Sustaining the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent: the LRSO and GBSD. Mark Gunzinger, Carl Rehberg, and Gillian Evans

Transcription

1 Sustaining the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent: the LRSO and GBSD Mark Gunzinger, Carl Rehberg, and Gillian Evans

2 Overview Why this reprt? Factrs that shuld shape future requirements fr the U.S. triad ALCM mdernizatin and the LRSO Minuteman III mdernizatin and the GBSD Summary 2

3 Backgrund The U.S. triad cnsists f lng-range bmbers that carry nuclear gravity weapns and cruise missiles, ICBMs, and SSBNs All DD Nuclear Psture Reviews since the Cld Wars (NPR 1994, 2001, 2010, 2018) supprted the need t maintain a strng and credible triad Hwever, multiple majr triad mdernizatin prgrams have been truncated (such as the B-2 and Advanced Cruise Missile prgrams), delayed (ICBM replacement), r cancelled (previus stealth bmber prgram) Russia and China are aggressively mdernizing their nuclear frces Russia has vilated the 1987 INF Treaty, China s nuclear inventry is nt cnstrained by an arms cntrl agreement The prliferatin f missile and ther technlgies enabled Nrth Krea t fast-track its develpment f nuclear weapns; Iran cntinues t develp relevant capabilities 3

4 A Cld War-era frce 1954 Chevy Bel Air 1970 Frd Pint 1984 Frd Escrt 1980 Oldsmbile Cutlass 1962 Frd Fusin 1993 Frd Prbe 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s B-52 ALCM B-2 Delivered Delivered Delivered Minuteman Sils First built in 1962 Minuteman III Delivered B-1B Delivered (nw cnventinal nly) 4

5 Funding fr DD s Strategic Frces (Majr Frce Prgram-1) FY1962: Abut 22% f DD s TOA ($68.9B in FY2018 dllars) FY1962 t end f Cld War: Averaged 9.6% f annual TOA ($38.6B in FY2018 dllars) FY1992 t FY2017: Averaged 2.4% f annual TOA ($12.6B in FY2018 dllars) FY2010 was the nadir at 1.4% f TOA jumped frm 1.9% t 2.5% f TOA, largest increase since Little frce mdernizatin 5

6 U.S. triad under New START 6 Undersea frces 14 Ohi-class SSBNs (2 in verhaul) 240 deplyed launchers (20 per bat) with Trident II D5 SLBMs (MIRV) 280 deplyed and nn-deplyed launchers, 1,090 ttal warheads Clumbia-class SSBNs IOC in early 2030s Bmber frces 20 ttal B-2s, carry B61 and B83 nuclear gravity bmbs 75 ttal B-52Hs, 47 are nuclear capable Nuclear gravity bmbs, AGM-86 ALCMs, LRSO IOC late 2020s Nuclear-capable B-21s begin t jin the frce in mid-2020s, nuclear gravity bmbs and future LRSO Land-based missile frces 400 Minuteman III missiles in deplyed sil launchers 50 nn-deplyed launchers and 4 test launchers All have single warheads, limited capability t re-mirv All B-1s have been mdified fr cnventinal nly missins GBSD IOC circa 2029, FOC 2036, single warhead but MIRV-capable

7 SSBNs Mst survivable leg f the triad, essential t maintaining a secure secnd-strike capability Deplyed SSBNs difficult t lcate and preemptively attack Cmprise abut 70% f U.S. deplyed strategic frces as defined by New START cunting rules W76 and W88 warheads facilitate bth cunterfrce and cuntervalue targeting Rapid, unfreseen advances in ASW technlgy culd increase vulnerability 7

8 ICBMs Highly respnsive abut 99 percent f missiles are n cnstant alert Sil-based Missiles Launch Cntrl Centers Redundant cmmand and cntrl netwrks Prvide the ability t execute a scalable retaliatry strike An enemy seeking t significantly degrade the triad wuld have t launch a massive strike against the U.S. hmeland-based ICBM frce this greatly increases the threshld fr nuclear aggressin Launch Facilities 8

