Transparency and accountability

Transcription

1 Transparency and Accountability NPT Reporting

2 TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY NPT Reporting Project Ploughshares

3 About this Publication As agreed in 2000, States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty are called to submit regular reports on their efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT nuclear disarmament and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. This paper tabulates and summarizes reporting at the five NPT review process meetings since then the three Preparatory Committee sessions leading up to the 2005 Review Conference (2002-4), the 2005 Review Conference itself, and the 2007 Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference. The paper briefly reviews the background to the reporting obligation and offers recommendations for enhanced reporting that would more effectively reflect the permanence with accountability framework that is at its core. The paper, prepared by Project Ploughshares staff Adam Parsons, Jessica West, and Ernie Regehr, has benefited from a review provided at a roundtable attended by Canadian government officials and civil society representatives. Prepared for International Security Research and Outreach Program (ISROP) International Security Bureau, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada Disclaimer: The views and positions expressed in this report are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada or the Government of Canada. The report is in its original language. Préparé pour le programme de recherche et d information dans le domaine de la sécurité internationale (PRISI), Direction générale de la sécurité internationale, Affaires étrangères et Commerce international Canada Déni de responsabilité : Les vues et opinions exprimées dans le présent rapport appartiennent exclusivement aux auteurs, et ne reflètent pas nécessairement celles du ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Commerce international, ou celles du gouvernement du Canada. Le rapport est présenté dans la langue de rédaction. Project Ploughshares Project Ploughshares is the ecumenical peace centre of The Canadian Council of Churches established to work with churches and related organizations, as well as governments and nongovernmental organizations, in Canada and internationally, to identify, develop, and advance approaches that build peace and prevent war. Project Ploughshares is affiliated with the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo. Project Ploughshares 57 Erb Street West Waterloo, Ontario N2L 6C2 Canada Fax plough@ploughshares.ca Project Ploughshares 2008 First printed April 2008 Printed by Pandora Press, Kitchener, Ontario. Pandora Press prints on 100% recycled Eco-Logo certified paper. ISBN

4 Table of Contents Preface 5 Introduction 7 Background to the Reporting Provision 9 Reporting to Date 14 NNWS Reporting 16 Support for the NPT and the nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime 16 Strategic reductions 17 Tactical or non-strategic reductions 18 Irreversibility 18 The CTBT and a testing moratorium 19 Fissile material controls 19 Security assurances 20 Verification 20 The Conference on Disarmament 21 Nuclear energy 21 Export controls 22 Safeguards 22 Nuclear-weapon-free zones 23 International cooperation 24 Transparency 24 Reporting 25 NWS Reporting 25 Warhead and delivery vehicle holdings 26 Operational status 28 Strategic reductions 29 Tactical reductions 30 Affirmation of Article VI 30 Doctrine 30 Security assurances 32 Fissile material control 32 Policy Considerations 34 Objective and Participation Rate 34 Frequency 35 Structure 36 Scope 37 Notes 39 Acronyms and Abbreviations 40 Table 1: Tabulation Table 2: Article VI Reporting by NWS 47

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6 Preface The indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 was agreed in the context of a collective commitment by States Parties to strengthening the Treaty s review process and, in particular, with a heightened sense of the need for mutual accountability in the implementation and furtherance of the aims of the Treaty. In 2000 states agreed (in step 12 of the 13 practical steps) that such accountability would be advanced by a more formalized approach to reporting by each State Party to its Treaty partners, providing regular information on the actions taken and policies followed to meet the requirements of the Treaty and to implement additional measures agreed to in the review process. The framers of the reporting obligation understood reporting as they understood the review process itself to be a potential prod to the more effective pursuit of nuclear disarmament. This paper reviews the frequency, format, and content of reporting to date and considers whether this experience offers guidance for the future elaboration and clarification of the Article VI reporting requirement. In the review of early drafts of this paper there was support for an annual update of the tabulations and summaries in the paper and for the development of a comprehensive online database of all reports submitted including the reports made available by NWS that they do not formally designated as reports under the 2000 Review Conference step 12 agreement. We welcome further suggestions along those lines, as well as corrections of the current paper, to help make future editions and a companion database as useful and informative as possible. Transparency and Accountability 5

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8 Introduction States Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have now had five specific occasions to submit the regular reports that were agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference (RevCon). Some 48 states have used at least one of those opportunities and have together submitted 112 reports (see Table 1). This paper summarizes the reporting to date, provides background to the reporting commitment, reviews the continuing discussion of the appropriate scope and format of reports, broadly surveys the content of reports submitted, and recommends ways in which reporting can be strengthened and thus better meet the principle of accountability that was emphasized as part of the 1995 indefinite extension of the Treaty. As shown in Figure 1, just over one-quarter of the 189 States Parties to the NPT have reported at least once since 2000, and one in six submitted reports to the 2005 RevCon. At the 2007 Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) one in 20 reported. Figure 1 48 States have submitted at least one report 11 States reported in States reported in 2003 (20 for the first time) 29 States reported in 2004 (8 for the first time) 35 States reported in 2005 (9 for the first time) 9 States reported in 2007 (none for the first time) 5 States have submitted reports all five years 16 States have submitted only once It is noteworthy that a relatively high proportion, almost two-thirds, of the 44 states in Annex 2 of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) reported at some point in the past seven years (see Figure 2, which identifies reporting by states within various groupings). Annex 2 lists states with some nuclear technology capability, all of which must ratify the CTBT before it can enter into force, of which three (India, Israel, and Pakistan) are not parties to the NPT. Only two nuclear weapon states (NWS) are included among the 48 states reporting. Russia and China each submitted formal reports in The three non-npt states in possession of nuclear weapons India, Israel, and Pakistan are not under any reporting requirement because they are not NPT signatories. All of the NWS that are party to the NPT have reported informally through a variety of statements and background materials (the selected contents of which are surveyed in Table 2). For the most part, however, NWS have chosen not to provide formal reports, in defiance of the promise made when they agreed to the 2000 reporting provision. Transparency and Accountability 7

9 Figure 2 6 New Agenda Coalition States reported: Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden (Egypt, also a member, has not reported). 12 Non-Aligned Movement States reported: Cuba, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand (NAM membership is now at 118, of which have not reported). 19 NATO States reported: Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey (of NATO s 26 members, the following seven did not report: Denmark, Estonia, France, Iceland, Slovenia, UK, US). 19 EU States reported: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden (the following EU states did not report: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, France, Malta, Slovenia, UK). 30 CTBT Annex 2 States reported: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine (of the 44 Annex 2 states, three India, Israel, and Pakistan are not signatories to the NPT, and 11 others that are parties to the NPT have not reported Algeria, Bangladesh, Chile, Colombia, DPRK, DRC, Egypt, France, UK, US, Vietnam). 2 Nuclear Weapon States formally reported: Russia, China (France, UK, US have not submitted formal reports). 8 Transparency and Accountability

10 Background to the Reporting Provision Permanence with accountability was the central equation of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The indefinite extension of the treaty was accompanied by a commitment to strengthen the review process, focused on the Preparatory Committee and Review Conferences. The 2000 RevCon then elaborated on the accountability commitment through the provision of a specific reporting requirement. The Final Document included a list of 13 Practical Steps toward the implementation of the Treaty, among which was the Step 12 agreement to submit: Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July The term regular reports was not defined, but it was accepted as a compromise and an alternative to annual reports. The call for reports within the framework of the strengthened review process for the NPT suggests that states are expected to report to each PrepCom and RevCon, the central features of the strengthened review process. The reporting requirement applies to all States Parties, as all signatories share in the responsibility to implement the Treaty. The reporting requirement is framed by the objectives of three internationally agreed nuclear disarmament decisions: cessation of the nuclear arms race (Article VI of the NPT) 3 ; reduction of nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons (Paragraph 4[c] of the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament ); 4 and the obligation to achieve a precise result nuclear disarmament in all its aspects (the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996). 5 Beyond these references, there is no further definition or elaboration of the reporting requirement. Some States Parties and NGOs have called for a standard reporting format to allow comparability of information among states and over time, while others, including the NWS, are opposed to any enforced or even agreed structure. Since the NPT has no permanent secretariat, there is in effect also no central entity to receive the reports and perhaps to compile and analyze them. The recipients of the reports are other States Parties (currently the reports are at least posted and maintained, and thus remain accessible, on the website of the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs). The reluctance of some states to accept the 2000 RevCon decision as adding a special obligation to report was reflected in disputes over the annotated agenda during the Transparency and Accountability 9

11 preparatory lead-up to the 2005 RevCon. In addition to dividing the PrepCom s program of work into three clusters (Cluster One, nuclear disarmament; Two, safeguards and nuclearweapon-free zones; and Three, the peaceful use of nuclear energy), the Chair s annotated agenda for the 2002 PrepCom included two specific items with reference to the reporting obligation: Implementation of Article VI, including the 2000 Final Document requirement for reporting; Regional issues, including the 2000 Final Document requirement for reporting on a Middle East Zone of Peace. The US and France in particular rejected the references to required reporting, while Egypt, on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), submitted a short working paper to argue the importance of retaining a separate reporting item: the reporting requirements of paragraph 12 of the nuclear disarmament part of the Final Document [2000] are an integral part of the language in the indicative timetable that we have just taken note of. Ultimately the following compromise language was agreed for the agenda item: Implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, as well as the agreements, conclusions and commitments listed under the section entitled Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs contained in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference [emphasis added]. Regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and the implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution and the commitments, conclusions and follow-up submissions to the United Nations Secretary-General, the President of the 2005 Review Conference and the Chairpersons of the Preparatory Committee meetings, in accordance with the relevant subparagraphs listed under the section entitled Regional issues: The Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference [emphasis added]. Canada presented a working paper on Reporting by States Party to the NPT to the 2002 PrepCom which called for a common understanding of the reporting requirements agreed at the NPT 2000 Review Conference and for a standardized reporting format. In its formal report in fulfillment of the reporting obligation, Canada offered a model for comprehensive reporting on an article-by-article basis, a format also used by New Zealand. Canada summarized its approach as supporting a loosely-defined and relatively simple common approach that balances the need for adequate and meaningful content with the desirability of keeping the procedure simple enough to facilitate compliance. Canada submitted its second Working Paper on Reporting at the 2003 PrepCom, in which it reviewed the 2002 experience of reporting and presented the results of informal consultations with states. The paper concluded that the value to be gained from reports 10 Transparency and Accountability

12 would only be realized through greater participation in reporting and wider use of the reports. Canada urged States Parties to draw on the body of information from reports to the first and second PrepComs to inform dialogues and discussion at the next PrepCom and the RevCon in The New Agenda Coalition 2002 working paper also offered reporting format and content suggestions: The reports on Article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the 13 steps and include specific and complete information on each of these steps (inter alia, the number and specifications of warheads and delivery systems in service and number and specifications of reductions, de-alerting measures, existing holdings of fissile materials as well as reduction and control of such materials, achievements in the areas of irreversibility, transparency and verifiability.) The reports should address current policies and intentions, as well as developments in these areas. 6 The NPT review process has not produced a consensus document since the 2000 review conference, but the results of the 2002 and 2003 PrepComs were reviewed in factual summaries compiled by the chair in each case. The issues of transparency in general and reporting in particular featured in both. The Chair s summary of 2002 reflects the PrepCom s broad support for reporting as an instrument of accountability and confidencebuilding. It also accurately notes the absence of consensus on the question of whether a specific new requirement exists and the extent to which reporting should be standardized: The importance of increased transparency with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament was stressed. It was emphasized that accountability and transparency of nuclear disarmament measures by all States parties remained the main criteria with which to evaluate the Treaty s operation. States parties recalled that regular reports should be submitted by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI as outlined in paragraph 15, subparagraph 12 of the 2000 Final Document. It was stressed that such reporting would promote increased confidence in the overall NPT regime through transparency. Views with regard to the scope and format of such reporting differed. Some States parties suggested that such reports should be submitted, particularly by the nuclear-weapon States, at each session of the Preparatory Committee, and should include detailed and comprehensible information, e.g. in a standardized format. Several States parties expressed interest in open-ended informal consultations on reporting to prepare proposals for consideration for subsequent sessions of the Preparatory Committee. Other States parties advocated that the specifics of reporting, the format and frequency of reports, should be left to the determination of individual States parties. Transparency and Accountability 11

