Export Controls What are they, and how do they affect me?

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1 Export Controls What are they, and how do they affect me? Elizabeth Haney Senior Research Officer and Export Control Officer Wyss Institute for Biologically Inspired Engineering, Harvard University Norman Hebert Director of International Research Administration Brown University Marie Hladikova Export Control Director Boston University Thomas Porro Export Control Compliance Manager University of Massachusetts Lowell

2 Outline Why do export controls exist and why should you care? What is an export? Overview of agencies that govern export controls and their regulatory regimes Department of State ITAR Department of Commerce EAR Department of Treasury OFAC Case Studies Export control checklist implementation Clauses and contract negotiations Licensing Enforcement actions Q&A

3 Why do U.S. Export Controls Exist? Foreign policy goals National security concerns Economic objectives Remember: US Export Controls are the law, and they apply not just to sponsored research but to all activities.

4 Why should you care about U.S. Export Controls? Risk Environment Collaborations internationally Diverse community locally 30% of full-time graduate students and 53% of postdocs in science and engineering in the U.S. were foreign nationals with temporary visas At Harvard: 10% of undergraduate community are international students, and 32% to 42% of the graduate student community are international students At Brown: 17.5 % of student community are international students, and more than 470 of 5000 (9.4%) undergraduates are studying abroad At UML: 2% of undergraduate community are international students, and 6% of the graduate student community are international students At BU: 24% of student community are international students, there are 1,054 visiting scholars from 77 countries, and 300+ global activities in over 90 countries

5 Why should you care about U.S. Export Controls? Penalties for Noncompliance State Department (ITAR) Criminal violations: : fines of up to $1,00,000 per violation for individuals and universities; individuals are also eligible for up to 10 years in prison per violation Civil penalties: fines of up to $500,000 per violation for individuals and universities Additionally, for any violation of the ITAR, any of the following may be imposed: seizure and forfeiture of the articles and any vessel, aircraft or vehicle involved in attempted violation, revocation of exporting privileges, inability to obtain federal contracts Commerce Department (EAR) Criminal violations: Willful: fines of up to $1,00,000 per violation for universities and $250,000 per violation for individuals, or five times the value of the export ; individuals are also eligible for up to 10 years in prison per violation Knowing: fines of up to $250,000 per violation for universities and individuals, or five times the value of the export ; individuals are also eligible for up to 5 years in prison per violation Civil penalties: fines up to $250,000 per violation Additionally, for any violation of the EAR, any of the following may be imposed: seizure and forfeiture of the articles and any vessel, aircraft or vehicle involved in attempted violation, revocation of exporting privileges, inability to obtain federal contracts, denial of export privileges Treasury Department (OFAC) Criminal violations: : fines of up to $1,000,000 per violation for individuals and universities; individuals are also eligible for up to 20 years in prison per violation Civil penalties: fines of up to $250,000 per violation for individuals and universities Additionally, for any violation of the OFAC, seizure and forfeiture of the articles may result

6 Why should you care about U.S. Export Controls? Your Institution Needs your Help The institution where you work most likely has someone at a central level who is responsible for export control compliance. Departmental Research Administrators are closest to research and the researchers and can be the first to become aware of activities that may implicate potential export control issues, such as Foreign Travel Shipping of Material Goods Abroad Central Office Research Administrators are involved in proposal submission and award negotiations and can be the first to become aware activities that may implicate of potential export control issues, such as Terms that restrict publication or participation in a project Industry Sponsored Research Agreements Bottom Line: If you come across a potential export control issue, know who to contact at your institution.

7 What is an export? An export is a transfer of technology, information, equipment, software, or services to a foreign person by any means. A foreign person is defined as anyone who is not a U.S. citizen or permanent resident or who is not a protected individual (a protected individual is someone who has been granted asylum or refugee status)

8 What is an export? Exports include the actual physical transfer of one of these items (technology, information, equipment, software, or services) outside the U.S. Exports also include making any of these items available for visual inspection, written or oral disclosures about the items, and electronic communication about the items this is what is referred to as a deemed export.

