Japan-EU Security Cooperation in Out-of-Area Missions: The Case of the Counter-Piracy Mission Off the Coast of Somalia

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1 Japan-EU Security Cooperation in Out-of-Area Missions: The Case of the Counter-Piracy Mission Off the Coast of Somalia Wilhelm Vosse International Christian University, Tokyo Paper to be presented at the International Studies Association Asia-Pacific Conference 2016 Hong Kong, June 25-27, 2016 DRAFT VERSION NOT FOR CITATION Abstract: By 2008, Japan had deployed the SDF only for UNPKO, minesweeping, and humanitarian and reconstruction missions (e.g. Iraq mission), this case was different in two respects. First, the Japanese government joined the counter-piracy mission from the very beginning, and secondly, it was the first deployment to a missions, that potentially required the use of force. Japan joined the multilateral counter-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia and the CGPCS in 2009, and gradually became even more deeply involved in the political and military governing of the piracy missions. The questions asked in this paper is: Has there been a spill-over effect from the involvement with non-us forces and governments - but specifically with European forces and how has it influenced Japanese security practice and policy since 2009? Introduction Maritime piracy has been an issue of concern for seafarers, shipping companies, and governments for a long time. In East Asia, maritime piracy had already been a problem in the 1990s, but in East Africa, the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean, the problem accelerated between 2007 and 2009, when the number of incidences of maritime piracy increased from 44 to 218 (ICC-CSS data). Most of these attacks occurred off the coast of Somalia, a country that had suffered from civil wars and had no functioning government, and the Gulf of Aden, between Somalia and Yemen. In October 2007, the Golden Mori, a Japanese owned ship under Panamanian flag, was approached by pirates and its crew was hijacked. After negotiations, Japan paid a US$ 1 million ransom. In 2008, five Japanese owned vessels were approached and in four cases the crew was hijacked, and in most of these cases, the Japanese owner paid a ransom. Between June and December 2008, the United Nations Security Council had begun to react to the growing crisis by passing a series of resolutions on maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia, authorizing naval forces to enter Somali waters (UNSC 1816), supress piracy and reconfirm UNCLOS (UNSC 1838), to criminalize piracy (UNSC 1846), and to set up the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) (UNSC 1851). These resolutions formed the legal justification for consolidated efforts to use military forces against piracy. Until 2008, Japan had employed the SDF only for UNPKO, minesweeping, and humanitarian and reconstruction missions (e.g. Iraq mission) and was traditionally very hesitant to deploy its forces, this case was different in two respects. First, the 1

2 Japanese government joined the counter-piracy mission from the very beginning, and secondly, it was the first Japanese deployment to a mission which was not a UNPKO, humanitarian and reconstruction, or rear-area support mission, but a one, that potentially required the use of force. Japan joined the multilateral counter-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia and the CGPCS from 2009, and gradually became even more deeply involved in the political and military governing of the piracy missions. The first time in post-war Japanese history, Japanese forces had joined a multilateral military operation with more than 40 other countries, which provided a major opportunity to engage and interact with forces other than the United States. The questions asked in this paper is: Has there been a spill-over effect from the involvement with non-us forces and governments - but specifically with European forces and how has it influenced Japanese security practice and policy since 2009? 1. Development of the Japanese counter-piracy mission The Japanese active participation in the counter-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia began on 28 January 2009, when the Japanese Minister of Defence (MoD) issued an order to the Commander in Chief of the Self-Defence Force (SDF) Fleet and the Director General of the Defence Intelligence Headquarters to begin preparations for a mission against piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. The outline of the instructions ask the SDF to (1) prepare for the formation of the unit, (2) information gathering, (3) training for the mission, (4) the procurement, replenishment, storage, maintenance of necessary means, and the (5) coordination with relevant organizations. Shortly thereafter, in February 2009, a MOD and SDF personnel field investigation team was sent to visit Yemen, Djibouti, Oman, and Bahrain. In March 2009, the MoD and SDF were similarly commissioned to review possible bases for Japanese troops, aircraft and vessels 1, and only three weeks later, on 14 March 2009, the first two destroyers, the DD Sazanami and the DD Samidare left MSDF Kure Base with about 400 MSDF troops and 8 JCG officers for the Gulf of Aden 2. The destroyers also carried