13 The chair s summary of the 2003 PrepCom repeated the points made in 2002, but added two important observations: The nuclear-weapon States were called upon to increase transparency and accountability with regard to their nuclear weapons arsenals and their implementation of disarmament measures. (para 10) It was also expressed that such transparency provides valuable means to address and respond to compliance concerns. States parties recognized the value of reports and used them in substantive deliberation, in line with their wish for enhanced interaction. (para 21) The reference to making use of the reports to support discussion ( interactivity ) echoes the Canadian Working Paper s plea to States Parties to allow the reports to stimulate greater debate. During the PrepComs for the 2005 Review Conference there were frequent references to reports and some significant requests for clarification or elaboration. If the pursuit of a culture of transparency, in which information is freely given and through which States Parties acknowledge that they are accountable to their Treaty partners, is advancing, it must be said that it is doing so only cautiously. Nevertheless, some states continue to call for States Parties to recognize and meet their obligations. In its 2007 report, the Republic of Korea said that national reporting on the implementation of nuclear disarmament measures enhances transparency and builds confidence, and therefore should be encouraged. It encourage[d] both nuclear weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States to submit regular reports to the Preparatory Committee and the Review Conference and noted, While there is no consensus on the content and format of national reports, more detailed information contained in them will instill greater confidence in the States nuclear policies and disarmament efforts. In its 2007 report Ireland described regular reporting as a key element of the 13 steps and saw reporting not as an end in itself but as an important tool in strengthening the NPT process, through greater transparency. The Islamic Republic of Iran in 2007 called for the adoption of a format properly defining categories of information required within the review strengthening process. In its 2007 report Canada recalled its 2005 working paper on the concept of permanence with accountability and its call for reports to be submitted prior to each set of meetings in the review process. Canada commend[ed] the nuclear-weapon States for the information they have provided to date and encouraged them to submit information about their efforts and activities as an official report. As part of their participation in the 2002 PrepCom, NGOs prepared Shadow Reports on 44 States Party to the NPT, 7 in a sense offering another variation on reporting models. The NGO reports assessed national positions on a variety of issues, including stated nuclear doctrine, transfer or acquisition of nuclear materials, fissile material holdings and nuclear 12 Transparency and Accountability

14 facilities, nuclear weapons holdings, and assessments of NWS efforts to fulfill Article VI. In 2003 the shadow report was updated to include a discussion of NWS compliance with the 13 Practical Steps. Transparency and Accountability 13

15 Reporting to Date A decline in attention to reporting is reflected in the fact that 2007 was the first year since the 2000 agreement on reporting in which no new states were added to the list of reporting states in other words, the first year in which no state submitted a report for the first time. Indeed, 2007 saw the lowest level of reporting since the obligation to report was undertaken. A decline from the level of reporting to the 2005 RevCon was perhaps to be expected, but a 75 per cent drop should be taken as a worrying sign about the level of commitment to transparency and accountability. To date the greatest increase in levels of reporting occurred in 2003, when 20 states submitted reports for the first time. The highest level of reporting occurred at the 2005 RevCon when 34 states reported, 11 for the first time. Of the 48 States that have submitted a report to date, 34 have reported more than once, and of these, only Australia, Canada, Ireland, Japan, and New Zealand have reported at all meetings of the review process since There is not yet wide agreement on the format of reporting. There are many variations, but they can be divided into three basic categories, as shown in Figure 3. The General format refers to reports that tend to focus on Article VI issues and describe broadly the reporting state s activities in support of disarmament. The Articles format refers to submissions that report on activities related to each article of the Treaty, generally on the grounds that the Treaty is an integrated whole and that all its articles are relevant to the implementation of nuclear disarmament. The 13 steps approach reports on each element of the widely agreed disarmament agenda outline in the 2000 RevCon 13 practical steps. Some states, notably Canada and New Zealand, have reported in two formats: article-byarticle and the 13 steps. Most states still prefer the general format of reporting on their disarmament activities, responding to the particular language of the 2000 Final Document to entitle their reports Implementation of article VI and paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. Some states refer simply to reporting on the implementation of Article VI, without mentioning the 1995 Decision. Others use the title, Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, broadening the reporting mandate to the entire Treaty. 14 Transparency and Accountability

16 Figure 3 Report Formats Total 10 Report Formats Total General Articles 13 Steps 9 15 General Articles 13 Steps 5 Report Formats Total 28 Report Formats Total General Articles 13 Steps General Articles 13 Steps 6 9 Report Formats Total 9 3 General Articles 6 13 Steps 2 These charts examine the breakdown of the various reporting formats since 2002: the article-by-article (Articles) and 13 Steps formats, and the overview of activities relevant to Article VI reports. In 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2007 New Zealand is counted twice, while Canada is counted twice in 2007, both due to the fact that theses States used two formats in the years listed. The general narrative format consistent with the 1995 Principles and Objectives and Article VI continues to be the most widely used, although increasingly states are exploring other formats. Transparency and Accountability 15

17 NNWS Reporting Table 1 provides a list, by country and year, of all reports submitted to date and tabulates the major and recurring disarmament themes referred to in each. All except two of the 112 reports tabulated are from non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). While the reports cover a wide range of themes, activities, and concerns, Table 1 identifies 16 issues that most often receive explicit and repeated attention. These 16 issues can be taken as reflecting key concerns of states and the priorities of the international nuclear disarmament agenda. The following elaboration on each of the issue areas includes excerpts from reports that are illustrative of overall reporting, but far from exhaustive. Support for the NPT and the nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime It is no surprise that states that have reported are strong supporters of the NPT and disarmament, and they use their reports to reaffirm that commitment and to express concerns or assessments of the overall health of the regime. Of the 112 reports submitted 91 or well over three-quarters made explicit reference to the well-being of the NPT and the broader regime that it anchors. Turkey (2005): Turkey favours global overall disarmament and supports all efforts in the field of sustaining international security through arms control and disarmament. Turkey does not possess any weapons of mass destruction and has no intention to develop programmes for acquiring weapons of this kind. In this spirit, Turkey became a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1979 and to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in Non-proliferation and disarmament are mutually reinforcing processes that require continuous and irreversible progress on both fronts. Turkey remains fully committed to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty and of the 1995 decisions and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in particular the 13 Practical Steps. Australia (2007): The current intense international concern about weapons of mass destruction proliferation, including potentially non-state groups, has added to the importance of the nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the Treaty. Universality remains a key objective. Australia calls upon the countries yet to join to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. Cuba (2005): Over the years, Cuba maintained reservations regarding the Treaty, which it considered to be a discriminatory international regime conductive to the existence of a club of nuclear-weapons-states On becoming a State party to the Treaty Cuba s position of principle did not change. Our country has decided to work from within the Treaty in order to further what we regard to be our priority in the area of disarmament, namely, achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The only way of overcoming the built in flaws of the NPT, and its selective and discriminatory nature, is by attaining the objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, thereby guaranteeing the security of all countries on an equal footing. 16 Transparency and Accountability

18 Strategic reductions One-half of all reports by non-nuclear weapon states referred to strategic reductions. This relatively low level of attention to the central Article VI obligation may in part reflect a NNWS assumption that this is obviously a NWS responsibility, even though the obligation to report applies to all states and provides an opportunity for NNWS to report on their activities and policies in support of nuclear disarmament. It could also reflect a sense that the arsenals of the two leading NWS are declining, although a number of the references to reductions deplore what they see as ongoing NWS commitments to the modernization of their arsenals as well as the failure to make reductions irreversible. In 2005, for example, Brazil noted: Particularly disturbing are new approaches concerning the role of nuclear weapons in security strategies, especially studies on the possible development of low yield nuclear weapons and plans related to their tactical uses, including countering conventional forces. The unequivocal undertaking agreed upon in 2000 should be demonstrated by further, stronger nuclear disarmament measures. Little has been done since 2000 by the 5 NWS to reduce the importance of nuclear weapons at their defence and strategic doctrines. The continuous importance attached by the 5 NWS to nuclear weapons suggests to the rest of the world that such weapons are indeed relevant to security needs. This perception may generate genuine interest in such an option in other Parties, which would in turn stoke the flames of nuclear proliferation. In 2007 Ukraine drew attention to its own successful program of disarmament: From 1992 to 1996 all tactical nuclear warheads and more then 1,600 strategic warheads were transferred from Ukraine to the Russian Federation. By October 2001 all those warheads were eliminated at the relevant facilities of the Russian Federation under the monitoring of Ukrainian representatives. The Republic of Korea said in its 2007 report that it hopes for deeper cuts and further engagement by nuclear-weapon States. The Republic of Korea recognizes that there is a perception gap between the record of nuclear-weapon States and the level of expectations held by non-nuclear-weapon States. Closing this perception gap will certainly provide nuclear-weapon States with the moral authority and the political legitimacy to strengthen non-proliferation norms while maintaining the delicate balance among the three pillars of the Treaty. Also in 2007, Ireland emphasized that developments since 2000 have not removed the need for a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons. Ireland notes the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation but questions its contribution to effective nuclear disarmament. As we have emphasized, through the New Agenda Coalition, reductions in the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads, while welcoming, are not a substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. Transparency and Accountability 17

19 Tactical or non-strategic reductions Only slightly more than a third of the reports referred to reductions on non-strategic nuclear weapons. This may in part reflect the regional character of this issue, with NATO and European states being more inclined to address it. The Netherlands report of 2004 is indicative of the approach: As party to the NPT and as a member of NATO, we feel a special responsibility in relation to the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has significantly reduced the numbers of tactical nuclear weapons in its arsenal. What remains deployed in Europe is only a very small amount of the original numbers that were there 10 or more years ago. More than 80 percent of these weapons were actually eliminated. Their readiness is presently measured in weeks and months rather than in hours and days. The purpose of NATO s remaining non-strategic nuclear weapons is fundamentally political. Within NATO, a process has started between the Alliance and the Russian Federation to give appropriate attention to the question of non-strategic nuclear weapons. The dialogue, which is now starting will hopefully lead to measures that will promote mutual confidence, transparency and stability. Sweden s 2005 Report continued to press for progress regarding reductions of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Sweden believes that it is essential that non-strategic nuclear weapons be included in international arms control and disarmament efforts. Non-strategic nuclear weapons are a global concern. Against this background, Sweden together with the other States in the New Agenda Coalition, have presented resolutions on the reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, which were adopted by the fifty-seventh and fifty-eighth United Nations General Assembly. At the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Sweden together with Austria and Mexico, submitted a working paper on non-strategic nuclear weapons, and at the third session a second working paper on reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons together with Austria and Ukraine. Sweden will continue to work on this issue at the NPT Review Conference. The 2007 report of the Republic of Korea called for progress toward reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons, as part of overall nuclear disarmament, and also proposed that nuclearweapon States should diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their nuclear doctrines. Irreversibility Step 5 of the 2000 RevCon s 13 practical steps called for the principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures and roughly half of all reports stressed its importance. For example, Argentina hopes that such principle will be explicitly included in all the bilateral and multilateral instruments that are negotiated pursuant to Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; clearly, this is vital for the credibility of such arrangements (2005). In 2005, Spain said, Spain believes that the principle of irreversibility should be considered as an essential principle of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The credibility of bilateral and multilateral agreements on disarmament and arms control depends very strongly on their 18 Transparency and Accountability