9 What is a deemed export? The disclosure or transfer of export controlled software, technologies or technical data to a foreign entity or individual inside the US is deemed to be an export to the home country of the foreign person. Applies to technology transfers under the EAR and the provisions of ITAR technical data and defense services ITAR takes into account all of a person s nationalities and citizenships and imposes the controls that correspond to the most restrictive nationality or citizenship EAR looks only at a person s latest citizenship or legal permanent residence in determining restrictions

10 Agencies that govern export controls State Department: International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) Commerce Department: Export Administration Regulations (EAR) Treasury Department: Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Nuclear Regulatory Commission Department of Energy Food and Drug Administration Environmental Protection Administration Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) Department of Interior, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Drug Enforcement Administration

11 ITAR Regulates the export of defense articles and defense services. The list of regulated items is the United States Munitions List (USML) which is part of the ITAR. Items on the USML include (Note: These definitions are proposed to be updated) Defense articles Defense articles are items on the USML. 22 CFR Technical data relating to defense articles Technical data is information required for the design, development, production, manufacture, assembly, operation, repair, testing, maintenance or modification of defense articles. This includes information in the form of blueprints, drawings, photographs, plans, instructions or documentation. 22 CFR In new proposed rules, there is a definition of technical data that arises during, or results from, fundamental research, and this would be excluded from ITAR regulation. Right now, technical data also includes software related to defense articles. In new proposed rules, software will be a defense article. Defense services Defense services include providing assistance or training in the design, development, engineering, manufacture, production, assembly, testing, repair, maintenance, modification, operation, demilitarization, destruction, processing or use of defense articles. 22 CFR

12 ITAR Information not considered technical data and excluded from regulation under ITAR includes Information concerning general scientific, mathematical or engineering principles commonly taught in schools, colleges and universities (Educational Exemption) Information which is published and which is generally accessible or available to the public through books, journals, libraries, conferences in the U.S. (Public Domain Exemption) Information which is published and which is generally accessible or available through fundamental research (Fundamental Research Exemption) Basic Marketing information on function, purpose, or general systems description Information approved for release by the cognizant government agency or the Office of the Security Review Information contained in patent applications Note: Things may change with the new proposed rules.

13 ITAR Defense articles always require a license to export Technical data relating to defense articles may be covered by the following exemption 22 CFR125.4.b.10 allows disclosures of unclassified technical data in the U.S. by U.S. institutions of higher learning to foreign persons who are their bona fide and full time regular employees. But. To use this exemption your institution must be registered with Defense Directorate of Trade Controls (DDTC) this is no small matter Postdocs and students are typically not considered bona fide and full time regular employees. All exemptions require certification by the Empowered Official and lack of certification is a violation of the ITAR. Note: Exemptions may change with the new proposed rules.

14 EAR Regulates the export of dual use items. The list of regulated items is the Commerce Control List (CCL) which is part of the EAR. Items on the CCL include equipment, materials, software, and technology. Each item on the CCL has an Export Control Classification Number (ECCN). If an item is not enumerated on the CCL, it is designated as EAR99 Information that is published, educational information, and information resulting from fundamental research is not subject to control under the EAR Note: Things may change with the new proposed rules.

15 Minor Differences: Fundamental Research under EAR and ITAR Both define fundamental research as information which is generally accessible to the public through fundamental research in science and engineering at accredited institutions of higher learning in the U.S. where the resulting information is ordinarily published and shared broadly in the scientific community. But But ITAR considers shared broadly to include release only at an open gathering in the U.S. (such as a conference, meeting, seminar, or trade show) EAR includes open gatherings abroad. ITAR requires that there be absolutely no restrictions on publication of the research and that there be absolutely no restrictions on the participation of foreign nationals in the research If the research qualifies as fundamental, EAR allows pre-publication review solely to insure that the publication would not inadvertently divulge proprietary information or compromise patent rights and allows National security controls under DOD contracts (such as review and approval of foreign nationals assigned to a project) 15 CFR and FAQs in 15 C.F.R. 734, Supplement 1 Note: Things may change with the new proposed rules.

16 ECCNs ECCNs tell you if the item is controlled to the country of interest Based on the ECCN, the item may not be controlled for export to the country of interest and therefore eligible for export as No License Required (NLR) may be eligible for a license exception to the country of interest may require a license from the Commerce Department before exporting to the country of interest EAR99 items do not require a license to export to all countries except Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Sudan Before exporting (as NLR or with an exception), you must also check for catch-all controls All items on the CCL and EAR99 items are still subject to OFAC regulations and to restrictions on end uses and end users (catch all controls).

