Obama s Second Term: Time for a New Discourse on

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1 1 Obama s Second Term: Time for a New Discourse on Nuclear Strategy Introduction President Barack Obama s second term in office will see developments in a number of policy areas. The president has, for example, promised greater action on climate change and plans to move forward with his policy of withdrawing United States (US) forces from Afghanistan by the end of One area that has been largely neglected in the media circus surrounding the November 2012 election is the impact of an Obama second term on US nuclear strategy. Indeed, nuclear strategy was completely absent from the presidential debate on foreign policy. This was despite the fact that conventional force structures were discussed, as was the issue of the Iranian nuclear program. This absence of discourse is problematic, because as this paper argues, Obama s stance on nuclear weapons has already had a detrimental effect on the credibility of US nuclear strategy. As a response, this paper seeks to stimulate discussion on the implications of Obama s abolition agenda for the future of US nuclear weapons strategy. Back in 2010, the Obama administration s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) attracted much comment in political and media circles. The new policy statement was welcomed by some in the arms control community for its commitment to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in US security policy, and thereby support the disarmament agenda. 2 This statement followed the signing of the New START Treaty that, at least

2 2 in theory, reduces the number of US and Russian deployed strategic warheads. 3 There is some concern within the pro-disarmament community that the Obama administration may be backing away from the goal of abolition. For example, one can point to comments made by the new Secretary of State, John Kerry, that abolition was an aspiration unlikely to be met, and that he favored nuclear deterrence and maintaining the nuclear stockpile. 4 This attitude appears to find policy support in Obama s pledge to spend $214 billion over the next ten years on force and infrastructure modernization. 5 However, this viewpoint is countered somewhat by Obama s appointment of Chuck Hagel as Secretary of Defense. Hagel is the co-author of the 2012 Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission Report, which promotes abolition via a multilateral disarmament process. Debate has also centered on the administration s stance against those states involved in nuclear proliferation. The NPR, although generally limiting nuclear weapons to the sole role of deterring nuclear attack on the US, its allies and partners, reaffirms the possibility of nuclear response in the face of chemical, biological and conventional attack by those states not in compliance with the nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, whilst this aspect of the NPR reads as fairly robust, the real intention behind it appears to be an attempt to entice proliferating actors back into the nonproliferation regime. Beyond the general public policy debate, the NPR needs to be assessed as the basis for nuclear strategy. There may be some validity in the view that the NPR is as much about nuclear public relations as it is about a genuine review of nuclear posture. 6 Hans Kristensen goes as far as to note that the new NPR is more a nuclear policy review

3 3 than a nuclear posture review. 7 Nonetheless, it is as the basis for strategy that the NPR must ultimately be judged. Military forces are instruments of war to be threatened or used in a manner that supports policy objectives. Nuclear weapons are no different than any other military instrument in this respect. Having initially provided a brief discussion of strategy, this paper will assess the NPR from a strategic perspective, identifying its strengths and weaknesses as the basis for US nuclear strategy. In doing so, the paper will make reference to a number of concepts that were developed during the Cold War, but now appear to have been consigned to the dustbin of strategic thought. Indeed, President Obama has publicly stated that he wants to put an end to Cold War thinking. 8 Whilst recognizing that the international security environment has changed significantly in the last twenty years, this paper contends that much of the strategic theory developed during the Cold War should be retained. Retention of this theory provides us with a conceptual framework within which to understand the implications of Obama s stance on nuclear weapons. Additionally, familiarity with classical nuclear strategic thinking helps to maintain an emphasis on the critical importance of credibility and flexibility in US nuclear strategy. As this paper will discuss, these elements of nuclear strategy have been eroded during Obama s watch. Strategy: The Challenge of Complexity Since strategy is the key to judging the true value of the NPR, it will be useful to briefly describe the nature of this challenging activity. 9 Over time, theorists have developed various concepts and classifications/categories in their attempts to codify the practice of strategy. The core relationship in strategy is that between the military

4 4 instrument and policy objective. The nature of this relationship is based on the notion that the former must serve the latter, in what Elliot Cohen described as an unequal dialogue. 10 Strategy is best thought of as a process within which military force is converted into policy effect. On this basis, Colin Gray describes strategy as a bridge that links the worlds of military and policy. 11 The great challenge for nuclear strategy is how to harness the awesome destructive force of nuclear weapons as a rational tool of policy. The process of strategy is complex and challenging. In the first instance, the military and policy worlds exhibit different cultures and priorities. Even if a good dialogue can be achieved, mutual understanding is far from guaranteed. Difficulties also arise from the fact that military force, despite many valiant efforts to hone it, is a rather blunt instrument characterized by violence and destruction. In the sensitive world of politics, such bluntness often appears ill suited to the task at hand. It goes without saying that nuclear weapons are perhaps the bluntest instrument in a strategist s toolbox. Into this already challenging atmosphere must be added the multidimensional nature of strategy. This issue has been most developed in the work of Gray, who has identified seventeen dimensions of strategy, which he organizes into three categories: People and Politics; Preparation for War; and, War Proper. Within these categories, the various dimensions include culture, time, doctrine, and command, to name just four. For the strategist, the real challenge emanates from the fact that competence has to be achieved in all of the dimensions to maximize the possibility of success. 12 This is complicated by the fact that one of the dimensions in strategy is adversary. The

