Georgia Strategic Defence Review

Transcription

1 Ministry of Defence Georgia Strategic Defence Review Progress Review May 2, 2006 Tbilisi, Georgia

2 1.1 Purpose of Progress Review Report Chapter one Introduction Following a March 2006 NATO Headquarters visit and formal assessment, a Planning and Review Process (PARP) Partnership Goals (PG) report was issued by the NATO Political-Military Steering Committee on Partnership for Peace (PfP). That report focused extensively on the accomplishments and way ahead for Georgia s Strategic Defence Review (SDR). Based on extensive discussions and consensus arrived at during the March 2006 visit, the report included the following: Georgia has sensibly concluded that in view of the complexities involved and the need for further analysis of a number of issues, it is necessary to reassess some work it had already completed, and to allocate more time to the work involved to ensure that the SDR is comprehensive. In particular, the present security environment is very dynamic, leading to the need to reconsider the threat assessment, while emerging views about the level of detail that needs to be addressed in a number of areas have also pointed in the direction of taking more time. Therefore, the interim results of this work will be presented to the government by May 2006, as an SDR Progress Review, after which work on the SDR will continue. 1.2 Background and objectives under IPAP Article 2.1, Defence and Reform, of the Georgia Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), approved by the North Atlantic Council on 29 October 2004, states that Georgia will conduct a Strategic Defence Review. The actions agreed to by Georgia under that IPAP task are: Define objectives and organize appropriately for conduct of SDR Conduct Threat Assessment Develop a life cycle/costing capability Develop SDR Develop implementation plan for SDR. The objective of the Strategic Defence Review is to provide to the leadership of Georgia a realistic assessment of threats facing the nation, the strategy to be adopted by the leadership of Georgia to meet those threats, and an analysis of the costs of that strategy. Finally, the SDR provides a sizing of the military and other forces available or needed to build a viable capability for the security of the nation, as well as have the capacity to contribute to international, including NATO-led, operations on an appropriate scale (as stated in the NATO POL-MIL Committee assessment of March 2005). Completion of the SDR is a necessary precursor to much of the defence restructuring and continued reforms that Georgia will make. The aim is to establish an affordable armed forces structure required to support the National Security Concept. This Strategic Defence Review is a dynamic process, and this initial product must be accompanied by the development of a systematic process to manage and track progress against commitments, and maintain and UNCLASSIFIED 2

3 update the information contained in and produced by this Review. The SDR aims to build consensus on defence and to establish a shared vision on the future of the nation s security and the role of its armed forces. The SDR examines all aspects of the Georgian Armed Forces (GAF). It includes all active and reserve forces in the Land Forces, Air Force, Navy and National Guard. It looks at service structure, personnel, training, equipment, facilities and procedures. Additionally, the SDR examines the functioning, organisation and composition of the Joint Staff and the principal subordinate staffs, to include planning, logistics, financial and resource management, personnel management, and procurement. Finally, the SDR includes a review of current defence related documents and the development of strategic level documents such as a Threat Assessment and National Military Strategy. All of these factors must be thoroughly reviewed to ensure an accurate assessment of existing capabilities and a logical determination of future requirements are made. 1.3 Methodology of SDR In September 2004 the President of Georgia directed the formation of an SDR interagency working group. In October 2004 the Ministry of Defence (MOD) established a Strategic Defence Review working group and development process to establish an affordable military structure to meet Georgia s security threats and commitments. It was determined the Review would be accomplished in three phases. Theses phases are defined by activities and not by dates. In actuality, there was overlap with events from more than one phase occurring at the same time. Phase I: inventory equipment, facilities and personnel; assess force capability Phase II: develop key strategic and defense documents Phase III: develop future force structure with estimates of the costs necessary to field and maintain that structure The principal objectives, processes and accomplishments under each phase are as follows. Phase I (completed): Inventory of armament and equipment, including analysis of their condition based on data provided by unit commanders. Inventory of GAF infrastructure, identifying the most important facilities, those requiring renovation, and those that are to be transferred to the Ministry of Economic Development. Database to capture inventory information, which will be part of the resource management system used to develop a life-cycle costing model including cost accounting for operations, maintenance and training. Personnel registration: data has been loaded into a personnel database; ID cards have been issued to the MOD, Joint Staff and the rest of the GAF. Assessment of current combat capabilities of GAF based on data provided by unit commanders. UNCLASSIFIED 3