17 Catch All Controls Prohibited Parties Embargoed Countries Proliferation Activities (Nuclear, Missile, and Chemical/Biological Weapons) Military End Uses/Users (in China and other Country Group D countries) Red Flags

18 Commonly Used Exceptions to License Requirements under the EAR List Based (based on ECCN) Shipments to country group B (GBS) Civil End Users (CIV) Limited Value Shipments (LVS) Technology and Software Restricted (TSR) Strategic Trade Authorization (STA) Transaction Based Temporary Imports, Exports, and Reexports (TMP) Service & Replacement Parts & Equipment (RPL) Technology and Software Unrestricted (TSU) When you use a license exception, OFAC regulations and restrictions on end uses and end users (catch all controls) still apply.

19 How you can help your institution If a physical item on the CCL is going out of the country, your institution s export control compliance folks need to know the ECCN (what) the destination country (where) the person(s) receiving the item (who) the intended end use (why)

20 OFAC Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Regulates all transactions abroad with prohibited parties. Prohibited parties include Foreign governments that are subject to trade sanctions and embargoes List is here End-users (individuals and companies) who are operating on behalf of foreign governments or who are participating in controlled activities (terrorism, narcotics, and nuclear proliferation) List of these Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) is here List/Pages/default.aspx Focus is on the end-user/country/end-use rather than the technology

21 OFAC Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) There is no Fundamental Research Exemption under OFAC There is no exemption for Educational Activities under OFAC But When persons from OFAC countries are here in the U.S., deemed exports of information to these persons in the course of their research activities while they are in the U.S. are subject to public domain, fundamental research, and education exclusions under ITAR and EAR. Licenses and exemptions are available from Treasury Department for transactions with sanctioned countries, individuals, or companies Information in the public domain can be exported to OFAC countries Activities in support of publishing (such as academic peer review) are allowed with certain OFAC countries But there are no licenses or exemptions available for dealing with individuals and companies that are Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs)

22 Take Home Message: What is an Export? An export is a transfer of Technology Information Equipment Software Services to a foreign person, i.e. anyone who is not a U.S. citizen a permanent resident a protected individual (asylum or refugee status) by any means, i.e. visual inspection written disclosures oral disclosures electronic communication interpretive dance Export controls are the law, and they apply to not only sponsored research but to all activities.

23 Take Home Message: ITAR ITAR If a physical item on the USML is going out of the country, a license from the State Department is always required. To get a license, your institution must be registered with DDTC (no small matter). If technical data is going out of the country or being shared with a foreign person, it must be licensed or subject to an exemption.

24 Take Home Message: EAR EAR If a physical item is going out of the U.S., it is always subject to export control under the EAR, but a license may not be required for the country of interest. If information, software, or technology, is going out of the U.S. or being shared with a foreign person in the U.S., it may be excluded from EAR regulations. All items subject to EAR regulations must be evaluated against catch-all controls before export

25 Take Home Message: OFAC OFAC There is no Fundamental Research Exemption under OFAC There is no exemption for Educational Activities under OFAC The research of persons from OFAC countries who are here in the U.S. is subject to public domain, fundamental research, and education exclusions under ITAR and EAR. Licenses and exemptions are available from Treasury Department for certain activities (e.g. public domain, academic publishing) but there are no licenses or exemptions available for dealing with individuals and companies that are Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs)

26 Case Studies Export control checklist implementation Clauses and contract negotiations Licensing Enforcement actions

27 Case Studies: Export Control Checklist Export Control Checklist Fundamental Research is generally exempt from export controls unless: PI accepts restrictions on the publication of the results of his/her research or restrictions on foreign national participation PI builds military/space qualified hardware, software or analyze tech. data related to hardware or software on the US Munitions List PI signs DoD form 2345 Militarily Critical Technical Data Agreement PI works with encryption software PI accepts controlled technology, software or data under a Non- Disclosure agreement PI transfers controlled technology, software or data to foreign students, scholars during the research

28 Case Studies: Export Control Checklist Determination of Applicable Controls Check the Agency Announcement Contract/Grant for export control indicators Restrictive FAR and DFAR clauses Review the statement of work and the full proposal Can you review every single proposal that is submitted via sponsored programs to assess export control issues?

