POSTMISSION ACTIVITIES

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1 CHAPTER POSTMISSION ACTIVITIES Information gathering is the goal of all SR operations. Gathering additional information accomplishes two goals. First, the information prevents the SFOD from having to go back into the same area to perform another reconnaissance to gain more information. Second, if needed, a quick reaction force (QRF) or other reinforcements can be given guidance for the best route through the area to adjacent SFODs or units. After completing SR mission tasks, the SFOD quickly exfiltrates to an isolation facility (ISOFAC) or other secure area for debriefing, preparation of after-action and lessons learned reports, reconstitution, recovery, stand down, or regeneration as required. SF units have SOPs for postmission SFOD debriefing to ensure all needed information is obtained. Debriefings must be timely and address PIR, IR, other mission-specific requirements, and other information. Command emphasis is essential to the success of these postmission activities. MISSION DEBRIEFING Immediately after the SFOD s arrival at the ISOFAC, the staff of the recovering operational base begins the debriefing process. The purpose of this quick and systematic debriefing is to capture as much accurate information as is available from the SFOD in the shortest time possible. For example, PIR may be missionspecific information on the operational capability of an enemy unit. However, if the SFOD noticed large movements of noncombatants during certain hours, reporting this information may help to identify enemy population control operations being undertaken. This extra information could play a key role in the timing of future infiltrations. The returning SFOD is also questioned about map corrections during all debriefing sessions. This key information aids in both planned and emergency exfiltrations or reinforcement operations. Debriefing Staff The AOB and/or FOB debriefing staff conducts debriefings. Appendix D contains information on debriefing formats. Priority in debriefing the SFOD goes to the SIO and his staff. Debriefings are tape recorded and or videotaped, and the SIO maintains these tapes on file for long-term use. The debriefing staff is made up of the following: OPCEN director or base deputy commander (committee chairperson). OPCEN operations officer (S3). SIO (S2). 4-1

2 AST for the recovered SFOD. SPTCEN personnel officer (S1). SPTCEN logistics officer (S4). CA staff officer. PSYOP staff officer. Signal center (SIGCEN) director or senior signal officer. Medical operations officer. Judge advocate. Staff weather officer (SWO). Chaplain. Unit historian. Others as directed by the OPCEN director. Procedures As soon as the SFOD is recovered, and before its members are allowed to attend to personal hygiene and other personal matters, members undergo a rapid debriefing as a group. The debriefing procedures described below address the basic steps to be followed as part of the debriefing process. Collective Intelligence Debriefing. The intelligence staff conducts this debriefing, but other staff elements may also be present. The purpose of this debriefing is to answer PIR and/or SIR, elicit indications, and provide warning. Format. This debriefing is quick and to the point. The format and line of questioning varies from mission to mission but is determined by the OPCEN director in accordance with the unit SOP. See FMs and for examples of the types of information for which the SFOD can be queried. For use of specific debriefing guides from the United States Special Operations Command s (USSOCOM s) concept of operations (CONOPS), and Special Operations Debriefing and Retrieval System (SODARS), refer to USSOCOM s SOCRATES. The Battalion S2 has access to this system. Appendix D has an example of a debriefing guide. The intelligence staff immediate y exploits time-sensitive information critical to decision making by the commander or higher headquarters. For example, a priority maybe the location of insurgent safe houses that are targets for DA teams. Technique. Normally, the principal debriefer uses a technique known as maptracking. The primary debriefing aid used is a map of the SFOD s AO. The debriefer starts at the point of infiltration or embarkation and follows the route travelled by the unit. He proctors the flow of information to ensure all events, sightings, and activities conducted to the point of exfiltration or debarkation are covered. After getting the initial information, the debriefer then segments return route information. He asks specific questions with emphasis on operating systems (intelligence, communications, engineering, weaponry, and medical aspects) that affected the SFOD s mission. Throughout the debriefing, the debriefer maintains a relaxed and nonhostile atmosphere in which the unit recounts its activities. A qualfied debriefer such as a member of the battalion counterintelligence (CI) team, an interrogator, or an order of battle technician conducts the 4-2