two rotary wing aircrafts. The legal framework of this first dispatch was Article 82 of the SDF Law, which allowed the deployment of MSDF troops without Diet approval when special measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and property or maintain order at sea 3. Domestic legal and normative constraints Because of the generally anti-militarist sentiment among the Japanese public which is shared in some political parties, including, among others, the governing LDP coalition partner Komeito, out-of-area missions have always, at least initially, triggered critical public discourse and depending on the mission, also public protest. The government decision for prior missions had required a special law, which made initial Diet approval a prerequisite alongside an annual vote should a mission require extension. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution puts additional constraints on SDF out-of-area missions, because the official government interpretation, at 1 Japanese Ministry of Defence (5 th February 2009), Press Releases: Field Investigation in Countries around the Gulf of Aden, at: 2 Japanese Ministry of Defence (13 th March 2009a), Press Releases: Issuance of Order for Operation of the Self-Defence Forces concerning Maritime Security Operations, at: Japanese Ministry of Defence (13 th March 2009b),Press Releases: Departure of the dispatched maritime force for response to piracy, at: 3 Government of Japan (1954), Self- Defence Forces Law, Article 82 2

3 least until 2014, was that article 9 prohibits the right of collective self-defence. Both issues were at least potentially problematic and would have severely limited any Japanese participation in the counter-piracy mission. The opposition parties were very critical of the imminent dispatch in March The leader of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), Mizuho Fukushima, said in a rally on March 5, 2009 in Tokyo that "the dispatch could very well induce the first use of armed force overseas by the Self-Defence Forces" and that to allow the dispatch under the circumstances would become a precedent that would allow the dispatch of the SDF anywhere, anytime, at any cost. 4 On 15 April 2009, the Japanese House of Representatives began negotiations about a permanent law that would allow the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) to protect ships from any nationality 5. In these debates, the-then prime minister, Taro Aso, insisted upon a swift passage of the law, highlighting the dramatic increase of piracy attacks off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden, which for Japan was a life and death matter because of its high reliance on international trade by ships and especially oil from just a few countries in the Middle East. 6 While the two governing parties, the LDP and Komeitô, both sought a permanent law, the opposition party in the Lower House moved an amendment to the draft law so that each mission would require prior Diet approval. After only one week of debate, the Japanese House of Representatives approved the bill on 23 April Since the opposition DPJ still had the majority in the Upper House of the Diet (House of Councillors) and continued to insist on Diet approvals prior to every dispatch of MSDF ships (the government insisted that it might have to deploy ships on short notice, but agreed to report an outline of each mission to the Diet) getting approval from the Upper House looked, at least at the outset, a more difficult proposition for the governing coalition 7. For the Japanese government, passing the Anti-Piracy Law, enabling full participation in the counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia, was so important that it was able to finally pass it in a second vote on June 2009 in the Lower House, overriding a rejection by the Upper House on 19 June The Ministry of Defence immediately ordered the Chiefs of Staffs and the Director General of the Defence Intelligence Headquarters to take necessary measures, such as organizing a force, procurement, replenishment, storage and maintenance of equipment, training, the coordination with related organizations, and information gathering, in order to promptly implement the anti-piracy measures. 9 The MSDF officially joined the surveillance duties in June 2009 with two P-3C surveillance aircraft and two destroyers, both based in Djibouti. 10 Anti-Piracy Specials Measures Law The Law on Punishment of and Measures against Acts of Piracy or Anti-Piracy Law came into force on 24 June It finally allowed the MSDF to protect ships owned by countries other than Japan, which made Japan a fully functioning independent deployer. The 4 The Japan Times (6 th March 2009), SDF Somalia dispatch slammed by opponents at rally. 5 The Japan Times (15 th April 2009), Debate starts on bill to free up MSDF. 6 The Japan Times (15 th April 2009), Debate starts on bill to free up MSDF. 7 The Japan Times (28 th May 2009), Upper House frets dispatch authority in antipiracy bill. 8 The Japan Times (19 th June 2009), Antipiracy bill set to be enacted. 9 Japanese Ministry of Defence (19 th June 2009), Press Releases: Issuance of Instructions and Orders for Preparation of the Self-Defence Forces for Anti-Piracy Measures off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. 10 See also analysis in: Black, Lindsay (2012). Debating Japan's Intervention to Tackle Piracy in the Gulf of Aden: Beyond Mainstream Paradigms, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 12 (2), pp