5 5 existence of an intelligent foe, which represents a constantly shifting counter to one s strategy, prevents strategy from becoming predictable and routine. Clearly, the process of strategy is complex and fraught with many mutually reinforcing challenges, to the point that the strategist is in danger of being overwhelmed. Thankfully, those with strategic responsibility can look to a number of aids to help them realize their policy objectives. Ideally, a state will have at its disposal an outstanding commander, what Carl von Clausewitz described as a military genius. 13 Such an individual is able to cope with the complexities of strategy, identify the route to success, and possesses the moral courage and determination to succeed. Unfortunately, military geniuses rarely appear in history. Therefore, sound strategic theory and well-organized, ample and adaptable forces provide a competent commander with the required tools. There are many other ingredients for strategic success, but good military forces and a solid understanding of how to use them are indispensable. It is, therefore, of great concern that in the field of nuclear strategy the Obama administration is whittling away US nuclear forces and ignoring much of the wisdom contained in Cold War nuclear theory. Obama s Nuclear Policy The Positives Clear Policy Objective Before strategy can be formulated, a clear policy objective has to be identified. On this point, the Obama administration has succeeded. The first page of the NPR explicitly states that the United States seeks a world without nuclear weapons. Indeed, in the Preface to the document, then Secretary of Defence, Robert M. Gates, notes

6 6 that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons sits atop the US policy agenda alongside the prevention of nuclear terrorism. From this, the role of nuclear weapons in US policy can be more clearly understood. According to a senior state department official, the NPR's "first step" involved "develop[ment of] a nuclear force structure and posture for use in the negotiations" of the successor agreement to START I. 14 Thus, there is clearly an identifiable strategy at work in the administration s nuclear policy. The Obama administration is using the US nuclear arsenal as an instrument to pursue a policy of disarmament within the overall goal of nuclear abolition. As part of this strategy, the administration has an associated objective: to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy. As one would expect, more traditional objectives are also expressed in the NPR: maintaining deterrence, stability, and sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. However, these objectives are to be achieved at reduced force levels. Thus, non-proliferation is clearly and explicitly given priority. As the NPR states, by reducing the numbers and roles of its nuclear weapons, the US is in a much stronger position to persuade our Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) partners to join with us in adopting the measures needed to reinvigorate the non-proliferation regime. 15 Whilst the existence of a clear strategy is to be welcomed, the strategy itself is fraught with problems and dangers. The negative consequences of Obama s strategy will be discussed in section two of this paper. Adapting to the Changing Security Environment In the second half of this paper it will be argued that some of the nuclear strategic theory developed during the Cold War still has relevance in the contemporary

7 7 strategic environment. Nonetheless, clearly much has changed. To its credit, the NPR acknowledges and utilizes some of the most important changes. The challenge of credibility has remained a constant in nuclear strategy, but is also subject to changes in perception. Since Massive Retaliation, the first declaratory nuclear policy of the US, credibility has regularly been at the heart of debates surrounding nuclear strategy. The enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons raises serious questions about the circumstances in which a state would credibly use them. Massive Retaliation appeared to fail the credibility test because it was based on the threat of an overwhelming nuclear response in the face of even limited communist gains. 16 In contrast to this first attempt at nuclear strategy, a credible nuclear posture must be built-upon the prospect of plausible and proportional response. In the current security environment the issue of credibility has come under even greater strain than during the Cold War. Without an overwhelming Soviet nuclear threat, and with increased sensitivity to discrimination in targeting, the circumstances within which nuclear weapons could be used have arguably reduced. At the same time, the increased potency of conventional weapons provides possible alternatives to nuclear strikes. In addition, the ongoing deployment of Ballistic Missile Defences (BMD) provides an added denial dimension to US deterrence policy alongside the more traditional punishment-based approach. The NPR sensibly incorporates all of these factors into its new position on deterrence. This incorporation builds upon work done by the preceding Bush administration, which had already begun to increase the role of conventional forces and BMD in US deterrence policy. 17 This is reflected in the current strategic war plan, OPLAN 8010-

