US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE US

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1 US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE US Army Command and General Staff School Command and General Staff Officer s Course (CGSOC) Common Core F100: Managing Army Change Lesson F101: Foundations of Change Reading F101RA Why FM? The reading begins on the next page. F101ASRA F101RA-1 JUNE 2014

2 Name Staff Group As an Army major embarking upon your career as a field grade officer, and therefore, a middle level executive in The Corporation, it is imperative that you are exposed to How the Army Runs. If you were hired by a major corporation as a middle level executive, it would be vital to your continued corporate progression to understand the fundamental processes used by the company to function daily, implement initiatives and manage change. As the Army begins the journey of recovering from a long war, reducing personnel, and preparing for the next war on a constrained budget, you will need to lead your soldiers through a tumultuous time. Understanding force management processes and the origins of change will assist you in navigating these issues with greater efficacy. As a major at the battalion or brigade level, you will experience force management actions regularly: New equipment fielding and training; changes to MTOEs; providing comment on doctrine reviews; establishing and prioritizing requirements for upcoming missions; reviewing, commenting on and initiating new Basis of Issue Plans for equipment in your unit. Understanding the Force Development Process will educate you on how to change your organization to prepare for the future. Understanding the Defense Acquisition Management System will assist you in better planning of future equipment fieldings and interaction with the key players, such as the program manager. By learning about the Total Army Analysis, you will understand how and why certain capabilities are deleted or redistributed from an organization, and how you replace that capability in the future. The value of Army Force Management knowledge cannot be overstated. As abstract as these topics seem to you, it will behoove you to concentrate and become familiar with them. Only through knowledge of FM will you be able to stay ahead of change in a volatile future. F101ASRA F101RA-2 JUNE 2014

3 US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE US Army Command and General Staff School Command and General Staff Officer s Course (CGSOC) Common Core F100: Managing Army Change Lesson F101: Foundations of Change Reading F101RB 2008 Force Management Primer and How the Army Runs Excerpts CONSTITUTIONAL / LEGAL BASIS 1 INTRODUCTION The role of the Army, as delineated in the Constitution, is to conduct prompt and sustained combat on land. The Army must provide the most combat effective force, within available resources, for joint and combined operations and a coherent military strategy for coordinating and integrating operational and managerial systems ensuring effective Army capabilities. Success, at this level, is measured in capabilities, transitioning from the broad policy and strategic level focus to the specific needs and requirements to meet the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Military Strategy (NMS), Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and Defense Strategy, including the Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF) / Joint Programming Guidance (JPG). GENERAL Force Management is the framework on which the Army is raised and maintained. Without an understanding of the functions of manning, equipping, readiness, requirements and authorization documents (TOEs 2, MTOEs 3, TDAs 4, JTA 5 ), and all categories of personnel, no Army can be created, maintained, trained or resourced. Force Management is based on the law, interrelated processes and force structure. The focal point of force management is meeting our statutory requirements to man, equip and organize the force. LAW The Constitution (Article I, Section 8 and Article II, Section 2), with amendments, provides the constitutional and legal basis of the military. The role of the Army is expressed in Title 10 of the United States Code, and is the principal basis of army functions. Title 32, United States Code, provides the statutory mission for the National Guard. 1. Constitution of the United States of America: Preamble We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. a. Article I Section 8. Provides the ability of congress to declare war,..to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a Navy, and to provide for calling forth the militia to execute 1 US Army Force Management School, 2008 Primer, Future Force Capabilities (Fort Belvoir, VA: Army Force Management School), Excerpts from pages 3-8. This not copyrighted; used with permission. CGSC copyright registration # E. 2 table of organization and equipment 3 modified tables of organization and equipment 4 Table of Distribution and Allowances 5 Joint technical architecture F101ASRB F101RB-1 JUNE 2014

4 the laws of the union, suppress insurrection and repel invasions Additionally, provides the statutory requirement: To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatever over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings b. Article II Section 2. The President shall be the Commander In Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and the militia of the several states. c. Amendments. The related Amendments providing statutory requirements: 2nd Amendment. A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be abridged. 3rd Amendment. No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. 2. Title 10, United States Code, Section 3062 provides the statutory mission from the Congress to the Army. This statute requires the Army to perform the functions that organize, train and equip forces capable of accomplishing missions as a component command of a unified command to: Preserve the peace and security of the United States Support national policies Implement national objectives Overcome any nations that threaten US peace and security a. Section 3062 states that It is the intent of the Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of preserving the peace supporting national policies, implementing national objective, and overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts b. Section 3062 directs that the Army shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. c. Section 3062 directs that the Army consists of Regular Army, the National Guard of the United States, the Army National Guard while in the service of the United States, and the Army Reserves d. Section 3062 establishes capabilities as the coin of the realm. The Army must possess the capability to preserve the peace and security of the United States, supporting the national policies (as articulated in the National Security Strategy), implementing the national objectives (found in the National Military Strategy) and overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States (including the planning scenarios provided in OSD guidance). F101ASRB F101RB-2 JUNE 2014

5 3. Title 10, United States Code, Section 3032 specifies the functions of the Secretary of the Army (SA). Further, Title 10 delineates the general duties of the Army Staff. The staff is required to assist the Secretary, the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretaries of the Army and the Chief of Staff, Army. Further, under the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of the Army, the Army Staff shall: Prepare for such employment of the Army and for such, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, servicing, mobilizing/demobilizing and maintaining of the Army. Investigate and report upon the efficiency of the Army and its preparation to support military operations by combatant commands. Section 3032 charges the Secretary of the Army to be responsible for the functions of raising, provisioning, sustaining, maintaining, training, resourcing, mobilizing/demobilizing, recruiting, and providing forces to the combatant commanders of the unified commands. 4. Title 10, United States Code, Section 3013 states that the Secretary of the Army is responsible for and has the authority necessary to conduct, all affairs of the Department of the Army, including organizing, supplying, equipping, training, servicing, and mobilizing/demobilizing organizations. 5. Title 32, United States Code provides the statutory mission for the National Guard. Specifically, Title 32 directs the Secretary of the Army that the Army National Guard organization and the composition of its units shall be the same as those prescribed for the Army. Additionally, the President may designate the units of the National Guard, by branch to be maintained in each State and Territory, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia. Change of units located entirely within a State require the governor s approval. The Constitution, Amendments, and appropriate Titles to the United States Code define: The ROLE of the Army too conduct land combat operations. The FUNCTIONS of the Army to organize, train, and equip ground forces. The RESPONSIBILTIES of the Army to raise, provision, sustain, maintain, train, and resource ground forces. The President and Secretary of Defense generally assign the STRATEGIC MISSIONS of the Army; the combatant commanders assign OPERATIONAL and TACTICAL MISSIONS. SUMMARY Force Management extends from the halls of Congress to the forward line of troops, through every level of the functional, as well as the strategic, operational and tactical levels of the Army. By law, the Army is required to be organized, trained and equipped for prompt and sustained combat on land in conjunction with the other armed Services. Approached systematically, this is accomplished by taking people, materiel and money, converting them though organization and training into a capable force. Force management performs the Constitutional/legal basis and statutory requirements to organize, train and equip the Army, including the Army National Guard, the United States Army Reserve, and the civilian work force. Success at this level is measured in capabilities. NOTE: The task of warfighting is not mentioned. Warfighting is the responsibility of the Combatant Commanders. SA 6 and CSA 7 Raise, provision, sustain, maintain, training, resource, mobilize, recruit and providing the forces. 6 senior advisor 7 Chief of Staff, United States Army F101ASRB F101RB-3 JUNE 2014

6 RELATIONSHIPS White House: The national security strategy (NSS) is formulated by the President assisted by the National Security Council, with the support of Congress. Congress: Congress provides input with Treaty Advice and Consent, raises and equips the Armies, assigns broad missions, and authorizes programs and appropriates the funds. Department of Defense (DoD) / Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS): In order to raise, provision, sustain, maintain, train, resource, mobilize, recruit and provide forces to the Combatant Commanders, strategies must be developed and articulated, policies, and procedures established. The Defense Planning System provides the framework to accomplish these tasks. Based on the guidance contained in the NSS, JCS uses the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) to develop the National Defense Strategy (NDS). The NDS outlines how the Department of Defense will contribute to achieving the NSS objects. The NDS serves as the Department's capstone document in the long-term effort described in the NSS. The NDS flows from the NSS and informs the National Military Strategy (NMS). The NMS describes the strategic environment, develops national military objectives, and describes the military capabilities required to execute the strategy. The NMS provides the basis for force structure guidance incorporated in the Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF) and, through the Extended Planning Process (EPP), develop the Joint Programming Guidance (JPG). These documents are the key set of DoD directives providing planning and programming direction to the Services and Defense Agencies. Based on the DoD level guidance, the Services prepare their Program Objective Memorandum (POM) submissions. Joint Staff (J-8) develops an assessment of the threat(s), missions, areas of operations and force structure recommend by the combatant commanders. Through the GDF/JPG the SECDEF provides force planning guidance. The GDF and JPG replace the OSD level guidance formerly found in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The GDF replaces the guidance called Strategic Planning Guidance (JPG). The Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF) (published in May 2008) translated the National Defense Strategy into force development priorities. These force development priorities are described as capability priorities for reducing capability gaps. The guidance includes the ability to establish, develop, maintain and manage a mission ready Total Force. The GDF focuses on what needs to be done, not the how. The Joint Programming Guidance (JPG) (published in June 2004) provides the link between planning and programming, and it provides guidance to the Services for the development of their program proposal, known as the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). The JPG provides fiscally constrained programming guidance, directing the services to program towards the strategic objectives. The JPG focuses on the how and the how well to do it. Based on the GDF/JPG, the Services prepare their POM. For the Army, the GDF/JPG provides the strategy. Combatant Commands: Combatant commanders provide input to force structure through the Army Service Component Command, the Joint Staff and the TAA process. Additionally, combatant commanders provide the Joint Staff and the Army Staff with force structure requirements for day - to - day operations in their theaters. Combatant commanders submit force structure requirements and data calls to TAA. The four critical regions the Combatant Commanders must address in the deter aggression requirement are: Northeast Asia (NEA), Southwest Asia (SWA), Europe and Southeast Asian Littorals. ARSTAF: CSA and VCSA charge the HQDA DCS, G-37 Force Management (DAMO-FM) with overall responsibility for policy, procedures, supervision, and execution of force Management for the entire Army. In performance of these missions and functions, DAMO-FM must work in close coordination with virtually every other element of the ARSEC, ARSTAF, FOAs, Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands (ASCC), Direct Reporting Units (DRU), ARNG, OCAR, and F101ASRB F101RB-4 JUNE 2014

7 Special Staff Activities (SSA). The focus is to provide forces and capabilities to the combatant commanders. ARMY PLANNING: Receipt of the GDF/JPG begins the force sizing process for the Army. The Army can, through the force planning process, determine specific force structure requirements, force capabilities and resources needed to execute Army functions and missions. Army force planning process begins at the DoD and JCS levels and proceeds from the conceptual view of national defense to the specifics of force structure. It considers risk assessments and resource constraints. The Army determines force requirements, force capabilities and resources needed to execute Army functions and missions. The force planning process determines specific force structure requirements and how to best resource the requirements. Through PLANNING we determine force size, structure, personnel, equipment, and training requirements the Army needs to support the national military strategy. Through PROGRAMMING we distribute resources available (manpower, dollars and materiel) among competing requirements per Army resource allocation policy and priorities. Through BUDGETING we convert program decisions on dollars and manpower into budget requests for congressional authorizations and appropriations. Through the EXECUTION we apply the resources, adjust resources and manage the funds to carry out approved programs. The SA and CSA translate direction, guidance and process to the ARSEC, ARSTAF, Army Commands, ASCC, DRUs, and FOAs based on the directives and directions provided to all Services by CJCS/JS and OSD to accomplish the Army missions through the Army Planning System (APS). The SA and CSA articulate the Army specific guidance through The Army Plan (TAP), providing specific force structure guidance and instructions for the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) build. The Army Planning System compliments the Defense Planning System. The Army force planning begins at the DoD/JCS levels, transitioning from the conceptual view of national defense to the specific missions assigned to the Army. The SA/CSA specifies force structure guidance through the TAP. The Army develops total force structure requirements and allocation of resources provided in the TAP through the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process. TAA is the transition process from planning to programming within the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process. PPBE ties strategy, programming, and budgeting together. TAA helps build a comprehensive plan in which budgets flow from programs; programs from requirements; requirements from missions; and missions from national security objectives. TAA considers the major programmed combat forces for each scenario; develops the "support (MTOE CBT/CS/CSS 8 ) and generating" forces (TDA) necessary to sustain the operating forces. TAA provides a rationale for each unit as it contributes to combat effectiveness; enables tradeoffs between types of units and assesses risk when shortfalls occur in the program force. The program force is a compromise decision, based on past force analysis and program forces, force requirements, priorities, deployment capabilities, risk analysis and resource levels. The programmed force established through TAA is used to develop the Army s POM. The Army s POM is submitted to OSD for inclusion in the DOD POM submission. Force programming translates the POM force into a final detailed future years program (FYPD) for budgeting and execution that describes all aspects of the Army program to increase readiness and implement new initiatives. Lesson author note: PPBE and TAA will be covered in more detail in F103. At the HQDA level, several procedures, processes and systems have a direct impact on the personnel, organizational, and materiel mix within the organizations. Additionally, these and a multitude of 8 combat service support F101ASRB F101RB-5 JUNE 2014

8 processes and decision making forums have direct and indirect impacts on personnel assignments, recruiting, the training base, equipment acquisition, equipment distribution, stationing, and so on. SUMMARY The Army s strategies for and execution of Force Management activities are reflective of statutory requirements, NSS, NMS, DOD guidance, Army Planning, and the supportive policies, procedures, and decisions which determine, develop, and integrate the requirements for and capabilities of Army forces. Successful integration and execution of Force Management activities requires in-depth knowledge and understanding of these factors, policies, and procedures and their interrelationships and impacts on the Total Force (MTOE & TDA). The key to success is the integration of all processes, making sure that the dollars, organizational structure, personnel, equipment, facilities, and doctrinal changes, occur in a synchronized manner --therefore increasing capabilities, and increasing readiness. THE ARMY PLAN (TAP) 9 Army planning responds to and complements OSD planning and joint strategic planning. In particular, Army planning:h A P T E R 9 1. Helps the senior Army leadership determine force requirements and objectives and set priorities. 2. Provides the basis for positions and comments supporting Army participation in OSD and joint processes. 3. Lays the planning basis for the Army program. The foundation of Army planning lies in The Army Plan (TAP), which provides strategic planning, priorities, programming, and execution guidance in four sequentially developed and substantively integrated sections: 1. The Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG), which forms section I of the TAPa. Nests Army planning in National, OSD, and Joint strategic guidance. b. Gives rationale for transforming The Army per the Army Vision. c. Provides senior leader guidance. d. Identifies joint demand for Army capabilities. 2. Army Planning Priorities Guidance (APPG), which is section II of TAP, links requirements to strategy and guides development of resource priorities for operational tasks. 3. The Army Program Guidance Memorandum (APGM), which exists as section III of TAP, relates operational tasks to resource tasks, thereby helping link operational tasks and their associated resources to Army Title 10 functions. 4. The Army Campaign Plan is Section IV of TAP. The nine campaign objectives of the ACP are as follows: support global operations; transform from the current to future force; optimize RC contribution; sustain the right all-volunteer force; adjust the global footprint; shape the future force; adapt the institutional Army; and develop a joint, interdependent logistics structure. These objectives incorporate Army transformation into the context of ongoing strategic commitments. 2 Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, United States Army War College. How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Handbook, (Carlisle: PA: USAWC, 15 July 2013 Excerpt from pages CGSC copyright registration # E. F101ASRB F101RB-6 JUNE 2014

9 ARMY STRATEGIC PLANNING GUIDANCE (ASPG) The G-3/5/7 Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate prepare the ASPG (TAP Section I). The ASPG is the Army's institutional strategy. It provides strategic guidance to translate requirements to serve the Nation -principally in terms of trained and ready forces capable of decisive action across the range of military operations and spectrum of conflict-into fielded capabilities. The AS provides a long-term general perspective (10-20 years) for planners through a common understanding of the Army's contribution to national security and the Joint Team. It also articulates the key Army concerns that must be addressed during the next POM period. ARMY PLANNING PRIORITIES GUIDANCE (APPG) The G-3/5/7 Resource Analysis and Integration Office prepares the APPG (TAP Section II). The APPG covers the mid-term period of the next 5-year POM plus 5-7 additional years. Adding substantial detail to Army Strategic Planning Guidance, the APPG identifies and prioritizes enduring operational capabilities needed now and in the future to maintain The Army's core competencies cited in Army Doctrine Publication 1. The APPG provides risk guidance as it relates to Army capabilities in accordance with the QDR Risk Framework. ARMY PROGRAM GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM (APGM) The G-8 Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate prepares the APGM (TAP Section III), which links operational capabilities and programming. Providing direction to PEGs, the APGM conveys Army senior leader intent as well as broad, general guidance concerning acceptable levels of risk for the initial POM/BES build. Applying readiness and war fighting requirements derived from strategic and operational capabilities in TAP sections I and II to program development, it completes the succession of guidance from strategic planning to mid-term planning to programming. Guided by planning priorities, the APGM translates operational tasks known as core competencies to resource tasks to perform Army Title 10 functions. It then prescribes other, non-operational task requirements to assure carrying out the three interdependent components of the Army Vision-People, Current Readiness, and Future Forces. Through MDEPs, the APGM relates resource tasks to the Army's Title 10 functions, grouped under the PEG structure as Manning, Training, Organizing, Equipping, Sustaining, and Installations. A forwarding memorandum from the SECARMY and CSA provides HQDA agencies additional guidance. H A P T E R 9 ARMY CAMPAIGN PLAN (ACP) The G-3/5/7 Army Campaign Plan and Transformation Office prepares and maintains the ACP (TAP Section IV). The ACAP is an order that implements the ASPG, is informed by the CSA Vision and is integrated with the Army Imperatives. It provides campaign and other major objectives and integrates other major efforts of the department for Army force generation. It is as much a process as a product as there is an established battle rhythm that provides continuous monitoring of progress towards its goals. F101ASRB F101RB-7 JUNE 2014

10 US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE US Army Command and General Staff School Command and General Staff Officer s Course (CGSOC) Common Core F100: Managing Army Change Lesson F101: Foundations of Change Reading F101RC 2014 Army Strategic Planning Guidance Excerpt 1 FORWARD Over the past 238 years, the United States Army has proudly served the Nation by winning its wars and securing the peace. Today, nearly 153,000 Soldiers are forward deployed around the world. From Asia and across the Pacific, across the Americas and through Africa and Europe, the Army continues to be globally responsive and regionally engaged. In over 150 countries, Soldiers continue to uphold a proud legacy of defending our Nation and its interests. The 2014 Army Strategic Planning Guidance reminds us of the Army s purpose and details our vision, direction, and strategic objectives. Today, the Army remains the most highly-trained and professional All Volunteer land force in the world. It is uniquely organized with the capability and capacity to provide landpower with strategic utility for the Joint Force, and stands ready to defend the Nation and its interests at home and abroad, both today and against emerging threats, across the range of military operations. The Army prevents conflict through credible deterrence, and shapes the environment by assuring partners and allies while coercing adversaries. When necessary, the Army wins decisively through compellence. To prevent, shape, and win across the range of military operations, the Army must remain an expeditionary, strategically adaptive, and campaign-quality land force. The Army s ability to deter, assure, coerce, and compel guarantees American military and diplomatic primacy and global leadership. Looking to the future, the Army must consider five strategic priorities. The foundation of the Army rests in Army leaders who can adapt to the challenges posed by a complex future environment. The force they lead will be globally responsive, yet regionally engaged worldwide, with the capability to rapidly deploy, fight, and win whenever and wherever our national interests are threatened. Such a force must come from the Active Component (AC) and Reserve Components (RC), and can readily leverage the capabilities provided by joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational (JIIM) partners. The Soldiers in the Army of the future are committed professionals. They are the credentials of the Nation, which places their confidence in the Army as a profession. Keeping faith with Soldiers is an integral part of ensuring that the Army remains the premier All-Volunteer land force in the world. Although the Army is constantly adapting to prepare for the future, Soldier and Civilian leaders across the Total Army, whether Active Army, Army National Guard, Army Reserve, must be able to apply the experiences and hard-earned lessons that have been learned over the last decade of war and continue to foster adaptability and innovation in their formations. At the same time, fiscal realities require us to eliminate redundant and poorly performing programs while sustaining those that have proven most beneficial. Anything less compromises the Army's ability to provide the forces that fight and win the Nation s wars. 1 US Department of the Army. Army Strategic Planning Guidance, Excerpts from the forward and pages 1, This is in the public domain. F101ASRC F101RC-1 JUNE 2014

11 PART 1: CONTEXT The 2014 Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG) reframes the Army s overarching strategy to reflect the ongoing unpredictability inherent to the security environment, within the bounds of austerity and fiscal uncertainty imposed upon the Army and Department of Defense. The 2013 ASPG was built upon the 2012 edition, keeping the same ends while refining the thought, vision, ways, and means to fulfill them. While the 2014 edition seeks the same goal of balancing longterm planning with short-term decision making to build the Army of the future, it does so under substantially different conditions than in 2012 and early As the first part of The Army Plan (TAP), the ASPG informs the Army Planning Priorities Guidance (APPG), which establishes planning priorities based on the vision outlined in this document. The Army Programming Guidance Memorandum (APGM) provides programmatic guidance to align resources to the planning priorities. Implementation of the Army strategy also occurs through the Army Campaign Plan (ACP), which directs tasks to the Army based on the ends, ways, and means articulated in the ASPG. The ASPG serves two purposes for the Army and its leaders. First, it provides a vehicle for leaders at every echelon to read, discuss, and think critically about how to exercise the disciplined initiative to operationalize the guidance provided herein. Second, this document provides the Army and its leaders a reference to explain to others what the Army does for the Nation, Army Strategic Priorities: Adaptive Army Leaders for a Complex World A Globally Responsive and Regionally Engaged Army A Ready and Modern Army Soldiers Committed to Our Army Profession The Premier All Volunteer Army how the Army does it, and where the Army is going. The Soldiers and Civilians of the Army have an obligation to remember the lessons of the past, while best preparing for an uncertain future. The supreme test of all armies stems from the unpredictability of the future strategic environment. It is a future about which we know almost everything in general, but we rarely know enough in detail to give reasonable certainty. Instead, the Army must prudently approach the future in a way that prepares it to adapt rapidly to circumstances it cannot foresee. Rather than trying to get preparation exactly right, it must not be too terribly wrong. The United States does not seek war, but others must never doubt our ability to wage it and win decisively when it occurs. PART 3: THE ARMY IN TRANSITION The Army remains the Nation s principal instrument of compellence on land, with the lethality, flexibility, and staying power to terminate conflicts on terms favorable to the United States. Those qualities are also the basis of the deterrent the Army poses to potential enemies. Between those ends, the Army shapes the security environment, whether through assuring allies and partners, or coercing adversaries. Army forces operate in and around the culture and politics of populations. They offer a versatile, discriminating tool to achieve strategic objectives using the appropriate force required to end wars and conflicts, in ways that the application of firepower alone cannot deliver. The strategic guidance from the President and Secretary of Defense (Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012) outlines 11 priority missions for the DoD. The Army has a significant role in 10 of the 11 missions, which will focus the training, organizing, and equipping of units assigned those missions. The Army uses three of the missions to guide the force-sizing construct: Conduct Counterterrorism and Irregular Warfare, Deter or Defeat Aggression, and Defend the Homeland and Provide Defense Support of Civil Authorities. We also believe that potential missions related to F101ASRC F101RC-2 JUNE 2014

12 Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction may impact the Army s required capabilities and capacity. The Army s support to the Joint Force in unified action includes critical enablers such as aviation, air/missile defense, intelligence, engineers, logistics, medical, signal, operational contract support, and special operations, both while enroute to and operating within expeditionary environments. With the projected end of combat operations in Afghanistan, the Army must downsize to a postwar structure and end strength, while rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region. In past drawdowns, the Army has sought to recast itself as a smaller, more capable force. However, the Army is approaching this postwar reality in a fundamentally different manner than before. Rather than reorganizing the Army as a force primarily for contingency response as it did from the 1970s to the 1990s, the Army will expand its engagement to proactively address the security environment. The Army continues to maintain a stabilizing regional presence, building and strengthening alliance and partner capacity, and providing essential enabling capabilities to the joint force to ensure operational access and rapid contingency response if and when needed. Regionally aligned forces, bolstered by the capabilities provided in mission tailored forces, directly address this proactive engagement which is an integral part of the Army s Strategic Vision. REGIONALLY ALIGNED FORCE Regionally Aligned Forces are those Army units assigned and allocated to combatant commands, as well as those capabilities that are service retained (but aligned to a Combatant Command (CCMD)) and prepared by the Army for regional missions. It includes Total Army organizations and capabilities that are forward stationed, operating in a CCMD area of responsibility, supporting from outside the area of responsibility, and those prepared to support from outside the area of responsibility. CCMD requirements will drive regional missions, requiring an understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of the countries where they are most likely to be employed, as well as expertise in how to impart military knowledge and skills to others. The goal of regional alignment is to provide combatant commanders (CCDR) predictable, task-organized, and responsive capabilities to achieve Guidance for the Employment of the Force end states and meet other requirements across the full range of military operations, to include joint task force-capable headquarters, crisis or contingency response, operations support, theater security cooperation, and bilateral or multilateral military exercises. Regional alignment also provides a more effective approach for non-traditional threats in an increasingly interdependent security environment. The Army seeks to train Soldiers and grow leaders who can adapt to changing conditions across the range of military operations. Regional alignment also prepares Army forces to build sustainable capacity in partners and allies to address common security challenges, consistent with principles of good governance and rule of law. Forces organized under this concept support enduring CCDR requirements for military engagement, strengthening relationships with key allies and partner nations by providing consistent and committed interaction. Units organized under the regionally aligned force concept also provide an immediate force-in-being to assure partners and deter potential adversaries. MISSION TAILORED FORCE Mission Tailored Forces are those Army units manned, trained, and equipped for the conduct of a specified mission. Rather than orienting on a particular geographic region, mission tailored forces maintain proficiency in the fundamentals of unified land operations and combined arms warfare, but have capabilities tailored primarily to their mission. They complement, and are informed by the capabilities of regionally aligned forces in meeting CCDR requirements. F101ASRC F101RC-3 JUNE 2014

13 Roles for mission tailored forces include, but are not limited to: Global Response Force (GRF) to defeat anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threats Countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD), to include support to forces conducting weapons of mass destruction elimination (WMD-E) operations. Conventional Army habitual support to other services or special operations forces for specified missions. Army cyberspace forces. Combat operations to decisively defeat a threat. Mission tailored forces span the Total Army and are likely to be stationed in the United States. They are best suited for use when requirements for proficiency in a specific mission outweigh needed readiness for a broader range of missions in a geographic region. IMPLICATIONS TO THE ARMY The implications of the Army s strategic concept and its supporting concepts of regionally aligned and mission tailored forces cut across many of the basic functions of the Department of the Army. Areas of emphasis include training and leader development, readiness, modernization, cyberspace, space, and countering weapons of mass destruction. TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT Training is a crucial investment in force readiness. Soldiers, civilians, leaders, and units cannot accomplish an assigned mission without the knowledge and skill needed to survive first contact, seize the initiative, and prevail. The Army cannot respond to future unknown challenges without developing adaptable leaders today. Over the last decade, the Army generated combat power through enablers such as contractors or other external support. In the current fiscal austerity, leaders and their organizations will have to look internally to perform many of those functions, which emphasizes the essential responsibilities in mentorship and oversight that are the obligations of leaders at all levels. Training across the Total Army serves two main purposes: preparing units to be versatile and ready to support CCDRs worldwide, and developing military and civilian leaders to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The outcome of Army training efforts will be more agile and adaptive forces capable of supporting regional requirements or contingency missions when assigned. Training for operational adaptability can take place at home station and combat training centers, overseas with allies and partner armies during joint and multinational exercises, in Army institutions and while deployed. Security cooperation and other shaping activities build on combat experience to enhance training and leader development, and when executed, the training and experience gained from large formation exercises will be critical to developing ready and relevant leaders in combat formations. Training for operational adaptability, also builds the understanding of a region, its people, and their dynamics that are necessary for the compellence that underpins the relevance of Army forces for the CCDRs that must employ them. Complementing training is leader development, which is the single best insurance for the Total Army s ability to adapt to the uncertainty that future challenges will bring. Both collectively provide the foundations of mutual trust, shared understanding, and purpose necessary for the practice of mission command. Implicit to those foundations is an acceptance of risk and uncertainty on the part of leaders who trust their subordinates to operate with disciplined initiative within the bounds of commander s intent. The demands placed on training and leader development become even more important given the continuing expectation to provide regionally aligned corps and division headquarters capable of operating with and alongside JIIM partners. Army leaders must recognize that problems, whether strategic, F101ASRC F101RC-4 JUNE 2014

14 operational, or even tactical, do not have predetermined solutions. While training can prepare Soldiers to address conditions of relative certainty, education prepares Soldiers to address situations that training alone cannot answer. READINESS The Army's non-negotiable contract with the Nation is to be ready to respond when called. Of readiness, force structure and modernization, readiness is the vital element of the Army mission, because it applies to personnel, materiel and supplies, equipment readiness, and training. The sum of those elements, properly balanced, enables a ready and modern force that can immediately and effectively apply military power when called. A smaller, well-equipped, and highly trained force is better able to meet contingencies than a large force that is ill-trained. Similarly, a force with modern equipment, but without the people to employ it, is not ready. The deterrent and coercive value of the Army is a direct function of its readiness. That readiness may be tiered to give the Army an immediate response capability, while managing risk to forces that may require additional preparation prior to employment. An ill-trained, unready force is twice a liability: it is not a credible deterrent, and it invites challenges which it may prove unable to meet. The hollow Army of the 1970s, with undermanned units maintained at low readiness against an immediate threat, took over a decade to repair, and the cultural scars of that experience did not fade until after The Nation, in reacting to contingencies, has consistently bought back readiness lost over years of peacetime. The risk in such an approach is the very real potential for being unable to accomplish immediate contingency requirements when the Nation calls. MODERNIZATION The basis of the Army s core capability rests in its Soldiers. The Army organizes its Soldiers first, and then trains and equips them to prevail against the challenges they will face. A decade of war has damaged or destroyed many of our systems, requiring supplemental funding for three years after the end of combat operations in Afghanistan to reset our equipment. This continued reset will also maintain important capabilities in the Army's organic industrial base. As we restore our current capabilities, we also look to the future, but declining resources may stop, delay or extend programs which may degrade future capabilities and increase risk. The Army has established a framework for modernizing its equipment over time in the Army Equipment Modernization Strategy, which focuses our efforts on the Soldier and squad as the foundation of our Army. This means building from the Soldier out and equipping our organizations for tactical overmatch in all situations. Among those initiatives are a single integrated network, as well as vehicles that are survivable, mobile and lethal. In general terms, we will improve and procure equipment that is versatile and tailorable, yet cost-effective and affordable. Our task is prioritizing declining resources against our planned programs while maintaining the ability to conduct research and development in defense-related disruptive sciences and technologies. We should prioritize maintaining modernized systems with potential for extended service, while divesting legacy systems where possible. We should also consider the full range of climate change effects which could potentially increase risks to the Army s supply chain and impact operations and mission assurance. The Army will modernize its network in alignment with DoD s Joint Information Environment. Information Technology Management Reform initiatives provide governance, architecture development F101ASRC F101RC-5 JUNE 2014

15 and agile acquisition for information technology that provides a critical component to empowering our Soldiers. CYBERSPACE Cyberspace has significantly increased the speed and reach of global communications. Ideas and messages are now exchanged almost instantaneously with even the most remote locations in the world. There are significant implications for our Army as we seek to understand, influence, and control human behavior through the use of landpower. As the Army prepares for the future it must appreciate this increasing convergence between land and cyberspace operations at all levels of war. While the network and its critical infrastructure are vulnerable to remote attack, attribution of attacks in cyberspace is difficult. The Total Army must be able to defend its key systems and ensure the continuity of critical network functions in the face of disruption. Similar to other domains, Army leaders and organizations must be capable of employing capabilities in cyberspace, but not to the point of dependency should those capabilities be negated. This convergence between land and cyberspace has created dependencies and vulnerabilities for the Army s ability to exercise mission command through the Army network. The Army will prioritize the defense of its network and key systems against increasingly sophisticated and evolving threats in order to retain freedom of maneuver and exploit its advantages. As the Army addresses these challenges, it will build cyberspace capabilities that are integrated within a Joint construct, but also include integration with Army units down to the tactical edge. Finally, when authorized, the Army must be prepared to plan and conduct cyberspace operations in support of national, joint, and service requirements. SPACE The Army will continue to fully exploit Space as a combat multiplier and critical enabler for our Soldiers, weapons, and battlefield systems. The Army will continue its contribution to Joint Space Operations, including special capabilities, and extend space services to all ground component forces including our coalition partners. Given growing and accelerating adversary A2AD capabilities, satellite jamming, cyber attack, and anti-satellite capabilities the Army must train to fight with degraded space services; while Army and Joint space forces fight to protect, defend, rapidly restore our space enablers. The Army must work closely with our Joint and Coalition partners to enhance space architecture resilience, and assure this vital global extension of our sensors, networks, and mission command capabilities. COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION WMD pose an enduring challenge to peace and stability world-wide and to the vital interests of the United States and its partners. To this end, the Army will be prepared to conduct operations world-wide in a CBRN environment. The Army will lead CWMD missions in the land domain and provide the preponderance of trained and equipped forces to support DoD CWMD efforts in the homeland and OCONUS as part of Joint and interagency requirements. Agile, adaptive and integrated conventional forces, Special Operations Forces (SOF), specialized Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and CBRN forces, and missile defense provide a unique mix of scalable and tailorable capabilities across the Total Army. This support ranges from Joint CWMD operations from CWMD planning and regional support through all phases of CCDR Theater Campaign Plans. The Army s fundamental CWMD goals are to protect Army capabilities, interdict and eliminate adversarial capability when necessary, respond swiftly across the CWMD spectrum if WMD use occurs and enhance capacity of partners and allies during steady state operations. F101ASRC F101RC-6 JUNE 2014

16 PART 4: STRATEGIC PRIORITIES As it refocuses itself as a leaner, smaller force, the Army must remain the most highly-trained and professional All-Volunteer land force in the world. An Army, with the capability and capacity to provide expeditionary, decisive landpower to the Joint Force, and stands ready to perform operations in support of CCDRs to defend the Nation and its interests at home and abroad. To guide its approach for the future, the Army has five strategic priorities for the force: Adaptive Army Leaders for a Complex World A Globally Responsive and Regionally Engaged Army A Ready and Modern Army Soldiers Committed to Our Army Profession The Premier All Volunteer Army These priorities inform the Army s strategy, and its associated ends, ways and means. GENERAL PRIORITIZATION AND TIMING The vision, priorities, ends, and objectives in the ASPG will inform the rest of the TAP for phasing and implementation. Programming guidance to the force appears in the APPG and APGM. The remainder of the guidance to the Army appears in the ACP, which provides direction and guidance for the years of execution to Army Commands (ACOM), ASCCs, Direct Reporting Units (DRUs) and Headquarters, Department of the Army. The Army's Strategic Priorities balance the accomplishment of assigned missions with competing demands of readiness, modernization, infrastructure consolidation, and end strength across three basic time horizons. Across all three time horizons, fiscal realities require the Army to terminate redundant and poorly performing programs while sustaining those that have proven most beneficial, while rebuilding the basic competencies that are the foundation of a ready force. The short-term (FY 16-19), is a recovery path in which the Army, while reducing manning to end strength goals, recovers readiness and rebalances investments in modernization lost in the first years of the Budget Control Act. The mid-term (FY 20-22) is a transition period as the Army continues to invest in modernization and readiness to abate risk to the force should it be called to support one sustained conflict. In the long-term (FY 23 and beyond), the investments in modernization and readiness made in the short-term and mid-term horizons under the Budget Control Act will begin to pay off in the full expression of an undersized, but campaign-quality Total Army. RISK GUIDANCE Short Term (FY 16-19) The priority for resourcing in the short-term (FY 16-19) will be on ensuring the full readiness of those forces that can expect to deploy and fight upon notification, with a secondary goal of achieving sufficient depth to meet immediate contingency demand. Those forces include units designated to defend the Korean Peninsula against North Korean aggression, the GRF, the Contingency Response Force Package, units assigned to the CBRN 2 Elimination Response Elements, and those forces deploying next into ongoing combat operations. The remainder of the force, while still grounded in the basic roles of the Army, will be subject to a tiered readiness system, in which about 20% of the Operating Force will receive the funds necessary for collective training. Units other than that 20% of the Operating Force will assume risk in collective training above the small unit level until after the Army downsizes to its end strength and force structure goals. That risk must be managed within the context of the increased military 2 chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear F101ASRC F101RC-7 JUNE 2014

17 engagement that underpins the Regionally Aligned Force concept. The Army's reduction will also include infrastructure consolidation, contractors, and headquarters structure. Under the President s Budget, the Army seeks to achieve end strength goals by the end of FY15, while under the Budget Control Act, the Army will not reach reduced end strength goals before the end of FY17. For modernization, the Army is taking short-term risk. The Budget Control Act has delayed planned and programmed Programs of Record such as the Ground Combat Vehicle. It has also delayed high priority capabilities such as the Army's LandWarNet. While the Army remains focused on Soldier-centered modernization and procurement, it must focus science and technology (S&T) investments to develop the potential of emerging game-changing landpower technologies to retain a materiel edge and enable forces to prevail in any tactical situation. While the Army cannot readily reverse divestitures of force structure, institutional knowledge, and its organic industrial base on command, it must nevertheless plan for reversibility should circumstances necessitate expanding the Army in time of war. As the Army emerges from the short-term, it will have achieved its end-strength reduction targets, and will have begun maintaining forces beyond the contingency force package and Global Response Force at full readiness. These end strength reductions create a second order impact on our ability to maintain the Premier All- Volunteer Force. We must not repeat the same mistakes made during the 1990s drawdown when American public perceived the Army as no longer hiring. To ensure we continue to attract and man a quality force, the Army cannot accept risk in recruiting and marketing to prospects and their influencers. We must maintain the Army s reputation as a valued choice of service. Mid-Term (FY 20-22) The priority for resourcing in the mid-term (FY 20-22) will be on rebuilding readiness across the Total Army, with the goal of achieving sufficient depth to resource the full duration of one sustained joint campaign. Readiness will shift away from tiered readiness for less than 20% of the force back to broader readiness across the Total Army, reducing the tension between military engagement and broader readiness for contingency sourcing requirements. The Army will resume its deferred modernization initiatives, making capital investments and modernization improvements that build on the previous efforts in S&T and preservation of the organic industrial base, with programs such as the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle and Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle. As the Army emerges from the mid-term, it will have balanced readiness, modernization, and end strength to enable it to resource forces for a sustained joint campaign, while reaping the benefits gained from short-term inputs to modernization. Long-Term (FY 23-beyond) In the long-term (FY23 and beyond), the Army will have achieved sufficient balance to mitigate risk across readiness, modernization, and end strength. Army modernization programs should begin to enhance key capabilities in the force. While the Army will have protected investments in cyberspace and air/missile defense, the Army will emerge undersized for the challenges it faces in the defense strategy. STRATEGIC PRIORITIES, ENDS, AND OBJECTIVES Strategic Priority: Adaptive Army Leaders for a Complex World End: Soldiers and Civilians across the Total Army with the morals, ethics, individual toughness, fighting spirit, intellectual capacity, tactical competence, technical proficiency, and strategic perspective to understand the complex contemporary security environment and Unified Action partner capabilities to better lead Army, Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational task forces and teams to prevail in peace and war. Recruit, Identify, and Develop Talent Informed by Long-Range Trends. Execute the Enterprise Army Brand strategy, leveraging a unity of effort approach to communicate the Army s story and build America s trust in its Army. Recruit and develop the talent, both physically and intellectually, in the quality and quantity that will support the leader base of the future force, informed by U.S. long-term demographics and trends. F101ASRC F101RC-8 JUNE 2014

18 Educate Leaders for an Uncertain Future. Enable leaders, in conjunction with joint, multinational, and interagency partners, to operate in circumstances of uncertainty, capable of applying not only tactics, but far more importantly, the appropriate operational art, informed by strategy, to attain the policy goals that govern military action. Train Leaders and Provide Them with Relevant Experience. Through traditional assignments and broadening opportunities, create leaders who can effectively temper sound tactical judgment with strategic and institutional awareness in a JIIM environment, informed by critical thinking skills and the ability to develop innovative solutions applicable to difficult or unfamiliar situations. Reinforce the Army Profession in the 21st Century. Institutionalize the gains of the last decade of combat while eliminating toxic leadership and the deleterious effects of prolonged combat. Retain professional leaders who demonstrate the resilience, values, trust, and skills, whether operationally deployed or in a training environment, to build a self-policing organization skilled in the practice of arms. Develop Leaders Who Are Proficient in Cyberspace and Enhance Our Cyberspace Professional Workforce. Develop Army leaders who understand and can quickly adapt to rapidly changing capabilities and risks, including a changing electronic warfare environment. While recruiting, educating, training and retaining cyberspace professionals in the Total Army, create a deeper workforce where all members of the Army, military and civilian, have a level of expertise in cyber-electromagnetic activities (CEMA) and its associated activities. Strategic Priority: A Globally Responsive and Regionally Engaged Army End: A ready and capable Total Army that provides joint and multinational forces with expeditionary, strategically adaptive, and campaign-quality landpower that assures partners, while it deters, coerces, and when necessary, compels adversaries across the range of military operations. Regionally Align Forces. Provide predictable and dependable capabilities to CCMDs and ASCCs in the form of deployable and scalable task forces, with clearly articulated and appropriate authorities for their employment, and sufficient compellence to underwrite credible deterrence. To meet recurring and emerging demands, CCDRs will request assigned or allocated forces. Set Theaters Via Capable Army Service Component Commands and Theater Support Forces. Ensure that Army forces are prepared to execute contingency plans in multiple combatant command areas of responsibility, rebalancing national focus to the Asia-Pacific region while maintaining presence and vigilance in the Middle East. The Army is the only service with the capability and capacity to provide the combatant commander with many theater framework capabilities including logistical preparation of the theater, the mission command system, operational preparation of the environment, and, integration of operational contract support, fires, and protection. Rebalance the Operating Force. Reduce the overall number and sizes of headquarters, while sustaining as much combat capability as possible, even with an overall reduction in end strength. Distinguish authorities between tactical, operational, and theater strategic structures to best posture the Army to meet ongoing and contingency sourcing requirements. Balance Active and Reserve Component Force Readiness. In the short-term, maintain the Contingency Response Force Package of forces slated to deploy to combat operations, while ensuring the defense of Korea, and sourcing the Global Response Force. Attain highest possible readiness with available resources for collective training for the rest of the Army at the small unit level, prior to rebuilding readiness over time across the Total Army for the full range of military operations. F101ASRC F101RC-9 JUNE 2014

19 Develop and Implement Mission Tailored Forces. Enable the Army to support CCDR contingency sourcing requirements with mission tailored forces, which are apportioned against a particular set of mission requirements. Mission tailored forces complement and balance the capabilities provided to CCDRs through regionally aligned forces. Provide Ready and Trained Forces (conventional force, SOF and technical enablers) for operations across the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction mission spectrum. Provide conventional forces and SOF improved capability and capacity for WMD detection, exploitation, identification, interdiction and elimination in the homeland and overseas. The Army must be prepared to provide forces capable of preventing the need for CWMD operations, mitigating the risk of WMD proliferation, and assisting partners and allies in building their own CWMD capacity. Reform, Restructure, and Rebalance the Generating Force. Provide a nucleus for future growth and leverage combat experience to inform training, education, concepts, and doctrine by rebalancing uniformed representation in the Generating Force. Improve Energy and Water Security Environmental Stewardship and Sustainable Practices. Through effective and efficient management of energy and water, immediate requirements are reduced and improve intra-theater mobility and distribution, reduce life-cycle sustainment costs, and decrease the amount of combat power dedicated to transporting those resources. The practice of good environmental stewardship and sustainable practices reduce immediate requirements in combat operations, preserve the ability to train, test, and conduct other activities, such as building goodwill and strengthening the partnerships and cooperation needed for the Army's future posture. Maintain a Responsive Force Posture and Effective Network Of Installations. Through an enterprise approach, enable the Army s infrastructure and industrial base, which includes installations, housing, facilities, ports, terminals, arsenals, and laboratories to best support readiness of the Total Army and the Army s overall preparedness for global contingencies. Continue to Modernize Business Operations. Instill a process improvement culture that continuously informs Army thinking and improved process efficiency at all levels. Strategic Priority: A Ready and Modern Army End: An operationally ready and responsive Total Army manned, trained, and equipped to rapidly deploy, fight, sustain itself, and win against complex state and non-state threats in austere environments and rugged terrain. The American Soldier remains the most discriminately lethal force on the battlefield. The Army can successfully execute all of its missions across the range of military operations. Train for Operational Adaptability. Create leaders and organizations that are physically and intellectually agile enough to adapt to conditions, tactics, and even methods of conflict that may be impossible to accurately predict. In the short-term, address both the forces that will have opportunities for collective training at combat training centers and others that must train collectively through other means until resources allow the availability of combat training center rotations to normalize. Reset the Force. Reconstitute those capabilities and equipment needed for the emerging security environment from the cumulative effects of sustained high operational tempo, with its effects on Soldiers, Civilians, Families, leaders, equipment and infrastructure. Divest those capabilities and equipment for which no true requirement exists. Downsize the Force. Provide a force of sufficient readiness to meet the defense strategy. Under the President s Budget, meet end strength goals by the end of FY15, while fully balancing readiness, modernization, and end strength by FY19. Under the Budget Control Act, meet further reduced end strength goals by the end of FY17 and balance readiness, modernization, and end strength by FY23. F101ASRC F101RC-10 JUNE 2014

20 Modernize the Force. Retain readiness for future challenges through modernization and equipping efforts commensurate with the changing environment. Under the President s Budget, defer but do not stop modernization to cover immediate readiness needs of the force through FY19, with the goal of an undersized, but ready Total Army by FY18. Under the Budget Control Act, reduce modernization accounts by 25%, with no program unaffected, to achieve balance in readiness, force structure, and modernization by FY23. The APPG will designate prioritization for specific programs. Modernize the Network. Enable leaders to have the right information at the right time to make the right decisions through the LandWarNet, a single, secure, standards-based network from the DoD Information Network (DoDIN) down to the small unit level. Integrate Lessons Learned and Capabilities Gained in Recent Operations Into the Generating Force and Operating Force. Advance the capabilities gained over the last 12 years in countering irregular threats and building partner capacity through concepts, doctrine, and training that incorporates that experience. Continue to Maintain a Global Stabilizing Presence. Through shaping operations and other military engagement, expand multinational, interagency, and intergovernmental contacts, reinforce preventive measures, help build the capacity and competence of U.S. allied and partner forces for internal and external defense, strengthen the cohesion of alliances, and increase U.S. influence. Adapt the Army Force Generation Model. Sustain the Total Army's ability to provide a manned, trained and equipped force to meet the full range of current and emerging CCDR requirements, to include areas such as space, cyberspace, missile defense, and countering weapons of mass destruction. Better Integrate the Total Army. Develop the right mix of operationally ready and responsive Total Army forces, capabilities, and processes to rapidly meet CCDRs emergent requirements. Provide Joint Task Force-Capable Headquarters for Land-centric Joint Campaigns. Enable divisions and corps to serve as regionally capable joint force land component command (JFLCC) and joint task force (JTF) headquarters for activities across the range of military operations. Ensure That Forces are Capable of Joint Entry Operations. Preserve and enhance capabilities for joint entry operations to overcome anti-access/area denial environments and enable joint operational access for forcible and non-forcible entry. Integrate Resilient Space Capabilities. Enable all personnel, not just space specialties, to leverage space capabilities for improved combat effectiveness in contested operational environments, even in the face of adversary attempts to degrade, disrupt, or deny access to space capabilities. Build Resilient Mission Command at the Tactical and Operational Level. Enable Army forces to operate through enemy attacks on its mission command systems, to include denial of capabilities in specific domains, to include space and cyberspace. Strategic Priority: Soldiers Committed to Our Army Profession End: Soldiers and Civilians who exemplify the morals, ethics, military expertise, honorable service, esprit de corps, and professional stewardship inherent to the Army Values, committed to the defense of our nation and way of life, continuing to earn the trust of the American people and their confidence in our Army. Enhance Army Professionalism through Army Values. By preventing sexual assault, we will maintain an Army that is true to our values. Enforce an environment across our Army free of harassment that promotes and respects the individual dignity and value of every member of the Army family, consistent with the values of our profession. We will remain vigilant to insider F101ASRC F101RC-11 JUNE 2014

21 threats and hold accountable those who do not share those values. Empower, through environments of trust and respect that are inclusive of Soldiers, Civilians and Families from diverse backgrounds, a culturally adept force that can operate globally. Strategic Priority: The Premier All Volunteer Army End: A professional force composed of the highest quality Soldiers and Civilians dedicated to the Army for the long term for a career in uniform and a lifetime of service through retirement. Supporting the force is a level of regular military compensation, retirement, and health care, while honoring the service and sacrifice of our Veterans, Retirees, Wounded Warriors and Families. Once a Soldier, Always a Soldier. Improve Programs Supporting Soldiers, Civilians, Families and Wounded Warriors. Remain an Army committed to Quality of Life (QOL) for its Soldiers and Families as a critical factor in maintaining the all volunteer force. Through the Ready and Resilient Campaign, Soldier for Life, and Wounded Warrior Care programs, improve the safety, health, readiness and resilience of our people in order to preserve and keep faith with our most valuable resource Soldiers and their families. Additional guidance will appear in the Army Safety and Occupational Health Strategic Plan. Safeguard the Nation s Trust in a Professional Army. Maintain the trust between the Soldier, the Army and the American people. Support Soldiers, Civilians and Families through appropriate compensation, sustainable benefits, leader development, training systems and programs that support Soldiers, Civilians and Families. Assist Soldiers transitioning out of Army service in returning to civilian occupations successfully as a contribution to the Nation. Ensure that Soldiers, Veterans, and their families receive the benefits and recognition they have rightly earned. Optimize Soldier and Civilian Acquisition, Management and Development. Retain the capabilities of its combat seasoned force, remove obstacles to effective personnel management, and maintain the bonds of trust with Soldiers and Families while reducing numbers responsibly to arrive at a smaller, balanced force. CONCLUSION The Army is at a crossroads as it emerges from over a decade of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Nation has traditionally reduced its armed forces after a war, even in domestic and international environments that promise no certainty of future prediction. Nonetheless, the Army can and must provide the forces that will fight and win the Nation's wars when called. What we do know of the future is that it will be complex, volatile, and dangerous. Addressing future challenges will require an expeditionary, strategically adaptive, and campaign-quality Army that prevents conflict, shapes the security environment, and when necessary, decisively wins conflicts to attain the strategic ends and policy goals that govern all military action. We must be wary of future visions that promise the Nation easy conflict termination or casual disengagement from a conflict once joined. While the Army may not always prosecute major combat operations in a war, it must prepare in peacetime to provide a hedge that mitigates the risks inherent to armed conflict. Doing so is our charter in ensuring that the Army can deliver its strategic contribution to the security of the United States. F101ASRC F101RC-12 JUNE 2014

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26 T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S I SECRETARY S LETTER III EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 INTRODUCTION 3 CHAPTER I: FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 11 CHAPTER II: THE DEFENSE STRATEGY 27 CHAPTER III: REBALANCING THE JOINT FORCE 43 CHAPTER IV: REBALANCING THE DEFENSE INSTITUTION 53 CHAPTER V: IMPLICATIONS AND RISKS OF SEQUESTRATION-LEVEL CUTS 59 CHAIRMAN S ASSESSMENT OF THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

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30 E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y The United States faces a rapidly changing security environment. We are repositioning to focus on the strategic challenges and opportunities that will define our future: new technologies, new centers of power, and a world that is growing more volatile, more unpredictable, and in some instances more threatening to the United States. Challenges to our many allies and partners around the globe remain dynamic and unpredictable, particularly from regimes in North Korea and Iran. Unrest and violence persist elsewhere, creating a fertile environment for violent extremism and sectarian conflict, especially in fragile states, stretching from the Sahel to South Asia, and threatening U.S. citizens abroad. Meanwhile, modern warfare is evolving rapidly, leading to increasingly contested battlespace in the air, sea, and space domains as well as cyberspace in which our forces enjoyed dominance in our most recent conflicts. Our sustained attention and engagement will be important in shaping emerging global trends, both positive and negative. Unprecedented levels of global connectedness provide common incentives for international cooperation and shared norms of behavior, and the growing capacity of some regional partners provides an opportunity for countries to play greater and even leading roles in advancing mutual security interests in their respective regions. In addressing the changing strategic environment, the United States will rely on our many comparative advantages, including the strength of our economy, our strong network of alliances and partnerships, and our military s human capital and technological edge. Doing so will require exceptional agility in how we shape, prepare, and posture the Joint Force. E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y III

31 The Department of Defense is also facing a changing and equally uncertain fiscal environment. Beginning with the Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 appropriations, the Department began absorbing significant impacts from the $487 billion, ten-year cut in spending due to caps instituted by the Budget Control Act (BCA) of The BCA also instituted a sequestration mechanism requiring cuts of about $50 billion annually. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 provided modest immediate relief from sequestration, but unless Congress acts, annual sequestration cuts are set to resume in FY2016. To protect the security interests of the United States most effectively while recognizing the fiscal imperative of deficit reduction, the President s FY2015 Budget reduces projected defense budgets by about $113 billion over five years compared to levels requested in the FY2014 Budget. The President s Budget provides a balanced and responsible path forward given continuing fiscal uncertainty. It reflects the strict constraints on discretionary funding required by the Bipartisan Budget Act in FY2015, but it does not accept sequestration levels thereafter, funding the Department at about $115 billion more than projected sequestration levels through Given this dynamic environment, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is principally focused on preparing for the future by rebalancing our defense efforts in a period of increasing fiscal constraint. The 2014 QDR advances three important initiatives. First, it builds on the Defense Strategic Guidance, published in 2012, by outlining an updated defense strategy that protects and advances U.S. interests and sustains U.S. leadership. Second, the QDR describes how the Department is responsibly and realistically taking steps to rebalance major elements of the Joint Force given the changing environment. Third, the QDR demonstrates our intent to rebalance the Department itself as part of our effort to control internal cost growth that is threatening to erode our combat power in this period of fiscal austerity. We will protect the health of the All-Volunteer Force as we undertake these reforms. The QDR makes clear that this updated national defense strategy is right for the Nation, sustaining the global leadership role of the United States and providing the basis for decisions that will help bring our military into balance over the next decade and responsibly position us for an era of both strategic and fiscal uncertainty. The FY2015 funding levels requested by the President will allow the military to protect and advance U.S. interests and execute the updated defense strategy but with increased levels of risk for some missions. We will continue to experience gaps in training and maintenance over the near term and will have a reduced margin of error in dealing with risks of uncertainty in a dynamic and shifting security environment over the long term. The President s Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative would add $26 billion in FY2015 defense investments, allowing the Department to continue restoring and sustaining readiness, investing in weapons modernization, and making needed facilities E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y IV

32 improvements significantly mitigating these risks. Overall, the Department can manage these risks under the President s FY2015 Budget plan, but the risks would grow significantly if sequester-level cuts return in FY2016, if proposed reforms are not accepted, or if uncertainty over budget levels continues. It is essential that we work closely with Congress to ensure that, as we put our Nation s fiscal house in order, we provide sufficient resources to preserve our national security. BUILDING ON THE DEFENSE STRATEGIC GUIDANCE The United States exercises global leadership in support of our interests: U.S. security and that of our allies and partners; a strong economy in an open economic system; respect for universal values; and an international order that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through cooperation. Protecting and advancing these interests, consistent with the National Security Strategy, the 2014 QDR embodies the 21st century defense priorities outlined in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. These priorities include rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region to preserve peace and stability in the region; maintaining a strong commitment to security and stability in Europe and the Middle East; sustaining a global approach to countering violent extremists and terrorist threats, with an emphasis on the Middle East and Africa; continuing to protect and prioritize key investments in technology while our forces overall grow smaller and leaner; and invigorating efforts to build innovative partnerships and strengthen key alliances and partnerships. The 2014 QDR builds on these priorities and incorporates them into a broader strategic framework. The Department s defense strategy emphasizes three pillars: Protect the homeland, to deter and defeat attacks on the United States and to support civil authorities in mitigating the effects of potential attacks and natural disasters. Build security globally, in order to preserve regional stability, deter adversaries, support allies and partners, and cooperate with others to address common security challenges. Project power and win decisively, to defeat aggression, disrupt and destroy terrorist networks, and provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. These pillars are mutually reinforcing and interdependent, and all of the military Services play important roles in each. Our nuclear deterrent is the ultimate protection against a nuclear attack on the United States, and through extended deterrence, it also serves to reassure our distant allies of their security against regional aggression. It also supports our ability to project power by communicating to potential nuclear-armed adversaries that they cannot escalate their way out of failed conventional aggression. Building security globally not only assures allies and E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y V

33 partners and builds their capacity but also helps protect the homeland by deterring conflict and increasing stability in regions like the Middle East and North Africa. Our ability to project forces to combat terrorism in places as far away as Yemen, Afghanistan, and Mali and to build capacity to help partners counter terrorism and counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) reduces the likelihood that these threats could find their way to U.S. shores. Across each of the three pillars of the updated defense strategy, the Department is committed to finding creative, effective, and efficient ways to achieve our goals and assist in making strategic choices. Innovation within our own Department and in our interagency and international partnerships is a central line of effort. We are identifying new presence paradigms, including potentially positioning additional forward deployed naval forces in critical areas, and deploying new combinations of ships, aviation assets, regionally aligned or rotational ground forces, and crisis response forces, all with the intention of maximizing effects while minimizing costs. With our allies and partners, we will make greater efforts to coordinate our planning to optimize their contributions to their own security and to our many combined activities. The impacts of climate change may increase the frequency, scale, and complexity of future missions, including defense support to civil authorities, while at the same time undermining the capacity of our domestic installations to support training activities. Our actions to increase energy and water security, including investments in energy efficiency, new technologies, and renewable energy sources, will increase the resiliency of our installations and help mitigate these effects. Reflecting the requirements of this updated defense strategy, the U.S. Armed Forces will be capable of simultaneously defending the homeland; conducting sustained, distributed counterterrorist operations; and in multiple regions, deterring aggression and assuring allies through forward presence and engagement. If deterrence fails at any given time, U.S. forces will be capable of defeating a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased campaign, and denying the objectives of or imposing unacceptable costs on a second aggressor in another region. The President s Budget provides the resources to build and sustain the capabilities to conduct these operations, although at increased levels of risk for some missions. With the President s Budget, our military will be able to defeat or deny any aggressor. Budget reductions inevitably reduce the military s margin of error in dealing with risks, and a smaller force strains our ability to simultaneously respond to more than one major contingency at a time. The Department can manage these risks under the President s FY2015 Budget plan, but the risks would grow significantly if sequester-level cuts return in FY2016, if proposed reforms are not accepted, or if uncertainty over budget levels continues. E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y VI

34 REBALANCING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY Given major changes in our nation s security environment including geopolitical changes, changes in modern warfare, and changes in the fiscal environment our updated defense strategy requires that the Department rebalance the Joint Force in several key areas to prepare most effectively for the future. Rebalancing for a broad spectrum of conflict. Future conflicts could range from hybrid contingencies against proxy groups using asymmetric approaches, to a high-end conflict against a state power armed with WMD or technologically advanced anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. Reflecting this diverse range of challenges, the U.S. military will shift focus in terms of what kinds of conflicts it prepares for in the future, moving toward greater emphasis on the full spectrum of possible operations. Although our forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale prolonged stability operations, we will preserve the expertise gained during the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We will also protect the ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future demands. The Joint Force must also be prepared to battle increasingly sophisticated adversaries who could employ advanced warfighting capabilities while simultaneously attempting to deny U.S. forces the advantages they currently enjoy in space and cyberspace. We will sustain priority investments in science, technology, research, and development both within the defense sector and beyond. The Department is taking steps to ensure that progress continues in areas most critical to meeting future challenges such as full-spectrum cyberspace capabilities and where the potential for game-changing breakthroughs appears most promising. We will actively seek innovative approaches to how we fight, how we posture our force, and how we leverage our asymmetric strengths and technological advantages. Innovation is paramount given the increasingly complex warfighting environment we expect to encounter. The United States will maintain a worldwide approach to countering violent extremists and terrorist threats using a combination of economic, diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, development, and military tools. The Department of Defense will rebalance our counterterrorism efforts toward greater emphasis on building partnership capacity, especially in fragile states, while retaining robust capability for direct action, including intelligence, persistent surveillance, precision strike, and Special Operations Forces. We will remain focused on countering WMD, which undermine global security. We will sustain efforts to strengthen key alliances and partnerships, placing more focus on deepening existing cooperation as well as E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y VII

35 building new and innovative partnerships. Finally, Combatant Commanders will invigorate their efforts to adjust contingency planning to reflect more closely the changing strategic environment. Rebalancing and sustaining our presence and posture abroad to better protect U.S. national security interests. In striving to achieve our three strategic objectives, the Department will also continue to rebalance and sustain our global posture. We will continue our contributions to the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, seeking to preserve peace and stability in a region that is increasingly central to U.S. political, economic, and security interests. Faced with North Korea s long-range missiles and WMD programs particularly its pursuit of nuclear weapons the United States is committed to maintaining peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. As part of our broader efforts for stability in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States will maintain a robust footprint in Northeast Asia while enhancing our presence in Oceania and Southeast Asia. As we end combat operations in Afghanistan, we are prepared to transition to a limited mission focused on counterterrorism and training, advising, and assisting Afghan security forces. The United States also has enduring interests in the Middle East, and we will remain fully committed to the security of our partners in the region. We will continue to maintain a strong military posture in the Gulf region one that can respond swiftly to crisis, deter aggression, and assure our allies and partners while making sure that our military capabilities evolve to meet new threats. Given our deep and abiding interests in maintaining and expanding European security and prosperity, we will continue our work with allies and partners to promote regional stability and Euro-Atlantic integration, as well as to improve capacity, interoperability, and strategic access for coalition operations. Across the globe, we will ensure the access needed to surge forces rapidly in the event of a crisis. Rebalancing capability, capacity, and readiness within the Joint Force. After more than twelve years of conflict and amid ongoing budget reductions, the Joint Force is currently out of balance. Readiness further suffered due to the implementation of sequestration in FY2013, and the force has not kept pace with the need to modernize. We will need time and funding to reset and reconstitute the Joint Force as we transition from operations in Afghanistan. The President s FY2015 Budget proposal outlines a range of realistic and responsible adjustments in specific areas the Department believes must be made in the near term to restore balance in the Joint Force. The force will become smaller in the next five years but will gradually become more modern as well, with readiness improving over time. Taking the prudent steps outlined in this QDR in the near term will improve the Department s ability to meet our national security needs should the fiscal outlook not improve. The longer critical decisions are delayed in the E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y VIII

36 hope that budget caps will be raised, the more difficult and painful those decisions will be to implement, and the more damaging they will be to our ability to execute the strategy if no additional resources are made available. Key end strength and force structure decisions in this QDR include: Maintaining an Air Force with global power projection capabilities crucial for this updated defense strategy. We will modernize next-generation Air Force combat equipment including fighters and bombers particularly against advancing modern air defense systems. To free resources for these programs as well as to preserve investments in critical capabilities, the Air Force will reduce or eliminate capacity in some single-mission aviation platforms. If sequestration-level cuts are imposed in FY2016 and beyond, the Air Force would have to retire 80 more aircraft, slow down purchases of the Joint Strike Fighter, and make other difficult adjustments. Sustaining a world-class Army capable of conducting the full range of operations on land, including prompt and sustained land combat as part of large, multi-phase joint and multinational operations by maintaining a force structure that we can man, train, equip, and keep ready. To sustain this force, the Department will rebalance within the Army, across the Active, Guard, and Reserves. The active Army will reduce from its war-time high force of 570,000 to 440, ,000 Soldiers. The Army National Guard will continue its downsizing from a war-time high of 358,000 to 335,000 Soldiers, and the U.S. Army Reserve will reduce from 205,000 to 195,000 Soldiers. If sequestration-level cuts are imposed in FY2016 and beyond, all components of the Army would be further reduced, with active duty end strength decreasing to 420,000, the Army National Guard drawing down to 315,000, and the Army Reserves reducing to 185,000. Preserving Naval capacity to build security globally and respond to crises. Through an aggressive effort to reduce acquisition costs and temporary ship lay-ups, the Navy will modernize its fleets of surface ships, aircraft, and submarines to meet 21st century threats. We must ensure that the fleet is capable of operating in every region and across the full spectrum of conflict. No new negotiations beyond 32 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) will go forward, and the Navy will submit alternative proposals to procure a capable and lethal small surface combatant. If sequestration-level cuts are imposed in FY2016 and beyond, the USS George Washington aircraft carrier would need to be retired before scheduled refueling and overhaul. The Department will have to make this decision, which would leave the Navy with ten carrier strike groups, in the 2016 budget submission. E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y IX