4 law provides a clear definition of acts of piracy, or attempted piracy, and the penalties, which these incur 11. Japan considers piracy a criminal offense and, therefore, regards the anti-piracy mission as a matter of policing and law enforcement, which is why the JCG plays a central role in enforcing the law. However, since the JCG does not have ships that would allow passage from Japan to Somalia, the MSDF is in charge of providing the necessary support activities such as observation and transportation of JCG officers, while the JCG takes necessary measures pursuant to the provisions of this law in line with the Japan Coast Guard Law (Law No. 28 of 1953) 12. Only JCG officials, and not the MSDF, may use weapons, provided the perpetrator or the ship disobeys other measures to deter and continues the acts of piracy and that there is probable cause to believe in the lack of any other appropriate measures to stop the navigation of that ship 13 regulated by existing policing laws 14. This law is different from special measures laws such as the Anti-Terrorism Law (October 2011), or the Refuelling mission in the Indian Ocean ( ), in that it gives the Minister of Defence, with the approval of the prime minister, the right to order units of the JSDF to take actions against acts of piracy at sea in the case where there is extraordinary necessity to take measures against acts of piracy and to draw up and submit to the Prime Minister the guidelines for response operations Japan's Contribution to the Multi-Force Counter-Piracy Mission Japan s Role in Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia Japan was a founding member of the CGPCS and has participated in all of its plenary sessions beginning on 14 January Early on, it became clear that the maritime component of the counter-piracy mission discussed in WG1 had to be flanked by the development of a financial support mechanism to facilitate the setting up of a legal framework in the countries of the region. In the Contact Group s 2 nd plenary session on the 17 th March 2009, Japan supported and worked towards WG2 s agreement to establish an International Trust Fund, to help defray the expenses associated with prosecution of suspected pirates. 16 The trust fund was endorsed at the third plenary, on the 29 th May 2009 in New York. 17 Japan has a long history of providing financial and capacity building contributions to military operations from the First Gulf War (1991), disarmament on the ground in Afghanistan, to support for coast guards under the ReCAAP framework in South East Asia. This was probably a central reason why Japan strongly supported the International Trust Fund and the development of better regional capabilities in the third CGPCS plenary meeting. Subsequently, Japan was asked to chair the fourth CGPCS plenary meeting on 10 September Government of Japan (2009), Law on Punishment of and Measures against Acts of Piracy, Articles 1 to 4 12 Government of Japan (2009), Law on Punishment of and Measures against Acts of Piracy, 2009, Article 5 13 Government of Japan (2009), Law on Punishment of and Measures against Acts of Piracy, 2009, Article Such as: Government of Japan (1948), Law concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials, Article 7; and Government of Japan (2009), Law on Punishment of and Measures against Acts of Piracy, Government of Japan (2009), Law on Punishment of and Measures against Acts of Piracy, 2009, Article 7 16 CGPCS Communiqué of the Second Plenary, 17 th March 2009, Cairo 17 CGPCS Communiqué of the Third plenary, 29 th May 2009, New York 4

5 As a chair, Japan could welcome the effective implementation of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Djibouti Code of Conduct, a multi-donor trust fund, initiated by Japan. Japan considers the establishment of the IMO Djibouti Trust Fund to be one of the most important achievements of its activities in the Contact Group 18. The core objective of this trust fund was the establishment of an information-sharing center in Kenya, Tanzania and Yemen, as well as a the Djibouti Regional Training Center (DRTC) 19. While the IMO Djibouti Trust Fund was initiated by Japan, it was stressed that it was open to financial support from all participants 20. Another area where more funds were needed was in making sure that arrested pirates could be processed, prosecuted, and jailed. Those capacities were considered insufficient in many countries in the region. Therefore, the Contact Group approved the draft of the Working Group 2 (Legal Aspects of Counter-Piracy) for the establishment of an CGPCS International Trust Fund and encouraged all parties to make contributions. While the CGPCS International Trust Fund was set up in January 2010, by the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon, following up on the decisions made in the CGPCS. The IMO Djibouti Trust Fund, established and administered by the IMO, which is a stakeholder in the CGPCS, is a simpler structure with only one fund and governing body. At the time of the 10 th CGPCS plenary session held on 17 th November 2011, Contact Group members saw the necessity to react to increased public anger about the large number of seafarers who had been held captive and the physical and psychological suffering which was increasingly reported in the media (although the number of crew being held hostage had actually already declined). 