The Paradoxes of Military Development in Post-Syria Lebanon Primacy of the Sectarian System

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1 1800 K Street, NW Suite 400 Washington, DC Phone: Fax: anerguizian@csis.org Web: The Paradoxes of Military Development in Post-Syria Lebanon Primacy of the Sectarian System Aram Nerguizian Resident Scholar Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy May 10, 2010

2 Agenda Post-9/11 Security Sector Reform Assumptions The Sectarian System & Civil-Military Relations in Lebanon : Syrian Regulation of Lebanese Civil-Military Relations 2005-Present: Civil-Military Relations & the Primacy of the Sectarian System 2

3 Post-9/11 Security Sector Reform Assumptions Security sector reform (SSR) & military professionalization perceived as important pillars of state & institution-building in the Middle East. Core assumptions: SSR & military professionalization can make governments & security actors more accountable. SSR & military professionalization can make the region more secure & minimize the spillover effects of conflict. Preponderance of centralized governments in the region to implement SSR & military professionalization (Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia etc). 3

4 Post-9/11 Security Sector Reform Assumptions Assumption of centralized governments inform the following scenarios for civil-military relations in the region: The military is part of a centralized power structure that regulates society. The military directly or indirectly leads and/or controls a structure that regulates society. Cooption of the military by a centralized power elite that regulates society. Civilian-military alliance that regulates society. Military accountable to democratically elected civilian government (ideal model) Common assumptions ignore the challenges to SSR & military development in fragmented or divided societies with emerging state institutions and strong neo-patrimonial networks Case of post-war Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). 4

5 The Sectarian System & Civil-Military Relations in Lebanon Sectarian system empowers sectarian actors at the expense of an already weak central government. The Lebanese state of anarchy*: Sectarian actors not unlike states in the international system. Absence of a third-party national arbiter to regular inter and intrasectarian relations. Interest defined in terms of power in the Lebanese system. Power as a zero-sum game gain for one actor are perceived as a loss for another. Incomplete information permeates the system. No sectarian actor can dominate the system domestic alliances & external patronage networks to facilitate local objectives. Struggles over the sectarian system, while not independent from regional & international confrontations, are ultimately concerned with producing local outcomes. *Source: Aram Nerguizian, The Lebanese Armed Forces: Paradoxes of Military Development in Post-War Lebanon, CSIS Significant Issues Series, 2010 forthcoming. 5

6 Budgeting Against Military Development Lebanese National Budget, Defense Expenditure and GDP from 1990 to (in constant 2010 US$ billion) GDP National Defense Budget Defense Budget National Budget GDP Source: Aram Nerguizian, The Lebanese Armed Forces: Paradoxes of Military Development in Post-War Lebanon, CSIS Significant Issues Series, 2010 forthcoming. 6

7 The LAF Officer Corps Bottleneck Lebanese & US Officer Corps by Rank Note: Numbers for the U.S. do not show Warrant Officers. Common rank system adopted. U.S. figures accurate as of January 31, LAF figures accurate as of early March Source: Aram Nerguizian, The Lebanese Armed Forces: Paradoxes of Military Development in Post-War Lebanon, CSIS Significant Issues Series, 2010 forthcoming. 7

8 : Syrian Regulation of Lebanese Civil-Military Relations 1990 End of Lebanese Civil War Taef Accord legitimizes Syrian military presence in Lebanon. Syrian military & intelligence networks penetrate and regulate society. Syrian military & intelligence networks penetrate and regulate civil-military relations. Syria holds leadership-level points of entry to state institutions including the LAF. The Lebanese anarchical system and the struggle to control the sectarian system are frozen. 8

9 : Syrian Regulation of Lebanese Civil-Military Relations Lebanese Politico- Sectarian Sphere Syrian Security & Intelligence Apparatus Lebanese Armed Forces Source: Aram Nerguizian, The Lebanese Armed Forces: Paradoxes of Military Development in Post-War Lebanon, CSIS Significant Issues Series, 2010 forthcoming. 9

10 2005-Present: Civil-Military Relations & the Primacy of the Sectarian System Post-2005 Un-freezing the struggle over post-taef Lebanon. No third party to regulate Lebanese civil-military relations. Post-2005 Lebanon defined by struggle to maximize penetration and regulation of institutions and the utility of external patronage networks in the pursuit of local outcomes. Impact on civil-military relations, SSR & military professionalization in Lebanon in the case of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF): No single sectarian actors has a monopoly on force or discreet control over the LAF. Sectarian actors Between self-interested military development & no military development in post-syria Lebanon. 10

11 2005-Present: Civil-Military Relations & the Primacy of the Sectarian System Impact on civil-military relations, SSR & military professionalization in Lebanon in the case of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF): While sectarian actors cannot control the LAF in discreet terms, they can penetrate, regulate and check its actions and effectiveness as an institution. Promotion of sectarian patronage networks is facilitated by low wages and escalating cost of living and leads to top-heavy manning levels. Incomplete information & the primacy of back-channel civil-military interaction. Stagnant defense expenditure as a bi-product of the zero-sum struggle over Lebanon. Domestic alliances and external patronage networks fragmented foreign policy choices and national security prerogatives. 11

12 2005-Present: Civil-Military Relations & the Primacy of the Sectarian System Impact on civil-military relations, SSR & military professionalization in Lebanon in the case of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF): Inability to conceive of a national strategic and security framework to inform LAF posture and development LAF and other national security actors relegated to playing internal security role and keeping the peace (case of LAF deployment during the June 2009 parliamentary elections). LAF attempting to preserve least worst common denominator interests of all major communities in Lebanon. 12

13 2005-Present: Civil-Military Relations & the Primacy of the Sectarian System Source: Aram Nerguizian, The Lebanese Armed Forces: Paradoxes of Military Development in Post-War Lebanon, CSIS Significant Issues Series, 2010 forthcoming. 13

14 The Impact of Foreign Policy Fragmentation on Strategic Planning Source: U.S. Army War College 14

15 LAF Decision-Making Tree in Theory How Many Cost Where When = Needs U.S. Munitions List Arms Export Control Act Non-U.S. Sources U.S. Commercial Export FMS Letter Of Request (LOR) Source: Aram Nerguizian, The Lebanese Armed Forces: Paradoxes of Military Development in Post-War Lebanon, CSIS Significant Issues Series, 2010 forthcoming. 15

16 LAF Deployment During the 2009 Elections 2 nd Brigade (+/- 1,500 men) 1 st Regiment (800-1,000 men) Maghawir Al-Bahr (500 men) 2 nd Regiment (800-1,000 men) 4 th Regiment (800-1,000 men) 7 th Brigade (1,200-1,400 men) 8 th Brigade (1,200-1,400 men) 3 rd Brigade (+/- 1,500 men) Maghawir (1,200 men) Al-Moujawal (800 mean) 5 th Regiment (800-1,000 men) 5 th Brigade (+/- 1,500 men) 3 rd Regiment (800-1,000 men) 9 th Brigade (1,200-1,400 men) 1 st Brigade (+/- 1,500 men) 6 th Brigade (+/- 1,500 men) 11 th Brigade (1,200-1,400 men) 10 th Brigade (1,200-1,400 men) 12 th Brigade (1,200-1,400 men) Source: Aram Nerguizian, The Lebanese Armed Forces: Paradoxes of Military Development in Post-War Lebanon, CSIS Significant Issues Series, 2010 forthcoming. 16

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