit. 7. Incident priorities will include: a. Protection of life/health b. Protection of the environment c. Protection of the crime scene d. Protection of property and equipment e. Preservation of crime scene evidence 8. No responder shall enter a hazardous environment without having received the specialized training and utilize appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) 9. Only specially trained and equipped personnel (i.e. HazMat, USAR, bomb disposal, etc.), shall be allowed into the exclusion zone once it has been established by the first responding officer, except recon/search rescue teams approved by the Incident Commander. Only the Incident Commander may make an exception to this policy, and only after careful consideration of the circumstances (risk vs. benefit). 10. The Incident Commander, after careful consultation with the appropriate Hazmat Technical Specialist, may redefine the exclusion zone as well as any other perimeter required by the incident. PROCEDURE: 1. At the first indication that an incident may be of a terrorist nature, the first-in company shall conduct an operational retreat to a safe location (uphill/upwind/upstream/upgrade) and institute first responder operations level procedures. The guidelines specified in FRO training (S.I.N. Safety, Isolate DATE DATE PAGE 4 of 23 PPO 3-48

5 and deny access, or exit, make Notifications) shall be used by the first-in personnel to establish an exclusion zone, a safe refuge area for victims, gross decon procedures, and begin the appropriate notifications irrespective of the type of B-NICE agent used in the terrorist attack. a. Personnel shall make note of environmental conditions, occupancy type, response type, and all other information to assist in their determination of a terrorist-related incident. b. Personal protective equipment, appropriate for the anticipated hazards of the incident, shall be worn or kept readily available. This includes carrying the Mark-1 auto-injector kit into medical incidents of a suspicious nature, or in an occupancy that has been identified as having a potential for terrorist attack. (1) Examples of medical incidents of a suspicious nature would be multiple victims in a non-trauma setting, explosions in high risk occupancies, etc. (2) Examples of occupancies with a potential risk for terrorist attack would include: (a) Public buildings (b) Mass Transit - above & below ground (c) Public Assembly (d) Places of historic or symbolic value (e) Manufacturing and testing facilities, etc. c. The First-in Officer shall make their initial size-up and follow-up reports per Department policy. During these reports, the initial Incident Commander will request the appropriate technical assistance according to the demands of the incident, (NBC, explosion/structure collapse, and /or MCI). d. The first arriving company will begin establishing mass/gross decontamination (decon) procedures. (1) Routine hazmat incidents usually require the decon of only a few people while NBC agents could require decon of numerous people, DATE DATE PAGE 5 of 23 PPO 3-48

6 possibly hundreds or thousands. The decon process may be the single most important and demanding task the public safety community can perform. Due to their high toxicity and fast action, NBC agents must be decontaminated rapidly to reduce exposure (see PPO 3-53 Terrorism Emergency Decontamination Considerations ). e. The Incident Commander shall consider the safety of people downwind of the incident and coordinate evacuation via the local law enforcement agency (e.g., Evaluation, shelter-in-place, etc.). 2. Suspected Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) Incidents: a. Signs Indicating Hazardous Environments, the following indicators may indicate a hazardous environment and a potential terrorist incident: (1) Unusual or unexplained dead, dying, or sick people, insects, or animals (2) Unusual liquids, sprays, or vapors and low-lying clouds or fog unrelated to the weather. (3) Unexplained odors or oily film on surfaces. (4) Suspicious devices or packages. (5) Explosions, small or large (possible dispersal devices). (6) When the first due company officer recognizes any one or more of the above-mentioned signs, he/she should take appropriate protective measures such as: operational retreat uphill, upwind, and upstream. Don appropriate respiratory protection and additional PPE as required. (7) After the company officer has taken appropriate measures for personal protection, they should then begin to isolate, deny entry, identify the material, and start the notification process. If possible, begin gross decon procedures. b. The following First Responder checklist will assist the initial Incident Commander/First-in Officer, in the management of the incident during the initial stages: DATE DATE PAGE 6 of 23 PPO 3-48