21 Despite the increasingly close international coordination of the military forces, these efforts were still considered as insufficient. While an increase in the number of deployed maritime force vessels was considered desirable, the CGPCS also recognized the growing use of privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) and the fact that no vessel with PCASP on board had been successfully pirated 22. However, it also saw the necessity to increase regulation and oversight by the IMO of PCASPs. The counter-piracy operation provided valuable opportunities for cooperation, especially between independent deplorers, which would have either not have happened outside of this mission, or on a much more limited scale. An example can be seen in the cooperation between Japan, China, India, Russia, and the Republic of Korea in the convoy operations in the Gulf of Aden, which was specifically mentioned in the 12th CGPCS plenary session on 25 July The European Union is one of the participants and members of the CGPCS. In January 2014, Deputy Secretary General EEAS Maciej Popowski adopted the chair of the CGPCS. In this capacity, Popowski and other members of the EEAS had numerous opportunities to discuss and exchange opinions with their Japanese counterparts. 18 Interview with Yoshihiro Katayama, July CGPCS Communiqué of the fourth plenary, 10 th September 2009, New York, p CGPCS Communiqué of the fourth plenary, 10 th September 2009, New York, p CGPCS Communique of the tenth plenary, 17 th November, New York, p CGPCS Communique of the tenth plenary, 17 th November, New York p CGPCS Communique of the 12th Plenary Session, 15 th July 2012, New York 5

6 Japan s Cooperation with the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) On 25 June 2013, the Japanese Defense Minister Onodera announced, that due to various demands being made of the SDF Japan will assign one destroyer to zone defense operations. The MSDF s destroyer JS Samidare would then be allocated to the CTF151 in December Those demands came in part from CMT itself as well as other participating countries, but also shipowners associations. Responding to questions from the press, Onodera stressed the Japanese government position that zone defense and joining the CTF151 coordination mechanism was not considered participation in collective security and therefore no issue of constitutionality, but merely an act of cooperation with a multinational force 25. This enabled the MSDF to extend its missions from escorting ships in the International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) to actively participating in so-called Zone Defense in the entire area off the coast of Somalia. Because Japan had been the most active and most involved force in the escort mission in the Gulf of Aden, it was a natural next step to extend Japan s mission to zone defense off the coast of Somalia and a closer formal integration into the CMF infrastructure. This also enabled Japan more opportunities of cooperation with maritime forces from other deployers and access to more intelligence and data from the CTF headquarter in Bahrain. After the announcement of the decision, the Commander of the Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, Commodore Muhammad Ihsan Qadir (Pakistan Navy), met the Commander of Escort Division Six, JMSDF Captain Tsutomu Iwasawa,in Djibouti to discuss future cooperation between the Japanese and CMF forces on 14 July, In June 2013, the Japanese had provided air support by helicopter when a Turkish Coast Guard vessel was following a potential piracy ship. Commander Qadir noted during this meeting, any additional support that the Japanese could provide CMF would be a significant development. The Japanese have experience operating in the CMF area of operations and are a proficient naval force that will be a great asset to CMF 26. Japan was widely praised for this step in by the CGPCS participants, some of whom had visited the JSDF operational facility in Djibouti in November 2013, and expressed in the 15 th CGPCS plenary session 27. Even before officially joining the CTF151, Japanese ships and also the base in Djibouti was visited by CTF151 commanders on a regular bases. At the occasion of a visit by the commander of CTF151, Rear Admiral Giam Hock Koon (Singapore Navy) to the Djibouti base in April 2013, he was briefed by the commander of Japan s P3 Deployment Air Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement (DAPE), Captain Akira Kinoshita and Captain Masami Katoh (then head of the Japan Self-Defense Force Liaison Office in Djibouti) and members of the Japan s Aerial Surveillance unit briefed on the capabilities 28. The surveillance capacities of the P3C units due to the exceptionally large number of hours in the air, had become a key factor in the success of the counter-piracy missions, which was by 24 Defense Minister Onodera repeated those position at a press conference on 25. Juli Defense Minister Onodera repeated those position at a press conference on 9. Juli Combined Maritime Forces (4 th August 2013), CTF 151 meets with Japanese Escort Division 6 in Djibouti. 27 CGPCS, Communique of the fifteenth plenary, 11 November 2013, Djibouti 28 Combined Maritime Forces ( ), CTF 151 Commander Visits Japanese Surveillance Squadron, 6