37 Maintaining the role of the Marine Corps as a vital crisis response force, protecting its most important modernization priorities and ensuring readiness, but planning for an end strength of 182,000 active Marines. This end strength includes almost 900 more Marines for the Embassy Security Guard program, which will protect U.S. interests and installations abroad. If sequestration-level cuts are imposed in FY2016 and beyond, the Marines would continue their drawdown to an end strength of 175,000. As the Joint Force rebalances so that it remains modern, capable, and ready, the Department will take the following additional steps that are consistent with the President s FY2015 Budget submission to protect key capability areas in support of our strategy: Cyber. We will invest in new and expanded cyber capabilities and forces to enhance our ability to conduct cyberspace operations and support military operations worldwide, to support Combatant Commanders as they plan and execute military missions, and to counter cyberattacks against the United States. Missile Defense. We are increasing the number of Ground-Based Interceptors and deploying a second radar in Japan to provide early warning and tracking. We will make targeted investments in defensive interceptors, discrimination capabilities, and sensors; and we are studying the best location for an additional missile defense interceptor site in the United States if additional interceptors are needed. Nuclear Deterrence. We will continue to invest in modernizing our essential nuclear delivery systems; warning, command and control; and, in collaboration with the Department of Energy, nuclear weapons and supporting infrastructure. Space. We will move toward less complex, more affordable, more resilient systems and system architectures and pursue a multi-layered approach to deter attacks on space systems while retaining the capabilities to respond should deterrence fail. Air/Sea. We will continue to invest in combat aircraft, including fighters and long-range strike, survivable persistent surveillance, resilient architectures, and undersea warfare to increase the Joint Force s ability to counter A2/AD challenges. Precision Strike. We will procure advanced air-to-surface missiles that will allow fighters and bombers to engage a wide range of targets and a long-range anti-ship cruise missile that will improve the joint ability of U.S. air forces to engage surface combatants in defended airspace. E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y X

38 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). We will rebalance investments toward systems that are operationally responsive and effective in highly contested environments, while sustaining capabilities appropriate for more permissive environments in order to support global situational awareness, counterterrorism, and other operations. Counter Terror and Special Operations. We will grow overall Special Operations Forces end strength to 69,700 personnel, protecting our ability to sustain persistent, networked, distributed operations to defeat al Qa ida, counter other emerging transnational threats, counter WMD, build the capacity of our partners, and support conventional operations. Rebalancing tooth and tail. Finally, the Department itself will rebalance internally to control cost growth and generate greater efficiencies in order to prioritize spending on combat power. The Department has previously submitted three packages of budget proposals aimed at achieving efficiencies and now plans to implement additional overhead reduction efforts. Key ongoing activities include reducing the Department s major headquarters budgets by 20 percent and decreasing the number of direct reports to the Secretary of Defense. These will lower the Department s operating costs by $5 billion over the next five years and by more than twice that amount over the next decade. The Department is making selected cutbacks in civilian personnel and contractors to hold down costs and is seeking to harness lower growth in privatesector health care costs in order to slow growth in military health care expenses. In addition, the Department is also improving its financial management, in part to achieve auditable financial statements. We are also continuing to implement acquisition reform efforts, most notably through the Better Buying Power initiative that seeks to achieve affordable programs by controlling costs, incentivizing productivity and innovation in industry and government, eliminating unproductive processes and bureaucracy, promoting effective competition, improving tradecraft in contracted acquisition of services, and improving the professionalism of the total acquisition workforce. The Department will remain committed to continuously increasing productivity in defense acquisition. Substantial long-term savings will be realized if the Department is permitted to eliminate unneeded infrastructure. We estimate that we already have more infrastructure than we need, and this will grow as we reduce end strength. The only effective way to eliminate unneeded infrastructure in the United States is through the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y XI

39 process. Congress has denied the Department s request for another BRAC in each of the past two years. If the Department is to make more effective use of taxpayer dollars, it is imperative that Congress authorize another BRAC round in MAINTAINING THE STRENGTH OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE AND IMPLEMENTING NEW REFORMS As we restore balance to the Joint Force and the Department, the United States will maintain its two-fold sacred contract with U.S. Service members: to properly compensate and care for our men and women in uniform and their families both during and after their service, and to provide our Service members the best training and equipment possible so they can safely accomplish their missions. Service members will be treated fairly and equally, on and off the battlefield. The Department last year expanded opportunities for women to serve in the U.S. Armed Forces and is seeking to integrate women successfully into the few remaining restricted occupational fields. Eliminating sexual assault is one of the Department of Defense s highest priorities, requiring an absolute and sustained commitment to improving the Department s prevention and response programs ensuring that we provide a safe environment free from threats to our military personnel. The Department will continue to implement changes needed to realize fully its decision to allow gay men and women to serve openly in the military. For those returning from combat ill or wounded, and for those who require hospitalization or rehabilitation, we will continue to provide the best possible care. And the Department of Defense will continue working with the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Labor to provide the best possible assistance to Service members transitioning into private life. In a constrained fiscal environment, the Department cannot afford to sustain the rate of growth in military pay and benefits that we experienced over the last decade. The Department and the American people have rightfully been very supportive of our men and women in uniform for more than a decade of war, providing increases in military pay and benefits that have more than closed compensation gaps and have appropriately recognized the sacrifices of those who are serving and have served and their families. The Department is proposing changes that will ensure we can continue to offer a competitive compensation package to recruit and retain our Joint Force of the future. These changes include: restrained annual military pay raises over the next five years; slowing the rate of growth in tax-free housing allowances; simplifying and modernizing the TRICARE programs, including modestly increasing co-pays and deductibles in E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y XII

40 ways that encourage members to use the most affordable means of care, adjusting pharmacy copay structure, and establishing a modest fee for the TRICARE-for-Life coverage for Medicareeligible retirees; and decreasing commissary subsidies. If implemented fully, these proposals would save approximately $12 billion over the next five years and considerably more by the end of ten years. Without support from Congress and the American people for reforms to slow the rate of growth in military compensation, the Department will be left with no choice but to take resources away from its ability to field the future Joint Force we need. The Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments and Service Chiefs, the Senior Enlisted Advisers, and the Department s senior leadership team support this comprehensive approach to reform and will work in partnership with Congress and the American public to continue to sustain the world s finest military. IMPLICATIONS OF SEQUESTRATION-LEVEL CUTS The FY2015 funding levels requested by the President will allow the military to protect and advance U.S. interests and fulfill the updated defense strategy but with increased levels of risk for some missions. In the near term, U.S. forces will remain actively engaged in building partnerships and enhancing stability in key regions, but our engagement will be even more tailored and selective. We will continue to sustain a heightened alert posture in regions like the Middle East and North Africa. At requested budget levels, we can sustain adequate readiness and modernization that is most relevant to strategic priorities over the near term. Moreover, the President s Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative would fund an additional $26 billion in FY2015 defense investments, helping the Department to make faster progress toward restoring readiness, investing in weapons modernization, and making needed facilities improvements. The development of advanced capabilities and sophisticated weapons systems by global rivals and potential adversaries will inevitably pose more risks to our forces and our security. The Department can manage these risks under the President s FY2015 Budget plan, but the risks would grow significantly if sequester-level cuts return in FY2016, if proposed reforms are not accepted, or if uncertainty over budget levels continues. If the modest, immediate relief that the Bipartisan Budget Act provides from sequestration more so in FY2014 and less so in FY2015 is followed by the return of annual reductions to the sequestration level, the Department would be unable to adjust the size and shape of the Joint Force in the more balanced way envisioned in the President s Budget submission. Our E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y XIII

41 ability to implement the defense strategy would be significantly reduced over the entire BCA period. The Department s readiness challenges, particularly in the near term, would greatly reduce both our ability to conduct steady state activities and to respond quickly in a crisis. Critical modernization programs would be slowed or truncated, creating deficiencies in the technological capability of our forces. The United States would likely need to count more on allied and partner contributions in future confrontations and conflicts, assuming they would be willing and able to act in support of shared interests. Reductions in capacity and capability would significantly challenge our ability to respond to strategic surprise, particularly those requiring large numbers of modern forces. Left unaddressed, continuing sequestration-level cuts would greatly affect what the U.S. military can and cannot do over the next ten years. The American people would have to accept that the level of risk in conducting military operations would rise substantially. Our military would be unbalanced and eventually too small to meet the needs of our strategy fully, leading to greater risk of longer wars with potentially higher casualties for the United States and for our allies and partners in the event of a conflict. Ultimately, continued resourcing at sequestration level would likely embolden our adversaries and undermine the confidence of our allies and partners, which in turn could lead to an even more challenging security environment than we already face. CONCLUSION The United States remains committed to protecting its interests, sustaining U.S. leadership, and preserving global stability, security, and peace. Recognizing current fiscal realities, the Department has made a number of decisions to ensure the Joint Force remains as balanced as possible over time, even as it must begin force structure reductions due to fiscal constraints. We will prepare the Department of Defense for the future and preserve the health of the All- Volunteer Force as we implement reforms. The President s FY2015 Budget provides a realistic alternative to sequester-level cuts, supporting the Department s ability to achieve our updated defense strategy and beginning an efficient transition to a smaller force over time. Resumption of sequestration-level cuts would lead to more immediate and severe risks to the strategy. Ultimately, with sequestration-level cuts, by 2021 the Joint Force would be too small and too outdated to fully implement our defense strategy. As a global leader, the United States requires a robust national defense strategy to protect and advance its interests and to ensure the security of its allies and partners with a E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y XIV

42 military and civilian workforce that can implement that strategy effectively. This can only be achieved by the strategic balance of reforms and reductions that the Department is presenting to Congress and will require Congress to partner with the Department of Defense in making politically difficult choices. E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y XV

43 E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y II

44 I N T R O D U C T I O N The 2014 QDR was a strategy-driven and resource-informed process focused on preparing the Department of Defense for the future and prioritizing our efforts in a period of fiscal austerity. The QDR advances three important initiatives. First, it builds on the Defense Strategic Guidance, published in 2012, to continue protecting and advancing U.S. interests and sustaining American leadership. Second, the QDR describes how the Department is responsibly and realistically taking steps to rebalance major elements of the Joint Force given the changing fiscal environment. Third, the QDR demonstrates our intent to rebalance the Department itself as part of our effort to control internal cost growth that is threatening to erode our combat power in this period of fiscal austerity. We will preserve and enhance the health of the All-Volunteer Force as we undertake these reforms. In conducting the 2014 QDR, the Department first assessed the challenging international security environment. Senior leaders sought to identify plausible strategic and operational futures that we could face over the near-, mid-, and long-term paying particular attention to threats, challenges, and opportunities emerging since the release of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. Informed by this assessment, senior leadership identified objectives the Department will likely need to be capable of accomplishing in support of U.S. national security interests and assessed the sufficiency and proficiency of the Joint Force to meet these demands. The results of these assessments guided development of the Department s force planning construct and informed the President s FY2015 Budget request. Throughout the QDR process, senior leaders also considered the impact of lower budget levels including sequestration-level cuts on the Department s ability to protect U.S. interests. The foundation of this QDR is a steadfast commitment to protect spending on combat power, while identifying new ways of achieving our goals and new approaches to reforming the Defense enterprise. I N T R O D U C T I O N 1

45 I N T R O D U C T I O N II

46 C H A P T E R I : F U T U R E S E C U R I T Y E N V I R O N M E N T As the United States completes its transition in Afghanistan and looks to the future, the international security environment remains uncertain and complicated. The United States will likely face a broad array of threats and opportunities and must prepare to address both effectively in the coming years. Powerful global forces are emerging. Shifting centers of gravity are empowering smaller countries and non-state actors on the international stage. Global connections are multiplying and deepening, resulting in greater interaction between states, nonstate entities, and private citizens. In a fundamentally globalized world, economic growth in Asia; aging populations in the United States, Europe, China, and Japan; continued instability in the Middle East and Africa; and many A U.S. Air Force MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicle taxis at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Efren Lopez) other trends interact dynamically. The operating environment is increasingly enabled by technology, which provides the types of capabilities once largely limited to major powers to a broad range of actors. The rapidly accelerating spread of information is challenging the ability of some governments to control their populations and maintain civil order, while at the same time changing how wars are fought and aiding groups in mobilizing and organizing. Regional and global trends in the security environment, coupled with increasing fiscal austerity, will make it imperative that the United States adapt more quickly than it has in the past and pursue more innovative approaches and partnerships in order to sustain its global leadership role. C H A P T E R I : F U T U R E S E C U R I T Y E N V I R O N M E N T 3

47 Regional Trends The United States has been a Pacific power for more than a century, with deep and enduring economic and security ties to the region. Particularly in the past six decades, the United States has helped ensure peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region through our commitment to free and open commerce, promotion of a just international order, and maintenance of open access to shared domains. U.S. economic, security, and people-to-people ties with the region are strong and growing. The Asia-Pacific region is increasingly central to global commerce, politics, and security. Defense spending in this region continues to rise. As nations in the region continue to develop their military and security capabilities, there is greater risk that tensions over long-standing sovereignty disputes or claims to natural resources will spur disruptive competition or erupt into conflict, reversing the trends of rising regional peace, stability, and prosperity. In particular, the rapid pace and comprehensive scope of China s military modernization continues, combined with a relative lack of transparency and openness from China s leaders regarding both military capabilities and intentions. A multilateral security architecture composed of groups such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and regional actors collaborating on issues ranging from humanitarian assistance to maritime security to counterterrorism is emerging to help manage tensions and prevent conflict. Traditional anchors of regional security such as Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK), and growing powers such as India and Indonesia, are taking on additional leadership roles to foster increased communication and shared understanding. As many Asia-Pacific countries seek to achieve greater prosperity, U.S. Marines with the 2nd Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team and Australian soldiers with the 5th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment conduct establish regional norms, and strive training at a live-fire range at Robertson Barracks in Darwin, Australia. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Pete Thibodeau) for a stable military balance, North Korea remains closed and authoritarian. North Korea s long-range missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs particularly its pursuit of nuclear weapons in contravention of its international obligations constitutes a significant threat to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia and is a growing, direct threat to the United States. C H A P T E R I : F U T U R E S E C U R I T Y E N V I R O N M E N T 4

48 Friction points also endure in the Middle East. Religious differences, particularly a widening Sunni-Shi a divide, are among the sources of trans-national division in the region. Competition for resources, including energy and water, will worsen tensions in the coming years and could escalate regional confrontations into broader conflicts particularly in fragile states. In the region, Iran remains a destabilizing actor that threatens security by defying international law and pursuing capabilities that would allow it to develop nuclear weapons. Even as Iran pledges not to pursue nuclear weapons, Iran s other destabilizing activities will continue to pose a threat to the Middle East, especially to the security of our allies and partners in the region and around the world. Many countries in the Middle East and Africa are undergoing significant political and social change. People in countries including Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, and Egypt are seeking a greater voice in their governance, upending traditional power centers in the process. Terrorist groups seek to exploit transitional governments and expand their influence. Internal strife in Syria continues amid sectarian friction, at great cost to human life. Syria has become a magnet for global jihad a situation that is likely to persist as long as the current leadership remains in power. Ongoing, severe spillover effects include an influx of foreign fighters and a flood of refugees into neighboring countries. These difficult political transitions are a reminder that events in the region will take years perhaps decades to develop fully. In Africa, terrorists, criminal organizations, militias, corrupt officials, and pirates continue to exploit ungoverned and under-governed territory on the continent and its surrounding waters. The potential for rapidly developing threats, particularly in fragile states, including violent public protests and terrorist attacks, could pose acute challenges to U.S. interests. At the same time, there is also significant opportunity to develop stronger governance institutions and to help build professional, capable military forces that can partner with the United States to address the full spectrum of regional security challenges. Multilateral peace operations under the aegis of the United Nations, African Union, and sub-regional organizations are playing an increasingly prominent role in maintaining and restoring international security, including through prevention and mitigation of mass atrocities in threat environments that previously would have deterred multilateral action. Europe remains our principal partner in promoting global security. As unrest and violence persist, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, Europe will be critical in addressing these challenges. Europe is home to our most stalwart and capable allies and partners, and the strategic access and support these countries provide is essential to ensuring that the U.S. Armed Forces are more agile, expeditionary, and responsive to global challenges. While most European countries today are producers of security, continued instability in the Balkans and on the C H A P T E R I : F U T U R E S E C U R I T Y E N V I R O N M E N T 5

49 European periphery will continue to pose a security challenge. The United States is willing to undertake security cooperation with Russia, both in the bilateral context and in seeking solutions to regional challenges, when our interests align, including Syria, Iran, and post-2014 Afghanistan. At the same time, Russia s multi-dimensional defense modernization and actions that violate the sovereignty of its neighbors present risks. We will engage Russia to increase transparency and reduce the risk of military miscalculation. In the Western Hemisphere, predominant security challenges no longer stem principally from state-on-state conflict, right-wing paramilitaries, or left-wing insurgents. Today s threats stem from the spread of narcotics and other forms of transnational organized crime, the effects of which can be exacerbated by natural disasters and uneven economic opportunity. These challenges are shared and do not respect sovereign boundaries. It is in the mutual interest of all the nations of the Western Hemisphere to unite to develop regional capacity to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat these threats from non-state actors. Global Trends The global trends that will define the future security environment are characterized by a rapid rate of change and a complexity born of the multiple ways in which they intersect and influence one another. As a result, despite the growing availability and flow of information around the world, it is increasingly challenging to predict how global threats and opportunities will evolve. The United States sustained attention and engagement will be important in shaping emerging global trends, both positive and negative. In many regions we are witnessing the emergence of international partners with the capacity to play productive and even leading security roles in their respective regions. Unprecedented levels of global interconnectedness through technology, travel, trade, and social media provide common incentives for, and more effective means of, fostering international cooperation and shared norms of behavior. The forces of globalization are contributing to important macroeconomic changes in some of the world s most destitute areas. And the pace of technological and scientific innovation in the private sector, particularly in energy markets, has the potential not only to revolutionize entire industries but also to enable new ways of providing for U.S. security in the future. At the same time, the technology-enabled 21st century operational environment offers new tools for state and non-state adversaries such as terrorists to pursue asymmetric approaches, exploiting where we are weakest. In the coming years, countries such as China will continue seeking to counter U.S. strengths using anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) approaches and by employing other new cyber and space control technologies. Additionally, these and other states C H A P T E R I : F U T U R E S E C U R I T Y E N V I R O N M E N T 6

50 continue to develop sophisticated integrated air defenses that can restrict access and freedom of maneuver in waters and airspace beyond territorial limits. Growing numbers of accurate conventional ballistic and cruise missile threats represent an additional, cost-imposing challenge to U.S. and partner naval forces and land installations. The United States has come to depend on cyberspace to communicate in new ways, to make and store wealth, to deliver essential services, and to perform national security functions. The importance of cyberspace to the American way of life and to the Nation s security makes cyberspace an attractive target for those seeking to challenge our security and economic order. Cyberspace will continue to feature increasing opportunities but also constant conflict and competition with vulnerabilities continually being created with changes in hardware, software, network configurations, and patterns of human use. Cyber threats come from a diverse range of countries, organizations, and individuals whose activities are posing increasingly significant risks to U.S. national interests. Some threats seek to undercut the Department s near- and long-term military effectiveness by gaining unauthorized access to Department of Defense and industry networks and infrastructure on a routine basis. Further, potential adversaries are actively probing critical infrastructure throughout the United States and in partner countries, which could inflict significant damage to the global economy and create or exacerbate instability in the security environment. Space also remains vital to U.S. security as well as to the global economy. Congestion in space is growing, due both to routine space activities and to irresponsible behavior. Threats to U.S. space capabilities, as well as to the space environment itself, are steadily increasing. Some nations are developing a range of counter-space capabilities with both reversible and permanent effects designed to deny or degrade our ability to conduct military operations and to project power globally. Additionally, many states are integrating space-enabled precision effects in their own systems to allow them to hold U.S. assets at risk. The spread of other sophisticated technologies poses a range of new challenges. Counter-stealth technology is just one example of how highly advanced weapons systems previously available only to those with significant research and development capabilities and large acquisition budgets could proliferate and change warfighting equations. Automated and autonomous systems as well as robotics already have a wide range of commercial, industrial, and military applications a trend that will likely continue. The availability of low-cost three-dimensional printers could revolutionize manufacturing and logistics related to warfare. New ways of developing WMD such as biotechnology breakthroughs could make dangerous agents more widely available, potentially presenting fast-moving threats that are very difficult to detect and C H A P T E R I : F U T U R E S E C U R I T Y E N V I R O N M E N T 7

51 even more difficult to counter. How these and other technologies will ultimately manifest on the battlefield remains unclear. Whether employing high-technology tools or less-advanced weapons, the terrorist threat to our Nation s interests persists and has evolved greatly since Many of the leading al Qa ida elements who were responsible for planning and prosecuting attacks on U.S. soil have been captured or killed. Although core al Qa ida has been severely degraded, instability in the A Soldier assigned to 1st Battalion, 72nd Armor Regiment, 1st Armored Middle East and civil war in Syria have Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division provides security during an anti-terrorism force protection exercise at Camp Casey, ROK. enabled al Qa ida to expand its global (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Michael Dator) reach and operate in new areas. Terrorists remain willing and able to threaten the United States, our citizens, and our interests from conducting major and well-coordinated attacks to executing attacks that are smaller and less complex. Terrorist networks continue to demonstrate interest in obtaining WMD. Foreign terrorist groups affiliated with al Qa ida, as well as individual terrorist leaders, may seek to recruit or inspire Westerners to carry out attacks against our homeland with little or no warning. Homegrown violent extremists, for instance, have attacked DoD personnel and installations. Even groups that are unable to cause harm on U.S. soil may still threaten U.S. interests and personnel overseas. The possibility that rapidlydeveloping threats, including violent protests and terrorist attacks, could escalate quickly and directly threaten U.S. interests at home and abroad is a significant challenge for the United States. Climate change poses another significant challenge for the United States and the world at large. As greenhouse gas emissions increase, sea levels are rising, average global temperatures are increasing, and severe weather patterns are accelerating. These changes, coupled with other global dynamics, including growing, urbanizing, more affluent populations, and substantial economic growth in India, China, Brazil, and other nations, will devastate homes, land, and infrastructure. Climate change may exacerbate water scarcity and lead to sharp increases in food costs. The pressures caused by climate change will influence resource competition while placing additional burdens on economies, societies, and governance institutions around the world. These effects are threat multipliers that will aggravate stressors abroad such as poverty, environmental degradation, political instability, and social tensions conditions that can enable terrorist activity and other forms of violence. C H A P T E R I : F U T U R E S E C U R I T Y E N V I R O N M E N T 8

52 U.S. Strengths and Opportunities In addressing this challenging environment, the United States will rely upon our many comparative advantages. The U.S. economy, which is strengthening following the global economic crisis, remains the foundation of U.S. power. Our economic strength is closely tied to a stable international order, underwritten by the U.S. military s role and that of our allies and partners in ensuring freedom of access and the free flow of commerce globally. Shale gas discoveries and new technologies allowing access to hydrocarbon deposits appear likely to enable the United States to be a net energy exporter in the coming decades. Overall, future prospects for the U.S. economy are strong. Built on a foundation of common interests and shared values, the strength of U.S. alliances and partnerships is unparalleled. People around the world gravitate toward the freedom, equality, rule of law, and A U.S. Marine greets a child during the annual Japan Air Self-Defense Force democratic governance that American Nyutabaru Air Base Air Show in Okinawa, Japan. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Benjamin Pryer) citizens are able to enjoy. From setting global norms to defeating terrorist threats and providing humanitarian assistance, the United States collaborates with allies and partners to accomplish a wide range of strategic, operational, and tactical goals. We leverage U.S. leadership and capabilities to drive global cooperation on security challenges in the United Nations and other multilateral fora. In recent years alone, we have cooperated with European allies and partners on operations in Afghanistan and Libya and have joined forces with Asian allies and partners on regional security issues. These and other key networks of alliances and partnerships, many of which are with other leading global military powers, will undergird the ability of the United States to face future crises and contingencies. Finally, the U.S. military remains well-positioned to leverage our technological and human capital strengths. The United States will remain a global leader in creative development and use of technology. U.S. innovations in warfighting, which have provided key capability advantages in areas such as undersea warfare, are built on the continued strength of our defense industrial base, a national asset that the Department of Defense is committed to supporting. Advanced technology, in addition to providing new combat capabilities, will continue providing lifealtering advances for the treatment of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines. And our Service members ability to fight honed through rigorous training in the classroom and hard-earned experiences on the battlefield alike will remain second to none. C H A P T E R I : F U T U R E S E C U R I T Y E N V I R O N M E N T 9

53 C H A P T E R 1 : F U T U R E S E C U R I T Y E N V I R O N M E N T 10

54 CHAPTER II: THE DEFENSE STRATEGY The United States underwrites global security by exercising leadership in support of four core national interests: The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners; A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity; Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges. The military is just one of many tools we as a nation have to protect our national interests. Whenever possible, we seek to pursue these interests through diplomacy, economic development, cooperation and engagement, and through the power of our ideas. When necessary, the United States and our allies have shown the willingness and the ability to resort to force in defense of our national interests and the common good. To ensure the military can answer that call, the Department of Defense must be prepared to execute a wide range of contingencies. The role of the Department of Defense in supporting U.S. interests is rooted in our efforts to reduce the potential for conflict, by deterring aggression and coercive behavior in key regions, and by positively influencing global events through our proactive engagement. Any decision to commit U.S. forces to hostile environments should be based not only on the likely costs and expected risks of military action but fundamentally on the nature of the national interests at stake. Protecting the security of the United States and its citizens is a vital national interest. If the security of the Nation is at risk, our national leadership will be prepared to use force and to do so unilaterally if necessary. We will ensure that our military remains global, capable, and sustainable so that our diplomacy can always be reinforced as needed by credible military force. We will be principled and selective when using military force and do so only when necessary and in accordance with all applicable law, as well as with U.S. interests and U.S. values. C H A P T E R I I : T H E D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y 11

55 The 2014 QDR represents an evolution of this Administration s prior defense reviews. The 2010 QDR was fundamentally a wartime strategy. It balanced near-term efforts to prevail in Iraq and Afghanistan with longer-term imperatives to prevent and deter conflict, and to prepare for a wide range of future contingencies, all while preserving and enhancing the health of the All-Volunteer Force. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance described a set of 21st century defense priorities and began the Department s transition from conducting ongoing wars to preparing for future challenges, while also guiding how the Department would absorb $487 billion in spending cuts required under the Budget Control Act. Protecting and advancing U.S. interests, consistent with the National Security Strategy, the 2014 QDR embodies the 21st century defense priorities outlined in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. These priorities include rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region to preserve peace and stability; maintaining a strong commitment to security and stability in Europe and the Middle East; sustaining a global approach to countering violent extremists and terrorist threats, with an emphasis on the Middle East and Africa; continuing to protect and prioritize key investments in technology, while our forces overall grow smaller and leaner; and invigorating efforts to build innovative partnerships and strengthen key alliances and partnerships. The 2014 QDR builds on these priorities and incorporates them into a broader strategic framework. As the United States completes the transition in Afghanistan, this updated national defense strategy is intended to protect and advance U.S. interests, sustain U.S. leadership, and take advantage of strategic opportunities. The Department s defense strategy emphasizes three pillars: Protect the Homeland. Maintaining the capability to deter and defeat attacks on the United States is the Department s first priority, and reflects an enduring commitment to securing the homeland at a time when non-state and state threats to U.S. interests are growing. Protection of the homeland will also include sustaining capabilities to assist U.S. civil authorities in protecting U.S. airspace, shores, and borders, and in responding effectively to domestic man-made and natural disasters. Build Security Globally. Continuing a strong U.S. commitment to shaping world events is essential to deter and prevent conflict and to assure our allies and partners of our commitment to our shared security. This global engagement is fundamental to U.S. leadership and influence. Project Power and Win Decisively. The ability of the U.S. Armed Forces to deter acts of aggression in one or more theaters by remaining capable of decisively defeating adversaries is critical to preserving stability and is fundamental to our role as a global leader. U.S. Armed Forces also project power to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. C H A P T E R I I : T H E D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y 12

56 These pillars are mutually reinforcing and interdependent. Our nuclear deterrent is the ultimate protection against a nuclear attack on the United States, and through extended deterrence, it also serves to reassure our distant allies of their security against regional aggression. It also supports our ability to project power by communicating to potential nuclear-armed adversaries that they cannot escalate their way out of failed conventional aggression. Building security globally not only assures allies and partners and builds partnership capacity, but also helps protect the homeland by deterring conflict and increasing stability in regions like the Middle East and North Africa. Our ability to project forces to combat terrorism in places as far away as Yemen, Afghanistan, and Mali and to build capacity to help partners counter terrorism and counter the proliferation and use of WMD reduces the likelihood that these threats could find their way to U.S. shores. Funding levels requested by the President for the Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 will allow the military to protect and advance U.S. interests and fulfill the updated defense strategy but with increased levels of risk for some missions. The Department can manage these risks under the President s FY2015 Budget plan, but the risks would grow significantly if sequester-level cuts return in FY2016, if proposed reforms are not accepted, or if uncertainty over budget levels continues. PILLARS OF THE U.S. DEFENSE STRATEGY Protect the Homeland The most fundamental duty of the Department of Defense is to protect the security of U.S. citizens. The homeland is no longer a sanctuary for U.S. forces, and we must anticipate the increased likelihood of an attack on U.S. soil. Against a varied, multifaceted, and growing set of threats, we continue to take an active, layered approach to protecting the homeland. We will maintain steady-state force readiness, resilient infrastructure to support mission assurance, and a Soldiers of the 1140th Engineer Battalion, civilian first responders, and local residents work quickly to build a three-foot sandbag wall to prevent possible flood waters from closing a Missouri highway intersection. (Photo by Michelle Queiser/Missouri National Guard) C H A P T E R I I : T H E D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y 13

57 robust missile defense capability to defend the homeland against a limited ballistic missile attack. The Department will sustain a modernized continuity of operations and continuity of government posture and will prepare to support civil authorities if needed. Advances in missile technology and the proliferation of these capabilities to new actors represent a growing challenge to the U.S. military s defense of the homeland. We must stay ahead of limited ballistic missile threats from regional actors such as North Korea and Iran, seeking to deter attacks or prevent them before they occur. To do this, we are increasing our emphasis on actively countering ballistic missile challenges by detecting missiles and continuously defending the U.S. homeland at longer ranges and at all altitudes. The ability to deter and defeat these kinds of threats protects the United States, reassures our allies and partners, and preserves strategic stability with Russia and China. The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear forces is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, as well as on our allies and partners. The United States will continue to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attack. However, nuclear forces continue to play a limited but critical role in the Nation s strategy to address threats posed by states that possess nuclear weapons and states that are not in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations. Against such potential adversaries, our nuclear forces deter strategic attack on the homeland and provide the means for effective responses should deterrence fail. Our nuclear forces contribute to deterring aggression against U.S. and allied interests in multiple regions, assuring U.S. allies that our extended deterrence guarantees are credible, and demonstrating that we can defeat or counter aggression if deterrence fails. U.S. nuclear forces also help convince potential adversaries that they cannot successfully escalate their way out of failed conventional aggression against the United States or our allies and partners. The United States will continue to maintain safe, secure, and effective nuclear forces while reducing our strategic nuclear forces in accordance with the New START Treaty. We will pursue further negotiated reductions with Russia. In a new round of negotiated reductions, the United States would be prepared to reduce ceilings on deployed strategic warheads by as much as one-third below New START levels. The United States will also work with our NATO allies to seek bold reductions in U.S. and Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe. As the frequency and complexity of cyber threats grow, we will continue to place high priority on cyber defense and cyber capabilities. The Department of Defense will deter, and when approved by the President and directed by the Secretary of Defense, will disrupt and deny adversary cyberspace operations that threaten U.S. interests. To do so, we must be able to defend the integrity of our own networks, protect our key systems and networks, conduct effective cyber operations overseas when directed, and defend the Nation from an imminent, C H A P T E R I I : T H E D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y 14

58 destructive cyberattack on vital U.S. interests. U.S. forces will abide by applicable laws, policies, and regulations that protect the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons. Further, the Department will operate consistent with the policy principles and legal frameworks associated with the law of war. Deterring and defeating cyber threats requires a strong, multi-stakeholder coalition that enables the lawful application of the authorities, responsibilities, and capabilities resident across the U.S. Government, U.S. Air Force technicians assigned to the 354th Communications Squadron industry, and international allies and support the new Air Force Network system enhancing cyber capabilities, by providing network oversight to all U.S. Air Force installations. (U.S. Air partners. We support the Federal Force photo by Staff Sgt. Christopher Boitz) government cybersecurity team and will continue working with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to improve critical infrastructure cybersecurity, and with DHS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to support law enforcement activities. The Department of Defense remains committed to working with industry and international partners as well, sharing threat information and capabilities to protect and defend U.S. critical infrastructure, including in our role as the sector-specific agency for the defense industrial base. We will ensure that international alliances and partnerships remain relevant to challenges in the threat environment by helping these partners improve their own cyber defense capabilities and mitigate shared cyber threats through mutual action. In addition to countering high-technology threats to the homeland, the Department of Defense will also remain able to defend against less advanced but still potentially lethal challenges. We will be prepared to deter, and if necessary, defend against direct air and maritime attacks. We will maintain persistent air domain awareness and capable, responsive defense forces. We will also provide support to civil authorities in the event of a domestic crisis. The American people expect the Department of Defense to assist civil authorities in saving and sustaining lives after natural and man-made disasters, including extreme weather events, pandemics, and industrial accidents. The surest way to stop potential attacks is to prevent threats from developing. Defeating terorrist attacks in the United States from the highly diversified and increasingly networked terrorist threat requires an equally diverse and networked counter effort. The Department of Defense s activities to protect the homeland do not stop at our nation s borders. We will C H A P T E R I I : T H E D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y 15

59 collaborate with interagency and international partners to tackle root drivers of conflict, including building capacity with allied and partner militaries, and to sustain a global effort to detect, disrupt, and defeat terrorist plots. Global prevention, detection, and response efforts are essential to address dangers across the WMD spectrum before they confront the homeland. For instance, the Department of Defense remains committed to funding global cooperative efforts to reduce proliferation and threats of WMD. This includes preventing the acquisition of, accounting for, securing, and destroying as appropriate WMD abroad a process that is ongoing in Syria. Build Security Globally The U.S. military forward and rotationally deploys forces which routinely provide presence and conduct training, exercises, and other forms of military-to-military activities to build security globally in support of our national security interests. In support of these goals, the Department will continue U.S. Army Sgt. 1st Class, assigned to the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade, carries supplies from a UH-60A Black Hawk to deliver to citizens in Montenegro rebalancing how we posture stranded by severe weather. A U.S. task force provided humanitarian assistance after record snowfalls left tens of thousands in the country's mountainous north ourselves globally. As we rebalance, unable to receive food, fuel, or medical assistance. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Edwin M. Bridges) we will continue to operate in close concert with allies and partners to establish norms and confront common threats, because no country alone can address the globalized challenges we collectively face. U.S. interests remain inextricably linked to the peace and security of the Asia-Pacific region. The Department is committed to implementing the President s objective of rebalancing U.S. engagement toward this critical region. Our enduring commitment to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region requires a sustained ability to deter aggression, operate effectively across all domains, and respond decisively to emerging crises and contingencies. In support of these goals, we are enhancing and modernizing our defense relationships, posture, and capabilities across the region. The centerpiece of the Department of Defense commitment to the U.S. Government s rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region continues to be our efforts to modernize and enhance our security alliances with Australia, Japan, the ROK, the Philippines, and Thailand. We are taking steps with each of our allies to update our combined capacity and to develop forward-looking roles and missions to address emerging regional challenges most effectively. We are also C H A P T E R I I : T H E D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y 16

60 deepening our defense relationships with key partners in the region, such as Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, and many others. Through both our alliances and partnerships, we are focused on enhancing our partners capacity to address growing regional challenges in areas such as missile defense, cyber security, space resilience, maritime security, and U.S. Navy Officer from USS Mason discusses techniques with Chinese sailors disaster relief. With China, the aboard the Chinese destroyer Harbin before a combined small-arms exercise in the Gulf of Aden. (U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Rob Aylward) Department of Defense is building a sustained and substantive dialogue with the People s Liberation Army designed to improve our ability to cooperate in concrete, practical areas such as counter-piracy, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. At the same time, we will manage the competitive aspects of the relationship in ways that improve regional peace and stability consistent with international norms and principles. Underpinning all of the Department s engagements in the Asia-Pacific region is our commitment to key principles and values that are essential to regional peace and security. We are working to support and expand the flourishing network of multilateral organizations and engagements that are taking root in the region. We are focused on promoting responsible behaviors and establishing mechanisms that will prevent miscalculation and disruptive regional competition and avoid escalatory acts that could lead to conflict. This includes supporting trilateral engagements and exercises, as well as strengthening ASEAN s central role in the region through participation in institutions such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus. As we end combat operations in Afghanistan, we are prepared to transition to a limited mission focused on counterterrorism and training, advising, and assisting Afghan security forces. We will continue efforts to help stabilize Central and Southwest Asia and deepen our engagement in the Indian Ocean region to bolster our rebalance to Asia. The stability of Pakistan and peace in South Asia remain critical to this effort. The United States supports India s rise as an increasingly capable actor in the region, and we are deepening our strategic partnership, including through the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative. The United States will retain a deep, enduring interest in and a commitment to a stable Middle East. We will seek to deepen our strategic cooperation with Middle East partners based on common, enduring interests. We will strengthen joint planning with allies and partners to C H A P T E R I I : T H E D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y 17

61 operate multilaterally, across domains, and to counter challenges to access and freedom of navigation. The Department will develop new or expanded forums to exchange views with allies and partners on the threats and opportunities facing the Gulf, particularly through the multilateral forum of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The Department plans to pursue a U.S.-GCC Defense Ministerial in 2014 and deepen U.S.-GCC ballistic missile defense cooperation. The United States will continue to seek more innovative and flexible approaches to meeting its enduring commitment to a secure Middle East. The United States will also remain active in other parts of the world. We have deep and abiding interests in a European partner that is militarily capable and politically willing to join with the United States to address future security challenges. Our commitment to the NATO Alliance is steadfast and resolute, and the United States will work with allies and partners to ensure NATO remains a modern and capable alliance. U.S. forces work closely with the nations of Europe on a wide range of shared goals, including strengthening NATO military capability and interoperability, counterterrorism efforts, maintaining shared strategic and operational access, and building the capacity of other global partners. Through continued defense cooperation, the Department will continue to promote regional security, Euro-Atlantic integration, and enhanced capacity and interoperability for coalition operations. We will continue to adapt the U.S. defense posture in Europe to support U.S. military operations worldwide while also conducting a range of prevention, deterrence, and assurance-related activities in Europe itself. U.S. engagement in the Western Hemisphere is aimed at promoting and maintaining regional stability. The Department will focus its limited resources on countries that want to partner with the United States and demonstrate a commitment to investing the time and resources required to develop and sustain an effective, civilian-led enterprise. We will emphasize building defense institutional Burundi soldiers prepare to load onto a U.S. C-17 Globemaster at Bujmumbura Airport, Burundi. In coordination with the French military capacity, increasing interoperability and the African Union, the U.S. military provided airlift support to transport Burundi soldiers, food, and supplies in the Central African with the United States and other likeminded partners, and supporting a Republic. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt Erik Cardenas) system of multilateral defense cooperation such as the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas and the Inter-American Defense Board to respond to shared challenges. C H A P T E R I I : T H E D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y 18

62 The United States remains focused on maximizing our impact throughout Africa by actively working with key partners to foster stability and prosperity. Many African countries are undertaking efforts to address the wide range of challenges they face, by improving their governance institutions, strengthening rule of law, and protecting borders more effectively. The U.S. Armed Forces cooperate with counterparts on counterterrorism and counter-piracy efforts, partnership capacity building especially for peacekeeping and crisis and contingency response. Recent engagements in Somalia and Mali, in which African countries and regional organizations are working together with international partners in Europe and the United States, may provide a model for future partnerships. Project Power and Win Decisively Our posture of global engagement is the foundation from which the United States responds to crises when required. For more than sixty years, the United States has maintained unmatched capabilities to project large-scale military power over great distances. Our power projection capabilities include ready and trained forces in the United States, the ability of our forces to move rapidly from place to place, and our forces ability to operate anywhere around the world. These capabilities have allowed our Nation to advance its interests worldwide, influencing events far from our shores and helping to bring stability to conflictprone regions. As the Department rebalances toward greater emphasis on fullspectrum operations, maintaining superior power projection capabilities will continue to be The Enterprise Carrier Strike Group transits the Atlantic Ocean, supporting central to the credibility of our maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of responsibility. (U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Nation s overall security strategy. Scott Pittman) Although our forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations, we will preserve the expertise gained during the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We will protect the ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future demands. Joint Forces will be prepared to battle increasingly sophisticated adversaries who could employ advanced warfighting capabilities while simultaneously attempting to deny U.S. forces the advantages they currently enjoy in space and cyberspace. To counter these challenges, the U.S. Armed Forces will not only invest in new systems and infrastructure but also continue to develop innovative operational concepts that confound adversary strategies. The United States C H A P T E R I I : T H E D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y 19

63 will continue modernizing our regional defense capabilities, including deploying advanced air and missile defense systems; fifth-generation fighters; long-range strike; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and updated models of critical naval assets. The Department will also improve the resilience of air, naval, ground, space, and missile-defense capabilities, even in the face of large-scale, coordinated attacks. Maintaining our ability to project power will also require exploiting, extending, and gaining advantages in cyber and space control technologies, as well as in unmanned systems and stand-off weapons. U.S. global communications and military operations depend on freedom of access in space, making security in this domain vital to our ability to project power and win decisively in conflict. The Department will pursue a multi-layered approach to deter attacks on space systems while retaining the ability to respond, should deterrence fail. This will require continuing to develop capabilities, plans, and options to defend against and, if necessary, defeat adversary efforts to interfere with or attack U.S. or allied space systems. We will continue to improve the resilience and affordability of critical space architectures. Growing commercialization and international investment in space will also provide opportunities to diversify space capabilities. All of the Department s initiatives in space will continue to be underpinned by U.S. Government efforts to work with industry, allies, and other international partners to shape rules of the road in this domain. We will retain and strengthen our power projection capabilities so that we can deter conflict, and if deterrence fails, win decisively against aggressors. The North Korean regime continues to pursue interests counter to those of the United States. Faced with this threat, the United States is committed to maintaining peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and F-35A Lightning IIs perform an aerial refueling mission with a KC-135 Stratotanker, off the coast of Florida. The 33rd Fighter Wing at Eglin Air closely monitors the situation through Force Base trains Air Force, Marine, Navy, and international partner operators and maintainers of the F-35 Lightning II. (U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. military and diplomatic channels in Donald R. Allen) coordination with the ROK, Japan, China, and Russia. The U.S. Armed Forces will continue their close collaboration with the ROK military to deter and defend against North Korean provocations. The ROK military is a highly capable, professional force that is increasing its ability to lead the defense of Korea. The United States trains regularly with members of the ROK military and participates in a variety of bilateral and multilateral exercises aimed at increasing interoperability. C H A P T E R I I : T H E D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y 20

64 The United States is also committed to ensuring it has the capability to win decisively in conflicts in the Middle East. Over the past five years, a top Administration priority in the Middle East has been preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, pursued through a multilateral, multi-pronged strategy combining diplomacy, international economic pressure, and the resolve to keep military options on the table. The November 2013 Joint Plan of Action in the P5-plus-one nuclear negotiations with Iran represents only a first step toward a longerterm comprehensive solution. Concerns over Iran s destabilizing influence as well as the uncertain trajectory of the greater Middle East will require the United States and our regional partners to remain capable of defeating aggression in this volatile region. As diplomacy on nuclear issues continues, the Department will maintain all options on the table and counter other threats that Iran poses in the region, including development of mid- and long-range missiles and support to terrorists and insurgents. Maintaining power projection capabilities that can counter not only state threats but also non-state threats is also increasingly critical. The United States will maintain a worldwide approach to countering violent extremists and terrorist threats using a combination of economic, diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, development, and Soldiers of the U.S. Army 10th Mountain Division's Headquarters Company, military tools. The Department of 3rd Brigade Combat Team conduct live-fire range training with M4 carbines in Afghanistan's Paktiya province. (U.S. Army photo by Pfc. Dixie Rae Liwanag) Defense will rebalance our counterterrorism efforts toward greater emphasis on building partnership capacity especially in fragile states, while still retaining robust capabilities for direct action, including intelligence, persistent surveillance, precision strike, and Special Operations Forces (SOF). We will remain focused on countering the proliferation and use of WMD, which continues to undermine global security. The Department will continue to cooperate with regional partners to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qa ida and other extremist threats. We will remain vigilant to threats posed by other designated terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah and Hamas. As these threats continue to diversify and adapt, we will increase the use of special operations capabilities to maintain security and preserve the element of surprise. Given the threat of violent protests and terrorist attacks that can imperil U.S. citizens and interests abroad, the United States is committed to improving the security of U.S. installations and personnel. The Department will work with the State Department and host nations to C H A P T E R I I : T H E D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y 21

65 develop proactive measures to augment security of U.S. facilities overseas, and we will be prepared to respond to a range of contingencies. Finally, U.S. power projection capabilities are not only about defeating threats. From responding to crises to executing non-combatant evacuations and partnering with civilian agencies to conduct humanitarian disaster relief missions, the U.S. Armed Forces project power to provide stability when countries or regions need it most. FORCE PLANNING CONSTRUCT Consistent with the requirements of the updated defense strategy and resourced at the President s Budget level, FY Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) forces, in aggregate, will be capable of simultaneously defending the homeland; conducting sustained, distributed counterterrorist operations; and in multiple regions, deterring aggression and assuring allies through forward presence and engagement. If deterrence fails at any given time, U.S. forces could defeat a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased campaign, and deny the objectives of or impose unacceptable costs on another aggressor in another region. The President s FY2015 Budget provides the resources to build and sustain the capabilities to conduct these operations, although at increased levels of risk for some missions. With the President s Budget, our military will be able to defeat or deny any aggressor. Budget reductions inevitably reduce the military s margin of error in dealing with risks, and a smaller force strains our ability to simultaneously respond to more than one major contingency at a time. The Department can manage these risks under the President s FY2015 Budget plan, but the risks would grow significantly if sequester-level cuts return in FY2016, if proposed reforms are not accepted, or if uncertainty over budget levels continues. A FOUNDATION OF INNOVATION AND ADAPTATION Across the three pillars of the defense strategy, the Department is committed to finding creative, effective, and efficient ways to achieve our goals and in making hard strategic choices. Innovation within our own Department and in our interagency and international partnerships is a central line of effort. Infusing a culture of innovation and adaptability that yields tangible results into an organization as large as the Department of Defense is by necessity a long-term, incremental undertaking. We will actively seek innovative approaches to how we fight, how we posture our force, and how we leverage our asymmetric strengths and technological advantages. Innovation is paramount given the increasingly complex warfighting environment we expect to encounter. C H A P T E R I I : T H E D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y 22

66 The past twelve years of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan have spurred tremendous tactical and technical innovation as the U.S. Armed Forces grew more experienced and interoperable. All four Services and the U.S. Special Operations Command have made greater use of unmanned aerial systems in support of An unmanned underwater vehicle submerges during International Mine Countermeasures Exercise (IMCMEX) 13 in the U.S. 5th Fleet Area of a wide array of joint missions, Responsibility. The USS Ponce operates in the background. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Daniel Gay) developing new generations of platforms and sensors capable of providing long-dwell coverage across the battlespace. Improved intelligence capabilities and processes have enabled effective targeting and engagement of high-value, elusive targets. By helping to build both the Iraqi and Afghan armed forces, U.S. forces learned valuable lessons about how to train, advise, and assist partner nation forces more effectively. Improvements in these and other areas are already being codified in doctrine, tactics, education, training, and elsewhere. Lessons that U.S. forces absorbed in Iraq and Afghanistan will remain invaluable as the Department turns its attention to future challenges. To most effectively prepare for wartime engagements, Combatant Commanders will invigorate their efforts to adjust contingency planning to reflect more clearly the changing strategic environment. Even when we are at peace, U.S. forces cannot be everywhere all of the time, and so the Department is pursuing a set of creative new presence paradigms to manage and employ our forces to enhance overseas presence and activities. The following examples demonstrate some of the concrete steps the Department is pursuing: Positioning additional forward-deployed naval forces in critical areas, such as the Asia- Pacific region, to achieve faster response times and additional presence at a lower recurring cost; Deploying new combinations of ships, aviation assets, and crisis response forces that allow for more flexible and tailored support to regional Combatant Command steadystate and contingency requirements; Employing regionally-focused forces to provide additional tailored packages that achieve critical global and regional objectives, including in critical areas such as the Asia-Pacific region; C H A P T E R I I : T H E D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y 23

67 Optimizing the use of multilateral, joint training facilities overseas in order to increase readiness and interoperability with our allies and partners; Developing concepts, posture and presence options, and supporting infrastructure to exploit the Department s investment in advanced capabilities rapidly, such as the Joint Strike Fighter; Extending the life of ships in innovative ways to get longer use out of our investments; and Pursuing access agreements that provide additional strategic and operational flexibility in case of crisis. A further key element of the Department s strategic commitment to innovate and adapt includes working with allies and partners, especially Gulf countries and those in Asia, to facilitate greater contributions to their own defense and, in the case of Europe, to facilitate greater security contributions across regions. The Department is developing strategically complementary approaches to deepen cooperation with close allies and partners, including more collaboratively planning our roles and missions and investments in future capabilities. Doing so not only helps our allies and partners develop the capabilities most needed to defend themselves, but also enables them to work more closely and more effectively with the United States. Going forward, we will thoroughly reflect the evolving capacity of our allies and partners in our defense planning efforts. For example, the United States will work with the United Kingdom and Australia to enhance collaboration between our respective defense planning processes. The United States is working with the United Kingdom to regenerate its aircraft carrier capability in the future, which will enable interoperable use of advanced fighters and allow more flexible options for combined employment of our forces, particularly to project power in key regions of the world. The United States and Australia are working toward full implementation of U.S. force posture initiatives in northern Australia, as both countries enhance collaboration between their planning processes to strengthen interoperability and cooperation, with a focus on submarine systems and weapons, helicopters, and combat and transport aircraft. British Royal Navy destroyer HMS Daring operates alongside the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility. (Photo: Leading Airman (Photographer) Keith Morgan RN. Crown Copyright, UK Government) C H A P T E R I I : T H E D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y 24

68 The Department is also working on its investment portfolio as well as with our closest allies to better align our investments and ensure that our activities complement one another s mutual priorities. The United States has long relied on technically superior equipment and systems to counter adversaries. Our technological superiority has allowed largely unfettered access to project power where needed. However, this superiority is being challenged by increasingly capable and economically strong potential adversaries that are likely developing and fielding counters to some or all of the key technologies on which the United States has come to rely. To maintain superiority, it will be necessary for the military to develop new capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures to continue to be effective. While the global technology landscape indicates that the United States should not plan to rely on unquestioned technical leadership in all fields, the Department must ensure that technological superiority is maintained in areas most critical to meeting current and future military challenges. The Department has invested in energy efficiency, new technologies, and renewable energy sources to make us a stronger and more effective fighting force. Energy improvements enhance range, endurance, and agility, particularly in the future security environment where logistics may be constrained. Finally, the Department will employ creative ways to address the impact of climate change, which will continue to affect the operating environment and the roles and missions that U.S. Armed Forces undertake. The Department will remain ready to operate in a changing environment amid the challenges of climate change and environmental damage. We have increased our preparedness for the consequences of environmental damage and continue to Student veteran, Lucas Bultema (right), is part of the Energy Systems Technology Evaluation Program, an innovative Office of Naval Research program that helps student veterans find high-level, meaningful opportunities in energy-related fields within the Navy and Marine Corps. (U.S. Navy photo by John F. Williams) seek to mitigate these risks while taking advantage of opportunities. The Department s operational readiness hinges on unimpeded access to land, air, and sea training and test space. Consequently, we will complete a comprehensive assessment of all installations to assess the potential impacts of climate change on our missions and operational resiliency, and develop and implement plans to adapt as required. Climate change also creates both a need and an opportunity for nations to work together, which the Department will seize through a range of initiatives. We are developing new policies, strategies, and plans, including the Department s Arctic Strategy and our work in building humanitarian assistance and disaster response capabilities, both within the Department and with our allies and partners. C H A P T E R I I : T H E D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y 25

69 C H A P T E R I I : T H E D E F E N S E S T R A T E G Y 26

70 CHAPTER III: REBALANCING THE JOINT FORCE Informed by the changing strategic environment and consistent with our updated defense strategy, the Department of Defense is responsibly and realistically taking steps to rebalance major elements of the Joint Force. After more than twelve years of conflict and amid ongoing budget reductions, the Joint Force is currently out of balance. Readiness levels already in decline from this period of conflict were significantly undercut by the implementation of sequestration in FY2013, and the force has not kept pace with the need to modernize. The Department of Defense will continue to face a challenging fiscal environment. Beginning with FY2012 Budget appropriations, the Department began absorbing significant impacts from a $487 billion, ten-year cut in spending due to caps instituted by the Budget Control Act (BCA) of The BCA also instituted a sequestration mechanism requiring additional cuts of about $50 billion annually through FY2021. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 provided modest immediate relief from sequestration, but unless Congress acts, annual sequestration cuts are set to resume in FY2016. Acknowledging the current fiscal environment, the President s FY2015 Budget reduces the defense budget by about another $113 billion over 5 years compared to levels in the FY2014 Budget request. It reflects the strict constraints on discretionary funding required by the Bipartisan Budget Act in FY2015, but does not accept sequestration levels thereafter, and funds the Department at about $115 billion more than projected sequestration levels over the 5-year period. Compared to sequestration-level cuts, the President s Budget provides a more prudent and strategic approach to managing declining resources given fiscal uncertainty. In support of the strategy, the Joint Force will become smaller across the FYDP, but will gradually become more modern as well, with readiness returning to presequestration levels. CHAPTER III: REBALANCING THE JOINT FORCE 27

71 Taking the prudent steps outlined in this QDR in the near term will improve the Department s ability to meet our national security needs should the fiscal outlook not improve. The longer critical decisions are delayed in the hope that the budget caps will be raised, the more difficult and painful those decisions will be to implement, and the more damaging they will be to our ability to execute the strategy if no additional resources are made available. These decisions which are reflected in the President s FY2015 Budget are intended to protect key priorities and minimize risk. AIR FORCE Airpower is vital to the Department s ability to project power globally and to rapidly respond to contingencies. The Air Force brings capabilities critical to national security in the air, in space, and in cyberspace and will continue to improve performance in each. We will incorporate nextgeneration equipment and concepts into the force to address sophisticated threats. Key priorities include continuing plans to field a new generation of combat aircraft and making advancements in cyber capabilities, avionics, weapons, tactics, and training. The Air Force will prioritize its most critical modernization efforts, including: The multi-role, fifth-generation F-35 fighter, which will provide improved survivability and an integrated suite of sensors to recapitalize the bulk of its fighter fleet; A new, stealthy, long-range strike aircraft, to maintain the ability to operate from long ranges, carry substantial payloads, and operate in and around contested airspace; and The KC-46A next-generation tanker/cargo aircraft to replace the legacy tanker fleet, to enable efficient and rapid long-range deployments. To free resources for these investments, the Air Force will make near-term capacity reductions in mission areas such as lift, command and control, and fighters. If sequestration-level cuts are imposed in FY2016 and beyond, the Air Force would have to retire 80 more aircraft, including the entire KC-10 tanker fleet and the Global Hawk Block 40 fleet, slow down purchases of the Joint Strike Fighter, sustain ten fewer Predator and Reaper 24-hour combat patrols, and take deep cuts to flying hours. ARMY Ground forces will remain an indispensable element of this Nation s ability to preserve peace and stability. Since their inception, Army forces have been employed to win and safeguard our freedom, deter and defeat aggression, render aid to civilian populations, build and sustain CHAPTER III: REBALANCING THE JOINT FORCE 28

72 alliances, develop the security forces of other nations to enhance collective security and respect human rights and civilian governance, and defend our national interests. The end of U.S.-led combat operations in Afghanistan provides the Army with an opportunity to prepare more broadly for the full range of future challenges that will likely require the employment of ground forces. A globally-engaged, modern, trained, and ready Army will need to be capable of conducting a wide spectrum of operations from support to civil authorities in the homeland to security force assistance to major combat operations, and from deterring aggression to having the ability to win decisively if deterrence fails. In a fiscally constrained environment, the future U.S. Army will need to be capable of conducting prompt and sustained land combat as part of large-scale, multi-phase joint and multilateral operations, including post-conflict U.S. and Indonesian Army paratroopers descend during a partnered mass-tactical airborne operation as part of exercise Garuda Shield The paratroopers are stability operations that transform assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division s 1st Brigade Combat Team. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Michael J. MacLeod) battlefield victories into enduring security and prosperity. To restore a balanced force over time, the Army will reduce all of its components. The Regular Army will continue to reduce from its war-time high force of 570,000 to 440, ,000 Soldiers. The Army National Guard will continue its downsizing from a war-time high of 358,000 to 335,000 Soldiers, and the U.S. Army Reserve will reduce from 205,000 to 195,000 Soldiers. The pace of planned Army reductions will enable the Army to realize savings rapidly while not breaking the Army force, although the Army will experience readiness and modernization shortfalls in the near term. The Army s planned force reductions in all components along with decisions to restructure Army aviation and conclude development of the Ground Combat Vehicle at the end of the current technology development phase of the program will make available resources to eventually restore readiness levels and invest in improvements to warfighting capabilities. These include selective upgrades of combat and support vehicles and aircraft, and investments in new technologies required for 21st century warfare. If sequestration-level cuts are imposed in FY2016 and beyond, all components of the Army would be further reduced, with active duty end strength decreasing to 420,000, the Army National Guard drawing down to 315,000, and the Army Reserves reducing to 185,000. CHAPTER III: REBALANCING THE JOINT FORCE 29

73 NAVY Building security globally and projecting power will continue to require sea power on, above, and below the world s oceans. The Navy will continue to build a future fleet that is able to deliver the required presence and capabilities and address the most important warfighting scenarios. Investments will focus on those assets that will ensure U.S. naval preeminence and preserve the Nation s security and prosperity. The Navy will prioritize: Maintaining a credible, modern, and safe sea-based strategic deterrent, including required investments to start SSBN(X) submarine construction in FY2021; and Sustaining or affordably enhancing asymmetric advantages to remain ahead of or keep pace with adversary threats including offensive strike capabilities such as the Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare weapons, Next-Generation Land Attack Weapon, Virginia Payload Module, and F-35 programs. The Navy s ship inventory will continue to grow into the 2020s, and will be influenced by a review of the desired capabilities of the future surface fleet in view of the emerging security environment. Specifically, AEGIS cruisers will be laid up for long-term modernization which will significantly extend their useful service life and sustain the Navy s Air Defense Commander abilities well into the 2030s. Flight III DDG-51 destroyer production plans will significantly increase air and missile defense capabilities. No new contract negotiations beyond 32 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) will go forward. The Navy will closely examine whether the LCS has the protection and firepower to survive against a more advanced military adversary, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. The Navy will submit alternative proposals to procure a capable and lethal small surface combatant. Recapitalization of LSD-41/49-class amphibious ships will commence with advance procurement funding for LX(R) in FY2019. To sustain investment in critical force structure and modernization, the Navy will reduce its funding for contractor services by approximately $3 billion per year to return to 2001 levels of contractor support. If sequestration-level cuts are imposed in FY2016 and beyond, the USS George Washington aircraft carrier would need to be retired before scheduled refueling and overhaul. We will have to make this decision, which would leave the Navy with ten carrier strike groups, in the 2016 budget submission. MARINE CORPS The Marine Corps will remain an expeditionary force in readiness, forward deployed to deter conflict, assure allies and partners, and respond to crises around the world. When access to critical regions or allies is denied or in jeopardy, rapidly employable Marine Corps forces are CHAPTER III: REBALANCING THE JOINT FORCE 30

74 trained and ready to execute amphibious operations in support of U.S. interests. In order to facilitate these operations, the Marine Corps will pursue the following steps: A phased acquisition approach to the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV). This will enable procurement of an ACV while continuing science and technology investments in technologies and capabilities that enabled extended littoral maneuver. In order to invest in critical modernization of this amphibious capability, the Marine Corps will plan for an end strength of 182,000 active duty Marines, with additional cuts to 175,000 if sequestration-level cuts are imposed in FY2016 and beyond. This end strength includes almost 900 more Marines for the Embassy Security Guard program that protects U.S. interests and installations abroad. ADJUSTING THE BALANCE BETWEEN ACTIVE AND RESERVE COMPONENTS Achieving the right balance between the Active Component and the Reserve Component is critical to the Department s overall efforts to size and shape the future Joint Force. The Reserve Components provide critical capabilities and capacity necessary to execute our national defense strategy. More than a decade of sustained and large-scale use of Reserve Component Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines, conducting overseas contingency operations and supporting domestic emergencies has transformed our Reserve Components to a force that is routinely and effectively engaged in a wide range of missions. As the United States completes its mission in Afghanistan, the Reserve Components will continue to play a key role in protecting the homeland, building security globally, and projecting power and winning decisively. To meet future defense requirements, the Department will sustain Reserve Components that are capable of providing trained units and personnel to augment and complement their Active Components when needed. As the Department evolves its forces and capabilities, the Reserve Component will seek to recruit personnel with critical skill sets, retain highly experienced personnel, and maintain complementary capabilities with the Active Component. PROTECTING KEY PRIORITIES Particularly in an era of reduced resources, the Department will redouble its efforts to protect capabilities that are most closely aligned to the pillars of our updated defense strategy. CHAPTER III: REBALANCING THE JOINT FORCE 31

75 Protect the Homeland The Department of Defense will continue to size and shape the Joint Force based on the need to defend the U.S. homeland, our most vital national interest. Missile Defense. The United States is increasing the number of Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) from 30 to 44 and building depth into our sensor network. With the support of the Japanese government, we are deploying a second surveillance radar in Japan that will provide early warning and tracking of any missile launched by North Korea. To ensure the homeland is protected against the projected intercontinental ballistic missile threat in the 2020 timeframe, the Department will target investments to increase defensive interceptor reliability and effectiveness, to improve discrimination capabilities, and to establish a more robust sensor network. The Department is also studying the best location for A Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) Block 1B an additional missile defense interceptor site in the interceptor launches from the guided missile cruiser USS Lake Erie during a Missile Defense United States to shorten the time required to Agency and U.S. Navy test. The SM-3 Block 1B intercepted a medium-range ballistic missile deploy additional interceptors if needed. Allied target off the coast of Kauai, Hawaii. (DoD photo by Jessica Kosanovich, Missile Defense and partner acquisition of interoperable ballistic Agency, U.S. Navy) missile defense capabilities and participation in regional deterrence and defense architectures will counter the coercive and operational value of adversary ballistic missile systems as well. Nuclear. As U.S. nuclear forces are reduced through negotiated agreements with Russia, the importance of ensuring our remaining forces are safe, secure, and effective increases. Thus, the Department of Defense, in collaboration with the Department of Energy, will continue to invest in modernizing our essential nuclear delivery systems; warheads; warning, command and control; and nuclear weapons infrastructure. These programs will ensure that the United States retains an effective triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems and forward deployable tactical aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Cyber. The Department of Defense will continue to invest in new and expanded cyber capabilities, building on significant progress made in recent years in recruiting, training, and retaining cyber personnel. A centerpiece of our efforts is the development of the CHAPTER III: REBALANCING THE JOINT FORCE 32