7 (1) Size-up consists of the following components: (a) Facts (situational status) (b) Probabilities/Possibilities (what the future of the incident may hold) (c ) Own Situation (resource status) (d) Strategy (objectives) (e) Tactics (plan of attack) (2) Safety (a) Full Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) (b) Weather conditions (wind direction; approach scene upwind) (c) Topography (approach scene uphill, upstream and away) (d) Keep a safe distance (300 feet for chemical releases and 1000 feet for explosions in all directions including vertical) (e) Think secondary devices (f) Consider all unknown substances as lethal until proven otherwise (3) Dynamic or static (4) Victims: How many? Signs & symptoms (5) State unit objectives Establish IDE (Isolate and Deny Entry) line/contain victims (6) Field Response To Terrorist Events: (a) 1st Arriving Company Size-up, report on conditions, request HazMat Team response, pass command to first arriving company outside the affected area (300 foot perimeter), stage incoming resources a safe distance, isolate and deny entry, isolate and discourage exit, don SCBA and PPE, offer direction and reassurance to victims, establish gross decontamination area, and provide emergency DATE DATE PAGE 7 of 23 PPO 3-48

8 decontamination (gross decon) to victims by removing contaminates from victims clothing utilizing water spray; first arriving firefighter assumes Safe Refuge Manager Position. (b) (c) (d) 2 nd Arriving Company Assume Command, stay 300 feet outside the affected area, don SCBA and PPE, provide the First Arriving Company with a water supply, establish an Incident Command Post (upwind, uphill, upstream and away, at a safe distance), establish perimeter control, isolate and deny entry, isolate and discourage exit, and establish control points with law enforcement. 3 rd Arriving Company - Provide for personnel safety, don SCBA as well as PPE, Captain on this company assumes Gross Decon Manager position, assigns reminder of company to assist and support the incident and initial fire companies at scene. Additional Arriving Companies Provide for personnel safety, don SCBA and PPE, receive an assignment from the Incident Commander and support incident. (e) 1 st Arriving Battalion Chief Assumes Command, provides an updated report on conditions, which clearly describes the type of incident (mass casualty with no apparent cause, etc.), requests additional/appropriate resource, assigns staged and incoming resources, organizes the incident by fully implementing the Incident Command System (ICS), ensures that Unified Command has been established with health, law and fire, assures that the Fire Chief is notified by communications, establishes the Medical Branch, Triage, Treatment, and Transportation Units, and establishes contact with the HazMat Group Supervisor. DATE DATE PAGE 8 of 23 PPO 3-48

9 3. Indicators of Possible Chemical Agent Release: a. Unusual dead or dying animals (lack of insects or insects on the ground). b. Unexplained casualties (1) Multiple victims (2) Serious illnesses (3) Nausea, disorientation, difficulty breathing, convulsions (4) Definite casualty patterns c. Unusual liquids, sprays, or vapor (1) Droplets, oily film (2) Unexplained odor (3) Low-lying clouds/fog unrelated to weather d. Suspicious devices/packages (1) Unusual metal debris (2) Abandoned spray devices (3) Unexplained munitions 4. Indicators of possible Biological Agent (BW) usage: a. Unusual sick, dead or dying animals, people, or fish b. Unusual casualties DATE DATE PAGE 9 of 23 PPO 3-48

10 (1) Unusual illness for region/area (2) Definite pattern inconsistent with natural disease c. Unusual liquids, sprays, or vapor d. Unusual swarms or insects 5. Suspected Explosion/Collapsed Structure (USAR) Incident: a. Any reported explosion should carry with it the suspicion of having been created by a terrorist act until proven otherwise. The First-in Officer must consider the type of occupancy and/or time of day/year as key indicators. b. As stated earlier, locations that could be targeted for terrorist attack include, but are not limited to: (1) Government buildings (2) Locations containing large numbers of people (shopping malls, sporting arenas, etc.) (3) Family Planning Centers (4) Religious Centers (5) Special events with political, ethnic, or religious subjects (6) Laboratories that do animal testing, etc. c. If a structural collapse/explosion is suspected of having been caused by a terrorist act, one of the greatest threats to the First Responder is the possible existence of secondary and tertiary devices. There is also DATE DATE PAGE 10 of 23 PPO 3-48