7 2013 recognized by the CMF commanders, which made closer cooperation and a formal integration of Japan a natural next step. At a visit of the Commander of the Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, Commodore Muhammad Ihsan Qadir (Pakistan Navy), with the Commander of Escort Division 6, Japanese Captain Tsutomu Iwasawa in Djibouti, Qadir stressed that any additional support that the Japanese could provide (the) CMF would be a significant development and a great asset to CMF 29. After the JS Samidare had officially joined the CTF151, the Commander of the NATO task force, Rear Admiral Eugene Diaz del Rio (Spanish Navy) paid an official visit to the JS Samidare and in his conversation with its Commanding Officer Captain Hiroaki Tajiri, stressed that the true strength of the combined counter piracy effort lies in the continuous close cooperation and information sharing between the EU, NATO and CMF task forces, as well as various independent deployers 30, of which Japan was now one. Soon after Japan had joined the CTF151, it had its first opportunity to show what it is capable of. On 17 th January, the Japanese destroyer Samidare was essential in capturing five pirates suspected of attacking the MV Nave Antropos in cooperation with the EUNAVFOR flagship Sirocco. After the pirates had been repelled by private armed forces on board the MV Nave Antropos and had fled, the JS Samidare s SH-60 Seahawk helicopter quickly found the nearby dhow and alerted the FS Sirocco which could apprehend the pirates. Shortly after this incidence, the CTF 151 commander, Commodore Aage Buur Jensen (Royal Danish Navy) praised the flexible approach of the MSDF, stressing that the Japanese forces involved responded quickly and professionally, without which the successful disruption might have been difficult 31, and the Force Commander of Operation Atalanta, Rear Admiral Hervé Bléjean, in April 2014 praised Japan s decisive action and the captain of the FS Siroco even said that this was a perfect example of international navies operating close-up and an excellent way to benchmark our action processes. 32 In February 2014, Japan expanded its counter-piracy activities even further, when the JASF joined the CTF151 and also began to participate in zone defense in the Gulf of Aden. Japan was already conducting about 60% of all surveillance flights with its two P-3C patrol aircraft ( : about 1067 patrol flights). 33 The MSDF cooperation with CTF151 also provides opportunities for joined exercises with troops from a wide range of countries with which Japan would usually not have the chance to work with. For example, in late January 2014, Japanese and South Korean maritime forces conducted a one-day counter-piracy exercise, together with the US navy. 34 In July 2014, Japanese Defense Minister Onodera announced the next step in the deepening of Japanese engagement in the CTF 151, namely the plan to send a major generalclass officer who will be appointed CTF151 commander from May 2015, for about three months. In his press conference, Onodera stressed two main reason for this decision, namely 29 Combined Maritime Forces ( ) CTF 151 meets with Japanese Escort Division 6 in Djibouti 30 Combined Maritime Forces ( ) JS Samidare and NATO task force meet 31 Combined Maritime Forces ( ) Pirates apprehended after coordinated response by counter 32 EUNAVFOR ( ), EU Naval Force French Flagship Siroco and Japanese Warship Samidare Reinforce Successful Counter Piracy Cooperation With Meeting in Gulf of Aden 33 Ministry of Defense (Japan) ( ), Press Conference by the Defense Minister Onodera (March 18, 2014) 34 Combined Maritime Forces ( ), CTF 151 s ROKS Choi Young in counter piracy exercise 7

8 that this is a (1) good opportunity for Japan to understand the whole of the anti-piracy operations and to improve Japan's capability in the future operations, and the (2) vital importance of information sharing between Japan, the EU and the USA. 35 Joining the CTF151 also allowed more frequent visits of EUNAFVOR commanders to the Japanese facilities in Djibouti or the two MSDF destroyers. On 24 July 2014, the German frigate FGS Brandenburg visited the JS Inazuma 36, and on 2 September 2014, Japanese Escort Task Group, Captain Tsutomu Okawa, was a guest on board the EU Naval Force flagship ITS Andrea Doria. 37 In an address at the RUSI-SPF Conference on UK-Japan Relations, Prime Minister Abe even stressed the significance of joining the CTF151 for enhancing the partnership between the MSDF and the Royal Navy - despite the multinational character of the CTF The high point of Japan s involvement with the CTF-151, was the appointment of JMSDF Rear Admiral Hiroshi Ito as CTF-151 commander. This was the first time since World War II, that a member of the Japanese armed forces had become the commander of a multi-national military mission. 