9 9 Air-breathing leg f the triad Offers flexible emplyment ptins that SSBNs and ICBMs d nt Bmbers prvide a highly visible means t send signals in crises Can generate the frce t alert status, disperse t ther lcatins including verseas bases, etc. Once generated, bmbers are survivable and can be launched and then recalled Flight paths can circumvent sensitive territry A bmber frce can attack targets frm multiple azimuths Bmbers can perfrm cnventinal peratins and nn-cmbat missins (e.g., participate in exercises with allies, cnduct glbal pwer demnstratins)

10 Key study recmmendatins A flexible, adaptable, & credible triad is needed t sustain strategic deterrence DD shuld plan fr multiplar great pwer cmpetitin DD s frce develpment planning shuld priritize cncepts and capabilities fr lngterm cmpetitin with Russia and China China s nuclear capabilities shuld nt be cnsidered as a lesser included case DD shuld assess capabilities that will be effective in increasingly cntested future threat envirnments Applies t future triad requirements as well as cnventinal frces and capabilities Replace the AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missile Fully resurce the LRSO prgram t replace ALCMs as planned Assess ptential fr LRSO t supprt extended deterrence Replace the Minuteman III and its infrastructure Fully resurce the GBSD prgram t replace the Minuteman III frce as planned Design the GBSD t hedge against uncertainty Take advantage f triad mdernizatin prgrams t help revitalize the U.S. defense industrial base 10

11 Shaping Future Triad Requirements 11

12 Russia s triad mdernizatin Prject 955A Brei II-class SSBN Undersea frces Includes 3 Delta II, 6 Delta IV, 3 Brei-class SSBNs (16 SLBMs) Declining il revenues may slw blue water navy mdernizatin, funding stream fr its SSBN mdernizatin plans is stable Fielding 8 new Brei II-class bats by 2020s with capacity t carry additinal warheads Als develping a nuclear trped with intercntinental range Tu-160M2 Blackjack Bmber RS-28 Sarmat ICBM Bmber frces Abut 120 ttal, abut 50 cunt tward treaty heavy bmber limits Plan t sustain Tu-160 (Blackjack) and Tu-95MS (Bear H) t 2030 New nuclear-capable stealth bmber, IOC by mid-2020s? New Kh-102 nuclear-capable cruise missile, new supersnic and hypersnic cruise missiles Strategic Rcket Frces ballistic missiles 3 missile armies, 12 divs, 40 regts; 300 ICBMS with 1,000 warheads; ver 50% Sviet-era ICBMs were mdernized by 2015, rest by early 2020s All mbile ICBMs MIRVed by early 2020, will give Russia the ability t quickly increase its numbers f peratinal warheads RS-28 Sarmat ICBM (the cuntry killer ) will deply circa RVs with capabilities t evade defenses; pssibly 24 hypersnic glide vehicles (HGVs) capable f evading knwn defenses 12

13 China s nuclear frces mdernizatin Type 094 Jin-class SSBN Undersea frces Operates 4 (sn 5) Type 094 Jin-class SSBNs, carry JL 2 SLBMs with max range f 8,000 km (MIRVs? r single warhead) Prvides China with the ability t cnduct a nuclear strike frm the sea and, perhaps mre imprtantly a survivable secnd strike capability Will invest in a next-gen Type 096 SSBN and a new JL-3 SLBM Bmber frces Unclear if PLAAF & PLAN H-6 bmbers deliver nukes Sme analysts believe sme H-6 intermediate range bmbers (20 H-6s) may have a secndary nuclear missin Develping H-X (H-20) stealth bmber, likely nuclear capable Future Y-20U refueling a H-6N CJ-20 lng-range CM nuclear/cnventinal (AFGSC) PLA Rcket Frce ballistic and cruise missiles Abut 150 land-based nuclear ballistic missiles, ICBMs New DF-31AG ICBM rad mbile and MIRV capable New DF-41 ICBM sil-based, rad- and rail-mbile, 6 t10 MIRVs DF-41 ICBM n a TEL Prgrams may give China a significantly larger, mre capable nuclear missile inventry; sme variants may sn carry HGVs 13