76 Department of Defense Cyber Mission Force. The Force includes Cyber Protection Forces that operate and defend the Department s networks and support military operations worldwide, Combat Mission Forces that support Combatant Commanders as they plan and execute military missions, and National Mission Forces that counter cyberattacks against the United States. The Cyber Mission Force will be manned by In addition to personnel, the Department is investing in state-of-the-art tools and infrastructure to conduct its missions. To defend its own networks, the Department is also migrating its information systems to a common, Defense-wide network infrastructure known as the Joint Information Environment (JIE). This JIE is critical to developing a more defensible network architecture and to improving network operations. The Department also will continue working with other U.S. departments and agencies, as well as with allies and partners abroad, to build their own cyber defense capabilities and mitigate shared cyber risks. Air/Land/Sea. Sustaining capacity to protect U.S. airspace, shores, and borders will remain a priority for the Department of Defense. U.S. Air Force fighters conducting Operation NOBLE EAGLE will remain on alert to defeat air threats over major cities. We will also maintain 27th Fighter Squadron F-22 Raptor aircraft returning from deployment in specialized ground-based air support of a 40-day training exercise in Southwest Asia. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman Rebecca Montez) defense assets in the National Capital Region that are capable of rapidly intercepting hostile air targets. At sea, U.S. Navy assets will continue to provide maritime domain awareness and security off U.S. shores. Support to Civil Authorities. The Department will continue to reshape the ability of U.S. military forces to provide support to civil authorities when needed, and work closely with the Department s domestic agency partners. Beginning in 2010, the Department restructured domestic chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) response forces, rebalancing Federal, regional, and state distributed military force contributions to the whole-of-community approach to national preparedness. In the coming years, we will build on improvements in preparedness for responding to major homeland natural disasters and man-made threats by better coordinating our pre- and post-incident CHAPTER III: REBALANCING THE JOINT FORCE 33

77 planning and response activities with domestic partners. The Department will continue working to assist the Federal civilian law enforcement agencies in preventing attacks by homegrown violent extremists and other groups that threaten the homeland. Build Security Globally Maintaining U.S. global posture and presence to support stability, security, and prosperity will become more challenging but perhaps even more essential in an environment of constrained resources. The Department will continue to rebalance our presence and posture abroad to protect U.S. national security interests more effectively. Asia-Pacific. Supporting the broader U.S. rebalance to the region, the United States will maintain a robust footprint in Northeast Asia while enhancing our presence in Oceania, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean. By 2020, 60 percent of U.S. Navy assets will be stationed in the Pacific, including enhancements to our critical naval presence in Japan. This will include LCSs rotated through Singapore, a greater number of destroyers and amphibious ships homeported in the Pacific, and the deployment of surface vessels such as Joint High Speed Vessels to the region. The Department is increasing the number of U.S. naval and air forces and relocating Marines to Guam as part of our distributed laydown, which A U.S. Marine and a Philippine Army soldier distribute U.S. Agency for International Development relief supplies from an MV-22 Osprey in Luzon, will result in a force posture Philippines, following Typhoon Haiyan. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Capt. Caleb Eames) that is more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable. The U.S. Air Force already stations assets in the Asia-Pacific region, including tactical and long-range strike aircraft, and will move additional forces such as ISR assets to the region, operating in concert with allies and partners to improve land, air, and maritime domain awareness. The deployment of Marines to Darwin, Australia will grow with the goal of establishing a rotational presence of a 2,500 strong Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) over the coming years. Even during the past decade while engaged in two warfights, the U.S. Army maintained a viable, substantial presence on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia to deter aggression and demonstrate commitment to regional stability. The end of U.S. combat in Iraq and Afghanistan will mean that forces currently CHAPTER III: REBALANCING THE JOINT FORCE 34

78 allocated to these conflicts will be available to return to their assigned home stations many of which are in the Asia-Pacific region to support the rebalance or for other missions. These forces will resume regular bilateral and multilateral training exercises, pursue increased training opportunities to improve capabilities and capacity of partner nations, as well as support humanitarian, disaster relief, counterterrorism, and other operations that contribute to the stability of the region. Middle East. The Department will continue to maintain a strong military posture in the Gulf region one that can respond swiftly to crisis, deter aggression, and assure our allies while making sure that our military capabilities evolve to meet new threats. The U.S. Armed Forces today have a strong presence in the region with more than 35,000 military personnel in and immediately around the Gulf, including advanced fighter aircraft, ISR assets, missile defense capabilities, rotational ground forces building partnership capacity, and a robust naval presence. Our forces are working closely with regional partners to provide reassurance and sufficiently robust capabilities to deter and respond to an array of challenges, from terrorist, paramilitary, and conventional threats, among others. Going forward, the Department will place even more emphasis on building the capacity of our partners in order to complement our strong military presence in the region. Together, we will work closely to enhance key multilateral capabilities, including integrated air and missile defense, maritime security, and SOF. In addition to the forward posture in the region, the Department will plan to flow additional forces to the region in times of crisis. Europe. U.S. forces will continue to pursue innovative ways to strengthen the military capabilities of European allies and partners by maintaining forward-stationed forces there and providing rotational presence, including through shared allied and partner locations. Recognizing Europe s strategic importance to operations in both Africa and the Middle East, we will work closely with host nations to improve the access and flexibility of our European basing to be able to better respond to crises in the region and beyond. We will continue to study U.S. infrastructure and headquarters in Europe to balance further consolidation in a time of fiscal austerity with our enduring responsibility to provide forces in response to crises in the region and beyond, and to train with NATO allies and partners. The Department will make every effort to enhance training with European nations, recognizing their role as primary U.S. partners in operations globally. We will continue to work to achieve a Europe that is peaceful and prosperous, and we will engage Russia constructively in support of that objective. CHAPTER III: REBALANCING THE JOINT FORCE 35

79 Africa. The Department will continue to maximize the impact of a relatively small U.S. presence in Africa by engaging in high-return training and exercise events; negotiating flexible agreements; working with interagency partners; investing in new, effective, and efficient small footprint locations; and developing innovative approaches to using host nation facilities or allied joint-basing. Latin America. Working with our interagency colleagues and international partners, we will assist as appropriate in countering diversified illicit drug trafficking and transnational criminal organization networks in Latin America that are expanding in size, scope, and influence. The Department will continue to maximize the impact of U.S. presence in Latin America by continuing to foster positive security relationships with our partners to maintain peace and security of the Western Hemisphere. A U.S. Navy Diver lowers a side-scan sonar with the help of Colombian divers during Navy Dive-Southern Partnership Station 2012, off the coast of Colombia. (U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Kathleen A. Gorby) Project Power and Win Decisively The ability of the United States to project large-scale military power abroad is central to protecting and advancing U.S. interests and promoting security worldwide. Sustaining superior power projection forces enabled by mobility capabilities including airlift, aerial refueling, surface lift, sealift, and prepositioning will remain a top priority for force planning and development, even in an austere fiscal environment. Air/Sea. The Department s investments in combat aircraft, including fighters and longrange strike, survivable persistent surveillance, resilient architectures, and undersea warfare will increase the Joint Force s ability to counter A2/AD challenges. The Department will continue to invest in a range of needed capabilities, including the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps commitment to the F-35 program. The Department will also deepen collaboration with key allies and partners as they develop future forces and capabilities to counter more sophisticated adversaries. Allied procurement of F-35s provides a major step toward enhancing our interoperability. Ground Forces. The ability to defeat an enemy s ground force and occupy territory is central to our ability to deter aggression, gain access, project power and win decisively. We will refine our doctrine, modernize our capabilities, and regain our proficiency to CHAPTER III: REBALANCING THE JOINT FORCE 36

80 conduct forcible entry and large-scale combined arms maneuver operations against larger and more capable adversaries than we have confronted over the past decade. Space. The Department will continue to emphasize space investments that provide enhanced resilience and the ability to deter, defend against, and defeat attacks to U.S. or allied systems. International partnerships in space situational awareness, such as the relocation of a radar and space surveillance telescope to Australia, will allow the Department to increasingly diversify, expanding coverage in key regions while yielding savings. Similarly, the Department will increasingly turn to hosted payloads, commercial imagery, and international ISR capabilities to provide diversified sources of space capabilities. Near-term investments in technology demonstrations and capabilities are needed to evolve toward more resilient architectures. Additionally, the Department is fielding new capabilities to detect and characterize interference with space systems, to enable timely attribution and response. The Department also will accelerate initiatives to counter adversary space capabilities including adversary ISR and space-enabled precision strike. These activities must be coordinated by a more dynamic, defensefocused battle management command, control, and communications architecture. Counterterrorism and Special Operations. The Department of Defense will continue to protect its capacity and capability to counter terrorist threats around the world. U.S. Special Operations Forces play a central role in these efforts, increasingly maintaining persistent forward presence to prevent crises in addition to serving as a crisis response and contingency force. The Department will grow overall SOF end strength to 69,700. We will protect the ability of SOF to sustain persistent, networked, distributed operations to defeat al Qa ida and counter other emerging transnational threats, counter WMD, build partnership capacity for counterterrorism, deny enemy sanctuary, and conduct or support direct action, as appropriate. As forces are withdrawn from Afghanistan, more SOF will be available to support Combatant Commanders efforts to counter a range of challenges across the globe. The demand for U.S. forces to expand the counterterrorism capabilities of allied or partner forces will likely increase in the coming years. The United States will continue to advise, train, and equip partner forces to perform essential tasks against terrorist networks, complementing U.S. activities in the field. Operations and activities in the Maghreb, Sahel, and Horn of Africa, for example, further our national security interests without a large commitment of U.S. forces. Precision Strike. Whether by air, land, or sea, the Department is prioritizing the ability to strike with precision. The Air Force will procure air-to-surface missiles that will allow both fighter and bomber aircraft to engage a wide range of targets effectively even when CHAPTER III: REBALANCING THE JOINT FORCE 37

81 the enemy s air defenses have not been fully suppressed. The Navy is also developing a new, joint, long-range anti-ship cruise missile that will improve the ability of Joint Forces to engage surface combatants in defended airspace. Although the Navy will reduce its annual purchase of Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missiles which are deployed across our fleet of surface combatants and submarines thousands of these long-range, accurate missiles will remain in the Navy s inventory. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). Timely, accurate information about operational and tactical situations is essential to the effective accomplishment of any military mission. U.S. forces operate a wide range of systems to provide such information in peacetime, crisis, and conflict. In the wake of the drawdown of forces from Iraq and Afghanistan and in light of growing challenges from state adversaries, the Department will rebalance investments toward systems that will be effective in defended airspace and denied areas. We will make critical space-based systems more resilient by expanding access to commercial and allied space ISR systems. As the Department makes these investments, we will sustain capabilities appropriate for more permissive environments in order to support global situational awareness, counterterrorism, and other operations. We will extend the range of our counterterrorism airborne ISR platforms and continue to equip them with new and better sensors. Continuing a trend that began in the late 1990s, U.S. forces will increase the use and integration of unmanned aerial systems for ISR. Resilience. The Department will also improve the resilience of air, naval, ground, space, and missile-defense capabilities, even in the face of large-scale, coordinated attacks. We will pursue a number of complementary measures that, in combination, will reduce the vulnerability of U.S. forces and allow them to sustain high-tempo operations. This includes active and passive measures to enhance the resilience of overseas bases. The Department will enhance capabilities to disperse land-based and naval expeditionary forces to other bases and operating sites, providing the ability to operate and maintain front-line combat aircraft from austere bases while using only a small complement of logistical and support personnel and equipment. We will also invest in additional rapid airfield repair capabilities, as well as procure fuel bladders to ensure survivability of supplies. RISKS The QDR makes clear that our updated national defense strategy is right for the Nation, sustaining the role of the United States as a global leader and providing the basis for decisions that will help bring our military into balance over the next decade and responsibly prepare for CHAPTER III: REBALANCING THE JOINT FORCE 38

82 fiscal and strategic uncertainty. The United States will need to continue to make difficult and deliberate decisions about how to prioritize the use of military force and how to deploy forces to our global Combatant Commanders based on its national security interests. In the near term, U.S. forces will remain actively engaged in building partnerships and enhancing stability in key regions, but our engagement will be even more tailored and selective. We will sustain a heightened alert posture in regions like the Middle East and North Africa. When possible, we will seek to reinforce our commitment to regional security by undertaking activities such as military-to-military engagements with critical partners. Over the long term, we face the risk of uncertainty inherent to the dynamic nature of the security environment. Although the Joint Force will gradually become more modern, we will face risks as others develop and field advanced capabilities and sophisticated weapons systems. We will have less margin of error to deal with unforeseen shifts in the security environment. The Department can manage these risks under the President s FY2015 Budget plan, but they would grow significantly if sequester-level cuts return in FY2016. The Department s approach thus provides a realistic alternative to sequestration-level cuts, sustaining adequate readiness and modernization most relevant to the Department s long-term strategic priorities. Moreover, the additional $26 billion in FY2015 in Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative funds that the President proposed providing to the Department would mitigate near-term readiness and investment risks. To sustain a healthy, ready, and modern force into the future, it is essential that requested savings from Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), compensation, health care, and other efficiencies be approved. MAIN ELEMENTS OF PLANNED U.S. FORCE STRUCTURE AND END STRENGTH, FY Department of the Army* 18 divisions (10 Regular Army; 8 Army National Guard) 22 aviation brigades (10 Regular Army, 2 U.S. Army Reserve, and 10 Army National Guard) 15 Patriot air and missile defense battalions, 7 Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense batteries (all Regular Army) 1 Some out year force structure plans may change if Congress appropriates at the five-year level in the President s Budget request. CHAPTER III: REBALANCING THE JOINT FORCE 39

83 Military Personnel: 440, ,000 Regular Army; 195,000 U.S. Army Reserve; 335,000 Army National Guard *Specific numbers and composition of Army forces are not yet finalized as the Army balances forces, modernization, and readiness, and considers innovative force designs. Department of the Navy 11 aircraft carriers (CVNs) and 10 carrier air wings (CVWs) 92 large surface combatants (68 DDG-51s, 3 DDG-1000s, and 21 CG-47s with cruisers in temporary lay-up for modernization) 43 small surface combatants (25 LCS, 8 MCMs, and 10 PCs) 33 amphibious warfare ships (10 LHAs/LHDs, 11 LPDs, and 12 LSDs, with 1 LSD in temporary lay-up for modernization) 51 attack submarines (SSNs) and 4 guided missile submarines (SSGNs) Personnel end strength: 323,200 Active Component (AC); 58,800 Naval Reserve 2 Marine Expeditionary Forces organized in 3 AC and 1 Reserve Component (RC) Division/Wing/Logistics Group teams 3 Marine Expeditionary Brigade Command Elements 7 Marine Expeditionary Unit Command Elements Personnel end strength: 182,000 AC; 39,000 RC Department of the Air Force* 48 fighter squadrons (26 AC; 22 RC) (971 aircraft) 9 heavy bomber squadrons (96 aircraft: 44 B-52, 36 B-1B, 16 B-2) 443 aerial refueling aircraft (335 KC-135, 54 KC-46, 54 KC-10) 211 strategic airlift aircraft (39 C-5, 172 C-17) 300 tactical airlift aircraft (C-130) 280 ISR aircraft (231 MQ-9, 17 RC-135, 32 RQ-4) 27 Command and Control Aircraft (18 E-3, 3 E-4, 6 E-8) 6 operational satellite constellations (missile warning, navigation and timing, wideband & protected SATCOM, environmental monitoring, multi-mission) Personnel end strength: 308,800 AC; 66,500 Air Force Reserve; 103,600 Air National Guard * Numbers shown for U.S. Air Force aircraft reflect combat coded inventory; that is, aircraft assigned to units for performance of their wartime missions. CHAPTER III: REBALANCING THE JOINT FORCE 40

84 Special Operations Forces Approximately 660 special operations teams (Includes Army Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha [ODA] teams and their equivalents; Navy Sea, Air, Land [SEAL] platoons; Marine special operations teams; Air Force special tactics teams; and operational aviation detachments [OADs]. Does not include civil affairs [CA] teams or military information support operations [MISO] detachments.) 3 Ranger battalions 259 mobility and fire support aircraft Approximately 83 ISR aircraft (40 remotely-piloted and 43 manned) Personnel end strength: 69,700 Strategic Nuclear Forces* No more than 1550 accountable deployed warheads for the following strategic nuclear delivery vehicles: Up to 420 Minuteman III intercontinental-range ballistic missiles 240 submarine-launched ballistic missiles deployed on 12 of 14 SSBNs Up to 60 nuclear-capable heavy bombers, with each deployed heavy bomber counting as one deployed warhead * This U.S. strategic nuclear force complies with the central limits set forth in the U.S.-Russia New START Treaty. These limits must not be exceeded from 5 February 2018 onward; that is, seven years after the treaty entered into force. These numbers pertain to deployed warheads and deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles as defined in the New START Treaty. Cyber Mission Forces 13 National Mission Teams (NMTs) with 8 National Support Teams (NSTs) 27 Combat Mission Teams (CMTs) with 17 Combat Support Teams (CSTs) 18 National Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs) 24 Service CPTs 26 Combatant Command and DOD Information Network CPTs CHAPTER III: REBALANCING THE JOINT FORCE 41

85 CHAPTER III: REBALANCING THE JOINT FORCE 42

86 CHAPTER IV: REBALANCING THE DEFENSE INSTITUTION The Department of Defense is taking steps to rebalance its own enterprise in order to control accelerating internal cost growth that threatens to be unsustainable in the future. The Department s first priority is to maintain the strength of our greatest asset the men and women who serve in the United States Armed Forces and their families. We will continue to support all current Service members, as well as those who transition out of the U.S. military, and especially those who require care after returning from combat. Maintaining our commitment to sustaining and strengthening the health of the All-Volunteer Force in times of decreasing defense budgets requires us to make prudent, significant, and enduring reforms wherever possible. This includes finding efficiencies within the Department of Defense organization, reforming our internal processes and consolidating our infrastructure, and making some adjustments to pay and compensation. In doing so, we will exercise good stewardship over the resources entrusted to the Department of Defense while continuing to honor the sacrifices of all those who serve. STRENGTHENING THE HEALTH OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE The past twelve years of combat have profoundly affected the All-Volunteer Force. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines from all components have served with distinction. Even as the entire Joint Force reaches the end of the U.S.-led combat mission in Afghanistan and devotes greater A U.S. Navy Specialist Seaman teaches children to salute at the Yawkey Boys and Girls Club during Boston Navy Week 2012 which commemorated the Bicentennial of the War of The eight-day event hosted service members from the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard as well as coalition ships from around the world. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Marco Mancha) attention to preparing for future challenges, members of the U.S. military will continue to endure hardships, including lengthy family separations and deployments in harm s way. CHAPTER IV: REBALANCING THE DEFENSE INSTITUTION 43

87 As the Department undertakes this transition from wartime, we will continue to ensure that Service members whose sacrifices have resulted in wounds, illnesses, or injuries receive topquality physical and psychological care. The Department of Defense is committed to supporting the approximately 14,000 wounded warriors and their families recovering from, and coping with, injuries sustained during global operations. The Department will invest in initiatives like the Recovery Coordination Program, which assigns a single point of contact to help Service members from the moment of an injury to when they return to active duty or leave active service. And we will sustain efforts to build the strongest possible support network for the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces who are in hospitals, rehabilitation, or are otherwise recovering. All veterans of the U.S. Armed Forces deserve the opportunity to translate their extraordinary experiences leading teams, making decisions, and solving problems into new occupations after they leave active service. The Department of Defense will continue to work with the Departments of Veterans Affairs (VA) and Labor (DOL) to help U.S. corporations, associations, Army Spc. Elizabeth Wasil wins gold in the 1500-meter wheelchair race during the 2013 Warrior Games in Colorado Springs, Colorado. (Defense municipalities, and non-profit Department photo by EJ Hersom) organizations select from the rich talent pool of separating Service members and retirees of the U.S. Armed Forces. As one example, the Department of Defense will continue work with the VA and DOL to support the Transition Assistance Program (TAP), which helps Service members receive training, education, and credentials needed to transition successfully to the civilian workforce. Efforts like these are mutually beneficial, not only aiding the men and women who have served our country in finding rewarding employment, but also providing potential employers with motivated, accomplished, effective workers, managers, leaders, and executives. For all current members of the U.S. Armed Forces, each of whom makes sacrifices in support of the Nation s security, the Department must seek to provide an environment where our personnel can succeed to the best of their abilities. Responsibly confronting instances of sexual assault remains a top priority for the Department. We are standardizing prevention efforts CHAPTER IV: REBALANCING THE DEFENSE INSTITUTION 44

88 across the Services, and strengthening commander accountability and victim advocacy while enhancing victim support and pretrial investigations. We are committed to demonstrating measurable progress in sexual assault prevention and response. We are also continuing to take major steps toward reducing all remaining gender-based barriers to service. The Army has ended the direct ground combat exclusion rule for female Service members, and other Services are moving forward to eliminate all unnecessary gender-based barriers to service. As a result of these and other decisions, since 2012 the Department opened approximately 57,000 positions to women, and our efforts to evaluate occupational performance standards are ongoing. The Department will also continue to implement changes needed to realize fully its decision to allow gay men and women to serve openly in the military. Across all of these efforts, senior leadership remains committed to one principle: ensuring that no form of discrimination persists in the U.S. Armed Forces. REBALANCING THE DEFENSE INSTITUTION Decreasing defense budgets require the Department to continue making prudent, significant, and enduring reforms wherever possible. Efficiencies This QDR builds on the successes of two previous Secretaries of Defense in driving institutional reforms. We have implemented or are currently implementing changes designed to reduce health provider costs, increase efficiencies in our internal health care facilities, eliminate lowerpriority organizations, consolidate information technology operations, and much more. In the President s FY2010 Budget submission, the Department capped and cancelled billions of dollars in programs that were inefficient and underperforming. As a result of a 2011 Secretary of Defense-led efficiency review, the Department realized five-year savings of $150 billion. In 2012, the Department identified another $60 billion in planned reductions over five years, with an additional $35 billion in In December 2013, Secretary Hagel announced that the Department will implement a number of additional efficiencies, including: Reducing the Department s major headquarters budgets by 20 percent, beginning with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, Service Headquarters and Secretariats, Combatant Commands, and Defense Agencies and Field Activities; and CHAPTER IV: REBALANCING THE DEFENSE INSTITUTION 45

89 Reducing the number of direct reports to the Secretary of Defense by further consolidating functions within OSD, as well as eliminating positions. In all, these efforts will reduce the Department s operating costs by some $5 billion over the next five years and more than twice that amount over the next decade. The Services are also finding efficiencies within their organizations. Better Buying Power and Financial Management Reforms Achieving greater efficiencies is a central piece of the Department s efforts to increase productivity in defense spending to deliver better value to the taxpayer and warfighter. Introduced in 2010, Better Buying Power encompasses a set of initiatives intended to move the Department toward this goal. In November 2012, the Department began its second phase of Better Buying Power, which reflects the Department s commitment to continuous improvement in seven key areas: Achieve affordable programs; Control costs throughout the product lifecycle; Incentivize productivity and innovation in industry and government; Eliminate unproductive processes and bureaucracy; Promote effective competition; Improve tradecraft in acquisition of contracted services; and Improve the professionalism of the total acquisition workforce. The initiatives that support these broad goals emphasize innovation, technology, best value, and professionalism of the workforce. This last area recognizes that people are essential to changing the way the Department provides critical capabilities to the warfighter and thus seeks to establish higher standards for key leadership positions, implement stronger professional qualification not just certification requirements for all acquisition specialties, increase the recognition of excellence in acquisition management, and continue to increase the cost consciousness of the acquisition workforce. CHAPTER IV: REBALANCING THE DEFENSE INSTITUTION 46

90 The Department is also improving its financial management, in part to achieve auditable financial statements. We have taken many steps: tightening financial business processes, installing modern systems, and instituting a formal course-based certification program for defense financial managers. Now our efforts are paying off. This year for the first time a military service the Marine Corps has achieved an unqualified opinion on its current-year budget statement, and we expect most of our budget statements to be audit ready by September Through these financial and acquisition improvements, as well as efficiencies, the Department continues to demonstrate its commitment to increasing productivity in defense spending. Managing the Total Force The Department s civilian workforce, augmented with contract support, directly contributes to mission readiness and serves as a key enabler of the operating forces by providing essential training, performing equipment modernization and reset, providing medical care, delivering base operating and infrastructure services, and ensuring the viability of critical family support programs. From FY2001 through FY2012, the Department saw a steady increase in its civilian workforce, especially in emerging areas such as intelligence, cyber, and acquisition areas where civilians are increasingly operators. The Department sought to reduce stress on the Joint Force by converting 50,000 military billets to civilian ones, freeing up more military personnel for combat, as well as increasing logistics and medical staff, among others. Civilian workforce increases enabled the Department to reduce excessive reliance on contractor support and rebalance the Total Force to ensure organic capabilities and government performance of inherently governmental and critical functions. Given the planned reductions to the uniformed force, changes to our force structure, and the Department s strategic direction under fiscal constraints, the Department must continue to find efficiencies in its total force of active and reserve military, civilian personnel, and contracted support. The Department needs the flexibility to size and structure all elements of its Total Force in a manner that most efficiently and effectively meets mission requirements, delivers the readiness our Commanders require, and preserves the viability, morale, and welfare of the All- Volunteer Force. CHAPTER IV: REBALANCING THE DEFENSE INSTITUTION 47

91 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Especially as the Department reduces force structure, we must avoid spending precious defense dollars on maintaining unnecessary facilities. The Department estimates that we already have more infrastructure than we need; our excess capacity will grow as we reduce force structure. The most effective way to eliminate unneeded infrastructure within the United States is through the BRAC process. BRAC is an analytical, apolitical, transparent, independently validated process that has proven to be a successful efficiency tool, saving more than $12 billion annually from the five BRAC rounds that have occurred during the past twenty-five years. Congress has denied the Department s request for another BRAC round in each of the past two years. If the Department of Defense is to make effective use of taxpayer dollars, Congress must authorize another BRAC round in While a U.S. BRAC is needed to eliminate the costs of unneeded infrastructure, the Department is also looking for efficiencies in its global infrastructure. To that end, the Department has embarked on a comprehensive review of its European infrastructure. This effort should deliver changes that will make a material improvement in both operating efficiency and effectiveness and validate the infrastructure we must maintain to meet our strategic commitments in the region. PAY AND COMPENSATION Strengthening the health of the All-Volunteer Force requires keeping the force in balance during this period of austerity. America will maintain its two-fold sacred contract with the U.S. Armed Forces: to properly compensate and care for our men and women in uniform and their families both during and after their service and to provide our Service members the best training and equipment possible so they can safely accomplish their missions. The Department and the American people have rightfully been very supportive of our men and women in uniform for more than a decade of war. Since 2001, increases in military pay and benefits have more than closed compensation gaps and have better aligned military compensation with the rest of the Nation s workforce. Increases in the glideslope of compensation growth were primarily a result of the following: Setting basic pay raises higher than private sector wage growth; A new health care plan for retirees 65 and older (TRICARE for Life); and CHAPTER IV: REBALANCING THE DEFENSE INSTITUTION 48

92 Providing a housing allowance to cover 100 percent of surveyed rent, basic utilities, and renter insurance costs. Reflecting these enhancements, the All-Volunteer Force today is compensated with a broad mix of pay and benefits including Basic Pay, Basic Allowance for Housing, Health Care, Subsistence, Clothing, Commissaries, and Special Pays and Incentives. To ensure a future force that is sized, shaped, trained, and equipped appropriately within increasingly constrained budgets, and to keep personnel costs on a sustainable path, it is necessary for the Department to slow the rate of growth in pay and compensation responsibly, fairly, and sustainably. The Department must make adjustments to place the still-upward compensation trajectory on a more appropriate, sustainable, and responsible glideslope. The Department is proposing a range of changes that will continue to offer a competitive package for recruiting and retaining our Joint Force of the future while slowing the rate of compensation growth. If implemented fully, these proposals could save approximately $12 billion over the next five years and considerably more by the end of ten years. And, these changes represent a far smaller percentage of the legislated total reduction in the Department s topline than we are taking from force capability, capacity, and readiness. Military Basic Pay is taxable Service member income based on pay grade and time in service. The Department proposes restraining the annual military pay raise over the next five years by providing pay raises below the Employment Cost Index, beginning at 1 percent in FY2015. This excludes general and flag officers, whose pay will be frozen for one year. Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) is a tax-free cash allowance for Service member housing costs when government quarters are not utilized. Prior to 2001, a member s housing allowance covered only about 80 percent of his or her full housing costs. Starting in 2001, the Department phased-in a zero out-of-pocket expenses policy, and by 2005, BAH covered 100 percent of average expected expenses. As more Service members took advantage of BAH and the Services grew, the cost share and impact to the budget grew correspondingly. The Department proposes slowing the rate of BAH growth over a phase-in period of three years and no longer reimbursing for renter s insurance until tax-free housing allowances cover an average of 95 percent of expenses. The proposal applies to domestic BAH only, and Service members are rate protected until they change duty stations. This change is projected to save about $5 billion from FY2015-FY2019. CHAPTER IV: REBALANCING THE DEFENSE INSTITUTION 49

93 TRICARE provides low-cost, world-class medical care for Service members, their families, and retirees. Over the past decade, Military Health System costs have more than doubled from $19 billion in FY2001 to $49 billion in the President s FY2014 Budget request, with some of this increase coming from the creation of TRICARE for Life for retirees 65 and older. Moreover, member fees have only been adjusted modestly since TRICARE was fully implemented in 1996, when a working age retiree s family of three who used civilian care contributed on average roughly 27 percent of the total cost of its health care. Today, that percentage contribution has dropped to less than 11 percent as costs have increased without a proportionate increase in user fees. In line with recent attempts to reform military health care, the Department has proposed combining the three TRICARE fee-for-service and managed care options into a consolidated plan. Modeled after best practices in the private sector, this proposal reduces costs without negatively affecting health care services, and will save about $9 billion from FY2015-FY2019. It includes adjustments in deductibles and co-pays to encourage members to use the most affordable means of care. Active duty Service member health care benefits will not change. Beneficiaries will be able to maintain their choice of doctor, and nothing we are doing will create incentives for current providers or doctors to leave TRICARE. Medically retired personnel and survivors of those who died on active duty will be treated as active duty family members. The Department will continue to fully fund its Wounded, Ill, and Injured warrior programs. Even with additional fees, the coverage is far cheaper than equivalent civilian sector health care plans, and the care will remain comparable to or better than the civilian sector. The Defense Commissary Agency operates 243 military grocery stores around the world (178 domestic, 65 overseas locations), providing at-cost groceries plus a 5 percent surcharge to Service members, their families, and retirees. Commissaries were established decades ago when military pay was much less, the majority of military members lived on installations, and the civilian market provided fewer low-cost store options near Department of Defense installations. This is not the case in most locations today. The Department proposes gradually reducing by $1 billion over the next three years the annual direct subsidy provided to military commissaries, which now totals $1.4 billion. Under this plan, all commissaries would still receive free rent and pay no taxes, and overseas commissaries as well as those in remote locations would continue receiving direct subsidies. In all, this proposal is projected to save $3.9 billion from FY2015-FY2019. In their totality, these proposed changes will maintain our promise to provide the All-Volunteer Force with fair and appropriate pay and compensation while always sending them into combat CHAPTER IV: REBALANCING THE DEFENSE INSTITUTION 50

94 with the best possible training and equipment that we can provide. The Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Service Chiefs, the Senior Enlisted Advisers, and the Department s entire senior leadership team support this comprehensive reform package, which we believe will put us on a sustainable path and will help fund the warfighting capabilities we need to maintain the Joint Force. We will work in partnership with Congress and the American public to implement these reforms so that we can ensure we continue to sustain the world s finest military. CHAPTER IV: REBALANCING THE DEFENSE INSTITUTION 51

95 CHAPTER IV: REBALANCING THE DEFENSE INSTITUTION 52

96 CHAPTER V: IMPLICATIONS AND RISKS OF SEQUESTRATION-LEVEL CUTS The Department of Defense is committed to protecting and advancing U.S. national security interests by taking steps to rebalance and prepare for the future. Today, at the level supported by the President s FY2015 Budget, the Department will still be capable of protecting our country and fulfilling the defense strategy, but with increased levels of risk for some missions. The Department can manage these risks under the President s FY2015 Budget plan, but the risks would grow significantly if sequester-level cuts return in FY2016, if proposed reforms are not accepted, or if uncertainty over budget levels continues. The scale and timeline of reductions would force the Department to make greater reductions in the military s size, reach, and margin of technological superiority. Under this scenario, the Department of Defense could see its planned budget reduced by almost $1 trillion over ten years compared to levels envisioned three years ago. Cuts to meet these budget levels would slash force structure and modernization too deeply to viably execute our defense strategy. IMPLICATIONS OF SEQUESTRATION-LEVEL CUTS ON THE DEFENSE STRATEGY AND FORCE PLANNING The return of sequestration-level cuts in FY2016 would significantly reduce the Department s ability to fully implement our strategy. Relative to funding levels in the President s FY2015 Budget, risks associated with conducting military operations would rise substantially. Our military would be unbalanced and eventually too small and insufficiently modern to meet the needs of our strategy, leading to greater risk of longer wars with higher casualties for the United States and our allies and partners. Ultimately, continued sequestration-level cuts would likely embolden our adversaries and undermine the confidence of our allies and partners, which in turn could lead to an even more challenging security environment than we already face. CHAPTER V: IMPLICATIONS AND RISKS OF SEQUESTRATION-LEVEL CUTS 53

97 Under continued sequestration-level cuts, the Department would maintain its priority focus on homeland defense albeit at heightened risk. Decreased levels of readiness and capacity would challenge the Department s ability to maintain air, missile, and maritime defenses over time, particularly if we faced a large-scale conflict overseas, while also negatively affecting our ability to support domestic homeland security agencies and catastrophic disaster response support to civil authorities. Sequestration-level cuts over the near-, mid-, and long-term would have an even more negative impact on the Department s ability to shape events globally. Under sequestration-level cuts, the United States would remain focused on strengthening alliances and partnerships and working with our partners to build capacity, but the Department would have difficulty matching our intent with the reduced resources available for engagement activity. Over the next decade, reductions in readiness and capacity imposed by sequestration-level cuts would diminish the Department s ability to build security globally, preserve stability, deter conflict, and reassure allies. For instance, the number of ships available for the Navy to provide global presence would decrease further than it did under sequestration in FY2013. Engagement programs such as Joint Combined Exchange Training events would be reduced significantly as well. Over time, the Department s ability to counter terrorism, conduct exercises and training activities with partners, make port visits, and provide ISR capabilities to regional Combatant Commanders would be significantly constrained. Under sequestration-level cuts, the United States would continue prioritizing efforts to sustain and complete our rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, including our focus on ensuring strong relations with our allies and partners. The Department would continue implementing key posture initiatives in the region, and by 2020, the Department would have home-ported 60 percent of naval ships in the region. Reduced capacity, however, would create challenges in maintaining current levels of presence, particularly aircraft carriers, across the Pacific. The scale, number, and complexity of U.S. exercises in the region and with our allies and partners would also significantly decrease over time if resource levels did not increase. While the Department of Defense would sustain its focus on the Middle East seeking to counter violent extremists and destabilizing threats we would need to move toward a leaner, yet still responsive, posture if sequestration-level cuts remain in place in the years to come. As in the Asia-Pacific region, smaller surface fleet capacity would lead to reduced presence. CHAPTER V: IMPLICATIONS AND RISKS OF SEQUESTRATION-LEVEL CUTS 54

98 The United States would remain committed to the security of our European allies and partners, but under sequestration-level cuts we would be unable to continue participating at current levels in joint training and exercises that are central to our relationships with allies and partners. This and other trends over the mid- to long-term would degrade hard-earned interoperability that we have developed between our forces and European militaries, threatening our ability to collectively and rapidly achieve objectives in potential future operations. If sequestration continues, there would be fewer U.S. military forces in other regions, such as the Western Hemisphere and Africa, than there are today. These regions are already seeing the impact of increasingly constrained resources. Sequestration-level cuts would also lead to significant risk in the Department s ability to project power and to win decisively in future conflicts. The Department would have less ability to deter conflict and would face challenges in being able to defeat an adversary quickly if called upon to engage in major combat. Reductions in capacity across all Services but particularly in the Army would challenge our ability to respond to strategic surprises, particularly those requiring large numbers of forces. We would likely need to count more on allied and partner contributions in confrontations and conflicts, assuming they would be willing and able to act in support of shared interests. Reductions in overall readiness, particularly in the near years, would further challenge the ability of U.S. forces to project power and respond to contingencies. Reducing readiness generates savings quickly, but it also robs the Services and U.S. Special Operations Command of resources they use to man, train, and equip their forces including aircraft carriers, Brigade Combat Teams, Special Operations Forces, and flying units. Sequestration-level cuts would reduce capacity available for the Services to maintain a ready surge pool of forces that could deploy rapidly. Deploying forces, especially in the Army and Marine Corps, could in some cases have to draw on personnel and equipment from non-deployed forces, resulting in lower readiness levels in the event of an unexpected contingency or the need to deploy forces to provide forward presence. Readiness decisions today will continue to have an impact for years to come. We know that core and niche skills take exponentially longer to regenerate than the time they take to erode. These corrosive readiness effects would require time and money to remedy. Critical modernization programs would also be broken under sequestration-level cuts, creating deficiencies in the technological capability of our forces despite the requirement that they be able to respond to a wide array of threats, including substantial A2/AD and cyberspace CHAPTER V: IMPLICATIONS AND RISKS OF SEQUESTRATION-LEVEL CUTS 55

99 challenges, as well as threats posed by adversaries employing innovative combinations of modern weaponry and asymmetric tactics. Development and fielding of critical warfighting capabilities, including advanced fifth-generation fighters, long-range strike assets, surface and undersea combatants, and precision weapons would be at significant risk, despite the fact that these are the capabilities the Department most needs to address growing threats. The Department would need to make tradeoffs in critical capabilities. The Services would have to delay, curtail, or cancel some high-priority modernization programs, as well as many lower-priority programs. Finally, in the event of sequestration-level cuts, the Department would be forced to make a number of non-strategic decisions with negative impacts for U.S. interests. For instance, the Navy would be forced to consider inactivating an aircraft carrier and its associated air wing and cutting one nuclear submarine, up to three DDG-51 destroyers, three logistics vessels (TAO(X)), and one Afloat Forward Staging Base/MLP from the shipbuilding plan in the next few years, solely to avoid near-term costs. Doing so would undermine a core competitive advantage for the United States, decreasing our ability to engage globally, project power, deter conflict, and decisively win against potential adversaries. The other Military Services would have to make similar difficult tradeoffs. The negative impact of choices like these would be clear not only to U.S. forces but to allies and partners we seek to reassure and to potential adversaries we seek to deter. The United States remains committed to protecting its interests, sustaining U.S. leadership, and preserving global stability, security, and peace. Recognizing current fiscal realities, the Department has made a number of decisions to ensure the Joint Force remains balanced over time, even as it must begin getting smaller given fiscal constraints. We will prepare the Department of Defense and the Joint Force for the future and preserve the health of the All- Volunteer Force as we implement reforms. The FY2015 funding levels requested by the President will allow the military to protect and advance U.S. interests and fulfill the updated defense strategy but with increased levels of risk for some missions. The Department can manage these risks under the President s FY2015 Budget plan, but the risks would grow significantly if sequester-level cuts return in FY2016, if proposed reforms are not accepted, or if uncertainty over budget levels continues. Ultimately, if the fiscal environment does not improve, by 2021 the Joint Force will be too small and insufficiently modern to fully implement our defense strategy. As a global leader, the United States requires a robust national defense strategy to protect and advance its interests, with a CHAPTER V: IMPLICATIONS AND RISKS OF SEQUESTRATION-LEVEL CUTS 56

100 military that can implement that strategy effectively. The Department is committed to working with Congress and the American people to ensure that as the Nation puts its fiscal house in order, we continue to provide sufficient resources for a strong national defense. CHAPTER V: IMPLICATIONS AND RISKS OF SEQUESTRATION-LEVEL CUTS 57

101 CHAIRMAN S ASSESSMENT OF THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 58

102 CHAIRMAN S ASSESSMENT OF THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW I support the strategic direction articulated in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). As we rebuild our readiness following more than a decade of conflict, the U.S. military will be capable of executing the 2014 QDR strategy but with higher risk in some areas. In fact, our military risk will grow quickly over time if we don t make the types and scope of changes identified in the report. Strategy is about balancing ends, ways, and means; that is, our national objectives, our operational concepts, and the resources available to us. Clearly this QDR addresses the fact that for the foreseeable future the Department of Defense will have fewer means to apply to defending our national security interests. Not surprisingly, given our responsibilities as a global power, the strategy articulated in the QDR preserves the ends articulated in the Defense Strategic Guidance of 2012 as they are considered necessary to protect the core interests of the United States. With our ends fixed and our means declining, it is therefore imperative that we innovate within the ways we defend the Nation. Successful innovation, particularly for an organization as large and complex as the U.S. military, is difficult. It will require strong, courageous leadership within the military, as well as close collaboration with our elected leaders. Thus, the core theme for the FY 2014 QDR from my point of view is one of rebalance. Because of geo-political change, frequent evolution in the way wars are fought, improving capabilities of our potential adversaries, and reduced resources as a result of the national imperative of deficit reduction, we will need to rebalance in many areas. These include: The types of conflict for which we prepare the Joint Force. The force has been focused on a single type of conflict for the past decade and needs to restore its readiness for the full spectrum of potential conflict. CHAIRMAN S ASSESSMENT OF THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 59

103 Our forward posture across the globe. We will need to balance permanent, prepositioned, and rotational presence with surge capability. We will seek new presence models that assure our allies and deter our adversaries while addressing our many responsibilities around the world. The capability, capacity and readiness of our force. It will take time to restore the balance among what we can do, how often we can do it, and maintaining readiness for both our known commitments and for inevitable surprise. They are significantly out of balance at the moment. Our tooth to tail ratio. Though inefficiency is often imposed from outside the Department, we need to continue to press to become more efficient as an organization in order to preserve our combat power. The force mix of Active, Guard, and Reserve. We need to carefully consider potential changes in the balance among our Active, Guard, and Reserve forces, leveraging the unique attributes and responsibilities of our Services and their components. ASSESSMENT As mentioned in my risk assessment last year, I believe there are six national security interests for which we are responsible directly derived from the four core interests outlined in the National Security Strategy. These interests are what we protect they are the ends of our strategy: 1. The survival of the Nation; 2. The prevention of catastrophic attack against U.S. territory; 3. The security of the global economic system; 4. The security, confidence, and reliability of our allies; 5. The protection of American citizens abroad; and 6. The preservation and extension of universal values. They are all important, but not equally so, and they inform us in the formulation of strategy and in the application of our resources. Based on these six interests, the Joint Chiefs and I use the following prioritization of missions (or ways ) to advise the Secretary of Defense and the President and to determine how to distribute the force among our Combatant Commanders: 1. Maintain a secure and effective nuclear deterrent; 2. Provide for military defense of the homeland; 3. Defeat an adversary; CHAIRMAN S ASSESSMENT OF THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 60

104 4. Provide a global, stabilizing presence; 5. Combat terrorism; 6. Counter weapons of mass destruction; 7. Deny an adversary s objectives; 8. Respond to crisis and conduct limited contingency operations; 9. Conduct military engagement and security cooperation; 10. Conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations; 11. Provide support to civil authorities; and 12. Conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster response. Prioritization aids us in choosing among resource options, analyzing plans, and articulating risk over time. Today the U.S. military can conduct all of these missions, but under certain circumstances we could be limited by capability, capacity and readiness in the conduct of several of them. Few powers possess the ability to deny American power projection. Our overseas basing is diplomatically and militarily secure. The homeland is safe. Our technological advantages still outpace other state adversaries. However, in the next 10 years, I expect the risk of interstate conflict in East Asia to rise, the vulnerability of our platforms and basing to increase, our technology edge to erode, instability to persist in the Middle East, and threats posed by violent extremist organizations to endure. Nearly any future conflict will occur on a much faster pace and on a more technically challenging battlefield. And, in the case of U.S. involvement in conflicts overseas, the homeland will no longer be a sanctuary either for our forces or for our citizens. I believe the QDR acknowledges this future and sets us on a useful direction to mitigate risk. We will need new operational concepts, new thinking about how to employ our comparative advantages, and new organizations and formations. We will need the synergy of the Joint Force even more than we do today. Above all, we will need to invest more in finding and developing leaders of consequence at every level, men and women of both competence and character. I consider the QDR s force structure recommendations appropriate to the resources available. The QDR prioritizes investments that support our interests and missions, with particular attention to space, cyber, situational awareness and intelligence capabilities, stand-off strike platforms and weapons, technology to counter cruise and ballistic missiles, and preservation of our superiority undersea. The QDR force takes risk in the capacity of each Service but most notably in land forces. While a U.S. military response to aggression most often begins in the air or maritime domains and in the future could begin with confrontations in the cyber and space domains they typically include and end with some commitment of forces in the land domain. Therefore, CHAIRMAN S ASSESSMENT OF THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 61

105 our QDR land forces will need to be even better organized, trained, and equipped for the full spectrum of 21st Century challenges. Moreover, since time is a defining factor in the commitment of land forces, I strongly recommend a comprehensive review of the Nation s ability to mobilize its existing reserves as well as its preparedness for the potential of national mobilization. Risk is increasing in other areas as well. We will need capabilities that can operate effectively in contested environments and that can execute forced entry. This means capabilities that have greater operating ranges and are more interoperable with other systems and concepts and capabilities that will enable dispersed operations. We will need to continue to provide and enhance a network of systems that can defeat deeply buried and hardened targets and that can track and destroy mobile launchers. We need to begin to move away from traditional platforms and methods, without sacrificing the benefits of our current posture and capability set. Such a transition will be challenging and could be costly. We must avoid procuring expensive and exquisite systems that can be neutralized by adversaries with far less investment. Determining just how costly this will be is nearly impossible. We are likely to be surprised pleasantly and unpleasantly by the speed of technology proliferation, increasingly sophisticated systems being developed by potential state adversaries, the cleverness and persistence of terrorists, the ability to adapt our own acquisition programs and capabilities, and the vitality of the U.S. technology and economic cycle. Estimations of how and where we would fight a war or militarily intervene will also probably be largely wrong. We will need to build a balanced Joint Force and that force will need to be prepared for frequent adaptation. RISK The QDR asserts that the U.S. military can meet the updated national defense strategy, albeit at higher levels of risk in some areas. I want to highlight three main areas of higher risk. More Difficult Conventional Fights. Our operational plans require capability, capacity, and force readiness. Operational plans cannot be executed with a large force that is not ready in time or a ready force that is too small. The most stressing interpretation of the strategy calls for defending the homeland while conducting simultaneous defeat and deny campaigns. When measured against high- to mid-intensity operational plans, executing this combination of contingencies simultaneously would be higher risk with the QDR force. To mitigate potential risks, we are currently reviewing our operational plans to ensure we have fully leveraged intelligence capabilities to see approaching threats early enough to ensure our asymmetric capabilities will be fully integrated into CHAIRMAN S ASSESSMENT OF THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 62

106 operational approaches, and that we have optimized our overseas posture to shorten response and logistics timelines. Reliance on Allies and Partners. Reductions in our capacity are unlikely to be completely mitigated by increased reliance on our allies and partners. We expect more from our allies even as their military power is mostly in decline, particularly relative to potential threats. Our effort to build new partners a core competence of each of our Services will be made more difficult by our own declining force structure. As part of our interaction with allies and counterparts, we have pursued more visibility into force management. Additional mitigation could include blended forces, an allied pool for force demand and supply, and increasing interoperability and training. The Reality of Global Responsibilities. The military objectives associated with meeting long-standing U.S. policy commitments are extraordinary and are growing in difficulty. The security environment is rapidly shifting. As the QDR explains, more diverse global actors are better connected, have more access to advanced technologies, and have proven their resilience and adaptability. Middleweight powers can threaten the homeland while sub-state actors can grab power without accountability. The number of nuclear-capable nations is growing. Our aging combat systems are increasingly vulnerable against adversaries who are modernizing many of whom have invested in leap-ahead technologies making our ability to develop and employ leading-edge technologies, systems and concepts even more urgent. Additionally, we must increasingly protect our forces, platforms, and installations against innovative, low-technology threats and tactics. All of these factors diminish our present military advantage and complicate our ability to meet ambitious strategic objectives. The Chiefs and I are working with the Secretary of Defense to refine and prioritize U.S. military objectives to align with the size and capabilities of our programmed force. CONCLUSION I believe that in 2020, we will still be the most powerful military in the world. More than 1 million men and women under arms present in more than 130 countries and at sea will still possess capabilities in every domain that overmatches potential adversaries. Enjoying alliances with a majority of the most powerful states, we will be the only nation able to globally project massive military power. Our forces will also have considerable responsibilities. They must protect allies, be globally present to deter conflict, protect the global commons, and keep war far from our shores and our citizens. These obligations are unique to the United States military, and they are inherently expensive. CHAIRMAN S ASSESSMENT OF THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 63

107 The smaller and less capable military outlined in the QDR makes meeting these obligations more difficult. Most of our platforms and equipment will be older, and our advantages in some domains will have eroded. Our loss of depth across the force could reduce our ability to intimidate opponents from escalating conflict. Nations and non-state actors who have become accustomed to our presence could begin to act differently, often in harmful ways. Moreover, many of our most capable allies will lose key capabilities. The situation will be exacerbated given our current readiness concerns, which will worsen over the next 3 to 4 years. The essentials of the 2014 QDR are correct. Given the increasing uncertainty of our future, and the inherent uncertainty in judging risk, I support its short-term conclusions and direction. As suggested by the QDR, we will be challenged as an institution to make even relatively simple and well-understood reforms. We will be preoccupied in the near term with restoring readiness given the devastating impacts of previous budget cuts. Nevertheless, if our elected leaders reverse the Budget Control Act caps soon and if we can execute the promises of the QDR then I believe we can deliver security to the Nation at moderate risk. My greatest concern is that we will not innovate quickly enough or deeply enough to be prepared for the future, for the world we will face 2 decades from now. I urge Congress again to move quickly to implement difficult decisions and to remove limitations on our ability to make hard choices within the Department of Defense. The changes required for institutional reform are unpleasant and unpopular, but we need our elected leaders to work with us to reduce excess infrastructure, slow the growth in military pay and compensation, and retire equipment that we do not need. Savings from these and other reforms will help us modernize, will add to research and development investments, and will provide needed funds to recover readiness. The lack of will to do what is necessary may drain us of the will to pursue the more far-reaching ideas promised in the QDR. The true risk is that we will fail to achieve the far-reaching changes to our force, our plans, our posture, our objectives, and our concepts of warfare. I believe that dramatic changes will be needed in all of these by Some of these changes are well-known and outlined in the QDR. Some of these changes are only dimly perceived today and need encouragement and direction. Innovation is the military imperative and the leadership opportunity of this generation. It s a fleeting opportunity. When we commit America s sons and daughters into combat, we must ensure that they are the best-trained, best-equipped, and best-led fighting force on the planet. That takes time, it takes money, and it is perishable. MARTIN E. DEMPSEY General, U.S. Army CHAIRMAN S ASSESSMENT OF THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW 64

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110 HOW THE ARMY RUNS (2) The Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS) whose product, the Army Program for Individual Training (ARPRINT), shows valid training requirements and associated training programs. (3) Depot maintenance programs. g. For investment accounts, managers for construction, RDT&E, and procurement first allocate program and budget resources by Army Management Structure code (AMSCO), APE, project number, and BLIN. They then distribute the resources to MDEPs within the resource management areas, listed in Para 9-27b above Program and Budget Years Covered by the MDEP a. The MDEP records manpower and TOA over the 9 fiscal years needed to display the program and budget. Which program year or which budget year each fiscal year addresses, depends on whether interest in the MDEP centers on the program or budget. Figure 9-8 shows the fiscal year structure of an MDEP applying to the President's FY budget. b. The MDEP shifts forward one year in the annual POM/BES submission. At the start of the cycle for the next annual POM/BES, the PPBE database drops the earliest year from the database and adds one new year. The first of the preceding years is the prior fiscal year (PY). It records resources spent in executing the budget the year before the current fiscal year (CY). The CY shows resources in the budget being executed. The last preceding year is called the budget year (BY). It lists resources requested in the PB being reviewed by Congress. CHAPTER 9 Figure 9-8. Fiscal Year (FY) Program Objective Memorandum (POM) Management Decision Package (MDEP) Extent that Manpower and Dollars can be Redistributed in the MDEP a. The MDEP, as just described, has both budget-year and program-year increments. The two increments differ primarily by the flexibility the Army has with manpower and funds. b. During the program or POM years, HQDA is constrained by Congress on total military end strength and by Fiscal Guidance. HQDA determines and approves civilian work year levels by balancing workload and available funding. Similarly, HQDA restricts program dollars only by TOA, not by individual appropriation. The distinctions allow redistributing previously programmed manpower and dollars to meet changing requirements. In later POM or budget submissions, for example, HQDA can, as needed, move program year resources between MDEPs, appropriations, and APEs. 9-24

111 ARMY PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING, AND EXECUTION PROCESS c. Once HQDA sends the BES to OSD, OSD must approve any changes to manpower and dollars. Even tighter controls govern changes in manpower and funding in the budget years after the PB has gone to Congress. (1) HQDA can redistribute previously budgeted manpower and dollars between MDEPs or commands and agencies, but must leave current budgeted dollars unchanged until current year appropriations become law. (2) Some flexibility during execution permits financing unbudgeted requirements to meet unforeseen needs or changes in operating conditions. Even so, congressional rules and specified dollar thresholds severely restrict spending for purposes other than those originally justified and approved. In addition, during execution, HQDA can transfer military and civilian manpower within appropriations without a corresponding transfer of funds How Flexibility Affects the MDEP a. Frequent change in MDEP resources. Competition at each stage of program development and budget formulation can produce frequent change in an MDEP's resource levels. Decisions resulting from OSD review of the POM/BES will further change amounts initially approved. Sometimes decisions may even affect requests in the PB already before Congress. Authorization and appropriation decisions by Congress often change amounts requested in the PB. Budget execution sometimes results in different rates and quantities of expenditure from those planned, and, at times, it results in different purposes. b. Keeping MDEP resources current. Program and budget analysts continually update MDEPs through their respective feeder systems to reflect the position of the last program or budget event. The kinds of changes described require that resource managers continually weigh how the stream of program and budget actions affect the MDEP and how a change in the program year or budget year portion of the package may affect the out years. Managers continually ask, In what ways do the changes: alter MDEP resource levels; shift resources between years; and affect resources in related MDEPs? c. Army Management Structure (AMS). The AMS serves as a second major resource recording structure. Based on congressional appropriations, the AMS relates program dollars and manpower to a standard classification of activities and functions per DFAS-IN Manual **** (where **** stands for the Current Fiscal Year, e.g., 2013). Army Management Structure Codes (AMSCO) help record the data in the detail needed for budgeting, execution, and accounting Other Structures. Other fiscal management structures include the 01 level BA structure for operation and maintenance appropriations shown in tables 9-8 through 9-14 (at the end of this chapter), SSN and BLIN for weapon systems, and project numbers for military construction automated support. The automated Army PPBE System supports Army PPBE functions and DOD PPBE data submissions to OSD, OMB, and Congress. Known simply as the PPBE database, it encompasses forces, funds, and manpower and serves as the database of record for Army resources. a. PPBE Database. The PPBE database organizes and registers 9 years of dollar and manpower data used in the process, and 12 years of forces data. It gathers manpower and dollar data through keys tied to the MDEP, appropriation, PEs, APEs, and other identifiers including the command or resource organization code. HQDA uses the database to: (1) Support user analysis. (2) Build and record the combined POM/BES. (3) Prepare the Army portion of the FYDP to reflect the POM/BES and later the PB. (4) Report consistent Army resource positions to OSD through the Select and Native Programming (SNaP) Data Collection System, Standard Data Collection System (SDCS), Service Support Manpower System (SSMS), and Comptroller Information System (CIS). (5) Issue Army commands Program and Budget Guidance (PBG) reflecting the FYDP resource position after each FYDP update. (6) Provide MDEP execution and expenditure information. b. Future System Enhancement. The Planning, Programming and Budgeting (PPB) Business Operating System (BOS) standardizes and better integrate the transactional automated information systems used in the Headquarters Department of Army level Programming and Budgeting processes. These systems are core to the PPBE business processes of the headquarters for gathering programmatic CHAPTER

112 HOW THE ARMY RUNS requirements, balancing resources and delivering the Army's program budget to OSD. The Business Operating System streamlines programming and budgeting business processes and significantly improving strategic analysis capabilities. The BOS provides architecting, reengineering, streamlining and consolidating HQDA systems, feeder database systems, and streamlines the business processes associated with them. These improvements have improved capabilities, eliminated redundancies and reduced overall costs of operations. Section VII Army Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Deliberative Forums Army Resources Board now called Senior Leaders of the Department of the Army (SLDA) The Army Resources Board (ARB) is chaired by the SECARMY with the CSA as the vice chair. The current SECARMY changed the ARB to Senior Leaders of the Department of the Army (SLDA) and no longer uses the ARB structure. The SLDA serves as a senior Army leadership forum, through which the SECARMY and CSA review Army policy and resource allocation issues, particularly those emanating from the Army PPBE process. It sets policy and approves guidance and priorities. The SLDA approves the prioritization of Army programs and selects resource allocation alternatives. In addition, upon their completion, the SLDA approves TAP, and the POM/BES. Table 9-6 shows the composition of Army PPBE deliberative forums. CHAPTER 9 Table 9-5. Composition of Army Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Deliberative Forums Forum Chairs OSA Members Army Staff Advisory and Support Members SLDA SECARMY-Chair CSA-Vice chair SRG PPBC USA-Co-chair VCSA-Co-chair Assistant G-3/5/7- Co-chair for Planning DPAE-Co-chair for Programming DAB-Co-chair for Budgeting and Execution USA ASA(ALT) ASA(FM&C) ASA(IE&E) ASA(M&RA) General Counsel CIO/G-6 ASA(ALT) ASA(CW) ASA(FM&C) ASA(IE&E) ASA(M&RA) General Counsel CIO/G-6 Representatives of- ASA(ALT) ASA(CW) ASA(IE&E) ASA(M&RA) AASA CIO/G-6 VCSA G-3/5/7 G-8 G-1 G-2 G-3/5/7 G-4 G-8 ACSIM CAR DARNG Representatives of- G-1 G-2 G-4 ACSIM TSG CAR DARNG Other participants as required Advisors ADCS G-3/5/7 DPAE DAB ARB Executive Secretary, ASA(FM&C) Other participants as required Advisors ADCS G-3/5/7 DPAE DAB SRG Executive Secretary, ASA(FM&C) Other participants as required, including- Director of Operations and Support, ASA(FM&C) Director of Investment, ASA(FM&C)Director of Force Management, G- 3/5/7 Director of Requirements, G-3/5/7 Director of Training, G- 3/5/7 Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy, G-3/5/7 9-26

113 ARMY PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING, AND EXECUTION PROCESS Forum Chairs OSA Members Army Staff Members Advisory and Support Director of Force Development, G Senior Review Group a. Co-chaired by the Under Secretary of the Army (USA) and Vice Chief of Staff, Army (VCSA) the Senior Review Group (SRG) serves as a senior level forum to resolve resource allocation and other issues but generally does not revisit decisions made at lower levels. The SRG monitors staff implementation of decisions of the SLDA and makes recommendations to the SLDA on- (1) The prioritization of programs. (2) Resource allocation alternatives. (3) Final TAP, and the POM/BES. (4) Other issues as determined by the Under Secretary of the Army (USA) and VCSA. b. See Table 9-6 for composition of the SRG Planning Program Budget Committee a. The Planning Program Budget Committee (PPBC) has three co-chairs, one of whom presides over the forum depending upon the subject matter under consideration - the ADCS G-3/5/7 for planning, the DPAE for programming, and the DAB for budgeting and execution. b. The PPBC serves the PPBE process in both a coordinating and executive-advisory role. It provides a continuing forum in which planning, program, and budget managers review, adjust, and recommend courses of action on relevant issues. The PPBC may return the results of committee deliberations to the Army Staff or Secretariat for action. It may pass them, in turn, to the SRG and ARB for review or approval. Among its responsibilities, the PPBC: (1) Maintains overall discipline of the PPBE process. (2) Oversees the PPBE schedule, with each chair controlling the chair's respective portion of the schedule. (3) Monitors force management and preparation of TAP, POM/BES, and PB. (4) Makes sure that Army policy remains internally consistent and that program adjustments remain consistent with Army policy and priorities. c. The PPBC maintains the PPBE Strategic Automation Committee to implement configuration management of the PPBE Enterprise process and to oversee long-term plans for investing in IT to improve the performance of PPBE functions (Para. 9-18a(10) above). As required, the PPBC may set up other standing committees or working groups to resolve issues that arise in managing the program or budget. d. See Table 9-6 for composition of the PPBC PPBC Council of Colonels A group of colonels or civilian equivalents, who represent PPBC members, meet throughout the PPBE process in a forum known as the Council of Colonels. The Council is co-chaired by the Chief, Resource Analysis and Integration Office, G-3/5/7; Chief, Program Development Division, Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate; and Deputy Director of Management and Control, ASA(FM&C). The group packages proposals, frames issues, and otherwise coordinates matters that come before the PPBC when it convenes. CHAPTER Implementation of the Budget, Requirements and Program (BRP) Groups The subsets of the three groups addressed in paragraphs 9-32 through 9-34 are more active in the process. These groups called the Budget, Requirements and Program (BRP or burp ) are composed of: the G-3, G-8 and MILDEP ASA(FM&C); ADCS, G3, Dir PAE and Dir ABO; and the Chief DAMO-CIR, Chief Program Development Division, PAE and Deputy Director Management and Control, ABO. These groups meet on a regular basis, and handle planning, programming, budgeting or resourcing decisions and issues appropriate to their level. The BRP can call meetings of the larger groups as needed to share information or gain wider perspective. 9-27

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120 Introduction The United States has played a leading role in transforming the international system over the past sixty-five years. Working with like-minded nations, the United States has created a safer, more stable, and more prosperous world for the American people, our allies, and our partners around the globe than existed prior to World War II. Over the last decade, we have undertaken extended operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to bring stability to those countries and secure our interests. As we responsibly draw down from these two operations, take steps to protect our nation s economic vitality, and protect our interests in a world of accelerating change, we face an inflection point. This merited an assessment of the U.S. defense strategy in light of the changing geopolitical environment and our changing fiscal circumstances. This assessment reflects the President s strategic direction to the Department and was deeply informed by the Department s civilian and military leadership, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Combatant Commanders. Out of the assessment we developed a defense strategy that transitions our Defense enterprise from an emphasis on today s wars to preparing for future challenges, protects the broad range of U.S. national security interests, advances the Department s efforts to rebalance and reform, and supports the national security imperative of deficit reduction through a lower level of defense spending. This strategic guidance document describes the projected security environment and the key military missions for which the Department of Defense (DoD) will prepare. It is intended as a blueprint for the Joint Force in 2020, providing a set of precepts that will help guide decisions regarding the size and shape of the force over subsequent program and budget cycles, and highlighting some of the strategic risks that may be associated with the proposed strategy. A Challenging Global Security Environment The global security environment presents an increasingly complex set of challenges and opportunities to which all elements of U.S. national power must be applied. The demise of Osama bin Laden and the capturing or killing of many other senior al-qa ida leaders have rendered the group far less capable. However, al-qa ida and its affiliates remain active in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere. More broadly, violent extremists will continue to threaten U.S. interests, allies, partners, and the homeland. The primary loci of these threats are South Asia and the Middle East. With the diffusion of destructive technology, these extremists have the potential to pose catastrophic threats that could directly affect our security and prosperity. For the foreseeable future, the United States will continue to take an active approach to countering these threats by monitoring the activities of non-state threats worldwide, working with allies and partners to establish control over ungoverned territories, and directly striking the most dangerous groups and individuals when necessary. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21 st Century Defense 1

