CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF NOTICE

Transcription

1 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF NOTICE J-2 CJCS Notice DISTRIBUTION: A, B, C INTERIM POLICY CHANGE TO TARGET VETTING References: a. CJCSI Series, Target Development Standards b. CJCSI Series, No-Strike and the Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology 1. Purpose. This interim policy notice updates how Combatant Commands and the Intelligence Community will conduct Department of Defense (DoD) target vetting. It replaces the guidance found in Appendix A to Enclosure E of CJCSI B, 6 May Superseded/Cancellation. None. This is a new notice. 3. Applicability. This Instruction applies to the Joint Staff, Services, Combatant Commands (CCMDs), Joint forces, DoD Combat Support Agencies (CSA), Joint activities and other USG Organizations participating in Target Vetting. 4. Background. A continued high operations tempo and a lack of prioritization of vetting requests has prevented accurate allocation of limited Intelligence Community (IC) vetting resources and resulted in an inability to satisfy CCMD/JFC vetting requests. There have been many issues with DOD target vetting and more specifically expedited vetting. These procedures will replace expedited vetting with non-standard vetting and provide a clear definition. The purpose of vetting is stated and how a vote is determined is clarified. New requirements for all vetting and assistance with deconfliction are also included. 5. Action or Procedure. Updated policy will enable analytic efficiencies and clarify the current target vetting policy for non-standard DOD target vetting support. 6. Releasability. UNRESTRICTED. This directive is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited on NIPRNET. DOD Components (to include

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3 ENCLOSURE A TARGET VETTING 1. Intelligence Community Target Vetting. This refers to an intelligence function initiated by the responsible CCMD/JFC J2 or Joint Force and supported by Intelligence Community agencies. Eleven elements are required to submit an entity for vetting. IC agencies participating in vetting will use their intelligence holdings and expertise to assess the accuracy of these elements. Electronic Target Folders (ETFs) submitted for vetting found incomplete by any IC member will be rejected. Rejected ETFs cannot complete vetting until complete in accordance with CJCSI series. Joint Staff targets will arbitrate any unresolved disputes. Participating agencies normally include the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and the National Security Agency (NSA). When one joint force desires or requires vetting for a target located in a second joint force s area of responsibility or operations area, the second joint force may be a voting member of the vetting session. Other members of the IC, agencies, or subject matter experts (SMEs) with additional expertise or equities may be included by invitation of the joint force. NOTE: Non-DoD agencies may determine if and when they will participate in vetting, but if participating, then they will agree to adhere to the processes below. 2. Vetting. Vetting occurs in Phase II of the joint targeting cycle, and informs the CCMD/JFC during validation and engagement planning of a target in the following ways: a. Supporting validation of an entity s functional characterization for planning: Vetting allows the CCMD/JFC to mitigate the operational and strategic risk of striking a target that is not WHO/WHAT/WHERE indicated and performing the FUNCTION identified for the adversary. CONCUR, PARTIAL CONCUR, NON-CONCUR or NO REPORTING/EXPERTISE votes will be based on the following seven elements related to the target s characterization: (1) Target identification and the use of the appropriate naming convention. (2) Target location. (3) Target function. (4) Target description A-1 Enclosure A

4 (5) Functional characterization of the target. (6) Critical elements. Physical and virtual elements of the target, which if effectively engaged, will serve to support the achievement of an operational objective and/or mission task. (7) Sourcing. Sources listed should be reliable and reference the target. b. Considerations for target engagement restrictions (inclusion on the Joint Target List or Restricted Target List (RTL): Vetting allows IC members an opportunity to, identify equity concerns, support CCMD/JFC target prioritization, and collateral damage mitigation processes. The decision to validate a target to the Joint Target List or RTL with specific restrictions is informed by these elements. Flags will be provided on the following four elements related to the target s engagement within the operational environment. (1) Target significance, focused on the target significance considering the system. (2) Target expectation statement, focused on the effect on the overall target system. (3) Collateral damage considerations, engagement concerns, collateral damage estimation remarks. (4) Intelligence Gain-Loss Concerns. Vetting agencies will annotate any restricted target list (RTL) requests in their vetting comments under the Intelligence Gain-Loss field to include the office and contact for use in operational deconfliction later in the targeting cycle. This will ensure visibility during the remaining phases of the targeting cycle. 3. Definition of Functional Characterization Responses. Organizations vote on the accuracy of the characterization of the target presented in the ETF within their intelligence discipline. Votes are not dependent on target engagement concerns. IC vetting votes reflect SME feedback regarding the body of intelligence put forth by the requesting CCMD/JFC and production from the IC to confirm that this entity has been accurately characterized. This policy directs Agencies to base their vote on their intelligence discipline(s) alone. Agencies will record their vote and any comments in the Modernized Integrated Database (MIDB). Modifications to target intelligence during the vetting session are not permitted. The only four votes that can be cast are: A-2 Enclosure A