14 Future threat envirnment: China s and Russia s maturing air and missile defenses Advanced SAMs Bth are mdernizing their SAMs; China first S-400 in January 2018, Russia rerganizing t imprve effectiveness f its air defenses Relcatable, netwrked, increasingly capable against aircraft and missiles China s HQ-9 TEL Russia s S-400 TEL Bth are prliferatrs China s ASAT and BMD Missiles Russia s S-500 System Missile defenses China s BMD is clsely linked t its ASAT prgram; tested hit-t-kill weapn in 2018 DF-41 ICBM n a TEL Military-Tday.cm Russia s S-500 and ther systems will give it a layered BMD system by 2020 Bth have increasingly capable active and passive cruise missile defenses Areas f reprted PLARF Tunneling (2011) Washingtn Pst Russia s Yamantau Undergrund Cmplex Undergrund facilities (UGFs) China is cntinuing its massive UGF building prgram Russia has reinvigrated its Cld War UGFs and is building mre 14

15 Increasingly integrated, verlapping, and redundant air and missile defenses Increasingly capable against individual weapns, nt just aircraft 15

16 ALCM Mdernizatin 16

17 AGM-86B ALCM Overview Lng-range (mre than 1,500 nm), subsnic, single warhead cruise missile Only nuclear cruise missile nw in the U.S. inventry Cnventinal CALCM AGM-86C/D variants Designed in the mid-1970s with a planned 10 year service life, life extensin prgrams will keep ALCMs in the inventry until apprximately 2030 A bmber frce capable f cnducting standff and penetrating attacks greatly cmplicates a cmpetitr s defensive challenges An all standff-strike frce wuld permit adversaries t ptimize their defenses t defeat cruise and ballistic missiles Cncerns: The ALCM s future reliability, availability, and effectiveness Numerus reliability issues that life extensin prgrams may nt be able t fully address May be pressed t meet availability requirements tward the end f its service life Peridic testing and ther attritin culd reduce ALCM inventry belw number needed t fully lad-ut all remaining nuclear-capable B-52s Ability f subsnic, nn-stealth cruise missiles t penetrate advanced missile defenses 17

18 Lng Range Standff (LRSO) missile Descriptin LRSOs will begin t replace AGM-86B ALCMs in the 2030 timeframe DD is prcuring the weapn, DOE has respnsibility fr the W80-4 warhead Life Extensin Prgram Will be able t penetrate advanced IADS, perate in GPS-denied envirnments, and hld high value targets at risk frm significant standff ranges Nuclear-capable B-52Hs and B-21s will carry LRSOs; tday, nly nuclearcapable B-52Hs carry ALCMs Typical arguments made against the LRSO Cruise missiles are destabilizing The LRSO will be a redundant capability The LRSO will be t expensive 18

19 Cruise missiles are destabilizing There is little evidence that cruise missiles were destabilizing during the Cld War Bmbers with cruise missiles and gravity weapns may be the mst stabilizing element f the U.S. triad Visible means t send signals in crises; fr instance, can generate bmbers t alert status and disperse the frce t ther lcatins Bmbers have lnger flight times relative t ballistic missiles and can be recalled after launch Cruise missiles can be withheld r retargeted China s and Russia s acquisitin f mdern, dual-capable air-launched cruise missiles suggest they may nt share this cncern Lng srtie duratins Chinese CJ-20 Russian Kh

20 LRSOs will be redundant Cruise missiles help enable attacks frm multiple azimuths Penetrating bmbers and cruise missiles impse csts LRSOs will give nn-stealth B-52Hs (in the frce until 2050) the ability t attack targets while staying utside cntested areas LRSOs will cmplement stealth bmbers Sme standff may be needed t avid highest threat areas lcated clse t sme high-value targets LRSOs culd supprt extended deterrence Prvide a pssible limited respnse ptin that avids using manned aircraft t penetrate enemy airspace r launching a nuclear weapn frm CONUS r an SSBN 20