4 Phase II (documents completed): Threat Assessment National Security Concept National Military Strategy Minister s Vision Law on Defence Planning Doctrine for Land Forces, Naval Forces, Air Forces, Logistics, Reserve, Resource and Personnel Management. Phase III (in progress): Develop a force structure options Costing analysis of proposed force structure, with affordability and sustainability analysis Development of timeline for implementation of Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) for Georgia Initiate development of transformation plans from existing structure to desired one, to include a timeline with costing and activities to be implemented Continuous dialogue with NATO Headquarters and partner nations Presentation of officially approved force structure to NATO Georgia recognises the expectation of the NATO members that an SDR look out for a planning period of years. Current work on the SDR is focused through As agreed to during the March 2006 NATO visit, Georgia will work towards producing an SDR that has this strategic timeline. This progress report will review what has been accomplished thus far, and provide a road map for extending the vision of the process. The SDR has been conducted in consultation with NATO Headquarters and with NATO members. The Ministry of Defence has benefited greatly from the advice and assistance of Georgia s friends and partner nations. The honest assessments and insights provided by many nations and organisations are essential to Georgia s continued progress. The following contributions have been particularly helpful to the conduct of the SDR: Formal and informal assessment visits by NATO Headquarters (2005 and 2006) Assessment of Georgian Maritime Capabilities, by NATO IS/DPP (FPD) and IS/DPP (LOG) (October 2004) U.S. European Command Defence Assessment of Georgia (September 2005) Assessment of Georgian Navy report, by United Kingdom and Latvia (2004) Expert advice from Romania on budgeting systems and costing analysis (2006 -) Training program in budgeting and costing analysis from the Netherlands (2006 -) UNCLASSIFIED 4

5 2.1 National Security Concept (NSC) Chapter two Key Strategic Documents The NSC was approved in 2005 by the Georgian Parliament and President is the first such document for the government of Georgia. This document outlines the country's fundamental national values: national interests; threats, risks, and challenges; major directions for national security policy; and foreign, social, and economic policy priorities: The NSC enumerates the fundamental national values of Georgia, which are of "vital necessity for the existence and security" of the state; including sovereignty, security, peace, democracy, rule of law, human rights and welfare. The NSC lists and discusses Georgian National Interests, which include reestablishing and supporting territorial integrity, building national unity, promoting regional stability, strengthening liberty and democracy in the Caucasus region, strengthening transport and transit, ensuring alternative sources of energy, maintaining the ecology, and protecting national and cultural identity. With direct reference to the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the NSC indicates that territorial integrity represents a "vital national interest. Georgia will resort to any available legal means to peacefully and legally resolve all those issues which might emerge in the process of restoring constitutional order on Georgia's territory." The NSC threat summary discusses territorial disintegration, spillover of conflicts from neighboring countries, military intervention, Russian military bases stationed in Georgia, contraband and transnational organised crime, and international terrorism. Separatist movements and uncontrolled territories which "are supported and provoked from outside forces" are indicated as a major threat in that they undermine the country's political, economic and social stability, and represent a source of terrorism, international organised crime, and smuggling. The NSC concludes that there is "little possibility of open military aggression against Georgia," but indicates a real threat does exist from spillover of conflicts in neighboring areas, particularly Chechnya. The continued presence of Russian military bases in the country violates Georgia's sovereignty and "undermines economic and social stability." The NSC also addresses the threat from international terrorism, which might be targeted at Georgia due to its participation in coalition operations. In a separate section, the NSC outlines challenges to the country's national security: corruption and ineffective governance, economic and social challenges, dependence on a single source of energy supply, absence of an effective information policy, and ecological problems. This section underscores the vulnerability resulting from Russia s control of Georgia s energy resources. The NSC describes major directions for Georgia's National Security Policy, aimed UNCLASSIFIED 5

6 at the protection of fundamental national values and threat reduction. These directions include: strengthening democratic and government institutions, strengthening defence capabilities, restoring territorial integrity, enhancing Euro- Atlantic integration; and strengthening foreign relations. Additional directions include protecting cultural heritage and enhancing security policies in the economic, social, information, energy, and ecological sectors. Under defence capabilities, the MOD is charged with creating armed forces compatible with NATO standards, as well as being capable of providing assistance to the civilian authorities and participating in anti-terrorism organisations and international peace support operations. Finally the NSC outlines Georgia's foreign policy priorities with respect to individual countries. It provides for a "strategic partnership" with the US, Ukraine, Turkey and Azerbaijan, a "partnership" with Russia, and "pragmatic cooperation" with Armenia. 2.2 National Threat Assessment In 2005 Georgia developed its first national threat assessment. This classified document assesses the potential impact from various external and internal threats; as well the probability that these threats will actually occur. In general, the probability of direct aggression against Georgia is relatively low. However, the potential consequences from direct aggression, should it occur, are severe. The focus of the internal threat assessment is on the conflict zones of Abkhazia and the so-called South Ossetia. The current situation with the separatist regions has long term consequences which undermine the security and development of Georgia. These conflict zones provide the greatest potential for crisis, unwarranted external actions, and armed conflict exists, particularly if they receive support and assistance from other states in the region. Because of the implications of external support to the separatist areas, the main characteristic of the security environment in Georgia is a very close link between internal and external threats. Unsettled conflicts in neighboring states, lawlessness in Georgia s separatist regions, and poor control of the state borders, add up to opportunities for contraband and transnational organised crime that seriously damage the national security and economy. These threats hinder establishment of law and order in the country, jeopardising the stability of Georgia and the entire region. International terrorism is a considerable threat to the national security of Georgia, especially in view of Georgia s proximity to terrorist havens in neighboring regions. As an active participant in the international anti-terrorist coalition, Georgia may become a target of international terrorist attacks. These may be directed against strategic infrastructure such as international oil and gas pipelines and other states assets located in Georgia. 2.3 National Military Strategy (NMS) UNCLASSIFIED 6

