Theory of War: Blitzkrieg

Transcription

1 Theory of War: Blitzkrieg Most sections in this lesson are taken from articles published in Paret, Peter, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Authors and titles of specific articles are given in the headings. Page references within the outline, unless specifically indicated, all come from this work. 1. Blitzkrieg a. Theory developed by J.F.C. Fuller and B.H. Liddell Hart, two British veterans of World War I, who sought to break the tactical deadlock i. Liddell Hart's vision more encompassing, more influential (although not everyone agrees with me on this; Trevor Dupuy, for one, reverses that relationship) ii. Liddell Hart, in particular, was studied intensively by the Germans (Guderian, Manstein, Rommel, Rundstedt), Patton (who followed Sherman's campaigns over the terrain with Liddell Hart's study in hand, and engaged him in lengthy conversations during the war) and in later years, by the Israeli Defense Forces (he was frequently invited as a lecturer). Liddell Hart therefore influences some of the most masterful practitioners of Blitzkrieg quite directly. iii. They began by trying to wed the tank developed by the Allies in the latter stages of World War I with the infantry assault tactics developed by the Germans b. Highly mobile, mechanized all-arms formations used as spearheads i. Medium and heavy tanks concentrated ii. Mechanized infantry iii. Mechanized artillery iv. Ideally, all armored fighting vehicles (tanks, carriers, self-propelled guns) would combine the gasoline engine with caterpillar treads for maximum off-road capability and operational flexibility c. Typical Blitzkrieg attack: i. Selection of a relatively narrow area of front that is weak ii. Feint attacks launched at other points of the front to deceive the enemy (1) On a strategic level, this could include diplomatic overtures designed to lull an opponent iii. Strategic isolation of the area by air attack on rear areas, accompanied by long-range artillery to seal the area off from assistance iv. Holding attacks launched to either side of the assault to pin enemy forces in place v. Heavy tactical air support to assist break through by heavy tanks accompanied by armored infantry

2 Makers of Modern Strategy Page 2 vi. vii. viii. Air, artillery, and possibly air-borne attacks on communications and transportation centers to rear of the front in order to create confusion and fear Tactics of by-passing strong points and infiltrating to the rear Once a break through has been achieved, the armored formations race ahead, spreading out in an expanding torrent, threatening multiple objectives, while motorized infantry (truck driven [now obsolete]) and infantry on foot fill in the spear head and hold the flanks against counterattack Air support acts here as a highly mobile artillery ix. x. Tanks are also nothing other than highly mobile gun platforms xi. Armored spearheads must include all arms, since tanks without infantry, infantry without tanks, and both without artillery are vulnerable xii. Substantial portions of this course will offer opportunities to apply this generalization to specific examples. Campaigns which one might bear in mind include: (1) The Fall of France 1940 (2) Operation Barbarossa 1941 (3) Normandy 1944 (4) The Six Day War 1967 (5) Operation Desert Storm 1992 d. I have very definite views on the correct application of Blitzkrieg ideas. Most modern armies are built with this type of warfare in mind. It should be understood that Blitzkrieg is not appropriate or successful everywhere. i. For all of its spectacular success in World War II, most of the fighting resembled World War I a great deal: for example, the entire Pacific campaign, Italy, most of Normandy. ii. Terrain and weather restrict the effectiveness of Blitzkrieg. (1) The mountains of Italy, with their narrow defiles, made rapid movement impossible; the Germans could always fall back to another formidable defensive line which had to be stormed frontally. (2) The bocage country of Normandy likewise restricted armored movement severely. Until the breakout at St. Lo, Normandy is a brutal infantry battle with tanks used as mobile pill boxes. (3) The spring thaw in Russia brought almost all movement to a halt. Recent photos of attempts to bridge a river in Bosnia (this is being typed in January 1996) should drive home the difficulties weather can impose, even to today's formations. (4) Terrain can be artificially modified to restrict armored movement, such as the immensely thick defensive belt at Kursk-Orel, using millions of mines, and thousands of anti-tank guns, tanks, and artillery. The British also constructed such defenses extensively in the Western Desert.