20 irreversibility. Spain calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to reflect the concept of irreversibility in their agreements on the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. Netherlands described irreversibility [as] important for multilateral and bilateral arms control alike. Although agreeing on bilateral nuclear arms reductions is primarily the responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States, international stability and security are best served by irreversible reductions. It has been a consistent element in the approach of the Netherlands towards nuclear reduction talks to emphasize the importance of irreversibility. The CTBT and a testing moratorium The most referenced item within national reports has been support for ratification of the CTBT and reiterations of the need to uphold the testing moratorium. The 2005 report from Morocco reflects the approach and concern that states regularly convey: The Kingdom of Morocco, which supports a total ban on nuclear tests, has signed and ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. It deplores the fact that this Treaty, which was opened for signature on 24 September 1996, has still not entered into force. In this respect, it reiterates its appeal to all States which have not yet done so to accede to the Treaty without delay. It stresses the importance of respect for the moratoriums on nuclear tests and of the convening of conferences in order to facilitate the entry into force of the Treaty. Norway reminded NPT states parties that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty establishes a far-reaching global monitoring and verification system, capable of detecting all relevant nuclear explosions. The verification system is thus at the core of the Treaty. The full implementation of the International Monitoring System as soon as possible, without waiting for the entry into force of the Treaty, would represent a significant confidence and securitybuilding measure. Six monitoring stations comprising altogether 119 field instruments are located on Norwegian territory as part of the International Monitoring System. With the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 1999, the Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR) was established as the Norwegian National Data Centre for verification of compliance with the Treaty (2005). Brazil s 2005 report pointed out that it has consistently called for the universalization of the CTBT. Furthermore, [Brazil] continues to call for signatories that have not done so, particularly those 11 States listed in Annex 2 of the Treaty, to ratify it with a view to its early entry into force (2005). Fissile material controls The prominence given to the need to end production of fissile material for weapons purposes is also reflected in more than three-quarters of the reports. In 2005 Lithuania declared, A fissile material cut-off Treaty constitutes the next logical step on the multilateral nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. Lithuania calls upon the immediate commencement of negotiations without preconditions on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty. Japan s 2005 report also linked the issue of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) to the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament (CD): Japan regards it as a primary task to Transparency and Accountability 19

21 reach an agreement on a programme of work at the Conference on Disarmament, thereby bring about the early commencement of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. Japan has been making utmost efforts to break the current stalemate at the Conference on Disarmament and has redoubled its endeavours to that end during its Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament from 29 August to December Security assurances Given the importance of negative security assurances in the stalemate at the CD it is perhaps surprising that less than a quarter of the reports made reference to the issue. Indonesia emphasizes the paramount importance of providing security assurances to the non-nuclearweapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons through a legally binding international instrument. This will constitute a critical element to maintain the norms of the non-proliferation regime (2005). Turkey s 2005 report described such assurances as supporting the overall effectiveness of the NPT: As pointed out in Security Council resolution 984 (1995), Turkey recognizes the legitimate interest of non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive security assurances. As also pointed out in the same resolution, Turkey believes that the concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States are legitimate, and that, in conjunction with adherence to the Treaty, further appropriate measures [should] be undertaken to safeguard their security. While recognizing the continuing value of confidence-building-measures such as unilateral declarations of nuclear-power States, Turkey believes that the further measures mentioned above should be largely binding security assurances and that these measures will complement and strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. Verification Verification concerns are also reflected prominently in the reports, with two-thirds of the reports including a reference; in most case the issue is raised in several contexts, including reductions, fissile material controls, and safeguards. In its 2007 report Canada referred to its working paper on An FMCT Scope-Verification Arrangement (CD/1819, 21 March 2007) discussing the interrelationship between the scope and verifiability of an FMCT and suggesting an approach for cost effective verification of an eventual treaty. The principles of verification and irreversibility were of major concern for states in 2003, particularly in response to the Moscow Treaty, which does not require that reductions are made irreversible or are verified. In 2005 Norway reported that it supports the further development of and strengthening of verification capabilities, which is clearly linked to the issue of compliance. We have taken a number of steps to support verification regimes under various arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation agreements, including the above-mentioned International Monitoring System for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Norway co-sponsored the resolution entitled Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of Verification, which was adopted at the fifty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly. 20 Transparency and Accountability

22 The Conference on Disarmament The stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) was also addressed in two-thirds of the reports. In its 2007 report Japan recounted its efforts to end the CD stalemate: Japan has been making its utmost effort to break the current stalemate at the Conference on Disarmament, thereby realizing the early commencement of negotiations on an FMCT. Japan has redoubled its endeavours for this purpose through the dispatch of high-level representatives to the Conference on Disarmament on various occasions. During the 2006 session, both the then Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Akiko Yamanaka, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Yohei Kono, delivered speeches stressing the need and the urgency for the commencement of negotiations on an FMCT. On 13 March 2007, Vice- Minister for Foreign Affairs Masayoshi Hamada also made a statement at the Conference on Disarmament, urging the members to commence negotiations on an FMCT in the second part of the current session, building upon the positive results in the first part. Nigeria reported in 2005 that it has supported all General Assembly resolutions calling on the Conference on Disarmament to agree to commence work on substantive issues before it as soon as possible. Nigeria has continued to reiterate its full support for the Five Ambassadors Proposal as a mechanism for breaking the existing impasse in reaching a work programme for the Conference on Disarmament. Argentina pointed out in 2005 that it favours establishing a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament, which would help to advance the issues that Argentina would like the Conference on Disarmament to address pursuant to Article VI. Nuclear energy Fewer than half the states referred directly to nuclear energy. States reporting in the articleby-article format are most likely to address the issue under Article IV. In its 2005 report Brazil emphasized the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy as existing outside the NPT: The NPT clearly recognizes the inalienable right to the development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful ends, which predated the Treaty. This recognition of this inalienable right was a central part of the bargain that was struck at the creation of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. This bargain was at the core of the creation of the IAEA, and it was later to prove instrumental in establishing the NPT and in making it a permanent, quasi-universal regime. The development and uses of nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes is a fundamental principle of our national policy, which is enshrined in our Constitution. We remain convinced of the potential benefits of the responsible use of nuclear technologies and of the synergies fostered by international cooperation in the nuclear field, for which the work of the IAEA is of great importance. Canada s 2005 report also recognized the inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, emphasizing the responsibilities that attend such use: In view of the inherent relationship between States inalienable rights to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the obligations contained elsewhere in the Treaty, cooperation by Canada with other countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy takes fully into account the non-proliferation credentials of the recipient country. Canada is committed to working with other States and relevant Transparency and Accountability 21

23 international organizations on new arrangements for the supply of nuclear items, consonant with the balance of rights and obligations agreed to in the Treaty and in particular in articles II, III and IV. In this regard, a Canadian expert participated in the recent IAEA ad hoc experts group studying new multilateral nuclear fuel cycle initiatives. In 2007 Malaysia reported that it is deeply concerned with the practice of selectivity and discrimination, as well as the trend towards unilateralism in dictating the limits of research, production and use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Malaysia calls upon NPT States parties, particularly the advanced States parties in terms of nuclear technology development, to live up to their obligations in upholding the principles of transparency and non-discrimination, to ensure that all NPT States parties can benefit from the peaceful application of nuclear technology. Export controls Export controls are referred to in fewer than half of the reports, but are especially addressed by states reporting in the article-by-article format. Hungary s 2005 report focused its attention on controls and declared support for, and the importance of, control of fuel cycle technologies: Hungary regards the introduction and application of appropriate export control measures as an important tool for stemming the risk of clandestine nuclear programmes. As a participating State of the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Hungary maintains and operates an effective national system of export controls and contributes to international efforts in this field. Hungary welcomes the adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), requiring States to adopt domestic controls to prevent and preclude the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Hungarian experts participate regularly in interdiction exercises organized in the Proliferation Security Initiative framework (e.g., in Germany, Italy and Poland). Hungary has taken stock of the available administrative structure and the legislative instruments necessary for Hungary s participation in cooperation activities within the Proliferation Security Initiative framework. Hungary follows with great interest the new initiatives aimed at preventing the proliferation of sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle in a multilateral and non-discriminatory framework. The dual-use technologies, such as those related to uranium enrichment and reprocessing, are a source of concern. In 2005 New Zealand reported that in implementing its national export controls, New Zealand seeks to restrict trade related only to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities or nuclear weapon programmes in non-nuclear-weapon States. New Zealand advocates cooperation only with States in compliance with obligations under safeguards agreement. Safeguards Wide support for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards regime is a prominent feature of the reports, with more than 80 per cent of reports addressing the issue. In 2003, Mongolia and Morocco announced entry into force of Additional Protocols, and in 2004 several EU states reported on the entry into force of the Additional Protocol between Euratom and the IAEA. A number of States Parties including Australia (2004), Canada 22 Transparency and Accountability

24 (2007), Croatia (2005), the Czech Republic (2004), Finland (2005), Hungary (2004, 2005), Indonesia (2005), Italy (2005), Lithuania (2005), Luxembourg (2004), Netherlands (2005), Norway (2003), Republic of Korea (2005, 2007), and Sweden (2003, 2004, 2005) called for the Additional Protocol to be the verification standard and a condition of supply for transfer of nuclear and dual-use items. In 2007 Australia noted that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are not static and have undergone considerable evolution since the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force in The Additional Protocol and the development of strengthened and integrated safeguards are the most recent manifestation of that evolution. Australia played a prominent role in negotiation of the Additional Protocol and was the first country to ratify such a protocol. It is of concern that seven non-nuclear-weapon State NPT parties with significant nuclear activities have yet to conclude an Additional Protocol. Finland s 2005 report said: The international safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is a fundamental pillar of the nuclear-non-proliferation regime. Finland considers that the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with the Additional Protocol, represent the verification standard pursuant to Article III.1 of the Treaty. Finland calls upon all states that have not yet done so, to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol without delay. Latvia s 2007 report says that Latvia considers the IAEA safeguards system as an essential mechanism of verifying compliance with the obligations of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Latvia favours the universalization of the Additional Protocol and urges all countries who have not yet signed this document to do so. Nuclear-weapon-free zones Just over one-half of all reports included references to nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ). Malaysia reported in 2007 that it signed the Treaty on the South-east Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free-Zone (SEANWFZ) on 15 December 1995, and ratified it on 11 October Malaysia is also continuing to work actively with other member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to this treaty, particularly in encouraging the nuclear-weapon States to accede as parties to the Protocol to the Treaty at an early date. Malaysia is also of the view that the accession to the Protocol to the Treaty by nuclearweapon States would effectively constitute a negative security assurance to the regional States parties of such nuclear-weapons-free zones. Croatia welcomed the creation of nuclear-weapons-free zones recognizing them as important complementary instruments to the NPT and appreciating the role they play in promoting regional and global peace and security. Croatia believes that the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free-zones must be based on arrangements freely made among the States of the region in question, and should not interfere with the existing or evolving security arrangements to the detriment of regional and international security (2005). Transparency and Accountability 23