8 8 08 Strategic Deterrence and Global Strike, which contains both nuclear and conventional options. 18 The Obama administration seeks to develop this trend further: As the role of nuclear weapons is reduced in US national security non-nuclear elements will take on a greater share of the deterrence burden. 19 In one respect, it makes good strategic sense to bolster the credibility of the US deterrence posture by providing more non-nuclear options. For example, Keith B. Payne, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Policy, notes that one method of shoring up deterrence in an increasingly complex security environment is by deploying a spectrum of capabilities aimed at improving the probability that we can deter diverse opponents 20 However, by leaning too heavily on conventional capabilities, the potency of US deterrence may be undermined. By expanding the Negative Security Assurance, essentially ruling out nuclear retaliation against those in compliance with their NPT obligations, even in the face of a chemical or biological attack, the US is arguably actually reducing both the flexibility and potency of its deterrent threats. 21 The development of the negative security assurance is designed primarily as an incentive for states to comply with the non-proliferation regime. It is not clear whether the deterrence implications of this stance have been clearly thought through. It is not impossible, given the relatively poor performance of US conventional forces in Kosovo (1999), the limited success of the shock and awe campaign in Iraq (2003), and the protracted war in Afghanistan, that an aggressive actor may take a gamble on being able to withstand a US conventional response (especially if it is restricted to an air power campaign). If such a calculation were ever to be made, deterrence would have failed.

9 9 In some important respects, conventional threats suffer in comparison with those based on nuclear weapons. At a military-technical level, at least, there is a certainty about the implications of a nuclear attack. Little can be done to avoid or mitigate the effects of nuclear weapons. This is clearly not the case in relation to conventional weapons. In recent years both Serbia and Iraq (1991) failed to be deterred by the threat of US conventional action. It may have been that neither of these actors believed the US would respond. In which case, deterrence failed more as a result of misperception of US commitment than a lack of respect for US conventional capabilities. However, there is evidence to indicate that the Iraqi government was deterred from using Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) during the 1991 Gulf War for fear of US and Israeli nuclear response. 22 This suggests that enemy decision makers are more likely to take a gamble in the face of US conventional threats, but are less courageous when faced with the prospect of nuclear retaliation. Nuclear weapons are unique in their ability to all but guarantee delivery of massive levels of destruction. David Trachtenberg has identified another potential flaw in placing greater emphasis on conventional forms of deterrence. As he correctly notes, it is US conventional superiority that drives some foreign WMD programmes. These actors perceive WMD as asymmetric equalizers to offset US conventional dominance. 23 That being the case, the Obama administration s emphasis on conventional response to chemical and biological attack may have precisely the opposite effect than that intended. Greater US conventional potency may energize foreign WMD proliferation, with, as the 1991 Iraq case appears to suggest, nuclear response being the only effective deterrent to

10 10 such capabilities. Thus, Obama s policies may aggravate the situation, while simultaneously reducing the US ability to respond effectively. Force Structure In terms of forces and operations, the NPR contains some commendable features. The nuclear triad, although destined to be smaller, remains in place. In addition, steps are to be taken to improve command and control of nuclear forces, as well as to improve intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) basing options. The triad of delivery systems is composed of ICBMs, submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and bombers. The retention of the Triad indicates that the Obama administration, despite its focus on smaller terrorist nuclear threats, is at least conscious of the need to retain a secure second-strike capability. The capability to forward deploy tactical nuclear weapons is also being retained Improvements in ICBM basing and further investment in command and control infrastructure are designed to maximize presidential decision-making time during a crisis or conflict (by reducing the need for prompt launch). Although the motivation behind these measures appears to be reflective of a negative stance on nuclear weapons, in that they are concerned with holding back nuclear weapons for as long as possible in a crisis, they are still to be welcomed. A secure and responsive command and control infrastructure is essential both for deterrence and warfighting purposes. On the issue of tactical nuclear weapons, the NPR provides something of a mixed bag. Capability is reduced somewhat by retiring the sea-launched nuclear equipped cruise missile (TLAM-N). However, the report does contain a commitment to retain

11 11 the ability to forward-deploy nuclear weapons on tactical fighter-bombers and heavy bombers, and maintain long-range strike capabilities. These capabilities are to be achieved by a full scope Life Extension Program for the current B-61 nuclear bomb. In addition, 200 B-61 gravity bombs are to be upgraded with new tail fins that turn them into guided weapons for delivery by F35 fighter-bombers. This measure has been criticized by some as an abandonment of Obama s pledge not to deploy new nuclear weapons. 24 However, from a strategic perspective this is a welcome aspect of Obama s nuclear policy, since it retains a degree of flexibility within US nuclear force structure. However, although bereft of any details, the NPR does call for tactical nuclear forces to be part of any future disarmament agreements with Russia. 25 How far such reductions would go is currently uncertain. It may be that the US, in its quest for strategic stability with Russia, is seeking parity of tactical weapons. Currently, the US has approximately 500 such weapons, whereas Russia is believed to have around 5,000. With its expressed desire to reduce the role of US nuclear forces, the Obama administration may emphasize the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons in any future treaty. However, that reduction may be unlikely in the short term since the NPR contains an acknowledgement of the role such weapons play in extended deterrence (expanding the nuclear deterrence umbrella to allies of the US). Having recognized this role/function, the report also stipulates that no changes will be made to extended deterrence capabilities without consultation with allies. That being said, as noted earlier, the NPR stipulates that non-nuclear elements will take on a greater share of the deterrence burden. 26 The future of US tactical nuclear weapons is therefore uncertain. What we do know is that for now the US will retain its capability in this

