Managing the bomb. If we must live with nuclear weapons, how can we survive them?

Transcription

1 Managing the bomb If we must live with nuclear weapons, how can we survive them? 1

2 Historically, there have been two approaches to this question A program of nuclear weapons abolition: Disarmament A program of nuclear weapons management: Arms Control 2

3 What are the differences? Disarmament Arms Control Reduce and eliminate existing arsenals and stockpiles Ensure that countries do not cheat or fail to disarm Control diffusion of nuclear technology and applications Monitor all nuclear activities to prevent weaponization Monitor production & trade in nuclear materials Punish violations Establish limits on arsenals and stockpiles or warheads Establish limits on delivery platforms (missiles, bombers) Develop & implement program of reductions Develop system of monitoring and inspection Limit diffusion of weapons technologies & materials 3

4 Some problems with disarmament It is almost impossible to control nuclear materials flows Nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented States will object to intrusive monitoring States will be inclined to hide weapons and break out in a crisis 4

5 Some problems with arms control It legitimizes nuclear arsenals & deterrence policies It is difficult to monitor numbers of weapons & their specifications It is very difficult to manage or slow down technological change It is difficult to compare apples and 5 oranges: different platforms and systems

6 Arms control and disarmament have a history: a number of agreements and treaties during the 20 th century tried to restrict weapons systems and abolish war The 1899 Hague Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land declared that it is especially prohibited...to employ poison or poisoned arms. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 outlawed war The 1925 Geneva Protocol to the Hague Conventions was entitled the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. The London Naval Conference of 1930 put limits on warships 6

7 We have seen how proposals to internationalize the control of atomic weapons within the UN foundered U.S. refusal to give up nukes until architecture was in place Soviet desire to acquire atomic weapons to match U.S. British wish to continue to play an international role Various disarmament talks proceeded during 1950s But no one was willing to take the first step 7

8 Initiatives took the following forms : UN Disarmament Commission 1952: U.S. plan for disclosure & verification of all armed forces & armaments (inc. atomic) 1953: Atoms for Peace 1955: Eisenhower announced that disarmament no longer feasible 1955: USSR agreed to Western proposal to prohibit use & manufacture of nukes, leading to eventual destruction of all nukes West refused to proceed, proposed Open Skies for inspection 8

9 In 1957, NATO presented a set of "Proposals for Partial Measures of Disarmament" to the UN to stop all nuclear testing halt production of nuclear weapons materials start a reduction in nuclear weapons stockpiles reduce the danger of surprise attack through warning systems begin reductions in armed forces and armaments. This came to naught 9

10 In 1958, a Conference of Experts from East and West met in Geneva to discuss verification of a nuclear test ban at the end of the year, a one year moratorium on nuclear testing was in place But in September 1961, due to French nuclear testing and the Berlin Crisis, the USSR announced it would resume testing, and the U.S. followed suit in April

11 Although the UN continued disarmament discussions until the present day, by 1961, nuclear disarmament by the superpowers was off the table replaced by arms control In 1963, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, barring nuclear testing in the atmosphere, oceans and outer space, was signed by the United States, Britain and the USSR 11

12 The NNPT was opened for accession in 1968 and today has 190 signatories. In was extended indefinitely in Non-members include: Israel, India, Pakistan, while North Korea has withdrawn. But it has been a relative success. 12

13 The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the US and USSR began in Helsinki in An ABM Treaty and the SALT I agreement were signed in

14 This was eventually followed by the SALT II agreement, signed in 1979 but never ratified as a result of charges that the Soviets gained an advantage and would cheat, anyway. 14

15 The SALT agreements did little to halt the arms race: they limited the number of platforms from which warheads could be launched, but nothing to limit the numbers of warheads SALT did institutionalize National Means of Verification, i.e. satellite reconnaissance over opponent s territory to monitor weapons-related activities U.S. strategic nuclear warheads,

16 SALT came under severe attack from the right and, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the negotiations stopped. In 1982, Reagan proposed, instead, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) The START I agreement was signed in 1991; START II in