25 International cooperation Several states reported on disarmament measures they took in cooperation with other states. Canada (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007), Japan (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007), Germany (2002), Kazakhstan (2004), Norway (2003, 2004), Sweden (2002), and Ukraine (2004) all reported on specific programs to assist in securing former Soviet nuclear facilities, weapons, and materials. In 2007 Japan reviewed the Global Partnership program: At their Summit in Kananaskis, Canada, in June 2002, the leaders of the Group of Eight announced the G-8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons of Materials of Mass Destruction to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues. Japan committed itself, for the purpose of the Partnership to make a contribution amounting to a little more than $200 million United States dollars, of which $100 million is to be allocated to the G-8 disposition programme for Russian surplus weapon-grade plutonium and the rest to projects for dismantling Russian decommissioned nuclear submarines. Meanwhile, with the cooperation of Japan, for the first time, 20 kilograms of weapon grade plutonium, equivalent to two to three nuclear warheads, was successfully disposed of with the aid of advanced technology developed by Russian scientists. Under the same partnership, in December of 2003, Japan and the Russian Federation launched the first cooperation project to dismantle a Victor III class decommissioned nuclear submarine, a project which was successfully completed in December of At present, Japan and the Russian Federation are making great efforts to conclude an implementing arrangement for dismantling five additional decommissioned nuclear submarines. Transparency Transparency was referred to by just over half of all reports. The 2005 report of the Netherlands noted: The Netherlands has been strongly advocating increasing accountability and transparency with regard to nuclear arsenals. At the last NPT Review Conference, in 2000, the Netherlands introduced proposals in this respect, together with Belgium, Germany, Italy and Norway. Regarding transparency, according to the original proposals, such measures could include a commitment by the nuclear-weapons States to make known periodically the aggregate numbers of warheads, delivery systems, and stocks of fissile material for military purposes in their possession and their nuclear policies. Sweden s 2005 report linked transparency and confidence building: Steps to increase transparency regarding nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI serve as a confidence building measure and should be strongly supported. The principle of transparency should be applicable to all disarmament and arms controls efforts, unilateral, bilateral or multilateral. It is also of particular importance that nuclear-weapon States diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies, do not increase the number or types of nuclear weapons deployed, and do not develop new types of nuclear weapons or rationalizations for their use. Spain (2005) offered specific suggestions for NWS to use their reporting obligation to enhance transparency: It would be desirable that nuclear-weapon States submit regular 24 Transparency and Accountability

26 reports on their arsenals, delivery systems, fissile-material stocks, and exports of technology for military use. Although it must be emphasized that some nuclear-weapon States have shown considerable proof of transparency, it should be borne in mind that any confidencebuilding measure and any progress made in this area is of particular importance and urgency. More specifically, one cannot ignore the risk that weapons of mass destruction may be used by terrorist organizations. This leads to the realization that non-nuclear weapon States also have important responsibilities with respect to verification and transparency: in this regard, it is essential inter alia to strengthen the role played by the IAEA. Reporting The reporting obligation was itself a feature of more than half of the reports. Reporting was identified as both a transparency and accountability mechanism. Mexico in its 2005 report emphasized the principle of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear-weapon and nonnuclear- weapon States and went on to make the point that the five nuclear-weapon States have a greater responsibility for submitting information about steps taken to comply with the obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures for nuclear disarmament, in accordance with article VI of the Treaty. In 2007 Canada referred to its working paper submitted to the 2005 Review Conference on the concept of permanence with accountability for the NPT, which, it said, among other proposals, supported the practice of submitting annual reports on treaty implementation prior to such meetings. This followed up on a number of previous papers submitted by Canada at earlier Preparatory Committee meetings on this topic. Canada commends the nuclear-weapon States for the information they have provided to date, and would encourage them to submit information about their efforts and activities as an official report. Indonesia noted in 2007 that the 1995 decisions included a Strengthened Review Process and an indefinite extension of the Treaty that was intended to ensure accountability, inter alia, by submitting annual reports on the implementing of its provisions. Such reporting, called for in the 2000 document, would contribute substantively to the regime s credibility and acceptance. Ireland s 2007 report noted that Ireland considers regular reporting to be a key element of the 13 practical steps and presented reports during the last NPT review cycle. Ireland views reporting not as an end in itself but as an important tool in strengthening the NPT process, through greater transparency. NWS Reporting China and Russia both submitted formal reports in Beyond that, NWS have not submitted reports that they specifically identify as being in response to the 2000 agreement on reporting. At the same time, all five NWS regularly report to NPT review process meetings and it must be said that such reporting, while it varies considerably, has increased in detail and scope since It comes in the form of national statements, working papers, fact sheets, and other background material, some of which is distributed informally at review process meetings. Table 2 attempts to summarize information provided on eight selected issues drawn from this broad range of formal and informal documents: Transparency and Accountability 25

27 Warhead and launch vehicles holdings, both tactical and strategic; Operational status of weapons held; Progress on strategic reductions; Progress on non-strategic reductions; Affirmation of Article VI; Strategic doctrine; Security assurances; and Fissile material control. The sources are listed and, as in the case of reporting by NNWS, the excerpts and summaries provided are illustrative rather than exhaustive. The basic guideline has been to include materials that the NWS made a point of distributing at NPT review meetings. It is clear that there is a great deal more information relevant to NWS arsenals, disarmament efforts, strategic doctrine, and security assurances available, both from the NWS governments themselves and from independent sources. The focus here is to review the information that the NWS have made a point of sharing with other States Parties to the NPT in the context of NPT review process meetings. There is, in fact, a sense in which other sources represent a means to verify the accuracy and completeness of reporting to the NPT (but the present report does not include references to such external sources). The reporting to the NPT review process provides a reading of the extent to which NWS regard themselves as accountable to other States Parties to the Treaty and the extent to which they regard the reporting provision as a firm obligation. By refusing, for the most part, to submit formal reports, the NWS seem to be asserting a basic unwillingness to accept Step 12 of the 13 practical steps set out in the 2000 RevCon as a clear obligation linked to their accountability to other States Parties of the NPT. On the other hand, their informal reporting suggests a measure of openness to meeting the reporting requirement and giving account of themselves to the international community represented by the NPT. Generally, the documents provided range from the reasonably detailed particularly in the case of the UK, which has provided numbers of nuclear weapons in its stockpile, their operational status, and details about disarmament and verification programs, fissile material stocks, and other policy commitments to the generally opaque, as in the case of some of China s statements and documents, which provided virtually no quantitative detail at all. Without a standardized format or more detailed reporting guidelines, NWS reporting will likely continue to be mixed. The following reviews the reporting under each of the eight categories referred to above. Warhead and delivery vehicle holdings Most of the reporting on warheads and delivery vehicles has focused on past reductions rather than on current holdings. Russia, the UK, and the US have provided some information on both warheads and launch vehicles; France has reported only on delivery vehicles; and China, in 2004, reported that it possesses the smallest nuclear arsenal of all NWS, while in the same year the UK reported that we hold less than 200 operationally available warheads. 26 Transparency and Accountability

28 The UK has consistently provided information on current holdings, reporting a reduction of more than 70% in the potential explosive power of our deterrent to fewer than 200 warheads in The information was repeated in In 2003, the UK noted that it has dismantled our last Chevaline warhead part of our commitment to irreversibility in reductions in the UK s nuclear weapons. The UK updated the statistic on its warhead holdings in 2007, stating that the UK has decided to reduce its stockpile of operationally available warheads by a further 20% to fewer than 160. The UK has also provided details on current delivery vehicle holdings, stating in 2002 that only a single Trident submarine is now on deterrent patrol, carrying 48 warheads and maintaining this report in In 2007 the UK referenced its Trident renewal program, indicating that the UK has decided to begin the concept and design work required to make possible a replacement for our current ballistic missile submarine fleet; and to maintain the option of using the D5 missile beyond its current life expectancy. It also stated that the UK is retaining not modernizing its deterrent. There is no change in the capabilities of the system, no move to produce more useable weapons and no change in nuclear posture or doctrine. China, France, and the UK all report their holdings as the minimum needed for national security. France uses the term strict sufficiency ; China describes its arsenal as the minimum level for self defense ; and the UK refers to the minimum level necessary for the UK s national security. The US and Russia supply data on deployment (not total holdings) that is frequently in reference to requirements under current treaties, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), START, and the Moscow Treaty. In a 2002 Information Paper the US reported dismantling over 13,000 nuclear weapons since 1998, including a reduction to a level of less than 6,000 deployed warheads by December 2001, also indicating that its arsenal would be further reduced to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads over the next decade. In 2007 the US reported that, as of December 31, 2006, the United States had 3,696 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. In response to claims that the US 2001 Nuclear Posture Review called for new nuclear weapons, a paper titled The Commitment of the United States of America to Article VI of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons clarified that there are two activities that have been debated extensively: a modest research effort on advanced nuclearweapon concepts that Congress recently redirected to study technologies to enhance confidence in warhead reliability without testing; and a study on whether without testing an existing weapon could be adapted to hold at risk hardened, deeply buried targets. There has been no decision to move beyond the study stage, which will require Presidential and congressional action. This stance was clarified in 2007 when the US reported that it has decided to go forward with developing the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). The Reliable Replacement Warhead will not provide any new or improved military capabilities compared to the older warheads it replaces in the United States arsenal. Russia has also reported holdings statistics that correspond to targets in the INF, START I, and Moscow Treaty, stating in 2002 that on the deadline date December 5, 2001 [Russia] has actually lowered the number of her deployed strategic delivery systems (ICBM, SLBM Transparency and Accountability 27

29 and strategic bombers) down to 1136 units, and the number of the reentry vehicles accounted with them down to 5518 units. In 2007 Russia provided specific updates on START reductions, indicating that as of January 1, 2007, Russia possessed no more than 900 deployed strategic offensive delivery vehicles and 4200 warheads accountable under the START 1 Treaty. France and China report the fewest details. France focuses its information on holdings on delivery systems, and a chart provided in 2005 appears to show holdings of about 105 nuclear delivery vehicles, but the precise figure is not provided. Finally, in 2007 France added that the number of nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles has been reduced from six to four. China, on the other hand, has only recently referenced its nuclear warhead holdings, indicating for the first time in 2004 that it possesses the smallest nuclear arsenal of all the NWS states. This detail was not published in its official report submitted in 2005 and no references to holdings were made in The most consistent indication of China s nuclear holdings has been the statements that China has exercised utmost restraint in developing nuclear weapons and that its weapons are for self-defence purposes only. It has no reporting on holdings of delivery vehicles. Both the UK and the US have reported on new programs, noting that these are not designed to produce new capabilities. Upgrades in missile, submarine, and bomber delivery systems have not been reported to other NPT states parties. Russia and China have not reported to the NPT on any of their delivery vehicle upgrade programs. Operational status All of the NWS have reported that their nuclear arsenals have been detargeted. China has provided the fewest details on the operational status of its nuclear arsenals, first mentioning in 2004 that China and Russia, China and the United States declared that they would not aim nuclear weapons at each other and adding in 2005 that in April 2000, the five nuclear-weapon states issued a joint statement announcing that they would not target their nuclear weapons at any countries. The readiness of China s weapons for launch has not been indicated. France has similarly focused on detargeting measures, reporting in 2002 that as far back as 1997 France announced that none of its nuclear weapons was henceforth targeted and repeating that information in 2004 and In 2007, however, France added the statement that the alert status of French nuclear forces has been downgraded on two occasions, in 1992 and Those reductions applied to both the response times and the number of weapons on alert. Russia reported in 2002 that detargeting of strategic nuclear weapons has become one of Russia s steps in the area of reducing the nuclear threat. At present as a result of implementation of that initiative all Russia s ballistic missiles are equipped with a so-called zero launch mission. In 2004 Russia added that, as a result of this initiative, the launch of 28 Transparency and Accountability