3. EU-Japan Cooperation in Multilateral and Multi-Stakeholder Bodies After the introduction of the overall Japanese contribution to the counter-piracy missions off the coast of Somalia, this part will take a closer look at one specific cooperation, namely the one between the EU and Japan. Comparison of Military Commitment For an independent deplorer, and one that was geographically located at quite a distance from the field of operation, and for a country with traditionally strong anti-militarist values, even considering Japan s strong dependence of oil supplies from the Gulf States and its strong support for UNCLOS and the rule of law, its military engagement in this case is still quite surprising. From the beginning, Japan had deployed two surface vessels 39 deployed, while the much larger EUNAVFOR mission ATALANTA had usually around five vessels in service. In Addition, the MSDF had two planes deployed to assist the findings or pirates, the same number as the mission ATALANTA. In 2015, the MSDF had about 390 troops stationed in Djibouti and on the surface vessels, while the EUNAVFOR had deployed around 1200 troops. However, while the much larger EUNAVFOR contingency flew about 17,000 hours between 2009 and 2015, the MSDF flew 11,000 hours. This shows the strong Japanese commitment, even compared to a mission which is supported by 28 EU member states. 35 Ministry of Defense (Japan) ( ), Press Conference by the Defense Minister Onodera. 36 EUNAFVOR ( ), EU Naval Force Flagship FGS Brandenburg And Japanese Destroyer Inazuma Meet At Sea In Gulf of Aden 37 EUNAFVOR ( ), EU Force Commander Hosts Commander of Japanese Escort 38 Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), , PM Abe Addresses RUSI-SPF Conference on UK- Japan Relations 39 As for the two surface vessels, it meant that constantly six vessels were involved in the counter piracy missions. Two were actually used off the coast of Somalia, two were either on the way to the missions or the way back to Japan, and two were used for training in waters around Japan. 8

9 While the EUNAVFOR mission cost about US$ 3.7 million in 2015, Japan spend about US$ 2.4 million 40, or about two-third of the EU spending. Another indicator for Japan s strong commitment in Somalia. JMSDF and EUNAVFOR Mil-Mil Contacts Since Japan s joined the counter-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia, there have only been very few encounters and even fewer exercise or joint training opportunities between JMSDF and EU Navy forces. Between 2009 and 2013, there were only between one and two such occasions every year. However, since 2014, the number of such encounters has somehow increased to six in 2014 and seven in In 2015, EUNAVFOR and JSMDF troops have visited each other six times, however, this involved mostly senior military officers who met their counterparts to demonstrate specific technology and exchange thoughts. While joint military exercises are mentioned in EU, JMOD and MOFA documents as one of the achievements of EU-Japan cooperation, the actual number of these training exercises on sea has remained relatively limited. In 2014 and 2015 there has been only one a year. EU Naval Forces conducted only one communications exercise at sea with the JMSDF Destroyer JS Harusame in the Gulf of Aden in March Almost one year later, in January 2016, the JDS Suzunami and the EUNAVFOR s ITS Carabiniere conducted a signaling exercise in the Gulf od Aden (see: Table: EUNAVFOR-MSDF Encounters since 2015). The only time EUNAVFOR and JSMDF units cooperated with and JMSDF in an actual counterpiracy mission was in January 2014, when a MSDF helicopter assisted in the freeing a crew of an Indian Dhow. Table 1: EUNAVFOR-MSDF Encounters since January Activity EUNAVFOR meets Japanese Escort Division 2 commander on board EU Naval Force Flagship ITS Andrea Doria Type Visit February EUNAVFOR Commander visited by Commander of Japanese Escort Division on board the EUNAVFOR flagship Visit March EUNAVFOR visits Japanese Navy to Djibouti Visit June July EUNAVFOR Warship FGS Bayern Conducts Communications Exercise with JMSDF Destroyer JS Harusame in Gulf of Aden Operation ATLANTA Force Commander Visits Japanese Warship JDS Ikazuchi at Sea Operation ATLANTA Force Headquarters Staff Visit Japanese Detachment in Djibouti Exercise Visit Visit December Operation ATLANTA Flagship Hosts Japanese Navy Visit 2016 January Japanese Escort Division 3 Hosts Operation ATLANTA Force Commander Visit 40 This budget does not include personnel cost, but only the special extra budget reserved for this missions. 9

10 June Operation ATLANTA Flagship Conducts Training with JDS Suzunami ATLANTA ESPS Victoria trains with JMSDF Escort Division in the Gulf of Aden Spanish warship ESPS Santa Maria participated in an exercise with units from the JMSDF (JS Yuudachi and JS Yuugiri) Training Training Training Table 2: EUNAVFOR-MSDF Exercises and Training since 2014 Date Joint Military Training Exercises 2014 / 1 EUNAVFOR Atalanta flagship FS Siroco, JMSDF Aircraft and helicopter from the JMSDF vessel JS Samidare freed crew of the Indian Dhow Shane Hind / 10 EUNAVFOR flagship ITS Andrea Doria and JMSDF JS Takanami: Counterpiracy exercise at sea in the Gulf of Aden. 1. Bridge to Bridge communications exercise 2. cross-deck to the other ship 2015 / 3 EUNAVFOR Warship FGS Bayern Conducts Communications Exercise with JMSDF Destroyer JS Harusame in Gulf of Aden:1. Joint tactical communications exercise 2016/1 Operation ATLANTA Flagship