7 The NMS was signed by the President of Georgia in November It provides guidance to enhance combat capabilities for self-defence in meeting current threats, and improving the defence management system. Its main theme is the necessity for Georgia to attain long term security through deterrence gained by collective defence, specifically membership in the NATO. The need for collective defence is underscored by Georgia s inability to put significant resources against a variety of internal and external threats, some originating from significantly more powerful sources. The Georgian NMS supports and implements the NSC; identifies military goals, objectives and requirements; defines activities and provides operational planning guidance to the GAF; and provides guidance for GAF structure and capabilities through The NMS prescribes the general principles for the defence of Georgia: Protection from direct aggression NATO integration and international cooperation Ability to assess strategic environment precisely Provide stability in the Caucasus region Contribute to the international security environment The NMS discusses the four main National Military Objectives of defence, readiness, deterrence of enemy/prevention, and international military cooperation. It also identifies and discusses, in general terms, the military capabilities that are required to be maintained by the GAF: Flexibility Conduct joint operations Interoperability Conduct deliberate and crisis action planning Support to civil authorities Information and intelligence Finally, the NMS describes the: Need for Georgia to contribute to the international security environment Benefit gained from participation in coalition operations Need to develop Special Forces, Intelligence and Military Police capabilities Ability for GAF to conduct joint planning and operations Military support to civilian authorities during emergencies UNCLASSIFIED 7

8 Chapter three Key Defence Documents 3.1 Minister s Vision 2006 The Minister s Vision guides development of a coherent Ministry of Defence contribution to the National Security of Georgia, consistent with the President s vision and the National Security Concept. The Minister s vision identifies the following three main priorities: First, improve GAF combat capabilities. This process requires proper training and equipping of the force, maintaining qualified personnel, and improving their living and working conditions. Second, facilitate the NATO-integration process. The ultimate goal is a highly capable, NATO-interoperable GAF able to contribute to NATO-led military operations. Third, improve the defence management system. This includes effective use of available human, material and financial resources; while improving planning process, program development and effective implementation of decisions. During 2006 the Ministry Staff and Joint Staff will work together on the following priority items: Create a functional Joint Staff, including permanent billets for Air Force, Navy and National Guard officers Create force development/management system and develop implementation plans for SDR force structure decisions Continue actions on recommendations received from NATO assessments, the 2005 U.S. European Command Defence Assessment, and other partner nations Start to develop an effective Human Resources System Continue to develop a functional logistics system Start to develop a functional Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System Improve NATO interoperability with focus on defining clear command and staff functions within the organisational structure and developing identified niche capabilities Develop a readiness reporting program Continue to develop capability in Special Forces, Military Police and Military Intelligence; integrate Military Intelligence with other national intelligence activities Update National Training Center (KTA) with Combat Maneuver Training Center capability UNCLASSIFIED 8

9 During 2006 all services of the Georgian Armed Forces will focus priority efforts on the following continuing actions: Support and contribute to peacekeeping operations for the resolution of territorial conflicts Support NATO-lead/coalition operations Improve the ability to deploy and sustain forces, within and outside of the country Continue to improve the quality of living and working conditions of military service members Develop effective intelligence structures and initiate capability Develop C2 capabilities Conduct disposition procedures for equipment identified as Non Fully Mission Capable Develop recommendations/plan for location of forces/assets consistent with threat, contingency plans and fiscal considerations During 2006 the Land Forces will focus on the following actions: Establish a functional Land Forces Headquarters Develop a deployable command and control systems and unit tactical communications Fully sustain the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP)/Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (SSOP) unit training program Implement a training management system in 1 st and 2nd Brigades During 2006 the Air Force will focus on continuing to develop air surveillance and reporting capability, compatible with NATO standards and procedures, to support maintaining air sovereignty. During 2006 the Navy will focus on continuing to develop effective, integrated operational capability with the Georgian Coast Guard to ensure maritime sovereignty/control and to maintain capability for Black Sea cooperative security During 2006 the National Guard will develop an effective mobilization system and work to gain and maintain 20 battalions in trained and equipped status. 3.2 Law on Defence Planning The Law on Defence Planning was approved by the Georgian Parliament in April This is the first piece of legislation of this type enacted by Georgia. This law establishes requirements and assigns responsibilities for defence planning in Georgia. Defence planning is essential to ensure Georgia is continuously ready to protect its people, critical assets and sovereign territory, and is able to meet its international commitments. Defence Planning includes force planning, resources planning, logistics planning, command and control planning, crisis and emergency situations planning for short, middle and long term periods. UNCLASSIFIED 9