5 a. Concur. The agency agrees with all seven elements related to the target s functional characterization. Administrative comments (misspellings, grammar, etc.) are authorized with this remark, but the vote remains CONCUR. b. Concur Partially. The agency agrees with one or more of the seven elements but cannot assess all. (NOTE: This vote cannot be cast if the agency disagrees with any element.) The agency will specify elements agreed upon and those that cannot be assessed; agencies may provide amplifying comments on any of the elements. For example, Agency concurs with Target Identification, Location, Target Description, and sourcing. This agency cannot assess Function, Functional Characterization, and Critical Elements. This alerts the requesting command to areas where risk may still exist. Administrative comments (misspellings, grammar, etc.) are authorized with this remark, but the vote remains CONCUR PARTIALLY. c. Non-Concur. The agency substantively disagrees with any one of the seven elements. The agency MUST include rationale for this vote and comment on each element disagreed upon. For example, if an Agency s intelligence source does not support the command and/or MIDB target function element, then this is a substantial disagreement and the agency should cast a non-concur vote. Comments remitted MUST be sourced. Administrative comments (typographical, punctuation, grammar, and spelling errors) are authorized with this remark, but cannot be the basis for the Non-Concur vote. d. No Reporting/Expertise. The agency will vote No Reporting/Expertise when the agency can assess none of the seven elements or the organization lacks SMEs on the target nominated at the time of the request (This applies especially to non-standard vetting requests). A statement of this fact is required with the vote, e.g.; Agency does not have intelligence holdings and/or all intelligence supporting this nomination is outside the specialty of this IC member. 4. Definition of Engagement Consideration Responses. Organizations identify any engagement concerns of the target within their intelligence discipline and flag them for the CCMD/JFC to consider during prioritization, effects, and collateral damage mitigation processes. a. No Concerns. The agency has no concerns with any of the four elements related to the target within the operational environment. This will be provided with all votes (i.e. CONCUR, NO CONCERNS ). A-3 Enclosure A

6 b. Concerns. The agency has concerns with any of the four elements related to the target within the operational environment. This will be provided with all votes (i.e. PARTIAL CONCUR, CONCERNS ). A comment must be made for each element where a concern exists. For Example, Collateral Damage Considerations, IC Agency cannot assess this entities affiliation and function. 5. Recording Responses. Vetting responses must be recorded and associated with the target in MIDB and linked to the ETF. In addition, provide timely contact information in the remark to facilitate reciprocal coordination, agency resolution and SME exchange. CIA, DIA, NGA and NSA will record their responses in MIDB directly. During crisis it may be necessary to provide vetting responses by other means to facilitate operational planning; however, the IC will populate vetting responses in MIDB as soon as possible to formally record the organization s response. For ETFs databased outside of MIDB, the IC will provide their response as requested by the joint force. For agencies without MIDB access, (e.g., Department of State, Energy, Treasury, etc.) votes will be recorded by the joint force in the vetting remark in MIDB. a. If vetting votes are not received in the allocated time, the joint force will NOT record the missing vote as a CONCUR or an NO REPORTING/EXPERTISE. The joint force will exercise due diligence in obtaining a vote. If the joint force cannot obtain a vote from a vetting partner, it will document all efforts to obtain a vetting vote and enter NO VETTING RESPONSE WAS PROVIDED by that agency. This MUST be briefed to the commander or delegated target validation authority. b. Vetting organizations are required to verify the accuracy of their response. If a response has been documented incorrectly, the agency should immediately contact the joint force to make the correction. If the record is not corrected to the agency s satisfaction, the agency should refer the matter to JS Targeting for adjudication. When reviewing the votes the agency should attempt to keep classifications at such a level as to enable coalition operations without sacrificing value. c. All substantive/non-administrative IC comments and concerns MUST be provided, regardless of vote on the target, to the validating authority for visibility and discussion. 6. The IC has Limited Capacity to Vet Targets. Targets submitted for vetting should normally include those of greatest risk (dual use, weak sourcing, etc.). Joint Staff J-2 in coordination with the IC vetting members will establish and publish guidelines that specify the current A-4 Enclosure A