Conducts Training with JDS Suzunami ATLANTA ESPS Victoria Trains with JMSDF Escort Division in the Gulf of Aden 2016/6 Spanish warship ESPS Santa Maria participated in an exercise with units from the JMSDF (JS Yuudachi and JS Yuugiri) Counter-Piracy in EU-Japan Summit Meetings What relevance did the counter-piracy missions play on the EU-Japan political and diplomatic level? Two levels of cooperation will be analyzed, one are EU-Japan summit meetings (bilateral summits), and the other in the cooperation between foreign- and defense ministry officials in multilateral regimes, in this case the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (see below). EU-Japan summits discuss a wide variety of issues and in recent years the focus has mostly been on the progress in negotiations for an EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA). The latter is the more important here, because it will include provisions about future security cooperation between the EU and Japan. However, the ongoing EU-Japan cooperation in the counter-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia has been mentioned several times in the last few years, usually as a prime example for ongoing and future security cooperation. After the 2013 EU-Japan summit meeting, both sides stressed that EUNAVFOR-JSDF cooperation is strengthening counter piracy capabilities in Somalia and its neighbouring countries and the significance of the EU-Japan cooperation in setting up the Djibouti Regional Training Center (DRTC). In 2014, the EU leadership praised Japan s new expanded security role and its so-called proactive contribution to peace, because it enables both sides an even closer cooperation in counter piracy activity off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, and more joint counter piracy exercises. 10

11 After the 2015 EU-Japan summit, the EU side stressed that it welcomed continuing concrete cooperation in anti-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden within the relevant International Contact Group and through operational activities between the deployed units of Japan Self-Defense Forces and the EU s Naval Force Somalia (EUNAVFOR)- Operation ATALANTA. Counter-Piracy in UK-Japan Summit Meetings Counter-piracy was also considered a good starting point or an example for closer security cooperation at UK-Japan summits. After the 2014 summit, both sides emphasized that they will work together in the field of maritime security to tackle piracy against ships off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulfs of Aden and Guinea, and in January 2015, they stressed that once a Japanese had taking over the command of the CTF-151 (from May 2015) the UK would send command staff to its headquarter, which provided even more opportunities for militarymilitary cooperation between the UK and Japan. 4. Possible Spillover Effects In 2014 and 2015, Japan has changed the interpretation of article 9 of the Japanese constitution and passed eleven new or revised security laws (September 2015). Both are going to have a significant effect on future Japanese security practice and policy decisions. How significant has the Japanese experience in the counter-piracy missions off the coast of Somalia in facilitating these changes, for example by providing a positive case of international cooperation which could be interpreted as collective defence, and as an example for a mission that involved the SDF, but was not a PKO or humanitarian and reconstructions missions, as others in the past. Influence on Japanese Laws and Regulations Japan, with its strong anti-militarist values and severe constitutional constraints (see above) has not only contributed its experience in the ReCAAP ISC, and the exceptionally active contribution to the military mission and the decisions in the CGPCS, but has also experienced a boomerang effect 41, meaning that Japan s involvement in counter-piracy initiatives has, in turn, affected Japanese policy-making. The successful mission was at least one reason why the current Abe administration was able to further normalize its international role and military contribution to global or regional challenges, such as maritime piracy. In a press conference in February 2014, Donna Hopkins (Coordinator for Counter Piracy and Maritime Security, U.S. Department of State) stressed that Japan changed its laws and created for the first time since World War II a counter-piracy based out of its own immediate regional sphere. ( ) piracy is a great uniter because it s a common enemy. Everybody hates pirates. 42 Therefore, Japan can be seen as an example of a country, where the CGPCS participation has not only helped to legitimize a five-year mission more than 9000 km away 41 Boomerang pattern or boomerang effect, as described by Keck, M., and K. Sikkink (1998), Activists Beyond Borders. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, pp U.S. Department of State (February 20, 2014), Counter-Piracy Update, U.S. Department of State, ISzut 11