121 U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia, creating a mix of evolving challenges and opportunities. Accordingly, while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region. Our relationships with Asian allies and key partners are critical to the future stability and growth of the region. We will emphasize our existing alliances, which provide a vital foundation for Asia-Pacific security. We will also expand our networks of cooperation with emerging partners throughout the Asia-Pacific to ensure collective capability and capacity for securing common interests. The United States is also investing in a long-term strategic partnership with India to support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region. Furthermore, we will maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula by effectively working with allies and other regional states to deter and defend against provocation from North Korea, which is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program. The maintenance of peace, stability, the free flow of commerce, and of U.S. influence in this dynamic region will depend in part on an underlying balance of military capability and presence. Over the long term, China s emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect the U.S. economy and our security in a variety of ways. Our two countries have a strong stake in peace and stability in East Asia and an interest in building a cooperative bilateral relationship. However, the growth of China s military power must be accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intentions in order to avoid causing friction in the region. The United States will continue to make the necessary investments to ensure that we maintain regional access and the ability to operate freely in keeping with our treaty obligations and with international law. Working closely with our network of allies and partners, we will continue to promote a rules-based international order that ensures underlying stability and encourages the peaceful rise of new powers, economic dynamism, and constructive defense cooperation. In the Middle East, the Arab Awakening presents both strategic opportunities and challenges. Regime changes, as well as tensions within and among states under pressure to reform, introduce uncertainty for the future. But they also may result in governments that, over the long term, are more responsive to the legitimate aspirations of their people, and are more stable and reliable partners of the United States. Our defense efforts in the Middle East will be aimed at countering violent extremists and destabilizing threats, as well as upholding our commitment to allies and partner states. Of particular concern are the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). U.S. policy will emphasize Gulf security, in collaboration with Gulf Cooperation Council countries when appropriate, to prevent Iran s development of a nuclear weapon capability and counter its destabilizing policies. The United States will do this while standing up for Israel s security and a comprehensive Middle East peace. To support these objectives, the United States will continue to place a premium on U.S. and allied military presence in and support of partner nations in and around this region. Europe is home to some of America s most stalwart allies and partners, many of whom have sacrificed alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Europe is our principal partner in seeking global and economic security, and will remain so for the foreseeable Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21 st Century Defense 2

122 future. At the same time, security challenges and unresolved conflicts persist in parts of Europe and Eurasia, where the United States must continue to promote regional security and Euro-Atlantic integration. The United States has enduring interests in supporting peace and prosperity in Europe as well as bolstering the strength and vitality of NATO, which is critical to the security of Europe and beyond. Most European countries are now producers of security rather than consumers of it. Combined with the drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan, this has created a strategic opportunity to rebalance the U.S. military investment in Europe, moving from a focus on current conflicts toward a focus on future capabilities. In keeping with this evolving strategic landscape, our posture in Europe must also evolve. As this occurs, the United States will maintain our Article 5 commitments to allied security and promote enhanced capacity and interoperability for coalition operations. In this resource-constrained era, we will also work with NATO allies to develop a Smart Defense approach to pool, share, and specialize capabilities as needed to meet 21 st century challenges. In addition, our engagement with Russia remains important, and we will continue to build a closer relationship in areas of mutual interest and encourage it to be a contributor across a broad range of issues. Building partnership capacity elsewhere in the world also remains important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership. Across the globe we will seek to be the security partner of choice, pursuing new partnerships with a growing number of nations including those in Africa and Latin America whose interests and viewpoints are merging into a common vision of freedom, stability, and prosperity. Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities. To enable economic growth and commerce, America, working in conjunction with allies and partners around the world, will seek to protect freedom of access throughout the global commons those areas beyond national jurisdiction that constitute the vital connective tissue of the international system. Global security and prosperity are increasingly dependent on the free flow of goods shipped by air or sea. State and non-state actors pose potential threats to access in the global commons, whether through opposition to existing norms or other anti-access approaches. Both state and non-state actors possess the capability and intent to conduct cyber espionage and, potentially, cyber attacks on the United States, with possible severe effects on both our military operations and our homeland. Growth in the number of space-faring nations is also leading to an increasingly congested and contested space environment, threatening safety and security. The United States will continue to lead global efforts with capable allies and partners to assure access to and use of the global commons, both by strengthening international norms of responsible behavior and by maintaining relevant and interoperable military capabilities. The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons technology has the potential to magnify the threats posed by regional state actors, giving them more freedom of action to challenge U.S. interests. Terrorist access to even simple nuclear devices poses the prospect of devastating consequences for the United States. Accordingly, the Department of Defense will continue to enhance its capabilities, acting with an array of domestic and foreign partners, to conduct effective operations to counter the proliferation of WMD. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21 st Century Defense 3

123 Primary Missions of the U.S. Armed Forces To protect U.S. national interests and achieve the objectives of the 2010 National Security Strategy in this environment, the Joint Force will need to recalibrate its capabilities and make selective additional investments to succeed in the following missions: Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare. Acting in concert with other means of national power, U.S. military forces must continue to hold al-qa ida and its affiliates and adherents under constant pressure, wherever they may be. Achieving our core goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-qa ida and preventing Afghanistan from ever being a safe haven again will be central to this effort. As U.S. forces draw down in Afghanistan, our global counter terrorism efforts will become more widely distributed and will be characterized by a mix of direct action and security force assistance. Reflecting lessons learned of the past decade, we will continue to build and sustain tailored capabilities appropriate for counter terrorism and irregular warfare. We will also remain vigilant to threats posed by other designated terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah. Deter and Defeat Aggression. U.S. forces will be capable of deterring and defeating aggression by any potential adversary. Credible deterrence results from both the capabilities to deny an aggressor the prospect of achieving his objectives and from the complementary capability to impose unacceptable costs on the aggressor. As a nation with important interests in multiple regions, our forces must be capable of deterring and defeating aggression by an opportunistic adversary in one region even when our forces are committed to a large-scale operation elsewhere. Our planning envisages forces that are able to fully deny a capable state s aggressive objectives in one region by conducting a combined arms campaign across all domains land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace. This includes being able to secure territory and populations and facilitate a transition to stable governance on a small scale for a limited period using standing forces and, if necessary, for an extended period with mobilized forces. Even when U.S. forces are committed to a large-scale operation in one region, they will be capable of denying the objectives of or imposing unacceptable costs on an opportunistic aggressor in a second region. U.S. forces will plan to operate whenever possible with allied and coalition forces. Our ground forces will be responsive and capitalize on balanced lift, presence, and prepositioning to maintain the agility needed to remain prepared for the several areas in which such conflicts could occur. Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges. In order to credibly deter potential adversaries and to prevent them from achieving their objectives, the United States must maintain its ability to project power in areas in which our access and freedom to operate are challenged. In these areas, sophisticated adversaries will use asymmetric capabilities, to include electronic and cyber warfare, ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced air defenses, mining, and other methods, to complicate our operational calculus. States such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection capabilities, while the proliferation of sophisticated weapons and technology will extend to non-state actors as well. Accordingly, the U.S. military will invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in anti-access Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21 st Century Defense 4

124 and area denial (A2/AD) environments. This will include implementing the Joint Operational Access Concept, sustaining our undersea capabilities, developing a new stealth bomber, improving missile defenses, and continuing efforts to enhance the resiliency and effectiveness of critical space-based capabilities. Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction. U.S. forces conduct a range of activities aimed at preventing the proliferation and use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. These activities include implementing the Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) Program, and planning and operations to locate, monitor, track, interdict and secure WMD and WMD-related components and the means and facilities to make them. They also include an active whole-of-government effort to frustrate the ambitions of nations bent on developing WMD, to include preventing Iran s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. In partnership with other elements of the U.S. Government, DoD will continue to invest in capabilities to detect, protect against, and respond to WMD use, should preventive measures fail. Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space. Modern armed forces cannot conduct high-tempo, effective operations without reliable information and communication networks and assured access to cyberspace and space. Today space systems and their supporting infrastructure face a range of threats that may degrade, disrupt, or destroy assets. Accordingly, DoD will continue to work with domestic and international allies and partners and invest in advanced capabilities to defend its networks, operational capability, and resiliency in cyberspace and space. Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent. As long as nuclear weapons remain in existence, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal. We will field nuclear forces that can under any circumstances confront an adversary with the prospect of unacceptable damage, both to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America s security commitments. It is possible that our deterrence goals can be achieved with a smaller nuclear force, which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons in our inventory as well as their role in U.S. national security strategy. Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities. U.S. forces will continue to defend U.S. territory from direct attack by state and non-state actors. We will also come to the assistance of domestic civil authorities in the event such defense fails or in case of natural disasters, potentially in response to a very significant or even catastrophic event. Homeland defense and support to civil authorities require strong, steady state force readiness, to include a robust missile defense capability. Threats to the homeland may be highest when U.S. forces are engaged in conflict with an adversary abroad. Provide a Stabilizing Presence. U.S. forces will conduct a sustainable pace of presence operations abroad, including rotational deployments and bilateral and multilateral training exercises. These activities reinforce deterrence, help to build the capacity and competence of U.S., allied, and partner forces for internal and external defense, strengthen alliance cohesion, and increase U.S. influence. A reduction in resources will Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21 st Century Defense 5

125 require innovative and creative solutions to maintain our support for allied and partner interoperability and building partner capacity. However, with reduced resources, thoughtful choices will need to be made regarding the location and frequency of these operations. Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations. In the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States will emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. force commitments to stability operations. U.S. forces will nevertheless be ready to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other stability operations if required, operating alongside coalition forces wherever possible. Accordingly, U.S. forces will retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been developed over the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations. Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations. The nation has frequently called upon its Armed Forces to respond to a range of situations that threaten the safety and well-being of its citizens and those of other countries. U.S. forces possess rapidly deployable capabilities, including airlift and sealift, surveillance, medical evacuation and care, and communications that can be invaluable in supplementing lead relief agencies, by extending aid to victims of natural or man-made disasters, both at home and abroad. DoD will continue to develop joint doctrine and military response options to prevent and, if necessary, respond to mass atrocities. U.S. forces will also remain capable of conducting non-combatant evacuation operations for American citizens overseas on an emergency basis. The aforementioned missions will largely determine the shape of the future Joint Force. The overall capacity of U.S. forces, however, will be based on requirements that the following subset of missions demand: counter terrorism and irregular warfare; deter and defeat aggression; maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent; and defend the homeland and support civil authorities. Toward the Joint Force of 2020 To ensure success in these missions, several principles will guide our force and program development. First, given that we cannot predict how the strategic environment will evolve with absolute certainty, we will maintain a broad portfolio of military capabilities that, in the aggregate, offer versatility across the range of missions described above. The Department will make clear distinctions both among the key sizing and shaping missions listed above and between these mission areas and all other areas of the defense program. Wholesale divestment of the capability to conduct any mission would be unwise, based on historical and projected uses of U.S. military forces and our inability to predict the future. Likewise, DoD will manage the force in ways that protect its ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future, unforeseen demands, maintaining intellectual capital and rank structure that could be called upon to expand key elements of the force. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21 st Century Defense 6

126 Second, we have sought to differentiate between those investments that should be made today and those that can be deferred. This includes an accounting of our ability to make a course change that could be driven by many factors, including shocks or evolutions in the strategic, operational, economic, and technological spheres. Accordingly, the concept of reversibility including the vectors on which we place our industrial base, our people, our active-reserve component balance, our posture, and our partnership emphasis is a key part of our decision calculus. Third, we are determined to maintain a ready and capable force, even as we reduce our overall capacity. We will resist the temptation to sacrifice readiness in order to retain force structure, and will in fact rebuild readiness in areas that, by necessity, were deemphasized over the past decade. An ill-prepared force will be vulnerable to corrosion in its morale, recruitment, and retention. Unless we are prepared to send confident, well-trained, and properly equipped men and women into battle, the nation will risk its most important military advantage the health and quality of the All-Volunteer Force. Fourth, the Department must continue to reduce the cost of doing business. This entails reducing the rate of growth of manpower costs, finding further efficiencies in overhead and headquarters, business practices, and other support activities before taking further risk in meeting the demands of the strategy. As DoD takes steps to reduce its manpower costs, to include reductions in the growth of compensation and health care costs, we will keep faith with those who serve. During the past decade, the men and women who comprise the All-Volunteer Force have shown versatility, adaptability, and commitment, enduring the constant stress and strain of fighting two overlapping conflicts. They have also endured prolonged and repeated deployments. Some more than 46,000 men and women have been wounded, and still others more than 6,200 members of the Armed Forces have lost their lives. As the Department reduces the size of the force, we will do so in a way that respects these sacrifices. This means, among other things, taking concrete steps to facilitate the transition of those who will leave the service. These include supporting programs to help veterans translate their military skills for the civilian workforce and aid their search for jobs. Fifth, it will be necessary to examine how this strategy will influence existing campaign and contingency plans so that more limited resources may be better tuned to their requirements. This will include a renewed emphasis on the need for a globally networked approach to deterrence and warfare. Sixth, the Department will need to examine the mix of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) elements best suited to the strategy. Over the past decade, the National Guard and Reserves have consistently demonstrated their readiness and ability to make sustained contributions to national security. The challenges facing the United States today and in the future will require that we continue to employ National Guard and Reserve forces. The expected pace of operations over the next decade will be a significant driver in determining an appropriate AC/RC mix and level of RC readiness. Seventh, as we transition out of Iraq and draw down in Afghanistan, we will take extra measures to retain and build on key advancements in networked warfare in which joint Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21 st Century Defense 7

127 forces have finally become truly interdependent. This imperative will shape a number of Departmental disciplines, ranging from establishing warfighting requirements to the way our forces train together. Finally, in adjusting our strategy and attendant force size, the Department will make every effort to maintain an adequate industrial base and our investment in science and technology. We will also encourage innovation in concepts of operation. Over the past ten years, the United States and its coalition allies and partners have learned hard lessons and applied new operational approaches in the counter terrorism, counterinsurgency, and security force assistance arenas, most often operating in uncontested sea and air environments. Accordingly, similar work needs to be done to ensure the United States, its allies, and partners are capable of operating in A2/AD, cyber, and other contested operating environments. To that end, the Department will both encourage a culture of change and be prudent with its seed corn, balancing reductions necessitated by resource pressures with the imperative to sustain key streams of innovation that may provide significant long-term payoffs. Conclusion The United States faces profound challenges that require strong, agile, and capable military forces whose actions are harmonized with other elements of U.S. national power. Our global responsibilities are significant; we cannot afford to fail. The balance between available resources and our security needs has never been more delicate. Force and program decisions made by the Department of Defense will be made in accordance with the strategic approach described in this document, which is designed to ensure our Armed Forces can meet the demands of the U.S. National Security Strategy at acceptable risk. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21 st Century Defense 8

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130 US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE US Army Command and General Staff School Command and General Staff Officer s Course (CGSOC) Common Core F100: Managing Army Change F102: Joint and Army Capability Development Reading F102RA Student Reading As you know, you go to war with the Army you have. They re not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time. SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld, 2003 Although ridiculed by many, the SECDEF s statement was an acknowledgement that we went to war in Iraq with the Army that was developed and programmed a number of years prior. This was a statement of fact that the military we had was built over time under certain assumptions about the world and expected enemies. Assumptions such as those may not and likely will not be true when we actually go to war. That was certainly the case in Iraq and almost every war we have ever been in. It takes time to build a force and it takes time to change, adapt and modernize one as well. Making changes or, as some call it, change management, is largely process driven in the United States Army. In the military, this process of change is called force management. Partly by democratic design and partly by the numbers of people/levels of decision makers involved, force management changes often require long lead times. This is due to the nature of our systems of democracy and bureaucracy. But it also reflects the competitiveness of determining, approving, implementing and fielding the best ideas to fill capability gaps in an environment of limited resources. Building upon F101 s lesson about vision, ideas, tasks, and guidance laid out in strategic-level documents like the NSS, NDS, NMS, QDR, and ACP; let us extend what we know and describe how they are converted into the capability to actually carry out these ideas. F101 dealt with national/strategic-level documents providing vision and direction to the military. The post 9-11 quote below by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld captures the change in the strategic environment that the US faced and its changed approach to preparing for it. A central objective of the Quadrennial Defense Review was to shift the basis of defense planning from a threat-based model that has dominated thinking in the past, to a capabilities-based model for the future. This capabilities-based model focuses more on how adversaries might fight, rather than specifically who the adversary might be or where a war might occur. It recognizes that it is not enough to plan for large conventional wars in distant theaters. Instead the United States must identify the capabilities required to deter and defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare to achieve their objectives. 1 With the demise of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the SECDEF accurately describes the shift in thinking and approach of building US military forces from a threat-based to a capabilities-based approach (CBA). The CBA is the current deliberate process of how the military takes vision documents; analyzes them; adds details; and converts them to concepts, plans, and ultimately solutions for combat capability. 1 Department of Defense, Forward, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 30 September 2001): iv, F102ASRA F102RA-1 JUNE 2014

131 A former J8 vice Director, MG Ken Hunzeker, adds: As [capabilities-based planning] evolves we are still learning how to make it better. So far, though, there are few critics who can refute that we need a process that goes from policy to concepts to capability assessments to fielded solutions. The previous requirements process in which everyone brought a brick and hoped they added up to a building has been rendered unworkable by both the security challenges we have and the opportunities to field a truly integrated force. 2 The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) At the joint level, the defense planning approach is called the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and CBA forms the analytic basis of the JCIDS process. JCIDS is a capabilities-based approach to identify current and future capability gaps and the joint force s ability to carry out joint warfighting missions and functions. CBA identifies capability gaps and recommends whether the gaps can be addressed by non-materiel or materiel means, or both. The receipt of Office of the Secretary of Defense and Senior Leader guidance initiates JCIDS. This guidance includes the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Military Strategy (NMS), Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), as well as Service guidance from senior leadership. Example input includes items such as The Army Plan (TAP) or operational guidance provided by the various Joint Concepts. Along with guidance, information about the Joint Operating Environment (JOE) provides context for the development of new or changed joint warfighting concepts (such as rapid decisive operations and peace enforcement operations); and/or new materiel capabilities evolving from the research, development, and acquisition (RDA) process. JCIDS: Capability-Based Process Current CJCSI G (1 March 2009) w/ supporting JCIDS Manual (on-line) COCOM CONOPS Strategic Direction Joint Operating Environment (JOE) Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) Joint Concepts (JOCs, JICs) Joint CBA Required Capabilities (RCs) identified Needs Identified Gaps Identified Joint Warfighter Capability Gaps Identified & Prioritized JROC Continuous S&T and Experimentation efforts / feedback; Service operating, functional & integrating concepts Services CBA / CNA Execution (Bottom-Up) JROC guidance to AROC to develop Army capabilities to satisfy Joint warfighter capability gaps ARCIC: Army Capabilities Integration Center AROC: Army Requirements Oversight Council CBA: Capabilities Based Assessment CDD: Capability Development Document COCOM: Combatant Commander CONOPS: Concept of Operations CoEs: Centers of Excellence CNA: CPD: Capability Production Document DCR: DOTMLPF Change Recommendation Service Capabilities - AROC Directs Army Required Capability (RC) Solution development FAA & FNA TRADOC ARCIC / CoEs identify potential DOTMLPF and policy solution approaches (FSA) ICD, CDD CPD, DCR ARCIC CoEs develop Army required capabilities documents AROC / JROC Approval Process Figure F102RA-1. 3 Potential Solution Approaches Identified APPROVAL Fiscally responsible DOTMLPF solutions approval FAA: Functional Area Analysis FNA: Functional Need Analysis FSA: Functional Solution Analysis ICD: Initial Capabilities Document JCIDS: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System JROC: Joint Requirements Oversight Council 2 MG Ken Hunzeker and LTC Bob Larsen, Evolution of the JROC Warfighting Capability-Based Assessments. Phalanx 37, No. 4, (2004): Army Force Management School, JCIDS: Top Down Capability-Based Process, Capabilities Development, Materials Development, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) Capability Based Assessment, slide 20, January 2011 modified by Greg Beck. F102ASRA F102RA-2 JUNE 2014

132 This process examines where we are, where we want to be, what risks we may face and what it might cost. JCIDS identifies capabilities needed to accomplish the strategic and operational requirements and is designed to provide systematic, integrated and interoperable materiel and non-materiel solutions to capability gaps or needs. It supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in identifying, assessing, and prioritizing joint military capability needs and provides a structure of analytical sub-organizations and evaluation bodies that conduct and evaluate assessments and analysis. This may sound like a lot of bureaucracy and oversight and, in fact, it is. But that is part of the nature of our democratic system, our military hierarchical penchant for control and decision-making, as well as for checks and balances. That said, let us focus on what we are trying to accomplish, and that is to produce military capability. What is capability? Naval War College Professor Sean C. Sullivan provides this definition: A capability is the ability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards and conditions through combinations of means and ways to perform a set of tasks. 4 Capabilities are investigated within the domains of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (commonly referred to as dot-mil-pf ). DOTMLPF is a joint term and analysis methodology that originated in the Army. Each DOTMLPF domain is an area providing focus for action officers to investigate solutions, products, and services to meet the required capabilities delineated in DoD directives. Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) Recommended Approaches / Documentation Approach(s) Recommendations - - AoA: Analysis of Alternatives CBA: Capabilities-Based Assessment CDD: Capability Development Document CPD: Capability Production Document Doctrine Organization Training Leadership Personnel Facilities Materiel Doctrine Program Directive Soldier Development Memorandum ICD: Initial Capabilities Document MILCON: Military Construction SRM: Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization Figure F102RA-2. 5 Unit Reference Sheets (URS) Table of Organization & Equipment (TOE) Individual Training Plan (ITP) Course Administrative Data (CAD) Combined Program of Arms Instruction Tng Strategy (POI) (CATS) Leader Development Action Plan (LDAP) MILCON Memorandum (new construction) SRM Funding Request (modify existing) System Modification System Upgrade (CDD / CPD Mods) New System Start (ICD, AoA, CDD, CPD) System-related DOTLPF Requirements Capability development, using DOTMLPF, analyzes future capabilities of potential adversaries, technological breakthroughs, and our national posture, and attempts to develop concepts and requirements to counter those adversaries and take advantage of technology. Doctrine development captures, in writing, the tactics, techniques, and procedures to be used. Organizational development produces the 4 The United States Naval War College, National Security Decision Making Department, CSE 9-1, Capabilities-Based Planning, Joint Capabilities-Based Planning, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and the Functional Capabilities Board Process (FCB), by Sean C. Sullivan, Newport, RI, 23 May 2008, 5. 5 Army Force Management School, Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) Recommended Approaches/Documentation, Capabilities Development, Materials Development 05, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) Capability-Based Assessment, slide 17, January F102ASRA F102RA-3 JUNE 2014

133 organizational designs to carry out the doctrine. Training development produces the training documents, devices, courses, and techniques to teach organizations and individuals to employ the doctrine and equipment to execute missions. Leader development includes education and training programs designed to inculcate or enhance soldier and officer leadership effectiveness. Materiel development, often referred to as acquisition, produces and maintains equipment required to fill organizations, and execute doctrine. DOTMLPF is a useful tool for looking at a large issue or set of issues, and breaking it apart into more discrete, manageable sets of tasks and deliverables. (Note: You may have heard it referred to as DOTMLPF-P. The additional P stands for policy, which is commonly used in joint terminology). The objective of JCIDS is to resolve identified capability gaps, perceived deficiencies, or shortcomings in the current force and to develop a balanced and synchronized DOTMLPF solution proposal that is affordable, militarily useful, supportable to the combatant commanders, and based on mature technology. The JCIDS analysis process defines capability gaps, capability needs, and approaches to provide those capabilities within a specified functional or operational area. JCIDS produces two main types of products: joint concepts and capabilities-based assessments and programming recommendations. Joint Concept Process. There are three categories of joint concepts: 6 the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO), Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs), and Supporting Joint Concepts. Joint concepts examine the missions defined in defense strategic guidance in the context of the Chairman's vision and the future joint operating environment. Service concepts, multi-service concepts, and concepts of operation (CONOPS) written within the joint community to address focused, limited scope topics, may expand or implement the ideas contained in joint concepts. While these concepts are not part of the formal family of joint concepts, they must be considered in all phases of joint concept development (JCD) to ensure integrated or mutually supportive development where possible, avoid duplication of effort, and identify potential risks. The figure below depicts the family of joint concepts structure with examples of JOCs and supporting joint concepts to illustrate concept alignment. The DJ-7 and JCD governance body will determine the specific alignment and continued relevance of approved joint concepts within the joint concepts structure. Figure F102RA Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) , Guidance for Development and Implementation of Joint Concepts, 22 November 2013, p. A5-A7. 7 Ibid, A6. F102ASRA F102RA-4 JUNE 2014

134 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations. The CCJO describes the Chairman's vision for how the Joint Force will defend the nation against a wide range of security challenges. The CCJO emphasizes the Joint Force's support of defense strategic guidance for the protection of national interests. As the foundational concept document, the CCJO's development is similar to that of subordinate operating and supporting concepts; however, the guidance, reviews, evaluation, and approval processes for the CCJO are as directed by the Chairman. The CCJO helps establish force development priorities to implement the vision for the future Joint Force and provides a bridge between strategic guidance and joint operating concepts in support of Joint Force development. Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs). JOCs broadly describe how the Joint Force will execute military operations within a specific mission area in accordance with defense strategic guidance and the CCJO. Collectively, JOCs describe required capabilities across the range of military operations and encourage further examination through wargaming, joint training, and a variety of studies, experimentation, and analyses. Supporting Joint Concepts. Supporting joint concepts add depth and detail to one or more JOCs by describing how the future Joint Force is expected to conduct a subset of a JOC mission or apply joint functions across two or more JOC mission areas. Supporting joint concepts are written at a level of detail suitable for a CBA. As such, supporting joint concepts allow for a more in-depth exploration of capabilities identified in JOCs by enabling follow-on testing, assessment, observations, and lessons learned. Approved supporting joint concepts drive the conduct of CBAs and other analyses designed to examine capability gaps and support the refinement and implementation of nonmateriel and materiel changes needed to achieve the required capabilities and desired end state specified in the concept. Based on the joint concepts, JCIDS identifies capability needs and gaps and produces recommended solutions across the full range of DOTMLPF solutions. Sometimes JCIDS capability recommendations are material solutions. However, non-materiel solutions are considered first and often meet the capability need or bridge the capability gap. Army Concept Framework (ACF) 8 The Army documents its fundamental ideas about future joint operations in the Army concept framework (ACF), promulgated in TRADOC 525-series pamphlets. The ACF family of concepts consists of a capstone concept, an Army operating concept (AOC), Army functional concepts (AFCs), and concepts directed by CG, TRADOC. Concepts facilitate the visualization and communication of the Army s key ideas on future operations. Army Capstone Concept. As the lead document of the Army Concept Framework, TRADOC Pam , The U.S. Army Capstone Concept (ACC), 9 describes our vision of the future operational environment, the role of the Army in the joint force, and the broad capabilities required by future Army forces. The ACC provides a guide to how the Army will apply available resources to overcome unpredictable and complex challenges and prevent, shape and win in support of recent strategic guidance. The ACC also serves as the foundation for a campaign of learning that will evaluate and refine its major ideas and required capabilities. Finally, the ACC provides a roadmap for development of a comprehensive investment strategy that will rebalance the Army s force structure, readiness, and modernization efforts in support of national strategy. The ACC establishes that the Army must maintain a credible capacity to win decisively and support combatant commanders across a wide range of military operations at home and abroad. Further, the ACC retains the idea of operational adaptability as the fundamental characteristic of the Army required to execute a wide variety of missions for both the institutional Army as well as the operating force. Within the ACF, this concept is the baseline of a campaign of experimentation and 8 Army Force Management School, Capabilities Development and System Acquisition Management, Executive Primer, February 2013, pages F102ASRA F102RA-5 JUNE 2014

135 analysis which will test these ideas. The ACC is the unifying framework for developing the AOC, AFCs, and integrated architectures. The United States Army Operating Concept (AOC), documented in TP , provides a generalized visualization of operations across the range of military operations. The AOC describes the Army s contribution to national security within the context of joint operations. It focuses on the operational and tactical levels of war and explains how the Army, 6-18 years in the future, employs combined arms maneuver and wide area security as part of full-spectrum operations to accomplish military missions on land. By addressing these operations in a way that illustrates how the Army integrates its warfighting functions, the AOC provides a conceptual framework for the development of subordinate Army functional concepts. The functional concepts, in turn, contain more specific explanations of how Army forces operate within each warfighting function and outline their mutual dependencies. The AOC does not include the details required to initiate the JCIDS CBA. The Army functional concepts (AFCs) describe how the Army force will perform a particular military function across the full range of military operations 6-18 years in the future. AFCs support the capstone concept and the AOC, as well as joint concepts, and draw operational context from those documents. Organized along the lines of the classic functions of a military force, the six AFCs are Fires, Intelligence, Mission Command, Movement and Maneuver, Protection, and Sustainment. As an integrated suite of concepts, they describe the full range of land combat functions across the range of military operations. AFCs may include the details required to initiate the JCIDS CBA. Three additional concepts devoted to learning, training, and the human dimension round out the ACF. The Army learning concept describes the learning model required by the future Army to develop adaptive, thinking Soldiers and leaders. The Army training concept outlines the requirements and capabilities of the future force to generate and sustain trained and capable units. TP outlines how the Army will develop the cognitive, physical, and social components of every Soldier to operate within the Army in full-spectrum operations. Collectively, the ACF defines the Army s vision of how it will operate in the future and provides the conceptual framework needed to determine the capabilities required across the Army to ensure future force effectiveness. F102ASRA F102RA-6 JUNE 2014

136 Figure F102RA Having explored the transition of national and strategic level documents through the joint level in JCIDS what is the impact on the Army and what do we see as our core capability? The Army sees its capability largely in terms of organizations, the O in DOTMLPF. How are concepts and vision translated into actual capabilities? Have you ever heard the term form follows function? It is an architectural design concept emanating from the industrial age in the early 1900s. Simplistically, the concept is that the shape of a building or object should be primarily based upon its intended function or purpose. Some think this concept, developed in an earlier age, applies to the Army s organizational design process also developed in an earlier age but still in use today. F101 introduced the major goals of the Army Campaign Plan (ACP) review. One of the goals from the original ACP was redesign the organization, with the proposed solution called modularity. Contained within modularity were sub-goals to: enhance deployability using smaller, tailored forces; reduce logistical challenges; increase active component combat power by 30 percent; have a 50 percent increase in a rotational pool of units; create deployable, joint-capable headquarters; standardize active and reserve component organizational designs; and ensure future-force design compatibility. Modularity goals reflect a form follows function mentality. The Army recognized a need to transform its organizations to reflect current and projected employment needs and to meet joint expeditionary requirements as called for in national strategic and joint vision documents from the late 1990s. 10 US Army War College. Department of Command, Leadership, and Management , How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook. Carlisle, PA: USAWC, 15 July 2013, figure 5-2 Army Concept Framework. CGSC copyright registration # E. F102ASRA F102RA-7 JUNE 2014

137 During this post-desert Shield/Desert Storm (DS/DS) timeframe, the Army, led by CSA GEN Eric Shinseki, approved an Army vision to transform. The original tenets of the Army s vision remain and continue to drive capability development as the Army seeks to capitalize on information-age decisioncycle speed, getting and staying ahead of the enemy s decision cycle, and harnessing the US s technological strengths to See First, Understand First, Act First, and Finish Decisively. This vision reflected the environment of that day lessons learned from DS/DS and no near-peer competitors; thus affording America a window of opportunity to modernize/re-organize. Other goals included a desire to increase joint interoperability/compatibility and the belief that the US could leverage technological advances in sensors, computers, and software to keep our decision cycles well ahead of any threat or competitor. Emphasis was placed on C2 systems, a common operational picture (COP), and pressure to reduce overseas presence. These ideas yielded recommendations for a CONUS-based, more expeditionary, and deployable force. Goals such as being able to deploy a brigade in 72 hours, a division in a week, and 5 divisions in 30 days were established. In the 1990s, the Army recognized that it had a capability gap ; it had excellent light and heavy division capabilities but lacked a middle capability able to bridge the gap between the two. The drive to build organizations to meet this doctrinal concept was reflected in its principal organizations, starting with an interim brigade organization design, known today as the Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT). In 2000, testifying to the Senate Appropriations Sub-Committee, GEN Shinseki stated: There is a shortfall today in our formation... And the shortfall I can best describe to you as in Desert Storm, 10 years ago, as Saddam began to move south; overran Kuwait City and moved to the Kuwaiti border; this Army deployed what it had and it was a brigade out of the 82 nd Airborne Division. We flew them in there and put them astride a high speed avenue of approach that moves south into Saudi Arabia. We got them in there and frankly all of us held our breaths...because if the movement south by Saddam s forces continued we knew that the arrangement of warfighting is not one we would have chosen--heavy formations fighting light infantry. For reasons we don t know, Saddam stopped. He stopped at the border and he stayed there for 6 months and that gave us time to reposition our heavy forces out of CONUS and out of Europe. And the rest of it is history. My operational requirement in describing the need for the interim brigades is to fix the problem that occurred 10 years ago [during Desert Shield, Desert Storm] Today, if we were called upon to go anywhere else other than Kuwait, where we have prepositioned significant resources, or Korea we would be in the same situation in a break-away crisis. And that is, we would fly the 82 nd light infantry assets in and then we would wait for the first heavies to arrive These interim brigades are the bridge between the light infantry and the arrival of those heavy forces. To provide what the 82 nd does not have today, mounted weapons platforms; the ability to move infantry tactically; also to provide them a modest amount of assault weaponry; This interim brigade will provide to the 82 nd Div, or any light division that goes in first, that added warfighting capability that fills the gap between the initial light infantry going in and the arrival, about 30 days later, of the first heavy elements. That s the pressure on getting a [sic] interim force stood up United States Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, Hearings Before A Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Prepared Statement of Gen. Erick K. Shinseki, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2000): , F102ASRA F102RA-8 JUNE 2014

138 Form Follows Function? See First Understand First Act First Army Vision / Concepts Finish Decisively C&C Maneuver Warfighting Functions ISR Fires Protection Sustainment (Supporting Concepts) X HHC BSB MI O O O HHC O O O O O O O O O SUPPORT 4 X 120mm MGS Interim Bde (Stryker BCT) Organizational Structure Figure F102RA GEN Shinseki proposed a three-prong organizational solution to correct the Army s force structure shortcomings. In light of a perceived 10-year minimum window of opportunity, afforded by no foreseeable threats to America, GEN Shinseki positioned the Army to make the transition from the capability it had to a capability it needed, then and for the future. The approach maintained the great legacy heavy and light forces (equipped with cold-war era Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, UH-60s, AH-64, MLRS, Patriots) in the event war broke out, and started immediate research and development to identify and incorporate new technologies for a future force (later named Future Combat System [FCS]) to replace that 1980s-fielded legacy force designed for a different fight and a different era. GEN Shinseki also advocated rapidly fielding an interim force capability to address the deployability/survivability trade-off concerns that DS/DS had demonstrated. This last prong would become the Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) equipped with off-the shelf technologies and bridging the gap between heavy and light force capabilities. This transformation also incorporated new joint and Army conceptualization. The SBCT s organizational structure reflects changed doctrinal thinking in terms of warfighting capabilities (warfighting functions). With form following function, these doctrinally identified functions drove developing new and modified organizational structures. The (then) new organizational designs incorporated the desired and organic warfighting effects: command and control (C2, signal, and intelligence)[now mission command], maneuver (combat and anti-tank), reconnaissance/surveillance/ target acquisition (RSTA)[now BfSB], fires (lethal/non-lethal and indirect/non-line-of-sight), combat support (engineer and obstacle reduction), and sustainment capabilities (brigade support battalion [BSB]). This provided a forerunner or draft thinking for our Army s current modularity as well as the Future Combat System s proposed organizational structure. 12 Command and General Staff College, Form Follows Function? , Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC, April F102ASRA F102RA-9 JUNE 2014

139 Modularity: Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) (built on Stryker concept & design) C &C ISR Maneuver Protection Fires Sustainment X Stryker BCT HHC BSB RSTA X Heavy BCT BSTB ARS BSB X Infantry BCT BSTB BSB RSTA Figure F102RA Under modularity, the Army kept the concept of warfighting functions to build the three standard BCT configurations we have today: heavy (HBCT), Stryker (SBCT), and infantry (IBCT). Standardizing the BCT s capabilities and making them interchangeable enhanced predictability in both using and resourcing (funding, manning, equipping, transporting, and fielding). While differences exist between BCT configurations in terms of number of maneuver elements (two in HBCTs and IBCTs and three in SBCTs) and type of support (forward support companies [FSCs] in HBCTs and IBCTs and consolidated brigade sustainment support in SBCTs), the warfighting functions remain the same. With this reasoning and example of changing organizational structure in mind, let s look at how those capabilities are designed and approved and by whom. Looking at the major players or agencies involved in this conversion process, we can see three major groups: the joint/joint staff level, the Army HQ/staff level, and the TRADOC level. The Key Players in Capability Development Mentioned previously when describing JCIDS, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is the principal military advisor to the SECDEF and the President and is responsible for assessing military needs from a joint warfighting perspective to ensure that the nation effectively leverages service and defense agencies capabilities while minimizing their limitations to develop greater joint interdependence. To assist him in carrying out this responsibility, he relies on and balances guidance from his boss (the SECDEF and the President) and input from his joint staff, his combatant commanders, and his joint chiefs of staff (JCS). At the joint level, the JCS is made up of the four service chiefs and the vice-chairman of the JCS (VCJCS). The CJCS also heads an organization called the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) used specifically to identify, analyze, assess, and prioritize joint military capability needs. The JROC is made up of the four vice chiefs of the services and the VCJCS (to whom the CJCS often delegates responsibility of this group). Additionally, the joint staff J8 normally attends, since he has major responsibilities for capability development at the joint staff level. The JROC provides advice to the 13 Command and General Staff College, Modularity: Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC, April F102ASRA F102RA-10 JUNE 2014

140 Chairman to enable him to better execute his responsibilities. These assessments involve improving nearterm readiness issues and long-term joint military capabilities. The overall intent is to provide more upfront guidance to ensure capabilities and systems are born joint and that there is also a focus on joint interdependency. The JCS CJCS - Military Advisors - Consult w/chairman - Provide Advice & Opinion to Chairman - Advice on request to Pres/NSC/SecDef - Recommendations to Congress CSA CNO CSAF CMC VCJCS J8 VCSA VCNO VCSAF ACMC The JROC The Joint Staff DJS VDJS ACJCS J 1 MANPOWER & PERSONNEL DIRECTORATE J 2 DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE J 3 OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE J 4 LOGISTICS DIRECTORATE J 5 STRATEGIC PLANS & POLICY DIRECTORATE J 6 COMMAND, CONTROL & COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS DIRECTORATE J 7 OPERATIONAL PLANS & INTEROPERABILITY DIRECTORATE J 8 FORCE STRUCTURE, RESOURCE, & ASSESSMENT DIRECTORATE Figure F102RA The joint staff exists to assist the CJCS in carrying out his responsibilities. As such, they lead the subordinate level working groups. Within the Joint Staff, strategic planning is primarily the responsibility of the J5 (Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate), and capabilities and resources are primarily the focus of the previously mentioned J8 (Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate). The J8 is overall responsible for the JCIDS process as well. They use input from the Joint Staff, OSD, other DOD agencies, combatant commanders, and the Services to assist in formulating policy, developing strategy, and providing force planning guidance. The primary responsibility for managing the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the evolving adaptive planning process, to include the review and approval of operations plans, resides with the Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, the J7, and the Operations Directorate, the J3. The J7 also is responsible for enhancing joint force development through war plans, doctrine, education, training, and exercises and is responsible for joint concept development and the joint capability areas management system. All of the above mentioned Joint Staff directors are members of the Global Force Management (GFM) Board. They, along with the J1, the J4, and the J6 directorates are responsible for providing direction to specific functional capability boards (FCBs), which serve as the points of entry for the JROC s actions related to the nine critical joint capability areas: force support; battlespace awareness; force application; logistics; command and control; net-centric; protection; building partnerships; and corporate management and support. Hence, all elements of the joint staff work together to fully execute JCIDS to support the Chairman. The Army integrates with the joint staff through its membership in all forums and staff elements from top to bottom. Obvious is the CSA and VCSA as members of the JCS and JROC. Likewise, since 2001 all joint staff elements have a corresponding Army staff counterpart J1/G1 through J8/G8. But this is at the command and headquarters level. Let us look a little deeper. In general, the Army makes change through a process officially called force management. Force management determines force and force structure requirements and methods of resourcing those 14 Command and General Staff College, The JCS, Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC, April F102ASRA F102RA-11 JUNE 2014

141 requirements to fulfill the Army s functions and missions. As an umbrella, or capstone term, force management includes as part of its definition the sub-developmental processes of capability development, doctrine development, organizational development, training development, leader development, force development, and materiel development generally following the DOTMLPF domains described previously. Focusing on organizational design and development in the Army, let us look a little deeper at the three main agencies involved: US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the Army G3, and the Army G8. (Note: Other Services have their equivalent of the DA G3, G8, and TRADOC, but they are not discussed here.) Capability, doctrine, organization, training, and leader development are all TRADOC responsibilities and the typical TRADOC school-type post will normally have various directorates for each of these developmental processes. TRADOC facilitates the coordination and dissemination of strategic operational concepts and plans, doctrine and training to the Defense Department, Department of the Army, Joint Staff, sister services, Congress, and external agencies and organizations. Often called the Army s architect (form follows function), TRADOC has three major missions and respective subordinate organizations to support those missions. Figure F102RA As its name describes, the first TRADOC mission is to create and orchestrate Army training and doctrine responsibilities. Leading this mission is the Deputy Commanding General-Combined Arms/Commanding General, Combined Arms Center (CAC) headquartered at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. CAC s CG serves as the TRADOC proponent for leader development; professional military education (officer, warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, and civilian); battle command and C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance); collective training; Army doctrine; and disseminating observations/lessons learned. The CAC commander also provides guidance, leadership, and command supervision to the branch centers and schools to ensure that training remains safe, relevant, and realistic and that it is executed to the Army s standards. 15 Command and General Staff College, TRADOC Command Brief, Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC, March Based on TRADOC s Webpage. F102ASRA F102RA-12 JUNE 2014

142 TRADOC recently finished re-designating elements to develop six Centers of Excellence (CoE) for each of the Army s warfighting functions (WfF). These include mission command, intelligence, maneuver, fires, protection, and sustainment. TRADOC also operates 32 centers and schools across 15 different installations with approximately 25,000 soldiers and 11,000 civilians. TRADOCs second major mission is in the area of accessions. While the G-1 assumed responsibility for Officer and Enlisted Accessions coordination functions, Cadet Command and Recruiting Command are subordinate commands of TRADOC, giving it the responsibility to recruit, educate, and train officers and enlisted personnel. The last major mission, and the one directly impacting our discussion of organizational development, is that of capability development. This mission is the responsibility of the Deputy Commanding General- Futures/Director, Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) (pronounced R-kick), headquartered at Joint Base Langley - Eustis, Virginia (note: ARCIC Headquarters recently moved from Ft. Monroe in 2012). ARCIC has several parts. First they design, develop, and integrate joint warfighting force capability requirements for the Army, using war gaming and experimenting and using concepts from a comprehensive perspective. Second, ARCIC is responsible to the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff for determining and integrating force requirements and for synchronizing and developing DOTMLPF solutions across the Army. It also synchronizes and integrates the Army s capabilities with joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities and oversees/coordinates branch schoolhouse efforts (now designated as Centers of Excellence [COEs]). A forward element is stationed in Arlington, Virginia, and acts as personal representatives of the ARCIC Director with the Army Staff (ARSTAF), Joint Staff, OSD, and others in the Washington, DC area. They maintain close working relationships with the other Services. Their direct linkage to the Joint Staff facilitates integrating concepts, experimentation, and interoperability work. The other major Army agency responsible for organizational development is the Army Staff with principal roles orchestrated by the Deputy Chief of Staff, G3 and supported by the G8. DA G3 s main responsibility is to prioritize and make recommendations among competing needs to the Army Secretary and Chief of Staff. Having primary Army staff oversight of strategy, operations, readiness, mobilization, training, simulations, integration, and Army force generation, he has one of his primary deputies responsible for force management. Force development (FD) is the purview of the DA G3 and is made up of both organizational and materiel development. It takes initial products produced by TRADOC and the Army Acquisition Corps and prioritizes/synchronizes when these components are brought together and fielded to the force in organizations. While TRADOC s ARCIC initiates and refines ideas about future army organizations in capability development, the DA G3/FM s role is to take the design through the force development (FD) process to further develop its acceptability, supportability, and executability. The DA G3/FM applies resources in terms of mission, manpower, and equipment (the components of Army organizations captured on tables of organization and equipment [TOEs]) and their resource/risk modifications known as MTOEs. Their analysis of the organizations needed to carry out directed, specified, and implied missions is known as Total Army Analysis (TAA), which produces a recommended Army organizational force structure. The Deputy Chief of Staff, G8 was activated in The Secretary of the Army directed that force development personnel and responsibilities be moved out of the DA G3 to build the DA G8 office and add to its traditional Program Assessment and Evaluation (PA&E) mission. Today the DAG8 has a significant role in force development with major responsibility for Army input to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process; analytical support of the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process by its Center for Army Analysis located at Fort Belvoir, VA; coordination with and input to the JROC; and F102ASRA F102RA-13 JUNE 2014

143 proponency for the Army FA 50 Force Developers who have major responsibilities including providing weapons systems program status for the Army and joint staffs. Army Capability Development Now that you are familiar with the major agencies, we will now focus on the actual process that the Army uses to translate vision (covered in F101) and concepts (discussed earlier as the Army Concept Framework) into actual capabilities. The Army s Force Development Process consists of five phases: develop capabilities; design organizations; develop organizational models; determine organizational authorizations; and document organizational authorizations. The primary focus of F102 is on the first two phases, which collectively, are known as capability development. The remaining three phases, collectively known as force development will be covered in more detail in the next lesson, F103 Army Force Development. Army Force Management: How the Army Runs Provide Vision (ACP) JCIDS Design Gap Analysis Organizations (URS) 2 Develop Capabilities (DOTMLPF) 1 Capability Development 3 Develop TOEs 4 Prioritize F103 Determine Authorizations & Request Resources HQDA G3 / G8 Force Development Make Stuff 5 Document Organizational Authorizations (Distribute MTOEs) US Army War College Model (simplified) A R F O R G E N Distribute People COMBAT READY UNITS Distribute Equip Cbtant Cdrs Figure F102RA-9 16 (left). As with JCIDS, the Army uses a capabilities-based approach to identify current and future capability gaps and the Army s ability to carry out required warfighting missions and functions. CBA identifies capability gaps and recommends whether the gaps can be addressed by non-materiel or materiel means, or both. The strategic inputs and the analytic considerations that drive developing joint concepts also drive and lead to the Army s capstone, operating and functional concepts in the Army Capabilities Integration and Development System (ACIDS). ACIDS serves the same function as JCIDS CBA process. The ACIDS CBA is a three-phased JCIDS process consisting of the functional area analysis (FAA), the functional needs analysis (FNA), and the functional solution analysis (FSA). The product of CBA is a materiel or non-materiel approach, with DOTMLPF-P implications. The results of the CBA become the basis for an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) and/or joint DOTMLPF Change Recommendation (DCR). In this context, the CBA results are merely a tool. Currently, the Joint Staff (JS) has streamlined the CBA process and eliminated the terms FAA, FNA, and FSA, while retaining the CBA methodology. The Army is retaining these terms 17. Below are descriptions of FAA, FNA and FSA paraphrased from ARCIC s Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) Guide. 18 The functional area analysis (FAA) is the first step of the CBA and identifies the operational tasks, conditions, and standards needed to achieve military objectives. Inputs to a FAA include national strategies, joint concepts, the Universal Joint Task List, and a broad range of possible capabilities an adversary may employ. FAA describes how the force will operate, the timeframe and environment in which it must operate, its required capabilities (in terms of missions and effects), and its defining physical and operational characteristics. The FAA s output is a description of the mission and the military problem being assessed, and a list of required capabilities and associated tasks to meet the mission objectives. The FAA output is the task list to be reviewed in the next step of the process, the functional needs analysis (FNA). 16 Command and General Staff College, Army Force Management: How the Army Runs, Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC, January CGSC copyright registration # E. 17 Army Force Management School, Capabilities Development and System Acquisition Management, Executive Primer, Feb 2013, p U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) Operations, Plans, and Policy Division (ATFC- OP) with the support of the TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC). Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) Guide, Version 2.0, 12 May 09. F102ASRA F102RA-14 JUNE 2014

144 The functional needs analysis (FNA) is the second step of the CBA. It assesses the capabilities of the current and programmed force to meet the military objectives of the scenarios chosen in the FAA. The FNA also identifies capability overlaps and/or unnecessary redundancies within capability areas. The FNA must list and prioritize a set of capability gaps that the Army should address, or conclude that no pressing gaps exist. The gaps may not include all the capability gaps uncovered, but they must be the ones that pose unacceptable risks to achieving the aims of the defense strategy. Since the leadership will ultimately decide which gaps are pervasive or important enough to commit to solving them, the suggested gaps must be directly linked to operational situations and consequences of failing to meet objectives. The primary input is the FAA and the output analysis is a list of capability gaps, redundancies, shortfalls, and an estimate of the timeframe that a solution is required. The functional solution analysis (FSA) is the last step in the CBA and is an operationally-based assessment of all potential DOTMLPF approaches to solving or mitigating one or more capability needs or gaps. It is also known as the solutions recommendations phase. Capability needs and gaps are used to develop potential solutions. Solutions can include making DOTMLPF changes, making product improvements to existing materiel or facilities, and initiating new materiel programs. In order to consider the full range of solution approaches, including transformational approaches, the best obtainable solutions are looked at as well as the optimal solutions given cost and feasibility issues. Some approaches may be weeded out, but discussion on potential approaches is not discarded before it is vetted within the Army community. Solution approaches must meet three criteria: strategically responsive and deliver approaches when and where they are needed (can be an incremental approach); feasible with respect to policy, sustainment, personnel limitations, and technological risk; and realizable the Army could actually resource and implement the approaches within the timeframe required. During FSA, the FCB searches first for a DOTMLPF solution (uses existing materiel), then looks at changes to existing materiel, and then, after these alternatives have not identified a solution, will look at a new materiel program solution. The final step in the FSA process is the post-independent analysis. In this step, the compiled analysis and information is used to determine an appropriate recommendation. F102ASRA F102RA-15 JUNE 2014

145 Figure F102RA Phase I. Develop Capabilities. Using the CBA process TRADOC ARCIC assesses the future warfighting concepts through a series of analyses, tests, experiments, and studies to gain insights across DOTMLPF. The Army s emphasis during phase one is to analyze the capability gap from their DOTMLPF perspectives and to further refine concepts. Remember, the objective is to develop a balanced and synchronized DOTMLPF solution proposal that is affordable, militarily useful, supportable, and based on mature technology. This process examines where we are, where we want to be, what risks we may face, and what it might cost. This assessment process leads to recommendations by the commanding general (CG), TRADOC to Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) on how to best fulfill the warfighting requirement. If the capability requires a change in doctrine, training, or leader development, TRADOC begins action to meet the requirement after it is validated by the HQDA Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), G3/5/7 and after it is approved by the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA). If the solution set results in a need for change in the soldier occupational specialty structure, the recommendation goes forward to HQDA DCS, G1 for action. If the required capability needs a materiel solution, TRADOC prepares the initial capabilities document (ICD) and a capability development document (CDD) and forwards them to HQDA DCS, G3/5/7 for approving the requirement through the Army Requirements Oversight Council s (AROC) validation/approval process. HQDA DCS, G8 is responsible for overseeing funding materiel solutions and for integrating DOTMLPF throughout the program s lifecycle. Warfighting concepts that require organizational solutions move to the next phase of force development. TRADOC s Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) submits DOTMLPF solution sets for Army Staff s (ARSTAF) validation and the Chief of Staff, Army s (CSA) approval via the Army Requirements 19 US Army War College. Department of Command, Leadership, and Management , How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook. Carlisle, PA: USAWC, 15 July 2013, figure 5-3, Capabilities-Based Assessment Process. CGSC copyright registration # E. F102ASRA F102RA-16 JUNE 2014

146 Oversight Council s (AROC) validation and approval process. The key output is recommending a solution set to the ARSTAF that is within the DOTMLPF domain. Phase II. Design Organizations. If the DOTMLPF solution developed in the Develop Capabilities section is a recommended organizational solution, the Design Organizations phase is initiated. In this phase, the Army addresses new organizations and modification to existing organizations usually by its centers of excellence and branch proponents and is overseen by TRADOC s Force Design Directorate (FDD). The Design Organizations phase analyzes the proposed organization for doctrinal correctness. The unit design normally focuses on the organization s doctrinal and primary mission, normally by branch/type (i.e., armor, infantry, aviation, quartermaster, etc.). This phase provides a forum for the entire Army to review the issue and links the capabilities, materiel, training, and document developers together. Organizational requirements flowing from the functional solution analysis (FSA) determine whether a new or modified organization is required on tomorrow s battlefield. Once identified, organizational requirements are documented through a series of connected and related organizational development processes and products: the unit reference sheet (URS); the Force design update (FDU) process; tables of organization and equipment (TOE); and the basis-of-issue plan (BOIP). Proposed organizational solutions require development of a unit reference sheet (URS), prepared at TRADOC proponent branch schools and centers of excellence, 20 which contains sufficient data about a unit s personnel and equipment to support Army s force design initiatives. The URS captures relevant data such as a proposed unit title, design description, mission, assignment, tasks, assumptions, limitations, mobility requirements, and concept of operations. Simplified, this information provides the skeleton or shell format of what will ultimately become a unit TOE and then an MTOE. Section one is for mission and capabilities; section two is for organizational structure (people layout); and section three is for equipment. The next step is the force design update (FDU) process. TRADOC s Force Design Division (FDD) at Fort Leavenworth shepherds the FDU process for the Army. This is where the good ideas from a variety of sources, which are staffed through the proponent centers and schools, are forwarded to FDD to ensure the proposed organizational solution is doctrinally correct, and to gain approval from the commanding general (CG) of TRADOC. The FDU is then forwarded to the CSA/VCSA for decision and implementation instructions. During the FDU process, the unit reference sheet (URS) is staffed throughout the Army. The FDU develops a consensus within the Army on new organizations and changes to existing organizations. The FDU process serves as the link between developing the URS and developing the TOE. Prior to 2007, a document called an operational and organizational (O&O) concept was prepared in this phase and was further refined into an O&O plan. In 2007, ARCIC renamed O&Os concept capabilities plans (CCPs) to better align them with joint terminology. The CCP generally entails a word picture describing the operational concept and environment and a graphical depiction often the URS of the organizational concept in terms of its organizational structure and equipment. Continued DOTMLPF analysis refines proposed solutions, marking the CCP process; it can and is applied down to battalion organizational levels. The key output is an approved organizational design and implementation instructions from the CSA or the VCSA. 20 It appears that the Army is moving away from branch-specific schools towards warfighting functions overseen by centers of excellence, i.e. the Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fires Center of Excellence, Mission Command, etc. F102ASRA F102RA-17 JUNE 2014

147 Figure F102RA Force Development Phases III-V As previously mentioned, phases III through V of the Force Development process will be covered in more detail in F103. However, the following is a brief preview so that you can have a better idea of how the Army translates concepts into resourced and authorized capabilities. Phase III. Develop Organizational Models. Phase 3 of the Army Force Development Model transitions organizational development responsibilities from the TRADOC world to the DA G3. This is the responsibility of the G3 force developer, specifically the US Army Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA) personnel who develop TOEs. The TOE is a requirements document, i.e., it is unresourced (unfunded), and is the model or definition of a fully mission-capable organization by type (branch/function). A TOE prescribes the doctrinal wartime mission, the organizational structure, and the personnel and equipment requirements for a military unit and is the model for authorization documents. While the URS provided approximates for people and equipment, the TOE details personnel and equipment requirements as accurately and completely as possible. Personnel are identified exactly by grade, skill level, military occupational specialty (MOS), quantity, paragraph, and line number. Equipment is by type, line item number, quantity, equipment readiness code (ERC), paragraph, and line 21 US Army War College. Department of Command, Leadership, and Management , How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook. Carlisle, PA: USAWC, 15 July 2013, figure 5-5, Force Design Update, CGSC copyright registration # E. F102ASRA F102RA-18 JUNE 2014

148 number (LIN). USAFMSA develops TOEs codifying the input from the URS basic design. The TOEs are the key output document from this process and are developed by USAFMSA and approved by HQDA. Phase IV. Determine Organizational Authorizations. Army Force Development, Phase 4 is Determine Authorizations. This phase is the analysis stage for determining the Army s force structure mix or how organizations (resources) are prioritized to accomplish missions and to meet guidance. Guidance for this phase includes externally-imposed resource constraints and total strengths for each component, including such things as AC/RC rebalancing, the Army Campaign Plan (ACP), the Army Posture Statement, and the Army Modernization Plan (AMP). Additionally, OSD, combatant commands, previous decisions, approved restructuring initiatives, and outside influences such as total strength, resources, lessons learned, rotational analysis, stationing (base realignment and closures BRAC), and procurement decisions are also inputs to the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process. We need the information input from all of these to move from the current force to the Army s vision of the future force. Based on guidance, TAA modifies the current force, identifies the total requirements and ultimately resources the future force. Whatever is not resourced is assumed by the Army/military as a risk. The purpose of TAA is to develop requirements and authorizations defining the force structure the Army must build, raise, provision, sustain, maintain, train, and resource. Determining organizational authorizations through TAA is an iterative, risk-benefit, trade-off analysis process, extremely complex, and involves a significant amount of staff work, man-hours and sequential decision points. The key output from the TAA process is the resulting Army force structure, forwarded to the CSA for approval. The CSA approved force is forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) with a recommendation for approval. The force contains the number and type of organizations, the fiscal year (FY), the component (AC, NG, USAR, etc.) and the action (activation, inactivation, conversion, or reorganization). TAA will be addressed further in F103. Phase V. Document Organizational Authorizations. No job is done until the paperwork is complete! Army Force Development, phase five, begins upon Army leadership s approval of the analyzed (resourced) force structure from TAA documenting the resources, people, equipment, and facilities for each unit in the Army. The United States Army Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA), the G3 s subordinate field operating agency (FOA) the same agency that manages TOEs manages the process of documenting the TAA decisions. This process results in the generation of organizational authorizations documented as modification tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) or tables of distribution and allowance (TDA). USAFMSA develops the authorization documents (MTOEs and TDAs) through The Force Management System (FMS) and enters them into FMSWeb (which you will use during F103). Authorization documents (MTOEs and TDAs) contain personnel and equipment authorizations at military occupational series (MOS), grade, line item nomenclature (LIN), equipment readiness code (ERC), and quantity level-of-detail for each organization. F102ASRA F102RA-19 JUNE 2014

149 Figure F102RA Army Force Management School, Organizational Design and Development Force Development Process, slide 14. Fort Belvoir: VA, AFMS, May F102ASRA F102RA-20 JUNE 2014

150 US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE US Army Command and General Staff School Command and General Staff Officer s Course (CGSOC) Common Core F100: Managing Army Change F102: Joint and Army Capability Development Reading F102RB: Doctrine Update Doctrine 2015 Strategy Overview In June 2011, The 37th Chief of Staff of the Army established the Mission Command Initiative that includes the Doctrine 2015 Strategy for recategorizing doctrinal publications, reducing their length and number, and enhancing collaboration and accessibility through technology. Doctrine 2015 will reduce doctrine development time and ensure doctrine catches up and keeps pace with Soldiers, leaders, and dynamic operational environments. The Doctrine 2015 Strategy introduces new publication media. The new doctrinal publication categories are Army doctrine publications (ADPs), Army doctrine reference publications (ADRPs), field manuals (FMs), and Army techniques publications (ATPs). While FMs will be retained as a publication category, their content will change. The Army tactics, techniques, and procedures (ATTPs) established in 2009 will be phased out. The milwiki program, originally established for ATTPs, now will include ATPs. Doctrine 2015 includes new digital publishing media such as video books, podcasts, mobile applications, and collaboration through social networking. Figure 1 illustrates an overview of the Doctrine 2015 Strategy (the ADRPs illustrated in figure 1 are only examples). Figure 1. Doctrine 2015 Strategy overview 1 U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Mission Command Center of Excellence. Doctrine Update 1-12, Fort Leavenworth, KS: 16 December 2011., pages 2-6. This is in the public domain. F102RB F102RB-1 JUNE 2014

151 Fifteen Army Doctrine Publications Fifteen ADPs will contain the fundamental, enduring principles that guide the actions of Army forces and explain how those principles support national objectives. ADPs will provide, in very concise language, the intellectual underpinnings of Army operational doctrine. ADPs will be Department of the Army publications printed in a small (6-inch by 9-inch) format and limited to fewer than fifteen pages. They will also be available on Army Knowledge Online (AKO). Fourteen Army Doctrine Reference Publications Fourteen ADRPs will elaborate on the fundamental doctrinal principles described in corresponding ADPs. They will not discuss specific tactics, techniques, or procedures. Every ADP except ADP 1 will have a corresponding ADRP of the same name. ADRPs will be prepared in a traditional (8½-inch by 11-inch) template and in electronic formats for the Web (on AKO) and digital devices. In its traditional format, each ADRP will be no more than 100 pages. Fifty Field Manuals Fifty FMs will describe doctrinal tactics and procedures minus techniques used by the Army to train for and conduct operations, consistent with the principles described in ADPs and ADRPs. FMs will present this knowledge using a streamlined approach that focuses on functions. FMs will not repeat information presented in ADRPs. FMs will be prepared in a traditional (8½-inch by 11-inch) template and electronic format for the Web (on AKO). In the traditional format, they will be limited to no more than 200 pages in the main body of the manual. Appendixes to FMs will contain procedures: prescriptive ways for performing tasks. Selected traditional FMs with content that is no longer considered doctrinal are being republished as training circulars and training manuals. Figure 2, page 4, illustrates Doctrine 2015 s fifty FMs (note that some titles may be truncated to fit the image). Army Techniques Publications An undetermined number of ATPs will discuss doctrinal techniques: nonprescriptive ways or methods for performing missions, functions, or tasks. ATPs will be Department of the Army publications, prepared in a traditional (8½-inch by 11-inch) template and electronic format for the Web (AKO). ATPs will not have a content length restriction but will be written concisely. They will not repeat information from other types of manuals. Organizations preparing doctrine will ensure their content aligns and integrates with the doctrine in ADPs, ADRPs, and FMs and avoids repetition. Each ATP will have a corresponding draft version on its collaborative milwiki site. The milwiki draft will allow direct and ongoing input from the field and accelerate the transfer of lessons learned into doctrine. The organization responsible for each ATP will obtain input through the milwiki, monitor contributions, determine the input to adopt into doctrine, and rapidly prepare revisions or changes to the authenticated publication. Doctrine 2015 and Unified Land Operations Briefings More information about Doctrine 2015 and unified land operations is available at < %20Management%20View.aspx>. F102RB F102RB-2 JUNE 2014

152 Figure 2. Overview of Doctrine 2015 s fifty field manuals ADP 3-0: Unified Land Operations, 10 October 2011 ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, superseded FM 3-0. ADP 3-0 is the first publication under Doctrine It introduces the Army s new operational concept, unified land operations, which replaces the full spectrum operations operational concept. ADP 3-0 defines unified land operations as how the Army seizes, retains and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution. In addition, ADP 3-0 briefly describes the strategic context within which Army forces expect to operate. It introduces the foundations of the operating concept and summarizes the tenets of Army operations. It describes the link between strategic aims and tactical actions (operational art) and a conceptual construct for organizing military effort (operations structure). Figure 3, page 5, illustrates the underlying logic of unified land operations. F102RB F102RB-3 JUNE 2014

153 Figure 3. Unified land operations underlying logic The foundations of unified land operations are decisive action, the Army core competencies, and mission command. To seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, Army forces strike the enemy in times, places, or manners for which the enemy is not prepared. Army forces conduct decisive action through the simultaneous combination of offensive, defensive, stability, and defense support of civil authorities tasks appropriate to the mission and the operational environment. The Army core competencies combined arms maneuver and wide area security are the means for balancing combat power with tactical actions and tasks associated with conducting decisive action. Mission command is a philosophy of command and a warfighting function. The mission command philosophy of command refers to the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander s intent. The mission command warfighting function develops and integrates activities F102RB F102RB-4 JUNE 2014