21 LRSO prgram will be t expensive LRSO Prgram Cst Estimates Missile Cst Estimate W-80-4 LEP Nuclear Warhead Ttal Estimated Cst 2016 Acquisitin Decisin Memrandum Natinal Nuclear Security Administratin Cngressinal Research Service Cngressinal Budget Office $9.7 B fr abut 1,000 missiles NNSA bears cst $7 B t $10 B fr 500 warheads $9.7 B fr missiles nly $7 B t $10 B fr nuclear warheads $10.8 B $10.8 B fr missiles nly $13 B $7 B t $10 B $23 B fr missiles and warheads Prgram will cst a fractin f the $94 billin the Pentagn prjected it will spend n the triad frm FY2016 t FY2020 (0.06 percent f DD s ttal prjected spending ver same perid) Cmparisn Missile Type (Quantity Prcured) Prgram Base Year Then Year $ FY2018 $ PAUC $ ALCM (1,765 missiles) 1977 $4.1 B $13.64 B $7.7 M ACM (460 missiles) 1983 $3.8 B $8.23 B $17.9 M LRSO (abut 1,000 missiles) 2016 $9.7 B $8.27 B $8.1 M LRSO s Prgram Acquisitin Unit Cst (PAUC) is cnsistent with the ALCM s PAUC and lwer than the Advanced Cruise Missile s PAUC (due in part t the ACM s truncated prductin run) 21

22 Minuteman III Mdernizatin 22

23 Minuteman III ICBM Overview Three-stage, slid-fuel, sil-based ICBM Only land-based cmpnent f the triad Maximum 13,000 km (abut 8,000 mile) range Upgraded frm Minuteman I and II, first delivered in 1970 with a planned service life f 10 years Series f prgrams upgraded/refurbished its prpellant, guidance set, re-entry vehicle, and extended its service life substantially Will remain peratinally deplyed thrugh mid-2030s Originally 3 warheads per missile, dwnladed t 1 warhead (NPR 2010) Cncerns: Future reliability, availability, and effectiveness Number f cmpnents will age ut ver the next decade and cannt be further extended r easily replaced Peridic test launches ver the remaining lifespan will reduce inventry available t meet peratinally deplyed requirements 23

24 Grund Based Strategic Deterrent Descriptin Integrated system, including launch cntrl facilities, and C2 infrastructure Air Frce intends t purchase apprximately 640 missiles t meet peratinally deplyed ICBM requirements Prgram will als refurbish assciated infrastructure, reuse 450 existing launch facilities and 45 Launch Cntrl Centers in lieu f new cnstructin Mdular systems architecture will facilitate design flexibility and upgrades ver time as technlgy and threat envirnments evlve IOC expected in late-2020s, FOC in mid-2030s, remain in the frce until 2070s Typical arguments made against the GBSD ICBMs are n lnger survivable/are nt a credible deterrent, s Minuteman IIIs shuld nt be replaced The Minuteman III frce can be further extended The GBSD prgram will be t expensive 24

25 ICBMs have lst their value as a deterrent The Minuteman III frce is dispersed acrss a very large area It is als a missile sink an enemy attempting a first strike wuld have t expend a very large number f warheads against Minuteman III sils and launch facilities An attacker wuld likely have t allcate ne t tw warheads per target Only Russia nw has a sizable enugh nuclear frce fr such a massive attack Greatly increases the threshld fr nuclear aggressin With ICBMs, 500+ CONUS triad targets Naval Base Kitsap Withut ICBMs, 6 CONUS triad targets Naval Base Kitsap Malmstrm AFB Plus deplyed SSBNs F.E. Warren AFB Kirtland AFB Kirtland AFB Mint AFB Mint AFB Whiteman AFB Barksdale AFB Whiteman AFB Barksdale AFB Naval Sub Base Kings Bay Naval Sub Base Kings Bay 25

