The CAPSTONE Course and its Critical Role In Effective Civil-Military Relations in the United States J. STEPHEN SHI

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1 In the twenty years between my attending the Army War College and becoming Chairman, [I] had received no formal education to prepare for managing the civil-military relationship, neither at the CAPSTONE course for general officers nor at the Harvard Kennedy School for senior executives. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richards Myers USAF Ret. 1 The CAPSTONE Course and its Critical Role In Effective Civil-Military Relations in the United States J. STEPHEN SHI In the eleven years since the attacks of 9/11, the United States has undergone significant stress and change in the area of civil-military relations and in particular with respect to that bedrock principle of civilian control of the military so vital to the healthy functioning of the Republic. A number of situations have arisen during this period, however, that suggest a crisis of varying degrees and intensity in effecting and maintaining what some scholars in the field of civil-military relations ( CMR ) have termed the bargain among the American people, the federal civil government and the military. 2 This paper will consider the extent to which the CAPSTONE course for all newly-selected flag officers and perhaps the pinnacle of the professional military education system for officers of the US military, prepares future flag officers for their proper roles and responsibilities in establishing and maintaining good CMR with both their civilian government superiors and the American people. Of particular interest is the extent to which CAPSTONE provides meaningful and concrete education and guidance to attendees regarding their role in shaping and executing national security policy including when necessary expression of dissent from policies or orders from their civilian superiors. This latter aspect of CMR is of recent concern as reflected in a number of instances since 2001 where senior civilian officials consciously isolated their uniformed subordinates from the process of developing and implementing a number of significant and controversial policies or where the advice and requests from senior military officers have been ignored for purely political reasons by our civilian leadership, including the Commander in Chief. 3 During this same period, tension in American CMR was also highlighted in several instances where retired senior officers expressed disagreement with national security policies of the U.S. government in very public fora. 4 Introduction to Modern Civil-Military Relations in the United States In the United States, CMR are significantly affected by the juridical aspect of the relationship between military officers and the other two parties to the civilian-military bargain, the federal civil government and the people at large. 5 While there are myriad direct and indirect references to the military in the United States Constitution, there are few specific provisions regarding its actual role (in the context of the civilian-military bargain ) in the functioning of the federal government 1

2 established by the Constitution. 6 As such, this role must be guided and interpreted within the provisions of the Constitution generally, which emphasize and embody the principle of federalism. In this system, the drafters were so wary of unchecked central governmental despotism that they purposely and carefully circumscribed those powers and prerogatives of the federal government to those inherently necessary and appropriate for the national government such as national defense, foreign affairs and interstate commerce. All governing powers not expressly or impliedly granted by the people to the federal government were vested in the governments of the several states or ultimately in the people themselves. 7 As a check on the natural tendency of humans to aggrandize political power at the expense of the liberty of the people, the drafters wisely and presciently set the major branches of government, the legislative, executive and judicial established by the Constitution in exquisite tension. This is understandably quite apparent in the manner in which they allocated those powers that directly or indirectly affect the military instrument of the federal government since the British army was the agent for most of the abuse of that sovereign power that in large part precipitated the War of Independence. 8 As a consequence, to effectively assess the role and functioning of military matters within our Constitutional republic, one must take into account not only the Commander in Chief function of the President, but also the powers of the Congress, and to a lesser extent the Judiciary. 7 The fundamental and all-encompassing nature of this relationship is no better focused than in the oath of office taken by all commissioned officers in the United States military both at their initial commissioning and as renewed throughout their careers at every promotion and assumption of certain commands: I, [name], do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God. 9 (emphasis added) This Constitution-centric focus for commissioned officers is further underscored when one considers the oath taken by United States enlisted personnel, particularly the highlighted portion: I, [name] do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God. 10 (emphasis added) Similarly, it is worth noting for comparison the oath of the Irish Defence forces: I [name], do solemnly swear (or declare) that I will be faithful to Ireland and loyal to the Constitution and that while I am a member of the Defence Forces I will obey all lawful orders issued 2