11 potential for combined explosion/nbc incidents that could contaminate the entire collapse scene. (1) The potential for the existence of secondary and tertiary explosive devices at the scene of a bombing has grown. These devices are normally in place solely for the purpose of injuring those emergency personnel responding to the initial incident. (2) Secondary devices are normally placed in locations where the terrorist anticipates the First Responders will locate their equipment and personnel during the mitigation of the incident (i.e., Command Post locations, Staging, Base). (3) The goal of these devices is to extend the disruption caused by the initial device and obtain a greater degree of publicity for the terrorist(s), by creating confusion and fear in the hearts and minds of the First Responders, thereby, taking their minds off the initial incident and victims. This event would also increase the media s attention that the terrorist craves. The potential for secondary dispersal devices must be considered. (4) Upon arrival to the scene of an explosion, the First Responding units must immediately recognize the potential for secondary and tertiary devices. They should also recognize the potential structural instability of the initial scene and take appropriate actions to ensure the safety of all emergency responders against secondary collapse. (a) Evacuate all personnel and secure the scene a safe distance from the initial explosion site. A recommendation of 1,000 feet in all directions, including vertically, has been suggested. The 1996 North American Emergency Response Guidebook (NAERG), Guide 112 warns that an explosion may throw fragments 1600 meters (1 mile) or more. DATE DATE PAGE 11 of 23 PPO 3-48

12 (b) (c) (d) Immediate request for bomb squad, USAR and HazMat units should be initiated through Fire Command and County Communications. Large-scale collapses may require the Office of Emergency Services (OES), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and USAR Task Forces. All initial triage and treatment of victims must be undertaken with the full understanding of the risks to the rescuers involved. The Incident Commander must follow a full evaluation of risk vs. benefit before ordering any rescuers into the impact area. This concept must be followed for all types of incidents. In general, First Responders should concentrate on locating victims and rescuing those who are lightly trapped, then begin searching void spaces with assistance from USAR units. The Incident Commander in accordance with San Mateo County protocols should ensure the presence of a Rapid Intervention Crew (RIC) for the incident. d. For major working incidents with trapped victims, multiple alarms and special-called USAR resources may be needed (i.e., OES USAR search dog teams). On-scene USAR personnel can advise the Incident Commander on the need for additional USAR resources. 6. Suspected Multi-Casualty Incident (MCI): a. Emergency Treatment/FRO Decontamination (Decon) (1) Survival of a terrorist threat will depend greatly on the First Responder s understanding of the use of the B-NICE devices, the prompt recognition of signs and symptoms of chemical weapons (CWs) and biological weapons (BWs) agents, and the rapid use of protective measures and gross decon of the victims. DATE DATE PAGE 12 of 23 PPO 3-48

13 (2) The use of nuclear devices has been rare because of the relative difficulty in obtaining reliable devices of this nature. Recognition and protection from such devices requires the use of radiation detection equipment along with the concepts of time, distance, and shielding. (3) Incendiary devices will create fire activity that the members of the Fire Department are well trained to deal with. The danger here, besides that of the fire itself, is the possible presence of other contaminants and secondary devices. (4) Explosive devices have been widely used by terrorists due to their destructive impact both physically and emotionally. The relative ease with which these items are obtained or manufactured, as compared to a nuclear or NBC device, adds to their popularity. Again, the danger of secondary devices is very high. If there has been one explosion, suspect the presence of a secondary device! (5) Chemical Weapons (CW) are becoming increasingly popular due to their availability and potential impact on society. Many of these agents are manufactured from common household or natural ingredients such as chlorine or castor beans. Their ability to produce nearly immediate symptomatic responses from victims makes them relatively easy to recognize, protect against or treat. Under these circumstances, the First Responder s ability to recognize symptomology cannot be over-emphasized. While chemical weapons can assault the victim through several routes, the greatest threat is to the respiratory tract. Therefore, the most important protective measure is to ensure adequate respiratory protection through distance, staying upwind, and appropriate PPE. (6) Biological Weapons (BW) pose the greatest threat to the First Responder because of the difficulty in the detection of their use. In fact, recognition of the use of BWs by a terrorist group will probably come from United States Public Health Service (USPHS) personnel DATE DATE PAGE 13 of 23 PPO 3-48