17 Under START, weapons systems are being systematically dismantled how far has this gotten? 17

18 A number of other agreements were signed during the 1980s and 1990s The Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987 eliminated the Euromissiles Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty in 1990 imposed limits on both NATO & WTO 20,000 tanks 20,000 artillery pieces 30,000 armored combat vehicles 6,800 combat aircraft 2,000 attack helicopters The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was opened for signing in 1996, and now has 177 members, 138 who have ratified (but not the U.S.) 18

19 Soviet/Russian Strategic Forces, 1990 & 2008 "START Accountable" [1] ICBMs Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles Septembe r 1990 July 2008 Strategic Nuclear Warheads Septembe r 1990 July 2008 SS SS SS SS ,080 1,040 SS , SS-24 (Silo) SS-24 (Rail) SS SS-27 (Silo) SS-27 (Road Mobile) SLBMs Subtotal Bombers Subtotal SS-N-6 SS-N-8 SS-N-17 SS-N-18 SS-N-20 SS-N-23 RMS-56 Bear (ALCM) Bear (Non- ALCM) Blackjack , , , Subtotal 1, ,612 2,018 Total 2, ,271 4,138 19

20 U.S. Strategic Forces, 1990 & 2008 "START-Accountable" [1] Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles Strategic Nuclear Warheads September 1990 July 2008 September 1990 July 2008 ICBMs MX/Peacekeeper Minuteman III ,500 1,200 Minuteman II Subtotal 1, ,450 1,600 SLBMs Poseidon (C-3) ,920 0 Trident I (C-4) , Trident II (D-5) ,688 Subtotal ,760 3,264 Bombers B-52 (ALCM) , B-52 (Non-ALCM) B B Subtotal ,353 1,087 Total 2, 246 1,214 10,563 5,951 20

21 There s still a long way to go "START-Accountable" Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles Strategic Nuclear Warheads September 1990 July 2008 September 1990 July 2008 U.S. Total 2,246 1,214 10,563 5,951 USSR/Russia Total 2, ,271 4,138 21

22 The current plan is to further negotiate these levels down but how low can we go? 22

23 In 1998, Charles Glaser presented one argument against disarmament Nuclear powers with good relations don t need to disarm war is unlikely but they should hedge against deterioration of relations Disarmament could increase the chances of deliberate nuclear war Accidental nuclear war can be avoided through measures other than disarmament, through retargeting, separation of warheads from delivery vehicles, etc. But disarmament would expose NWS vulnerable to attack by new nuclear states & makes NWS more willing to launch non-nuclear wars which would help to deter proliferation arms control and nuclear disarmament are fundamentally different enterprises (p. 125) Is Glaser correct? (note that these are not new arguments) 23

24 Can we get to Zero? Must nuclear weapons be uninvented first? 24

25 Beginning in the 1950s, the United States started to worry about nuclear proliferation this table shows Robert McNamara s 1963 assessment of which countries might acquire nuclear weapons 25

26 In 1963, President Kennedy warned, I see the possibility in the 1970 s of the President of the United States having to face a world in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may give these weapons. I regard that as the greatest possible danger and hazard. The first Chinese nuclear test in October, 1964, served to wonderfully concentrate the mind and probably work on the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty 26

27 Beginning in 1967, seven regions of the world declared themselves by treaty to be nuclear weapons free zones 27

28 The NNPT of 1968 defines five nuclear weapons states, who are committed to meaningful disarmament and sharing of nuclear technology under IAEA supervision and monitoring. In return, the non-nuclear weapons states agree to forego acquisition of nuclear weapons. 28

29 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) required that 5 nuclear weapons states (NWS) engage in meaningful efforts to reduce their arsenals This is the quid pro quo for nonnuclear weapons states (NNWS) to sign & ratify the NPT At least 3 new NW states are not signatories; North Korea has withdrawn Arguably, the NWS have not taken the NPT very seriously NNWS have had good reason to go nuclear although none have done so Do U.S.-Russian negotiations offer any hope for NNPT? 29

30 As we shall see The risk from U.S. & Russian arsenals remains potentially quite high Very small arsenals can be retained for some period of time to maintain strategic uncertainty Nuclear weapons can be an attractive nuisance Nukes can be uninvented it has happened 30

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