3 to me by my superior officers and that while I am a member of the Permanent Defence Force I will not join or be a member of or subscribe to any political organisation or society or any secret society whatsoever and that, if I become a member of the Reserve Defence Force, I will not, while I am a member of the Reserve Defence Force, join or be a member of or subscribe to any secret society whatsoever. 11 (emphasis added) Even more striking in this regard is the oath taken by most military officers and other ranks of the United Kingdom: I[name] swear by Almighty God that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, Her Heirs and Successors, and that I will, as in duty bound, honestly and faithfully defend Her Majesty, Her Heirs and Successors, in Person, Crown and Dignity against all enemies, and will observe and obey all orders of Her Majesty, Her Heirs and Successors, and of the generals and officers set over me. So help me God. 12 (emphasis added) In the context of CMR, it is especially important to note that the highlighted portions of each of these oaths make it clear that the United States Constitution, and not the offices of superior officials, is the true lodestar for the allegiance and duty owed by commissioned officers in the United States upon taking their oaths of office. As a consequence, this oath is an ever-present reminder of the inherent tension created between the allegiance expressly owed by American officers under and to the Constitution and their tacit duty to obey their civilian superiors, all of whom, civilian and uniformed, ultimately answer to the President in his or her role as Commander in Chief. 13 This is but one of the several interrelated tensions purposely included in the Constitutional framework as an additional check and balance against the potential for tyranny represented by a central national government. 14 This tension between duty to the Constitution and the duty to obey the orders of civilian superiors underlies much of the theory and actual functioning of CMR and especially the principle of civilian control of the military. 15 Fortunately, the history of CMR in the United States is such that instances of military officers having to choose between these duties are quite rare and thus far have not included the most senior flag officers within the uniformed services. A Changing Line Between Obedience and Dissent? Traditionally since the beginning of the 20 th century in the United States, the officer corps has had as its ethos of professionalism in the arena of CMR that while officers were duty-bound to provide unvarnished information and advice to their civilian superiors to assist the latter in developing and implementing national security policy. This duty however did not extend to resisting such policy in the event of disagreement between the military and civilian leadership in that once the civilian leadership had taken its decision, the dictates of professionalism required that any previous dissent among military leaders be replaced by obedience to and support of such policy throughout the military chain of command. 3

4 This view is consistent with Professor Huntington s three part framework of professionalism whereby a profession is imbued with corporateness, expertise and a duty to society. 16 In the United States this framework of course is not without its own contradictions that complicate the CMR equation. For example, corporateness requires strong institutional cohesion that, given the inherent role of the military, in turn demands a degree of physical and cultural separateness from the society from which it is derived. Given the apparently diverging trajectories of the liberalism (in the classical sense) of American civilian society and the inherently conservative and insular world of the now all-volunteer military, this further exacerbates the civil-military divide that some argue can, if not sufficiently constrained institutionally and through active leadership, lead to praetorianism. 17 The second prong of Huntington s framework, expertise, includes not merely technological and leadership capabilities but also expertise in civil-military relations. 18 Significantly, as reflected in the following paragraphs, the professional military educational system of the United States is weighted primarily toward the first two of these aspects. The third component of this framework, duty to society, brings into acute focus the nature of the officer s oath of office and primary obligation that, as previously shown, is to support and defend the Constitution, which in turn enshrines the principle that all political power of the United States government is derived from the people. 19 It is this duty to the people that tempers and informs the officer s duty of obedience to his or her superiors, both military and civilian and which can create very difficult issues for military officers in terms of where the center of gravity of their allegiance and duty to obey may lie in a given case. Relevant Senior Officer Education Regarding Civil-Military Relations With this as a backdrop, in addition to the CAPSTONE course discussed in more detail below, the so-called top level or senior level (typically for Colonels specially selected by boards of officers who have deemed such selectees to have potential for subsequent advancement to flag rank) professional educational institutions of the several services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff ( JCS ) generally approach the subject of CMR in similar fashion, with primary differences being the emphasis afforded specific substantive aspects and pedagogical methods used to present the material and otherwise engage the students. 20 Thus in varying fashion, all of these schools as well as the CAPSTONE course acquaint the students with the science of CMR including the major contributions of Clausewitz, Huntington, Janowitz, Weigley, Desch, Avant, Langston, Feaver and others. 21 In addition, analyses of more recent and topical examples are studied such as Cook s Revolt of the Generals and Snider s Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions. 22 From a pedagogical perspective, various methods are used to both deliver the information regarding CMR and also to reinforce the material in the minds of the students. This usually means a mix of classroom lecture and small cohort-based guided discussion of both the substantive material and actual or potential situations in which CMR issues, especially those involving civilian control, are covered. Given the variability and criticality of the specific context and facts involved in real situations of fundamental disagreement between the civilian political leadership and senior military 4