10 The Law on Defence Planning identifies the following structural documents and gives the Ministry of Defence the lead responsibility for their preparation, review and revision. Other departments and offices take part in the defence planning process by supporting the Ministry of Defence. National Military Strategy Georgian Threat Assessment Document Defence Planning Guidance Military Development Programs Annual Programs Operational Plans, Concepts, Doctrine and Minister of Defence Instructions. 3.3 MOD Planning As detailed in the Law on Defence Planning, the MOD will publish a series of ministerial level documents, in addition to its own internal procedures. These documents provide specific guidance for programs and resource allocation. Defence Planning Guidance. This document is based on the National Military Strategy and Threat Assessment. It prescribes the principal directions and objectives by the Ministry of Defence for the Georgian Armed Forces for a four year period. Military Development Programs. This provides guidance on structure modernization, equipment, training, unit sustainment, logistics support, reserve retaining and interoperability with NATO, for a three year period Annual Programs. This document provides specific guidance to implement the Principal Programs. After internal discussion of these programs, the Ministry of Defence develops a military budget plan. This budget plan considers the nation s current threats and challenges, and requirements for effective defence. The Annual Programs document guides the prioritisation of the military budget approved by Parliament. UNCLASSIFIED 10

11 Chapter four Analysis of national requirements 4.1 Key Political and Military Assumptions ( ) This subchapter lists the key political and military assumptions necessary to determine Georgia s military requirements and to plan the GAF Mid-Term Force for the period These assumptions are made with the complete understanding that political decisions are made by the national leadership. Political assumptions: The political direction and development orientation of Georgia is Euro-Atlantic, with the objective of gaining membership in the NATO Alliance. Georgia will continue to have friendly and cooperative relations with all of its neighboring states, except Russia. Russia will continue to subvert the interests and stability of Georgia by supporting the separatist regions and pursuing an aggressive energy control policy. The Caucasus will remain an unstable and unpredictable region. The tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as in the north Caucasus area are the main threat to stability to the region. Georgia will continue to be a member of CIS. However, the CIS will not be an acceptable alternative to NATO due to the policies and actions of Russia with regard to Georgia The separatist leadership of Abkhazia and so-called South Ossetia will continue to maintain restricted control over those areas, with the intention of attaining recognised separation from the Georgian government. Resolution of the conflict zone issues and the peaceful reintegration of both areas will remain one of the most significant priorities for Georgia. Existing agreements on peacekeeping forces in so-called South Ossetia and military observers in Abkhazia will remain in effect. Military assumptions: The current threat assessment regarding a low probability of open military aggression against Georgia will remain. Russia will honor their current agreement and withdraw their military forces from Georgia by Russian peacekeeping forces may remain in the conflict zones, until political resolution of those areas. The presence of Russian forces and bases within Georgia will continue to present an urgent risk to Georgian interests, until their final withdrawal. Georgia will continue to enjoy the same level of military support and assistance from its current partner nations. UNCLASSIFIED 11

12 The threat from international terrorism will require continued international coalition operations in Iraq and elsewhere. Georgia will continue to provide an appropriate share of military forces to support these international efforts. Georgia will maintain forces deployed in support of international coalition operations. The decision to deploy forces rests with the nation s elected leaders. For planning purposes, the MOD assumes the requirement to deploy forces through 2009 will remain at least at the current level (two battalions in Iraq and one company in Kosovo). The Ministry of Defence will not have sufficient budget resources during to significantly expand the force, conduct large scale equipment purchases, or construct major building effort. 4.2 Requirements based on the threat assessment From the National Threat Assessment and review of current geo-political events, the following military requirements are determined: Visible and ready forces with appropriate combat power to give the Georgian people a sense of security and to support the stability of the government. Mobile and ready forces with appropriate combat power to deter acts of aggression or territorial violations (small force incursions, illegal immigration) and to effectively respond to these if they should occur. Forces to stop the spillover of instability in conflict zones inside Georgia as well as from North Caucasus. This requires enhanced capabilities to conduct operations in mountain terrain. Deployable forces capable to continue the participation in international and counter terrorism operations. Forces to provide security to capital, ports and key infrastructure against subversive actions. Capabilities to provide airspace sovereignty on a certain level. Forces to provide emergency assistance to civil authorities in the event of natural disasters or attack by weapons of mass destruction UNCLASSIFIED 12

