Cyber & Information Ops Update

Transcription

1 Headquarters United States Air Force Cyber & Information Ops Update Maj Gen Bolton Director of Cyber & Space Operations 21 Oct 2010 Version 1.4

2 Overview Cyberspace is a Warfighting Domain Cyber Fires in a Regional Conflict Challenges in Cyber and Info Op ( Big Rocks ) Closing Thoughts 2

3 Cyberspace is a Warfighting Domain The mission of the United States Air Force is to fly, fight, and win in air, space, and cyberspace Cyberspace permeates and overlays every other domain 3

4 Realities and Challenges Attribution of cyber attacks is difficult Cyberspace vulnerabilities cross the boundaries between military and commercial sectors Cyberspace operations are intertwined with and inseparable from air and space operations Our C2, Space, and ISR capabilities depend on our cyber capabilities Our dependence on those cyberspace capabilities represents an asymmetric vulnerability and our enemies know it 4

5 Cyber Support to the Mission Global Hawk Recce Satellite AWACS Comm Satellite Predator Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) JSTARS Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) Control and Reporting Center (CRCC Combined Air and Space Operations Center (CAOC) 5

6 Cyber Fires Facts C2 & integration of non-kinetic fires in a regional fight are vital For Cyber, fires = Computer Net Attack (CNA) capabilities Cyber forces are low-density/high-demand assets Assumptions Cyber fires should be handled the same way as kinetic fires Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) and Component CCs need control of non-kinetic tempo/timing/effect to integrate Cyber fires w/ kinetic fires JFCs should use existing processes to plan & integrate all fires OPCON/TACON matter as much in non-kinetic as kinetic ops Location & control of planners more important than shooters 6

7 Regional Hybrid Cyber CNA C2 Model Regional Hybrid Model : best enables global cyber mission while still enabling Geographical Combatant Cdrs to meet their regional missions STRATCOM has global planners & OPCON of global CNA assets Cyber fires from global CNA assets can be called in if needed JFC & components have OPCON of theater planners and TACON of theater CNA assets if not forward deployed OPCON of theater CNA assets if forward deployed CYBERCOM JOC, 624th OC and AOC have shared visibility of all theater CNA missions Similar to Mobility & Space force models TRANS/STRAT has global planners & OPCON of global assets JFACC has theater planners & OPCON of theater mobility/space assets TACC/JSpOC and AOCs coordinate and deconflict missions/effects 7

8 Regional Hybrid Model (with forward forces) Ops centers at all levels will have shared awareness GCC SFIT Supporting STRATCOM If requirements exceed organic cyber capacity, JTF (supported) can request CYBERCOM (supporting) to provide add l fires JTF J-39 CYBERCOM SFIT CSE JFACC OPCON TACON Supporting STRATCOM Forward Intg Team Cyber Support Element (Deployed) JFMCC JFLCC JFSOCC AOC CSE CSE CSE CSE CYBER FORCES Cyber fires within JOA CYBER FORCES Cyber fires into JOA Will be exercised in Exercise UNIFIED ENGAGEMENT (UE10) 8

9 Regional Hybrid Model (without forward forces) GCC SFIT Supporting STRATCOM Ops centers at all levels will have shared awareness CYBERCOM Cyber planners are deployed forward, operational forces are not in JOA JTF J-39 JFACC JFMCC JFLCC JFSOCC AOC CSE CSE CSE CSE CYBER FORCES Cyber fires into JOA SFIT CSE OPCON TACON Supporting STRATCOM Forward Intg Team Cyber Support Element (Deployed) 9

10 Cyber and Space Exercise Observations Day Without Space Jamming of GPS & SATCOM has major impact on the warfighter Expand study beyond AF effort Army & Navy have done similar studies Robust cyber & space capabilities need to be stronger with planned upgrades Need better testing, training, & TTPs Future Capabilities Game Schriever Wargame 2010 Difficult to attribute or ID an attack or determine when/if an attack had ended Precise regional I&W of intent or proven mechanisms to communicate national security messages were needed Need for comprehensive vulnerability assessments with deliberate plans to expedite decisions TERMINAL FURY Need a comprehensive analysis of materiel & non-materiel air, space, & cyber solutions to withstand & fight through degradation of space services Need to confirm assumptions & estimates on numbers, composition, & training levels for the Alternate Forces cyberspace capabilities Extra layers & new concepts impaired coordination & timely planning & non-kinetic effects delivery Need for clear lanes in road & better defined roles & responsibilities 10

11 Cyber & Info Ops Big Rocks Previous Big Rocks (Last 2 yrs): Cyber Program Action Directive (PAD) revised AFSPC designated as Lead MAJCOM & 24 AF stood up OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM/OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OEF/OIF) combat ops Current Big Rocks : Normalize Joint & AF Cyber C2 structures (CNA, CND, and NetOps) Policy, Doctrine & Strategy (AF Policy Directives, AF Instructions, Jnt Pubs, terminology, etc) Force Management & Force Structure (17DX & 1B4XX AFSCs, OSD IO and Cyber workforce studies, Cyber WIC, AETC Trng Pipeline, etc) Institutionalize Cyber integration in Combat, OPLANs & Exercises Further Integrate Cyber Ops on Air Staff & between HAF and Field OEF/OIF combat ops We re Hitting The 5m Targets Need To Start Shooting 50m Targets! 11

12 Future Trends Higher percentage of net worth on the internet Rapid increase in internet usage Pervasive use of mobile communication media Internet usage for radicalization is growing worldwide Trend is apparent in the US, not just overseas Recent NYPD briefing identified the internet as an important venue for radicalization 12

13 Final Thoughts Twenty years ago, computers were a novelty, and cyberspace was a concept in a science fiction novel Today, cyberspace capabilities are integral to our warfighting mission Every Airman has a responsibility to protect and advance cyber support to mission accomplishment. Information Technology in the military has evolved from an admin tool for enhancing office productivity into a national strategic asset in its own right. DepSecDef Lynn 13

14 Questions? 14