5 officers, however, it is difficult to provide the students with specific immutable bright line rules for resolving or otherwise addressing every nuance of such situations. The CAPSTONE Course In this regard, perhaps the best opportunity for adequately preparing flag officers in the area of CMR, is the CAPSTONE course. CAPSTONE is an intense five-week course, mandatory since 1986, for all newly-selected flag officers conducted at the direction of the JCS by the National Defense University. As reflected in the course syllabus in Appendix 1, the curriculum is quite broad with pedagogy ranging from classroom instruction and briefings to actual exercises involving policy considerations and decision-making in the joint and combined arenas. As also suggested by the syllabus, and especially given the relatively short duration of the course, the breadth of the subject matter necessarily puts a premium on instructional time for any particular subject. As such, CMR does not appear to be addressed as a discrete subject but is rather subsumed in other substantive areas of instruction. Furthermore, as is also apparent from the syllabus, the emphasis of the course is operational and the subject matter relatively concrete such that a subject like CMR, with its inherent abstractions dictated by the very nature of the interface between the civilian leadership and the subordinate uniformed leaders, could be perceived by CAPSTONE attendees as secondary in terms of its criticality to their future roles as flag officers when compared to more familiar operational subject matter. This assessment is supported by communications with former participants and those on the CAPSTONE staff, the consensus of whom is that while attendees come away from the course with an appropriate understanding of the various theories and analyses of the science of CMR and an appreciation of its importance to the effective functioning of the United States military, those attending the course are not generally provided with specific normative standards by which they could carry out their respective roles and duties within the context of CMR. That is to say, while those completing the CAPSTONE course are aware that good CMR is vital to the effective functioning of the military in the United States, the specific day-to-day challenges of so doing are in large part left to the particular value judgments and moral and ethical standards of those whose future roles may put them squarely in the middle of CMR issues. Further evidence of the operational focus of CMR for CAPSTONE attendees is found in the written materials that are required reading. For example, in the excerpt attached as Appendix 2, only oblique references are made to CMR with the use of such terms as full government team, whole of government, national leadership, stakeholders and the like. The context of such terms underscores the point that while CAPSTONE may afford its graduates a healthy appreciation of the importance of integrating civilian leaders into their activities, such as operational planning and execution, it does not sufficiently equip them for the super-heated crucible of CMR at the national security policy level in terms of providing specific principles and guidance as to the need for candor 5