13 Chapter five MOD internal assessment of Georgian Armed Forces 5.1 Personnel database and identification system The Personnel Information Bank/Database has been created under Phase I of the SDR. The database contains all necessary permanent documentation and information required to manage the assignment of personnel to units, as well as to manage individual careers. This database provides an information management system supporting effective personnel management, human resource allocation and personnel career management. J1 is the major custodian of the database. Database information is available for use within the Ministry of Defence and General Staff, as well as other governmental and nongovernmental organisations upon their request. The database includes the following: The Table of Organisation which includes the following data: unit structure, organisation number, unit name, position name, Military Occupational Specialty and location. The Table of Equipment which includes the following data: organisation number, unit, equipment data (name), quantity and location. Personnel Information File: information on Officers, NCOs, Privates, military academy students and Civilians. Files include the following data: ID number, military rank, name, blood type, address, religion, position, military specialties, education (military, civilian), service data, awards, and penalties (order identification, number and date). Diagram 5-A provides a sample of the personnel database with the personnel identification data for an officer in the Georgian Army. Information on veterans of the civil wars fought regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Information on temporary contractors hired outside the Table of Organisation.. Personnel registration, including the issuing of identity cards, has also been completed in conjunction with SDR Phase I. Identification cards have been issued to all military and civilian personnel within the MOD, as well as within the entire GAF. Conscripts have received temporary service cards. MoD/GAF Identification Cards have been issued based on Information File data. ID cards include: Mod/GAF ID number, personal identification number, name, family name, military rank, position, sex, date of birth, blood type, height, and eye color. In addition a Human Resources Management Section has been established within the Defence Policy and Planning Department of the MoD. The main function of this section is to formulate Human Resources policy for the Georgian Armed Forces Inventory of armament and equipment: UNCLASSIFIED 13

14 The inventory of armaments, ammunition and other military equipment in the military bases has already been completed, with Presidential Order (#119) serving as a guideline. Following the inventory, the process of categorizing those items began on August 1, 2005 and is scheduled to be completed by June, Once the categorization process is completed, the identification of Fully Mission Capable and Non Fully Mission Capable property will be completed. Throughout the process, Security Council minutes #20 and #28 will serve as guidance for the disposal of outdated armament and equipment. Commissions have been organised and deployed to evaluate the condition of all armament and equipment. At the bases where ammunition is stored, an assessment of the conditions of the storage facilities was conducted in addition to the inventory of ammunition. Once completed, lists of property recommended to be disposed of will be sent to MOD Permanent Commission on Military-Technical issues, for the further determination. A temporary storage site has been identified for that excess and obsolete equipment pending final disposition. In conjunction with this task, development of an integrated equipment database has started. 5.3 Inventory of Infrastructure Facilities Prior to the 1991, the military infrastructure facilities in Georgia were designed to accommodate 300, ,000 military servicemen. After 1991, the lack of proper proportion between personnel and facilities was evident. Given the relatively low recent personnel strength of the Georgian Armed Forces (20,000-25,000) and large number of infrastructure facilities inherited from the Soviet troops many facilities were no longer needed by the GAF. On the basis of the reforms and modernization efforts performed during the past years, many of installations belonging to the GAF have been identified as excess and no longer hold any military-strategic interest for MOD. By 2001, it was determined that there was a need for better and more detail accounting of infrastructure as well as identification of the intended use and strategic importance. While the MOD conducted a property inventory during 2001, the documentation developed during this inventory was not accurate, and required further refinement. This became possible through inventories conducted during the year Nearly 500 military bases and separate facilities were subjected to the inventory, including 4600 buildings. From these 500 military bases registered in the MOD, only 90 facilities were determined to be of continued value (18% of the total number). Only 60% out of 90 facilities can be considered Fully Mission Capable. The utility of the remaining facilities requires further review. Of these 90 facilities, 41 military bases (8.2% of the total number) are in a TOE (active) status, and 49 military bases (9.8% of the total number) are in a reserve facility status. 5.4 Equipment and facilities identified for transfer from MOD. In , as a result of receiving military facilities from the Ministry of Interior Affairs, withdrawal of the Russian Federation s military forces from Georgia, and fewer force locations, the number of unusable facilities possessed by the Ministry of Defence UNCLASSIFIED 14