7 vetting capacity of the IC. CCMDs are responsible for establishing procedures to ensure candidate targets submitted for vetting are triaged appropriately to determine if vetting is required, and whether that vetting should be standard or non-standard. In lieu of specific guidelines, general guidelines are defined below: a. Standard vetting requests will not exceed 20 targets per command within 10 working days. A production requirement should be submitted to the IC via applicable agency tasking mechanism. (Note: Vetting participants should notify the requestor if the response will not be forthcoming in the 10-day period.) b. Non-Standard vetting applies to any request that exceeds 20 targets and/or does not allow 10 working days. All requests for non-standard vetting must be accompanied by an operational justification and approved by the CCMD/JFC J3. The CCMD/JFC should develop a framework to prioritize targets submitted for non-standard vetting to allow the IC to allocate vetting resources appropriately. Non-Standard vetting will be submitted to the IC via the most expeditious means available (normally JWICS ) and the production requirement should be submitted as time allows. Sources in their entirety must be provided as an attachment in the vetting request. The IC will provide the requester and Joint Staff J2 Targeting with an acknowledgment of receipt and intent to meet the suspense. Joint Staff Targeting will review targets submitted for Non-Standard vetting and track them throughout the vetting process. (1) Justification. The CCMD/JFC J3 will approve and provide a statement of operational necessity. The operational necessity for non-standard vetting must be defined and correlated to an imminent window of execution, an unplanned target requirement, or emergent operational or strategic constraint (i.e., a specific date is required). Statements of operational necessity should also detail the impact on the Joint Force Commander objectives if the target is not vetted expeditiously. For example, We anticipate engaging this target between DD-MMM and DD-MMM and vetting responses must be received within XX hrs. Statements that cite operational necessity, by themselves do not justify operational necessity. (2) Non-standard vetting will NOT be used to accelerate routine target development, and the CCMD/JFC must make every reasonable effort to plan and prioritize target development that allows routine IC vetting in accordance with CJCSI It is the responsibility of the Joint Force to ensure that non-standard vetting requests are used judiciously. The submission of a non-standard vetting request does not alleviate the responsibility of the Joint Force to ensure all vetting requirements are satisfied IAW CJCSI A-5 Enclosure A

8 7. Fires Deconfliction. Target vetting contributes to validation of targets and deconfliction of Joint Fires which occurs later in Phases 4 and 5 of the joint targeting cycle. A RTL/restriction request indicates an equity, operation or significant interest is at risk due to a target engagement. The RTL request will be in the Intelligence Gail/Loss remark and the Target Validation Authority will decide at validation whether to place the target on the RTL. The Target Validation Authority will notify the requestor of that decision. Due to the operating environment some targets may be submitted for vetting concurrent with the coordination of target engagement and/or in an area with other ongoing operations. The engagement authority responsible for deconfliction, MUST ensure reliable procedures are in place to address engagement concerns identified during vetting as this information may be provided prior to the conclusion of vetting and entry of the RTL request. The IC agencies must ensure adequate representation and participation in the engagement authority s operational deconfliction procedures to address target engagement concerns in a time-sensitive manner. See JP 3-09 Joint Fires & JP 3-60 Joint Targeting, for further information on Deconfliction. A-6 Enclosure A