154 enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control. (ADP 6-0 will contain a concise description of the fundamental principles of mission command.) The tenets of unified land operations are flexibility, integration, lethality, adaptability, depth, and synchronization. Operational art is the pursuit of strategic objectives through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose. The operations structure includes the operations process (planning, preparation, execution, and assessment), the operational framework (area of operations, area of interest, deep-close-security, decisive-shaping-sustaining, and main and supporting efforts), and the warfighting functions (mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection). FM 6-0, Mission Command, 9 October 2011 In support of the Chief of Staff of the Army s Mission Command Initiative, FM 6-0, Mission Command, was published on 9 October This edition of FM 6-0 thoroughly explains the mission command philosophy of command and the mission command warfighting function. This updated manual institutionalizes the principles of mission command in doctrine to enable agile and adaptive leaders. Having been under development for some time, FM 6-0 was published consistent with the 2011 change to FM 3-0 (and before ADP 3-0) to avoid delay and to retain continuity of mission command doctrine. The 2011 change to FM 3-0 replaced the Army term and definition of command and control with the term and definition of mission command. The command and control warfighting function became the mission command warfighting function. The mission command warfighting function consists of the mission command tasks and the mission command system. In FM 6-0, mission command system replaced mission command networks and systems (which had been established in the 2011 change to FM 3-0). The 2011 change to FM 3-0 rescinded the term battle command. (See the preface of the new FM 6-0 for a summary of new, modified, and rescinded Army terms from change 1 to FM 3-0 and FM 6-0.) Under the Doctrine 2015 Strategy, ADP 6-0 and ADRP 6-0 will reorganize mission command doctrine and align the mission command principles with the doctrine recently published in ADP 3-0. By April 2012, ADP 6-0 will contain a concise explanation of the fundamental principles of mission command, and ADRP 6-0 will elaborate on those principles. ATTP 5-0.1, Commander and Staff Officer Guide, 14 September 2011 ATTP 5-0.1, Commander and Staff Officer Guide is a companion manual to the 2011 edition of FM 6-0. ATTP reinforces the fundamentals of mission command and provides a single reference for its tactics, techniques, and procedures. New material includes a chapter on staff organization and the duties and responsibilities of the staff and updated formats and instructions for building effective plans and orders. Under the Doctrine 2015 Strategy, tactics and procedures for the exercise of mission command will move from ATTP to a new FM 6-0, Mission Command and the Operations Process. The projected publication date is October The techniques associated with mission command will be published in a series of ATPs. F102RB F102RB-5 JUNE 2014

155 US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE US Army Command and General Staff School Command and General Staff Officer s Course (CGSOC) Common Core F103: Army Force Development Reading F103RA The Army Force Development Process Overview: Force development (FD) is the starting point, rationale, and underlying basis for defining the Army s force structure. The Force Development process consists of defining required military capabilities, designing force structures to provide these capabilities, and translating organizational concepts based on the threat, doctrine, technologies, materiel, manpower requirements, and limited resources into a trained and ready Army. The five phases are: a. Develop Capabilities b. Design Organizations c. Develop Organizational Models d. Determine Organizational Authorizations e. Document Organizational Authorizations This model reflects a system of systems, each of which provides an essential force integration function. More importantly, the model reflects a sequence of events and how these functions relate to each other. In this network, the processes for generating warfighting requirements, conducting research and development, and providing resources all provide input to the Force Development process. The resulting products of force development, in turn, provide the basis for acquiring and distributing materiel and acquiring, training, and distributing personnel in the Army to achieve the ultimate goal of fielding a properly structured and resourced force. Requirements generation for organizations or materiel initiate the functions that develop and document force structure. Resource requirements are brought to fruition through the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process. Phases I-II of the Force Development process were discussed in lesson F102. In this lesson, we will discuss phases III-V, as well as the Total Army Analysis (TAA) and PPBE. Phase III: Develop Organizational Models Develop Organizational Models is the third phase of the Army Force Development process. During this phase, the Army moves from an approved, general design to a more specific model for units in order to meet an identified organizational capabilities gap. In more simple terms, phase III is where the Army begins to apply doctrinal and operational-based realities to the concepts developed in phases I-II. It is also where the overall developmental responsibility transitions from capability developers, primarily TRADOC and ARCIC, to the force developers of the Army G-3/5/7. Typically, this phase begins with a force design update (FDU) decision for an organizational change. You may recall from F102 that during capability development (phases I-II), TRADOC proponents develop new designs or correct deficiencies in existing organizations by developing organizational issues, organizational concepts, and unit reference sheets (URS). The URS, along with training, doctrine and materiel considerations, is then presented to the Army senior leadership for approval through the FDU process. Following approval during the FDU process, the unit reference sheet (URS), the key input from Phase II, is sent to the United States Army Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA). F103ASRA F103RA-1 JUNE 2014

156 (Note: For a materiel change requirement, an approved capability development document (CDD) or a capability production document (CPD) can also initiate the transition between phases II and III of the Force Development process). USAFMSA then begins developing tables of organization and equipment (TOE) and basis of issue plans (BOIP) codifying the input from the FDU process (URS basic design) or the Materiel Acquisition Management process (BOIP feeder data), shown in figure 1 below. (Note: The United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) fulfills this function for special operations-specific organizations and materiel). Figure F103RA-1. 1 Develop Organizational Models. USAFMSA, then applies rules, standards, and guidance to the doctrinally correct design to produce a new organizational model (TOE), or modifies an existing TOE. The TOE is a requirements document and is the definition of a fully mission-capable organization. A TOE prescribes the doctrinal wartime mission, organizational structure, personnel, and equipment requirements for a military unit and is the model for authorization documents. TOEs also depict mission-essential wartime requirements (MEWR) for sustained combat operations and provide models for levels of organization for units when available resources dictate that all like units cannot be organized at their full wartime requirement (that is -- less than the authorized level of organization [ALO] 1). The URS provides approximate quantities for people and equipment. The approved organizational design (TOE) captures personnel and equipment requirements as accurately and completely as possible. Personnel quantities are developed and documented in the TOE by paragraph, line number, grade, military occupational specialty (MOS), skill level, and quantity. Equipment is by paragraph, line item number (LIN), type, and quantity. USAFMSA develops TOEs and BOIPs, codifying the input from the URS basic design or the BOIP feeder data. 1 US Department of the Army, Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, Placemat, Army Force Management Model (Carlisle Barracks, PA: DCLM),1 March F103ASRA F103RA-2 JUNE 2014

157 USAFMSA develops basis of issue plans (BOIP). BOIPs are requirement documents that specify the change in personnel and equipment for each organization. The BOIP specifies the addition of personnel by grade, skill level, MOS, paragraph, line number, and quantity. Equipment is specified by LIN, paragraph, line number, quantity and ERC. Also, BOIPs apply to organizations that might not be issued the primary system, but may provide support, maintenance, or command and control to the unit listed in the BOIP. TOEs and BOIPs are key output documents from this phase. Phase IV: Determine Organizational Authorizations After HQDA approves the TOE, the desired unit type enters into the resourcing phase, where the organizational model competes for resources through the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution process (PPBE). This phase provides the proper mix of organizations, resulting in a balanced and affordable force structure, which supports the strategic, and operational planning from Joint and Army guidance (figure 3). Guidance for this phase includes externally imposed constraints of dollars, total strength by component, and missions for each component. Figure F103RA-2. 2 Determine Authorizations. Figure F103RA-3. 3 QDR 2010 Army Force Structure FY US Department of the Army, Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, Placemat Army Force Management Model (Carlisle Barracks, PA: DCLM), 1 March Adapted from US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2010 (Washington, DC: DOD), F103ASRA F103RA-3 JUNE 2014

158 Figure F103RA-4. 4 Quadrennial Defense Review The guidance includes the Directed Force (figure 4a). In the 2010 QDR and in the 2011 ASPG, the Directed Force was: 73 brigade combat teams (BCT) (45 for the Active Component and 28 for the Army National Guard). However, the Army has since announced plans to cut from 8 to as many as 15 BCTs in the Active Component, while also considering the adding a maneuver battalion and engineer assets to most remaining BCTs. Additionally, with the publication of the 2014 QDR (4b) in March 2014, the resolution has changed. Only the number of divisions is now specifically mentioned, as well as end strength variations that take into account the continuation and severity of sequestration. This QDR has met with criticism from some in Congress. Army Guidance: Similar to the guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Army leadership provides guidance and direction. The Army Plan (TAP) is the principal guidance provided from the Secretary of the Army (SA) and Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) to the Army Secretariat (ARSEC), ARSTAF, commands, DRUs and FOAs for building the Program Objective Memorandum (POM), which provides the details of the resources required to operate the entire Army. The TAP provides guidance on strategy, threat data, resource priorities, and force structure guidance. Additionally, the SA, CSA, VCSA, G-3/5/7 and G-8, provide the directives and guidance to the ARSEC, ARSTAF, and commands (ACOMs, ASCC and DRUs) in form, substance, direction, and process to accomplish the missions through the Army Planning System and to develop force structure to meet OSD s guidance. To move from the current force to the future force, it is necessary to understand the inputs or guidance that modifies the current force, when they are issued, and the interrelated processes. Some of the guidance and documents influencing and directing the PPBE process is depicted in figure 5. Additional documents and guidance not displayed include AC/RC Rebalance, Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), Army Campaign Plan (ACP), Army Posture Statement (APS) and the Army Modernization Strategy. 4 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2010 (Washington, DC: FMC), F103ASRA F103RA-4 JUNE 2014

159 Figure F103RA-5. 5 PPBE Documents and Products. Based on the guidance, Total Army Analysis (TAA) is then used to modify the current force, identify the total requirements and ultimately, resource the future force. This is an extremely complicated sequence of processes and sub-processes, involving a significant amount of staff work, man-hours and sequential decision points. Once HQDA approves the TOE, the unit type then competes for resources through the Army PPBE process. This phase determines the correct mix of organizations required and resourced to meet the guidance. The TAA is what moves the PPBE process from planning to programming, providing the Program Objective Memorandum Force (POM FORCE) as input to the G-8, Program Analysis and Evaluation Division (PA&E). TAA and PPBE are the key processes for this phase. Army TAA Total Army Analysis (TAA) occurs during the fourth phase of the Force Development process, Determine Organizational Authorizations. TAA determines the proper mix of organizations required and resourced that comprise a balanced and affordable force to meet the guidance issued by the President, Congress, OSD, or Army leadership. TAA develops the total requirements for peacetime, wartime, rotational force and DOD tasks, and subsequently the authorizations defining the force structure that the Army must build, raise, provision, sustain, maintain, train, and resource to meet OSD or Army guidance, combatant commanders requirements, and force structure initiatives. The tables of organization and equipment (TOE), which were approved by HQDA during the previous FD phase, compete for authorizations that are broken into officer, warrant officer, and enlisted spaces. TAA first determines the total requirements (the number of units, by type one hundred percent manned and 5 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Staff Officer s Training Course, Introductory Brief to PPBE (Washington, DC: HQDA), 13 November 2013, slide 47. F103ASRA F103RA-5 JUNE 2014

160 equipped). It continues by determining the force to be resourced based on priorities, budgetary constraints and guidance. The resulting force structure is the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) force, the force that is recommended for resourcing to OSD in the Army s POM submission. TAA takes into account force guidance and resource availability to produce a balanced and affordable force structure. It determines and/or verifies the affordability, supportability, and the ability to execute the organizational model. TAA continues to evolve. The DOD and Army transformation efforts required more agile, responsive, concise processes to provide the Army leadership more timely and flexible force structure options. The Army Staff (ARSTAF) continues to refine the TAA process, shortening the process time and initiating selected analyses (i.e., the Modular Support Force Analysis, the Force Management Review, and the Institutional Army Requirements Review). Based on guidance from Army leadership, the process was modified in several ways. The process cycle has been reduced to ten (10) months instead of the Army s regulatory requirement of two years. TAA now develops and analyzes force structure options versus a single force structure recommendation. Video teleconferencing (VTC) has been incorporated to speed up the decision making cycle. Finally, the Senior Leaders of the Department of the Army (SLDA) have been incorporated as a collective review forum to assist in senior leader decision-making. TAA is the basis for the developing the Army s POM and for establishing the POM Force. The Army develops the POM force to achieve an affordable and competent force capable of best supporting national objectives and combatant commanders warfighting needs. This force supports the joint strategic planning conducted by the Joint Staff, combatant commanders, and the Services at the transition between planning and programming. TAA determines the total requirements to meet NMS, DPPG, TAP and other guidance. TAA resources the total requirements based on Army leadership directives, written guidance, risk analysis, and input from the combatant commanders. The resulting force structure is the POM Force, forwarded to OSD with recommendations for approval. The specified combat forces and the echelons above brigade (EAB) support forces determined during the TAA process are referred to as operating forces. Determining the size and the content of the Army s force structure is an iterative, risk-benefit, trade-off analysis process. TAA determines the force for each program year. It has Army-wide participation, culminating in Senior Leaders of the Department of the Army s (SLDA) decision and approval. Process: TAA has two phases: Capability Demand Analysis and Resourcing and Approval. Capability Demand Analysis (Phase I) identifies force structure requirements. It begins with guidance, which is initially in the form of outputs from the DOD Analytic process, which provides all services, including the Army, with analytical baselines, packages comprising results from specific scenario(s), and the corresponding concept of operation. A quantitative analysis is accomplished by the Center for Army Analysis (CAA), which uses multiple models and computer systems to analyze different aspects of each scenario. In short, all aspects of numerous conflict scenarios are wargamed through CAA-facilitated simulations to ensure that the force meets all potential requirements. Next, Council of Colonels or general officer-level forums review and approve the warfighting capability requirements portrayed by the CAA-facilitated modeling efforts as a fully structured and resourced force. Additionally, these forums reach agreement on the force structure demands supporting homeland defense, Army support to other Services, and foundational activities and the appropriate level of inclusion of contractor support, use of strategic partners, joint capabilities, and other risk mitigation variables. This helps to appropriately scope the capability demands within end strength, ensuring a focus on shaping the Army and not on sizing the Army. The GO-level review recommends approving the capability demands to the Senior Leaders of the Department of the Army (SLDA), which consists of the F103ASRA F103RA-6 JUNE 2014

161 Secretary of the Army (SA), the Under Secretary of the Army (USA), the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), and the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA). The SLDA reviews and approves the capability demands generated through the computer models and analysis recognized within the required force structure. The SLDA review and approval is the transition to Phase II of TAA (Resource Determination). After the SLDA reviews and approves the capability demands, DAMO FMF compares data files (MATCH report) between the SLDA approved capability demands and the current program force from the most recent force review point (usually the Master Force (MFORCE)). The MATCH (not an acronym) report identifies the difference between the capability demands and the programmed force in order to determine the projected unit deficits (COMPO 4) for future programming discussions and issue formulation. Figure F103RA-6. 6 Phase I: Capabilities Demand Analysis Quantitative Analysis. Resourcing and Approval is the second phase of TAA is. This phase consists of two separate activities: qualitative analysis and capability-based assessment. 6 US Department of the Army, Army Force Management School, Army Force Management Course, Lesson FS04, TAA (Fort Belvoir, VA), July 2013, slide 50. F103ASRA F103RA-7 JUNE 2014

162 Figure F103RA-7. 7 Phase II: Resourcing and Approval (MTOE/TDA). Qualitative analysis is conducted to develop the initial POM force, within total strength guidance, for use in developing the POM. This starts with a resourcing conference, which is held in two forums: a Council of Colonels (CoC) and a General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC). The CoC level provides initial analysis and review of the CAA developed force and allows the ARSTAF, commands, and other support agencies to provide input and to propose changes. AC and RC mix and end strength issues are also identified, as well as potential bill payers and claimants. The GOSC is a series of two- and three-star committees that review and approve the issues and recommendations made by the CoC, as well as proposing recommendations for those issues that the CoC was unable to resolve. These recommendations are then forwarded to the Senior Leadership of the Army for ultimate approval. The recommended force structure options are briefed through the Director, Force Management, through the G-3/5/7 to the senior leadership of the Army. They scrutinize, review, and evaluate the options. At the conclusion of the briefs to the senior leadership of the Army, the CSA decides the force structure recommended for inclusion in the Army s POM submission to OSD. The objectives of the TAA are: Determine and justify a POM force, aligned with the QDR, DPPG and TAP. The POM force is that force projected to be raised, provisioned, sustained, and maintained within resources available during the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). Provide analytical underpinnings for the POM force for use in dialogue among Congress, OSD, Joint Staff, combatant commanders, and the Army. Assess the impacts of plans and potential alternatives for materiel acquisition, the production base, and equipment distribution programs on the projected force structure. Assure continuity of force structure requirements within the PPBE process. Provide program basis for structuring organizational, materiel, and personnel requirements and projected authorizations 7 US Department of the Army, Army Force Management School, Army Force Management Course, Lesson FS04, TAA (Fort Belvoir, VA), July 2013, slide 61. F103ASRA F103RA-8 JUNE 2014

163 The product of the TAA and POM processes is the approved and funded force structure for America s Army. The resourced TAA force represents the force structure for POM development, capturing all components (Active, Reserve, host nation) and type unit code (TYPCO: MTOE, Augmentation TDA, or TDA) requirements through the end of the POM years (MFORCE). The POM force meets the projected mission requirements within anticipated end strength and equipment levels. The final output should result in an executable POM Force. The Army forwards the POM Force to OSD with a recommendation for approval. The approved force structure is divided for resource management purposes into components: the Active Army (COMPO 1), the ARNG (COMPO 2), and the USAR (COMPO 3). Three other components direct host-nation support (COMPO 7), indirect host-nation support (COMPO 8), and logistics civil augmentation (COMPO 9) comprise force structure offsets. COMPO 7 and 8 are guaranteed by hostnation support agreements. COMPO 9 is an augmentation, not an offset, and represents contracts for additional support and services to be provided by domestic and foreign firms augmenting existing force structure. COMPO 4 represents the unresourced units. COMPO 4 units, mostly CSS units, are a part of the Army s required force structure, but were deliberately not resourced so that available resources could be applied to higher priority peacetime force structure initiatives and other Army programs. This information is communicated to the Army though the Army Structure Memorandum (ARSTRUC). The ARSTRUC memorandum provides a historical record of the Army s Senior Leadership s final decisions made during the TAA process. The ARSTRUC memorandum, produced by DCS, G-3/7 (FM), is directive in nature, providing the commands results at the standard requirements code (SRC) level of detail. The ARSTRUC memorandum marks the end of the TAA process. POM force structure that is identified as needed but not feasible during the current TAA is included in the force guidance inputs of the next TAA cycle. Army PPBE The Army PPBE s main objective is to establish, justify, and acquire the fiscal and manpower resources needed to accomplish the Army s assigned missions in executing the defense strategy. One important thing to keep in mind is the difference between DOD s PPBE process and the Army s PPBE process. DOD s process is the overarching system that rationalizes and attempts to ultimately integrate the submissions from the Services and defense agencies into one defense budget. The overarching objective of the Army PPBE process is to establish, justify, and acquire the fiscal and manpower resources needed to accomplish its specifically assigned missions according to the National Military Strategy. Army PPBE process objectives are: To provide essential focus on departmental policy and priorities for Army functional activities during all phases of PPBE. Through planning, to size, structure, man, equip, and train the Army force to support the national military strategy. Through programming, to distribute projected manpower, dollars, and materiel among competing requirements per Army resource allocation policy and priorities. Through budgeting, to convert program decisions on dollars and manpower into requests for congressional authorization and appropriations. Through program execution, to o Apply resources to achieve approved program objectives. o Adjust resource requirements based on execution feedback. Through budget execution, manage and account for funds to carry out approved programs. F103ASRA F103RA-9 JUNE 2014

164 Key Players in Army PPBE The ASA (FM&C) is responsible for the administering all phases of Army PPBE as well as overseeing the PPBE process and developing and issuing Army-wide PPBE policy. The ASA (FM&C) also serves as appropriation sponsor for all appropriations (funds) except ARNG and AR appropriations. The Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), G-3/5/7 manages the PPBE planning phase co-chairs the Planning Program Budget Committee (PPBC) with the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPAE), and Director of the Army Budget (DAB). The G-3/5/7 also guides the work of program evaluation groups (PEG) on planning and readiness matters to include requirements determination, prioritization, and the integration of security cooperation issues per the Army International Activities Plan as well as assesses capabilities, deficiencies, and risks of the POM force at the end of the current POM. The Deputy Chief of Staff G-8 provides the HQDA focal point for program development, materiel integration, and assessments like the QDR. Along with the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA(ALT)), the G8 prepares the Research, Development, and Acquisition Plan (RDA Plan), which is represented by the database for the FYDP augmented for the Extended Planning Period (EPP). The G-8 also prepares the Army Modernization Strategy and helps prepare Army input to OSD's Defense Program Projection. Finally, the G-8 serves as proponent of the PEG for equipping. Figure F103RA-8. 8 Army PPBE Overview and Objectives. Summary: The PPBE System is a tool used by the Secretary of Defense to ensure that his goals and those of the President are implemented. PPBE is also used to create a joint Defense Program one that balances the capabilities of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. The system provides financial checks and balances and an opportunity for programs and Services to compete for resources. Finally, the decision making process is designed to be transparent; internal justifications are used to validate programs to Congress. Phase V: Document Organizational Authorizations This is the fifth phase of the Force Development process. After Army leadership approves the resourced force structure, the United States Army Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA) manages the process of documenting the decision(s); USAFMSA develops the authorization documents through The Force Management System (FMS). This process results in the generation of organizational authorizations documented as modification tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) or tables of distribution and allowance (TDA). 8 US Department of the Army, Army Force Management School, Army Force Management Course, Lesson FS09, Army PPBE and Planning (Fort Belvoir, VA), January 2013, slides 14 and 19. F103ASRA F103RA-10 JUNE 2014

165 Figure F103RA-9. 9 Army Force Management Model, PPBE and Planning. The programmed and budgeted force is documented to unit identification code (UIC) level of detail, to ensure that organizations may place demands on the functional systems of the Army. Upon receiving the Army Structure (ARSTRUC) memorandum, components and commands prepare to conduct a forum called the command plan (CPlan) (figure 7). The command plan is the annual force management process designed to account for and document force structure decisions and directives from the Army leadership, including those changes submitted by Office of the Secretary of Defense and the commands and outlined in congressional guidance. Annually, DCS, G 3/5/7 (DAMO FMP) will publish the command plan guidance memorandum which provides key force structure guidance and milestones for the command plan submission and describes the actions that must be accomplished. The command plan results in the approval of the Army Master Force. The Army Master Force will adjust current force structure, establish the programmed force structure, and will align force structure requirements and authorizations, military, civilian, and contractor man-year equivalent with budget data and decisions. It will also provide manpower, personnel and equipment requirements, and authorizations at the grade, MOS, personnel occupational specialty code for civilians, and geographic location, UIC, LIN, and quantity level of detail through authorization documents. G-37/FM initiates the documentation of the force structure decisions by issuing the Command Plan Guidance to the ARSTAF, commands and USAFMSA. USAFMSA builds the draft MTOEs and TDAs and distributes them to the ARSTAF and commands for review. G-37/FM hosts the CPlan in the Pentagon to identify the differences between the proposed force structure changes, documentation of the decisions and the Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS) database. SAMAS is the force structure database of record and accounting system for all current and planned MTOE and TDA units in the Total Army. It produces the annual master force and directs the creation of authorization documents. After a final review of the documents, the FMSWeb documents are electronically reconciled with the SAMAS database (force structure and budget files) through the Automatic Update Transaction System (AUTS). 9 US Department of the Army, Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, Placemat Army Force Management Model (Carlisle Barracks, PA: DCLM),1 March F103ASRA F103RA-11 JUNE 2014

166 Figure F103RA MTOE Documentation Process. Once reconciled, the authorization documents are then sent to the Director, Force Management (FM) for review and approval. At this point we are documenting resources, personnel, equipment, and facilities for each unit in the Army for the next 18 months. Finally, the Structure and Composition System (SACS) computes the personnel and equipment requirements and authorizations based on integrating the input from BOIPs, TOEs, SAMAS, and FMSWeb. SACS computes personnel (PERSACS) and equipment (LOGSACS) requirements and authorizations for the next ten years, comparing existing inventory of personnel and equipment to the future authorization of personnel and equipment. After approval of the resourced force structure by Army leadership, USAFMSA manages the process of documenting the decision(s). This process results in organizational authorizations documented as MTOE or TDA. The programmed and budgeted force is documented to UIC level of detail to ensure that organizations may place demands on the functional systems of the Army. The Force Management System (FMS) maintains MTOE and TDA data. FMSWeb is an Internet/Webbased application that provides an interface for FMS data. It also provides an interface for some SAMAS data as well. FMS data includes BOIPs, TOE, MTOE and TDA. All documents are reviewed and staffed on FMSWeb. Summary The five phases of the Force Development (FD process) are the start point, rationale and underlying basis for defining the Army s force structure. The Force Development process consists of defining required military capabilities, designing force structures to provide these capabilities, and translating organizational concepts based on the threat, doctrine, technologies, materiel, manpower requirements, and limited resources into a trained and ready Army. Phases III-V allow the Army to determine what type unit is needed to meet a capability gap, determine what level of resourcing is feasible for them, and documents those units in terms of requirements and authorizations, respectively, incorporating the PPBE and TAA process to do so. 10 US Army, Army Force Management School, Army Force Management Course, E05, Authorization Documents (Fort Belvoir, AFMS), by Sullivan, May 2014, slide 47. F103ASRA F103RA-12 JUNE 2014

167 US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE US Army Command and General Staff School Command and General Staff Officer s Course (CGSOC) Common Core F103: Army Force Development Reading F103RB Feb. 24, Gen. Odierno AUSA Winter Symposium 1 The position of strength that the Army has is that everyone has seen over the last ten years what our Army has done, and is capable of. Lots of people want to put the Army in a box. They want to say this is what the Army can do -- they can do this little thing over here. I am here to tell them that the Army is probably the most flexible, adaptable organization across all the services, and that we can respond and be capable anywhere any time to support any Combatant Commander. That is what this is about today. For over 236 years, the Army has overcome many challenges, but it always continues to answer our Nation's call. Today we face another challenge -- a global financial crisis on top of an already uncertain and increasingly complex environment in which we operate. As all of you are aware, probably better than I, the United States confronts a very large deficit problem, and we also know that sustaining the strength of our economy is a national security issue. I want to make it clear to everyone that the development of this Budget was difficult. Sometimes as we go out and we talk about the fact that we are going to make this work, and yes we are okay, that is true, but it was difficult. I define it as we are on the razor's edge right now in terms of the Army budget as I look over the next five years. That razor's edge is about balancing end-strength, readiness and modernization. We have to continue to balance those. The choices that the Secretary and I have to make will always be in balancing those three so we can still maintain whatever the size of the Army that is left as the best trained, best equipped force in the world today. We will never walk away from that. I will say that before we did this budget, Secretary McHugh and I participated in an intensive and inclusive strategy review with the senior DoD leadership. What is lost on a lot of people - in my mind - is that when I go around, everyone asks if I am worried about air-sea battle and if I am worried about this and that. Air-sea battle is a continued Sea Op. It is a way to do certain things. It is certainly not the new DoD strategy. The resulting strategic guidance that we articulate has several primary missions for the Joint Force that clearly require a strong, versatile, expeditionary Army to meet our Nation's security needs. Among them are deterring and defeating aggression, conducting irregular warfare, supporting counter terrorism, defending the Homeland, and providing support to civil authorities. Going forward, you all know that our immediate priority is to meet our current commitments in Afghanistan and elsewhere by ensuring a highly trained, well-equipped, well-manned force. Our Conventional and Special Operations Forces continue combat operations as part of Operation Enduring Freedom, while simultaneously developing the Afghan security forces. And I will tell you I just spent yesterday up at Special Operations Command; we had the first Army- Special Operations Command Talks. Why do we do this? Admiral McCraven and I have worked for several years together in the Middle East, and we realize how important it is to sustain a long term relationship between Conventional and Special Operations Forces. They cannot operate without the support of the Army. And there are many missions that they know they must go forward with that will require support from the Army. It is important for us to understand that. Our formations continue to stand watch on the Korean Peninsula, the Balkans and the Middle East. We have led relief efforts for many natural disasters at home and abroad, domestically and internationally. Our Corps of Engineers is preserving and rebuilding infrastructure and critical services, and we continue to provide vital institutional 1 General Odierno, Feb. 24, Gen. Odierno AUSA Winter Symposium, US Department of the Army, News Archives, February 28, Transcript of speech given by General Odierno. (Accessed 6 June 2014.) Gen Odierno_AUSA_Winter_Symposium/ F103ASRB F103RB-1 JUNE 2014

168 and executive agent support across the globe that significantly enables the Joint Force. That is an important statement. The other services, the interagencies are dependent on the Army to provide support to their actions. So as we look to the Army of 2020, as a part of Joint Force 2020, how do we want to shape it? Today, we are an Army that is globally engaged in 150 countries on six of seven continents. We have over 95,000 Soldiers deployed in support of operations; another 96,000 Soldiers forward stationed. Our strategic posture is a testament to our flexibility and adaptability as well as our unmatched credibility as the best trained, best equipped, and best led land force in the world. Moving forward, our Army's primary purpose is steadfast and resolute: to fight and win our Nation's wars. But we all know that the Army must be able to do much more than that. Today, we require an Army that is adaptive and innovative, flexible and agile, integrated and synchronized, lethal and discriminate. Even more critical in today's complex and uncertain environment, the Army is the decisive arm of the Joint Force in a broad range of missions. Historically the Army has been focused on a specific set of needs, but these needs and the means in which they are resourced have changed. So we must fundamentally change how we do business. As we keep adding rocks to our Soldiers' rucksacks, all leaders must remain cognizant over time. Everyone's load can get too heavy and cause permanent wear and tear. So it is a good idea to pause for introspection, which is exactly what our Army is doing now, although we remain in contact. As we transition, we will change how we organize, man, equip, and train our Force to be more responsive for the Combatant Commanders so we can better enable the Joint Force of This requires us to review a number of areas and adapt them in order to remain the most capable, most lethal, most dominant land force in the world. I will discuss a few of these, including force structure, alignment of forces and headquarters, force generation, and modernization. By the end of FY17, the Army will decrease its end strength from 570,000 to 490,000 in the Active Army; from 358,000 to 353,500 in the National Guard; and from 206,000 to 205,000 in the Army Reserve. Actually, the Army Reserve has already reduced themselves to 205,000. But it is not just about the numbers themselves; it is about reducing our end-strength over a deliberate and gradual ramp through the end of FY17. Why do I want this? This allows me to ensure I can take care of our Soldiers and Families and Department of Army Civilians. We can continue to meet our contingency commitments, to include Afghanistan. And we can remain responsive for unforeseen contingencies and facilitate reversibility if necessary in this uncertain environment. As recently announced, this decreased end strength will result in at least eight fewer Active Component Brigade Combat Teams, going from 45 to 37. The first two BCT reductions occur in Europe, where the 170th BCT will inactivate in FY13, and the 172nd Brigade Combat Team will inactivate in FY14, both as they return from deployments in Afghanistan. Decisions on the remaining Brigade Combat Team reductions have not yet been made. As we drawdown and apply the lessons from ten years of sustained combat, and as we look forward to what characteristics and capabilities the force must be, I have asked TRADOC to lead an aggressive and extensive analysis of the Brigade Combat Team design. Modularity has served our Army very well, and we will not walk away from it. However, we now have the time and the opportunity to study and recommend changes to our Brigade Combat Team organization, and the execution and oversight of the modular Brigades. It is critical that this vital war fighting formation remains dominant against the evolving hybrid threats in tomorrow's operational environments. Using a combination of warfighter assessments, sufficiency analysis, and combat modeling, TRADOC is informing critical decisions about force design in the future. This rigorous work included Brigade Commander seminars, study of future demands and risk, and included over 6,500 hours of simulated operations. We will continue this analysis over the next couple of months before making any recommendations to the Secretary of the Army on Brigade restructuring. However, the early feedback clearly indicates that significant flexibility and capability would be gained by adding a third maneuver F103ASRB F103RB-2 JUNE 2014

169 Battalion and more engineers to our Brigade Combat Teams. If a decision is made to add a third maneuver Battalion and some more engineers, it would cause us to reduce further our Brigade Combat Teams from a planned number of 37 down to perhaps 32 or 33 Brigade Combat Teams in the Active Component. However, such a reduction represents an investment in the overall number of Battalions and Combat formations while reducing overhead with Brigade level headquarters. Again, there have not yet been any decisions made by the Secretary but these are foreseeable possibilities based on lessons after a decade of war, with deliberate consideration to the characteristics and capabilities needed for Joint Force 2020 so that we can support the Combatant Commanders. In terms of our force structure, we will continue to grow Army Special Operations Forces up to 35,000 of our end-strength. We have made incredible gains in the integration and synchronization between Conventional and Special Operations Forces over the past ten years. We intend to build on this relationship and institutionalize Army support to counter-terrorism operations, counter WMD proliferation, and the wide array of tasks associated with building and improving partner capacity. This tremendous synergy affords the Joint Force and Combatant Commanders with significantly enhanced capabilities. Just as critically, we will also increase our aviation assets, not only to support the Army, but because they provide much needed support to the Special Operations Force community, the Joint Force, and importantly, our international partners. Following the end of our mission in Iraq, with the continued transition in Afghanistan, we now have an opportunity to reinforce our support to all the Combatant Commanders. We are an Army that is reaching out to make sure that we are an integral part of all of our Combatant Commanders, specifically geographical, but also to support the other Combatant Commanders as well. Looking at how we are going to regionally align forces and headquarters from Corps level and below, we will work with them to develop a series of engagement tools that include a combination of assigned and rotational forces to conduct training and multi-lateral exercises, as well as develop partner capacity, provide planning capability for future contingency operations. I see this as a model of how we will be doing things in the future, using a tailored approach that will help us create a more expeditionary Army, which will add flexibility and predictability for the COCOMs and with our sister services across the Joint Force. We will also leverage our pre-positioned equipment sets for both contingencies and multi-lateral training, which requires a comprehensive review of our Army pre-positioned stock strategy. Additionally we are re-looking at our Army service Component Commands to better fit the unique requirements of their areas of responsibility to support planning and provide joint support. This includes establishing closer working relationships between Army Service Component Commands, our Corps, and Division Headquarters for contingency planning and theater security cooperation execution. Finally there needs to be a greater Army representation in key positions at COCOM headquarters that can provide expertise on how Army capabilities can better support the Joint Force. We will adapt how we conduct force generation through the Army Force Generation process. We implemented the current Army Force Generation process several years ago in order to meet our requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan, to reduce our OPTEMPO, to measure OPTEMPO, to understand the impact it had on the Force, and to ensure that those who are deploying were manned, equipped and trained appropriately. It should not come as a surprise that we are approaching another point of transition since we are no longer deploying forces to Iraq and continue to transition in Afghanistan. So we must adapt Army Force Generation to align with DoD strategic priorities and guidance. I envision a progressive readiness model for most units, but there are some high-demand, low-density units that may be better served by a constant readiness model. The majority of the units will progress though readiness levels. We will adjust the process where Active and Reserve Component units advance through a reset phase, a training phase, and an available phase, and prioritize their training and planning in support of a specific Combatant Command and mission sets. In our Active Component, I want to align the future Force Generation Model along Command tours between 24 and 27 months long. Command would be rotated at the conclusion of the available period to F103ASRB F103RB-3 JUNE 2014

170 coincide with the beginning of the reset period. Taking advantage of a more seasoned Reserve Component Force, we will also adapt ARFORGEN to sustain an Operational Reserve. The recent combat experience of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve in Iraq and Afghanistan has significantly increased their capabilities and readiness. The challenge is how to sustain Reserve Component proficiency, given the biggest constraint, which is time to train. This requires us to carefully manage notification, mobilization, and deployment timelines and work closely with Reserve leaders to leverage their unique skill sets and advantages for certain missions. To prevent conflict, we must maintain credibility, which is partly based on modernization. In this regard, we must develop and field both a versatile and affordable mix of equipment that enables us to succeed in the full range of missions, while maintaining a decisive advantage over potential adversaries. We are better integrating our acquisition strategy with requirements process through capability portfolio reviews to ensure our modernization efforts are affordable, timely, and achievable in line with technological development. Additionally, we are looking to develop more efficient testing and evaluation strategies by eliminating redundancies. We want to develop incremental modernization capabilities that allow us to deliver new and improved capabilities by leveraging mature technologies, shortening developmental times, planning growth potential, and acquiring the right quantities when needed. We seek to increase buying power by using this approach in combination with better business deals, better contracts, and increased competition. The equipment requested in the President's FY13 budget strikes a balance between current and future needs; provides the basis for affordable equipping strategy over time; and takes into account strategy over time. It takes into account Army requirements and priorities. In developing this request, the Army made difficult decisions to shift funds previously programmed for future capabilities to current needs. With this year's budget, we did not lose any major programs, but many were slowed down. However, our modernization priorities were preserved and remain the Network, the Ground Combat Vehicle, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, our Soldier Systems, and Aviation. Of course, all of this depends on superior leadership. I believe that great leaders can lead change and solve any problem, and we are blessed with an abundance of them. We ask much more of our junior leaders today than we ever have. And I am absolutely committed to their development for the challenges in today's strategic environment, but most importantly, in the growing complexity of the environment they will face in the future. General McArthur in 1962 said, "Through all this welter of change, your mission remains fixed, determined, inviolable. It is to win our wars." Exactly fifty years later, his words could not be more true. America's Army is indeed in transition, yet we remain the Nation's force of decisive action. The strength of our Nation is our Army; the strength of our Army is our Soldiers; the strength of our Soldiers is our families; and that is what makes us Army Strong. F103ASRB F103RB-4 JUNE 2014

171 US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE US Army Command and General Staff School Command and General Staff Officer s Course (CGSOC) Common Core F100: Managing Army Change F104: Developing Materiel Capabilities (Acquisition) Reading F104RA Materiel Development and Acquisition System Introduction This lesson explores the continuously changing materiel development and acquisition system used by DOD and the services to extend and enhance the capabilities and protection of our fighting men and women. Up to this point in F100, we have introduced you to aspects of national vision and strategic guidance (F101), two of DOD s primary decision support systems (F102 [JCIDS] and F103 [PPBE]) and their impact on Army force management. In F104, we address DOD s last major support system: the Defense Acquisition Management System and the Army s role in it. Linkage to JCIDS As discussed in F102, sometimes a capability gap that is identified through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) or through the Army s version (i.e., ACIDS) can be filled in one of two ways. The first is designated the non-materiel solution that may include the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) domains and/or policy changes across the Army. Using this process, recommendations are considered first in all other domains except materiel (i.e., potentially the most costly, and would take the longest time to execute within our current acquisition guidelines). This non-materiel solution may include things like: changing, editing, updating, or publishing new policies or doctrine (D); organizational changes in an MTOE driven by equipment, personnel, and/or new mission and capabilities requirements (O); reorganizing training and/or educating DOD personnel differently (T); sustaining skills that exist or developing new skills in our leaders (L); the requirement for increases in manpower based on new weapons systems or adding or reassigning personnel to new mission areas (P); and moving or realigning facilities to support increased billeting and training sites (F). 1 These changes, in many cases, involve more than one domain, and are often referred to as DCRs or DOTMLPF Change Recommendations. If non-materiel solution recommendations are inadequate, then materiel solution recommendations (known as materiel change recommendations, or MCRs) are made in the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) phase in one of three listed areas in terms of fielding uncertainty (from low to high): Development and fielding of information systems (or similar technologies with high obsolescence rates) or evolution of the capabilities of existing information systems; Evolution of existing systems with significant capability improvement (this may include replacing an existing system with a newer more capable system, or simple recapitalization); and, Breakout systems that differ significantly in form, function, operation, and capabilities from existing systems and offer significant improvement over current capabilities or transform how we accomplish the mission. 2 1 US Department of the Army, Army Force Management School, CDMD 05, JCIDS CBA (Fort Belvoir, VA: ARMS), January 2011, slide US Department of the Army, Army Force Management School, CDMD 05, JCIDS CBA (Fort Belvoir, VA: AFMS),January 2011, slide 16. F104ASRA F104RA-1 JUNE 2014

172 In some cases, capability gaps can be filled best by a materiel solution (the M in DOTMLPF) identified during the Functional Solution Analysis (FSA) stage of analysis (figure F104AA-1 below). Figure F104AA-1. JCIDS CBA. 3 When this occurs, there are three FSA criteria that the services seek: Solution approaches are affordable; that is, DOD could actually resource and implement the approaches within the timeframe required; Solution approaches are feasible, both from the standpoint of policy, sustainment, personnel limitations, and technology risk; and, Solution approaches are strategically responsive; that is, they deliver solutions when and where they are needed. 4 Once the materiel solution decision occurs, there is an effort to minimize the amount of research and development required (cost and time) to bring a system on line and to field it. There are various ways to fill a materiel need without developing and fielding a new system. The three methods that minimize the amount of research and development have their advantages and disadvantages: 1. Use or modify preexisting, previously developed US or allied equipment (government off-theshelf [GOTS]) or pre-existing commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products. Pros: This can be the least expensive and fastest way to fill a need because little or no science and technology (S&T) and research and development (R&D) work and funding needs to be used. There are numerous programs to modify existing government systems, such as modification work orders 3 US Department of the Army, Army Force Management School, CDMD 05, JCIDS CBA (Fort Belvoir, VA: AFMS), January 2011, slide US Department of the Army, Army Force Management School, CDMD 05, JCIDS CBA (Fort Belvoir, VA: AFMS), January 2011, slide 14. F104ASRA F104RA-2 JUNE 2014

173 (MWOs), system enhancement programs (SEP), preplanned product improvements (P3I), and block improvements, to name a few. Cons: Limited capability to get exactly what you need or want; you take what is there. Additionally, off-the-shelf equipment has often not been analyzed via TRADOC ARCIC DOTMLPF methodology or integrated with the rest of the Army s equipment, so the resulting system may not be as seamless, maintainable, or sustainable as one would like it to be. (See figure F104AA-2, Examine System Modifications First, which is on next page.) 2. A cooperative materiel development with one or more allied nation(s) is explored. Pros: This enables sharing expensive R&D costs, provides for potential mass production savings through buying in bulk, potentially creates greater future sustainment capabilities (availability of parts), and increases future allied interoperability. Cons: Decision-making ability over the program is much more complex, and is often adversely impacted by national strategic interests, international procurement laws, and international politics. 3. A joint-component development program shared by one or more Services. Pros: Any new materiel development that can be used by more than one service will prevent needless capability redundancy and hence will reduce costs. The service will procure exactly what they wanted based on a well-written request for proposal and follow-on contractual documentation. Cons: Each service has differing environmental, and often completely valid, doctrinal, or procedural needs to which a one-size fits all or a jack-of all trades approach to equipment production is not suitable. Aside from this, joint decision-making also involves multiple levels of decision makers in multiple services that have to agree and to compromise. An example of this is the delay in approval, and near cancellation, of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program caused by differing interservice requirements between the US Army and US Marine Corps. 4. Single-component unique development. Pros: Decision-making and control over requirements and desired capabilities is often easier and is more streamlined than other approaches. Cons: The entire weapon system/equipment life-cycle costs (S&T, R&D, production, operating, and sustaining) are borne by one service. In addition, assuming a lower quantity of vehicles/systems is being purchased by a single-component, this single service will probably pay a higher cost for each item. Regardless of the hierarchy of preference approach taken, all acquisition programs are evaluated and are assessed using key aspects or considerations including the urgency of the requirement; the maturity of key technologies; interoperability, supportability, and affordability of alternative acquisition approaches; and the cost and benefit of evolutionary versus single-step approaches. As an example, the Army s Future Combat Systems program floundered and was cancelled because of its inability to demonstrate the maturity of key technologies as well as concerns about its ability to control costs during development prior to fielding. F104ASRA F104RA-3 JUNE 2014

174 Figure F104AA-2. Examine System Modifications First. 5 Defense Acquisition Management System (DAS) All new materiel development and acquisition programs (including commercial off-the-shelf [COTS] or government off-the-shelf [GOTS]) fall under the purview of the Defense Acquisition Management System, which is depicted on the next page (figure F104AA-3). Since this is a DOD model, all Services use and comply with the regulations that govern it and establish service acquisition regulations (i.e., AR70-1 for the Army), when required. The figure depicted on the next page is the latest variation of this system; it has been in use through 16 variations and changes since 1971 when it was first instituted. As an overview of this complex system, the model shows five phases broken into three acquisition activities: pre-systems acquisition, systems acquisition, and sustainment. These phases are materiel solution analysis, technology maturation and risk reduction, engineering and manufacturing development, production and deployment, and operations and support. These phases are not to scale in terms of time to complete or difficulty since every acquisition program or project differs. Generally, the last phase operations and support is considered to be the longest and it may be the most expensive, since a piece of equipment may remain in use for 50 years or longer. 5 US Department of the Army, Army Force Management School, CDMD, Lsn 12, Strategies Contracting (Fort Belvoir, VA: AFMS), December 2010, and CDMD ( DOM Presentation, (Fort Belvoir, VA: AFMS), January 2012, slide 26. F104ASRA F104RA-4 JUNE 2014

175 Figure F104AA-3. Defense Acquisition Management System. 6 The triangles in the model above, called acquisition decision memorandums (ADM) (labeled A, B, and C ) represent milestones or decision points often correlated to a program s progress based upon its technological maturity. As an example, if COTS is available to meet desired needs, then the first several stages of R&D can be expedited and a production/procurement decision can be made more quickly at milestone C. Of particular note, the model depicted above represents the latest change to the Defense Acquisition Management System captured in DOD Instruction , published in November The most notable change to the process is the introduction of new program structures and procedures that are more specifically tailored to the dominant characteristics of the product being acquired and to unique program circumstances, such as risk and urgency. This lead to the introduction of six new product-tailored acquisition models which are: Model 1: Hardware Intensive Program (depicted in Figure F104AA-3) Model 2: Defense Unique Software Intensive Program Model 3: Incrementally Fielded Software Intensive Program Hybrid Program A (Hardware Dominant) Hybrid Program A (Software Dominant) Model 4: Accelerated Acquisition Program Prior to this, there was only one Defense Acquisition Management Model, of which the new Model 1, Hardware Intensive Program, is the most similar. For the purposes of this lesson, we will focus primarily on this version of the model. Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) All large scale or major acquisition programs are principally a balancing or tradeoff between the aspects of cost, performance, and schedule. Programs are assessed on these criteria, contained as requirements of an acquisition program baseline (APB), and are often denigrated for failing to be cheap enough, good enough or provided quickly enough. Many acquisition programs are cancelled when they fail to meet or exceed pre-established thresholds of cost, performance or schedule. 6 US Department of the Army, Army Force Management School, CDMD, 08 MCD (Fort Belvoir, VA: AFMS), February 2014, slide 13. F104ASRA F104RA-5 JUNE 2014

176 Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) B (ADMs are also called milestones) is a particularly important milestone because this is the point at which a materiel program shifts from being a concept to being an actual program of record (POR), at which time an acquisition program manger (PM) must have been appointed and an acquisition program baseline (APB) and budget must be created; i.e., it becomes a real materiel program. Complying with Title 10 USC 2435 and 2220, and DODI , the APB documents objectives, thresholds, and exit criteria for program performance, schedule, and cost - managers must immediately report all imminent and actual breaches of approved baselines. The PM bases the APB on users performance requirements, schedule requirements, estimated total acquisition cost, and total sustainment costs. Performance criteria shall include interoperability, supportability, survivability, net readiness, and, as applicable, environmental requirements. 7 Cost Considerations. Cost criteria has always been a key acquisition program consideration; in the current budget conscious environment, it will likely even be more significant than before. PMs develop initial total program cost estimates based on many factors (see figure F104AA-4). Individual PMs report these program costs quarterly; these program costs are compiled and provided to Congress in a document called the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR). You may view past SARs at PMs must also report programs that breach, defined as cost growth exceeding 15 percent of their original APB, within thirty days of the breach. This is called a Nunn McCurdy Breach, named after Senator Nunn and Congressman McCurdy; it was first enacted in the 1982 National Defense Authorization Act. It was designed to curtail excessive cost growth in weapons procurement programs. It requires that Congress be notified of acquisition program exceeding breach thresholds. This criterion is based on cost growth of more than 15 percent, and calls for the termination of those programs whose total costs grow by more than 25 percent over the original estimate (see figure F104AA-4). However, if the Secretary of Defense submits a detailed explanation certifying that the program is essential to national security, that no suitable alternative of lesser cost is available, that new estimates of total program costs are reasonable, and that the management structure is (or has been made) adequate to control costs; the program may be approved to continue. A program is rarely cancelled under this provision; Congress normally regards the explanations from the Secretary of Defense as acceptable. Nonetheless, in 2010 and 2011, the US Army's FCS and the USMC EFV vehicle programs were both cancelled due in part to Nunn-McCurdy breach cost overruns. Figure F104AA-4. APB: Cost. 8 7 US Department of the Army, Army Regulation 70-1 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 22 July 2011), para 6-2(a, b). 8 Ibid, para. 6-2(f) and information on the Defense Acquisition University s Website. F104ASRA F104RA-6 JUNE 2014

177 Performance Considerations. Programs can also breach for lack of meeting performance objectives and thresholds. Performance is measured in terms of meeting or exceeding identified performance measures, the most important of which are called key performance parameters (KPPs) and key system attributes (KSAs). KPPs are a limited number of measurable and testable attributes/characteristics considered critical or most essential to developing an effective military capability. Failure to achieve a KPP may result in a program s reevaluation, reassessment, or cancellation. KSAs are those system attributes considered critical or essential for an effective military capability, but not selected as a KPP. Currently there are three required KPPs (Force Protection and Survivability [Congressionally directed]; Sustainment Availability; Net-Ready/Interoperability Compliance) and two selectively applied KPPs (System Training and Energy Efficiency). Performance may also be measured in terms of whether a program is attaining certain technology readiness levels (TRLs) and manufacturing readiness levels (MRLs) depicted below (Figure F104AA-5). TRLs are a measure that enables consistent, uniform discussions of technical maturity, across different types of technologies. Decision authorities must consider the recommended TRLs when assessing program risk. Current joint and Army guidance emphasizes that the services seek systems that are either mature, at the prototype stage, or have already been tested in a relevant environment. This equates to TRL 6 (depicted below) and is required by regulation prior to a Milestone B decision. This would mitigate risk to the service but often places tremendous risk, pressure, and costs on industry (commercial or private) to provide demonstrated mature technologies and may preclude some materiel solutions or options coming forward for evaluation. As an example, Future Combat System vehicle programs did not achieve TRL 6 maturity - this was a second reason the FCS program was cancelled. Though the focus and control of an acquisition project shifts to the materiel developer at Milestone B, it does not solely remain just the responsibility of the program executive officer (PEO) or PM. The PM and PEO are the primary leads on equipment development and primarily work with contractors by continually focusing on cost, performance, and schedule. Other agencies share interests and impacts, however, and must coordinate with the PM throughout the entire acquisition process. Some of these interests and agencies include testing and evaluation (the Army Test and Evaluation Command that reports to the VCSA), manpower integration (MANPRINT) that the DA G1 oversees, integrated logistics support (ILS) that DA G4 oversees, and training development overseen by TRADOC. Figure F104AA-5. Technology and Manufacturing Readiness Levels. 9 9 US Department of the Army, Army Force Management School, CDMD Lsn 13, Pre-systems Acquisition (Fort Belvoir, VA: AFMS), January 2014, slide 45. F104ASRA F104RA-7 JUNE 2014

178 Schedule Considerations Phases of Defense Acquisition Management System Entry into the Defense Acquisition System: Pre-Systems Acquisition Activity includes the materiel solution analysis (MSA) phase and the technology maturation and risk reduction phase (Figure F104AA- 6). MSA occurs when JCIDS DOTMLPF analysis indicates that a materiel solution is likely the best solution to address a particular capabilities gap. It recommends a program strategy, including overall cost, schedule, and performance goals for the total R&D program. It is generally the least expensive of the phases since it is a study that is done on paper, but it is the start point and provides permission to proceed for any and all acquisition programs. An initial capabilities document (ICD) describes the gap, summarizes the results of the JCIDS capabilities- based assessment (including DOTMLPF analysis), and makes a case for the materiel solution course of action. It covers what capability needs to be developed, not how the solution will be built. When this ICD is approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) or the Army version (AROC), it moves into the materiel development decision (MDD) review process. At the MDD review, the approved ICD is presented to the milestone decision authority (MDA). The ICD includes the preliminary concept of operations, a description of the needed capability, the operational risk, and the basis for determining that non-materiel approaches will not sufficiently mitigate the capability gap. At this time, an Analysis of alternative (AoA) study guidance is also developed. The purpose of the AoA is to assess the potential system-level materiel solutions to satisfy the selected materiel concept (approach) documented in the approved ICD. Figure F104AA-6. JCIDS & DAS (2014). 10 The MDA designates the lead agency/service to refine the initial concept selected, approves the AoA study guidance, and establishes a date for the Milestone A review. The MDA decisions are documented in an acquisition decision memorandum (ADM). This effort normally is funded only for the materiel solution analysis (MSA) work. The MDA s decision to begin the MSA phase DOES NOT yet mean that a new acquisition program has been initiated. Following the materiel development decision (MDD), the MDA may authorize entry into the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) at any point consistent with phasespecific entrance criteria and statutory requirements. Progress through the DAS depends on obtaining 10 US Department of the Army, Army Force Management School, CDMD 1 and 2, JCIDS & DAS Overview (Fort Belvoir, VA: AFMS), January 2014, slide 36. F104ASRA F104RA-8 JUNE 2014

179 sufficient knowledge to continue to the next phase of development. The MDD review is the formal entry point into the DAS and is mandatory for all potential acquisition programs. 11 First phase - the materiel solution analysis (MSA) phase assesses potential materiel solutions to satisfy the phase-specific entrance criteria for the program. Milestones are designated by the MDA and are used to develop a technology development strategy (TDS). The TDS documents the following: A program strategy, including overall cost, schedule, and performance goals for the total R&D program; Specific cost, schedule, and performance goals - including exit criteria - for the first technology demonstration (TD); and, A test plan to ensure that the goals and exit criteria for the first TD have been met. 12 Materiel solution analysis ends when the AoA has been completed, materiel solution options for the capability identified in the approved ICD have been recommended, and the entrance criteria for the initial review decision have been satisfied. The designation of a PM will be made before milestone A or, if there is no milestone A, no later than program initiation (that is usually milestone B). 13 At Milestone A, the MDA designates a lead agency/service, approves the technology development (TD) phase exit criteria, and issues the acquisition decision memorandum (ADM). Second phase - the technology maturation and risk reduction phase entails demonstrating actual (not theoretical) systems technologies and sub-components. The goal is to show that a proposed technology solution is affordable, militarily useful, and based on mature, demonstrated technology. Demonstrations and experiments are often performed in a relevant environment, but those done in an operational environment are preferred. The phase reduces technology risk, and determines a mature and appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system, and to demonstrate critical technology elements on prototypes. Entrance into this phase depends on the completion of the AoA, a proposed materiel solution, and full funding for planned phase activity. The TDS and associated funding approved at milestone A provides for competitive prototyping [two or more competing teams (contractors) producing prototypes of the system and/or key system elements prior to, or through MS B]. Prototypes are employed to reduce technical risk, validate designs and cost estimates, evaluate manufacturing processes, and refine requirements. Multiple technology development demonstrations may be necessary before the capabilities developer and the materiel developer (MATDEV) agree that a proposed technology solution is affordable, militarily useful, and based on mature, demonstrated technology. Initial life-cycle sustainment of proposed technologies is planned during this phase. Technology developed in S&T or procured from industry or other sources is demonstrated in a relevant environment or, preferably, in an operational environment. A preliminary design review (PDR) is conducted for the candidate design(s). The PM provides a PDR report to the milestone decision authority (MDA) at milestone B and includes recommended requirement trades based upon an assessment of cost, schedule, and performance risk. The MDA must consider the results of the PDR and the PM s assessment, and determines whether remedial action is necessary to achieve acquisition program baseline (APB) objectives. The results of the MDA's post-pdr assessment are documented in an acquisition decision memorandum (ADM). The proposed system-level solution exits the technology maturation and risk reduction phase when an affordable program or increment of militarily-useful capability has been identified; the technology for that program or increment have been assessed and demonstrated in a relevant environment (TRL 6 or greater); manufacturing risks have been identified and assessed; and a system or increment can be 11 US Department of the Army, Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, How the Army Runs, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: DCLM), 2011, para 11-38, 11-39, CGSC copyright registration # E. 12 US Department of the Army, Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, How the Army Runs, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: DCLM), 2011, para 11-40, 240. CGSC copyright registration # E. 13 US Department of the Army, Army Regulation 70-1 (Washington, DC: HQDA), 22 July 2011, para 3-4. F104ASRA F104RA-9 JUNE 2014

180 developed for production within a relatively short timeframe (normally less than five years for weapon systems); or, when the MDA decides to terminate the effort. 14 Third phase - the purpose of MS B is to authorize entry into the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase. In general, an MS B is planned when a system-level materiel solution and design have been selected, a PM has been assigned, requirements have been approved, and system-level integration is ready to begin. In no case will MS B be approved without full funding (i.e., inclusion of the dollars and manpower needed for all current and future efforts to carry out the acquisition strategy in the budget and out-year program). This funding is programmed in anticipation of the MS B decision. In no case can full funding (at least five years) be done later than MS B. At MS B, the PM prepares and the MDA approves an acquisition strategy that guides activity during EMD; from this point, EMD does two main things. First, it produces an operational prototype that brings together all needed sub-components and systems that may have been tested separately in the technology maturation and risk reduction phase. Second, it develops/recommends an affordable and executable manufacturing process for effective and efficient mass production. The goal is to develop the best overall value solution over the system s life cycle that meets the user s operational requirements. 15 This strategy describes how the PM plans to employ contract incentives to achieve required cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. The MDA selects a contract type for the program that is consistent with the level of program risk. Regardless of the approach recommended, PMs and other acquisition managers continually assess program risks. Risks must be well understood before MDAs can authorize a program to proceed into the next phase of the acquisition process. The types of risk include, but are not limited to: schedule, cost, technical feasibility, risk of technical obsolescence, software management, dependencies between a new program and other programs, and the risk of creating a monopoly for future procurements. The engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) phase develops a system or an increment of capability; completes full system integration; develops an affordable and executable manufacturing process; ensures operational supportability with particular attention to minimizing the logistics footprint; implements manpower and personnel integration (MANPRINT); designs for production; ensures affordability; and demonstrates system integration, interoperability, safety, and utility. Entrance into the EMD phase depends on demonstrated technology maturity 16 (including software), validated and approved capabilities-based requirements, and full funding. Prior to beginning EMD, capability developers identify and the requirements authority validates a minimum set of key performance parameters (KPPs), included in the CDD, that guide the efforts of this phase. Each program must have an acquisition program baseline (APB) establishing program goals thresholds and objectives for the minimum number of cost, schedule, and performance parameters that describe the program over its life cycle. EMD effectively integrates the acquisition, engineering, and manufacturing development processes with test and evaluation (T&E). The completion of the EMD phase is dependent on a decision by the MDA to commit to the program at MS C or a decision to end this effort. This work effort ends when the system meets approved requirements and is demonstrated in its intended operational environment, using the selected productionrepresentative item; manufacturing processes have been effectively demonstrated; industrial capabilities are reasonably available; and the system meets or exceeds exit criteria and MS C (production) entrance requirements US Department of the Army, Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, How the Army Runs (Carlisle Barracks, PA: DCLM), 2011, para 11-43, 241. CGSC copyright registration # E. 15 US Department of the Army, Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, How the Army Runs (Carlisle Barracks, PA: DCLM), 2011, para 11-42, CGSC copyright registration # E. 16 Technological maturity is identified by technology readiness levels (TRL) US Department of the Army, Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, How the Army Runs (Carlisle Barracks, PA: DCLM), 2011, para , CGSC copyright registration # E. F104ASRA F104RA-10 JUNE 2014

181 Fourth phase - the production and deployment phase focuses on getting operational capability to the field. This phase is usually marked by two sub-phases: low rate initial production (LRIP) and full rate production (FRP). LRIP is designed to produce some minimum production run equipment quantities necessary for initial operational testing (IOT) by real soldiers and to ensure the manufacturer has the needed capacity, quality, and efficiency needed for full rate production (FRP). FRP delivers the fully funded quantity of systems and supporting materiel and services to the users. The PD phase can be reached directly from pre-systems acquisition (i.e. COTS) but requires: 1) a milestone C decision authorizing entry into low-rate initial production (LRIP); 2) updates/approval of the acquisition strategy; 3) updates/approval of the acquisition program baseline; and, 4) LRIP exit criteria or limited deployment plan. Entrance criteria for this phase include: acceptable performance in development, test and evaluation, and operational assessment; mature software capability; and no significant manufacturing risks; manufacturing processes under control (if milestone C is full-rate production); an approved capability production document (CPD) detailing the performance expected of the production system; acceptable interoperability; acceptable operational supportability; demonstration that the system is affordable throughout the life cycle, optimally funded, and properly phased for rapid acquisition; compliance with the DOD Strategic Plan; acceptable information assurance to include information assurance detection and recovery; and acceptable anti-tamper provisions. Low rate initial production (LRIP) is intended to result in completion of manufacturing development in order to: 1) ensure adequate and efficient manufacturing capability and to produce the minimum quantity necessary to provide production configured or representative item for IOT&E; 2) establish an initial production base for the system; and, 3) permit an orderly increase in the production rate for the system, sufficient to lead to full-rate production upon successful completion of operational (and live-fire, where applicable) testing. LRIP, which normally does not exceed ten percent of the total production quantity, may be funded by RDTE (research, development, test, and evaluation) or procurement appropriations, depending on the intended use of the LRIP systems. A program may not proceed past LRIP without milestone decision authority (MDA) approval at the fullrate production (FRP) review. The MDA considers costs, manpower estimates, test results, C4I supportability, and interoperability certification. The decision to continue beyond LRIP requires initial operational test (IOT) completion and submission of appropriate reports to Congress, the SecDef, and Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics), as needed. Full-rate production (FRP) and deployment delivers the fully funded quantity of systems and supporting materiel and services to the users. Units attain initial operational capability (IOC), which is the first attainment of the capability by a modified table of organization, and equipment (MTOE) unit (usually a battalion) and supporting elements to operate and maintain effectively a production item or system. The system is 1) type classified as standard; 2) unit and support personnel have been trained; and, 3) the unit can be supported in an operational environment with special tools, test equipment, repair parts, documentation, and training devices. 18 Fifth and final phase - the operations and support (OS) phase has two major work efforts: life-cycle sustainment and disposal. It is often the longest and most costly phase since equipment is often designed for longevity exceeding fifty (50) years and must be sustained over that timeframe. The PM ensures that a flexible, performance-oriented strategy to sustain systems is developed and executed. This strategy includes consideration of the full scope of operational support, such as maintenance, supply, transportation, sustaining engineering, spectrum supportability, configuration and data management, 18 US Department of the Army, Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, How the Army Runs (Carlisle Barracks, PA: DCLM), 2011, para , CGSC copyright registration # E. F104ASRA F104RA-11 JUNE 2014

182 manpower, training, environmental, health, safety, disposal and security factors. A follow-on test (FOT) program that evaluates operational effectiveness is conducted, as appropriate. After delivery from the manufacturer and the PM, units pick up responsibility for most operating and maintenance costs outside of any warranty period. Similarly, unless there is some immediate planned system upgrade or modification after FRP has been completed, the acquisition community passes program responsibility to the Army Materiel Command. At the end of its useful life, a system must be demilitarized and disposed of IAW all legal and regulatory requirements and policy relating to safety (including explosives safety), security, and the environment. During the design process, PMs document hazardous materials contained in the system, and estimate and plan for demilitarization and safe disposal. The demilitarization of conventional munitions (including any item containing propellants, explosives, or pyrotechnics) shall be considered during systems design. 19 With the onset of significant combat operations post-9/11, the employment of Army pre-positioned stocks (APS) of equipment, and enemy use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) - DOD and the Army recognized that Standard acquisition system was not going to be responsive enough to warfighting materiel demands. To provide the needed flexibility and responsiveness, the Congress passed the Bob Stump National Defense Act (2003). This act granted the Secretary of Defense and the services special (but limited) authority for rapid acquisition. Congressional legislation uses the term rapid acquisition authority to describe measures with respect to procurement that the SECDEF can take to eliminate a combat capability deficiency that has resulted in combat fatalities. The $100 million is not appropriated funding by Congress for this purpose; it is the authority to expend up to $100 million of existing DOD funding, using this waiver authority. This rapid acquisition authority, as well as the operational contingency operations (OCO) funding, were the primary sources of funding for the accelerated capabilities and materiel development initiatives in support of OIF and OEF missions. 20 As noted earlier in the reading, the recent reissuance of DOD Instruction has added a model to account for Accelerated Acquisition Programs. In addition, you will learn more about rapid equipping methods later on in F105, Army Force Integration. Key Players in the Army Acquisition Process The Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC) was created in 2001 to provide a concrete linkage and synchronization between required capabilities and resources. The AROC, coordinated by DCS - G3/5/7, is responsible for advising the CSA/VCSA in the assessment and prioritization of capabilities integrated across DOTMLPF to include the disposition of materiel capabilities documents (MCDs). TRADOC s Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) continues to be responsible for the balanced development of concepts, capabilities (requirements), and products in DOTMLPF. The AROC process is used to validate and approve: (1) proposals for rapid insertion of technologies to address current capability requirements when the solution extends into the Program Objective Memorandum (POM); and, (2) strategies to resolve capability gaps and resultant changes to modernization programs and plans. It validates all Army documents for JCIDS prior to submission to the Joint Staff, JCIDS gatekeeper - Deputy Director, Requirements, J 8. This encompasses all JCIDS efforts including Army annexes to joint and other service MCDs. It also includes those where an Army proponent has been designated as a joint capability developer. The AROC reviews and provides decisions and guidance on the capability gaps identified in JCIDS proposals presented for validation and approval. This ensures identified gaps are linked with modernization investment priorities essential for maintaining land force dominance. The AROC validates that the recommended strategies to resolve capability gaps, 19 US Department of the Army, Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, How the Army Runs (Carlisle Barracks, PA: DCLM), 2011, para , 245. CGSC copyright registration # E. 20 US Department of the Army, Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, How the Army Runs (Carlisle Barracks, PA: DCLM), 2011, para 11-67, CGSC copyright registration # E. F104ASRA F104RA-12 JUNE 2014