30 missiles becomes technically impossible in the absence of a real flight mission plan ; these statements were repeated in The only mention of operational status in 2007 was that Russia continues steadily reducing strategic delivery means and the related warheads. The UK has consistently provided information on the targeting and readiness status of its Trident nuclear weapons system from , indicating that only a single Trident submarine is now on deterrent patrol at any one time, normally at several days notice to fire and with its missile detargeted. The US reported in 2002 that U.S. nuclear forces are not targeted on any state on a day-today basis and that NATO has ceased to maintain standing peacetime nuclear contingency plans, and its nuclear forces no longer target any country. NATO has taken a number of steps to reduce the number and readiness of its dual-capable aircraft; readiness of these aircraft is now measured in weeks and months compared to minutes and hours as in the past. U.S. reliance on the forward deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons has been dramatically curtailed. The statement on the increase of NATO s launch time from minutes to months was repeated in In 2004 and 2005 the US reported that it no longer targets any country with nuclear weapons on a day-to-day basis. Strategic bombers are no longer on alert. Dual-capable aircraft no longer operate on a high-alert basis, and their readiness requirements now are measured in weeks and months, rather than minutes. There was no clear indication of the operational status of US nuclear weapons in 2007, however, aside from reports on nuclear warhead and delivery vehicle reductions. Strategic reductions China reports no reductions, insisting that the two countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals bear special responsibility and should take the lead in nuclear disarmament. In 2007 the UK committed to reduce operationally available warheads by 20% to fewer than 160. France, Russia, and the United States tend to focus on reductions from the 1990s. France says the number of warheads held by France has never exceeded a few hundred and that the number of delivery vehicles has been reduced by over half. The United States reports that we have reduced the explosive power of our nuclear forces by over 70 per cent since the end of the Cold War. The general approach of Russia and the United States is to report on the implementation of START I and draw on major reductions undertaken in the 1990s. At the RevCon of 2005 Russia submitted its first formal report and gave specific strategic reduction numbers: over the five year period that elapsed between the previous and today s NPT Review Conference the Russian Federation reduced its strategic nuclear force by 357 delivery vehicles and 1740 nuclear warheads. The Moscow Treaty between Russia and the United States commits both states to reduce strategic nuclear weapons holdings to between 1,700 2,000; both states have emphasized and repeated the reduction targets without regularly reporting the details of progress made to date that is, the specific deployment reductions toward those goals in each reporting period. Transparency and Accountability 29

31 Tactical reductions NWS reporting on tactical reductions tends to focus on total tactical reductions undertaken since the Cold War. Russia reported in 2002 that, in accordance with statements made by the President of the U.S.S.R. on Oct. 5, 1991 and the President of the Russian Federation on January 29, 1992 Russia consistently fulfills the initiatives, which she declared unilaterally. We would like to remind at this juncture that all nuclear weapons deployed outside of Russia, have been brought back to her territory and are in the process of liquidation. The US reported that non-strategic weapons deployed in support of NATO have been reduced by more than 90 per cent and that all have been removed from ground forces and naval surface ships and its carrier-dual capable aircraft. In sum, the Army, Marine Corps, and surface and air components of the Navy have been denuclearized. The United Kingdom reported that it had dismantled the last of its freefall Chevaline warheads in In 2004 France drew attention to the withdrawal of its short-range Pluton surface-to-surface missiles and AN-52 bombs. Affirmation of Article VI All NWS have declared themselves to be in complete support of Article VI and committed to its implementation. China declares support for the elimination of nuclear weapons. France affirmed in 2002 the ultimate goal of eliminating [nuclear weapons] altogether and in 2003 emphasized that nuclear disarmament presupposes a context of undiminished international stability and security for all. Russia declared in 2003 that it is committed to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and in 2007 reaffirmed the NPT as being at the core of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. The UK declared in 2003 its commitment to verifiable nuclear disarmament. In 2007 the UK stated that, in the absence of further measures being agreed in 2005, the UK continues to implement the decisions taken in previous review cycles. The United States regularly affirms its support for Article VI, but in 2003 pointed out that: [w]e think it is a mistake to use strict adherence to the 13 Steps as the only means by which NPT parties can fulfill their Article VI obligations. In 2005 the United States reaffirmed that it is fully committed to fulfilling our obligations under Article VI, but there can be no artificial timetable for progress in realizing our common Article VI objectives. In 2007 the US stated in a working paper on disarmament that it seeks to build a new global environment in which disarmament can become a realistic possibility. 8 Doctrine China s doctrinal statements tend to focus on its non-first-use commitment, its utmost constraint towards developing nuclear weapons, and its commitment to keeping its arsenal at the minimum level for self-defense. In 2005 China added that no efforts should be made to develop and deploy missile defence systems detrimental to the global strategic balance and stability, and no weapons systems should be deployed to outer space. 30 Transparency and Accountability

32 France describes its policy of nuclear deterrence as based on the principle of strict sufficiency, stating in 2005 that France considers that the purpose of its deterrent forces is to guarantee that its vital interests will never be threatened by any other power and that French nuclear weapons form no part of any strategy based on the military use of such weapons and have never been considered by France to be war-fighting assets. In 2007 its document on nuclear disarmament measures quotes the President as saying: Our doctrine has been adapted taking account of the new threats and our international commitments: faced with a major power, to be able to inflict damage of any kind, and, faced with a regional power, to exercise our response on its centres of power and capacity to act so that the risk of unacceptable damage deters any potential aggressor. Russia makes several references to maintaining a nuclear arsenal at minimum levels corresponding to requirements of strategic stability, or in accordance with the idea of minimum sufficiency. In 2004 it explained that nuclear disarmament may not be pursued in isolation from other types of weapons or outside of the overall political situation in the world and Europe. In 2002 the UK stated that, having reduced our nuclear weapons to a single system at the minimum level necessary for the UK s national security, further unilateral steps we can take now without compromising that security are limited. This reference to a minimum level was repeated in In 2005 the UK referenced its 1998 Strategic Defence review and the 2003 Defence White Paper, which noted that due to the continuing risk of nuclear proliferation and the retention by other countries of substantial nuclear arsenals, Trident was likely to remain a necessary element of our security we are continuing the policy we have had since the 1998 Strategic Defence Review of taking appropriate steps to ensure that the range of options for maintaining a minimum nuclear deterrent capability are kept open. The US reported the outcome of the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, that the new U.S. defense strategy increases the role of advanced conventional forces, missile defenses, intelligence capabilities and the defense infrastructure. This approach is designed to provide the President with a broad array of options to address a wide range of contingencies. It will increase the nuclear threshold by giving U.S. Presidents additional non-nuclear options and defenses to deter an enemy attack. In 2003, it added that there has been no change in U.S. nuclear declaratory policy and the United States has not lowered the threshold for nuclear weapons use. Indeed, by strengthening non-nuclear forces we will be able to hold targets at risk with an advanced conventional system that heretofore required a nuclear weapon. The result is an increase in the threshold for nuclear use. This line of reporting is consistent between 2002 and (The US also calls for general and complete disarmament. ) In 2002 the US also reported on NATO s nuclear doctrine, indicating that the United States and its NATO allies over the past decade have adapted NATO s defense posture to the new security environment. NATO has radically reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons. Its strategy is no longer dominated by the possibility of nuclear escalation, and the circumstances in which NATO might have to contemplate the use of nuclear weapons are considered to be extremely remote. Transparency and Accountability 31

33 Security assurances China s declared determination not to be the first to use nuclear weapons represents a general security assurance to NNWS when joined by its commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states and nuclear-weapon-free-zones. France reaffirmed its commitment to negative security assurances provided in UN Resolution 984 in , stating in 2002 that its commitments made in Resolution 984 remain valid and in 2003 that France has made absolutely no change to its policy in this area. This policy was qualified in 2003, however, by the statement that states in breach of their commitments on non-proliferation cannot invoke the benefit of those safeguards, and again in 2004 by reference to the natural right of legitimate self-defense. France also reports the security assurances it provides to members of NWFZs by signing onto supporting Protocols, indicating in 2003 and 2004 that it has extended these to over 100 countries and in 2005 that among NWS, France is party to the greatest number of protocols to treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. The UK reports that it is fully committed to negative security assurances and also supports the establishment of NWFZ and security assurances to their members. Russia s statements in 2002 and 2003 indicate that the unconditional fulfillment of negative security assurances provided in the 1995 resolution are fixed in the military doctrine of the Russian Federation. In 2004, while maintaining the right of NNWS to security assurances and continuing to support NWFZ, Russia began to call for a global, binding negative security assurance (NSA) agreement, provided it contains reservations concerning cases in which nuclear weapons may be used. This statement was continued in 2005 and 2007, with the added clarification that the instances when nuclear weapons may be used would be based on the military doctrines of NWS. The US stated in that there remains no change in US negative security assurances policy toward NPT non-nuclear-weapon states. In 2004 this statement was qualified insofar as the US does not see any justification for expanding NSAs to encompass global-legally binding assurances ; that these assurances are applicable only to NPT nonnuclear-weapon states in compliance with the Treaty ; and that in this security environment [of nuclear proliferation], it is apparent that NSAs by the NPT nuclear weapon states are of diminishing importance as a possible remedy to the security concerns of NPT non-nuclearweapon states, calling instead for strict compliance with the NPT by all states. Similar statements were repeated in 2005, but security assurances were not mentioned in Fissile material control In their 2007 statements, working papers, and reports submitted to the NPT, each of the NWS has indicated support for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. China says that it attaches great importance to the recent proposals submitted by parties concerned regarding the program of work of the CD, but refers to the need for substantive work on the FMCT, rather than negotiations. 32 Transparency and Accountability

34 France declares itself ready to initiate, without preconditions, negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear-weapons at the Disarmament Conference. It reports that it announced in 1996 a definitive halt to the production of fissile weapons material and closed down the relevant facilities, making it the first State to take and implement a decision to dismantle its facilities for the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Russia also declares that it is high time for the CD in Geneva to start negotiations on elaboration of the FMCT. We reaffirm our support for this idea. The sooner the deadlock situation at the CD is broken and the programme of work is agreed, the earlier it could undertake negotiating the FMCT. The United Kingdom reiterates its commitment to abide by its moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. We hope that the recent positive indicators that the 10 year long blockage at the Conference on Disarmament may be broken herald a new phase of consensus building in that forum. In the first instance we would like to see the early negotiation, of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty an issue that would represent an important and concrete step towards disarmament and one that is ripe and ready to be taken forward. The United States declares itself a staunch advocate of a treaty to ban any further production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive purposes, and reported on its May 2006 draft FMCT submitted to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. The draft treaty reflects US opposition to FMCT verification measures. Transparency and Accountability 33

35 Policy Considerations Though reporting is in its infancy in the sense that only a minority of NPT states report and the amount of detail varies considerably, it can still be said that formal reports submitted in response to the 2000 reporting agreement have already begun to demonstrate their value. In them each State Party offers its own account of its disarmament commitments and activities. These accounts are not offered in a vacuum but are subject to at least an informal level of verification inasmuch as it is possible in most cases to check a State Party s reporting against independent sources. That is particularly true for NWS reporting. Formal reports by NNWS, it is probably fair to say, tend to be more descriptions than national statements, and they generally contain more detail about specific initiatives undertaken to pursue the goals of Article VI than do other statements. In addition to stating policy and making general assessments about the state of disarmament, States Parties use the reports to note resolutions they supported in the First Committee, the signing and ratification of relevant treaties, initiatives such as national and regional technical meetings, and to confirm their compliance with IAEA safeguards, export controls, and nonproliferation mechanisms. NWS reporting remains largely informal and some of it has the character of promotional material designed to build the political case for NWS commitment to disarmament. Some states have suggested that the practice of reporting could become repetitive over time. Reporting in 2003 for the first time, South Africa noted that the Preparatory Committee should make every endeavor to ensure that this does not take place as a matter of rote. The Preparatory Committee should endeavor to ensure that a seemingly endless procession of largely repetitive prepared statements and reports does not lull us into a sense of complacency in which we would come to believe that all is well. As South Africa notes, its comment is relevant to all statements to the review process. Germany, in its opening statement of 2003, explained: We have at this time decided not to submit a national report, which would have repeated in essence our last year s contribution. The following addresses recommendations regarding the objective, frequency, structure, and scope of NPT reporting in light of the experience to date. Objective and Participation Rate To be a tool for accountability, reporting must become detailed, systematic, universal. It is clear that in the case of NWS in particular, reporting will have to become a formal expression of their accountability to other States Parties to the NPT and will also need to become much more detailed and systematic for it to mature into an effective tool for States Parties to assess the compliance of other states with Treaty obligations. Accountability is the fundamental purpose or objective of reporting, and reporting even at current minimal levels has begun to help states to better understand the approaches and activities of other States Parties and has helped to generate a general attitude that each owes the others an accounting 34 Transparency and Accountability