15 increased. During 2005, 186 of the 473 MOD were transferred to the Ministry of Economic Development for privatisation. In July 2005, a special working group was established in the MOD, consisting of selected department heads from the Ministry and the Joint Staff. Their task is to consider the future use of military facilities and assets, and to present future plans. Based on the final SDR and the recommendations of this group, future utilization of military infrastructure will be determined. The primary list of the further infrastructure which can be transferred to the Ministry of Economic Development is now being developed. Other sites that may be closed will be studied by this Ministry as to their potential alternative use and offered for sale as appropriate. Several ammunition storage depots were closed in 2004 and the continued centralization of usable munitions will improve control. Currently, the GAF possess four central ammunition storages. In order to ensure safely stored usable ammunition an action plan was developed with set timeframes, according to which two central storages were repaired in For 2006, repair of the third ammunition storage is planned. 5.5 Logistics accomplishments under SDR Some obsolete and unusable equipment has been already centralized at the Vaziani base and Tank Repairing Factory depots, and prepared for disposal according to Presidential guidance of Two pieces (one T-55 and one BMP-1) of the CFE Treaty Limited Equipment were cut according to the Treaty requirements. The MOD plans to dispose of the remaining obsolete armor. The joint NATO-Georgia demilitarisation project was successfully completed in February 2006 within the framework of the NATO Trust Fund. Twelve Allies, with Luxembourg as a lead nation, contributed to this 1.2 Million Euro project that lasted for three years. A total of 569 ground-to-air missiles left at former Soviet bases were demolished. Currently, the project on Demilitarisation and disposal of ammunition and bombs at former Soviet bases in Georgia signed between Georgia and the OSCE on October 24, 2005 is underway. It will be completed in August The scope of project foresees the disposal of outdated and unusable air defence artillery and aviation ammunition. Other demilitarisation oriented projects are also being developed. Taking into account the large amount of obsolete ammunition to be disposed, Georgia will require assistance from partner countries. An inclusive catalogue of defence assets will now permit a more detailed assessment of usable infrastructure and equipment to proceed. This will form the essential basis for future decisions on basing arrangements, site closures, renovation and all manner of equipment demilitarisation, acquisition and refurbishment. The multi-year basing and infrastructure development plans as well as any associated funding for infrastructure improvements and maintenance will stem from the force structure recommended by the SDR. UNCLASSIFIED 15

16 A Host Nation Support catalogue has been created and all related data had been consolidated. In the second part of the 2006, the data will be updated and regular annual reviews will be conducted. An MOU with NATO regarding the provision of HNS and transit of NATO forces was ratified by the Georgian Parliament in October The plan for establishing a standardisation and codification system was developed for the GAF in According to the plan, a 4-man task group was created. This group was tasked to study the issue and develop the appropriate draft structure. It analyzed Polish and German standardisation and codification systems as well as NATO corresponding committee basic documents. As a result, a standardisation section was established within the J4 in January At the first stage, the section was tasked to develop a Standardisation and Codification Concept by September After approval of this concept by the end of 2006, an action plan for will be developed. The plan will reflect all steps necessary to establish a fully capable standardisation system corresponding to NATO requirements. There are plans for the creation of the national codification bureau which will conduct: Familiarization with NATO codification system and preliminary work aimed at achieving interoperability with abovementioned system, ; In cooperation with AC/135 preparation for the II stage necessary to achieve interoperability with NATO in codification system (acquiring NMBS, NABS, NMCRL systems), ; Determination of financial requirements and funds allocations necessary to achieve TIR-2 membership, ; Application for NATO A/C135 committee for (TIR-2) membership, Georgian Armed Forces current capabilities assessment Based on the capabilities analysis, the present GAF requires further capabilities development in order to fully perform all tasks given to it in the National Military Strategy. Existing Georgian Armed Forces are not able to deter or to successfully conduct large scale combat operations against a major armed force. The do have the capability to delay and defend against lower level military threats and confrontation. The GAF can integrate service assets to plan and conduct joint operations of a limited size and duration. A capable artillery force is a strength of the GAF, while insufficient logistics support and little air defence are main weaknesses Command Level The Joint Staff has been trained under the GTEP program can conduct effective command and control. Newly created Land Forces HQ is undergoing SSOP training and will be fully operational and ready to conduct command and control of subordinated units from the Jun Air Force and Navy HQs require education and training for staff personnel, and development of NATO standards Land Forces (LF) UNCLASSIFIED 16