12 12 field. How credible these weapons are as useable instruments of nuclear strategy is open to question. Obama s Nuclear Policy The Negatives The Abolition Objective The overriding problem with the NPR is the policy objective it seeks to serve. The Obama administration s stance on nuclear weapons is so obviously negative that it undermines the credibility of US nuclear strategy. There is little, if any, indication in the NPR that nuclear weapons can act as positive instruments of policy. Even in the section that describes the rationale for not extending the negative security assurance to NPT non-compliant states, the Obama administration dilutes the threat: Yet that does not mean that our willingness to use nuclear weapons against countries not covered by the new assurance has in any way increased. 27 Under the Obama presidency, the US appears to be a reluctant nuclear power. So much so, that the US is in danger of being perceived as, and perhaps actually becoming, self-deterring. This negative stance on nuclear weapons in the current policy ignores valuable elements of Cold War nuclear strategic theory. Thomas Schelling, a leading theorist during the Cold War era, best described nuclear strategy as a bargaining process, in which risk manipulation was the key to success. Within Schelling s theory, positive outcomes can be achieved via an aggressive bargaining process, in which the destructive power of nuclear weapons is used to coerce or deter. Critical to success in such a process is reputation, which in turn is based upon the enemy s perception of

13 13 one s actions, words, and will. Clearly, for a credible posture to exist, the enemy must believe threats are both genuine and sustainable. 28 A potential adversary of the US, having read the NPR, is likely to be unimpressed by US nuclear threats. This perspective is strengthened by the inclusion in the NPR of Ronald Reagan s famous quote: A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. 29 Such an absolute statement can easily be challenged. The assumption that nuclear war will always result in abject devastation is questionable. There can be many potential forms and sizes of nuclear conflict. However, even if one accepts the basic premise of Reagan s statement, in a world of bargaining reputations, it is inadvisable for a state to nail its colors to the mast in such a public fashion. Schelling s theory is driven by the objective of forcing one s enemy to blink first and compromise. This objective can be achieved by a number of methods, but perhaps Schelling s most innovative suggestions are concerned with irrationality and loss of control. Schelling argued that an actor who appeared to have limited control over his actions and nuclear forces could gain advantage. Exhibiting behavior that appears irrational and/or deploying nuclear forces that are under limited central control, and therefore have a tendency to promote a rapid escalation of conflict, have the effect of limiting one s freedom of action. This sends a signal to the enemy that responsibility for deescalating a crisis lies in their hands: you must control this situation by compromising your position because I cannot. Ironically, control is achieved by a lack of control (or at least the perception that one lacks control). These more extreme aspects of Schelling s work tend to receive a great deal of criticism for being overly theoretical, impractical and dangerous in a nuclear

14 14 environment. It is unlikely that any decision maker would take such high risks and voluntarily limit control over nuclear forces. There are also inherent dangers in such an approach. Most obviously, what happens if both sides in a conflict adopt Schelling s approach? Thus, this paper is not advocating that the Obama administration s nuclear strategy should closely mirror Schelling s work in this respect. However, Schelling s work is extremely valuable for noting that nuclear strategy has a strong psychological element. Since nuclear strategy has traditionally been concerned primarily with compellence and deterrence, success or failure resides in the mind of the enemy. In order to achieve one s goals, the power of nuclear weapons must be used for positive effect to manipulate the enemy s decision making. Schelling s work highlights the complex and subtle ways in which the enemy can be manipulated. Disappointingly, in its ill-judged rush to bolster the flagging nonproliferation regime, the Obama administration eschews much of the valuable work developed during the Cold War. The result is a rather shallow form of US nuclear strategy that underplays the psychological component. Loss of Flexibility Nuclear strategy has become so shallow during the Obama presidency, that it is now essentially one-dimensional. Aside from the vague and unconvincing threat against NPT non-compliant actors, the NPR explicitly states that US nuclear weapons have only one role: deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our Allies and partners. 30 Whilst this is perhaps the primary role for nuclear weapons, they can fulfill other functions. The history of US nuclear strategy has been dominated by the quest for credibility and flexibility. Once the destructive power of nuclear weapons was understood, the key challenge became harnessing that power for policy effect.