3 debriefing. If such a person is not available, a detached but knowledgeable proctor and prompter collect and record the information concerning the SFOD s observations during its mission. Review of SFOD Documents and Other Materiel. After the collective intelligence debriefing, the intelligence staff gathers all maps, notebooks, papers, exposed film, video tapes, photographs, recovered equipment, and other materiel. It then releases the SFOD to attend to personal hygiene, rest, and recuperate. If necessary, all rucksacks, map cases, and uniform pockets are inventoried to ensure all items of intelligence interest are collected. The intelligence staff thoroughly reviews all of the collected items for data and formulates more detailed questions for the next stage of debriefing. Individual Debriefing. As soon as the intelligence staff is ready, and in any case not later than three hours after the SFOD has recovered to the operational base, the intelligence staff calls SFOD members in individually for detailed debriefing. At this stage in debriefing, the intelligence staff focuses first on the commander s PIR and SIR and then on IR. The intelligence staff also collects information on the adequacy of preinfiltration intelligence support. As an individual is released by the intelligence staff, other staff elements may conduct similar individual debriefings. However, no other staff element should talk with an SFOD member until the intelligence staff has had its turn. General Collective Debriefing and After-Action Review. After individual debriefings, and not later than 6 hours after the SFOD has recovered to the operational base, the base debriefing staff assembles the SFOD and the staff as a group for a general collective debriefing and after-action review. The base commander may also be present. At this debriefing, the SFOD leader gives a quick summary of the operation, focusing on the SFOD s stated and implied missions. He also briefs unanticipated SFOD s or members activities (for example, to exploit a high-value source of information). After the SFOD leader gives his summary, each staff section, in turn, questions the SFOD members and augmenters. At the conclusion of this stage of the debriefing, the commander or OPCEN director provides any necessary further guidance. The SFOD is then released to prepare its after-action review and report of lessons learned. Odinarily, this debriefing includes Name, rank, and position of each SFOD member. Mission. Time, location, and insertion and extraction methods. Routes. Terrain (vegetation, height of canopy if in forest, trails, water sources and direction of flow, LZs and BLZs), local population, including distance and direction to the nearest terrain feature, and natural and man-made obstacles to movement in the area. SFOD s uniforms and equipment. Hostile forces (strength, activity, location, uniform, time, equipment, weapons, and morale). Results of hostile contact (friendly and enemy killed in action [KIA] and wounded in action [WIA], disposition of KIA, PWs, descriptions and serial numbers of captured weapons, and descriptions of captured documents and equipment). 4-3

4 Weapons, demolitions, and ammunition used and results. Map corrections. Communications equipment used and results. Friendly contacts, including descriptions, locations, circumstances, and results. Miscellaneous information such as incorporation of surveillance plan, security procedures, surveillance techniques used, and surveillance site type, construction, and occupation. Condition of the SFOD, including time needed to prepare for the next mission. Conclusions and recommendations. Electronic Information Retrieval. Upon completion of a debriefing, the battalion S2 places the information into the most appropriate format in accordance with USSOCOM s CONOPS and SODARS to ensure it can be retrieved and cross-referenced within the chain of command and the SOCRATES. The battalion S2 has access to these formats and systems. He forwards debriefing reports via secure STU III data modem or by mail or courier on 5.25-inch floppy disks through operational channels to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT), United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), for final review and electronic submission via SOCRATES to USSOCOM. Security Manager Duties. Once a debriefing is completed, the unit security manager reviews all resulting reports to ensure they are properly classified. He further reviews each report for any unclassified but sensitive information. He ensures that each report is marked with the appropriate classification markings. FOLLOW-ON MISSIONS As stated in FM 31-20, follow-on missions may be conducted; however, such missions must be performed by exception and not by rule. SFODs may perform these missions under the following conditions: The follow-on mission becomes a new, separate mission. The new mission allows for additional planning time. The new mission does net compromise the main mission. The follow-on mission does not go beyond the SFOD s capability or its task organization. The SFOD A trained for the mission and has the mission-specific equipment. The SFOD going into isolation understands that this is a be prepared to follow-on mission at the time the mission letter and/or briefing is issued. WRITTEN REPORTS After the debriefing, the SFOD leader, assisted by other members of the SFOD and attachments, prepares several written reports. The unit historian prepares the unit s historical report. 4-4

5 After-Action Report The after-action report states the who, what, when, why, where, and how of the operation. It is a permanent record of the SFOD s major activities from isolation to debriefing. As such, it is an extremely important template on which past missions may be compared and future missions planned. The battalion S3 will submit the SFOD s after-action report through command channels to the group commander not later than 48 hours after the SFOD A has been debriefed. The intelligence and operations officers at each echelon maintain copies of SFOD s after-action report. The unit historian reviews this report and prepares a draft historical report. Report of Lessons Learned Shortly after completing the after-action report, or simultaneously with its submission, the SFOD leader submits a report of lessons learned. This report is the SFOD leader s reflection on the operation and his recommendation for the future. This report organizes lessons learned according to the seven BOS (see Chapter 1). It addresses what worked and did not work on the operation, why it did or did not work, and what changes are needed in existing tactics, techniques, and procedures in the unit. Unit Historical Report The unit historian reviews the report of lessons learned and then finalizes the draft unit historical report and submits it for the commander s approval. He issues the official historical report of the operation, in classified and unclassified versions as appropriate, within 90 days after the completion of the operation. Technical Intelligence Report SFODs may encounter first seen, odd, or modified U.S. or foreign equipment. These items should be reported using a technical intelligence report (shown in Appendix D). New, modified, or enhanced equipment is not normally considered classified, but enemy-modified U.S. equipment is. For example, a discovery of a U.S. projectile modified by the enemy to accept non-u.s. fuzes would be classified. Common sense and AR will dictate classification. 4-5