17 Land Forces constitute the majority of the GAF and provide the preponderance of the nation s warfighting capability. Land Forces are capable of conducting offensive, defensive and support operations, and are experienced in multinational and coalition operations. LF can participate in PSO with up to two battalions, but only provide limited National Logistic Support. Consistent with the National Military Strategy, LF commands are capable of operating separately, within their organic capabilities, at the brigade and battalion level. Land Forces is yet inexperienced at operating at the multi-brigade or joint levels. LF can conduct static and mobile defence at the brigade and battalion levels. They can conduct an offensive operation in one main direction. Land Forces Headquarters: The Land Forces Command has recently been established and the personnel assigned to its headquarters have been undergoing staff training. In case of war part of LF HQ becomes a Task Force HQ. 1 st Infantry Brigade. With its organic assets, the Brigade is capable of conducting day and limited night offensive and defensive combat operations, and to provide combat support and combat service support to its subordinate units. 2 nd Infantry Brigade. 2nd Brigade has similar capabilities as the 1 st Brigade. 3 rd Infantry Brigade. 3rd Brigade is in process of being manning and is training under GSSOP program. 4 th Infantry Brigade. 4 th Brigade has been formed primarily with personnel and equipment from the forces formerly assigned to the Minister of Interior. A large portion of this brigade s soldiers are conscripts. Artillery Brigade. Fire support capabilities include target oriented direct and indirect fire, concentrated fire and defensive fire Separate Battalions. Land Forces currently has specific combat, combat support and combat service support capabilities organised within the following battalions. Infantry. This unit is well trained and equipped. Armor-Mechanised. This unit is also well trained and equipped. Engineer. This unit is in the process of formation. Communications Signal Reconnaissance Air Defence. This unit is limited to low altitude engagement with gun systems Special Forces Brigade (SF): UNCLASSIFIED 17

18 SF Brigade is equipped with nearly all major equipment items and are capable of conducting day and night special combat operations. SF brigade have training centre which conducts trainings for SF personnel and for other brigades Air Force (AF): AF is comprised of aviation, air defence, and air surveillance units. All units are equipped with older and in some cases partially capable yet unmodern systems. This will be highlighted later. The Air Force is relatively small and only has between 1100 and 1200 personnel at any time. Aviation units are capable of conducting limited combat operations in daytime under visual flight rules (VFR) good weather conditions. Some assets including the UH-1 helicopter and some SU-25 subsonic jets can conduct night operations. The Air Force does not have cargo fixed wing capability. Over the past two years there has been an increase in the numbers and types of different helicopters and fixed wing aircraft going through more intensive crew training. Currently the Air Force has no supersonic armed jets to conduct Air Police, nor does it have cargo fixed wing, and would need support from other NATO countries in these areas. In the near term the Air Force will establish a new airfield collocated with 2 nd Infantry Brigade, in Senaki (Western Region) and will include selected helicopters relocated from Tbilisi. The Georgian Air Force has significantly increased funding and the average annual pilot flying hours since 2000, but still needs to increase funding for flying hours to meet the minimum NATO annual flying hour program for each type aircraft. Georgian Air Space Surveillance units are operational and have combined surveillance operations from air defence units to provide a better air space surveillance picture. The current radars do not meet the NATO range requirements beyond the Georgian country borders and will need upgrading at a minimum. The Air Surveillance Command is able to work with both the air defence units and Georgian Civil air traffic radars to receive a more comprehensive air space surveillance picture; however none of it is connected electronically and has to be reported verbally by phone or two way radios Navy: The Georgian Navy currently has nine principal ships in an operational status. The Navy is well manned, however, crew readiness and experience among the ships companies suffers from limited opportunities to train at sea. The Georgian Navy normally maintains one ship in port in a ready status to respond to emergencies. The Navy is capable of conducting limited sea control operations in the Eastern Black Sea and point defence of the ports and oil terminals. Additionally, the Georgian Navy is an active participant in the Black Sea Forces, and contributes to the collective maritime security and cooperation. A Georgian Navy officer commanded the Black Sea Forces during The Georgian Navy is also capable of conducting show the flag deployments in support of the nation s political and diplomatic interests, as well as multinational peacekeeping and humanitarian support UNCLASSIFIED 18

19 operations. Working with other State agencies, the Georgian Navy can conduct emergency support to civilian authorities, sea-based search and rescue operations, ecological monitoring, and support to law enforcement activities against smuggling, illegal entry, piracy, and trafficking National Guard and Reserve The Georgian reserves consist of units throughout the country organised at the battalion level. They are mostly Homeland Security type forces, with some limited capabilities that can be applied to warfighting. These reserve battalions do three weeks of basic training and every year go through a two week retraining program under the National Guard Department. The National Guard is not a standing force. There are 18 trained reserve battalions with approximately 350 personnel in each. These soldiers are equipped with uniforms, individual weapons and some basic personal equipment. Reserve units are capable to perform point security, some rear area operations, and emergency support to local civilian authorities. The National Guard constitutes the country s strategic reserve. Due to the fact that reserve units are located throughout the country and know their local regions and communities, they are particularly valuable to respond to local emergencies requiring an organised force to provide security and/or manpower. With some additional training and equipment they can perform some Host Nation Support tasks. The reserve units could also provide personnel augmentation to the infantry brigades during time of war. The Georgian reserve forces are limited in its capability to conduct warfighting by a lack of combat support assets to provide firepower and the ability to operate in an armor/mechanised environment. They also have limited combat service support assets to provide mobility and sustainment. UNCLASSIFIED 19