29 Case Studies: Export Control Checklist Boston University Best Practices Export Control Advisory Committee Simplified export control checklist for proposals Faculty members provided helpful feedback and recommended drafting explanations to the questions Helped with launch of the checklist Export Control Website All checklists and forms are easily accessible

30 Case Studies: Export Control Checklist Proposal Development and Review Principal Investigator Export Control Checklist Collected by Sponsored Programs with proposals Explanations for the questions on the new Export Control Checklist Checking yes on this list doesn t automatically mean that the research or activity falls under export controls

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32 Case Studies: Clauses and Contract Negotiations Clauses and Contract Negotiations There are multiple U.S. government contract clauses which are troublesome in terms of export controls and maintaining the fundamental research exemption. One of the most common such clauses encountered is: DFARS Disclosure of Information

33 Case Studies: Clauses and Contract Negotiations Disclosure of Information (AUG 2013) (a) The Contractor shall not release to anyone outside the Contractor's organization any unclassified information, regardless of medium (e.g., film, tape, document), pertaining to any part of this contract or any program related to this contract, unless (1) The Contracting Officer has given prior written approval; (2) The information is otherwise in the public domain before the date of release; or (3) The information results from or arises during the performance of a project that has been scoped and negotiated by the contracting activity with the Contractor and research performer and determined in writing by the Contracting Officer to be fundamental research in accordance with National Security Decision Directive 189, National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific, Technical and Engineering Information, in effect on the date of contract award and the USD (AT&L) memoranda on Fundamental Research, dated May 24, 2010, and on Contracted Fundamental Research, dated June 26, 2008, (available at DFARS PGI 204.4). (b) Requests for approval under paragraph (a)(1) shall identify the specific information to be released, the medium to be used, and the purpose for the release. The Contractor shall submit its request to the Contracting Officer at least 10 business days before the proposed date for release. (c) The Contractor agrees to include a similar requirement, including this paragraph (c), in each subcontract under this contract. Subcontractors shall submit requests for authorization to release through the prime contractor to the Contracting Officer.

34 Case Studies: Clauses and Contract Negotiations (a)the Contractor shall not release to anyone outside the Contractor's organization any unclassified information, regardless of medium (e.g., film, tape, document), pertaining to any part of this contract or any program related to this contract, unless (1) The Contracting Officer has given prior written approval; This restriction on dissemination of the research results, by definition, disqualifies the designation of the project as fundamental research. However, in 2013, the following paragraph was added to the clause: (3) The information results from or arises during the performance of a project that has been scoped and negotiated by the contracting activity with the Contractor and research performer and determined in writing by the Contracting Officer to be fundamental research in accordance with National Security Decision Directive 189, National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific, Technical and Engineering Information, in effect on the date of contract award and the USD (AT&L) memoranda on Fundamental Research, dated May 24, 2010, and on Contracted Fundamental Research, dated June 26, 2008, (available at DFARS PGI 204.4). So, while still requiring written approval of the Contracting Officer, this clause (in theory) sets the stage for the formal designation of the project as fundamental research by the U.S. Government.

35 Case Studies: Clauses and Contract Negotiations In late 2013, UMass-Lowell received two contracts from a (small) local company. The contracts contained no restrictive language, but upon inquiring, it was determined that both were subcontracts for AFRL SBIRs. One was a Phase I, and the other a Phase II. We asked for copies of the entire contracts, and found only the Phase II contained the actual clause. However both contracts had an H028 clause Implementation of Disclosure of Information, which references compliance with DFARS

36 Case Studies: Clauses and Contract Negotiations Both of these H028 clauses also identified the AF Public Affairs officer as the approval authority for the Contracting Officer. We spent several months trying to work with our sponsor, the AF public affairs offices, and the Contracting Officers to have UML s portion of the protects designated as fundamental research. And we eventually succeeded.