183 including associated DOTMLPF changes that are consistent with Army modernization strategies. Proposals must contribute to a balanced and synchronized modernization program. The AROC: Reviews how the recommended strategies fit into related joint concepts, force modernization strategies and investment portfolios to ensure interoperability and synergy. Reviews the affordability of all proposed solutions to capability gaps and programs presented to ensure that, if pursued, they are within budgeting and programming limits for development, procurement and sustainment. Considers trades of capability and/or performance versus cost to ensure only affordable solutions are pursued. Affordability includes potential long-term supportability requirements for the concept or system. Ensures that the operational definition of the capability gap and the proposed solution is clear and consistent with Army and joint warfighting concepts. As depicted in Figure F104AA-7, the AROC consists of the following members and advisors: Figure F104AA-7. AROC. 21 The Program Executive Officer (PEO) system, first implemented by the Army in 1987, administers a defined number of Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) major and/or other programs as assigned. The PEO, normally a major general or above or a civilian SES (GS15 and above) is responsible for making programmatics (i.e., materiel acquisition cost, schedule, and total system performance) and for the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) necessary to guide assigned programs through each milestone. In addition, the PEO provides program information to the AAE, DA, DOD, and Congress; defends assigned programs to Congress through the Army Office Chief of Legislative Liaison (OCLL); and participates in the development of data to support AAE programmatic decisions in the PPBE. Other PEO and direct-reporting program manager (PM) responsibilities include assisting the capability developer and training developer in developing materiel capabilities documents (MCDs) by providing technical, availability, performance, anticipated materiel acquisition cost, and schedule type information, as needed. Currently twelve Army PEOs (shown in figure F104AA-8) are responsible for intensively managing weapon and information systems US Department of the Army, Army Force Management School, CDMD 10, Joint-Army Reqts Val Appr (Fort Belvoir, VA: AFMS), February 2012, slide US Department of the Army, Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, How the Army Runs (Carlisle Barracks, PA: DCLM), 2011, para 11-31, 228. CGSC copyright registration # E. F104ASRA F104RA-13 JUNE 2014

184 The Program/Project/Product Managers (PMs) are all central select list (CSL) approved and managed by the AAE and report to his or her assigned MDA/PEO. Only a DA CSL PM will manage acquisition programs and has authority and responsibility for the programmatic (i.e., cost, schedule, and performance) decisions to execute the assigned program. A PM primary responsibility is to provide the acquisition program baseline (APB), subject to functional standards established by regulation, Secretarial direction, or law. Generically, all PMs are program managers, but they are chartered as a program manager, a project manager, or product manager based on the value and importance (visibility) of the program they manage. The criteria established for designation of a program manager are generally the same as those that cause a system acquisition to be designated as a major or other program as assigned. Project managers report to a PEO or to the AAE. All product managers report to a project manager. As a rule, a program manager is a general officer or a Senior Executive Service official (SES); a project manager is a colonel or a GS-15; a product manager is a lieutenant colonel or a GS-14. This distinction between PMs is unique to the Army and does not apply to the other services or within industry. Examples of product managers include PM-JLTV, PM-MTV, and PM-HTV who all report to the Tactical Vehicles Project Manager who works for PEO, Combat Support or Combat Service Support (CS or CSS), currently an SES civilian. The last program manager for the Army was a two-star billet as the PM-Future Combat System (FCS); this position was terminated in An organizational chart depicting PEO Soldier and its project/product managers is provided in figure F104AA Figure F104AA-8. Army PEOs. 24 Figure F104AA-9. PEO Soldier. 25 Acquisition Category (ACAT) All programs are given an acquisition category (ACAT). The ACAT determines the level of review, and who will make approval or milestone decisions. The lower the ACAT number, the higher the priority/level of oversight. Normally, this is because of the greater amount of money involved. As seen in the following chart below (Figure F104AA-10), ACATs are largely designated by anticipated program costs in two areas: research, development, test, and evaluation (RDTE), and total procurement/production. Although costs are the primary determinant, ACATs can also be designated because of the political visibility, sensitivity, or priority of a potential program (i.e., a program that has the SECDEF s or congressional interest, even if below the dollar threshold, may easily garner the highest ACAT: ACAT I). 23 US Department of the Army, Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, How the Army Runs, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: DCLM), 2011, para 11-32, 230. CGSC copyright registration # E. 24 US Department of the Army, Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, Army Force Management School, CDMD Lsn11 MD Roles, Slide 8 (updated February 2012). 25 US Department of the Army, Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, Army Force Management School, CDMD 22 ONS AR2B, Slide 32, (January 2011). F104ASRA F104RA-14 JUNE 2014

185 The ACATs include weapons platforms and automation programs (IAM). ACAT II programs are under the decision or control of the parent service secretary. ACAT III programs are lower-level programs that are usually under the decision or control of a program, project, or product manager (PM) working for the program executive officer (PEO) (two-star or Senior Executive Service civilian equivalent). Most programs, particularly in the Army, are at the ACAT III level. Acquisition programs are controlled under law establishing a hierarchy implemented by DOD since This control significantly changed in 1987 in response to requirements established by the Goldwater- Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986, and the recommendation of the Packard Commission that President Reagan approved and then ordered by National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 219. Figure F104AA-10. Acquisition categories (ACATS) US Department of the Army, Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, How the Army Runs, figure 11-3B, 219. CGSC copyright registration # E. F104ASRA F104RA-15 JUNE 2014

186 US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE Intermediate Level Education (ILE) Common Core F100: Managing Army Change F104: Developing Materiel Capabilities (Acquisition) Reading F104RB Operational Needs Statement (ONS) Sample This page is left blank intentionally. F104ASRB F104RB-1 MAY 2011

187 ABCD-EFG-HI 13 June 200X MEMORANDUM THRU Assistant Division Commander (Support), XX Infantry Division, Fort X, Rhode Island FOR Commander, XX Infantry Division Fort X, Rhode Island SUBJECT: Operational Needs Statement for Cabin Gunner Seat, Part Number and UIC: WXXXX 2. SHIP TO ADDRESS: Avn BDE XX Infantry Division Fort X, Rhode Island PROBLEM: a. CH-47D door gunners are improvising non-crashworthy seats during training and combat operations. With the threat to aircraft high, flying without a full complement of personnel manning weapons systems is not viable. Currently there is no aircraft seating for the door gunners on the left and right side of the aircraft leaving that crew member unprotected in a hard landing or crash sequence. b. During a emergency crash sequence or while conducting evasive maneuvers there is not enough time for the door gunners to leave their position and secure themselves into a crashworthy seat. 4. JUSTIFICATION: B / 1-23s deployment to Iraq will require door gunners to improvise non-crashworthy seats unless an acceptable alternative can be funded. Crashworthy gunner seats with an air worthiness release (AWR) already exist and can mitigate aircrew fatality or injury during hard landings or while conducting evasive maneuvers. This is a major risk mitigation piece of equipment that without implementation will certainly cause unnecessary injury or death. 5. SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS: a. Crashworthy gunner seats for the left and right door gunner. b. Provide full range of motion to door gunner and doesn t hinder ability to effectively engage the enemy. 6. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT: Each left and right door gunner will perform duties from a stable and safe location. F104ASRB F104RB-2 MAY 2011

188 7. ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPT: Each aircraft will have two gunner seats installed to allow area coverage on a crashworthy platform. 8. PROCUREMENT OBJECTIVE: Procurement of this equipment is for training and operational use with a unit of issue of two per deploying airframe and one spare set to support aircraft maintenance. Gunner seats remain the only proven and reliable solution to protect the aircraft gunners during daily operations. The Combat Aviation Brigade requires the following equipment: 13 x Gunner Seat Kit Left Hand (PN ) - $9,965 each, total $129,545 for CH- 47D fleet. 13 x Gunner Seat Kit Right Hand (PN ) - $9,965 each, total $129,545 for CH-47D fleet. 9. SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS: No external support is required once installation is complete. Maintenance of the system can be accomplished within the unit s current maintenance capabilities. Cost estimates provided by Y indicate that the cost of 12 installed seats and two seats to support maintenance is $259, AVAILABILITY: Once funded, gunner seats can be available within 22 weeks after receipt of purchase order. Additional purchasing information and technical support can be obtained from Y. 11. RECOMMENDATION: Recommend immediate purchase and installation of gunner kits for Combat Aviation Brigade. 12. Point of Contact is MAJ Jim Johnson, CAB XO, DSN (123) , Commercial (555) JOHN DOE COL, AV Commanding F104ASRB F104RB-3 MAY 2011

189 STATEMENT NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES. Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? Statement of Moshe Schwartz, Specialist in Defense Acquisition Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives October 29, 2013 Congressional Research Service

190 Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? Contents DOD Contract Obligations... 1 The Quest for Acquisition Reform... 3 Cost, Schedule, and Performance Problems Still Persist... 5 Increased Complexity of the Acquisition Process... 6 Constantly Changing Acquisition Rules... 8 Legislative Changes... 8 Regulatory Changes... 8 Successful Acquisition Reform Efforts... 9 Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of Operational Contract Support The Changing Landscape of Defense Acquisitions A Framework for Improving Acquisitions Improving the Workforce Building a Capable, Trained, and Sufficiently Sized Workforce Creating the Right Incentives Establishing Authority and Accountability Targeted Reform Efforts Streamlining Acquisition Laws and Regulations Contract Logistics Figures Figure 1. Contract Obligations by Agency... 2 Figure 2. DOD Contract Obligations (FY2012 dollars)... 3 Figure 3. Percentage of Contract Obligations Dedicated to R&D Contracts Contacts Author Contact Information Congressional Research Service

191 Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? C hairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of the Congressional Research Service to discuss efforts to improve defense acquisitions. The Department of Defense (DOD) has always relied on contractors to equip and support our military. Contractors design, develop, and build advanced weapon systems, construct military bases around the world, and provide needed services such as intelligence analysis, logistics, and base support. Operations over the last thirty years have highlighted the critical role that contractors play in supporting U.S. troops both in terms of the type of work being performed and number of contractors. Over the last decade in Iraq and Afghanistan, and before that, in the Balkans, contractors accounted for 50% or more of total U.S. forces in theatre. As the debates over the Mine Resistant Ambush Protection vehicle (MRAP) and other systems have highlighted, getting the right systems into the hands of our troops in the field quickly and efficiently can save lives and impact operations. Conversely, the ineffective execution of defense acquisitions can prevent troops from getting the resources they need, when they need it, and can lead to the wasteful spending of billions of dollars dollars that could have been used to fund other military requirements. 1 For decades, Congress and the executive branch have expressed frustration with the level of waste, mismanagement, and corruption in defense acquisitions, and have spent significant resources seeking to reform and improve the process. Despite these efforts, many acquisition programs still experience cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls. As reflected by events in the Middle East, the United States must prepare for a diverse range of hard-to-predict security challenges, and do so within the context of constrained budgets. Many analysts believe that to meet these challenges, the United States can no longer afford a defense acquisition system that they see as costly, overly-complex, and slow to respond to an everchanging world. DOD Contract Obligations In FY2012, the U.S. government obligated $515 billion for contracts for the acquisition of goods, services, and research and development. The $515 billion obligated on contracts was equal to approximately 14% of the entire FY2012 U.S. budget of $3.5 trillion (Figure 1). 2 DOD obligated $360 billion on federal contracts, which was more than all other government agencies combined. 1 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p. 93. U.S. See also Government Accountability Office. Stabilizing And Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Address Inadequate Accountability over U.S. Efforts and Investments. GAO T. March 11, p. 4, 6; Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting, Op. Cit., p Calculations are based on total contract obligations data as recorded in the Federal Procurement Data System Next Generation, January, See also: the Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 2012 (see Congressional Research Service 1

192 Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? DOD s contract obligations were equal to 10% of the entire U.S. budget. In FY2012, contract obligations represented 52% of total DOD obligations. 3 Figure 1. Contract Obligations by Agency FY2012 Source: Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation, January, Figure by CRS Graphics. From FY1999 to FY2012, adjusted for inflation (FY2012 dollars), DOD contract obligations increased from $170 billion to $360 billion (see Figure 2). Over the first part of this period FY1999-FY2008 DOD contract obligations increased 150%, from $170 billion to $420 billion. This trend reversed itself in FY2008: from FY2008-FY2012, DOD contract obligations decreased by 14%, dropping from $420 billion in FY2008 to $360 billion in FY For purposes of this statement, total obligations are defined as total direct obligations. See Department of Defense, Budget for Fiscal Year 2005-FY2012, Financial Summary Tables. Deflators for converting into constant dollars derived from Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Department of Defense, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2012, Department of Defense Deflators TOA Total Non-Pay, Table 5-5, p. 58, March Congressional Research Service 2

193 Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? Figure 2. DOD Contract Obligations (FY2012 dollars) FY1999-FY2012 (in billions) Source: CRS analysis of data from the Federal Procurement Data System Next Generation, January, The Quest for Acquisition Reform Congress and the executive branch have long been frustrated with waste, mismanagement, and fraud in defense acquisitions, and they have spent significant resources seeking to reform and improve the process. In the early 1980s, a number of major weapons systems programs were experiencing dramatic cost overruns, overruns that increased the defense budget by billions of dollars but resulted in the same number, or in some cases fewer, weapons. These programs included the Patriot missile system (37% cost growth over original estimates), the Hellfire missile (48% growth), the Blackhawk helicopter (24% growth), and the F-18 (21% growth). According to the December 1980 Selected Acquisition Report, there was a $47 billion cost increase for 47 major weapon systems in just the last three months of Public and congressional concern over cost growth led to several reform efforts. In 1982, Congress passed the Nunn-McCurdy Act, which created a reporting requirement for programs experiencing cost overruns. 4 In 1985, President Reagan established the President s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, which issued a final report (known as the Packard Commission Report) that contained far-reaching recommendations intended to assist the Executive and Legislative Branches as well as industry in implementing a broad range of needed reforms. Many of DOD s current initiatives to improve acquisitions can be traced back to the ideas and recommendations in the Packard Report. Efforts to address cost overruns, schedule slips, and performance shortfalls have continued unabated, with more than 150 major studies on acquisition reform since World War II. Every administration and virtually every Secretary of Defense has embarked on an acquisition reform 4 The Act was included in the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1983 (P.L ) Congressional Research Service 3

194 Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? effort. 5 Congress has also been active in pursuing reform efforts, by legislating changes through the annual National Defense Authorization Acts as well as through stand-alone legislation, such as the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, 6 Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, 7 and Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of The various studies and reform efforts have dramatically altered the process by which DOD procures goods and services. Major changes include creating the Federal Acquisition Regulation to develop uniform acquisition regulations across DOD and the federal government, establishing the Defense Acquisition University to improve the performance of the acquisition workforce, instituting a streamlined management chain (Program Manager-Program Executive Office-Service Acquisition Executive-Under Secretary of Defense) to foster accountability and authority, implementing a milestone decision process to improve oversight, using multi-year procurement to promote cost efficiency (with Congressional approval), requiring independent cost estimates to improve budgeting forecasting, 9 establishing a joint requirements board to improve requirements development and eliminate duplicative programs, and moving away from military standards and specification to promote the use of commercial technologies. 5 Robert F. Hale, Promoting Efficiency in the Department of Defense: Keep Trying, Be Realistic, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, January 2002, p P.L P.L P.L The Cost Analysis and Improvement Group was established in 1972 to develop independent cost estimates. Today, independent cost estimates are generated by the Office of the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation. Congressional Research Service 4

195 Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? Cost, Schedule, and Performance Problems Still Persist 10 There is much debate over how effective the numerous acquisition reform efforts have been and it is not clear whether the reform efforts of recent decades have generally accomplished their aims. According to many analysts, since the 1970s and 1980s, acquisition programs continue to experience significant cost increases. 11 As one RAND report stated, despite the many acquisition reforms and other DoD management initiatives over the years, the development cost growth of military systems has not been reduced. 12 Consider the following: Since 1993, development contracts have had a median of 32% cost growth (not adjusted for inflation). 13 Since 1997, 31% of all Major Defense Acquisition Programs have had cost growth of at least 15%. 14 During the period , the Army terminated 22 Major Defense Acquisition Programs; every year between 1996 and 2010, the Army spent more than $1 billion on programs that were ultimately cancelled. 15 Aircraft development times have increased significantly since Cost, schedule, and performance are the benchmarks most commonly used to evaluate the acquisition system. It is important to note, however, that as paradoxical as it may seem, avoiding or minimizing procurement cost growth is not always synonymous with minimizing procurement cost, and that a sustained, singular focus on avoiding or minimizing procurement cost growth might sometimes lead to higher procurement costs for the government (See Statement of Ronald O Rourke, Congressional Research Service, Before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, On the Navy s FY Year Shipbuilding Plan, October 23, 2013). In addition to cost growth discussed in this report, DOD acquisition has experienced increasing total costs for weapon systems, driven in part by additions to weapon systems of technologies that provide marginal increases in capabilities relative to their cost. The process of gaining marginal operational benefit for substantial cost is often referred to as gold-plating requirements. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argued that DOD needed to shift away from the 99-percent exquisite service-centric platforms that are so costly and so complex that they take forever to build, and only then in very limited quantities. With the pace of technological and geopolitical change and the range of possible contingencies, we must look more to the 80-percent solution, the multi-service solution that can be produced on time, on budget and in significant numbers. As Stalin once said, Quantity has a quality all of its own. " 11 See David S. Christensen, Ph.D., Capt. David A. Searle, USAF, and Dr. Caisse Vickery, "The Impact of the Packard Commission's Recommendations on Reducing Cost Overruns on Defense Acquisition Contracts," Acquisition Review Quarterly, Summer 1999, p. 251.; Obaid Yousossi, Mark V. Arena, and Robert S. Leonard, et al., Is Weapon System Cost Growth Increasing?, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2007; Deloitte Consulting LLP, Can We Afford Our Own Future? Why A&D Programs are Late and Over-budget and What Can Be Done to Fix the Problem, 2008; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security, Comments of Michael J. Sullivan, Government Accountability Office, Tools to Prevent Defense Department Cost Overruns, 112th Cong., 1st sess., March 29, See Obaid Yousossi, Mark V. Arena, and Robert S. Leonard, et al., Is Weapon System Cost Growth Increasing?, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2007, p. xx. 13 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Performance of the Defense Acquisition System, 2013 Annual Report, June 28, 2013, p Based on the percentage of programs experiencing a Nunn-McCurdy breach. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Performance of the Defense Acquisition System, 2013 Annual Report, June 28, 2013, p U.S. Army, Army Strong: Equipped, Trained and Ready, Final Report of the 2010 Army Acquisition Review, January 11, 2011, p. ix. 16 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Performance of the Defense Acquisition System, 2013 Annual Report, June 28, Congressional Research Service 5

196 Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? Procurement costs for the aircraft carrier CVN-78 have grown more than 20% since the submission of the FY2008 budget, and 4% since the submission of the FY2013 budget, prompting the Navy to program more than $1.3 billion in additional procurement funding for the ship in FY2014 and FY Part of the acquisition plan for the F-35 was referred to as acquisition malpractice by then acting Pentagon acquisition chief Frank Kendall. 18 A number of analysts have argued that the successive waves of acquisition reform have yielded limited results, due in part because of poor workforce management. A recent DOD report stated, There is little doubt that acquisition reforms produce limited, positive effects because they have not changed the basic incentives or pressures that drive the behavior of the participants in the acquisition process. 19 Increased Complexity of the Acquisition Process Until World War II, the regulations and rules governing government contracting in general, and defense contracting in specific, were minimal. After WWII, the growth in defense acquisition regulations was so rapid and uncoordinated that an Office of Federal Procurement Policy study conducted in the late 1970s found that DOD had 79 different offices issuing procurement regulations, and that these offices had developed a procurement process that consisted of some 30,000 pages of regulations. Concerned that the defense acquisitions process was an overly complex and unwieldy system, Congress enacted the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (P.L ) to overhaul the process. Despite this act and various other congressional and executive branch efforts, contracting with the federal government remains a highly regulated process governed by a myriad of statutes and regulations. 20 These regulations govern such issues as how DOD solicits, negotiates, and awards a contract; what costs DOD will reimburse and how contractors account for those costs; the information systems used by contractors; and how contractors must comply with rules regarding such socio-economic goals as affirmative action, combatting trafficking in persons, and maintaining a drug-free workplace. 21 A number of analysts have argued that rather than improving the system, acquisition reform efforts have made the process less efficient and effective. 22 A recent report on Army acquisitions 17 CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, p CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by Jeremiah Gertler, p J. Ronald Fox, Defense Acquisition Reform : An Elusive Goal (Center of Military History, 2011), p Carl L. Vacketta, Federal Government Contract Overview, 22 U.S. Institute for Peace, The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America's National Security Needs in the 21st Century, Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, July 28, 2010, p. 83; Department of Defense, Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Report, January 2006, p. 6; Business Executives for National Security, (continued...) Congressional Research Service 6

197 Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? argued in an attempt to not repeat past failures, additional staff, processes, steps, and tasks have been imposed. While well intended, collectively these modifications are counterproductive. 23 One observer noted, If someone were asked to devise a contracting system for the federal government, it is inconceivable that one reasonable person or a committee of reasonable people could come up with our current system. 24 Acquisition reform is not the only factor leading to the complexity of the acquisition system. Other factors include the increased complexity of military systems and inclusion of public policy goals into the acquisition process. Examples of regulations that reflect public policy goals include the requirement to purchase certain goods from domestic suppliers (such as the Berry Amendment and Buy American Act), 25 preferences for buying goods and services in Afghanistan to support campaign objectives in theatre, requirements to take steps to combat trafficking in persons, 26 set asides to promote small businesses and other entities perceived as disadvantaged, and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. In some instances, the goals of obtaining the best value for the government and promoting public policy goals are in conflict with one another. For example, some analysts debate the value of the various regulations requiring certain defense items to be manufactured domestically. Some analysts argue that these requirements are necessary to ensure domestic sources of supply during war time. Other analysts argue that domestic sourcing regulations unnecessarily increase the cost to government, that the regulations could be implemented in a more cost-efficient manner, and that some items are on the list for protectionist reasons, not to preserve military capabilities. From the Wright Brothers to the Modern Tanker In December 1907, the War Department issued a two-page procurement notice for what some observers have called one of the most important government contracts in U.S. history: a contract to build a flying machine that is heavier than air. By the February 1908 deadline, the War Department received 41 proposals. The contract, awarded to Orville and Wilbur Wright, is noteworthy for its brevity (less than 10 pages), focusing on engineering requirements and contractor compliance. In contrast, according to a Boeing official, the original signed contract for the KC-46 tanker that was awarded to Boeing on February 24, 2011 consisted of 1,233 pages when originally signed 70 pages of the basic contract, with references to 27 attachments consisting of an additional 1,163 pages. (...continued) Getting to Best: Reforming the Defense Acquisition Enterprise, A Business Imperative for Change from the Task Force on Defense Acquisition Law and Oversight, July, 2009, p. iii. 23 U.S. Army, Army Strong: Equipped, Trained and Ready, Final Report of the 2010 Army Acquisition Review, January 11, 2011, p. iv 24 J. Ronald Fox, Defense Acquisition Reform : An Elusive Goal (Center of Military History, 2011). 25 See DFARS, Part ; FAR Part 25. See also CRS Report RL31236, The Berry Amendment: Requiring Defense Procurement to Come from Domestic Sources, by Valerie Bailey Grasso. 26 FAR Subpart 22.17, Combating Trafficking in Persons. Congressional Research Service 7

198 Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? The complexity of the regulations can make it difficult for some companies to enter the government contracting arena. 27 Many analysts believe that the rules and regulations governing defense acquisitions need to be further streamlined and simplified in a manner that reduces the burden on private industry and controls the increase in costs while preserving sufficient oversight. Constantly Changing Acquisition Rules Some analysts believe that the successive reform efforts have discouraged some companies from seeking government contracts out of concern that the rules could be changed in the middle of the game. Implementing successive changes to the acquisition system can also add to the cost of doing business with DOD, and make it more difficult for DOD and Congress to determine whether individual changes are having a positive or negative effect on the acquisition process. Changes to the rules governing defense acquisitions generally are a result of legislation or executive branch rules and regulations. Legislative Changes In recent years, the primary mechanism by which Congress has exercised its legislative powers to reform defense acquisitions has been the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Sections of these acts have prescribed requirements applicable to both specific acquisition programs and the acquisition structure overall, the latter of which has typically been addressed in Title VIII, which is usually called Acquisition Policy, Acquisition Management, and Related Matters. Over the last six years, the Title in the NDAA dealing with acquisitions included more than 275 sections. 28 Other titles within the NDAA can also include legislation that affects companies seeking to contract with DOD. 29 At times, Congress has chosen to enact legislation affecting defense acquisitions in a stand-alone bill. For example, in May 2009, Congress passed and the President signed into law the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (S. 454/P.L ), which contained a number of sections that impacted defense acquisitions, ranging from issues related to competition to conflicts of interest. Regulatory Changes DOD procurement activities are generally governed by three sets of federal government regulations: 27 Ibid. See also Grant Thornton, 16th Annual Government Contractor Industry Survey Highlights Book, Industry Survey Highlights 2010, p Based on CRS review of the National Defense Authorization Acts for FY Not all sections in the Title impact private industry; rather, the volume of sections portray the challenges in keeping abreast of legislative changes that could significantly impact industry. 29 For example, the FY2010 NDAA, Title III (Operation and Maintenance) included a section effecting defense acquisitions. See P.L , sec Congressional Research Service 8

199 Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? the first set of regulations, which applies to the entire federal government (including DOD unless stated otherwise), are found in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the second set of regulations applies only to DOD and is found in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, and the third set of regulations applies only to individual DOD components and is found in component-unique FAR Supplements. 30 Procurement actions in DOD must adhere to the various regulations, and program managers must take the regulations into account during the planning and execution of their programs. The rules and regulations governing defense acquisitions can change at a rapid pace. For example, the DOD Directive 5000 series was established in 1971 to regulate the acquisition of major weapon systems. Over the next 40 years, the process for acquiring weapon systems set forth in the 5000 series was revised more than a dozen times a change approximately once every three years. In some cases, the changes have been dramatic. The 5000 series documents have been issued and reissued, with different versions varying in length, ranging from as few as eight to as many as 840 pages. These regulatory changes also modified the number of milestones and other decision points required for approval from two, to three, to as many as seven. The documentation required for milestone reviews has ranged from one document in 1971 to dozens of documents in Successful Acquisition Reform Efforts Given the results of past acquisition reforms, some analysts have argued that acquisition reform is a fruitless effort; that the fundamental problems with DOD acquisitions lie not in policy but in execution and expectations. In an article entitled Let s Skip Acquisition Reform This Time, MIT professor Harvey Sapolsky writes The limited number of available reforms have all been recycled. You can centralize or decentralize. You can create a specialist acquisition corps or you can outsource their tasks. You can fly before you buy or buy before you fly. Another blue-ribbon study, more legislation, and a new slogan will not make it happen. 32 Other analysts point out that some past reform efforts have had modest success, generating savings in certain areas and keeping pace with a changing world. These analysts argue that defense acquisitions can and must be improved, 33 that learning from past reform efforts understanding what worked, what didn t work, and why is critical to successful acquisition 30 The Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, Defense Logistics Agency, and U.S. Special Operations Command each have unique supplements. 31 Based on discussions with analysts and government officials, CRS review of regulations and documentation, and review of academic working papers that have not yet been published. See J. Ronald Fox, Defense Acquisition Reform: An Elusive Goal to 2010, Harvard Business School, Working Paper , p. Appendix B, referenced with permission of the author. 32 Harvey Sapolsky, Let s Skip Acquisition Reform This Time, DefenseNews, February 9, 2009, p Robert F. Hale, Promoting Efficiency in the Department of Defense: Keep Trying, Be Realistic, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, January 2002, p. 11; Business Executives for National Security, Getting to Best: Reforming the Defense Acquisition Enterprise, A Business Imperative for Change from the Task Force on Defense Acquisition Law and Oversight, July, 2009, p. iii. Congressional Research Service 9

200 Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? reform. 34 A number of analysts have argued that Congress is critical to significantly improving DOD acquisitions. 35 Some acquisition reforms have been judged successful. For example, most analysts view the original consolidation of disparate acquisition rules into a single, uniform Federal Acquisition Regulation as an improvement to the system. More recently, Congress has embarked on select acquisition reform efforts that analysts believe have contributed to improving defense acquisitions, including the Weapon Systems Reform Act of 2009 and legislation and oversight connected with Operational Contract Support. Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 In developing the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, Congress considered reports by government and other analysts that focused on the early stages of weapon system development, prior Congressional hearings and investigations, and extensive consultations with DOD, industry, and outside experts. The Act did not seek to rectify all of the problems related to the acquisition process. Rather, it focused primarily on improving the early stages of weapon system development. Key provisions in the act included The appointment of a Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), The appointment of a Director of Developmental Test and Evaluation, The appointment of a Director of Systems Engineering, A requirement that the Director of Defense Research and Engineering periodically assess technological maturity of MDAPs and annually report finding to Congress, A requirement that combatant commanders have more influence in the requirements generation process. Given how recently the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act was enacted, the full effect of the Act may not be felt until the next generation of weapon systems are in production. However, a number of analysts believe that the Act is having a positive effect. 36 Senior officials within the offices of the CAPE, Developmental Test and Evaluation, and Systems Engineering, believe that their offices are being better resourced and empowered to positively impact weapon system acquisitions. 37 These offices have been given access to senior leaders within the department, opportunities to provide input at key points in the acquisition system, and resources to carry out their responsibilities. For example, the CAPE has contributed to a better understanding of potential costs for a number of major programs, such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program See: Robert F. Hale, Promoting Efficiency in the Department of Defense: Keep Trying, Be Realistic, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, January 2002, See: Business Executives for National Security, Getting to Best: Reforming the Defense Acquisition Enterprise, A Business Imperative for Change from the Task Force on Defense Acquisition Law and Oversight, July, 2009, p U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisition Reform: Reform Act is Helping DOD Acquisition Programs Reduce Risk, but Implementation Challenges Remain, GAO , December 14, Based on meetings these senior officials had with CRS in early Based on discussions with senior officials from the Joint Staff, J-8 (Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment (continued...) Congressional Research Service 10

201 Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? Operational Contract Support In recent years, DOD has significantly improved its use of operational contract support. Many analysts and senior DOD officials have stated that without the efforts of Congress, DOD would not have been as successful at improving operational contract support. 39 Congressional efforts have included establishing the Special Inspector General for Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan, and the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Congress has also held numerous hearings, published committee reports, and maintained focus on the issue. These efforts combined to elevate the importance of the use of contractors and resulted in the development of a body of work that informed DOD and Congress. Examples of Congressional action often cited as having contributed to improving operational contract support include: legislation that led to establishment of the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Support), legislation establishing general/flag officer billets for acquisition, legislation establishing the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund, and oversight hearings that raised awareness of contractor abuses and led to the creation of Task Force The Changing Landscape of Defense Acquisitions Much of the foundation of the defense acquisition system was developed during the early years of the Cold War. Over recent years, the defense acquisition landscape has changed significantly and a number of analysts believe that the acquisition system has not been sufficiently responsive to an ever changing world. 41 A 2009 study by the Defense Science Board argued that current DOD acquisition practices are inadequate in a changing industrial world. 42 Significant changes often cited by analysts include the following: The defense industrial base has consolidated significantly over the last 25 years. According to a study by the Defense Science Board, over the last 25 years, the number of major defense contractors decreased from fifty to six. 43 Such consolidation can hurt competition and innovation. (...continued) Directorate) and Joint Operations Support (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), December CRS Report R43074, Department of Defense s Use of Contractors to Support Military Operations: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress, by Moshe Schwartz. 40 For a detailed discussion of reform in operational contract support, see CRS Report R43074, Department of Defense s Use of Contractors to Support Military Operations: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress, by Moshe Schwartz. 41 Department of Defense, Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Report, January 2006, p Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Buying Commercial: Gaining the Cost/Schedule Benefits for Defense Systems, Defense Science Board Task Force on Integrating Commercial Systems into the DOD, Effectively and Efficiently, February 2009, p. xvii. 43 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Creating an Effective National (continued...) Congressional Research Service 11

202 Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? DOD is becoming a less influential buyer. Fewer and fewer U.S. industries are dominated by defense spending. 44 For example, in 1965 DOD accounted for over 75% of all U.S. semiconductor purchases. In 1990, government-wide purchases represented less than 10% of the market; by 2012, government represented less than 2% of semi-conductor purchases. 45 As DOD becomes a less important customer, an increasing number of companies are diversifying their revenue streams. In 2012, the top 100 defense companies received 28% of their revenue from defense contracts, down from 38% of revenue in Other companies are choosing not to compete for defense contracts because of the extensive and ever-changing regulations, increased costs, auditing requirements, and the instability of funding associated with defense contracting, including sequestration, continuing resolutions, and lapses in appropriations. Weapon and information technology systems are more complex and sophisticated. Some analysts believe that the acquisition system is not nimble enough for acquisition programs that rely heavily on rapidly changing technologies. These technologies are posing new challenges to acquisitions. For example, according to U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Christopher Bogdan, the biggest risk to the F-35 program is software development. 47 Some analysts believe that the increasing complexity of systems is the reason that aircraft development times have increased significantly since U.S. Military Spending is declining. U.S. defense spending is declining, necessitating cuts to force structure and modernization programs. 49 Despite decreased spending, the U.S. must still be prepared for a diverse range of security challenges. 50 Given current defense spending trends and potential security threats, DOD acquisitions may need to be more efficient to ensure sufficient resources to protect U.S. interests. Increased cost-efficiency could free up resources that can (...continued) Security Industrial Base for the 21st Century: An Action Plan to Address the Coming Crisis, Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Industrial Structure for Transformation, July 2008, p. 15. See also: Kenneth Flamm, "Post-Cold War Policy and the U.S. Defense Industrial Base," National Academy of Engineering of the National Academies, vol. 35, no. 1 (Spring 2005); Barry D. Watts, Sustaining the U.S. Defense Industrial base as a Strategic Asset, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Backgrounder, September 2013, p Kenneth Flamm, "Post-Cold War Policy and the U.S. Defense Industrial Base," National Academy of Engineering of the National Academies, vol. 35, no. 1 (Spring 2005); See: Business Executives for National Security, Getting to Best: Reforming the Defense Acquisition Enterprise, A Business Imperative for Change from the Task Force on Defense Acquisition Law and Oversight, July, 2009, p Data provided to CRS by Semiconductor Industry, October, Zachary Fryer-Biggs, "Looking Beyond Defense: Firms Grow Revenue--By Diversifying," DefenseNews, July 22, 2013, p Andrea Shalal-Esa, "Pentagon Sees Some Risk of Delay in F-35 Software," NBCnews.com, April 24, 2013, at 48 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Performance of the Defense Acquisition System, 2013 Annual Report, June 28, 2013, p Department of Defense, Defense Budget Priorities and Choices, Fiscal Year 2014, April 2013, p Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012, p. 1, 4-7. Congressional Research Service 12

203 Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? be used to maintain a robust force structure or fund research and development aimed at maintaining a qualitative advantage over potential adversaries. Some analysts have argued that the United States may not dominate defense spending in the future as much as it did in recent years, further requiring a more efficient and effective allocation of resources. These analysts point to China s military modernization, which has been fueled by two decades of steadily increasing military spending. According to a DOD report to Congress, China s officially disclosed military budget increased an average of 9.7% annually in inflation-adjusted terms over the decade from 2003 to At $114 billion, China s officially announced budget for 2013 represents an increase of 10.7% over The Pentagon believes China s actual military spending is higher than the officially disclosed figures, with the report to Congress estimating that China s military spending for 2012 was in the range of $135 to $215 billion. 51 Industry is playing an increasingly important role in innovation and development. 52 DOD is spending a smaller share of its contracting dollars on research and development (R&D) contracts. In FY1998, 18% of contract obligations were dedicated to R&D contracts compared to just 10% in FY2012 (see Figure 3). One analyst pointed out that even though the military is still an important funder of specific, leading-edge technologies such as supercomputers and microelectromechanical systems devices, commercial demand for these products has far outstripped the requirements of the military. 53 At the same time, technologies developed for the commercial market are commonly adapted for military use. As one general officer stated, whereas the military used to go to industry and tell them to create a technology to meet a requirement, increasingly the military is going to industry and asking them to adapt an existing commercial technology to military requirements See CRS Report R41108, U.S.-China Relations: An Overview of Policy Issues, by Susan V. Lawrence, p See Business Executives for National Security, Getting to Best: Reforming the Defense Acquisition Enterprise, A Business Imperative for Change from the Task Force on Defense Acquisition Law and Oversight, July, 2009, p Kenneth Flamm, "Post-Cold War Policy and the U.S. Defense Industrial Base," National Academy of Engineering of the National Academies, vol. 35, no. 1 (Spring 2005). 54 Based on discussion with CRS analyst, May 8, Congressional Research Service 13

204 Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? Figure 3. Percentage of Contract Obligations Dedicated to R&D Contracts FY1998-FY2012 Source: Analysis of data from the Federal Procurement Data System, October 14, Many analysts believe that an acquisition system designed to meet the challenges of the Cold War is not sufficiently nimble or efficient to address the security and economic realities of today. 55 They argue that in light of the evolving landscape the current cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls in acquisitions have a debilitating effect on our military and threaten America s technological advantage and military capabilities. 56 Some of these analysts argue that a comprehensive acquisition reform is urgently needed. 57 Norman Augustine (former CEO of Lockheed Martin) and former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman jointly wrote that the defense acquisition system operates too slowly and at vastly greater cost than necessary. In earlier times we could arguably afford such flaws in efficiency, but we can afford them no longer... We must examine the status quo systemically, in all its aspects, in order to make necessary and long overdue changes. If we do not, we will be in an increasingly sclerotic defense acquisition process that may one day no longer be able to supply American war fighters with the means to assure this nation s freedom and security Department of Defense, Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Report, January 2006, p See: Business Executives for National Security, A Business Imperative for Change from the Task Force on Defense Acquisition Law and Oversight, July, 2009, p. 4. Then Secretary of Defense William Perry used the same logic to implement acquisition reforms in the 1990s. He stated Because the world in which DoD now must operate has changed beyond the limits of the existing acquisition system's ability to adjust or evolve -- the system must be totally re-engineered. If DoD is going to be capable of responding to the demands of the next decade, there must be a carefully planned, fundamental re-engineering or re-invention of each segment of the acquisition process. See Honorable William J. Perry, Acquisition Reform: A Mandate for Change, Department of Defense, February 9, 1994, p See Department of Defense, Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Report, January 2006, p. Introductory Letter by Chairman Ronald Kadish. 58 Business Executives for National Security, A Business Imperative for Change from the Task Force on Defense Acquisition Law and Oversight, July, 2009, p. iii. Congressional Research Service 14

205 Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? Just as the acquisition landscape has changed in recent years, many analysts and DOD officials argue that DOD has also undergone changes that may make significant reform possible. Some DOD officials and analysts detect a culture shift underway within the Department - a shift that reflects a better understanding of the importance of defense acquisitions, and a fuller commitment on the part of senior leadership, uniform personnel and civilian personnel, to support efforts to improve defense acquisitions. Changes contributing to the culture shift include the following: Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the importance of acquisitions. In the early years of the conflicts, contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan was done on an ad-hoc basis, without significant consideration of implications for foreign policy and without putting in place necessary oversight systems. Insufficient resources were dedicated to oversight, resulting in poor performance, billions of dollars of waste, and failure to achieve mission goals. 59 However, the experiences of the operational force have highlighted the critical role of contractors in military operations. These experiences underscored the importance of acquisitions to senior leaders and prompted numerous internal efforts to examine contractor support, such as the report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations (known as the Gansler report). Constrained budgets are fostering a culture of better decision making. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that as a result of defense spending more than doubling between FY2001 and FY2010, we ve lost our ability to prioritize, to make hard decisions, to do tough analysis, to make trades. 60 Declines in defense acquisition spending since FY2008 require, and have resulted in, efforts to prioritize programs, reign in the gold-plating of requirements, and increased the focus on costs. 61 Data is improving. 62 Data reliability is a critical element in making informed policy decisions. 63 If data is lacking or is unreliable, there may not be an appropriate basis for measuring or assessing the effectiveness of contracting, making policy decisions, or providing transparency into government operations. In some circumstances, a lack of reliable data could lead analysts and decision makers to draw incorrect or misleading conclusions. The result could be policies that squander resources, waste taxpayer dollars, and threaten the success of the mission CRS Report R43074, Department of Defense s Use of Contractors to Support Military Operations: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress, by Moshe Schwartz. 60 Department of Defense, "DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen from the Pentagon," press release, June 6, 2011, 61 See Yamil Berard, "Former Pentagon leader says defense cuts are necessary," Fort Worth Star-Telegeram, October 16, 2013.; Barry D. Watts, Sustaining the U.S. Defense Industrial base as a Strategic Asset, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Backgrounder, September 2013, p Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Performance of the Defense Acquisition System, 2013 Annual Report, June 28, 2013, p CRS Report R41820, Department of Defense Trends in Overseas Contract Obligations, by Moshe Schwartz, Wendy Ginsberg, and Daniel Alexander; U.S. Government Accountability Office, Reliability of Federal Procurement Data, GAO R, December 30, 2003, p. 1. For an additional discussion on the importance of having reliable data to develop policies affecting acquisitions, see U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions: Tailored Approach Needed to Improve Service Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-07-20, November 9, For a discussion on the importance of good contract data to improving government efficiency and saving taxpayer money, see U.S. Government Accountability Office, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue: Collecting improved data on interagency contracting to minimize duplication could help the government leverage its vast buying power, GAO SP, March, 1, 2011, p. 70. Congressional Research Service 15

206 Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? Advances in information technology are making it possible to better track and analyze larger amounts of data. DOD is improving its IT systems and has embarked on a number of wideranging efforts to gather and analyze data to inform policy decisions, often at the behest of Congress. For example, the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 required DOD to conduct a root cause analysis of the cost, schedule and performance of Major Defense Acquisition Programs that experience cost growth that surpasses the thresholds set forth in the Nunn- McCurdy Act. 65 Over the years, these analyses have provided insight into what drives cost growth. Despite the progress being made, there continue to be significant gaps in the data available and reliability of some existing data. 66 A Framework for Improving Acquisitions Improving the Workforce Despite the hundreds of disparate recommendations to improve defense acquisitions, most reports seeking to address the fundamental weaknesses of the system arrive at the same conclusion: the key to good acquisitions is having a good workforce and giving them the resources, incentives, and authority to do their job. 67 As David Packard, co-founder of Hewlett-Packard and former Deputy Secretary of Defense wrote in a report to President Reagan, Excellence in defense management cannot be achieved by the numerous management layers, large staffs, and countless regulations in place today. It depends...on reducing all of these by adhering closely to basic, common sense principles: giving a few capable people the authority and responsibility to do their job, maintaining short lines of communication, and holding people accountable for results. 68 Workforce is not the only area that analysts believe need to be improved numerous recommendations are aimed at the budget process, requirements development, cost estimating, and other structural problems. However, without a culture that promotes good acquisition decisions, reform efforts will not achieve their fullest potential. This is true not only for the acquisition workforce but also for other people involved in the process, such as those involved in developing requirements and budgets. As DOD Comptroller Robert Hale wrote in 2002 Efficiency requires change, and change is difficult to implement in any organization public or private. To have any chance of success, there must be an incentive to change. Incentives start with the climate created by top leaders... But commitment must extend beyond the senior leadership to the Defense Department s field commanders and managers. Efficiencies 65 P.L , section Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Performance of the Defense Acquisition System, 2013 Annual Report, June 28, 2013, p. 105; U.S. Army, Army Strong: Equipped, Trained and Ready, Final Report of the 2010 Army Acquisition Review, January 11, 2011, p. iv. The report found that The Army lacks a sufficiently robust and trustworthy database on acquisition programs, workforce and lessons learned, p See below. For additional discussions, see Thomas Christie, Sound Policy, Awful Execution, DefenseNews, December 15, 2008, p. 53. Thomas Miller, Rearranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: Why Does Acquisition Reform Never Work?, Defense AT&L, November-December 2010, p. 27; Scott Reynolds, Let s Fix It: A Five-Step Plan for Improving Acquisitions, Defense AT&L, November-December 2009, p A Quest for Excellence, Final Report to the President by the Blue Ribbon Commission of Defense Management, June 30, Congressional Research Service 16

207 Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? achieved at the base or installation level could add up to substantial savings, and the individuals running these bases will be more likely to implement changes if they have incentives to do so. 69 It is this belief that prompted Under Secretary of Defense Frank Kendall to introduce guidance on implementing the Better Buying Power initiatives with the following overarching principle: Policies and processes are of little use without acquisition professionals who are experienced, trained, and empowered to apply them effectively. At the end of the day, qualified people are essential to successful outcomes and professionalism, particularly in acquisition leaders, drives results more than any policy change Robert F. Hale, Promoting Efficiency in the Department of Defense: Keep Trying, Be Realistic, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, January 2002, p Frank Kendall, Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power Achieving Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Memorandum, April 24, Congressional Research Service 17

208 Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? The Importance of People and Proper Incentives Numerous reports have highlighted the importance of people in successful acquisitions. Below are conclusions from some of the most influential reports on defense acquisitions from 1970 to the present. Regardless of how effective the overall system of Department procurement regulations may be judged to be, the key determinants of the ultimate effectiveness and efficiency of the Defense Procurement process are the procurement personnel... The importance of this truism has not been appropriately reflected in the recruitment, career development, training, and management of the procurement workforce. 71 Fitzhugh Report (1970) DOD must be able to attract, retain, and motivate well qualified acquisition personnel. 72 Packard Report (1986) Making fundamental improvements in acquisitions will require attaching the cultural dimension of the problem. Changes of the type needed will not come easily. They must be directed at the system of incentives. 73 GAO (1992) Give line managers more authority and accountability (reward results, not just compliance with rules; focus on the customer). 74 Perry Report (1994) The department should focus on creating incentives so that commanders and managers seek efficiencies. 75 Robert Hale (2002) To repeat: the emphasis must be on the individuals in line management... the key to effective execution of any contract is not the quality of the contract, it is the quality of the program management responding to clear assignment of authority and accountability for each program. 76 QDR Independent Panel (2010) There is little doubt that acquisition reforms produce limited, positive effects because they have not changed the basic incentives or pressures that drive the behavior of the participants in the acquisition process. 77 Defense Acquisition Reform: (2011) Most analysts believe that a number of steps need to be taken to improve the performance of the acquisitions workforce. 78 Three common recommendations for doing this include the following: 1. recruiting talented people and providing them with the right training, 2. providing the right incentives, and 71 Department of Defense, Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense by the Blue Ribbon Panel, July 1, 1970, p A Quest for Excellence, Final Report to the President by the Blue Ribbon Commission of Defense Management, June 30, 1986, p. xxv. 73 U.S. General Accounting Office, Weapons Acquisition: A Rare Opportunity for Lasting Change, NSIAD 93-15, December 1992, pp Honorable William J. Perry, Acquisition Reform: A Mandate for Change, Department of Defense, February 9, 1994, p Robert F. Hale, Promoting Efficiency in the Department of Defense: Keep Trying, Be Realistic, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, January 2002, p. iii. 76 U.S. Institute for Peace, The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America's National Security Needs in the 21st Century, Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, July 28, 2010, p J. Ronald Fox, Defense Acquisition Reform : An Elusive Goal (Center of Military History, 2011), p For example, one report found that Army acquisition competencies have eroded in the last two decades; the Army has reduced the number of qualified people essential to acquiring modern equipment. See U.S. Army, Army Strong: Equipped, Trained and Ready, Final Report of the 2010 Army Acquisition Review, January 11, Congressional Research Service 18

209 Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? 3. granting the authority to make decisions and holding people accountable for those decisions. Building a Capable, Trained, and Sufficiently Sized Workforce Insufficient resources or shortages in the numbers properly trained acquisition personnel increase the risk of poor contract performance, which in turn can lead to waste, fraud, and abuse. 79 The issue is not just the number, but also the quality and capability of the workforce. 80 In an effort to improve the size and quality of the acquisition workforce, the FY2008 NDAA mandated the establishment of the Department of Defense Acquisition Workforce Fund to enable the recruitment, training, and retention of acquisition personnel. 81 From FY2008 through FY2012, DOD obligated $2.3 billion through the fund. According to DOD, this funding was used to augment training and hire an additional 8,300 people and in contracting, cost estimating, systems engineering, auditing, and other related fields. Many analysts believe that while DOD and congressional efforts are starting to have a positive impact on the acquisition workforce, additional support and focus is needed. 82 DOD has recognized the need to dedicate sufficient resources to develop a good, capable workforce. According to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, to operate effectively, the acquisition system must be supported by an appropriately sized cadre of acquisition professionals with the right skills and training to successfully perform their jobs... We will continue to significantly enhance training and retention programs in order to bolster the capability and size of the acquisition workforce. 83 Creating the Right Incentives Many analysts argue that even with a sufficiently robust, highly trained and capable workforce, the right incentives must be in place. Yet often the incentives in the acquisition process encourage people to make poor decisions. 84 For example, there is a culture within DOD that encourages the obligation of funds before they expire out of fear that if money is not spent, funding for 79 J. Ronald Fox, Defense Acquisition Reform : An Elusive Goal (Center of Military History, 2011), p. 195, 199.See also, Commission on Wartime Contracting In Iraq and Afghanistan, At What Risk? Correcting over-reliance on contractors in contingency operations, Second Interim Report to Congress, February 24, 2011, p. 17; United States Institute of Peace, The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America's National Security Needs in the 21st Century, 2010, p. 39; U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Operations: High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Longstanding Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces, GAO , December 18, 2006; Commission on Wartime Contracting In Iraq and Afghanistan, Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling costs, reducing risk, Final Report to Congress, August, 2011, p See: Business Executives for National Security, Getting to Best: Reforming the Defense Acquisition Enterprise, A Business Imperative for Change from the Task Force on Defense Acquisition Law and Oversight, July, 2009, p P.L , section Data provided by DOD. See also Department of Defense, Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund (DAWDF) FY2012 Report to Congress, Department of Defense, April 2013, p QDR, p J. Ronald Fox, Defense Acquisition Reform : An Elusive Goal (Center of Military History, 2011), p ; Department of Defense, Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Report, January 2006, p. 5; See: Business Executives for National Security, Getting to Best: Reforming the Defense Acquisition Enterprise, A Business Imperative for Change from the Task Force on Defense Acquisition Law and Oversight, July, 2009, p. 3. Congressional Research Service 19

210 Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? future budgets will be cut. This belief can drive managers to prioritize spending money based on an arbitrary calendar deadline instead of sound business decisions. 85 Resetting incentives to ensure that they align with desired outcomes can improve the decisions of the workforce. Another example of incentives driving poor acquisition decisions relates to cost estimating. Senior Defense officials, both past and current, acknowledge that program advocates have strong incentives to underestimate program acquisition costs. Contractors use low cost estimates to win the contract; program representatives use low estimates to argue for approval of the system against competing systems. 86 In 1981, then-deputy Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci testified that low cost estimates are fueled by optimistic contractor proposals to win competitions and program managers who want to see their programs funded. 87 Almost 30 years later, then-under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics John Young echoed this sentiment, stating the enterprise will often pressure acquisition teams and industry to provide low, optimistic estimates to help start programs. 88 The absence of more reliable cost estimates denies Congress the ability to decide on competing strategic and budget priorities based on realistic cost assumptions and denies DOD the opportunity to develop a well-conceived acquisition plan. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review stated, our system of defining requirements and developing capability too often encourages reliance on overly optimistic cost estimates. In order for the Pentagon to produce weapons systems efficiently, it is critical to have budget stability but it is impossible to attain such stability in DOD s modernization budgets if we continue to underestimate the cost of such systems from the start. 89 Establishing Authority and Accountability Authority and accountability is viewed as a critical element in building an effective workforce. 90 Without authority, even the most skilled and incentivized professionals cannot effectively run and manage a program. Yet many analysts believe that the management structure is too bureaucratic; that too many people can say no or influence a program. As one program manager recently quipped, the inside joke among program managers is that We are not really sure who runs the program. 91 Without anyone having practical authority to manage a program, there is no one to effectively hold accountable. As the QDR Independent 85 Robert F. Hale and Frank Kendall, Department of Defense Management of Unobligated Funds; Obligations Tenets, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Memorandum, September 10, House Armed Services Hearings, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., Volume 11, Op. Cit. p House Armed Services Hearings, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., Volume 11, Op. Cit. p John J. Young, Jr., Reasons for Cost Changes for Selected Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs), Memorandum, January 30, Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p The Packard, for example, stated We must give acquisition personnel more authority to do their jobs. If we make it possible for people to do the right thing the first time and allow them to use their common sense, then we believe that the Department can get by with far fewer people. See p. xxiv. 91 Based on conversation with program managers and other acquisition personnel, September 14, Congressional Research Service 20

211 Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? concluded, the fundamental reason for the continued underperformance in acquisition activities is fragmentation of authority and accountability for performance. 92 Targeted Reform Efforts In addition to improving workforce management, as discussed above, targeted reform efforts, similar to the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 and efforts to improve Operational Contract Support can generate significant financial savings and operational benefits. Examples of possible targeted areas ripe for reform include Streamlining acquisition laws and regulations and Focusing on contract logistics. Streamlining Acquisition Laws and Regulations In some instances, regulations aimed at improving the acquisition process or promoting important public-policy goals impose unintended cost or regulatory burdens to industry. A number of analysts have argued that repealing or amending regulations that no longer provide a benefit could serve to simplify the acquisition process, remove unnecessary regulatory burdens on industry, and entice more companies to compete for defense and other federal government contracts. Sometimes, the laws and regulations governing defense procurement can add to the costs of doing business, as may occur in the case of certain domestic source restrictions like the Berry Amendment. Such a perspective does not necessarily argue for wholesale removal of regulations and oversight, but at a minimum argues for adopting an approach of weighing the costs to industry and government against the policy and oversight benefits of the regulations in question. 93 Congress could also choose to amend certain statutes and regulations in such a way as to alleviate the regulatory or financial impact while preserving the fundamental intent of the regulation. Contract Logistics Some government officials and industry experts have identified logistics as an area where significant cost savings could be generated without having an impact on operational capabilities. 94 Recent reports have identified instances of wasteful spending in this area. For example, the DOD Inspector General has developed a body of work that found Boeing charged the Army about $13 million more than fair and reasonable prices for 18 parts on a support contract, U.S. Institute for Peace, The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America's National Security Needs in the 21st Century, Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, July 28, 2010, p. 85. Italics as in original. 93 Honorable William J. Perry, Acquisition Reform, Department of Defense, A Mandate for Change, February 9, 1994, p Based on conversations of these officials with CRS analysts, July 2013 through October Department of Defense Inspector General, Excess Inventory and Contract Pricing Problems Jeopardize the Army Contract with Boeing to Support the Corpus Christi Army Depot, Report D , May 3, Congressional Research Service 21

212 Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? Sikorsky charged the Army approximately $12 million more than fair and reasonable prices for 28 parts, 96 and Boeing charged DLA Aviation $13.7 million more than fair and reasonable prices for 27 parts associated with 1,469 delivery orders. 97 Earlier this month, the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction reported that military forces in Afghanistan were unable to account for about $230 million worth of spare parts and then ordered $138 million of additional parts without sufficient accountability. 98 Given the examples of potential savings identified to date, Congress could consider logistics as a potential area for increased congressional oversight. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, this concludes my statement. I will be pleased to respond to any questions the Committee may have. Author Contact Information Moshe Schwartz Specialist in Defense Acquisition mschwartz@crs.loc.gov, Department of Defense Inspector General, Pricing and Escalation Issues Weaken the Effectiveness of the Army Contract with Sikorsky to Support the Corpus Christi Army Depot, Report D , September 8, 2011, 97 Department of Defense Inspector General, Improved Guidance Needed to Obtain Fair and Reasonable Prices for Sole-Source Spare Parts Procured by the Defense Logistics Agency from the Boeing Company, Report DODIG , June 7, 2013, 98 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Afghan National Army: Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan Lacks Key Information on Inventory in Stock and Requirements for Vehicle Spare Parts, SIGAR 14-3, October 16, 2013, p. 1. Congressional Research Service 22

213 US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE US Army Command and General Staff School Command and General Staff Officer s Course (CGSOC) Common Core F100: Managing Army Change F105: Army Force Integration Reading F105RA What is Force Integration? 1 Effective force integration is a difficult and demanding process that involves coordinating many complex and unique procedures and data systems. Force integration is the synchronized, resource-constrained execution of approved force development plans and programs to achieve systematic management of change, including: The introduction, incorporation, and sustainment of doctrine, organizations, and equipment into the Army. Coordination and integration of operational and managerial systems collectively designed to improve the effectiveness and capability of the Army. Knowledge and consideration of the potential implications of decisions and actions taken within the execution process. The scope of force integration includes the functions of structuring organizations, manning, equipping, training, sustaining, deploying, stationing, and funding the force during the introduction and incorporation of approved organizational or force structure changes. It also includes the function of minimizing adverse impacts on force readiness during the introduction and incorporation of change. Force integration synchronizes these functional activities to produce combat ready organizations. Force integration is the enabling process of force management. Force integration focuses Army management actions towards organizations to ensure the orderly incorporation and sustainment of structure, equipment, and doctrine in the Army. The objective of the effort is to assess the combined impact of Army functional systems on units and ensure the appropriate mix of resources (structure, people, equipment, dollars, facilities, and information) result in fully operational units. How does the Army prioritize resources to meet operational demands? The Army produces three primary Armywide prioritization documents. The DCS, G 3/5/7 is responsible for integrating and synchronizing Army priorities. 2 a. Army resource priority list. The Army Resource Priority List (ARPL) is an unclassified/for official use only document generated by the DCS, G 3/5/7 Global Force Management (GFM) Division and authorized by the DCS, G 3/5/7, which provides four broad categories for the classification and prioritization of resources. The ARPL is updated, as required, but no less than every two years. The four ARPL categories are (1) Expeditionary capability includes deployed or employed forces and critical institutional requirements. (2) Mission critical capability includes next to deploy or employ forces. 1 Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, United States Army War College. How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Handbook, (Carlisle: PA: USAWC, 15 July 2013, para 2-4.b. CGSC copyright registration # E. 2 Headquarters, Department of the Army, AR , Army Force Generation (Washington, DC: HQDA, 14 March 2011). F105ASRA F105RA-1 JUNE 2014

214 (3) Mission essential capability includes remaining institutional requirements. (4) Mission enhancing capability includes transformation or resetting forces. b. Integrated requirement priority list. The integrated requirement priority list (IRPL) is a secret document generated by the DCS, G 3/5/7 GFM Division and provides Army prioritization of all force requirements (both GCC and institutional) within each ARPL category. The IRPL is generally updated each fiscal year (FY) at the beginning of the sourcing process, but may be updated, as required. c. Dynamic Army Resource Priority List. The Dynamic Army Resource Priority List (DARPL) is a document generated by the DCS, G 3/5/7 Force Management Directorate and provides detailed prioritization of specific units over time. Programmers primarily use the unclassified version, which removes the qualitative data for use in resourcing applications. The DARPL is generally updated twice each FY at the beginning and midpoint of the resourcing process, but may be updated, as required. How does the Army prioritize and distribute personnel? Military human resource management (MHRM) follows a life-cycle that is derived from the Army s Organizational Life Cycle Model discussed in F101, Personnel Structure, Acquisition, Training, Distribution, Development, Deployment, Compensation, Sustainment, and Transition. This reading will focus primarily on the structure and distribution processes; more specifically, how the Army prioritizes and distributes personnel to meet authorized strength levels and operational requirements. In previous lessons, you learned about how the Army projects its strength requirements and attains personnel authorizations to meet those requirements through Total Army Analysis (TAA) and PPBE. This process is referred to as manpower management, which links accession, retention, and promotion targets to Army requirements as measured against the military manning program in the PPBE. Manpower management, which manages personnel authorizations, or commonly referred to as spaces, is a G3 function. Whereas personnel management, a G1 function, deals with the actual soldiers, commonly referred to as faces, assigned to fill authorizations in the approved Army force structure. It is important to differentiate between these two terms, specifically because there frequently is not enough personnel (faces) available to fill all authorizations (spaces). Throughout the year, the total strength (TS) of the Army will change based on enlistments, commissioning source graduations, retirements, etc. The Army must manage the total strength to meet a specific authorization set by Congress. At the end of each fiscal year, the Army must report its end strength (ES) to congress. This number is a snap shot in time of how many people are within the Army. The end strength authorization set by Congress plays a key role in the TAA process as a resource constraint. Another important personnel factor in the force management process is the Army s operating strength. The operating strength is simply the number of personnel who are assigned against a modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) or table of distribution and allowance (TDA). The rest of the personnel in the Army are in a Trainees, Transients, Holdees, or Students (TTHS) category. During the TAA process, the goal is to limit the authorized number of positions within MTOE and TDA units to the operating strength of the Army. The total number of MTOE and TDA positions is referred to as the force structure authorization (FSA). When the FSA does not equal our operating strength, there is an operating strength deviation (OpSD). OpSD measures the difference between the OS (faces) and the FSA (spaces). The goal is to minimize the difference between the two, but some deviation almost always exists. Unpredicted changes in retention rates (OS total changes) and season surges in acquisitions (TTHS changes) are two reasons the OS number fluctuates. A positive deviation (an OS greater than F105ASRA F105RA-2 JUNE 2014

215 FSA) means personnel are present in units in excess of structure requirements. A negative deviation (FSA exceeds OS) means the structure is larger than the quantity of personnel available to fill it. 3 The figure below provides a graph of what all these personnel numbers might look like in a given fiscal year. Figure F105AC-1. Manning Spectrum 4 When the Army can t fill its force structure, priorities must be set. The Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) sets priorities for how the operating strength of the Army will be distributed. This document is called the HQDA Active Component Manning Guidance. The guidance establishes levels of fill based on unit missions and provides a mitigation strategy for personnel shortages. The manning priorities established in the HQDA Active Component Manning Guidance are also influenced by the ARPL. In addition to guidance from senior leaders and the ARPL, the Army G-1 uses established authorizations (obtained from FMS) and Force Structure (obtained from Structure And Manpower Allocation System [SAMAS]), which you learned about in F103, to determine the Army Manning Guidance which are the Army priorities for that fiscal year. From the Army Manning Guidance, the G-1 then produces an annual Personnel Management Authorization Document (PMAD), which is a by skill, by grade distribution plan. If this distribution plan is required more than annually, the G1 will publish a supplemental document known as an updated authorizations document (UAD). HRC takes this guidance and then fills the faces into the right spaces, as directed by the G-1. Personnel fill rates and timelines for units are established by the Army (HQDA) G-1, which uses authorized strength levels, target fill levels, PMAD directed authorizations, and the operational (deployment) timelines established by the Army G-3. 5 The PMAD allocates personnel down to the unit identification code (UIC) level and manning cycle for the current year. There are currently two manning cycles per year. During these cycles, HRC will review the personnel available for movement along with 33 Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, United States Army War College. How the Army Runs How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Handbook, (Carlisle: PA: USAWC, 15 July 2013, 307. CGSC copyright registration # E. 4 Army Force Management School, Lesson FS 16, Manning the Force (Enlisted), (Fort Belvoir, VA: AFMS, May 2009), Slide 5. 5 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 1-0, Human Resources Support (Washington, DC: HQDA, 6 April 2010), 3-2. F105ASRA F105RA-3 JUNE 2014