26 Minuteman IIIs can be further extended Majr Minuteman III life extensin/mdificatin prgrams Prgram Name/Type Prpulsin System Rcket Engine Prgram (PSRE) Prpulsin Replacement Prgram (PRP) Cmpleted r Planned Cmpletin Apprximate Cst (Then Year $) Lngevity f SLEP Cmpleted 2013 $0.2 B 2027 Cmpleted 2013 $2.1 B 2028 Guidance Replacement Prgram (GRP) Cmpleted 2009 $1.8 B 2032 Rapid Executin and Cmbat Targeting (REACT) Service Life Extensin Cmpleted 2006 $0.2 B Nt available Prgram Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle (SERV) Cmpleted 2012 $0.4 B Nt available Miscellaneus small prgrams Unknwn $2.3 B Nt available Subttal fr first wave f SLEPs $7.0 B Slid Rck Mtr Warm Line Prgram Only funded in 2013 $76.9 M Nt applicable ICBM Fuze Mdernizatin fr Minuteman III and GBSD Onging, 2027 $410.2 M spent $1.64 B t cmplete 2060 ICBM Demnstratin/Validatin Prgram fr Minuteman III and GBSD Onging $252.3 M thrugh FY17, final TBD Nt applicable 26

27 Critical MM III cmpnents will age ut Prjected decrease in MM III missiles due t aging cmpnents 450 deplyed and undeplyed launchers 400 deplyed launchers Rcket bster Prpulsin system Guidance system Inability t upgrade r repair sme majr cmpnents will reduce inventry available t supprt deplyed frce Anther issue: annual required testing will als reduce inventry Less testing nt desirable given the need t assess viability f aging MM III 27

28 The GBSD will be t expensive Air Frce estimate (in 2015) Surce ICBM C2 Infrastructure Ttal Cst OSD/Office f Cst Assessment and Prgram Evaluatin $48.5 B $700 M fr TMRR $15 B fr EMD $32 B prcurement $6.9 B $6.9 B $62.3 B $85 B t $100 B Optin Ntes Ttal Cst (FY14 $) Minuteman III SLEP GBSD in mdernized MM III launch facilities GBSD Prgram Cst Estimates The Air Frce estimate was largely based n data extraplated frm previus ICBM prgrams; the GBSD prgram is taking advantage f mature technlgies t reduce cst OSD/CAPE estimate based in part n data frm MDA prgrams such as the Grund-based Midcurse Defense, which is technlgically mre challenging and likely required mre new develpment cmpared t GBSD Estimated Ttal Cst FY Maintaining and extending the life f a system that des nt meet capability gals eliminated it as a final candidate slutin $160.3 B $159.2 B Althugh the estimated cst f bth ptins thrugh FY2075 is abut the same, DD has said nly the GBSD will meet its future requirements 28

29 Summary 29

30 Mdernizing the air-breathing leg f the triad A failure t mdernize the U.S. nuclear-capable bmber frce including its weapns wuld erde the triad s credibility Funded life extensin prgrams will keep ALCMs in the frce until apprximately 2030 Hwever, it s unlikely that life extensin prgrams fcused n ALCM availability and sustainability issues significantly imprved its ability t penetrate future threat envirnments Withut a standff attack weapn capable f penetrating future air defenses, nn-stealth B-52Hs that nw make up the majrity f the nuclear-capable bmber frce will nt able t strike targets in cntested areas As air defenses cntinue t imprve, even stealth platfrms may need t launch attacks against sme targets frm standff distances that exceed the very shrt ranges f gravity bmbs 30

31 Minuteman III and the GBSD DD has funded multiple prgrams t upgrade and sustain its Minuteman IIIs beynd their riginal ten-year planned service life Despite these prgrams, there are critical MM III capabilities that cannt be sustained much past 2030 Electrnics updated by the cmpleted Guidance Replacement Prgram begin t age ut in 2032 Issues related t extending MM III slid rcket mtrs are s significant that they undercut the viability f ding s Cmpnent age-ut is a majr reasn why DD has requested funding t develp and field a Minuteman III replacement Cmpnent age-ut and required testing will eventually reduce the size f the U.S. ICBM frce belw minimum peratinal requirements Cst ver time f sustaining the Minuteman III cmpared t a GBSD frce is essentially a wash Hwever, the Minuteman III will nt meet future requirements 31

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