6 in advising civilian leaders and as to the appropriate situations for and means of expressing dissent with policies or orders emanating from the civilian leadership. As a consequence, CAPSTONE should include in its coverage of CMR an effective legal and ethical framework within which each military leader must assess his or her appropriate role and position within a given CMR context, and to the extent necessary, to disagree with civilian superiors in the chain of command. Even more to the point, in such circumstances of disagreement, CAPSTONE should confront the elephant in the room in discussing just how a military leader should act in those situations where he or she concludes that a given position of or order from civilian leadership is extra-constitutional and thus ultra vires in the context of the officer s penultimate sworn duty to support and defend the Constitution. Recent Instances Where Civilian Superiors May Have Abused Their Role in CMR In her article The Detainee Interrogation Debate and the Legal-Policy Process, Air Force Colonel and judge advocate, Lisa Turner, details but one of the several episodes since 2001 when principled dissent by uniformed senior officers doing their duty under applicable law to advise and inform their civilian superiors led to their being effectively and intentionally cut out of the policy formulation and implementation process by these same superiors. 23 This occurred in the context of senior members of the administration of then-president George W. Bush attempting to address the issue of the applicable standards for and limits of interrogation of detainees kept at Guantanamo. Given the inherent legal issues raised, the judge advocates general of the Army, Air Force and Navy, joined by their counterpart for the Marine Corps, the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant, were required under applicable law and policy to review and comment on the legality and the appropriateness of a number of the aspects of the interrogation policies put forward by civilian leaders in the Bush administration. When these officers unanimously expressed grave concerns over salient aspects of the proposed policies under both domestic and international law, certain civilian officials of the Bush administration determined that these officers were an impediment to the adoption of the policies they favored. What then followed was an effort to adopt and implement the policies in question by intentionally excluding these senior judge advocates from further involvement, contrary to the letter and spirit of applicable policies requiring their involvement. This apparent subversion of the process of appropriate interaction between senior military officers and their civilian superiors has been widely criticized. In addition, subsequent Congressional hearings, several Supreme Court decisions and most telling perhaps, retrenchment by both the Bush and Obama administrations as to certain policies regarding interrogation of detainees have supported the position taken by these senior officers. In another instance cited by some observers, very senior civilian officials of the Obama administration, including the Commander in Chief himself, may have abused their position of authority over military subordinates in connection with the so-called surge by US and 6

7 allied forces in the on-going conflict in Afghanistan. To a large extent, this situation has been overshadowed by the related but separate issue of the relief of General Stanley McChrystal by President Obama and as such may not have yet received the critical scrutiny is deserves in terms of assessment of CMR in the post 9/11 period. Specifically, in 2009 the Obama administration adopted a new strategy of focusing on the security of the Afghan people through a counterinsurgency approach rather than the counterterrorism approach of the previous administration. 25 Subsequently, a classified study undertaken by the staff of General McChrystal, who had been specifically chosen by the President to head up the western coalition forces in Afghanistan, determined that more troops were needed to pursue this new strategy. 26 President Obama, in consultation with his political advisers determined that the number of troops requested by General McChrystal in this study was politically untenable with a significant component of President Obama s political base that was quite vocal in its disagreement with continued United States involvement in both Iraq and Afghanistan. 27 As a consequence it is argued by critics of this decision, the Obama administration effectively ignored the legitimate military expertise of General McChrystal and his staff for purely short term domestic political reasons. Exacerbating this, so goes the argument, was a fundamental breakdown in effective and appropriate CMR that ultimately may have contributed to additional problems with implementing the surge, including even unnecessary casualties resulting from having inadequate forces for the surge. 28 Conclusion Particularly in view of numerous instances since 9/11 that have strained positive CMR in the United States and the apparent negative trajectory of CMR into the foreseeable future, more intense and hopefully effective education in CMR is required for both senior military leaders as well as their civilian superiors. While achieving the latter is beyond the scope of this paper, with respect to the more thorough CMR education of senior military officers, the CAPSTONE course appears to be the most effective context for such education. Strengthening the CMR curriculum at CAPSTONE in terms of both the substantive principles and norms involved and in the specific pedagogical techniques needed to ensure not only an intellectual appreciation of the need for positive CMR but more importantly a practical working framework for senior officers who will likely be involved for the remainder of their careers in serious national security policy issues that necessarily implicate CMR at the highest level. Hopefully this increased focus on CMR at CAPSTONE would help address the deficit noted by many observers in the current system of professional military education that has contributed to recent crises in American CMR. 29 7