15 15 The creation of a more flexible capability and an increase in options open to decision makers, enables nuclear weapons to be viable instruments of policy. It also bolsters the credibility of US deterrence. A broad range of weapons and delivery systems helped to achieve this viability and credibility status. This more flexible approach to nuclear strategy became formally adopted in NATO s 1967 Flexible Response (which included a range of conventional and nuclear options). Operationally, a degree of flexibility was achieved, at least to some degree, through the US Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), which provided the president with a range of attack options during a crisis or conflict. In reality, however, the SIOP was never as flexible as advertised. 31 Finally, towards the end of the Cold War, US options increased further with the development of countervailing and prevailing theories. The latter even raised the prospect of victory in a superpower nuclear conflict. 32 Over time, US nuclear strategy became ever more sophisticated. Whether or not flexible and limited nuclear options would have worked as intended during a Cold War nuclear exchange, we will never know. Ronald Reagan may have been right. Even with the best of intentions, nuclear conflict may have escalated rapidly to Armageddon levels of destruction. Nonetheless, it was surely sensible to develop more flexible capabilities and to provide decision makers with options beyond mutual annihilation or surrender. In this sense, the Obama administration s decision to isolate nuclear weapons in US security strategy, and thereby limit flexibility of response, is problematic. The nuclear security environment is far more complex today than it was during the Cold War. A range of possible threats already exists, and others may arise.

16 16 Russian nuclear forces could return as a sizable threat in the future, and China may emerge as a nuclear peer competitor at some point. Countries such as Iran, North Korea and Pakistan provide current or near-term small to medium state-based threats. Finally, as the Obama administration is so keen to point out, nuclear terrorism is a growing concern. With such a range of potential threats of varying kinds and sizes, limiting the nuclear posture appears counterintuitive. This is especially the case since the NPR acknowledges that the risk of nuclear attack has increased. 33 Nuclear weapons can be used to counter a range of threats, and can exert leverage in various forms. Absence of Warfighting The current US nuclear posture is not only one-dimensional; the single remaining role for nuclear weapons appears underdeveloped. To reiterate, the singular role of nuclear weapons is deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our Allies and partners. An important question to ask in regards to this statement is: What happens if deterrence fails? This question was eloquently addressed during the Cold War by theorists such as Gray, and continues to be pertinent. If the US or one of its allies comes under nuclear attack, how would Washington respond? Would the United States engage in retaliatory strikes and nuclear warfighting? These questions are not just relevant to the outcome nuclear combat. Whether or not the United States maintains a credible warfighting stance has important implications for deterrence. 34 Since deterrence is built upon the credibility of the threat posed, having a declared warfighting stance (with the forces to enact it) makes the threat more credible. This credibility is built upon the fact that a warfighting capability provides the means for escalation control, damage limitation, and possibly even facilitates victory. Taken

17 17 together, these make resort to nuclear weapons more likely, and therefore more credible. Although the NPR will, by default, be translated into operational plans, there is no explicit discussion of warfighting in the document itself. Warfighting does more than just bolster deterrence. It is also vital for damage limitation should nuclear conflict occur. If deterrence fails, the objective must be to limit destruction to the United States and its allies. In the event of war, in addition to passive and active defensive measures, counterforce missions will be important. Enemy nuclear forces may have to be destroyed, and a positive post-conflict outcome should be sought. Positive conflict termination may require a theory of victory, which in turn will require developed warfighting plans and a will to carry out such plans. A warfighting stance will help shore-up a deterrence posture, and should deterrence fail, may make the difference between survival and ruin. The lack of discussion of warfighting in the NPR is therefore of concern. Absence of Escalation Control In addition to the lack of discourse on bargaining and warfighting in the Obama administration s nuclear posture, the NPR refrains from addressing the concept of escalation dominance. This concept is most readily associated with the work of Herman Kahn, and is an important consideration for making positive gains during nuclear bargaining. 35 Escalation dominance requires both the will and capability to outclass the enemy at the next level of escalation. If escalation dominance can be established, it is reasonable to assume that the enemy will have to concede at a lower level of conflict. Escalation dominance is based on a range of related military capabilities and the ability to move between them seamlessly. By isolating nuclear