36 of what it is doing to implement and strengthen the disarmament and nonproliferation regime. There may well be a temptation for states to drift toward either minimalist, pro forma statements or toward overly self-serving assessments that do not yield any significant information. The intent of the reporting mandate is just the opposite that is, it anticipates reports that are regular, systematic, and detailed accounts that make a significant contribution to transparency and confidence-building. While the overall rate of explicit responses to the reporting requirement remains low, many States Parties that have formally responded have pursued a significant level of detail that suggests that reporting states accept the obligation as a serious one. That in turn suggests that overall transparency and accountability could be significantly enhanced through a determined effort to increase the response rate to the reporting requirement. The general quality of formal reports suggests that if enhanced transparency is the primary objective of reporting, it might now be useful to focus attention on increasing the response or participation rate rather than negotiating a common format. Simply achieving higher levels of participation would substantially contribute to the purpose of the reporting mandate, enhanced transparency and accountability, since it seems the very act of entering into a formal reporting mode encourages higher levels of quality and thoroughness. Of course, as the reporting experience develops, states are likely to find it useful to follow common reporting formats. But the primary objective of enhanced transparency depends more on increasing the participation rate than on the pursuit of standardized formats for reporting. In that regard, it is critically important that NWS begin to submit formal reports and thus to acknowledge and act on the fundamental principle of accountability that they agreed to in Frequency Reporting should occur at all substantive meetings of the NPT. The 2000 RevCon reporting requirement, as already noted, is for regular reports to be provided within the framework of the strengthened review process agreed to at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. And that review process, it was noted in turn, was to include the PrepComs as substantive meetings designed to promote the full implementation of the Treaty and to make recommendations to the RevCon. Since the PrepComs and RevCons are not annual events, it is logical to conclude that the decision to mandate regular reporting, rather than annual reporting, is based on the assumption that States Parties should be reporting to all PrepComs and RevCons. This would mean that states would be reporting four out of five years. Only a very small handful of states currently meet that standard. If NPT States Parties were to move to annual decision-making meetings, as has been proposed in the context of discussions of the NPT s institutional deficit, it would follow that reporting would then become an annual requirement. Transparency and Accountability 35

37 Structure Common categories that have emerged should form the basis of more uniform reporting formats. In the absence of any agreed structure, the reports that have been submitted broadly followed the themes that dominate international disarmament discourse. The reports did not uniformly follow any discernable standard or model, although most reflected one of three basic formats (article-by-article, the 13 steps, and general information on activities related to implementing Article VI). Notwithstanding the suggestion above that the current priority should be to increase the reporting participation rate rather than to negotiate a common reporting format and structure, certain common or generic categories of reporting have emerged over two years, and could in the long run form the basis of more uniform reporting formats. General Assessments of Developments and Trends relevant to the implementation of the Treaty Most of the reports include statements or comments on certain developments and trends within the broad nonproliferation regime. Such comments are frequently accompanied by explicit statements of welcome or regret and amount to broad assessments of the arms control and disarmament landscape. Information on National Nuclear Holdings and Doctrines Most of the NWS statements include some information on holdings and more extensive information on reductions of nuclear arsenals. They also include direct or implicit statements of doctrine, including information on operational status. While the UK statements have offered the most explicit detail, in all cases there is room for substantial elaboration. At the same time, with the exception of China, all NWS have included hard information on at least some elements of their holdings, reductions, doctrine, and operational status of their arsenals. In other words, the principle of reporting on these elements is accepted; now the priority must be further progress toward comprehensive and formal reporting on each of those categories. NWS should thus be encouraged to provide much more detailed reporting on their basic nuclear weapons facilities and on holdings in materials, warheads, and delivery systems, for example: The transfer or acquisition of nuclear materials; Holdings of fissile materials; Nuclear facilities of all kinds; Holdings and production of nuclear weapons (including the numbers, types, and yields of warheads, as well as numbers and types of delivery vehicles); The operational status of all weapons held; and Nuclear weapons doctrines (including security assurances) and policies to govern the use of those weapons. Descriptions of Disarmament Policies, Initiatives and Programs (national as well as cooperative bilateral and multinational efforts) Reports also include information on national measures undertaken in support of the objectives of the 36 Transparency and Accountability

38 Scope Treaty, including references to studies commissioned and research undertaken in support of efforts, for example, related to verification. States also use the reports to provide information on their efforts in cooperation with other states to achieve specific implementation objectives, for example, plutonium disposition efforts, NWFZ discussions, multinational seminars, and so on. Identification of Advocacy and Diplomatic Priorities States also report on states efforts to engage other states and forums on Treaty implementation issues, and on efforts to encourage other states to take specific actions in support of implementation and compliance. Thus, the reports could be used to identify priority items for international attention and action. In some instances states used the reports themselves as advocacy tools, calling on other States Parties to take particular actions, although, in the context of the Review Process, it might be useful to regard Reports as vehicles for reporting actions taken, including the policies on which those actions are based, and to use national statements as vehicles for advocacy. Information on Agreements Reached and Commitments Undertaken States also report on a broad range of international agreements and Treaties to which they adhere in support of NPT implementation objectives (ranging from the CTBT to IAEA safeguards and Additional Protocols, to other weapons of mass destruction [WMD] agreements and conventional arms control and disarmament efforts). Regular Declarations of Compliance Some states make specific statements of compliance with the Treaty, or specific elements of it. It would be useful for States Parties to the NPT to regularly provide public assurances to other signatories, on an Article-by-Article basis, of their full compliance with the Treaty, and provide information on national mechanisms and policies relied on to assure such compliance. States should report on all elements of the Treaty, as all are relevant to the implementation of Article VI. The scope or content of reporting, as distinct from the format, has been understandably guided by the international action agenda identified in the 2000 RevCon 13 steps. This focus has influenced the format of some reports as some states choose to use the 13 steps as the outline for their submission. Whether states report specifically on Article VI, on the 13 steps, or on an Article-by-Article basis, they implicitly acknowledge that all elements of the Treaty are relevant to the goal of implementing Article VI. Any reporting mechanism should serve as an enabling tool one that first of all encourages transparency in principle and practice, and then serves to shape information into helpful and useable forms. Thus States Parties should be encouraged to report on any and all issues important to their national and cooperative efforts toward Treaty implementation. Transparency and Accountability 37

39 Given the range of priorities and preoccupations of individual states, it might not be practical or useful to attempt to pre-define, through the establishment of a highly structured or standardized reporting form, the range of issues on which reporting is sought; nevertheless, the practice to date suggests a compelling format. Since all elements of the Treaty are relevant in achieving the objectives of Article VI paragraph 4(c) of Decision 2 of the 1995 Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non- Proliferation and Disarmament, the most appropriate current format for reporting would be to report on each Article of the Treaty and then use the 13 steps as a means of organizing the reporting on Article VI. As noted above, NWS have an additional requirement to report on all relevant holdings. The principle of mutual accountability has been a long time in developing within the NPT, but it became explicit in the 1995 decision to indefinitely extend the NPT. In the 2000 decision reporting became a particular mechanism for operationalizing that accountability. The degree to which the mechanism of reporting is accepted by States Parties will reflect the degree to which the principle of mutual accountability is accepted. 38 Transparency and Accountability

40 Notes 1 See NAM News Network, Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document (Volume I, Part I), Review of the operation of the Treaty, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty, New York, 2000, NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II), lement. 3 Non-Proliferation Treaty, Article VI: Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control NPT Decisions and Resolution, Decision 2: Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament: 4(c): The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. 5 The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996 [relevant excerpts]: Paragraph 99: The legal import of the (Article VI) obligation goes beyond that of a mere obligation of conduct [of negotiations in good faith]; the obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise result nuclear disarmament in all its aspects by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely the pursuit of negotiations in good faith. Paragraph 100: This two-fold obligation to pursue and to conclude negotiations formally concerns the [then] 18 States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or, in other words, the vast majority of the international community. 6 Statement by Egypt on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, Special Time on Nuclear Disarmament, The Reaching Critical Will Shadow Report examined holdings, policies, and activities of the 44 States identified by the IAEA as possessing nuclear weapons and/or nuclear power. 8 Working Paper Submitted on May 3, 2007 by the United States of America, Disarmament, the United States, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, p. 7. Transparency and Accountability 39

41 Acronyms and Abbreviations CD CTBT EU FMCT IAEA INF NAC NAM NATO NGO NNWS NPT NSA NWFZ NWS PrepCom RevCon START Conference on Disarmament Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty European Union Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty International Atomic Energy Agency Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty New Agenda Coalition Non-Aligned Movement North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nongovernmental organization Non-nuclear weapon state Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Negative security assurance Nuclear-weapon-free zone Nuclear weapon state Preparatory Committee Review Conference Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 40 Transparency and Accountability

42 TABLE 1: Tabulation of NPT Reports since the 2000 RevCon agreement on reporting Country Year Format NPT Regime Strategic Reductions Tactical Reductions Irreversibility CTBT/Moratorium FMCT Security Assurances Verification CD Nuclear Energy Export Controls Safeguards/Additional Protocol NWFZ International Cooperation Transparency Reporting Argentina Steps x x x x x x x x x x Australia Austria Belgium Brazil 02 General x x x x x x x 03 General x x x x x x x x x x 04 General x x x x x x x x x 05 General x x x x x x x x x x x 07 General x x x x x x x x x x x 04 Articles x x x x x x x 05 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x 05 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x Bulgaria 03 General x x x x x x x x x x x x x Canada 02 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 03 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 04 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 05 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 07 Articles/Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x China 05 General x x x x x x x x x x x x x Croatia 03 General x x x x x x x x x 05 Articles x x x x x x x x x x Cuba 05 General x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Czech Rep Steps x x x x x x x x x Transparency and Accountability 41

43 Country Year Format Finland NPT Regime Strategic Reductions Tactical Reductions Irreversibility CTBT/Moratorium 03 General x x x x x x 04 General x x x x x 05 General x x x x x x x x FMCT Security Assurances Verification CD Nuclear Energy Export Controls Safeguards/Additional Protocol NWFZ International Cooperation Transparency Reporting Germany Steps x x x x x x x x x x Greece 04 General x x x x x x x Guatemala Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x Hungary Indonesia Iran Ireland 03 General x x x x x x x x 04 General x x x x x x x x 05 General x x x x x x x x 02 General x x x x x x 03 General x x x x x x x x x x x 05 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x 03 General x x x x x x x x x 04 General x x x x x x x 05 General x x x x x x 07 General x x x x x x x x x x 02 Articles x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x x Italy 05 General x x x x x x x x x Japan 02 General x x x x x x 03 General x x x x 04 General x x x x x 05 General x x x x 07 General x x x x x x 42 Transparency and Accountability