3 Makers of Modern Strategy Page 3 iii. (a) (b) One should not assume, however, that such a defensively line cannot be overcome. The Egyptian defense line in the Sinai was constructed along the Soviet model in 1967, but the Israelis nevertheless achieved a swift rupture and then collapsed the Egyptian rear. Likewise, Saddam Hussein constructed immensely powerful fixed defenses only to see them ruptured frontally by well trained assault forces and outflanked in the desert. The best use of positional defenses is to provide a shield and a pivot for powerful counterattacks, while channeling enemy assaults into killing zones and allowing the defender to conserve resources. (5) Jungle terrain, such as much of Viet Nam, or Burma or Malaya, is completely unsuitable for armor. Infantry tactics must predominate. Japanese and Viet Cong troops were more at home in the jungle than their British or American opponents, and therefore were generally able to maintain tactical initiative. Fighting in such terrain demands more out of the individual soldier on the ground than any other type of combat I can think of. Desert Storm is pure, classic Blitzkrieg. (1) The main assault was focussed in the west, around rather than through the chief Iraqi defenses. The Iraqis thought the desert to the West was impassible for large formations. American reconnaissance showed them to be wrong; therefore, we came from an unexpected direction. (2) Feint attacks prevented the Iraqis from identifying the thrust at their jugular, and stretched their defenses. The Marine amphibious task force tied up huge numbers of enemy troops (however frustrated Marine commanders may have been, this was the best use of the force). Attacks by Marines directly at Kuwait City fulfilled Iraqi expectations; other Arab forces farther west helped to pin any forces down. (3) Strategic isolation by air forces was achieved at perhaps a level unprecedented in warfare. The desert environment maximized all Coalition advantages of technology. Modern equipment allowed Coalition aircraft to interdict the Iraqis even at night. Iraqi redeployment and resupply was virtually impossible. The only bridges connecting the Iraqi forces to the rest of the country that were still (more or less) intact, were at Basra. (4) Assault forces were supported by close air support that applied overwhelming firepower quickly to any particular spot. One Iraqi battalion sized attack was massacred by Apache helicopters alone, without the use of ground forces. (5) Air borne forces seized intermediate locations and a foothold at the

4 Makers of Modern Strategy Page 4 Euphrates itself. 24th Mech, following up, sealed the Iraqis against the river, and then turned east, to sever all connection-- closing the bag. (6) British and US armored divisions could then wheel shoulder to shoulder to seek out and destroy the Republican Guard. Frontal defenses were completely bypassed. Coalition mobility and flexibility allowed us to engage the Iraqis from unexpected directions and to engage them piecemeal. (7) These armored divisions were well-balanced with tanks, mechanized infantry, integral air, and mobile artillery. They combine staggering speed and violence. Their mobility allowed concentration of forces and surprise. (8) The result is one of the greatest massacres in modern military history. e. Liddell Hart, Strategy. (New York: Signet, 1967). i. Grand Strategy: "grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace. It should not only combine the various instruments, but so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peace--for its security and prosperity." (322) ii. Military Strategy: "Strategy depends for success... on a sound calculation co-ordination of the end and the means. (322) iii. Elements and Conditions of Strategy: "Its purpose is to diminish the possibility of resistance, and it seeks to fulfill this purpose by exploiting the elements of movement and surprise. (323) iv. Aim of Strategy: A commander's "true aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this. (325) v. Action of Strategy: "it takes the line of least resistance. The equivalent in the psychological sphere is the line of least expectation. (327) vi. Concentrated Essence of Strategy and Tactics: (1) Adjust your end to your means. (2) Keep your object always in mind (3) Choose the line (or course) of least expectation (4) Exploit the line of least resistance (5) Take a line of operation which offers alternative objectives (6) Ensure that both plan and dispositions are flexible--adaptable to circumstances (7) Do not throw your weight into a stroke whilst your opponent is on guard (8) Do not renew an attack along the same line (or in the same form) after it has once failed ( ) vii. "The object of war is to attain a better peace--even if only from your own

5 Makers of Modern Strategy Page 5 viii. ix. point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire.... A State which expends its strength to the point of exhaustion bankrupts its own policy, and future." (353) "Victory in the true sense implies that the state of peace, and of one's people, is better after the war than before. Victory in this sense is only possible if a quick result can be gained or if a long effort can be economically proportioned to the national resources. Failing a fair prospect of such a victory, wise statesmanship will miss no opportunity for negotiating peace." (357) You will note from the above that Liddell Hart is neither a war monger nor a believer in killing for its own sake. In fact, his aim is a quick victory, which might be achieved through extremely violent action but which is, in the long run, cheaper in blood and treasure than a long war of attrition. x. Wars and campaigns to which one might instructively apply Liddell Hart's criteria include: (1) The Fall of France 1940 (2) Operation Barbarossa 1941 (3) The Stalingrad Campaign 1942 (4) Operation Zitadelle 1943 (Kursk-Orel) (5) The Korean War (6) The Six Day War 1967 (7) The Second Indochina War (Vietnam War) (8) The Yom Kippur War 1973 (9) Operation Desert Storm 1992