18 18 weapons into their own category with just one rather extreme role, the NPR does not provide the wherewithal for a coherent strategy of escalation dominance. Under the current NPR s guidance, the US may have the physical capability (weapons) to operate at the higher reaches of nuclear conflict, but it certainly does not appear to have the will to operate along the entire spectrum of possible nuclear options. 36 Once again, this is due to the absence of a positive strategic approach to nuclear weapons. In this sense, the Obama administration has taken a backward step from the Clinton and Bush eras, during which a range of operations was developed to cope with the increasingly complex security environment. 37 In contrast to the Obama administration s nuclear policy, the above discussion of warfighting, bargaining, and escalation dominance may seem an inappropriate throwback to a bygone age. However, this chasm in thinking is merely a reflection of how far removed the administration is from the logic of nuclear strategy. Its antinuclear policy will only work if the rest of the world signs-up to this vision. However, this seems an unlikely outcome based on current evidence. Whilst the US continues to reduce its nuclear warheads and put a freeze on developing new weapons, proliferation and modernization of existing arsenals continues to gather pace. Worryingly, the Obama administration acknowledges the trend in nuclear proliferation and modernization, but remains hopeful that its unilateral action will turn the tide of global opinion. 38 Nuclear weapons clearly have the potential to inflict terrifying levels of destruction. This does not mean, however, that a state should leave itself devoid of a comprehensive and mature nuclear strategy. Indeed, a reluctant approach to nuclear

19 19 strategy may so undermine one s deterrence that you risk bringing about the one thing you feared most. In addition, in the face of deterrence failure underdeveloped nuclear strategy may leave you at the mercy of a more determined nuclear-armed foe. As the much-maligned Herman Kahn noted, the prospect of nuclear conflict may be terrifying, but that is exactly why we need to engage positively with the subject. 39 Misplaced Confidence in Technological Forms of Stability In its approach to nuclear strategy, the Obama administration has also fallen into the trap of seeking security through stability, especially in regards to Russia. The NPR makes an attempt to establish and maintain strategic stability with the former Cold War adversary. The key variables in the quest for stability are the quantity, quality, and operational stance of nuclear weapons. The restriction on new weapons development, improved command and control procedures, and the demirving of existing Minuteman III ICBMs, present approaches to neutralize potential areas of technical and operational tension between the United States and Russia. At some level, all of these measures have the intention of minimizing the vulnerability of retaliatory capability and/or reducing the possibility of unintended launch. For example, demirving ICBMs reduces their penetrative and strike capability against ICBM silos. In addition to ironing out perceived technical and operational points of tension, such approaches can also be seen as confidence building measures that increase trust between the former adversaries. Strategic stability is also being pursued via arms control in the New START Treaty, which reduces the number of deployable strategic warheads to 1,550 on no more than 700 launchers.

20 20 Whilst laudable in its intention to reduce tension between the United States and Russia, the pursuit of strategic stability through technical means, including calculations of quantity and quality, is flawed. Such an approach ignores the basic Clausewitzian truism that war is a continuation of policy. 40 As Gray noted in response to Cold War arms control efforts, the causes of conflict are to be found in political motives not technical-military imbalances. There is also evidence that during the long process of arms control within the Cold War, the two superpowers had significantly different understandings of what actually constituted stability. 41 Thus, even if stability via a technical-military route is possible, the chances of two states reaching a common understanding would be remote. The Obama administration s search for stability is also undermined by the NPR s anti-nuclear stance. Even if we accept the problematic premise that stability is partly built upon parity in capability, will and credibility have to be part of that equation; weapons are not enough. If one side in a nuclear relationship has substantial credibility deficiencies, then an imbalance will occur, and stability may be compromised. An imbalance in credibility appears to exist within the US-Russia relationship. Due to its relative disadvantage in conventional forces in recent years, Russia has understandably placed greater emphasis on its nuclear capability. Indeed, in contrast to the United States, Russia has left open the possibility of using nuclear weapons in any circumstances, including against non-nuclear powers and in a pre-emptive strike. 42 Therefore, there is an apparent imbalance in terms of will and credibility between the two powers. The numbers of warheads and delivery systems may be essentially the same, but Russia appears as a more potent nuclear power than the United States.

21 21 Underdeveloped Deterrence Posture Even judged on its own terms, the Obama administration s nuclear posture is unhelpfully vague and unconvincing. If we accept that deterrence of nuclear attack on the US and its allies is the one remaining role for nuclear forces, then in the interests of credibility that deterrence posture has to be clearly expressed. This is especially the case since it involves extended deterrence, which has always posed substantial credibility problems. When one digs below the surface of the NPR s position on deterrence there is a worrying absence of detail. In the first instance, it is not clear whether US deterrence posture is based upon punishment or denial. These two approaches to deterrence, although not mutually exclusive, seek to deter via different routes. Punishment threatens to impose unacceptable costs on an attacker whereas denial seeks to prevent an enemy from achieving goals. The NPR contains some details, but ultimately provides no clear indication of the nature of a nuclear response. For example, the NPR references a devastating conventional response in the face of a chemical or biological attack on the US or its allies. Also, the NPR notes how The United States will continue to ensure that the perceived gains of attacking the United States or its allies and partners would be far outweighed by the unacceptable costs of the response. 43 These sections of the report appear to suggest that punishment is at least still part of the US nuclear strategic vocabulary. However, a devastating response leading to unacceptable costs is not explicitly mentioned in relation to nuclear attack. Instead, the NPR vaguely comments that any use of nuclear weapons will be met with a response that would be effective and overwhelming. The President, as Commander-in-Chief, will determine