12 from home (involving the continued deployment of two destroyers and two planes and the setting up of the first out-of-area (military) base since 1945, in Djibouti), but has facilitated a domestic debate and a series of new laws and regulations that will lead to more active engagement in out-of-area missions in the future. This growth in military engagement can be seen in the establishment of a new National Security Council (December 2013), a new force doctrine with a Dynamic Joint Defence Force, an increase of defence spending in 2014 and 2015, and the increasingly force-focused and assertive defence policy announced in the-then National Defence Program Guidelines for 2014 and beyond and the Five-year Defence Program for 2014 through 2018, both passed in December 2013, and the June 2014 cabinet decision to re-interpret the Japanese constitution to allow the use of collective self-defence measures (see above). National Security Strategy (NSS) The National Security Strategy (NSS), which came into force in December 2013, and lists the principles of the future of Japan s security policy specifically mentions the importance of maritime security and the positive example of the counter-piracy missions. It emphasizes that Japan will play a leading role, through close cooperation with other countries, in maintaining and developing Open and Stable Seas, that Japan will take necessary measures ( ) including anti-piracy operations to ensure safe maritime transport and promote maritime security cooperation with other countries, that it will enhance the frequency and the quality of bilateral and multilateral cooperation on maritime security such as joint exercises ( ) and in particular, sea lanes of communication, stretching from the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which are critical to Japan due to its dependence on the maritime transport of natural and energy resources from the Middle East (NSS 2013). National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond, which also came into force in December 2013, mentioned under Priorities in strengthening architecture of the Self Defense Forces that the SDF will work on enhancing transport and deployment capability, information communication capability with a view to long term activities in Africa and other remote locations, and strengthening logistic and medical service structure for smooth and continuous operation and that Japan will consider measures for making more effective use of the SDF Operational Facility for Deployed Air Force for Anti-Piracy Operation in Djibouti (NDPG 2013). International Peace Support Bill (2015) While the new International Peace Support Bill, which enabled support activities to armed forces of foreign countries collectively addressing the situation which threatens the international peace and security does not specifically mention the experience of the counterpiracy mission, it is the result of the necessity of deeper and broader military and security cooperation of the Japanese government and the JSDF with governments and military forces of partner countries such as the EU, but currently more importantly Australia and India, as well as Asian countries with claims in the South-China Sea. 12

13 5. Conclusion Through political, military, logistical, and governing cooperation in the counter-piracy missions off the coast of Somalia on the ground, on sea, in surrounding areas, and in its institutional structure, Japanese government representatives as well as SDF personnel have learned new ways to deal with complex problems. In the CGPCS, the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) meetings, which are multistakeholder organizations and purely solution oriented, non-political, and apply informal decision-making process. These new procedures provided a learning experience for Japanese decision-makers and government bureaucrats alike. The counter-piracy missions also provided limited opportunities for military-military cooperation between Japanese and European forces. Frequent visits of EUNAVFOR and MSDF senior military officers on each other s vessels or at the Japanese base in Djibouti, and the opportunities to discuss during and after meetings of the governing bodies have certainly been an important opportunity for both sides to exchange ideas, and to deepen trust and understanding. While none of these mil-mil interactions between European and Japanese maritime forces come close to the week-long military exercises conducted between Japanese, US, and other forces from the Asia-Pacific or South-Asia, such as the Joint Naval Exercises Near South China Sea (Malabar exercises) or the RIMPAC, they are still an important learning opportunity for Japanese JMSDF officers. In the case of EU-Japan security ties, or the security ties between EU member states such as the UK or France, the counter-piracy mission was a starting period (for seven years now), which makes cooperation in other specific policy areas more likely and easier to achieve. However, for the time being, these policy areas will not include Japan s national defense or security in East Asia, but areas such as cyber security, international terrorism, legal aspects of maritime security, or energy security. European governments have praised changes in Japanese security legislation implemented by the Abe administration and now have a better understanding of the security challenges Japan is facing, and might be more willing to support Japan s position in international bodies or through political or economic for example in regard to North Korea and in a more limited way also towards China. 13