20 Chapter six Georgian Armed Forces Mid-Term Force Chapter 6.1 Force Planning Study In conjunction with the SDR, the MOD and General Staffs conducted a force planning study against a worst-case scenario. The worst-case scenario used for this study involved a military response by the Georgian Armed Forces in the event a major invasion by an enemy force with substantial land, naval and air capabilities. The probability of such an attack occurring is recognised as low. The purpose of this study was to conduct an analysis of force requirements in the defence of Georgia under the most challenging circumstances. In this way, the staffs hoped to gain valuable lessons learned that could be applied to force structure planning and resource allocation against other threats. The methodology of this study started with determining a realistic enemy force and a probable military course of action to be taking in the invasion of Georgia. Next the MOD and Joint Staffs devised a strategy and a force structure adequate to defeat such an invasion, assuming no constraints on resources. The resultant force was well beyond the resources available to the country of Georgia. Diagram 6-A illustrates a notional unconstrained force developed during this force planning study. The next step was to develop strategies and force structures sufficient to conduct a series of block and delay operations against the same invasion force. These block and delay operations would be intended to give Georgia sufficient time to receive military and/or political assistance from other nations. Realistic resource constraints were introduced into this phase of the study. This required prioritisation of capabilities and determining acceptable risk. Future force planning studies will focus on specific scenarios such as military provocation, incidents of terrorism or sabotage, providing Host Nation Support, and natural disasters. This will test whether the GAF possesses sufficient capabilities in command and control systems, communications, tactical mobility, logistics and ability to mass combat power, necessary to respond to these events. 6.2 Options for force structure ( ) The existing structure of the Georgian Armed Forces is shown in Diagram 6-B. Looking at options for the Mid Term Force ( ), the following factors were considered: command and control structure, size and type of combat forces in all services and National Guard, equipment, logistics, personnel, and the training and education system. Based on the assumptions as to the MOD budget during , efforts must focus on increasing combat capability through supportable and cost effective force structure changes. Solving problems through major procurement will not be possible. The priority UNCLASSIFIED 20

21 is on making the most effective command and control, and on eliminating unnecessary and inefficient elements within the structure. The final SDR will determine future force structure based on long term cost analysis and NATO interoperability requirements. Georgia s 2005 self assessment identified air defence and logistics support as the two most critical warfighting shortfalls in the GAF. Substantial investments in fighter aircraft and/or ground based air defence missile systems are neither economically feasible in the short run, nor warranted by the current threat. However, significant improvements in logistics support are possible through restructuring and reorganisation of existing assets. The two options for Mid-Term Force are Option A (shown in Diagrams 6-C and 6-D) and Option B (shown in Diagrams 6-E and 6-F). Option A essentially retains the current structure, but provides for more capability through fully manning, equipping and training. Option B restructures command and control of certain units and reduces certain units. Diagram 6-G illustrates logistics support options that could be applied to either force structure option. Diagram 6-H illustrates the Structure Chart of the Joint Staff October 2006, which applies to both GAF structure options. Changes made under Options A and B primarily impact which forces will be assigned to the new Land Forces Command, and how assigned forces will be organised under that command. Under both Options A and B, the Air Force and Navy structures remain the same Option A 3 full professionally manned, trained and equipped infantry brigades 4 th Brigade retained in an active status, manned principally by conscripts A full artillery brigade One separate infantry battalion and one separate mechanised battalion One logistics battalion may be organised under Land Forces command, if sufficient assets are available Combat service battalions for communications, engineering and air defence. Special Forces Brigade is organised outside the Land Forces Command One MP Company remains organised under the MP department, outside Land Forces Command; this MP Company to planned to be increased to MP Battalion once personnel are trained and appropriate equipment is available Conscripts are utilized at the same level as in the current force. Estimated total GAF personnel strength approximately 23, 600 plus reserves Option B 3 full professionally manned, trained and equipped infantry brigades (2 infantry and one mechanised infantry) Separate infantry battalion is reorganised under 2nd Infantry Brigade Separate armor/mechanised battalion is reorganised under a new 3d Mechanised Infantry Brigade (mechanised with enhanced capability) UNCLASSIFIED 21