44 Country Year Format NPT Regime Strategic Reductions Tactical Reductions Irreversibility CTBT/Moratorium FMCT Security Assurances Verification CD Nuclear Energy Export Controls Safeguards/Additional Protocol NWFZ International Cooperation Kazakhstan 04 General x x x x Transparency Reporting Latvia 05 General x x x x x x x x Lithuania Luxembourg Malaysia Mexico Mongolia Morocco Netherlands New Zealand 03 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x x 04 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x 05 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x x 04 Articles x x x x x x x x 05 Articles x x x 03 General x x x x x x 04 General x x x x x x 05 General x x x x x x x 07 General x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x 05 General x x x x x x x x x 02 Activity x x x x 03 Articles x x x x x x x x x 03 General x x x x x x x x x 04 General x x x x x x x x x 05 General x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x x 02 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x x 03 Articles/Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 04 Articles/Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 05 Articles/Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 07 Articles/Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Transparency and Accountability 43

45 Country Year Format NPT Regime Strategic Reductions Tactical Reductions Irreversibility CTBT/Moratorium FMCT Security Assurances Verification CD Nuclear Energy Export Controls Safeguards/Additional Protocol NWFZ International Cooperation Transparency Nigeria 05 General x x x x x x x x x x x Reporting Norway Peru Poland Portugal Rep of Korea Romania Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x x 07 General x x x x x x x x x x x 03 Articles x x x x x x x x x 05 General x x x x 04 General x x x x x x x x 05 General x x x x x x x x x x x 02 General x x x x x x x 04 General x x x x x x x 03 General x x x x x x x x x x 04 General x x x x x x x x x 05 General x x x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x x 03 General x x x x x 04 General x x x x x x Russia 05 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Slovakia 03 General x x x x x x x x x x 04 Articles x x x x x x x x x x South Africa Steps x x x x x x x x x x x Spain Steps x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x x Sri Lanka 03 General x x x x x x x x x x x 44 Transparency and Accountability

46 Country Year Format Sweden NPT Regime Strategic Reductions Tactical Reductions Irreversibility CTBT/Moratorium FMCT 02 General x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x Security Assurances Verification CD Nuclear Energy Export Controls Safeguards/Additional Protocol NWFZ International Cooperation Transparency Reporting Switzerland 03 General x x x x x x 04 General x x x x 05 General x x x x x Thailand 02 General x x x x x x Turkey Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x Ukraine 04 General x x 05 General x x Total Reports Total Countries 48 Transparency and Accountability 45

47

48 TABLE 2 Article VI Reporting by NWS NPT PrepComs Although only China and Russia to date have submitted formal reports, all five NWS provide information, through various national statements, fact sheets, and working papers, on their efforts to implement Article VI. The following summary of selected reporting is based on these documents. The references included in the Table are illustrative of such reporting and are certainly not intended to be exhaustive or comprehensive. Sources for the years 2004 and following are indicated below. Evidence for 2002 and 2003 are based on similar documents. China: Information for 2004: the opening statement of April 26, a Fact Sheet on Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of the Danger of Nuclear War, a statement on Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, a Working Paper on Security Assurances, a Working Paper on NWFZs, and a Working Paper on prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Information for 2005: China s Contribution to Nuclear Disarmament; Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of the Danger of Nuclear War, a Working Paper submitted April 26; Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a Working Paper submitted May 4; Security Assurances, a Working Paper submitted May 4; NWFZ, a Working Paper Submitted April 26; General Debate Statement of May 3; National Report of May 11. Information for 2007: Security Assurances, a Working Paper submitted May 7; NWFZ, a Working Paper submitted May 7; Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of the Danger of Nuclear War, a Working Paper submitted May 7; Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a Working Paper submitted May 7; General Debate Statement of May 1; Cluster 1 Statement of May 1; Cluster 2 Statement of May 9; Cluster 3 Statement of May 10. France: Information for 2004: General Debate statement of April 26, Cluster 1 statement of April 29. Information for 2005: Fighting Proliferation, Promoting Arms Control and Disarmament: France s Contribution, General Debate statement of May 5. Information for 2007: Nuclear Disarmament Measures Implemented by France, General Debate Statement of May 1, Cluster 1 Statement of May 8, Cluster 2 Statement of May 9, Cluster 3 Statement of May 10. Russia: Information for 2004: Opening Statement of April 27, Statement on Article VI of the Treaty, Statement on negative security assurances. Information for 2005: Practical Steps Taken by the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Disarmament, May; General Debate Statement of May 3; National Report of May 11. Information for 2007: General Debate Statement of April 30, Statement on Nuclear Disarmament and Security Assurances of May 9, Cluster 2 Statement of May 9, Cluster 3 Statement of May 10. United Kingdom: Information for 2004: General Debate Statement, April 26; Cluster 1 Statement, April 30; Cluster 1: Specific time: Disarmament/NSAs, May 3. Information for 2005: Strengthening Non-Proliferation: The 2005 Review Conference, April; Verification of Nuclear Transparency and Accountability 47

49 Disarmament: Final Report on Studies into the Verification of Nuclear Warheads and their Components, a Working Paper submitted April 18; General Debate Statement of May 5. Information for 2007: General Debate Statement of April 30; Cluster 1 Statement of May 8; Cluster 2 Statement of May 9; Cluster 3 Statement of May 10; Working Paper on Cluster II Issues, submitted May 9. United States: Information for 2004: Opening statement by Under Secretary of State on The NPT: A Crisis of Non-Compliance, April 27; Article VI: The US Record of Compliance, statement by Assistant Secretary of State, May 3. Information for 2005: Statement by Assistant Secretary of State Rademaker, May 2; Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, United States Department of State, April 20; The Commitment of the United States of America to Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Information for 2007: General Debate Statement of April 30; Cluster 1 Statement of May 8; Cluster 2 Statement of May 9; Cluster 3 Statement of May 10; Challenges of Non-Proliferation Compliance, a Working Paper submitted May 3; Disarmament, the United States, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a Working Paper submitted May 3; Achieving and Sustaining Nuclear Weapons Elimination, a Working Paper submitted May 3; Safeguards and Nuclear Security, a Woking Paper submitted May 3; Facilitating Disarmament, a Working Paper submitted May 3. The following table summarizes information supplied by NWS through these various statements and documents on a set of issues particularly relevant to Article VI implementation: 1. Holdings 2. Operational status of weapons held 3. Progress on strategic reductions 4. Progress on non-strategic reductions 5. Affirmation of Article VI 6. Strategic doctrine 7. Security assurances 8. Fissile material control. 48 Transparency and Accountability

50 Holdings 2002 Holdings 2003 Holdings 2004 Holdings 2005 Holdings Holdings China France Russia UK US No number, minimum level for self defense No number No medium- or short-range missiles, 1,136 strategic delivery units, 5,518 re-entry vehicles Available stockpile fewer than 200 warheads, single Trident submarine on patrol with 48 warheads Fewer than 6,000 deployed strategic warheads No number, China has exercised utmost restraint towards developing nuclear weapons. No number (see reductions), principle of strict sufficiency determines the format of the French nuclear arsenal Fulfilled START I requirements 1,136 deployed strategic delivery systems, 5,518 warheads, no information on stockpiled weapons Available stockpile fewer than 200 warheads, single Trident submarine on patrol with 48 warheads As a result of START I it now has fewer than 6,000 deployed strategic warheads; no information on delivery systems or stockpile. China possesses the smallest nuclear arsenal of all the NWS. No numbers Since 1990, France has halved the number of nuclear delivery vehicles in its force, and the number of nuclear weapons systems is down from 6 to 2. The share of nuclear forces in total French defence spending has dropped from 17% in 1990 to below 9.5% in As of January 1, 2004, Russia possessed 1031 deployed strategic offensive delivery vehicles and 4978 weapons accountable under the START 1 Treaty. We hold less than 200 operationally available warheads. The United States provides information on executed and planned reductions but provides no information on current holdings. China keeps a very limited nuclear arsenal only for selfdefense purposes. Total holdings of just over 100, split between sea-to-land missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft. As of January 1, 2005 Russia possessed 981 deployed strategic offensive delivery vehicles and 4732 warheads accountable under the START. Have a stock pile of less than 200 operational warheads and only one Trident Submarine is on deterrent patrol at one time, carrying a reduced load of 48 war heads. The United States provides information on executed and planned reductions but provides no information on current holdings. No reference In total, taking all components together, the number of delivery vehicles has been eliminated by more than half since Nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles have been reduced from 6 to 4. As of January 1, 2007, Russia possessed no more than 900 deployed strategic offensive delivery vehicles and 4200 warheads accountable under the START 1 Treaty. Reducing stockpiles by 20% to fewer than 160 UK nuclear weapons now account for less than 1% of the global inventory. As of December 31, 2006, the United States had 3,696 operationally deployed nuclear warheads, which is significantly lower by 40 per cent than the total number of attributed nuclear warheads permitted under START. The number of French nuclear weapons systems has been reduced from 6 to 2. Transparency and Accountability 49

51 Operational Status 2002 Operational Status 2003 Operational Status 2004 Operational Status Operational Status China France Russia UK US No reference No weapons targeted since 1997 Committed to detargeting strategic nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles have zero launch mission Only patrolling submarine on several days notice to fire, missiles are de-targeted Forces not targeted on day-to-day basis, does not believe general dealerting contributes to stability, with Russia working on early warning data sharing No reference No reference No reference Single Trident submarine on deterrent patrol; it is normally on several days notice to fire ; its missiles are de-targeted Launch time of NATO s nuclearcapable delivery aircraft increased from minutes to months In 1994 China and Russia announced the non-targeting of nuclear weapons against each other. In 1998 China and US announced mutual non-targeting, and in 2000 all five NWS issued a joint declaration announcing the non-targeting of their nuclear weapons at any countries Announcement that no part of the French nuclear deterrent forces was any longer targeted One of the steps taken by the Russian Federation to reduce the nuclear threat was the statement by the Russian President of May 27, 1997, on detargeting strategic nuclear weapons. As a result of this initiative, the launch of missiles becomes technically impossible in the absence of a real flight mission plan. [O]ur nuclear forces patrol on reduced readiness; only a single Trident submarine is now on deterrent patrol at any one time, normally at several days notice to fire and with its missile de-targeted. Does not target any country with nuclear weapons Strategic bombers are no longer on alert Dual-capable aircraft no longer operate on a high-alert basis (readiness measured in months) NATO no longer maintains nuclear contingency plans and associated targets for its NSNW It is true that nuclear weapons can be re-targeted with relative ease, but US consciously has chosen not to target any nation. This is an important symbolic and confidence-building measure. In September 1994, the Presidents of China and Russia made a pledge in their joint statement on nofirst-use and de-targeting of nuclear weapons against each other. In June 1998, China and the United States declared de-targeting of nuclear weapons against each other. French deterrent is not directed against any particular country. All nuclear weapons of the former USSR that were outside Russia at the end of 1991 have been withdrawn to its territory for elimination. Trident Submarine is normally at a reduced alert status and its missiles are not targeted at any State. US strategic bombers are no longer on alert. The US no longer targets any country with Nuclear weapons. NATO no longer maintains nuclear contingency plans and associated targets for its non-strategic nuclear weapons. US dual-capable aircraft no longer operate on a high-alert basis, and their readiness requirements now measure in weeks and months, rather than minutes. 50 Transparency and Accountability