14 several hours to days after the event has actually taken place. This will occur as unusual patterns in public illnesses, or other such indicators, are noted. The ease and cost effectiveness of BWs are also making the use of these devices more popular to terrorist groups. (7) In an actual dispersion, terrorists will most likely use a combination of these devices to disburse their terror. For example, using an explosive to disburse chemical or biological agents. (8) The First Responder must always be aware of the existence of secondary or tertiary devices at the scene of any explosion, which can also contain a contaminant. b. One of the key factors that terrorists (group) use to gain attention for their cause is the creation of a high number of casualties. The media attention gained through a high injury or death rate is priceless to the terrorists. Therefore, a primary concern for the Incident Commander will be establishing a Mass Casualty Incident Branch within the command structure to provide for the management of these casualties. c. Once the incident has been identified and the command structure has been established, the Incident Commander must consider the creation of an MCI Branch within the Operations Section. 7. Command and Control a. Management of the incident should be accomplished using the standard accepted practice of ICS, specifically the use of a Unified Command approach involving health, fire and law enforcement, for the following reasons: (1) Any incident involving the use of WMD/NBC agents causing widespread damage injury will require a great deal of coordination DATE DATE PAGE 14 of 23 PPO 3-48

15 between several agencies from Federal, State, County, and Local Agencies. (2) If an incident has been caused by a terrorist act, then it becomes a federal crime with heavy emphasis on evidence gathering. (3) Mitigation and cleanup of any hazmat incident requires a cooperative effort between several agencies. (4) An incident involving NBC agents, industrial chemical release, or use of radioactive materials may involve several jurisdictions. b. Overall management of the consequences of all actual or threatened terrorist incidents is the responsibility of the affected local jurisdiction. At the federal level, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead agency and the on-scene manager for the U.S. Government. c. Command and control of all incident activities remains with the jurisdictional Incident Commander (or Unified Command). Strategic resource coordination and the acquisition and deployment of all mutual aid resources will be a coordinated effort following normal procedures. d. Incident Management Teams (IMT), may be activated to support the management of fire service activities at terrorist incidents. Typical duties for these teams would include support to fire service activities outside the hot/warm zone of NBC incidents. These teams could contribute to effective overall incident operations by providing a skilled staff to support the command and control activities of fire/rescue operations at a terrorist incident scene. The individual IMT Commanders can also provide the staff support for the Unified Command among the law enforcement, fire service, and other responding entities. e. Field elements will be under the command of a Unified Incident Command. DATE DATE PAGE 15 of 23 PPO 3-48

16 f. County Communications personnel play a key role in mobilizing the proper response and support of a WMD incident. Public safety dispatchers (both law enforcement and fire) are vital elements in recognizing and assessing NBC events. (1) Dispatchers must be aware of potential target locations and the indicators of possible criminal or terrorist activity involving NBC agents; they must also know the indicators, signs, and symptoms of exposure to NBC agents and recognize unusual trends or patterns of activity indicative of a possible NBC incident; they must be able to discern and elicit critical information regarding threats and WMD indicators encountered by field personnel. (2) Dispatchers should be familiar with the initial actions for First Responders checklist, described earlier in this document, and must make proper notification and communicate the NBC hazard to potential responders. 8. Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) a. The MMRS is a technically trained group able to provide response to terrorist events within an ICS structure (the closest MMRS sites are located in San Jose and Oakland). (1) The MMRS consists of uniquely trained personnel that provide the additional expertise needed to handle a WMD/NBC event within an ICS structure. (2) Members of the MMRS come from the Fire Department, the Law Enforcement and the Department of Health Services (DHS). b. Scope of Operations The MMRS response, assistance, and support includes: DATE DATE PAGE 16 of 23 PPO 3-48

17 (1) Responding within the Incident Commander structure to WMD/NBC events. (2) Providing medical management and/or medical assistance in support of response to NBC incidents. (3) Providing technical assistance in the identification of NBC agents and coordinating the continuity of medical care. (4) Supporting coordination with designated regional, state, and federal NBC incident response assets. c. Operational areas of particular concern during a terrorist event would include: (1) Detection, Identification, and Sampling: Provide early detection for appropriate control of the scene and confirmed identification through sampling to expedite appropriate medical intervention. (2) Hospital/Public Health Coordination: Coordinate with local public health officials and hospitals that includes professional medical guidance on agent identification, mass triage, and decon, victim intake, and treatment for specific agents. (3) Medical Treatment/Management: Direct medical intervention in NBC incident consequences including victim triage, treatment and transportation. (4) Decon: Coordinate with the existing ICS to establish mass decon facilities. (5) Pharmacology: Maintenance, distribution, and administration of appropriate medications for NBC incidents, maintaining an DATE DATE PAGE 17 of 23 PPO 3-48