37 Case Studies: Clauses and Contract Negotiations Only to have the AF Security Office subsequently rescind the designation on the Phase II award. In the end, the P.I. requested that we refuse both contracts, claiming that there was not enough time left after the delays to complete the work. While these contracts did involve somewhat sensitive technologies, we are currently negotiating two U.S. Department of Transportation SBIR sub-contracts, both of which contain the following clause:

38 Case Studies: Clauses and Contract Negotiations Dissemination of contract information The Contractor shall not publish, permit to be published, or distribute for public consumption, any information, oral or written, concerning the results or conclusions made pursuant to the performance of this contract, without the prior written consent of the Contracting Officer. Two copies of any material proposed to be published or distributed shall be submitted to the Contracting Officer. There is no sensitive technology involved in either research project, so we requested that the flow-down be removed for us, or alternatively, the clause be replaced with the Educational Institutions version:

39 Case Studies: Clauses and Contract Negotiations Dissemination of information - educational institutions (a) The Department of Transportation (DOT) desires widespread dissemination of the results of funded transportation research. The Contractor, therefore, may publish (subject to the provisions of the "Data Rights" and "Patent Rights" clauses of the contract) research results in professional journals, books, trade publications, or other appropriate media (a thesis or collection of theses should not be used to distribute results because dissemination will not be sufficiently widespread). All costs of publication pursuant to this clause shall be borne by the Contractor and shall not be charged to the Government under this or any other Federal contract. (b) Any copy of material published under this clause must contain acknowledgment of DOT's sponsorship of the research effort and a disclaimer stating that the published material represents the position of the author(s) and not necessarily that of DOT. Articles for publication or papers to be presented to professional societies do not require the authorization of the Contracting Officer prior to release. However, two copies of each article shall be transmitted to the Contracting Officer at least two weeks prior to release or publication. (c) Press releases concerning the results or conclusions from the research under this contract shall not be made or otherwise distributed to the public without prior written approval of the Contracting Officer. (d) Publication under the terms of this clause does not release the Contractor from the obligation of preparing and submitting to the Contracting Officer a final report containing the findings and results of research, as set forth in the schedule of the contract. Our request to remove the clause entirely was denied on one of the contracts, and we are still awaiting word on the other one, and on the Educational Substitutions request

40 Case Studies: Clauses and Contract Negotiations These are just two examples of clauses which can affect an institution s ability to claim that a project qualifies as fundamental research. There are several new proposed clauses which will (possibly) add to the list, but always be looking for any clauses or terms which: Restrict publication or dissemination of information, including requiring permission for such Restrict who may participate in the project Require security controls

41 Case Studies: When Licensing Might Be Appropriate and Cannot Be Avoided A NEW PROFESSOR WHO IS COMING TO CAMPUS IN A FEW MONTHS, CONTACTS YOU TO LET YOU KNOW HIS INTENTIONS TO CONDUCT ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH ON FORESTS WORLDWIDE BEGINNING IN CENTRAL AMERICA. THE TOOLS HE PLANS TO USE FOR HIS RESEARCH INCLUDE A LARGE UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE (UAV) TOGETHER WITH AIRBORNE IMAGING SPECTROSCOPY REMOTE SENSING DEVICES. THE REMOTE SENSING DEVICES HE PLANS TO USE ARE MULTIPLE INFRARED CAMERAS IN SPECIFIC RANGES THAT WILL REVEAL CARBON AND WATER INTAKE AND PHOTOSYNTHESIS ACTIVITY.

42 Is it ITAR or EAR? Original plan was to use an Avenger Drone military unmanned aircraft identified on the ITAR in Category VIII of the USML Brown has not previously registered with the US State Department, taking advantage of specific exemptions at 122.1(b)(2) and 122.1(b)(4) Process to complete Brown ITAR registration begun in September 2013 unexpected reluctance from the Corporation Office (Boards of Trustees and Fellows that oversee Brown University)

43 Is it ITAR or EAR? Process to complete ITAR registration process halted abruptly in November, 2013, after the Professor identified a foreign civilian drone suitable for his purposes New drone identified on the Commerce Control List under ECCN 9A012 Whew! But not quite out of the woods yet.