216 the PMAD to determine where and when Soldiers will be assigned. Units in the ARFORGEN process will have different manning levels on the PMAD depending on their phase in the ARFORGEN cycle. Unit ARFORGEN cycles provide one time factor for personnel assignments. Other factors include the professional development requirements of the individual. Each enlisted Soldier and officer must complete key developmental (KD) jobs to qualify them for the next higher grade. Personnel also require professional education in order to prepare them for future assignments. HRC seeks to assign enlisted and officer personnel in units or on installations in order to provide them these opportunities within their timeline for advancement. Each branch must identify key developmental positions for their personnel along with career paths for specific specialties. For example, in most branches for an officer to be a battalion commander at the rank of lieutenant colonel (LTC), they must complete platoon and company command time as well as other KD jobs and schools along their career. If a branch has limited company command opportunities within the FSA, this will limit the number of officers with the experience necessary for battalion command in the future. How does the Army prioritize and distribute equipment? In F104, you explored how the Army uses the Defense Acquisition Management System to develop and acquire its materiel requirements. However, as with personnel, the Army does not always have sufficient quantities of equipment to fill all required authorizations. Therefore, the Army must prioritize how it modernizes and integrates equipment into operational units. The foundational guidance for how the Army prioritizes its equipment is provided in the National strategic documents and The Army Plan, which you learned about in F101. More refined guidance is then provided through the following: 6 The Army Equipment Modernization Strategy: This Secretary of the Army (SecArmy) and Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) multi-year strategy provides guidance and establishes a framework for synchronizing the requirement, resourcing, and acquisition processes to modernize equipment with the underlying foundation of being Versatile and Tailorable, yet Affordable and Cost-Effective. It provides the strategic underpinnings for how to adjust equipment modernization programs due to changes in the strategic, technological, and fiscal environments across equipment portfolios. The Army Equipment Modernization Plan: This SecArmy and CSA yearly plan provides the results of the annual Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process and summarizes how the Army's Research Development and Acquisition budget request is linked to the Army's strategy. It details the dollars, quantities, and rationale for the equipment procured in the yearly President s Budget and is based upon the underlying foundation of Starts with the Soldier and Squad. The Army Equipping Guidance: This Headquarters, Department of the Army multi-year guidance provides direction for Army components, major commands, and units to allocate and distribute equipment. The underlying foundation is to identify and minimize equipment risks and costs as the Army transitions from Afghanistan through Sequestration towards Regionally Aligned and Mission Tailored Forces. In addition, the Army Equipping Guidance provides specific lines of effort which tie resource prioritization to current National and Army strategies. The figure below provides an example of the lines of effort from the latest Army equipping guidance. 6 Headquarters, Department of the Army G8, Army Equipping Guidance 2013 through 2016 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 20 June 2013), 7. F105ASRA F105RA-4 JUNE 2014

217 THE ARMY EQUIPPING GUIDANCE Equip Units for their Missions Prioritize, 2013 through 2014, units deploying to Afghanistan, the Global Response Force, forward deployed units, and low density/high demand units Transition, 2014 through 2016, to the Future Force Generation model supporting Regionally Aligned and Mission Tailored Forces Meet critical dual use equipment needs and equip organizations that train Soldiers Increase Readiness by Redistributing Equipment Implement Lead Materiel Integrator through the use of Decision Support Tool Be innovative with retrograde; aggressively cross-level at lowest levels to increase readiness Increase transparency of reserve equipment payback and fieldings Save Money Minimize transportation costs Ensure 100% visibility and accountability, and divest to reduce excess Establish accurate authorization documents Figure F105AC-2. The Army Equipping Guidance 7 Equipping priorities will be based on the DARPL, which includes expeditionary, mission critical, and enhanced mission capability forces such as units in Afghanistan, the Global Response Force, forward deployed units, and low density/high-demand units. 8 To equip units for their assigned missions, the Army uses a series of aim points and S-level goals to ensure equipment is delivered at the correct time in the right quantities. Aim Points provide a means to track units state of readiness as they move through Army force generation (ARFORGEN). They are targets at specified points in time that enable training to increase readiness. They enhance the ability of Army leadership, resource managers, and force providers to make accurate and timely decisions to mitigate risk and synchronize manning, equipping, training, and sourcing. Equipping (S)-level goals provide a means to measure units equipment levels to achieve a prescribed state of readiness. Like aim points, these metrics enhance the ability to make accurate and timely decisions. The goals are applied to all echelons, but most commonly are applied to brigade-sized units (for example, brigade combat teams, and functional and multi-functional brigades). 9 Where will I get my stuff? According to the Army Equipping Guidance for 2013 through 2016, the goal is to ensure that we get the right equipment, to the right units, on the right installations, at the absolute least possible cost. For the soldier at the tactical level, it ultimately boils down to the question of where will I get my stuff? As you have learned throughout F100, the Army has established processes for ensuring that capabilities are identified, developed and integrated into units to meet global requirements. With regards to distributing materiel to units, the Army has developed both deliberate and rapid processes and procedures that can adapt and change based on the constantly evolving operational and fiscal environments. Prior to covering these specific processes, it is important to know the difference between fielding and equipping. Fielding applies to a solution for the entire Army and generally goes through the DOTMLPF integration as well as the materiel processes that you learned about in F104. Equipping refers to solutions (usually only commercial-off-the-shelf [COTS] materiel) provided to a single unit for a single mission. While equipping is generally a much faster solution, there is normally no accompanying doctrine, training, or sustainment integration concurrent with receipt of the system. Sometimes this is okay (i.e., 7 Ibid, Ibid, Ibid, 17. F105ASRA F105RA-5 JUNE 2014

218 metal detecting wands for security checkpoints), but sometimes it creates problems especially in the long-term. As an example, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAP) were rapidly acquired under non-program of record (POR) funding due to urgency without the accompanying integration. Training, maintenance, and doctrine for their use occurred on the fly after their issue. Most recently, the Secretary of Defense has asked the Army to make MRAPs part of their new modernization program, requiring a much greater reverse-integration effort. The following are brief explanations of current Army processes, both deliberate and rapid, whose goal is ultimately to provide units with the right amount of material, in the right amount of time. Total Package Fielding (TPF) 10 is the Army s standard fielding process developed to provide Army materiel systems to using units in a coordinated/consolidated package of end items, support items and technical documentation. The intent of TPF is to relieve the gaining command (GC) and subordinate units from much of the work load associated with fielding new systems. Instead, under TPF, the program manager (PM) is required to: program funds for initial issue materiel to be provided; requisition the initial issue materiel; deliver all the TPF materiel to the GC in a coordinated manner and pay for all cost associated with deprocessing and fielding of the TPF materiel; and, provide customer documentation. TPF has been the Army s standard fielding process since It is a recognized method for successful fieldings, specifically known for its ability to adjust to changes in production and fielding schedules. As an S3 or executive officer (XO), you will more than likely work with material fielding teams (MFT) and new equipment training teams (NETT) to integrate new capabilities into your unit under the TPF process. Capability sets are an assembly of multiple programs of record integrated into the Army Network to achieve enhanced network performance. In October 2012, the Army began to equip deploying brigade combat teams (BCTs) with Capability Set (CS) 13, the Army s first integrated package of radios, satellite systems, software applications, smartphone-like devices and other network components. This capability set was the first fully integrated suite of network gear fielded as part of the Army s new Agile Capabilities Life Cycle Process (or Agile Process), a fundamental change in the way the service delivers equipment to Soldiers. Rather than developing network systems independently and on their own timelines, the Army is integrating capabilities up front, testing them at semi-annual, Soldier-driven network integration evaluations (NIEs) and delivering complete technology packages aligned with the Army Force Generation cycle. As each capability set is fielded, the Army is developing and evaluating the next capability set via the NIE process. 11 In the past, gaining units have traditionally received new equipment directly from PMs based on TOE authorizations. However, capability set management inserts an Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASA/ALT)-level integrator or coordinator into the modernization effort to focus across products for an integrated capability. Theater provided equipment (TPE) 12 provides deploying units with the equipment required to meet specific mission requirements. This process reduces transit requirements (times and costs) and achieves readiness for the deployed unit, but leads to cascading shortages for non-deployed units. A significant percentage of equipment is in sets; this includes critical mission-unique equipment not documented on Army MTOEs, but which provides essential capabilities that should be captured in readiness reporting. It is imperative that the Army document and account for this equipment properly to convey an accurate picture of the Army s equipment resourcing to Army leaders and other external audiences. As the war in 10 Army Force Management School, Lesson FS 37, Total Package Fielding, (Fort Belvoir, VA: AFMS, January 2014). 11 Association of the United States Army, Capability Set Production and Fielding: Enhancing the U.S. Army s Combat Effectiveness (October 2012), Headquarters, Department of the Army G8, 2012 Army Equipping Strategy (Washington, DC: HQDA, June 2012), 7. F105ASRA F105RA-6 JUNE 2014

219 Afghanistan draws down and the US shifts its focus from long term stability operations, we will most likely see a decreased reliance on the use of theater provided equipment. However, similar concepts, such as Army prepositioned stocks, may be a viable alternative based on the developing regional alignment strategy. Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) 13 are strategically positioned critical war-fighting stocks that are forward positioned afloat and land-based at worldwide locations. APS contribute to an agile stance by optimizing expeditionary power projection. In addition, they enable Joint Force commanders to reposture forces to other priority missions secure in the knowledge that APS is available to equip next-to-deploy forces should the need arise. The use of APS is primarily driven CCDR OPLAN requirements. In this capacity, they provide forward-positioned equipment and sustainment stock to equip early arriving BCT and support formations. More specifically, the land-based sets provide a robust, forward presence to deter potential hostile forces and should deterrence fail, provide combat capability to defeat the enemy. Afloat equipment sets are multi-apportioned for planning, strategically-agile and provide full spectrum capability. In addition to priority OPLANs, APS supports an array of CCDR operations including COIN, IW, TSC, BPC and exercises. The Rapid Equipping Force (REF), 14 headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, harnesses current and emerging technologies to provide immediate solutions to the urgent challenges of U.S. Army forces deployed globally. Established in October 2002, REF is a staff support agency under HQDA G 3/5/7, Army Asymmetric Warfare Office (AAWO) and reporting directly to the VCSA. During the past 11 years, the REF has met challenges as diverse as defeating improvised explosive devices, increasing tactical-level operational energy efficiency, gathering blast effect data to better understand traumatic brain injury and improving intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance capabilities in austere locations. The REF responds to global Army units of all types, combat, combat support and combat service support, to rapidly adapt to changing battlefield conditions and enemy tactics. On 30 January 2014, the U.S. Army affirmed the continued existence of its Rapid Equipping Force, thus maintaining the service s ability to quickly address soldier non-standard equipment needs. In 2015, the REF will formally fall under the authority of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT) is an Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC)-led quarterly assessment process that identifies non-program of record, nonstandard systems or pieces of equipment, including REF, to be rapidly transitioned into an acquisition program of record. It also identifies other non-equipment capabilities that merit consideration as potential enduring Army capabilities. In partnership with the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, ARCIC manages this process to assess systems in operational settings to determine whether or not they should become: 1) systems of record and be fielded to the entire Army; 2) niche systems for certain theaters; or 3) discontinued. An iteration of CDRT lasts six months and it primarily considers materiel capabilities. Participants include HQ TRADOC, ARCIC FWD, HQDA G2, G3/5/7, G4, G6, G8, the Office of the Surgeon General (OTSG), the Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC), ASA (ALT), the Army Materiel Command (AMC), and the Operating Force. Operational Army unit input, through survey responses, is the basis for the recommendations. The intent of the process is to enter the formal developments process at a later stage, reducing time from the development cycle. Iterative lists of equipment candidate systems are streamlined for reasonable warfighter assessments. Its recommendations are ultimately briefed to the Army Vice Chief of Staff. CDRT s force protection candidates that have become proven winners for our Soldiers are the Interceptor body armor, the improvised explosive device (IED) route clearance package, the Armored Security Vehicle (ASV), and the Common Remote Operated Weapons System (CROWS). Examples of non-materiel capabilities approved include the Weapons Intelligence Team (WIT), the Joint Trauma Analysis and Prevention of Injury in Combat Program (JTAPIC), and the Company Intelligence Support Team (CoIST) training. Recent CDRT candidates 13 Headquarters, Department of the Army G4, Army Prepositioned Stocks briefing (Washington, DC: HQDA, June 2014). 14 The U.S. Army Rapid Equipping Force, Press Release, Army Confirms Rapid Equipping Force s Enduring Status (Ft. Belvoir, VA, 31 January 2012). F105ASRA F105RA-7 JUNE 2014

220 include: the one-system remote video terminal, the Green Laser Z-Bolt, specialized search dogs, line of communication bridging, and the Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System. Operational Needs Statements (ONS) are Army capability requests to HQDA constituting a request for a materiel and/or non-materiel solution to correct a deficiency or to improve a capability impacting mission accomplishment. Prior to combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army s operational needs statements were requests through DA G4 to access equipment in war reserves. The advent of rapid acquisition systems (RFI and REF) necessitated a mechanism to make changes to MTOE equipment levels as well as to request non-mtoe equipment. ONSs became the tool that operational field commanders used to document the urgent need for a materiel solution to correct a deficiency, to improve a capability, or to request that HQDA procure a new or emerging capability that enhances mission accomplishment. The ONS is used to support deployed units, deploying units, and units conducting their assigned missions. An ONS is adjudicated in accordance with (IAW) Army priorities. The ONS provides an opportunity to the field commander, outside of the acquisition, capability development and training development communities, to enter the Capabilities Development System. Operational units normally route ONSs through their chain of command through the DA G3 to the Army Requirements and Resourcing Board (AR2B) via the Equipment Common Operating Picture (ECOP) SIPR Website. Approved ONSs are commonly routed to HQDA G 8/G 4/ASA(ALT) for resourcing. The Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) is a Department of Defense (DOD)-initiated request that was first used in 2004 emulating the success of the Army s REF program. The JUON is a joint request used to break through the institutional barriers of providing timely, effective support to operational commanders. It does not attempt to introduce a new acquisition or procurement process; however, it is attempting to push joint commander-identified urgent or critical needs through the existing DOD processes to meet certified operational critical doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) (primarily materiel and logistics) requirements. The goal is to act on requests within 14 days to designate or decline a JUONS as an immediate warfighter or soldier need (IWN), so that a contract is awarded and goods and services are delivered within 4 months to 2 years. All incoming requests for an urgent operational need must be validated and prioritized by the combatant command before forwarding to the Joint Staff via the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET). The cell tracks how quickly the military responds to IWNs and periodically reports directly to the SECDEF through the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF). 15 How does force generation build capable forces to meet operational requirements? The Army force generation process is the structured progression of unit readiness over time to produce trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of the combatant commander (CCDR) and other Army requirements. 16 Prior to September 11 th, 2001, the Army s process of force generation, referred to as tiered readiness, did not require all units to be manned and equipped to the same levels. Tiered readiness focused on fulfilling established war plans, which generally took into account time to mobilize, train, deploy and, if necessary, drawdown forces. Units were resourced or modernized based on an assigned authorized level of organization (ALO) that the Army dictated by a unit s place in the Time-Phased Force Deployment Data/Document (TPFDD). With the onset of the global war on terrorism, characterized by the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US required a continuous rotation of deployed forces. As a result, the Army developed and instituted a 15 Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, United States Army War College. How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Handbook, (Carlisle: PA: USAWC, 15 July 2013, para 11-60, 246. CGSC copyright registration # E. 16 Headquarters, Department of the Army, AR , Army Force Generation (Washington, DC: HQDA, 14 March 2011), 1. F105ASRA F105RA-8 JUNE 2014

221 new force generation process, referred to as cyclic readiness, which allocated resources based on the operational readiness cycle to ensure that all units had what they needed to fight and win when it was their turn to deploy. To execute cyclic readiness, the Army established a force generation model, referred to as ARFORGEN, that cycled units through three force pools: RESET, Train/Ready, and Available. Each of the three force pools contained a balanced force capability to provide a sustained flow of forces for current commitments and to hedge against unexpected contingencies. 17 The drawdown of major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has indicated a future characterized by force reductions and resource constraints. The current Army Force Generation model was designed to provide a steady stream of fully resourced units to support continuous operations. Ultimately, this was made possible by a large force structure, sustained funding levels and the addition of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding. The future Army Force Generation Model must consider force and resource reductions while still maintaining the flexibility and adaptability to support current operations and unexpected contingencies. In addition, it must consider Army goals and objectives aimed at maintaining predictability for manning, equipping, training, and resourcing. This also includes providing rapidly deployable, surge capable forces that are both regionally aligned and make effective use of the National Guard and Reserves. The Army is developing a Future Force Generation model that according to the 2013 Army Strategic Planning Guidance: sustains the Army s ability to provide a manned, trained, and equipped Total Force to meet the full range of current and emerging combatant commander requirements. The Army must remain able to tailor its versatile mix of both active and reserve capabilities and deploy them rapidly for unified land operations of various durations. The Army will avoid the costs caused by generating readiness in excess of requirements. The Future Force Generation model consists of three distinct Force Pools: Mission Force Pool, Rotational Force Pool, and the Operational Sustainment Force Pool. 18 Mission Force Pool: Consists of theater committed forces such as the 2nd Infantry Division, 1 st Brigade Combat Team in Korea, low-density units with high operational demand requirements (e.g. Terminal High Altitude Air Defense), and units required to maintain a sustained mission readiness like the 20th Support Command. In general, Mission Force Pool corps, divisions, and brigade combat teams will be maintained at the highest readiness level. Rotational Force Pool: Consists of those units allocated for deployment or apportioned against a contingency plan. These units move through the Reset, Train/ Ready, and Available cycles in preparation for a rotation into a known deployment in support of planned operations or remain within the Available state for potential contingency operations. The majority of units currently scheduled to deploy in support of OEF are examples of these units. Rotational Force Pool units will be incrementally manned and equipped to 100 percent, like the current ARFORGEN model, but should be able to retain much of their equipment when they return to the Reset Pool. Operational Sustainment Force Pool: Is comprised of units not currently allocated to planned operations or apportioned to contingency operations. Units in this pool may be manned and equipped at lower levels and achieve training proficiency levels based on available training days. Examples include 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at the National Training Center, and Army National Guard division headquarters. 17 Ibid, HQ, Department of the Army G8, Army Equipping Guidance 2013 through 2016 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 20 June 2013), F105ASRA F105RA-9 JUNE 2014

222 Figure F105AC-3. Future Force Generation Force Pools 19 Finally, in an effort to provide more predictability and stability for leaders and soldiers and their career development, GEN Odierno announced at the AUSA Winter Symposium on 24 February 2012 that the Future Force Generation Model would be aligned along command tours between 24 and 27 months long for the Active Component. Command would be rotated at the conclusion of the available period to coincide with the beginning of the reset period. Figure F105AC-4. Example 24-month Force Generation Cycle Army Force Management School, ARFORGEN and Readiness Briefing (Fort Belvoir, VA: AFMS, December 2013), Slide Army Force Management School, ARFORGEN and Readiness Briefing (Fort Belvoir, VA: AFMS, December 2013), Slide 9. F105ASRA F105RA-10 JUNE 2014

223 Conclusion The purpose of this reading was to give you an overview of how the Army prioritizes and integrates capabilities, primarily personnel and equipment, into operational units to meet global requirements. How the Army Runs defines force integration as the synchronized, resource constrained execution of approved force development plans and programs to achieve systematic management of change. In more simple terms, force integration actions are what link the institutional-level force management processes (that you explored in F101 through F104) to the Operating Force. Additional Resources: US Army War College. Department of Command, Leadership, and Management. How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, Carlisle, PA: USAWC, 15 July Available at: AR Army Force Generation. The entire regulation can be found at: The FY Army Active Component Manning Guidance (ALARCT 293/2012) can be found at: The Army Equipment Modernization Strategy, Army Equipment Modernization Plan, and the Army Equipping Strategy 2013 through 2016 can all be viewed and downloaded at: F105ASRA F105RA-11 JUNE 2014

224 US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE US Army Command and General Staff School Command and General Staff Officer s Course (CGSOC) Common Core F100: Managing Army Change F105: Army Force Integration Reading F105RB Sep. 18, 2013 Statement by Gen. Odierno before the House Armed Services Committee 1 Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and other distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you about the reduced discretionary caps in 2014 and the continued threat of sequestration under current law as well as the strategic choices facing the Army. Let me begin by thanking each member of the committee for your support and commitment to U.S. Army Soldiers, Civilians, and Families particularly while we remain at war and with the specter of great fiscal challenges and strategic uncertainty. The Nation s investment in the Army over the past decade has been decisive in ensuring the success of American Soldiers on the battlefield and securing our national security objectives. Resourcing the Army The need for a standing military has been scrutinized by Americans and today is no different. Throughout our history, we have drawn down military forces at the close of every war. This time, however, we are drawing down our Army before the war is over and at a time when there is grave uncertainty in the international security environment. Today, the Total Army the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the U.S. Army Reserves remains heavily committed in operations overseas and at home. More than 70,000 Soldiers are deployed, including 50,000 Soldiers in Afghanistan, and nearly 88,000 Soldiers are forward stationed across the globe. We have also learned from previous drawdowns that the costs of creating an unprepared and hollow force will always fall on the shoulders of those who are asked to deploy and respond to the next contingency. We have experienced this too many times to repeat this egregious error again. As Chief of Staff, it is my responsibility to provide my best military advice in order to ensure we have an Army that will meet our national security needs in the complex, uncertain environment of the future. It is imperative that we preserve decision space for the Commander-in-Chief, the Secretary of Defense and the Congress. Together, we must ensure our Army can deliver a trained and ready force that deters conflict but when necessary has the capability and the capacity to execute a sustained, successful major combat operation. During my more than 37 years of service, the U.S. Army has deployed Soldiers and fought in more than ten conflicts including the longest war in our Nation s history in Afghanistan. No one can predict where the next contingency will arise that will require the employment of ground forces; we only know the lessons of the past. In every decade since World War II, the United States has deployed U.S. Army Soldiers to defend our national security interests. Unfortunately, there is little to convince me that we will not ask our Soldiers to deploy again in the near future. If the magnitude and speed of the discretionary cap reductions remain, the Army will not be able to fully execute the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance requirements. From FY14 to FY17, as we continue to draw down and restructure the Army into a smaller force, the Army will have significantly degraded readiness 1 Congress, House, Statement by Gen. Odierno before the House Armed Services Committee, First Session, 113 th Congress on 18 September 2013, Planning for Sequestration in Fiscal Year 2014 and Perspectives of the Military Services on the Strategic Choices and Management Review. Accessed on 5 May pdf F105ASRB F105RB-1 JUNE 2014

225 and extensive modernization program shortfalls. Only in FY18 to FY23 will we begin to rebalance readiness and modernization to a level that is appropriate to fully execute the Defense Strategic Guidance. But this will come at the expense of reductions in force structure and endstrength, which in my view will add significant risk for the Army to conduct even one sustained major combat operation. Past Budgetary Priorities and Reductions In the years since 2003, the Army has relied heavily on Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding to build and maintain the core competencies and readiness for operations overseas. OCO funds have been used to meet immediate operational needs and to fill voids in Soldier training and modernization procurement. Prior to 2003, the Army used major exercises at our combat training centers to ensure the readiness of our brigade combat teams. The Army began shifting the focus of these exercises from training for the full range of combat operations to preparing for more limited stability or counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in support of ongoing wars. In 2011, the Army began reintroducing training for combined arms in an effort to restore these core warfighting skills which had atrophied after a decade of COIN-focused operations. The Army had intended in 2013 for all Army brigades not scheduled to deploy to Afghanistan to train for these critical combat functions in their Combat Training Center (CTC) exercises. Unfortunately, our goal to begin rebuilding these core warfighting skills in FY13 has not been realized due to the effects of sequestration. This puts us and our Soldiers at risk if faced with a future conflict or unforeseen contingency. Over the past three years, the Army has absorbed several budgetary reductions in the midst of conducting operations overseas and rebalancing the force to the wider array of missions called for in the 2012 Defense Strategy Guidance. In 2010, under Secretary Gates, DOD developed a ten-year plan to achieve nearly $300 billion in efficiencies. To comply with the discretionary caps outlined in the Budget Control Act of 2011, the FY 2013 Budget proposed $487 billion in DOD funding reductions over ten years, of which the Army s share is an estimated $170 billion. With the end of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars and after the collaborative development of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, the Army agreed to reduce our endstrength in order to maintain a balanced, ready and modern force. 98% of the Army s endstrength reductions were taken from the Active Army. As a result, we are in the process of shrinking our Active Army by 14% from a wartime high of 570,000 to 490,000. At the same time, we are keeping the Army National Guard relatively constant, with a 2% reduction from 358,000 to 350,000, and retaining the Army Reserves at 205,000. In conjunction with endstrength reductions, on 25 June 2013, we announced changes to the Army force structure to reorganize 45 brigade combat teams (BCTs) into 32 BCTs. In doing so, we will eliminate excess headquarters infrastructure while reinvesting the greater combat power of 95 of 98 combat battalions across the remaining Brigade Combat Teams. All of these endstrength and force structure decisions were developed to respond to previous budget cuts and prior to the implementation of sequestration. If the additional discretionary cap reductions required under current law continue, we will be forced to further reduce the Army endstrength to at least 420,000 in the Active Army, 315,000 in the Army National Guard, and 185,000 in the U.S. Army Reserves. This will represent a Total Army endstrength reduction of more than 18% over seven years a 26% reduction in the Active Army endstrength and a 45% reduction in Active Army Brigade Combat Teams; a 12% reduction in the Army National Guard; and a 9% in the U.S. Army Reserves. F105ASRB F105RB-2 JUNE 2014

226 Sequestration Impacts in FY13 and FY14 Sequestration has had a profound effect on our efforts to prepare units for future contingency operations. The continued implementation of the reduced discretionary caps beginning in FY 2014 will force drastic impacts across all aspects of Army readiness in training, equipment sustainment and modernization, military and civilian manning, and installation support. Training In FY13, the Army was forced to cancel CTC rotations for seven brigade combat teams the equivalent of two divisions that were not slated to deploy to Afghanistan or serve in the Global Response Force. We had intended for all Active Army brigades not scheduled to deploy to Afghanistan to train on their critical core competencies, but we were forced to cancel all CTC rotations for non-deploying units. If sequestration-level reductions continue into Fiscal Year 2014, 85% (59 of 69) active and reserve component BCTs will not meet the contingency requirements of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. Even the four BCTs that have been funded for collective training at a CTC in preparation for an Afghanistan deployment will only be trained for the Train and Assist mission required for that theater; they will not be prepared for any other contingency operation. Certification at a CTC rotation means that a BCT is fully trained to accomplish all of its assigned missions. Without this training and certification, these units are not properly prepared to deploy. In the event of a crisis, we will deploy these units but they will be at a higher risk of not accomplishing their mission for the Nation. Our Soldiers are adaptive and agile; over time they may accomplish their mission but their success will come at a higher risk of casualties. This means that if these units are called upon to defend South Korea, or to secure chemical and biological weapons in Syria, the Commander in Chief will be forced to send Soldiers into harm's way who have not trained as part of a large Army formation and have not proven their ability to execute their collective unit missions. Twelve years of conflict have resulted in an extensive backlog in our leadership education and training programs due to reductions in schoolhouse capacity. For example, only 68% of Majors, 75% of Warrant Officers, and 71% of Non-Commissioned Officers have completed their critical professional military education (PME) courses necessary to effectively lead Soldiers in current and future assignments. The opportunities lost to train the Army s midgrade and senior leaders in CTC rotations, collective training, and institutional education will result in Army leaders incapable of maneuvering units under fire and in combat being promoted to command larger units and organizations. Finally, there continue to be extensive shortfalls in critical specialties and backlogs in institutional training. FY14 cuts will increase the current 200-seat backlog in Aviation Flight Training and will continue to erode the capacity in our sniper, Ranger, and language schools. Risk taken in training readiness cannot be quickly recovered. It takes an Active Army BCT one year to build full training readiness for unified land operations. Missed leader development opportunities will create a deficit that cannot be recovered. Equipment Sustainment and Modernization Due to a $1.7 billion reduction in FY13 OCO Reset funding, the Army deferred maintenance on 172 aircraft, more than 900 vehicles, almost 2,000 weapons, and over 10,000 pieces of communications equipment. For those units not deploying last year, the Army reduced routine maintenance costs that in turn incurred an additional ~$73.5 million in deferred maintenance costs that will carry over into FY14. In addition, a $411.2 million shortfall in depot level funding resulted in the release of nearly 2,600 civilian and contract personnel in critical engineering and trade skills that have further eroded resident and private sector industrial base capabilities. F105ASRB F105RB-3 JUNE 2014

227 The Army is responsible for maintaining pre-positioned sets of equipment that serve as the strategic hedge in critical regions of the world in order to allow for rapid deployment of Soldiers in times of crisis. Sequestration has forced the Army to defer maintenance and new equipment fielding of these sets impacting each Combatant Commander s war plans. We will be unable to maintain the software upgrades necessary to sustain aerial network operations; the Army software sustainment program will be at high risk due to the reduction in funding for 135 systems that affect network security, systems operations, integration and information assurance. In the event sequestration-level discretionary caps continue into FY14, we will assume significant risk in our Combat Vehicle development and delay the fielding of Abrams training simulators by two years. In our aviation program, we cannot afford to procure a new Armed Aerial Scout program and we will be forced to reduce the production and modernization of 25 helicopters. We will reduce system upgrades for unmanned aerial vehicles. We will delay the modernization of Air Defense Command and Control systems. If reductions of that magnitude continue into FY15 and beyond, every acquisition program will be affected. These reductions will significantly impact 100 modernization programs by not transitioning to production, terminating their funding, restructuring the program or significantly delaying their completion. This will be necessary to facilitate our ability to concentrate the available funds on priority programs in science and technology, Paladin Integrated Management (PIM), Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) and the JLTV (Joint Light Tactical Vehicle). Additionally, FY13 sequestration cuts greatly impacted Army Science & Technology (S&T) the seed corn of Army modernization and innovation. Sequestration nearly halved new basic research grants in FY13 and affected grants at more than 120 universities in 38 states. If additional reductions continue, we expect that increasing numbers of Army scientists and engineers will move to private sector jobs, impacting Army S&T now and the development of new capabilities for the future. Applied Research and Advanced Technology Development efforts in key capability areas will be further impacted across all areas including basic research, armor, high energy lasers, anti-access/area denial technologies, electronic warfare, cyber, mission command, night vision, Soldier training, medical research, operation and sustainment cost-cutting initiatives for Army systems and manufacturing technology efforts. As these lower funding levels continue, we are increasingly concerned about the health of the industrial base and the subsequent consequences for the Army. Shrinking demands and production rates will tend to lead to higher proportional overhead costs and unit costs. Lower demand will also lead to the loss of trained and experienced workers, which will reduce industry s ability to respond to future requirements. Small businesses, which provide components and subcomponents for large end items and are less likely to have the capital resources to survive gaps in production, may shutter or leave the sector. The engineering and technical workforce necessary to design and develop new systems may migrate to other sectors or retire. Manufacturing skills in highly specialized areas such as aircraft integration and large caliber weapons are likewise difficult to replace if lost due to downsizing. Manning Military Manning. The Army will strive to retain its most talented Soldiers but will be forced to separate large numbers of high quality experienced, combat Veterans. For example, in FY14, the Army will begin to convene boards to separate up to one third of the Captains from Year Groups 2007, 2008, and 2009, the majority of whom have served multiple deployments in combat. The loss of experienced manpower will negatively impact short-term readiness and is likely to impact future recruitment and retention. Reductions in the pool of Soldiers will exacerbate the impact on our manning readiness, as the pool of unavailable and non-deployable Soldiers is at a historical peak of 16% after twelve years of continuous operations. Civilian Manning. This year, we furloughed approximately 197,000 civilian employees, 48% of whom are Veterans, forcing them to take a 20% pay cut for six weeks. Furloughs delayed maintenance services; F105ASRB F105RB-4 JUNE 2014

228 slowed contracting; and decremented nearly every support function to include medical and family services at every installation. Furloughs have also begun to have a tremendous effect on morale as they come on the heels of two years of frozen pay and performance-based bonuses; we have begun to see some of our highest quality personnel seeking employment in the private sector. Given the lower discretionary caps and the continued threat of sequestration we are preparing to reduce civilian endstrength to levels proportional to military endstrength reductions - an estimated 14% cut to our dedicated civilian workforce. Installations Support In FY13, we reduced our base sustainment funds by $2 billion, a 70% drop from historic levels of funding. In FY14, facilities sustainment will receive 36% of historic funding levels which will meet minimum requirements for installation sustainment of buildings for Health, Life and Safety, but otherwise will significantly impact every service program including municipal, fire and emergency, logistics, facilities engineering, and family programs. For example, we will not be able to fund municipal services contracts for custodial, pest control, or other services and we will be forced to eliminate nearly all preventative maintenance programs. The backlog of approximately 158,000 work orders is 500% above this time last year, and will increase future sustainment costs throughout the year by 31%. We will suspend all restoration and modernization projects which includes those projects needed to support the consolidation of bases in Europe. The degradation of services to Soldiers, Civilians, and their Families, particularly as units continue to deploy into and return from theater and in the midst of the drawdown, will significantly erode recruitment and retention. Likewise, funding for military construction, to include large-scale renovations of older infrastructure, will be more than 50% below historic norms. Fiscal Year 2014 The Army remains fully committed to the enactment of President s budget for Fiscal Year The Army s portion of that budget, $129.7 billion, is necessary in its entirety to ensure that the Army meets the requirements of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. The FY14 budget, however, does not provide the funds necessary to address decaying readiness that is the result of cuts made to our training programs in FY12 and FY13. As a result, I submitted a $3.2 billion Unfunded Request Memo on 6 June In addition to the FY14 base budget, the Army has submitted a separate request of $47.6 billion in FY14 OCO funding for operations in Afghanistan; it is critical that this request be fully funded to support our Soldiers currently deployed and those soon to deploy into theater. However, given the necessity to prepare for the reduced discretionary caps and threat of sequestration in FY14, the Army s execution of the FY14 budget will proceed along five avenues. First, Secretary McHugh and I have directed that we accelerate the deliberate downsizing of the Army s Active endstrength from its current level of 532,530 to 490,000 by FY15 instead of FY17. Second, we are implementing force structure changes including the reorganization of our Brigade Combat Teams to reduce brigade level headquarters while sustaining combat power. Third, we will be forced to implement a drastic tiered readiness system in which about 20% of the operational force will receive the funds necessary for collective training. Fourth, we will reprioritize our modernization programs and determine which ones are most critical to filling capability gaps and which ones will be delayed or cancelled. Fifth, we will make every effort to recruit and retain a high quality, professional, and disciplined All-Volunteer Force while we support our Veterans transitioning back to civilian life. Strategic Choices In March of this year, Secretary Hagel directed a four-month long Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR). The SCMR was a valuable forum to discuss the projected impacts of sequestration and F105ASRB F105RB-5 JUNE 2014

229 to formulate the choices facing us in the areas of endstrength, force structure, readiness, and modernization. The SCMR review concluded that the Total Army must reduce its endstrength, combat formations, readiness, and modernization programs dramatically to keep pace with each of the proposed budget options. The SCMR process concluded that the Active Army endstrength could be as low as 420,000 while the Army National Guard could be as low as 290,000. Because the U.S. Army Reserve structure is based on their combat support role, the SCMR concluded that their endstrength and structure should not change. Ultimately, the size of our Army will be determined by the guidance and amount of funding provided by the Congress. To that end, the SCMR looked at two different funding levels, one that reflects the President s Budget proposal and another that reflects the reductions to the discretionary caps required under current law. In both cases, the Army takes significant budget reductions. Under the funding levels of the President s Budget proposal, which defers the effects of sequestration for several years, the Army will reach what I believe is the absolute minimum size to fully execute the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance: 450,000 in the Active Army, 335,000 in the Army National Guard, and 195,000 in the U.S. Army Reserves which would include a total of at least 52 Brigade Combat Teams. In this case, because the President is proposing to defer the largest funding reductions until 2018, we can maintain a ready force, albeit a smaller one, that across the Total Army, can meet the requirements of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. At this size, however, we are at high risk for reacting to any strategic surprise that requires a larger force to respond. In addition, the Army will only be able to maintain an adequate level of future readiness by accepting a high degree of risk across every modernization program. The second case examined by the SCMR was how to achieve the additional budget cuts called for under the current law. In this case, the Army was sized-to-budget, meaning that in order to build and sustain a ready force, the Army would be reduced to no more than 420,000 in the Active Army, 315,000 in the Army National Guard, and 185,000 in the U.S. Army Reserves which would include significantly less than the 52 Brigade Combat Teams I believe we need. Additionally, it would require us to reduce our modernization accounts by nearly 25%, with no program unaffected. While we have made no final decisions yet, major weapon programs will be delayed and while we tried to protect certain programs, the impact on the industrial base is likely to be severe. In my professional military judgment, these projected endstrength and force structure levels would not enable the Army to fully execute 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance requirements to defeat an adversary one major combat operation while simultaneously denying the objectives of an adversary in a second theater. Additionally, it is unlikely that the Army would be able to defeat an adversary quickly and decisively should they be called upon to engage in a single, sustained major combat operation. Whatever budget decision made by Congress, the Secretary of the Army and I have determined that we will reduce the size of the Army as needed to ensure that all units Active Army, the Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve will be ready for their assigned missions. Therefore, our deliberations should not solely pivot around a discussion of the future Army endstrength but also upon the readiness and capabilities of the Army given the resources available. Congressional Action As I have detailed above, the fiscal outlook today and in the near future continues to be exceedingly difficult due to the blunt instrument of sequestration. It is imperative that Congress avoid future cuts through the vehicle of sequestration. Sequestration continues to have a devastating impact on our ability to train, man, and equip the Army. As you continue to work through the issue of continuing resolutions and dealing with sequestration, we ask you to consider the following actions that will allow us to deal with these cuts in a more reasonable and rational way. F105ASRB F105RB-6 JUNE 2014

230 Compensation Reform. We are extremely grateful for the high quality care and compensation our Nation has shown to our service men and women over the last decade. Military manpower costs remain at historic highs and consume 46% of the Army budget today. As we go forward, we must develop compensation packages that reduce future costs but at the same time recognize and reward our Soldiers and their families for their commitment and sacrifice. If we do not slow the rate of growth, Soldier compensation will double to approximately 80% of the budget by The President proposed modest reductions and changes to pay, entitlements, and health care. If these changes are not approved, we will be forced to reduce the Total Army endstrength even further. We simply cannot have a ready force within the funds provided without some type of compensation reform. It is our solemn duty to our Soldiers and Nation to ensure that they are ready to fight when called to do so. We must make choices that preserve the high quality, All-Volunteer Force as the most critical component of a ready Army. Civilian Workforce. The furloughing of our civilian workforce in FY13 caused much disruption across our Army and impacted our ability to remain focused on critical mission requirements. As we move forward, the shaping and restructuring the Army civilian workforce is necessary to ensure we have the right mix of talent and skills to support our Army for the future. Additional authorities to increase the cap on the Voluntary Separation Incentive Program (VSIP) and the ability to offer Voluntary Early Retirement (VERA) are crucial to us in order to maintain our professional and capable civilian workforce. BRAC. Due to reductions in military and civilian endstrength, force structure, and industrial base demand, a future round of base realignment and closure (BRAC) is essential to divest excess Army infrastructure. BRAC would also allow for a systematic review of existing DOD installations to ensure effective Joint and multi-service component utilization. If we do not make the tough decisions necessary to identify inefficiencies and eliminate unused facilities, we will divert scarce resources away from training, readiness, and Family programs and the quality of our installation services will suffer. Conclusion We must develop a leaner, smaller Army that remains the most highly-trained and professional All- Volunteer land force in the world; one that is uniquely organized with the capability and capacity to provide expeditionary, decisive landpower to the Joint Force, and is ready to perform the range of military operations in support of Combatant Commanders to defend the Nation and its interests at home and abroad, both today and against emerging threats. To ensure that we align resources to set ourselves on course to realize this Army, I have established five strategic priorities for the force: 1. Develop adaptive Army leaders for a complex world; 2. Build a globally responsive and regionally engaged Army; 3. Provide a scalable and ready, modern force; 4. Strengthen our commitment to our Army profession; and 5. Maintain our premier All-Volunteer Army. The impact of sequestration in FY13 coupled with the threat of continued sequestration levels of funding are forcing the Army to implement significant reductions to endstrength, readiness, and modernization in order to generate short-term cost savings. However, this will leave Congress, future administrations, and the Nation with severely reduced options for action. The next administration will have less capability to deter conflict and would be increasingly reliant upon allies in any future conflict, with no guarantee that our allies would be willing or able to provide the assistance needed to meet U.S. national security goals. In the event of a strategic surprise or upon the completion of hostilities, an undersized Army would be unable to conduct long-term stability and transition operations. F105ASRB F105RB-7 JUNE 2014

231 The choices we must make to meet reduced funding levels by sequestration could force us to reduce our Army in size and capability to levels that I, as the Chief of Staff of the Army, am not comfortable with. For those that present the choice as one between capacity and capability, I want to remind them that for the Army, Soldiers are our capability. Unlike other services that man their equipment, the Army must train and equip Soldiers to achieve decisive strategic results on the ground. If the funding dictates a smaller Army, then we must be prepared for both reduced capacity and reduced capability. Today, we have the best Army in the world. It is our charge, Congress and DOD working together, to ensure that by the end of this decade, we still have the best Army in the world. Thank you for taking the time to listen to us about our budgetary concerns. The strength of our Nation is our Army The strength of our Army is our Soldiers The strength of our Soldiers is our Families. This is what makes us Army Strong! F105ASRB F105RB-8 JUNE 2014

232 Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION OVERVIEW 1-1. The scope of this Army Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (ATTP) manual applies to the execution of operational contract support (OCS) across the full spectrum of military operations in both foreign and domestic contingencies. It is applicable for all units from the brigade to Army service component command (ASCC) levels. Its purpose is to assist commanders at each level to get OCS right in the areas of effectiveness (combat readiness), efficiency (being good stewards of United States (US) tax dollars), and ethics (upholding the public s trust in the US government). US forces have seen an exponential growth in operational contract support in recent operations. At one point in Bosnia, our Army uniformed presence was 6,000 supported by 5,900 civilian contractor personnel. In Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the total number of Logistics Civil Augmentation Program related contractor personnel supporting the military force alone exceeds 60,000. A specific example of our significant reliance on contractors can be found with a strategic signal brigade in OIF which had only a few hundred assigned/ attached military members, but had over 3,000 contractor personnel executing this critically important battlefield function! Also, these numbers do not include the tens of thousands of Department of State contractors employed in support of Iraqi reconstruction and related security force efforts. OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT DEFINED 1-2. OCS is the integration of commercial sector support into military operations. OCS consists of two complimentary functions: a. Contract Support Integration - The process of synchronizing operational planning, requirements development and contracting in support of deployed military forces and other designated organizations in the area of operations (AO). The desired end state of contract support integration actions include: (1) Increased effectiveness, efficiencies, and cost savings of the contracting effort. (2) Increased visibility and control of contracting functions. (3) Minimized competition for scarce commercial resources. (4) Increased ability for the Army force (ARFOR) commander to enforce priorities of support. (5) Decreased and/or mitigated contract fraud. (6) Limiting sole source (vice competitively awarded) and cost-plus contracts (vice fixed price) as much as practical. (7) Enhanced command operational flexibility through alternative sources of support. b. Contractor Management - The process of managing and integrating contractor personnel and their equipment into military operations. Contractor management includes: planning and deployment/redeployment preparation; in-theater management; force protection and security; and executing government support requirements Integrating the two related OCS functions is a complex and challenging process. Multiple organizations are involved in this process including commanders, their primary/special staffs (at the ASCC down to, and including, battalion levels) and the supporting contracting organizations. 20 June 2011 ATTP

233 Chapter 1 Note: OCS is not just contracting - it is a commander s responsibility requiring active involvement of all primary and special staff members in planning and execution. GETTING FAMILIAR WITH OTHER KEY TERMS 1-4. It is imperative Army commanders and staffs have a working knowledge of key OCS related processes and terms discussed in this ATTP, and that they understand, and take seriously, their roles and responsibilities in effecting OCS planning and management. Without the basic understanding of these terms, effective planning and execution of this complex source of support is simply not possible. a. Contract - An agreement, enforceable by law, between two or more competent parties, to do or not do something not prohibited by law, for a legal consideration. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) defines a contract as a mutually binding legal relationship that obligates the seller to furnish supplies or services (including construction) and the buyer to pay for them. (1) Prime Contract - A contract or contractual action entered into by the United States Government for the purpose of obtaining supplies, materials, equipment, or services of any kind. The prime contractor is the organization that has entered into/signed the contract with the United States. The United States has privity of contract only with the prime contractor. (2) Subcontract - A subcontract is a contract entered into by a prime contractor to a subcontractor for the purpose of obtaining supplies, materials, equipment, or services under a prime contract. The prime contractor is responsible for the actions of the direct subcontractor. Likewise, subcontractors are responsible for managing any subcontractor at the next lower tier. Sub-contractors and their employees must be treated the same as the prime contractor when it comes to contractor management planning and actions. (3) Privity of contract - Privity of contract is the legal relationship that exists between two contracting parties, for example, between the prime contractor and the United States. This term is important to the Army commander in that only the prime contractor has direct responsibility to the government. This fact can limit the ability of Army commanders to directly enforce contractor management policies on subcontractors and their employees. However, a flow-down provision for subcontractor compliance with such policies requires prime contractors to enforce those policies on lower-tier subcontractors when they are included in the terms and conditions of their contract. Note: Military units receive their guidance and instructions to conduct an operation from published plans and orders, usually operations plans (OPLAN), operation orders (OPORD) and fragmentary orders (FRAGO). These plans and orders describe the mission and the manner in which the operation will be accomplished. Similarly, contractors receive guidance and instructions via the contract, not the OPLAN, OPORD, or FRAGO. b. Contractor - A contractor is an individual or business, to include authorized subcontractors that provide products or services for monetary compensation in accordance with (IAW) the terms and conditions of a contract. c. Head of Contracting Activity - The head of contracting activity is the official who has overall responsibility for managing the contracting activity. d. Contracting Officer - A contracting officer is the military officer, non-commissioned officer (NCO) or Army civilian with the legal authority to enter into, administer, and/or terminate contracts. The contracting officer is appointed in writing through a warrant (Standard Form 1402, Certificate of Appointment) by the Head of Contracting Activity (HCA) or designated senior contracting official. 1-2 ATTP June 2011

234 Introduction Administrative contracting officers (ACOs) are a subset of contracting officers whose duties are limited to administering the contract. e. Requiring Activity - A requiring activity is a military or other designated supported organization that identifies, plans for, and coordinates for contracted support during military operations. A requiring activity may also be the supported unit. f. Supported Unit - The supported unit is the organization that is the recipient, not necessarily the requestor, of contractor-provided support. A supported unit may also be the requiring activity, if it initiates the request for support. g. Contracting Officer Representative (COR) - The COR (sometimes referred to as a contracting officer technical representative or COTR) is a Service member or Department of Defense (DOD) Civilian, appointed, in writing, by a contracting officer. Responsibilities include monitoring contract performance and performing other duties as specified by their appointment letter. A COR is normally nominated by the requiring activity or designated supported unit and usually serves in this position as an extra duty depending upon the circumstances; it is a key duty that cannot be ignored without creating risk to the government. h. Types of Contract Support (1) Theater support contracts - A type of contingency contract awarded by contracting officers deployed to the operational area serving under the direct contracting authority of the designated HCA for that particular contingency operation. These contracts, normally executed under expedited contracting authority (e.g. reduced time frames for posting of contract solicitations; allowing for simplified acquisition procedures for higher dollar contracts, etc.), provide goods, services, and minor construction from commercial sources, normally within the AO. Also important from a contractor management perspective are local national employees that often make up the bulk of the theater support contract workforce. (2) Systems support contracts - Prearranged contracts awarded by and funded by acquisition program executive officers (PEOs) and project/product management (PM) officers. These contracts provide technical support, maintenance support and, in some cases, Class IX support for a variety of Army weapon and support systems. Systems support contracts are routinely put in place to provide support to newly fielded weapon systems, including aircraft, land combat vehicles, and automated command and control (C2) systems. Systems support contracting authority and contract management resides with the Army Contracting Command, while program management authority and responsibility for requirements development and validation resides with the system materiel acquisition PEO/PM offices. Systems support contractor employees, made up mostly of US citizens, provide support both in garrison and in contingency operations. Note: Operational commanders generally have less influence on the execution of systems support contracts than other types of contracted support. (3) External support contracts - Contracts awarded by contracting organizations whose contracting authority does not derive directly from the theater support contracting head(s) of contracting activity or from systems support contracting authorities. External support service contracts provide a variety of logistic and other non-combat related services and supply support. External support contracts normally include a mix of US citizens, third-country nationals (TCNs), and local national contractor employees. Examples of external contract support are: 20 June 2011 ATTP

235 Chapter 1 Service (Air Force, Army and Navy) civil augmentation programs. Special skills contract (e.g. staff augmentation, interpreters, interrogators, etc.). Defense Logistics Agency prime vendor contract. Reach-back contracting support provided by contracting offices outside the operational area. Note: While reach-back contracting support is technically an external support contract by virtue of the fact the contracting authority is located outside of the operational area, most reach-back contracting is coordinated through the local theater support contracting officer. Planning and coordinating for this reach-back support does not normally require any special requiring activity actions. The largest and most commonly known external support contract is the Army s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). LOGCAP may provide supply services (e.g. storage, warehousing, distribution, etc.) for the 9 classes of supplies, but the Services source the actual commodities. LOGCAP does not provide personal services type contracts. Figure 1-1 illustrates some services LOGCAP provides. (Note: This listing is not all-inclusive.) Figure 1-1. Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) Services Note: LOGCAP is a Service Contract! OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT IMPERATIVES 1-5. The following imperatives apply to all aspects of OCS planning, integration, and management. Understanding and following these imperatives will optimize OCS and minimize the risks of contract fraud or unauthorized commitments. 1-4 ATTP June 2011

236 Introduction a. Command authority does not equal contracting authority. Command authority is the legal authority of the operational commander to organize and employ assigned and attached forces; however, command authority does not include the authority to make binding contracts for the US government. Contractors are only obligated to perform functions specified in the terms and conditions of their contract. WARNING Only warranted contracting officers, have the authority to award or change a contract. The phrase other duties as assigned does not apply to contractor personnel! b. The OCS process is based in law. Contracted support must be administered IAW US public law along with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation (DFARS) and the Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFARS). FAR Part 18 and DFARS Part 218 outline emergency procurement authorities that may be available in support of contingency operations. WARNING Commanders should never ask, nor direct, their supporting contracting officers to circumvent or violate the FAR. Such command direction would be similar to directing a subordinate to violate the Law of War. The ramifications include monetary fines, punitive discipline, and criminal penalties. c. Contracting for support requirements does not relieve the commander of mission responsibility. Commanders and their staffs, i.e., the requiring activity, are responsible for contract support planning and management actions. OCS is a team effort between the requiring activity, the contracting officer, and the contractor. d. Procurement integrity, conflict-of-interest, and ethics. Commanders and supporting contracting activities are collectively responsible to ensure the appropriate command climate and training exists covering procurement integrity, conflict-of-interest and ethics, to mitigate fraud, waste and abuse of government resources. Department of Defense s (DOD s) joint ethics regulation, administered by the Office of General Counsel, requires the Army to provide training and counseling to educate Soldiers and Department of the Army civilians regarding applicable ethics laws and regulations. All leaders, both operational and acquisition, must ensure training raises individual awareness to enable the recognition and reporting of misconduct, as well as, track and follow up on all reports of acquisition related misconduct. For further information regarding ethics, see Appendix C, General Ethical Principles, of this manual. Note: Requiring activities and/or subordinate supported units must be prepared to closely monitor contract performance and assist the contracting officer in the contract management process through the nomination and aggressive tracking of qualified contracting officer representatives (for service contracts) and receiving officials (for commodity contracts). 20 June 2011 ATTP

237 Chapter 2 b. CSBs provide C2 over a number of contingency contracting battalions (CCBN), senior contingency contracting teams (SCCTs), and contingency contracting teams (CCTs) as determined during the mission planning process Contingency Contracting Battalions. Like the CSB, the primary mission of the CCBN is planning and C2. The CCBN does not normally write, award or administer contracts. Their subordinate CCTs are responsible for the mission of writing, awarding, and administering contracts. CCBNs are normally placed under the direct command of the deploying CSB or, in small scale operations, may deploy separately from the CSB HQs. In major sustained operations, the CCBN may be combined with SCCTs, CCTs and/or contracting elements from other Services to form a regional contracting center (RCC) Senior Contingency Contracting Teams. SCCTs normally deploy under the C2 of a CSB and provide theater support contracting services on a general support (GS) basis within a designated support area or in DS to a designated maneuver or sustainment unit as directed. In long-term operations, SCCTs may be utilized to form regional contracting offices (RCOs) to provide GS support to multiple organizations as directed. Note: In early phases of an operation, contingency contracting teams may have a DS relationship to major units (brigade through corps), especially if these units are operating in distinctly different sectors within the AO. A GS relationship is the norm for long term stability operations where overall efficiency of support and greater operational-level control over contract support executions is necessary Contingency Contracting Teams. CCTs represent the basic Army contracting unit of maneuver. CCTs normally deploy under the C2 of a CCBN and provide theater support contracting, on a DS or GS basis, as directed. In long-term operations, CCTs may be combined with a SCCT or other CCTs to form RCCs and RCOs as required. For more information regarding the CSB and its subordinate units, see FM 4-92, Contracting Support Brigade Army Sustainment Command. ASC is a major subordinate command of USAMC. ASC is USAMCs field coordinator for national-level sustainment support and is responsible to administer LOGCAP. a. Army Field Support Brigade. AFSBs are subordinate ASC commands designed to provide general USAMC support, synchronization, and coordination of national-level support (less theater support contracting, LOGCAP, and medical contracting) to deployed Army forces. AFSBs are regionally aligned to a designated area of responsibility (AOR) or other support area and serves as the ASC s bridge between the generating force and the operating force. Their primary OCS focus is the synchronization and coordination of system and sustainment maintenance focused support. For more information regarding the AFSB, see FMI Army Field Support Brigade Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. b. Team LOGCAP Forward. Team LOGCAP-Forward (TLF) is an ad hoc deployable USAMC element responsible to provide centralized in-theater LOGCAP management structure and to ensure effective and efficient execution of LOGCAP requirements within the AO. As required, TLF is organized, deployed and managed under the auspices and direction of the USAMC s LOGCAP Executive Director, normally in coordination with (ICW) the supporting CSB. TLFs are usually formed and deployed in support of any major exercise or contingency where LOGCAP support is planned or being executed. The specific size and composition of a deployed TLF is determined by METT-TC factors. (1) A key element of the TLF is its logistics support officers (LSOs). The US Army Reserve LOGCAP Support Unit provides C2 for the LSO and when activated, is placed in Operational Control (OPCON) for USAMC in support of LOGCAP. LSOs provide LOGCAP mission specific training, and planning 2-2 ATTP June 2011

238 Operational Contract Support Structure and Related Organizational Initiatives and requirement development assistance to major sustainment and maneuver units designated by the ARFOR commander as having major LOGCAP related requiring activity/functions. LSOs, like the entire TLF, are deployed based on METT-TC factors. Note: There are no fixed rules of allocation for LSO support. LSOs are provided to selected units (normally sustainment brigade, expeditionary sustainment commands, theater sustainment commands, divisions and/or corps HQs) on a METT-TC basis. (2) TLF is supported by Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) administrative contracting officers (ACOs), quality control representatives, and property book officers. TLF also works very closely with deployed Army Corps of Engineer organizations for facility related support, Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) for audit services, and with any deployed CSB or joint theater support contracting command (JTSCC), if formed, to ensure LOGCAP efforts are properly synchronized with the overall OCS effort. OTHER ARMY ORGANIZATIONS 2-9. US Army Corps of Engineers. The US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is a DOD construction agent responsible for military construction (MILCON) planning and execution in various designated nations across the globe. Joint and Army commanders leverage USACE to provide technical engineering assistance for design and award of construction contracts to civilian companies in support of military operations in their designated support countries. They also have deployable civilian contracting officers who provide in-theater contracting services utilizing USACE contracting authority. Naval Facility Command provides similar support in selected countries outside of USACE s designated support areas. Specific information on the responsibilities of DOD construction agents is contained in Department of Defense Directive (DODD) , Military Construction US Army Special Operations Command. The US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) works closely with the ECC and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) for OCS planning and execution. USASOC units are normally provided GS support in the AO via a designated lead Service or joint contracting element. In some operations, deployed USASOC units may have their own DS contracting team operating under USSOCOM contracting authority. Normally, the DS USASOC contracting team provides support for special operations unique services and commodities. In all cases, the USASOC contracting team should coordinate their efforts with the lead Service or joint contracting element providing GS support US Army Medical Command. The US Army Medical Command (USAMEDCOM) is responsible for providing Army Health System support for mobilization, deployment, sustainment operations, and redeployment of Army forces. The USAMEDCOM, through its subordinate research, acquisition, educational, and training institutions, leverage assets to ensure deployed Soldiers receive the best possible health care regardless of their geographic location. Due to stringent requirements of the Food and Drug Administration for pharmaceuticals and the provision of medical care, contracting for host nation support is not always feasible for medical activities and may be restricted to nonmedical functions. However, if medical contingency contracting support is required during deployment, it can be obtained via reach back to the USAMEDCOM s Health Care Acquisition Activity. When required, a request for forces is forwarded to the USAMEDCOM and contracting officers from the Health Care Acquisition Activity deploy as part of the Medical Logistics Management Center s (MLMC) forward support team. The MLMC deploys a forward support team to provide centralized theater-level inventory management of Class VIII materiel for the theater. The MLMC has two forward support teams; one team is deployed per theater. The MLMC forward support team is subordinate to the medical command (deployment support) (MEDCOM [DS]) or senior medical C2 headquarters and collocates with the distribution management center of the TSC/ESC. As part of the MLMC forward support team, the USAMEDCOM contracting officers remain under the C2 of the MEDCOM (DS), maintain home station contracting warrant authority under the Commander, Health Care Acquisition Activity, and collocates with the contracting cell of the CSB. 20 June 2011 ATTP

239 Chapter US Army Intelligence and Security Command. Like USACE, the US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) has its own contracting officers who provide contracting services for military intelligence related requirements. INSCOM s contracting officers normally do not deploy. JOINT ORGANIZATIONS Joint Theater Support Contracting Command. The geographic combatant commander may stand up a JTSCC when warranted. Doctrinally, the JTSCC organizational option is normally applicable only for major, long-term and complex stability operations where the subordinate joint force commander (JFC) requires direct control over all aspects of theater support contracting. The JTSCC commander reports to the subordinate JFC and has overall responsibility to ensure the theater support contracting mission is conducted in an effective, efficient, and well coordinated fashion. The JTSCC commander would also serve as the subordinate JFC s principal OCS advisor, coordinator and integrator. For more information regarding the JTSCC, see Joint Pub 4-10, Operational Contract Support. Note: At the time of this manual s publication, theater support contracting, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, falls under the auspices of Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan Defense Contract Management Agency. DCMA provides contingency contracting administrative services for delegated external support contracts (primarily, but not exclusively, LOGCAP) and for selected theater support contracts. For more information regarding DCMA, see Joint Pub 4-10, Operational Contract Support. Note: DCMA does not develop or award contracts in theater. It provides contingency contract administration services to selected major external support, systems support, and theater support contracts as delegated by the appropriate contracting official Defense Logistics Agency. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is the DOD combat support agency responsible for providing worldwide logistics support, for designated commodities to military departments, combatant commands, other DOD components and federal agencies. When authorized, this support can be extended to state and local government organizations, foreign governments and non-governmental organizations. While not a primary function, DLA can provide external support contracts in direct support of contingency operations. OCS planning needs to consider commodities provided by DLA, such as bottled water and food. For more information regarding DLA, see Joint Pub 4-10, Operational Contract Support Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office. The DOD is in the process of standing up a new OCS support organization: the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO). The JCASO is currently assigned to the DLA. It is intended to provide contingency acquisition management support to combatant commanders OCS planning efforts and training events. Additionally, when requested, the JCASO can deploy selected personnel to assist subordinate JFC and Service components in OCS planning and management matters Joint Operational Contract Support Planners (JOCSP). The joint operational contract support planners (JOCSP) initiative is a DOD-level funded initiative intended to provide dedicated OCS related planning capability at each Geographic Combatant Command (GCC). The JOCSP mission is to assist GCC and Service component commanders and their staffs in developing theater strategic and operational level OCS related plans, policies and guidance and to ensure these documents are developed IAW current DOD and joint policies. 2-4 ATTP June 2011

240 Chapter 5 CONTRACTOR MANAGEMENT INTRODUCTION 5-1. In past conflicts, contractor management was often considered only after deployment and only then when serious contractor management issues came to light. Today, it is Army policy to consider the Total Force, to include contractor personnel, in operational planning and execution actions. AR provides comprehensive policy on the subject of contractor personnel management in contingency operations. This chapter, along with Appendices A and B, provides detailed guidance on integrating contractor personnel and their equipment into military operations. Discussion includes details on contractor personnel legal status, discipline, pre-deployment preparation, deployment in-theater management, force protection/at/security issues. KEY TERMS 5-2. The following terms and descriptions are critical to understanding contractor management challenges: Contractors authorized to accompany the force (CAAF). CAAF are contractor employees and all tiers of subcontractor employees specifically authorized through their contract to accompany the force and have protected legal status IAW international conventions. CAAF normally includes US citizen expatriates and TCN employees who are not normal residents in the AO. However, local national employees may also be afforded CAAF status on an as needed basis METT-TC dependent. Contractors not authorized to accompany the force (Non-CAAF). Non-CAAF are employees of commercial entities in the AO, but do not accompany the force (e.g. they do not live on base or receive life support from the military). Non-CAAF employees include local national day laborers, delivery personnel, supply contract workers. Non-CAAF contractor employees have no special legal status IAW international conventions or agreements and are legally considered non-combatants rather than civilians authorized to accompany the force. Letter of Authorization (LOA). The LOA is the travel order equivalent for CAAF. The LOA provides CAAF both travel and in-theater government furnished support authorizations. Contractor acquired property (CAP). CAP is property/ equipment purchased by the contractor, under terms of the contract, for government use. Once the contract is closed out, the US Government will dispose or redistribute CAP as required. Note: CAP is also referred to as contractor acquired, government owned (CAGO) property/ equipment in JP Government Furnished Property. If the contract requires GFP, the unit must be aware of all its roles and responsibilities for accountability. CONTRACTOR MANAGEMENT RISKS AND CHALLENGES 5-3. Integrating contractor personnel and their equipment into military operations can be a significant challenge and may also involve additional mission risk when compared to utilizing organic support capabilities. Challenges such as potential loss of flexibility, additional force protection/security related requirements, limited authority to keep contractor personnel on the job, etc. when compared to military members are not well understood by operational commanders and staff. Figure 5-1 identifies common contractor management risks and challenges. Over time, the new 3C ASI, additional professional military education and the new updated 20 June 2011 ATTP

241 Chapter 5 OCS related policy, doctrine and training publications should greatly assist commanders and their staffs to better understand their role in planning and execution of contractor management. RISKS Risk to mission accomplishment from contractor non-performance due to force protection/at/security issues. Increased force protection requirements to protect contractor personnel. Increased security risk to the force when utilizing third country national and local national contractors. CHALLENGES General lack of knowledge on how to integrate contractor personnel into military operations. Limited legal authority over contractor personnel. Restrictions on arming contractors/use of private security firms to protect US forces, facilities and supplies. Different procedures and automated systems used to establish and maintain contractor personnel accountability. Enforcing contractor management policies and procedures through multiple tiers of subcontractors. Understanding the link between the contract process and contractor management. Figure 5-1. Contractor Management Risks and Challenges CONTRACTOR MANAGEMENT PLANNING 5-4. Contractor management planning is related to, but not the same as, contract support integration planning. While the CSIP is focused on overall guidance on how the deployed force will acquire and manage contracted support, contractor management planning is focused on contractor accountability, force protection, government furnished support, etc. This includes developing command policies and procedures required to ensure proper integration of contractor personnel into the military operations. By its very nature, contractor management related planning responsibilities cross all primary and special staff functional lanes. To address this situation, the ASCC or subordinate ARFOR commander should consider establishing a contractor management working group to ensure the various contractor management challenges are addressed and integrated across all primary and special staff lines. Figure 5-2 highlights specific ASCC/ARFOR level contractor management responsibilities. Staff/Supporting Command Major Responsibilities G-1 Accountability Reporting G-2 Threat Assessment/Screening Policies G-3 Deployment, Force Protection Planning G-4 Government Support Requirements G-5 Overall Integration of Planning Effort Surgeon Medical Policy Staff Judge Advocate Legal Advice Contracting Support Brigade Operational Contract Support Advice/ Planning Assistance Figure 5-2. Staff Contractor Management Planning Responsibilities 5-2 ATTP June 2011