18 inventory of medications, and monitoring the medications shelf life to ensure they remain current. (6) Communications: Maintenance and inventory of communications equipment and coordination with the local responders to establish common communications capabilities. (7) Public Information Officer (PIO)/Media Relations: Coordinate with the local PIO to establish information parameters and determine the appropriate information releases to avert further casualties due to mass hysteria. (8) Law Enforcement Coordination (Intelligence/Security): Coordinate with local law enforcement officials to brief them on potential impacts of the incident and courses of action to take. (9) Mental Health/CISD: Coordinate with internal and local mental health resources to brief them on the potential impacts of the incident and courses of action that may be needed to care for responders and victims. (10) Mortuary and Forensic Activities: Coordinate with the County Medical Examiner/Coroner to establish appropriate services for deceased victims, and to ensure proper collection of evidence of criminal activity from deceased victims. d. Deploying the MMRS (1) The MMRS is a multi-agency, multi-disciplinary response team designed to manage the consequences of NBC terrorism. This task force forms the technical nucleus of a comprehensive regionwide response plan. The MMRS incorporates 49-person teams consisting of personnel from selected fire, law enforcement, and health services agencies. DATE DATE PAGE 18 of 23 PPO 3-48

19 9. Decontamination: (2) Emergency response agencies within the operational area will become aware of NBC terrorism incidents either by direct observation of First Responders to the incident or by pre-incident intelligence relayed by the Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEWG). (3) In either case, the MMRS will be activated when the requesting jurisdictional agency, through the Governor s OES, will request the County Emergency Command Center (CECC) at the County Emergency Operations Center (CEOC) to activate the MMRS. Requests will include the nature of the incident, resources on scene and projected action plan for mitigation. a. Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) incidents may potentially involve civilians, law enforcement, fire service, and medical personnel that have been exposed to potentially lethal agents. Prompt, safe, and effective decon procedures are essential to protecting exposed persons, equipment, and the environment from the harmful effects of these agents. b. Decon is the process used to reduce the hazards of any WMD incident agents to safe levels. Decon minimizes the uncontrolled transfer of contaminants from the hazard site to clean areas. Decon should be accomplished anytime contamination with a NBC agent or hazardous material is suspected. During decon operations, the safety of emergency response personnel is the first and most important consideration. Proper use of personal protective clothing and respiratory protection such as selfcontained breathing apparatus (SCBA) reduced the hazards to response personnel. c. The risk of secondary contamination to rescue personnel, medical personnel on scene and at the hospital, other persons, and to transport vehicles and equipment, must be assessed and protected against to avoid spreading the incident. Any contamination of the skin must be decontaminated immediately. DATE DATE PAGE 19 of 23 PPO 3-48

20 d. Factors that can affect the decon process include: (1) Prevention of further contamination minimizing contact with potential contaminants is essential to keep the incident from escalating. (2) Physical and chemical properties of the agent the very properties that make the agent hazardous make it difficult to decon. (3) Amount and location of contamination the greater the area contaminated, the more involved the decon process. (4) Contact time and temperature the longer a contaminant is in contact with an object, the greater the probability and extent of contamination. (5) Level of protection and work function decon requirements may vary somewhat according to the particular type of protective clothing. d. Decon helps to eliminate spreading the contamination beyond the exclusion zone. A Contamination Reduction Corridor (CRC) and decon equipment must be set up prior to any entry by response personnel (with the exception of an emergency decon to save a life). Limited access to the exclusion zone through the contamination reduction corridor helps to keep the incident from spreading. 10. Managing Mass Fatalities/Deceased Disposition a. A terrorist incident involving WMD/NBC agents may yield fatalities. The number of deaths is dependent upon the specific conditions present at an incident. Factors influencing the number of fatalities include: (1) The agent dispersed DATE DATE PAGE 20 of 23 PPO 3-48