44 Export Classification for all Other Items In addition to the drone itself, other items include the Ground Control Station for the UAV, Laser Scanner, GPS, the Infrared Sensor devices, Ground Station for data collection from onboard sensors, and a digital camera The specific ECCN for each item was identified and researched to determine if/when license might be required an iterative process due to multiple units identified for each over more than a year of careful acquisition

45 License Determination Made Once all items Purchased Infrared sensors proved to be the most sensitive --- license exceptions would not apply. The professor also anticipated a multi-year project with equipment remaining on station in the foreign country over the course of the project except for some minor, periodic calibration for sensors and UAV All BIS license requests must be processed through the BIS electronic system, SNAP-R

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47 SNAP-R Know your parties and the ECCNs of all devices Identify the foreign Ultimate Consignee, whether there are Intermediate Consignees ; know all foreign End Users For example, in our case, the intended use (and license) was for two foreign countries with an Ultimate Consignee in the host country and an alternate foreign organization as the end user in the second country Attached to the request was a detailed end use statement and the vendor characteristics of the UAV and Sensors A change in plans for the UAV pilots resulted in the need for a Replacement License after the first license was issued

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52 License Processing Original License -- submitted on January 14, 2015 and issued on February 27, 2015 (44 days) Replacement License (simply to add a new end user to replace US pilots with aircraft manufacturers) submitted on March 18, 2015 and issued on May 5, 2015 (48 days) In each case, additional reviews were conducted by the State Department and DOD DOD insisted on adding conditions to Replacement License regarding software and technology that were not part of license request for the replacement

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56 Case Studies: Enforcement Actions Pathogens The Violation: On January 14, 2003, A professor reported to the FBI that thirty vials of a potentially deadly plague bacteria, Yersinia pestis (the causative agent of human plague), were missing and presumed stolen from his research lab. The report sparked a bio-terrorism alert in his state. The investigation proved that the professor had illegally exported the Yersinia pestis which is a controlled item under the EAR and cannot be exported without the required export licenses from BIS. The Consequences: On January 15, 2003, the professor was arrested. Among the numerous charges of which the professor was found guilty at trial, two were export control related: making false, fraudulent and fictitious statements regarding the exports to federal agents and making an unauthorized export to Tanzania.

57 Case Studies: Enforcement Actions UAVs The Violation: A professor gave ITAR technical data to a Chinese and an Iranian student; downloaded his periodic report to the Air Force from a Chinese colleague s computer while in China, gave a lecture on Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) development at a University in China. His laptop and flash drive were confiscated by U.S. Customs upon his return. The University Export Control Officer warned the professor that his activities violated the ITAR but he did not follow the advise and the University disclosed the violation. The Consequences: In 2009, the professor was sentenced to 48 months in prison for illegally exporting technical data subject to the ITAR. One of the professor s students agreed to plead guilty to one count of conspiring to violate export controls and despite his cooperation, he was sentenced to 14 months in prison and served one year. The student s career and personal life disintegrated. He was barred from working on federal contracts and his relationship with a longtime personal partner broke up. He filed for bankruptcy in 2011, citing income of $1,200 a month and debts of almost $400,000, mainly student loans.

58 Case Studies: Enforcement Actions Entity List The Violation: A University shipped uncontrolled (EAR99) devices to an organization on the Entity List in Pakistan in 2007 without required licenses The Consequences: The University received a$100,000 fine which was suspended if the University did not violate export controls for 2 years. The University implemented a robust compliance program, no violations occurred during the probation period, and no fine was paid.

59 Case Studies: Enforcement Actions Sharing Documents on Servers The Violation: A two-day videotaped training course at a University for engineers, scientists and technical managers on the history of DoD infrared technology and current state of the art technology was inadvertently uploaded on a public server. Computer forensics indicated access by unknown individuals in proscribed countries. This constitutes an unauthorized export of technical data. The Consequences: The University was required to purchase media management software and obtain release approvals by the Export Control Director on all future online content.

60 Case Studies: Enforcement Actions Failure to Get a License The Violation: A researcher from a U.S. University planned to ship a component of an MRI machine to Iran without the required licenses via the Netherlands. An employee of the company he ordered the part from reported the violation. All he needed to do was to apply for a license which would very likely have been granted. The Consequences: The researcher was charged in federal court with conspiracy to export to an embargoed country, conspiracy to smuggle goods, money laundering and obstructing justice. If convicted, he faces a maximum of 20 years in prison on the first count alone. He remains free on bond and is continuing his research.

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62 Questions?