22 22 the precise nature of any U.S. response 44 One could assume that the US would respond with nuclear weapons in a similar manner to that which it threatens with conventional forces. However, the anti-nuclear theme of the NPR raises the possibility that the United States is a member of the nuclear taboo club. In which case, the lack of detail pertaining to nuclear response may be evidence of an unwillingness to fully contemplate the issue. Would President Obama order a retaliatory nuclear attack on another state? This is a crucial question for the credibility of US deterrence and one that the NPR fails to unambiguously answer/address. When one searches for evidence of deterrence by denial, the aforementioned absence of a warfighting discourse is worrying. Without an explicit warfighting posture, it is difficult to persuade the enemy to forego its operational and strategic plans. However, denial does appear in the administration s February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report (BMDR). The first policy priority identified in the report is the development of BMD to deter an adversary from using an ICBM force against the US, by being able to blunt an attack. 45 However, US BMD is only capable of dealing with limited attacks. The BMD Report explicitly states that, in the interests of maintaining stability, the United States has neither the intention nor capability to defeat a Russian or Chinese nuclear attack. 46 That being the case, a comprehensive strategy of deterrence by denial against these countries would have to include the possible use of nuclear weapons in a counterforce role. In order for a limited BMD system to succeed against a substantial threat, such as that provided by Russia, the enemy s nuclear forces would have to have been depleted by an initial strike. The remaining enemy missiles could more easily be dealt with by the limited BMD system. There is no indication that the Obama administration seeks this approach. A

23 23 BMD-based deterrence by denial approach also faces the problem that the US BMD system is untested in conflict. As with conventional forms of deterrence, an enemy may gamble on being able to overcome US missile defences. As is the case in relation to US nuclear weapons, one is left with the strong impression that US BMD programme is primarily seen as another method of supporting the non-proliferation regime. In this case, by deploying a capability to defeat a limited ICBM attack, the Obama administration hopes to dissuade potential adversaries from developing such a capability in the first place, as stated in the BMDR. 47 This approach seems to be failing, certainly in relation to North Korea, which is forging ahead with missile testing and in February 2013 conducted a third nuclear test. A robust deterrence posture rests upon the 3 Cs of credible deterrence: capability, commitment, and communication. An analysis of the current US nuclear posture against these criteria suggests that credibility will be difficult to achieve. In spite of the various problems identified in relation to warfighting and escalation dominance, and despite the cuts announced in the New START Treaty, the US is still in possession of the capability to launch a devastating retaliatory strike on an aggressor. Therefore, problems arise in relation to commitment and communication. As noted above, the NPR portrays the US as a reluctant nuclear power. In the absence of a clear and recognizable commitment to use its nuclear arsenal, US nuclear capabilities present a rather hollow threat. The lack of detail pertaining to its deterrence posture also suggests that the current administration may be loath to grasp the nettle of nuclear warfighting. Whether this is motivated by a moral objection to nuclear use or

24 24 it is designed not to undermine the Obama administration s nonproliferation efforts, the result is the same. The NPR communicates a significant lack of will to engage in the inescapable logic of nuclear strategy. As Schelling emphasized, in nuclear bargaining, one s declaratory policy really matters. What you say can have a significant effect on your bargaining reputation. Underselling the Utility of Nuclear Weapons Reducing nuclear weapons to the single role of deterring nuclear attack against the US and its allies seriously underplays the value of these weapons. This is especially important in the current complex security environment in which nuclear weapons could have some critical, albeit limited missions. It also highlights the error of ruling out new missions, capabilities and further weapons development, especially in the field of low-yield, cleaner (in radiation terms) nuclear weapons. One of the great errors of those who promoted the Revolution in Military Affairs (Military Transformation) was to overplay the potential of modern conventional forces. Although there has clearly been a qualitative improvement in the lethality and accuracy of conventional arms in the information age, the conflicts in Kosovo and Iraq reveal the limits of what can be achieved. Intelligence failures, enemy countermeasures and poor strategy, to name just three, have all hampered the performance of modern armed forces. That being the case, it is unwise to assume that conventional weapons can now fulfill most of the roles previously held by nuclear weapons. One of the main positive characteristics of nuclear weapons is their substantially greater potential for assuring the destruction of targets. It is not inconceivable that in