21 (2) Dispersal method (3) Location of release (4) Number of persons present during the attack (5) The response and mitigation measures employed b. The most complex situation would involve a mass casualty situation requiring the establishment of fatality or decedent collections points, as well as the activation of mutual aid protocols (Governor s OES, Law Enforcement, Coroner s Annex) to effectively manage a mass fatality situation. c. The presence or risk of NBC contaminants compounds a mass fatality situation resulting from a terrorist incident. Deceased persons (and their personal effects) contaminated by NBC agents must be decontaminated before removal from the incident scene. Decedents and their personal effects will be managed by the Coroner s Office, however, contaminated bodies or items shall not be released to Coroner s personnel prior to decon. Additionally, no Coroner s personnel shall conduct operations within a contaminated area unless equipped with proper PPE. d. The management of a mass fatality situation involving NBC agents may require specialized assistance. Additional technical assistance is available from the United States Public Health Services (USPHS) and military specialists. Military mass fatality management resources (i.e., Graves registration units) may be appropriate in some cases. If required, they are accessible through the regular Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) channels. As a reminder, the local FBI has established themselves as the one-stop-shop for all federal resources. As such, they should be notified for assistance in this area. e. Coroner s personnel will coordinate their activities with command to ensure appropriate mass fatality management. All requests for DATE DATE PAGE 21 of 23 PPO 3-48

22 specialized mass fatality assistance will be coordinated with the Law Enforcement Branch of the Governor s OES to ensure that there is no duplication of effort. The Coroner shall provide the official death count during any disaster. It is critical that all involved agencies immediately relay all fatality information to the Coroner. 11. Recover, Site Decon, and Restoration (Remediation Concerns) a. The release of WMD (including CW or BW agents, industrial chemicals or radiological materials) creates a complex hazardous materials incident. Remediation efforts include site decon, cleanup and/or removal of contaminated soil, materials, vehicles, etc. Close coordination among all involved agencies is essential to minimize the long-term environmental impact of the release and ensure complete recovery. The following concerns must be addressed in the Incident Action Plan (IAP)/Operations Plan for an NBC event: (1) Oversight Regulatory oversight is required following hazmat releases to ensure that remediation of the site, equipment, and all contaminated items are conducted within current environmental and occupational safety (OSHA) statutes and regulations. The area, facilities, and items affected by the release must be held until the oversight agency declares them fit for reoccupancy or reuse. All items not released must be removed and properly disposed of pursuant to current local, state, and federal laws. All personnel who assist in remediation efforts must be properly trained and equipped per OSHA regulations. (2) Investigation Investigative operations must be closely coordinated with the remediation effort. Coordination of investigations and the remediation ensures proper evidence preservation and limits potential health and safety risks to investigators. (3) Specialized Resources Remediation efforts may require assistance. The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) DATE DATE PAGE 22 of 23 PPO 3-48

23 responds to acts of NBC terrorism. The EPA Federal On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) is the primary federal entity that can activate a wide range of resources for environmental remediation at an NBC incident. These resources include the US Coast Guard s (USCG) National Strike Force, assistance from the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and EPA contractor resources. (a) EPA contractor resources include the Superfund Technical Assessment and Response Team (START) and Emergency and Rapid Response Services (ERRS). (i) ERRS contractors can mobilize within 2 to 48 hours and provide containment, countermeasure, cleanup, and disposal services. (b) (c) EPA can also assist in radiological incidents. EPA resources include a radiation Environmental Laboratory in Las Vegas, Nevada and the Environmental Radiation Ambient Monitoring System (ERAMS) with sampling stations nationwide for monitoring the spread of contamination. During an emergency, EPA resource can be accessed through the National Response Center s 800 Number. b. Funding: Remediation costs are dependent upon a number of factors. In a terrorist incident, designating a responsible party to bear the cost of cleanup is problematic. Cleanup efforts may require emergency funding from local contingency funds, the state Superfund, or the US EPA Superfund. c. All remediation and recovery efforts require close coordination among local, state, and federal regulatory agencies to ensure effective elimination of the hazard. DATE DATE PAGE 23 of 23 PPO 3-48