242 Contractor Management 5-5. IAW DOD policy, the supported GCC and Service components must identify operational specific contractor management policies and requirements in the appropriate portion of the OPLAN/OPORD. These requirements include, but are not limited to: restrictions imposed by applicable international and HNS agreements, contractor-related deployment, theater reception and accountability reporting requirements, operational security plans and restrictions, force protection guidance, personnel recovery (PR) policy and procedures, medical support authorizations, and redeployment requirements. For each operation, the ASCC, ICW the supported GCC and/or subordinate ARFOR HQs, should publish operational specific contractor personnel management policies, procedures, and plans in order for subordinate commands to incorporate relevant guidance into their applicable plans. Supporting contracting officers will also include this information into applicable contracts as required. CJCSM D, Joint Operation Planning and Execution, DODD and AR all provide additional information on contractor management policy and procedures. LINKING CONTRACTOR MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS TO THE CONTRACTING PROCESS 5-6. The contracting officer, ICW the requiring activity, is responsible to incorporate contractor management policy and procedural requirements into the contract. The ACO (if appointed) and supported unit CORs are the link to the contracting officer for the oversight of contract performance to include contractor management policy and procedure compliance. For prearranged contracted support, the contracting officer will use standard DFARS deployment clauses to ensure contractors are informed and prepared to execute their contract in a contingency environment. While generic in nature, these clauses ensure contractors are informed of and required to comply with basic deployment preparation and operational specific management requirements. For contracts awarded for a specific operation, operational specific contract clauses should be included in the SOW/PWS and other terms and conditions (T&Cs) of the contract. Contingency contract clause information can be found in DFARS Clause Sub-Part , Defense Contracts outside the United States, and DFARS Procedures, Guidance and Instruction (PGI) , Contracts Requiring Performance or Delivery in a Foreign Country In some situations, CAAF may be required to live and work under field conditions, often in a hostile environment. Field conditions are quite different from normal civilian life and are characterized by austere and often physically demanding conditions. Requiring activities must coordinate closely with the supporting contracting officers to ensure appropriate performance environment clauses are included in the contract for all CAAF who are expected to perform their duties in field conditions. Requiring activities are responsible to ensure this information is provided in their requirements package. If the requiring activity is at all unsure about these conditions, they must consult with the supported unit to identify the details of the operational environment. Specific field conditions that should/could be addressed in contract SOW/PWS/T&Cs include: Limited showers and laundry service. Field sanitation (no fixed or even portable latrines). Combat rations for extended period of time. Sleeping in a tent or even outdoors. Exposure to excessive heat, cold and other weather extremes. Ability to hike a certain distance each day while carrying a certain weight in a back pack. Being subject to enemy action to include improvised explosive devices and direct fire. 20 June 2011 ATTP

243 Chapter 5 WARNING IF CAAF ARE GOING TO BE REQUIRED TO LIVE AND PERFORM UNDER FIELD CONDITIONS, THE REQUIRING ACTIVITY MUST ADDRESS THE SPECIFICS OF THE EXPECTED OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN THEIR REQUIREMENTS PACKAGE. DO NOT ASSUME ALL CAAF CAN EASILY ADAPT TO FIELD CONDITIONS THEY ARE NOT SOLDIERS! AVOIDING UNSCRUPULOUS LABOR PRACTICES 5-8. The uncontrolled use of labor brokers in order to avoid CAAF deployment and quality of life standards has been identified as a recurring problem in recent operations. Serious cases of these practices in the past have reached the level of a combating trafficking in persons (CTIP) policy violations. The following list contains examples of prohibited CAAF related labor practices seen in recent operations: Taking away passports or other travel documents. Providing housing that does not meet local command standards. Transportation without adequate force protection. Denying reasonable access to transportation out of the AO when requested. Any one of the actions listed above can be a violation of international law, US law, Presidential directives, DOD policies, and military alliance policies and must not be tolerated by joint and Service component commanders. WARNING COMMANDERS AND LEADERS AT ALL LEVELS MUST BE ON THE LOOKOUT FOR CAAF RELATED UNSCRUPULOUS LABOR PRACTICES AND POSSIBLE CTIP VIOLATIONS. CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL LEGAL STATUS 5-9. Law of war treaties, such as the Hague and Geneva conventions (see Figure 5-3); establish the status of contractors in support of military operations. During armed conflict with nations or organizations that are not signatories to these treaties, the status of contractors may be less clear. Commanders should consult their staff judge advocate (SJA) for legal advice in these situations. 5-4 ATTP June 2011

244 Contractor Management Hague Convention in 1907 (Article 13) Individuals who follow an army without directly belonging to it, such as contractors, who fall into the enemy s hands and whom the latter thinks fit to detain, are entitled to be treated as prisoners of War, provided they are in possession of a certificate from the military authorities of the army which they were accompanying Geneva Convention, treatment of prisoners (Article 4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as contractors, who fall into the hands of the enemy, and whom the latter think fit to detain, shall be entitled to be treated as prisoners of war, provided they have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card. Figure 5-3. Excerpts from Key International Agreements Contracting officers, in direct coordination with the requiring activity, determine contingency contractor employee CAAF/non-CAAF status up front in the contracting process. For many employees, determining their status is relatively simple; for others, it is not. For example, if the contractor employee is a US citizen or TCN who will be working in the vicinity of US forces (e.g. working on base), residing with the force (e.g. living in military barracks on a US facility) and being supported by the force (e.g. eating in military run dining facilities) they must be afforded CAAF status IAW Army policy and be issued an LOA that outlines specific government support authorizations. In some cases, CAAF status may also be afforded to a local national contract worker who is performing services on a military installation and who is required by the contract to live on base for security reasons. The key to properly establishing CAAF/non-CAAF status is for contracting officers and requiring activities to be familiar with, and follow, DOD, Army and local command contractor management policy guidance. Additionally, requiring activities should identify the recommended status of service contract employees in requirements package (e.g. if the requirement is for the contractor employee to deploy with and/or live with the supported unit, then the requirements package should recommend that the employees be designated CAAF in the contract). When in doubt, this determination should be made in close coordination with the supporting SJA. DEPLOYMENT/REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING AND PREPARATION The global nature of the systems and external support contractor base dictates contract companies may deploy their employees and associated equipment from anywhere in the world. Even US-based contractors often have elements originating from locations outside CONUS. Many contractors, especially sub-contractors, will hire TCN employees and deploy them directly from their point of hire. Proper deployment of CAAF and equipment requires early planning, establishment of clear and concise theater-entrance requirements and the incorporation of standard deployment related clauses in appropriate contracts Establishing Theater Entrance Requirements. The supported GCC, ICW their Service components, determines operational specific CAAF theater entrance requirements. Theater entrance requirements include, but are not limited to AO specific administrative preparation, medical preparation, as well as general training and equipping guidance. Specific CAAF pre-deployment preparation requirements can be found in the Army Personnel Policy Guidance publication which can be accessed via the Army G-1 website: Other theater specific contractor management information can be found at the following Department Of Defense website: Note: Know how to access and be familiar with the CAAF deployment preparation provisions found in the Army Personnel Policy Guidance Specific Theater Entrance Requirements Overview. The following is a synopsis of the key theater administrative and entrance requirements that can and will impact the ASCC and subordinate commands. The 20 June 2011 ATTP

245 Chapter 5 supported ASCC staff should work closely with subordinate staffs, special operations units, and other organizations as required to ensure they understand, promulgate and enforce these theater entrance requirements. a. Identification (ID) Cards. Army policy requires CAAF to be issued an ID card with Geneva Convention identifier prior to deployment to the AO. Expiration dates for these ID cards should correspond to the end date of the contract period of performance. Normally, only replacement cards will be issued in the AO. See AR and current Army personnel deployment guidance for more information on issuing ID cards to CAAF. WARNING DESPITE APPROVED IDENTIFICATION CARD POLICY, THE ISSUANCE OF IDENTIFICATION CARDS TO CAAF CONTINUES TO BE PROBLEMATIC AT BEST, ESPECIALLY FOR TCN EMPLOYEES. AT THE TIME OF HANDBOOK PUBLICATION, PERSONNEL POLICY STAFF OFFICERS ARE WORKING THIS ISSUE AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF DOD. b. Letters of Authorization. DOD and Army policy require Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) generated letters of authorizations, issued by a warranted contracting officer, for CAAF to process through a deployment center, and travel to, from, and within an AO. LOAs contain specific dates to cover the deployment and are issued to the contactor personnel prior to arrival in the AO. Additionally, the LOAs identify any additional authorizations and government-furnished support CAAF are entitled to under the contract. The contracting officer, or designated official (normally the appointed COR), must validate LOA authorizations and availability of this support in the AO prior to preparation of the final solicitation package. Any change in the contract dates or entitlements will result in an updated LOA being issued to the contractor. CAAF are required by policy to maintain a copy of their LOA and have it in their possession at all times. Note: DOD and Army policy require Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) generated letters of authorizations. c. Security Screening/Biometrics Identification Card/Base Access. Currently, there is no standard DOD or Army methodology for screening, biometric identification and base access badge issuance for contractor personnel. Local command policy will dictate these measures per METT-TC. d. Medical Preparation. CAAF medical preparation includes deployment health briefings, medical surveillance screening, medical evaluation, deoxyribonucleic acid specimen collection, determining prescription needs, and immunizations. Specific medical related theater entrance requirements, such as human immunodeficiency virus screening requirements, are established by the operational command s staff surgeon. This medical related theater guidance normally covers specific immunization requirements, restrictions applicable to certain TCN or local national personnel for specific mission functions (e.g., food service workers). Contract companies are responsible for all medical preparation with the exception of military specific immunizations. e. Protective Clothing and Equipment. Contractors are responsible to ensure their employees are outfitted with appropriate occupational specific protective clothing and equipment necessary to safely carry out their contract requirements. Military protective equipment may be issued to CAAF as GFE or issued to them by their company when required by theater entrance policy and so specified in the contract. f. Uniforms. Normally, contractor personnel will not be issued or wear regulation US Service uniforms and/or other uniform items. However, the JFC or designated subordinate can authorize certain contractor employees to wear standard US Service uniforms on an operational need basis. In these cases, the uniform 5-6 ATTP June 2011

246 Contractor Management should be readily distinguishable through the use of distinctive patches, arm bands, nametags and/or headgear. Contractor personnel authorized to wear distinctive military uniforms are required by policy to carry, on their person, written authorization for the wearing of said uniforms at all times. g. Other Actions. There are various other, often simple, but still important, contractor management actions that must take place before a CAAF is deployed to the AO. These tasks include, but are not limited to: issuance of identification tags; acquiring Base Defense Act issuance; storage of privately owned vehicles (POVs); establishing/updating wills and powers of attorney; acquiring a current passport and Visa (if required); and, getting Army Knowledge On-line sponsorship (required for CAAF who need to have access to government computer systems). It is important to note that some of these tasks are solely the responsibility of the contract company, while some are shared contractor/military tasks. Paragraph 5-15 and Figure 5-4 below provide additional guidance on task responsibility. h. Routine Training Requirements. The ASCC, subordinate commanders and Army contracting authorities are responsible to ensure required common training and any operational-specific training is accomplished prior to deployment of CAAF into the AO. Required CAAF training and validation process must be closely coordinated between the contracting officer, the prime contractor and the requiring activity. Key contractor personnel training requirements normally include, but are not limited to: (1) Legal status familiarization. This training is mandated by the DFARS to ensure all CAAF understand their legal status IAW international law. This DFARS clause requirement includes prevention of human trafficking awareness training as well as familiarization training on US laws, host nation laws and SOFAs to which contractor personnel may be subject. (2) Government-furnished support familiarization. This training is intended to inform CAAF of what authorized government-furnished support (mail, medical, etc.) is available to them while accompanying US forces. (3) Law of War training. Law of War training related to the handling of enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) and detainees is required by DOD policy for all CAAF contractor personnel who may come into to contact with detainees or EPWs. (4) Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) training. The requirement for SERE training for CAAF is determined by the requiring activity and supported ASCC. (5) Medical threat awareness training. Medical awareness training related to local health risks, medical related policies and procedures is required for all CAAF. (6) Sexual harassment and sexual assault training. Executive Order 11246, DOD Directive , Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program, and DODI , Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program Procedures require sexual harassment and sexual assault report training for the total force, which includes contractors IAW DOD Directive , Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)). i. Operational specific requirements. Operational specific training requirements include mission specific force protection/at/security, hazard awareness, etc. as directed by the GCC and/or ASCC Contractor Personnel Certification and Deployment. IAW AR CAAF can be certified and deployed via three methodologies: 1) with their habitually supported unit, 2) as non-unit related personnel (NRP) through a CONUS Replacement Center (CRC), and 3) self-certification and deployment. In all cases, the contracting officer, working in conjunction with the requiring activity and/or supported unit COR, must ensure CAAF being deployed into an AO are properly certified and fully integrated into the ARFOR s deployment plan. 20 June 2011 ATTP

247 Chapter 5 Note: Contractor pre-deployment verification has been a significant problem for TCN CAAF, especially sub-contractor employees. Close coordination between the contracting officer, the requiring activity and the prime contractor is imperative to ensure TCN CAAF are properly prepared to deploy, especially in the areas of medical screening and required training (i.e. legal status familiarization, medical threat awareness training, etc.). a. Process and Deploy With the Supported Unit. This is the preferred method of deployment for CAAF, normally systems support contractors, who have a habitual relationship with a specific unit. This group deployment process involves certification and deployment of CAAF in a coordinated fashion between the supported unit, contracting officer, the contractor and, if applicable, any contractor management over watch entity such as the supporting AFSB. Once certified, these CAAF normally deploy as part of the habitually supported unit. Note: Units with habitually related CAAF are responsible to ensure these contractor personnel and their equipment are included in the unit s time phased force deployment data list (TPFDDL) or request for forces (RFF) process. b. Process and Deploy Non-Unit Related Personnel. NRP include CAAF who deploy as individuals or as part of a small group that does not have a habitual support arrangement with any particular unit. Army policy requires CAAF NRP to deploy through a CRC. In this process, CAAF NRP are certified for deployment via processing through a designated CRC. Once certified, CAAF NRP normally immediately deploy via transportation means directed by CRC authorities and as identified in their contracts. c. Self-Certification and/or Deployment. Self-certification and deployment applies to contract companies who have been authorized by the Government to conduct their own certification and/or deployment process. Self certification and deployment operations conducted by the contractor are referred to as non-military individual replacement deployment operations. This authorization is usually restricted to major contract companies such as LOGCAP performance contractors. Contractors requesting self-certification authority must coordinate this request, ICW the contracting officer, through the HQDA G-4. If it appears to be in the best interest of the Army, the G-4 will staff this request through the G-1 for G-3/5/7 approval. Self-certification of CAAF is required to meet or exceed the CRC standards. In some cases, selected contractors may also be authorized to arrange their own strategic transportation as long as it is properly integrated into the Defense Transportation System and approved by the requiring activity and supporting contracting officer Pre-deployment Task Responsibilities. Pre-deployment tasks are a shared responsibility between the contractor and the Government. Some tasks are specified by policy to be a contractor responsibility (e.g. medical screening) while other tasks are more situational dependent. For example, CAAF deploying through a CRC will be provided personal military protective equipment by the Government, but in some cases, such with a LOGCAP performance contractor, may be authorized by the contract to procure and issue military protective equipment to their employees. Figure 5-4 provides a synopsis of current policy and operational experience related to this subject. 5-8 ATTP June 2011

248 Contractor Management Contractor Responsibilities Entering and updating synchronized predeployment operational tracker (SPOT) data. Medical screening and preparation (less military specific immunizations). Dental screening. Issuance of work place safety equipment. Ensuring employees have a current passport and Visa (if required). Legal support (wills and power of attorney). Ensuring employees are signed up for Defense Base Act insurance. Shared Responsibilities Certifying pre-deployment tasks are complete. Common military related training. Theater specific military related training. Issuance of military protective equipment. ID tag issuance*. Privately owned vehicle storage*. Government Responsibilities Verifying and approving letter of authorizations. Issuance of government ID card. Issuance of government furnished equipment items. Military specific immunizations*. Sponsorship for required CAAF army knowledge online accounts. Entering CAAF personnel and equipment into the time phased force deployment data list or request for forces process. * may require reimbursement of cost to the government Figure 5-4. Responsibilities for Contractor Pre-deployment Preparation General Redeployment Considerations. The contracting officer, the supported unit and the contract company share the responsibility for CAAF redeployment. Normally, CAAF are redeployed to the original unit deployment, CRC or contractor run deployment site they were originally processed for deployment. Key redeployment actions include, but are not limited to: updating SPOT; recovery of government issued badges and ID cards; recovery/ disposition of all GFE or CAP; and, withdrawal of security clearances (as applicable). Paragraph 5-24d below provides more discussion on GFE and CAP Medical Redeployment Requirements. CAAF are required by DOD policy to complete a postdeployment health assessment and obtain a post-deployment health debriefing. Any recommended medical referrals that come out of this process are the contractor's responsibility. IN-THEATER CONTRACTOR MANAGMENT In-theater contractor management includes actions by operational commanders, requiring activities/supported units (via appointed CORs and 3C staff), contracting officers and contract companies to ensure the proper integration of CAAF and their equipment into day-to-day deployed operations. In-theater contractor management also includes force protection/at/security support and base access actions related to non-caaf whose area of performance is on a military facility Reception and Onward Movement. Positive in-theater contractor management begins with the integration of CAAF into the in-theater reception and onward movement process. This process includes establishing initial in-theater accountability and ensuring that CAAF and their equipment are quickly and safely moved from the port of debarkation to their area of performance. a. Reception. All CAAF should be processed in and out of the AO through a formal reception center or designated reception center process. The reception center personnel will verify NRP CAAF are included in the SPOT database and have met all theater entrance requirements. Units with habitually supporting CAAF and contractors with self-deployment authorization are responsible to ensure associated CAAF meet all theater entrance requirements and are properly captured in SPOT. Contractor personnel who do not meet established theater entrance requirements may be sent back to their point of origin or placed in a holding area until these requirements are met. 20 June 2011 ATTP

249 Chapter 5 b. Onward Movement. Once the reception center verifies the NRP CAAF are included in the SPOT database and all theater entrance requirements are met, the CAAF should be issued any required operational specific identification documents/badges and instructed on onward movement transportation procedures. Arrangement of intra-theater transportation of CAAF will include the appropriate force protection/security measures commensurate to force protection/security measures taken for DOD civilians Personnel Accountability. Establishing and maintaining CAAF accountability is an extremely important OCS related task. Without such information, it is impossible to properly plan and integrate CAAF into military operations. CAAF accountability is critically important information for determining and resourcing government support requirements such as facilities, life support, force protection, and force health protection in hostile/austere operational environments. The DOD has recently designated SPOT as the DOD enterprise system to manage and maintain by name accountability of CAAF and other designated contractor personnel in the AO.SPOT is a web-based application allowing authorized users to view, input and manage contractor personnel pre-deployment, accountability and location data. SPOT access procedures and training information can be found at Note: Ensure your 3C ASI and selected personnel staff officers have access to SPOT and are familiar with its functional capabilities Command Authority in General. Commanders at all levels must understand they do not have the same command authority over contractor personnel as they do military members. Area and base commanders do have the authority however, to direct CAAF and non-caaf working on base in matters of force protection and security (e.g. temporary cease work during base attacks, route alterations, etc.) as long as these actions do not require contractor personnel to perform inherently governmental functions or to perform tasks outside the terms and conditions of the contract Discipline and Legal Jurisdiction. Discipline of CAAF is a shared responsibility between the contract company and the government. Normally, minor CAAF discipline infractions will be handled through their contractor supervisors and managed by established government contracting management channels (i.e. contracting officer, ACO and COR) IAW the terms and conditions of their contract; however, serious CAAF discipline infractions should be addressed by military and/or Department of Justice channels. If Army commanders determine disciplinary actions may be necessary for CAAF, they should first coordinate their actions with their SJA and government contract management team. This coordination is necessary because of the potential impact on contract performance, cost, and government liability. Actual legal jurisdiction and commander s legal authority over contractor personnel varies depending on contractor personnel nationality, CAAF or non-caaf designations, operational specific policies, and the type and severity of the alleged discipline infraction. Normally, local national contract employees are subject to local laws while US citizens and TCN CAAF may or may not be subject to local laws depending on provisions, if any, documented in existing SOFAs or other security agreements. All CAAF however, are subject to US federal law to include the newly expanded Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) jurisdiction discussed later in this section. Note: It is imperative Army commanders at all levels are aware of the specific command guidance for handling contractor discipline issues. In all cases of alleged major misconduct/criminal activity of contractor personnel, consult your SJA and government contract management team (i.e. the supporting contracting office and the contracting officer representative). a. Local Nation Law. All non-caaf are subject to local law. CAAF are also subject to local laws unless specifically exempted by SOFAs, other security agreements, and in cases where there is no functioning or recognized host nation. b. Status-of-Forces Agreements/Security Agreements. SOFAs and security agreements are international agreements between two or more governments that address various privileges, immunities, and 5-10 ATTP June 2011

250 Contractor Management responsibilities and enumerate the rights and responsibilities of individual members of a deployed force. These SOFAs and security agreements may or may not define CAAF legal status (e.g., the circumstances of host national criminal and civil jurisdiction). Note: The 2009 US-Iraqi security agreement stipulates all contractor personnel, to include US citizens and third country nationals are subject to Iraqi law. c. US Federal Law. In the absence of any host nation jurisdiction or the exercise of it, US federal law will apply to CAAF misconduct. The following sections provide a synopsis of current applicable statutes. (1) Uniformed Code of Military Justice. As expanded by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2007, the military UCMJ has jurisdiction over persons serving with or accompanying the Armed Forces of the United States in the field, both in times of declared war and during contingency operations. In accordance with DOD guidance, the unique nature of this extended UCMJ jurisdiction over civilians requires sound management over when, where, and by whom such jurisdiction is exercised. Currently, UCMJ authority over CAAF is restricted to the highest levels of command authority and normally will only be applied for civilian equivalent felony level infractions. Non-judicial punishment and military specific offenses (e.g. disrespect to a senior officer, desertion, etc.) do not apply to CAAF. The UCMJ authority over CAAF must be judiciously applied and carefully coordinated with Department of Justice personnel to ensure CAAF discipline infractions are handled in a prompt, thorough manner and within the proper legal framework. Note: Because this area is such a moving target, ensure your SJA has access to and is familiar with the latest DOD, Army and/or local command policy guidance on the implementation of UCMJ authority over contractor personnel. (2) Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of In November 2000, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 was passed by Congress and signed into law. This law permits the prosecution in federal court of civilians who, while employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces overseas, commit certain crimes. Generally, the crimes covered are any federal-level criminal offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. The law applies to any DOD contractor or subcontractor (at any tier) or their employees provided they are not a national or a legal resident of the host nation. It does not apply to non- DOD contractor employees unless their employment relates to supporting the mission of DOD. This law authorizes DOD law enforcement personnel to arrest suspected offenders IAW applicable international agreements and specifies procedures for the removal of accused individuals to the US. It also authorizes pretrial detention and the appointment of counsel for accused individuals. Like the War Crimes Act, actual prosecutions under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act are the responsibility of federal civilian authorities. DODI , Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Employed By or Accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States, Certain Service Members, and Former Service Members, provides more information on the implementation of this law. (3) War Crimes Act of Depending on the offense committed, US national CAAF may be prosecuted for war crimes under the War Crimes Act of This act defines a war crime as any grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (such as willful killing or torture) or any violation of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Penalties include fines, imprisonment, or the death penalty if death results to the victim. Prosecutions under the War Crimes Act are the responsibility of federal civilian authorities. (4) USA Patriot Act. In October 2001, the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001 was passed by Congress and signed into law. The USA Patriot Act was enacted by Congress in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. One of its provisions allows the US to apprehend and prosecute US citizens and foreign nationals who commit crimes on overseas US bases and facilities. Similar to the War Crimes and Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Acts, prosecutions under the USA Patriot Act are the responsibility of federal civilian authorities. 20 June 2011 ATTP

251 Chapter 5 (5) Federal Anti-Torture Statute. Contractor personnel could also be prosecuted under the federal anti-torture statute. A person found guilty under the act can be incarcerated for up to 20 years or receive the death penalty if the torture results in the victim s death. Similar to the other federal laws, actual prosecutions under this statute are the responsibility of federal civilian authorities. d. Other Disciplinary Options. Area and base commanders have the authority to address minor contractor personnel disciplinary issues or misconduct through revocation or suspension of clearances, restriction from installations or facilities, or revocation of privileges. DFARS allows the contracting officer to direct the contractor, at its own expense, to remove and replace any contractor personnel who jeopardize or interfere with mission accomplishment or who fail to comply with or violate applicable requirements of the contract. The process of removing contractor employees is dependent upon the established local command policies and the extent to which those policies are incorporated in the terms and conditions of the contract. When confronted with disciplinary problems involving contractors and contractor employees, commanders should seek the assistance of their legal staff, the contracting officer responsible for the contract, and the appointed COR. This allows for a thorough review of the situation and a recommendation for a course of action based on the terms and conditions of the contract, applicable international agreements, and host nation or US law Force protection/at/security. Force protection/at/security of CAAF and their equipment is a shared responsibility between the contract company and the Government. In a permissive environment, there may be no specific contractor force protection or security requirements. However, in hostile environments, contractor related force protection and security requirements can be a significant challenge and will require specific contractor personnel related policies and procedures. All contingency contractor personnel (both CAAF and non-caaf) whose area of performance is in the vicinity of US forces shall be required by the terms and conditions of their contract to comply with applicable area or base commander force protection policies and procedures. In hostile environments, CAAF should receive force protection/at/security support commensurate with the level of security provided to Army Civilians. Non-CAAF employees whose area of performance is on a military facility or in close contact with US forces will receive security support incidental to their work location. a. Location Restrictions. CAAF can be expected to perform virtually anywhere in the AO, subject to the terms of their contract and the operational commander s threat assessment. Based on the commander s threat assessment, the JFC, ARFOR and/or subordinate area commanders may place specific restrictions on locations and timing of contract support; however, care must be taken to coordinate these restrictions with the requiring unit and the supporting contracting officers to ensure these restrictions do not significantly interfere with the contractors ability to meet contractual performance requirements. b. Determining specific force protection and security measures. The ARFOR and subordinate area and base commanders must plan for the protection of contractor personnel in the overall force protection and security plan in any operation where the contractor cannot obtain effective security services, such services are unavailable at a reasonable cost, or threat conditions necessitate security through military means. IAW established DOD doctrine and policy; military provided force protection is the preferred option for operations where an on-going or anticipated level II or III threat level exists. In these high-threat operations, it is normally in the best interest of the Government to provide military force protection to CAAF and selected non-caaf. However, the operational commander, within specific parameters, can plan and coordinate the use of private security contracts (PSCs) to protect other contractor personnel. In all cases, operational specific force protection and security conditions, procedures and control measures should be identified by the requiring activity as part of the requirements package. Use of private security services in support of deployed Army forces is discussed in detail in paragraph 5-23 h. FM 3-37 Protection provides more information on threat levels. c. Establishing Force Protection/AT/Security Requirements in the Contract. The contracting officer will normally include the level of government furnished protection as well as contractor employee requirement to follow area and/or base commander guidance relative to force protection/at/security measures as a stipulation in the contract based on force protection/security requirements identified in the requirements package. In some cases, government furnished force protection contract terms may be included in non-caaf related contracts if the area of performance of the contract is on a military installation. Requiring activities must 5-12 ATTP June 2011

252 Contractor Management ensure the supported unit or other designated organization is prepared to meet the government obligations set forth in these contracts and contractor employees meet the force protection/at/security stipulations of their contract. Changes to this level of government force protection must be coordinated with the contracting officer as soon as possible, preferably prior to the actual implementation of these changes. d. Base Access. The ARFOR and individual base commanders are responsible for the security of all Army run facilities within the AO. However, the lack of a fully functional DOD-wide standard security badge issuance policy for contractor personnel requires the ARFOR and subordinate commanders to develop local policies and procedures to vet and badge CAAF, as well as non-caaf contractor employees, who require routine access to military facilities. Not having these policies and procedures in place can severely reduce the effectiveness, timeliness, flexibility and/or efficiency of contracted support. This can be an especially significant issue when changes to operations require a quick surge of contracted support from one base to another. WARNING IN RECENT OPERATIONS, INCONSISTENT AND UNCOORDINATED BASE ACCESS AND SECURITY BADGE ISSUANCE POLICIES HAS, AT TIMES, SIGNIFICANTLY HAMPERED THE EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT USE OF CONTRACT SUPPORT. e. Individual Movement Protection. Another key contractor management challenge is protection of contractor personnel during individual or small group movements within the AO. In general, CAAF should be provided protection during transit within the AO commensurate to protection provided to Department of the Army civilians. It is important for the ARFOR and subordinate area and base commanders to properly balance force protection requirements with the need for contractor personnel to have ready access to their place of performance. Overly restrictive movement requirements can hinder the responsiveness of contracted support, especially for systems support contractors who are providing support on an area or general support basis. Too lenient movement restrictions may also have a negative effect on contracted support if contractor personnel become casualties due to the lack of or improper enforcement of movement related force protection/security measures. In operations where there is more than a level I threat, CAAF should be required to be included into routine military movements or special arrangements will have to made by the supported commander and the area commander responsible for local force protection matters. f. Convoy Protection. The ARFOR, based on JFC guidance, must establish, publish and implement operational specific contractor related convoy force protection standards and procedures. Depending on the current or anticipated threat level, contractor operated vehicles may be required to move under the designated movement control authority and be integrated into military convoys (often referred to as a mixed "green" and "white" convoy). In some operations, contractor operated vehicles may be directed to transit the AO in convoys made up exclusively of contractor personnel and vehicles (often referred to as an all "white" convoy). In either case, the ARFOR is responsible to ensure adequate force protection measures are in place to protect contractor convoy operations in support of the deployed military forces. As the threat level is reduced, some contract vehicle movement, especially local national contracted trucks, may be excluded from these convoy protection requirements. For more information on integrating contractor personnel into convoy operations see the Air, Land, Sea Application Center's Multi-Service Publication, Army Field Manual Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Tactical Convoy Operations. 20 June 2011 ATTP

253 Chapter 5 WARNING RESTRICTIONS IN CONTRACTOR MOVEMENT MAY HAVE A NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE CONTRACTOR S ABILITY TO MEET THEIR CONTRACTUAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS. COMMANDERS RESPONSIBLE FOR FORCE PROTECTION/AT/SECURITY AND MOVEMENT CONTROL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MUST CONSULT WITH THE APPROPRIATE REQUIRING ACTIVITY AND CONTRACTING OFFICER IF THERE ARE INDICATIONS LOCAL MOVEMENT AND/OR SECURITY RESTRICTIONS COULD POSSIBLY IMPACT THE CONTRACTOR S ABILITY TO PERFORM THE MISSION OR IF SUCH MEASURES COULD POSSIBLY INCUR ADDITIONAL COST TO THE GOVERNMENT. g. Issuance of Personal Defense Weapons. In general, individual contractor personnel should not be armed. However, consistent with applicable US, HN, international law, relevant SOFAs or other international security agreements, and DOD policy, the JFC and/or ARFOR commander may authorize CAAF to carry a government issued or approved individual weapon for personal protection. Variables such as the nature of the operation, the type of conflict, any applicable status agreement related to the presence of US forces, and the nature of the activity being protected require case-by-case determinations. IAW DOD policy, the GCC can delegate this authority down to a designated general officer within the deployed joint force. AR provides the specific procedures required to be followed when requesting approval to arm individual CAAF. h. Use of Private Security Services. If consistent with applicable US, HN, international law, relevant SOFAs and/or security agreements, and JFC policy a defense contractor may be authorized to provide armed security services for the protection of deployed US Army forces, facilities and supplies as long as these service are restricted to purely security (vice offensive) related functions. The ARFOR commander should, however, use caution when contemplating the use of private security services to protect US forces and facilities in any operation where there is a current or expected Level II or III threat. In general, threat levels above Level I require significant force protection measures (e.g., crew served weapons, combined arms response, indirect fire, etc.) that may be legally considered an inherently military function. (1) Whether a particular use of contract security to protect military assets is permissible is dependent on the facts and requires detailed legal analysis and coordination by the ARFOR commander and SJA. Variables such as the level and nature of the threat, the type of conflict, applicable host nation laws, and the nature of the activity being protected require case-by-case determinations. The use of force by contingency contractor personnel is often strictly limited by laws and not protected by SOFA provisions. Contractor personnel providing security services who exceed the limits imposed by applicable law may be subject to prosecution. Additionally, there can be significant civil-military related risks when utilizing private security services in military operations. For example, the local populace may not distinguish between a private security guard and a US military member when it comes to use of force, improper actions, etc. Incidents involving private security guards can have potentially negative impact on the operation, especially since the ARFOR has significantly less direct control over contractors when compared to US military members. (2) When private security services are utilized in contingency operations to protect reconstruction efforts and/or Army forces, facilities or supplies, the contracting officer is responsible to ensure the contract contains provisions informing the contractor of any known or potentially hazardous situations. This includes general stipulations limiting support to non-offensive operations and government responsibilities to provide back-up security support. The ARFOR commander, ICW the JFC, must ensure operational specific private security services coordination procedures and control measures, to include appropriate rules for the use of force (RUF), are developed, promulgated and enforced within the AO. Additionally, requiring activities must ensure specific conditions, procedures, and control measures are addressed in the requirements package. DODI , Manpower Mix, DODI , Private Security Contractors Operating in Contingency Operations, 5-14 ATTP June 2011

254 Contractor Management and AR provide detailed regulatory guidance on the use private security services in contingency operations. WARNING ARMY COMMANDERS, THEIR 3C STAFF OFFICERS AND SJA STAFF SHOULD CLOSELY REVIEW JFC POLICIES AND REGULATORY GUIDANCE WHEN CONTEMPLATING REQUESTING PSC SERVICES TO PROTECT ARMY FORCES, FACILITIES AND SUPPLIES IN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS Other Government Provided Support. IAW Army policy, contractors are required to provide their own logistical support in contingency operations except when this methodology is not practical and/or is costprohibitive. Since most military operations are conducted in austere and/or non-permissive environments, CAAF support will often be provided through military means or via a contract directed by the Government. In all cases, the contracting officer, based on requiring activity input, will detail the government support to be provided in the terms and conditions of the solicitation, and subsequently the contract, after determining availability of such support from the designated authorities/requiring activity. And as stated above, all CAAF government support authorizations are required to be documented in a SPOT generated LOA. a. Base Operating Support/Facilities. In permissive and non-austere operations, contractors should arrange for their own lodging, subsistence and facilities support; however, in hostile and austere environments this may not be practical or desirable. The circumstances under which the Army provides this support would be those in which the contractor has no commercial infrastructure from which to draw or when the cost for a contractor to furnish the support is not economical. In situations when contractor-arranged base operating support would impede the government s efforts to provide force protection, generate competition with the military, or adversely influence prices, the Army must consider providing the support using organic support capabilities and/or arrange this support via contract means. The ARFOR commander, pursuant to approved DOD, Army and JFC policies, retains the authority to direct where CAAF reside and what government support will be provided. If the location is changed after a contract is awarded, this must be communicated to the contracting officer as soon as possible because of potential cost ramifications. CAAF must generally be provided the same standard of support provided to Department of the Army civilians of similar responsibility level. (1) In some operations or phases of operations, selected CAAF may be required to temporarily live in field conditions. In these situations, the requiring activity or the directed supported unit is responsible to ensure adequate tentage, field feeding support, etc. is available for these personnel. (2) Subsistence may be provided to contractors when local dining sources are either unavailable or deemed unsuitable for health and/or force protection/at/security related reasons. For those CAAF living in field conditions, the food provided might be pre-packaged rations with very little opportunity for choice; consequently, special diets may not be accommodated. In some sustained operations, it may be desirable to have a separate, contract run, dining facility provide ethnic based subsistence that may be both less expensive and more appealing to TCN employees. (3) Although it is natural to expect reimbursement from contractors for the cost of lodging and subsistence, the cost for such support would normally be included in the overall cost of the contract. Therefore, when possible, subsistence support should be done on a non-reimbursable basis, eliminating the unnecessary administrative burden of reimbursement. However, ASCC and subordinate command planners must include the cost of supporting contractors in the overall cost of the operation so adequate funding is provided. (4) Like base operating support, facility support to contractor personnel is situational dependent. Facilities support must be planned for as early as possible, especially in austere and non-permissive environments where contract companies cannot coordinate their own facility support via local commercial sources. In operations where facilities remain under military control, external support and systems support 20 June 2011 ATTP

255 Chapter 5 contractor managers must provide their facility requirements during contract negotiations. The contracting officer or designated ACO must then coordinate these requirements with the appropriate ASCC or subordinate command staff engineer to ensure these requirements are properly addressed in the overall facility support plan. b. Personnel Recovery (PR). The DOD PR program is the aggregation of military, civil, and political efforts to recover captured, detained, evading, isolated or missing personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied areas. PR may occur through military action, action by non-governmental organizations, other United States Government (USG) approved action, and diplomatic initiatives, or through any combination of these options. IAW DOD and Army policy, CAAF must be included in the PR program. Operational specific CAAF PR requirements should be identified as early as possible to ensure the specific PR training and administrative requirements are addressed in the contract. c. Medical and Dental Support. During contingency operations in austere/non-permissive environments, CAAF will most likely be unable to access adequate medical and dental support from local sources. Therefore, DOD policy and doctrine directs the senior Army commander to, at a minimum, be prepared to have level III medical treatment facilities (MTFs) provide emergency medical and dental care to all CAAF and non-caaf who are injured in the immediate vicinity of US forces or on a US base. This military provided medical support includes emergency and resuscitative care, stabilization, hospitalization at level III MTFs, and assistance with patient movement in emergencies where loss of life, limb or eyesight could occur. In situations where CAAF are not authorized routine medical care, policies and procedures should be established to ensure transportation of these contractors out of the AO to receive proper medical attention. Methods for government reimbursement by contractors for medical care provided should be addressed in Contractor Management Planning. WARNING MEDICAL AND DENTAL SUPPORT FOR CAAF, BEYOND EMERGENCY CARE, IS A MAJOR PROBLEM AREA IN CURRENT OPERATIONS. IN SOME OPERATIONS, THERE ARE COMMAND POLICIES IN PLACE PRECLUDING ROUTINE MEDICAL CARE FOR CAAF, YET, THERE ARE NO CORRESPONDING MECHANISMS IN PLACE TO ENSURE TRANSPORTATION OF THESE INDIVIDUALS OUT OF THE AO FOR THEM TO RECEIVE THE PROPER LEVEL OF MEDICAL AND DENTAL CARE. PREVENTING CAAF ACCESS TO ROUTINE MEDICAL CARE COULD LEAD TO HEALTH FORCE PROTECTION ISSUES FOR THE FORCE AS A WHOLE. d. Major Equipment Items. Major equipment items include Class VII GFE and CAP equipment. GFE includes Class VII items either deployed into the AO with the contractor or theater provided equipment issued to the contractor in the AO. GFE issuance, maintenance, training and return are the responsibility of the appropriate contracting officer ICW with the requiring activity. However, in some operational situations, the ASCC may be required to coordinate operational specific disposition of GFE and/or CAP equipment if so directed by Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). For example, in some stability operations, OSD may direct certain GFE and/or CAP equipment be transferred to the host nation or a designated multinational force. If transfer of GFE and/or CAP equipment is anticipated, the ASCC G-4 should work closely with the appropriate Department of State (DOS), OSD, supported organization and contracting officer to ensure clearly understood and properly coordinated disposition instructions are provided in a timely manner. e. Postal. The nationality of the contractor employee usually determines postal support. US citizen CAAF may be authorized use of the military postal service (MPS) if there is no US postal service available and if MPS use is not precluded by the terms of any international or host-nation agreement. CAAF employees normally are provided postal support through the existing host-nation system or through arrangements made by the contractor. In some operations, TCN personnel may be authorized limited access to MPS for the purpose of mailing paychecks to their home country ATTP June 2011

256 Contractor Management f. Mortuary Affairs. The joint mortuary affairs program is a broadly based military program providing the necessary care and disposition of deceased personnel, including personal effects, across the spectrum of conflict. This program includes the search, recovery, tentative identification, care, and evacuation or temporary interment, disinterment, and re-interment of deceased personnel, to include all CAAF, within the AO. Non- CAAF personnel who die in the vicinity of US forces may also be covered by this program as determined by local command policy. The specific nature and extent of mortuary affairs support is determined during the planning process. It is communicated to military forces and contractors through governing plans and orders, local command policy guidance and contractual documents. g. Post/Base Exchange Privileges. When deployed, CAAF are generally eligible to use Army and Air Force Exchange Service, Navy Exchange, or Marine Corps Exchange facilities for health and comfort items in operations where CAAF do not have access to local commercial sources for these items. This privilege is dependent upon the overall operational situation, SOFAs and individual terms and conditions in the contract. Post/base exchange privilege must be recorded on the LOA. h. Morale, Welfare and Recreation. The availability of MWR programs in the AO vary with the deployment location. MWR activities available may include self-directed recreation (e.g., issue of sports equipment), entertainment ICW the United Services Organization and the Armed Forces Professional Entertainment Office, military clubs, unit lounges, and some types of rest centers. CAAF may be authorized to utilize MWR support on a space-available basis when contractor MWR sources are not available or practical. 20 June 2011 ATTP

257 US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE US Army Command and General Staff School Command and General Staff Officer s Course (CGSOC) Common Core F100: Managing Army Change Lesson F107: Force Design Practical Exercise Reading F107RA Compilation of Strategic Guidance Initiating Capability Development The following is a compilation of guidance from multiple strategic documents. These sources and the information therein, often serve as a catalyst for capability development, by exposing capability gaps that need to be addressed. Based on what was provided in the National Defense Guidance entitled Sustaining Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21 st Century Defense, January 2012; and Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2013; a Joint Emergent Operational Needs Statement (JEONS) (F107RB) was produced and sent forth by United States Pacific Command (PACOM). In other words, after analysis of strategic guidance, a combatant command (COCOM) has identified a capability gap, and is requesting Joint Staff consideration and endorsement for the development of a hydro-terrain (HT) capability. A Challenging Global Security Environment 1 The global security environment presents an increasingly complex set of challenges and opportunities to which all elements of U.S. national power must be applied. The demise of Osama bin Laden and the capturing or killing of many other senior al-qa ida leaders has rendered the group far less capable. However, al-qa ida and its affiliates remain active in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, and elsewhere. More broadly, violent extremists will continue to threaten U.S. interests, allies, partners, and the homeland. The primary loci of these threats are South Asia and the Middle East. With the diffusion of destructive technology, these extremists have the potential to pose catastrophic threats that could directly affect our security and prosperity. For the foreseeable future, the United States will continue to take an active approach to countering these threats by monitoring the activities of non-state threats worldwide, working with allies and partners to establish control over ungoverned territories, and directly striking the most dangerous groups and individuals when necessary. U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia, creating a mix of evolving challenges and opportunities. Accordingly, while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region. Our relationships with Asian allies and key partners are critical to the future stability and growth of the region. We will emphasize our existing alliances, which provide a vital foundation for Asia-Pacific security. We will also expand our networks of cooperation with emerging partners throughout the Asia-Pacific to ensure collective capability and capacity for securing common interests. The United States is also investing in a long-term strategic partnership with India to support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region. Furthermore, we will maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula by effectively working with allies and other regional states to deter and defend against provocation from North Korea, which is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program. The maintenance of peace, stability, the free flow of commerce, and of U.S. influence in this dynamic region will depend in part on an underlying balance of military capability and presence. Over the long term, China s emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect the U.S. economy and our 1 US Department of Defense, The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21 st Century Defense (Washington, DC, DOD), January 2012, 1-3. F107ASRA F107RA-1 JUNE 2014

258 security in a variety of ways. Our two countries have a strong stake in peace and stability in East Asia and an interest in building a cooperative bilateral relationship. However, the growth of China s military power must be accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intentions in order to avoid causing friction in the region. The United States will continue to make the necessary investments to ensure that we maintain regional access and the ability to operate freely in keeping with our treaty obligations and with international law. Working closely with our network of allies and partners, we will continue to promote a rules-based international order that ensures underlying stability and encourages the peaceful rise of new powers, economic dynamism, and constructive defense cooperation. In the Middle East, the Arab Awakening presents both strategic opportunities and challenges. Regime changes, as well as tensions within and among states under pressure to reform, introduce uncertainty for the future. But they also may result in governments that, over the long term, are more responsive to the legitimate aspirations of their people, and are more stable and reliable partners of the United States. Our defense efforts in the Middle East will be aimed at countering violent extremists and destabilizing threats, as well as upholding our commitment to allies and partner states. Of particular concern are the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). U.S. policy will emphasize Gulf security, in collaboration with Gulf Cooperation Council countries when appropriate, to prevent Iran s development of a nuclear weapon capability and counter its destabilizing policies. The United States will do this while standing up for Israel s security and a comprehensive Middle East peace. To support these objectives, the United States will continue to place a premium on U.S. and allied military presence in and support of partner nations in and around this region. Europe is home to some of America s most stalwart allies and partners, many of whom have sacrificed alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. Europe is our principal partner in seeking global and economic security, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. At the same time, security challenges and unresolved conflicts persist in parts of Europe and Eurasia, where the United States must continue to promote regional security and Euro-Atlantic integration. The United States has enduring interests in supporting peace and prosperity in Europe as well as bolstering the strength and vitality of NATO, which is critical to the security of Europe and beyond. Most European countries are now producers of security rather than consumers of it. Combined with the drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan, this has created a strategic opportunity to rebalance the U.S. military investment in Europe, moving from a focus on current conflicts toward a focus on future capabilities. In keeping with this evolving strategic landscape, our posture in Europe must also evolve. As this occurs, the United States will maintain our Article 5 commitments to allied security and promote enhanced capacity and interoperability for coalition operations. In this resource-constrained era, we will also work with NATO allies to develop a Smart Defense approach to pool, share, and specialize capabilities as needed to meet 21st century challenges. In addition, our engagement with Russia remains important, and we will continue to build a closer relationship in areas of mutual interest and encourage it to be a contributor across a broad range of issues. Building partnership capacity elsewhere in the world also remains important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership. Across the globe we will seek to be the security partner of choice, pursuing new partnerships with a growing number of nations including those in Africa and Latin America whose interests and viewpoints are merging into a common vision of freedom, stability, and prosperity. Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities. To enable economic growth and commerce, America, working in conjunction with allies and partners around the world, will seek to protect freedom of access throughout the global commons those areas beyond national jurisdiction that constitute the vital connective tissue of the international system. Global security and prosperity are increasingly dependent on the free flow of goods shipped by air or sea. State and non-state actors pose potential threats to access in the global commons, whether through opposition F107ASRA F107RA-2 JUNE 2014

259 to existing norms or other anti-access approaches. Both state and non-state actors possess the capability and intent to conduct cyber espionage and, potentially, cyber attacks on the United States, with possible severe effects on both our military operations and our homeland. Growth in the number of space-faring nations is also leading to an increasingly congested and contested space environment, threatening safety and security. The United States will continue to lead global efforts with capable allies and partners to assure access to and use of the global commons, both by strengthening international norms of responsible behavior and by maintaining relevant and interoperable military capabilities. The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons technology has the potential to magnify the threats posed by regional state actors, giving them more freedom of action to challenge U.S. interests. Terrorist access to even simple nuclear devices poses the prospect of devastating consequences for the United States. Accordingly, the Department of Defense will continue to enhance its capabilities, acting with an array of domestic and foreign partners, to conduct effective operations to counter the proliferation of WMD. Primary Missions of the U.S. Armed Forces 2 To protect U.S. national interests and achieve the objectives of the 2010 National Security Strategy in this environment, the Joint Force will need to recalibrate its capabilities and make selective additional investments to succeed in the following missions: Deter and Defeat Aggression. U.S. forces will be capable of deterring and defeating aggression by any potential adversary. Credible deterrence results from both the capabilities to deny an aggressor the prospect of achieving his objectives and from the complementary capability to impose unacceptable costs on the aggressor. As a nation with important interests in multiple regions, our forces must be capable of deterring and defeating aggression by an opportunistic adversary in one region even when our forces are committed to a large-scale operation elsewhere. Our planning envisages forces that are able to fully deny a capable state s aggressive objectives in one region by conducting a combined arms campaign across all domains land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace. This includes being able to secure territory and populations and facilitate a transition to stable governance on a small scale for a limited period using standing forces and, if necessary, for an extended period with mobilized forces. Even when U.S. forces are committed to a large-scale operation in one region, they will be capable of denying the objectives of. or imposing unacceptable costs on. an opportunistic aggressor in a second region. U.S. forces will plan to operate whenever possible with allied and coalition forces. Our ground forces will be responsive and capitalize on balanced lift, presence, and prepositioning to maintain the agility needed to remain prepared for the several areas in which such conflicts could occur. Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges. In order to credibly deter potential adversaries and to prevent them from achieving their objectives, the United States must maintain its ability to project power in areas in which our access and freedom to operate are challenged. In these areas, sophisticated adversaries will use asymmetric capabilities, to include electronic and cyber warfare, ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced air defenses, mining, and other methods, to complicate our operational calculus. States such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection capabilities, while the proliferation of sophisticated weapons and technology will extend to non-state actors as well. Accordingly, the U.S. military will invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) environments. This will include implementing the Joint Operational Access Concept, sustaining our undersea capabilities, developing a new stealth bomber, improving missile defenses, and continuing efforts to enhance the resiliency and effectiveness of critical space-based capabilities. 2 Ibid, 4. F107ASRA F107RA-3 JUNE 2014

260 The 2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG) provided our initial vision for how the Army could best support the new strategic guidance. The 2013 ASPG is a refinement of that vision, incorporating a year s worth of study, analysis, and experience. We are an army in transition, so this refinement will continue. Though in Afghanistan we are proceeding to transfer security responsibility to the Afghan National Security Forces, the fight there is not yet finished. But the future won t wait; so we have already begun preparing to meet the demands of the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region and the emphasis on building partner capacity and shaping the security environment as directed by the new Defense strategic guidance. We will reinvigorate existing capabilities, develop new capabilities for the changing environment, and adapt processes to reflect the broader range of requirements. We must make these changes, however, while carefully managing our resources in this time of decreasing budgets. 3 In the near future, the Army will focus on four areas: 1) commitment to the current fight through its successful termination, 2) downsizing the force, 3) adapting to the new security environment, and 4) meeting the requirements of the new Defense strategic guidance. To accomplish these objectives, the Army developed a concept to regionally align forces to the combatant commanders, has adapted our progressive readiness model, refocused training, limited non-essential capabilities and missions, and is reviewing the composition of our Brigade Combat Teams. 4 The 2013 ASPG nests Army strategy within national and Department of Defense directives. It provides our vision, direction, and objectives for the Army and our institutional strategy. Through the implementation of this strategic guidance, the United States Army will continue to play a vital role in meeting the challenges of today while preparing for those of tomorrow. The Army is the strength of the Nation. 5 A Complex Operational Environment 6 In today s complex environment, no clear primary threat exists. Instead, America faces a complex and interconnected global operational environment populated by a multitude of opportunists. This complex environment poses a wide range of possible threats under chaotic conditions, with local events now having global consequences. This environment will have fewer unequivocal friends and foes, with most actors instead along a continuum. Regular forces, irregular forces, criminals, refugees and others intermingle in this environment and interact across space, cyberspace, social networks and law. Each actor has an agenda, often at odds with America s objectives, those of other actors and the goals of the existing political order. In addition to a broad range of readily available conventional weapons, state and non-state actors can select from an array of affordable technologies that can be adapted in unconventional ways, including an increasing use of cyberspace. Social media will enable even small groups to mobilize people and resources in ways that can quickly constrain or disrupt operations. The operational environment extends beyond the threat environment. Domestically, it is dominated by the health of the U.S. economy, which will affect the development of the force. The operational environment also presents a host of opportunities to: shape relationships with non-hostile rivals, avoiding conditions and misunderstandings that could escalate to war; work with friends, partners and allies to expand and encourage conditions of favorable order; and work with weaker states to manage unacceptable levels of disorder short of major combat operations or strategic strike options. 3 US Department of the Army, Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2013 (Washington, DC: DA), foreword. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid, 3-4. F107ASRA F107RA-4 JUNE 2014

261 The Army s presence offers National leadership a tool to shape opportunities to the advantage of U.S. interests. Complexity and uncertainty are at the heart of the Army s challenge. It cannot afford to focus on just one threat or challenge, but must be prepared to operate in a wide spectrum of complex environments, including the homeland. The Army must develop the right set of capabilities so that the President and combatant commanders have relevant and flexible options to apply. It is crucial for these options to include choices for early engagement, shaping, regional presence and deterrence and always the ability to fight and win because the judicious application of those options will be critical to global stability and America s security. The Army of the Future 7 The Army of the future will continue to provide the Nation the ability to decisively defeat the enemy on land, which remains our top priority. The Army also represents one of America s most credible deterrents against future hostility and plays a critical role in shaping the strategic environment through matured relationships our presence has fostered over time. The Army remains an indispensable source of support for the Joint Force. Army forces provide a wide range of medical, intelligence, logistical and signal support to the combatant commands across the range of military operations. The Army builds and operates the network that connects us with Joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational partners on austere battlefields and provides Joint Task Force and Joint Forces Land Component Command headquarters. The brigade remains the building block of the Army. The Army of the future is characterized as a regionally aligned, mission tailored force organized by leaders into squad- to corps-size formations empowered by Soldiers. These Soldiers will be connected to the network in vehicles that increase mobility and lethality while retaining survivability to meet the specific requirements of the combatant commander across the full range of military operations. These forces will be able to accomplish even the most complex missions, with greater agility, in challenging human terrain, able to respond with a range of capabilities and headquarters from squad to Joint Task Force level. Mission Tailored Forces 8 The strategic guidance from the President and Secretary of Defense (Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012) prioritizes 11 missions DoD must be prepared for. The Army has a significant role in 10 of the 11 missions, which will focus the training, organizing and equipping of units. The Army uses three of the missions to guide the force sizing construct: Conduct Counterterrorism and Irregular Warfare, Deter or Defeat Aggression, and Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities. We also believe that Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction may have implications for our capacity. Mission tailored forces will be those Army units aligned against a particular mission. These forces will maintain proficiency in the fundamentals of unified land operations, but also possess particular capabilities tailored for one or more of the specified missions. This approach requires us to adapt forces from the lowest levels by emphasizing leader development and leveraging technology to empower the force. 7 Ibid, 5 8 Ibid, 6. F107ASRA F107RA-5 JUNE 2014

262 Army Imperatives 9 A globally responsive and regionally engaged Army one building toward a regionally aligned, mission tailored force that can Prevent, Shape and Win now and in the future has four imperatives that form the basis of the Army Campaign Plan: provide modernized and ready, tailored land force capabilities to meet combatant commanders requirements across the range of military operations; develop leaders to meet the challenges of the 21st century; adapt the Army to more effectively provide land power; and enhance the all-volunteer Army. These imperatives drive a set of coordinated actions the Army will take to support the 11 missions outlined in the strategic guidance from the President and Secretary of Defense. This extensive list requires us to emphasize certain actions in the near-term (FYs 13-15) and others in the mid-term (FYs 16-20) and long-term (FY 21 and beyond). The Army s role in enhancing its all-volunteer force is a continuous imperative whose associated actions are always emphasized. (See Annex A: Outline of Objectives.) Provide modernized and ready, tailored land force capabilities to meet combatant commanders requirements across the range of military operations. 10 (Near-Term) Set Theaters Via Capable Army Service Component Commands and Theater Support Forces. Army forces, in support of the combatant commander, work with partner nations to set the conditions to prevent conflict as well as ensure the theater is prepared to execute contingency plans. The new defense strategy calls for a rebalancing in national focus to the Asia-Pacific region while maintaining presence and vigilance in the Middle East. The Army will also maintain its commitments to Europe while increasing reliance on rotational units instead of forward stationed forces. The theater must also be set in complex catastrophe response operations in the homeland, which is a unique array of challenges the Army must prepare for. In light of this, the Army must evaluate and prioritize risk to its infrastructure investments, specifically to strategic en route infrastructure, deployment and distribution operations, and in-theater support requirements to support and protect this shift in global posture, while continuing to consider the homeland as a unique and special theater of operations. 11 (Near- to Mid-Term) Modernize Equipment to Prepare for Future Challenges. The Army will develop and field a mix of equipment needed to ensure that our Soldiers have the right equipment, for the right missions, at the right time. Our modernization approach must be agile and strategic moving forward, reflecting the need to modernize equipment in key portfolios, leveraging mature capabilities where appropriate, and addressing the needs of our industrial base. We face evolving threats, rapid technological change and new strategic guidance that include our rebalancing in the Asia Pacific region. The Army s approach in equipment modernization must reflect this to ensure overmatch capabilities through new technologies and weapon systems Ibid. 10 Ibid, Ibid, Ibid. F107ASRA F107RA-6 JUNE 2014

263 US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE US Army Command and General Staff School Command and General Staff Officer s Course (CGSOC) Common Core F100: Managing Army Change Lesson F107: Force Design Practical Exercise Reading F107RB Joint Emergent Operational Need Statement For Hydro-Terrain Organization Capability This reading is for CGSOC student use only and is a student exercise product. See the reading on the next page. F107ASRB F107RB-1 JUNE 2014

264 UNCLASSIFIED 3 Jun 13 From: Commander, US Pacific Command To: Joint Capabilities Division, Joint Staff, J-8 Subject: JOINT EMERGENT OPERATIONAL NEED STATEMENT (JEONS) FOR HYDRO-TERRAIN ORGANIZATION CAPABILITY 1. Title: Hydro-Terrain (HT) Organization. 2. CCMD Submitted by: PACOM. 3. CONOPS Summary: The 2012 National Defense Strategy dictates a shift in regional focus from the Middle East (CENTCOM) to Asia and the Pacific region (PACOM). Given the emphasis on Joint Operational Access Capability (JOAC) and the dominant terrain of the AOR, a need for a combined arms formation with a hydro-terrain (HT) maneuver capability has emerged. An HT based formation, in concert with other maneuver elements, would provide a dominant maneuver solution to the problem of rapidly traversing and accessing terrain within the littoral regions. At the current time, only rotary wing air assault assets provide that capability, but airframes are limited. Motorized and mechanized forces are road bound, and often unable to provide direct support to their dismounted personnel. An infantry/rifle battalion transported in a HT craft could rapidly traverse dry terrain or brown water areas so common in the PACOM AOR. Such a formation could execute decisive action missions unilaterally, or in conjunction with coalition air assault to seize a mission objective. Ideally, the HT craft would have organic direct fire capability in order to over-watch dismounted personnel and engage wheeled and tracked vehicles. 4. Required Capability: A battalion sized and dedicated HT capable formation that would support Division or MEF sized operations. Its primary function would be to execute decisive action missions such as: attack, hasty defense, reconnaissance and security missions, and cordon and search. A HT based force would directly support JOAC mission requirements as directed in national and Army strategic guidance. The proposed vehicle must be able to traverse water, flooded areas, and swamp, as well as dry terrain with equal efficiency. It should have armor capable of defeating up to and including 30mm fire. The HT craft must be able to transport an Army fire team (minimum 5 pax) plus driver and vehicle commander. It should be armed with a direct fire weapon that has the ability to fire high explosive or armor piercing munitions at ranges exceeding two kilometers. A tank killing system would be optimal, but not essential. 5. Flexibility: A partial solution is acceptable, providing it encompassed the most important attributes: ability to traverse water, swamp, or dry land; and have ability to carry an Army fire team (4-5 dismounts). If a partial solution is fielded, it should be an interim one, with efforts to attain an objective capability continuing. While the entire organization (personnel and equipment) is desired, the requisite number of vehicles is UNCLASSIFIED F107ASRB F107RB-2 JUNE 2014

265 UNCLASSIFIED most important, as assigned light infantry battalions could be trained to operate the system. 6. Mission and Threat Analysis: Rotary wing aircraft is the only capability currently available that allows access to most of the terrain in the AOR. The number of airframes available at any given time limits the size of the force that can be moved. Terrain does not always allow a landing zone suitable for desired size force. Motorized/mechanized units are road bound which severely limits mobility and makes movement predictable to a potential adversary. Dismounted forces can access many areas; however, movement is slow and ineffective if speed is required. Currently no maneuver capability exists that allows access of a ground force to all areas within the AOR. Due to this fact, the ability to conduct rapid decisive action throughout the AOR is greatly hindered. Continued reliance on motorized forces will result in the need for additional forces and potentially higher casualties for any future operations. 7. Potential Non-Materiel Solutions: There are no non-materiel solutions available that provide the desired capability. 8. Potential Materiel Solutions: No current materiel solutions fill this identified capability gap in a satisfactory manner. 9. Required Quantities: The USPACOM requirement is three (3) HT battalions (one per division plus one in APS). In order to maneuver a complete light infantry battalion, HT craft is required. A total of 120 HT craft is the theater requirement. 10. Constraints: No AOR constraints are known at this time. The only constraints known are funding and the doctrinal force design process used to design and organize a new capability. 11. Primary POC: LTC Norman F. H. Dyke, (808)477-XXXX, norman.f.dyke@pacom.smil.mil ; Secondary POC: MAJ F.M Rocks, (808)477-XXXX, fred.m.rocks@pacom.smi.mil. SAMUEL J. LOCKLEAR, III Admiral, USN Commander UNCLASSIFIED F107ASRB F107RB-3 JUNE 2014

266 US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE US Army Command and General Staff School Command and General Staff Officer s Course (CGSOC) Common Core F100: Managing Army Change Lesson F107: Force Design Practical Exercise Reading F107RC The Journey of a JEONS via JCIDS to ACIDS to TAA Upon receipt and analysis of the National Defense Strategy 2012, and the 2013 Army Strategic Planning Guidance, USPACOM identified a capability gap for what they called a Hydro-Terrain (HT) Vehicle capability. They submitted a Joint Emergent Operational Needs Statement (JEONS) to the Joint Staff, J8 on 3 June USPACOM hoped and assumed that this document would initiate a Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) as part of the Joint Capabilities Integration System (JCIDS), and resulting in the development of the requested capability within a five-year timeline. In accordance with the Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration System (JCIDS), on 4 June, the Joint Capabilities Division of the J8 assigned the JEONS to a functional capabilities board (FCB) for review. The FCB chair, in coordination with the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC), reviewed the JEONS for validity. In accordance with the process, the VCJCS directed the Joint Capabilities Board (JCB) as the validation authority and after further review issued their decision. On 22 June 2013, the JCB rejected the JEONS with the following justification (in part): The JRAC and FCB review of USPACOM s JEONS indicates that there are numerous anticipated technology challenges prohibiting the fielding of a militarily useful solution on an appropriate timeline. Additionally, the FCB and JRAC failed to ascertain the inherent jointness of the capability requested. The J8/Deputy Director for Requirements (DDR) recommends that this capability request be resubmitted through service specific channels (Army) for entrance into the deliberate requirements validation process. Disappointed, but undaunted, the J8, USPACOM coordinated with US Army Pacific (USARPAC) to submit an Operation Needs Statement (ONS) to Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA), G3 for validation and subsequent sourcing by the G8. USARPAC, as the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) and Title X (Administrative Control) ADCON authority for USPACOM drafted and submitted the ONS to HQDA, G3 on 27 Jun On 1 July (despite the upcoming four-day weekend) G3 validated the requirement for an HT capability. However, given the complicated technological requirements highlighted by the Joint Staff, J8, and the force development implications of the HT Organization, HQDA G3 directed the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), TRADOC to execute a CBA through the Army Capabilities Integration System (ACIDS). The intent is to create a holistic capability through the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) as well as the force development process, simultaneously. The results of this analysis will be crafted into a force design update (FDU) and prioritized among other Army concepts to compete for resources in the Total Army Analysis (TAA). The Way Ahead: ARCIC will work closely with USARPAC and the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) to produce an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), which will provide greater detail on the required capability and be the foundational document for ACIDS and the deliberate requirements process. F107ASRC F107RC-1 JUNE 2014

267 ARCIC will execute a CBA through ACIDS consisting of three distinct phases: The Functional Area Analysis (FAA), the Functional Needs Analysis (FNA), and the Functional Solution Analysis (FSA). On 30 August ARCIC initiated work on the FAA. The following tasks and concepts were analyzed to determine the capability required to respond to the latest national and Army guidance, as well as PACOM s requirement. Figure F107RC-1. Functional Area Analysis Results. ARCIC completed the FAA and then moved into the next phase known as the Functional Needs Analysis (FNA). The FAA analyzed strategy to concepts to required tasks in order to determine the required capabilities. Next, the FNA looks at the required capabilities from the FAA, analyzes current and programmed (future) capabilities, and determines whether a capability gap exists. The identified gaps are then evaluated based on risk, and prioritized for potential action. Required Capability -- Current/Programmed Capabilities = Capability Gaps On 15 September, ARCIC initiated their FNA. On 28 October, the following prioritized results were briefed to Director, ARCIC: F107ASRC F107RC-2 JUNE 2014