25 25 the future the US could be faced with a scenario in which a WMD threat needs to be neutralized within a small window of opportunity. Indeed, whether intended or not, the NPR would seem to support this position with its increased emphasis on the threat from WMD terrorism. Were such a scenario to emerge, it is likely that nuclear weapons would provide the best chance of destroying such a critical target before it is lost from the intelligence radar. Clearly, this is an extreme example of the conditions in which nuclear weapons would present a viable and effective option. Nonetheless, in the post-9/11 world such a threat is perceived to be increasingly likely. The development of low-yield, cleaner nuclear weapons would provide an invaluable capability for such a scenario. Thus, one can conclude that, with its policy of halting the development of new nuclear weapons, the Obama administration is limiting the flexibility of US nuclear strategy at a time when increased options and capabilities are required. There exists a dichotomy between the contemporary complex security environment, which is acknowledged by the Obama administration, and the nuclear strategy that it has adopted. Conclusion The recent NPR provides an overwhelming impression that the Obama administration does not regard nuclear weapons as positive instruments of strategy. By reducing the role of nuclear weapons in US security policy, the administration seeks to kickstart a process that will eliminate nuclear weapons globally. This approach will only work if all security actors follow suit. One would have to be extraordinarily optimistic, verging on naive, to believe this will occur. Both the NPR and recent statements from members of the administration acknowledge that nuclear abolition is unlikely, and

26 26 that the current trend is towards greater levels of proliferation and modernization of nuclear weapons. Thus, the impact of the Obama administration s anti-nuclear stance on US nuclear strategy is very damaging. By focusing on the threat [of] nuclear proliferation, 48 the Obama administration has misunderstood the nature of threats. The threat from nuclear proliferation itself does not constitute an existential threat. Rather, the threat emanates from those who may acquire nuclear weapons. Thus, the United States is in danger of denuding itself of a credible nuclear posture to counter a threat (proliferation) that does not exist. In doing so, it may leave itself ill equipped to deal with the real threat (hostile actors with nuclear weapons) if it appears. The closer one looks into the details of the NPR, the more hollow and unconvincing the Obama administration s nuclear posture appears. The NPR potentially leaves the US with a nuclear strategy that is out of touch with current security realities. In particular, US deterrence suffers from credibility issues, and there appears to be little commitment to engage with the details of what happens if deterrence fails. Likewise, there is no indication that the Obama administration seeks to gain any positive effect from its nuclear forces. The absence of a warfighting discourse and escalation dominance from US nuclear posture weakens the US bargaining position and may leave it strategically under-prepared should nuclear deterrence fail. Nuclear weapons should not be isolated from the other instruments of strategy. In the contemporary complex security environment, the president requires a range of integrated capabilities and a will to employ such capabilities. As Obama enters his second term of office, it is essential that the discussion of nuclear strategy goes beyond the rhetoric of the abolitionist agenda. The administration s nuclear posture, as outlined in the NPR, must be analyzed in terms of strategy. This analysis can only be meaningfully

27 27 achieved within the framework of established nuclear strategy theory, much of which was codified during the Cold War. 1 Suzanne Goldenberg, Obama Vows to Take Personal Charge of Climate Change in 2 For example, Joe Cirincione, President of the Ploughshares Fund described the policy as a positive step. See Ewen MacAskill, Barack Obama's radical review on nuclear weapons reverses Bush policies, 3 There is some concern that, due to counting methods in the treaty, numbers of deployed warheads could actually increase. David J. Trachtenberg, Six Myths About the New START Treaty, 4 Lawrence Wittner, Is the Obama Administration Abandoning Its Commitment to a Nuclear-free World?, 5 Hans M. Kristensen, Remarks on Nuclear Modernization., pdf 6 Stephen M. Walt, Nuclear Posture Review (or Nuclear Public Relations?), ublic_relations 7 Hans M. Kristensen, The Nuclear Posture Review, 8 Cited in Hans, M. Kristensen, Obama and the Nuclear War Plan, 9 For a more in depth discussion of strategy see Thomas M. Kane and David J. Lonsdale, Understanding Contemporary Strategy, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012).

28 28 10 Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime, (New York: The Free Press, 2002). 11 Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), Gray, Modern Strategy, Carl von Clausewitz, On War, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). 14 Quoted in Anna Loukianova, The Nuclear Posture Review Debate, 15 Nuclear Posture Review Report, (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2010), v-vi. 16 In reality, Massive Retaliation was not quite as simplistic as it is often portrayed. Nonetheless, the Eisenhower administration made little effort to flesh-out the details of their declaratory policy. Hence the public caricature of the policy remained. For a discussion of this see Lawrence Freedman, The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists, in Peter Paret (ed), Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts] 18 Hans M. Kristensen, Obama and the Nuclear War Plan. 19 Nuclear Posture Review Report, xiii. 20 Keith B. Payne, Nuclear deterrence for a New Century, The Journal of International Security Affairs, Spring 2006, 10, 21 The NPR does leave the door open for a return to greater reliance on nuclear weapons to deter NPT compliant states, but only if biological weapons evolve and proliferate significantly. Nuclear Posture Review Report, viii.