52 Operational Status 2007 Strategic Reductions 2002 Strategic Reductions 2003 China France Russia UK US No reference The alert status of French nuclear forces has been downgraded on two occasions, in 1992 and Those reductions applied to both the response times and the number of weapons on alert. No reference. Our Trident submarines are normally at several days notice to fire. Their missiles are not targeted at any one country. No reference No nuclear component of the French deterrent force continues to have designated targets. 3. Strategic Reductions China France Russia UK US No reference, those with largest arsenals have greatest responsibility to reduce Halved its delivery vehicles, no ground-to-ground component, scaled back other programs, dismantled testing and fissile material production sites Eliminated more than 1,200 ICBM/SLBM launchers, 2,350 ICBM/SLBMs, 40 submarines, 60 bombers; production potential halved; prepared to further reduce arsenal to minimum levels for security Unilaterally reduced force to fewer than 200 warheads, withdrew freefall nuclear bomb, last Chevaline warhead dismantled (2002) Strategic reductions to 1,700-2,200 over the next decade with retirement of ICBM Peacekeepers, four Trident submarines, elimination of B-1 s nuclear capability; has dismantled 13,000 weapons since 1988 No reference to its arsenal; existing arsenals must be reduced in an irreversible, effectively verifiable and legally binding manner. Countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals bear special and primary responsibility in this regard. Eliminated surface-to-surface weapons, reduced number of nuclear submarines, halved total number of delivery vehicles, dismantled testing site in Pacific, fissile materials production sites at Pierrelatte and Marcoule closed and being dismantled Under START I arsenal reduced to levels listed above, October 2001 last nuclear warhead returned to Russia from Ukraine eliminated, expressed support for Moscow Treaty and agreed reductions to between 1,700-2,200 units by 2012, until 2009 START I will remain in force, double mutually reinforcing limitations by two treaties reductions to fewer than 200 warheads represent reductions to less than 70 per cent of the potential explosive power of UK s nuclear deterrent since the end of the Cold War Moscow Treaty represents a 2/3 reduction from START I levels of 6,000 warheads 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs are being retired and disassembled, 2 of planned 4 Trident submarines removed from strategic service, entire B-1 bomber force is now dedicated to conventional missions; further reductions will result in fewer warheads on ballistic missiles and fewer operationally deployed weapons at bomber bases Transparency and Accountability 51

53 Strategic Reductions 2004 China France Russia UK US No reference to reductions, only that it has the smallest arsenal of the NWS From 1964 to 1996, China conducted 45 nuclear tests. Among the nuclear weapon states, China has performed fewest nuclear tests and possesses the smallest nuclear arsenal. It has never taken part in any nuclear arms race or deployed any nuclear weapons outside its territory. Since the 1990s, China has gradually cut back on its nuclear weapons development program. The research and development site in Qinghai was closed [and] was returned to civilian use in May [T]he end of the cold war set the scene for effective implementation of Article VI. France has cut its nuclear arsenal, eliminating all of its surface-to-surface nuclear weapons; reducing the number of its ballistic missile nuclear submarines; and halving its total number of delivery vehicles,[and] has dismantled its nuclear testing centre in the Pacific announcement of the early withdrawal, ahead of schedule, of Pluton surfaceto-surface missiles and AN-52 bombs 1996 France s last and final nuclear test 1996 Announcement of reduction in the number of ballistic missile nuclear submarines from 5 to 4, the end of the Mirage IV s nuclear missions, the abandonment of the surface-to-surface component of the nuclear forces through the standing down and destruction of the Hades and S3D surface-to-surface missiles [R]atification of the Russian-US Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions calling for reciprocal cuts in the aggregate number of strategic nuclear weapons by each side down to before December 31, In other words, these weapons will be reduced approximately threefold against the level envisaged under the START I Treaty. To date, Russia has eliminated 1250 ICBM and SLBM launchers, 2580 ICBM and SLBM delivery vehicles, 43 Strategic nuclear-powered submarines and 65 heavy bombers. [F]or the purposes of implementation of the Moscow Treaty the Bilateral Compliance Commission was established under the Treaty s provisions, and its first session was held in Geneva on April 8-9, Willing to reduce strategic arsenal well below SORT provisions consistent with the notion of minimum sufficiency 70% reduction in the explosive power of UK nuclear weapons since end of the Cold War Polaris, superseded by Trident, the only nuclear system; since 2000 have completed the dismantling of the Chevaline (Polaris) warheads The United States has been reducing its nuclear forces and nuclear weapons stockpiles in a consistent fashion through both unilateral and bilateral initiatives, most recently under the Moscow Treaty. Dismantled more than 13,000 nuclear weapons since 1988 Drawing down operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to the level of 1,700-2,000, about one-third of the 2002 level By 2012, will have reduced strategic warheads deployed by 80% since 1991 From eliminated nearly 1,000 strategic nuclear missiles and bombers Since 1999 eliminated 64 heavy bombers, 150 missile silos, taken out of strategic service 4 missile submarines (and missile removed), and deactivated 28 peacekeeper ICBMs (the remaining 22 scheduled for deactivation by October 2005) Nuclear forces declined from 7% of DOD budget to less than 3% today 52 Transparency and Accountability

54 Strategic Reductions 2005 China France Russia UK US No reference China is the only nuclearweapon state to advocate a complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. France has therefore abandoned and dismantled the surface-to-surface weapons systems on the Plateau d Albion and the short-range surfaceto-surface weapons systems Pluton and Hades. The number of nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles (SSBNs) has been reduced from six to four. Today, one SSBN, at least, is at sea at all times, compared with three until Lastly, the airborne component has also been reduced. In total the number of delivery vehicles has been reduced by over half. France announced on 20 January 1996 the cessation of all nuclear testing following completion of a final series of tests. This decision took practical shape in the complete dismantling of testing facilities in the Pacific, which was announced as early as 22 February 1996 and completed by the end of July This means since the end of the Cold War and opening of the (CTBT) for signature in 1996, France is the only NWS to have closed down and dismantled its nuclear testing facilities. The INF Treaty of unlimited duration remains an essential contribution to the nuclear disarmament. Under this Treaty two classes of land-based missiles with a range of 500 to 1000 and 1000 to 5500 km a total of 1846 intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and 825 of their launchers were completely destroyed, while further production and testing of such missiles was banned. Over the five year period that elapsed between the previous and today s NPT Review Conferences the Russian Federation reduced its strategic nuclear force by 357 delivery vehicles and 1740 nuclear warheads. In accordance with the Treaty (START), as of December 5, 2001, the strategic offensive arms level should not have exceeded 1600 carriers and 6000 nuclear warheads. As of that target date the actual levels reached 1136 and 5518 pieces correspondingly. The Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (Moscow Treaty) calls for the obligation by Russia and the US to reduce and limit by December 31, 2012, their respective strategic nuclear warheads to the aggregate number not exceeding The President of the Russian Federation Vladimir V. Putin has time and again reiterated our country s commitment to reduce, on a mutual basis, its nuclear arsenals envisaged by the Moscow Treaty namely to 1500 weapons and less. Elimination of 1328 ICBM and SLBM launchers, 2670 ICBMs and SLBMs, 45 strategic nuclear submarines and 66 heavy bombers We have reduced the explosive power of our nuclear forces by over 70 per cent since the end of the Cold War. Since 2000 we have completed the dismantling of all our remaining Chevaline (Polaris) warheads. The UK maintains a minimum deterrent at the lowest level consistent with our national security, as outlined in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review and 2003 Defence White Paper. Trident is our sole nuclear weapons system, making the UK the only NWS to have reduced to a single system. On this point we are proud to be the most forward-leaning of the NWS. Trident submarine carries 48 warheads compared to a previously planned total of 96 Since the last review conference the United States and the Russian Federation concluded our implementation of START I reductions, and signed and brought into force the Moscow Treaty Under the Moscow Treaty, we have agreed to reduce our operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to , about a third of 2002 levels and less than a quarter of the level at the end of the Cold War. When this Treaty is fully implemented by the end of 2012, the United States will have reduced the number of strategic warheads it had deployed in 1990 by about 80%. [W]e have eliminated thousands of nuclear weapons, eliminated an entire class of intermediaterange ballistic missiles, taken B-1 bombers out of nuclear service, reduced the number of ballistic missile submarines, drastically reduced our nuclear weapons-related domestic infrastructure, and are now eliminating our most modern and sophisticated land-based ballistic missile. We have also spent billions of dollars, through programs such as Nunn-Lugar, to help other countries control and eliminate their nuclear materials. We are proud to have played a leading role in reducing nuclear materials. We have also reduced the role of nuclear weapons in our deterrence strategy and are cutting our nuclear stock pile almost in half, to the lowest level in decades. Transparency and Accountability 53

55 Strategic Reductions 2007 China France Russia UK US No reference China maintains that the two countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals bear special responsibility and should take the lead in nuclear disarmament. Abandonment of the strategic surface-to-surface S45 missile programme destined to replace the S3D missiles on the Plateau d Albion Closure of the Plateau d Albion facility Decision to dismantle the Hades short-range surface-to-surface missiles system Early withdrawal of the Pluton short-range surface-to-surface missiles Early withdrawal from service and dismantling of the AN 52 nuclear bombs carried by Jaguar and Mirage III aircraft Withdrawal of the Mirage IV strategic aircraft from nuclear missions Russia fulfilled its obligations completely and ahead of the START, and continues steadily reducing strategic delivery means and the related warheads. We are fulfilling obligations under the Russian-US Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions which provides for reduction of the number of strategic nuclear weapons down to by each side before December 31, The Joint declaration of the Presidents of Russia and the United States which was signed upon conclusion of the Moscow Treaty and which states the intention of the two nations to reduce their strategic offensive potential to the minimal possible levels corresponding to their national security and ally obligations as well as reflecting the new nature of relations between Russia and the United States in the strategic sphere. We will now cut our stockpile of operationally available warheads by 20 per cent to fewer than 160. This amounts to a total reduction of explosive power of the United Kingdom nuclear weapons by 75 per cent since the end of the cold war. The United Kingdom is the only nuclear weapon State that has reduced its deterrent capability to a single nuclear weapon system. Building new submarines for our existing Trident D5 missile system does not reverse or undermine any of these positive disarmament steps. Any suggestion that the United Kingdom is further developing nuclear weapons is a misunderstanding. Dramatic reductions are in fact underway in strategic warhead numbers. The United States is now in the process of drawing down its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between by the year The decision made by President George W. Bush in 2001 to do this was reflected in the Moscow Treaty he signed with Russian President Putin in Since the end of the Cold War the United States has cancelled the modern, highly sophisticated MGM- 134 Midgetman missile, and halted production of other major weapon systems such as the B-2 Stealth bomber. Under President George H.W. Bush, the United States took out of nuclear weapon service four Ohioclass nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines carrying the Trident C-4 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and modified these vessels for other uses. When this ongoing process of warhead reductions has been completed, the United States will have removed about 80 per cent of the number of strategic nuclear warheads deployed in 1991, leaving the total at about one-third of the United States 2002 level. When this point is reached in 2012, in fact, the number of such weapons will have reached its lowest level since the administration of United States President Dwight Eisenhower. 54 Transparency and Accountability

56 Tactical Reductions 2002 Tactical Reductions 2003 Tactical Reductions Non-Strategic Reductions China France Russia UK US No reference No reference All nuclear weapons deployed outside Russia have been returned, more than 30 per cent of tactical sea-launched missiles eliminated, production of tactical nuclear munitions ceased, destruction continues No reference Non-strategic nuclear weapons reduced by more than 85 per cent, removed from ground forces and naval surface ships; gravity bombs reduced by 50 per cent; Army, Marine Corps, and surface and air components of Navy denuclearized [N]o research and development work should be conducted into low-yield nuclear weapons or mininukes aimed at probable battlefield use No reference Whole class of non-strategic offensive weapons was eliminated according to INF Treaty; removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe an important practical step to ultimately overcome the remnants of the cold-war period Withdrawn freefall nuclear bomb (WE177); in 2002 last of Chevaline warheads dismantled In January the US finished dismantling the nuclear weapons it pledged to under the 1991 PNI; all but one nuclear delivery system in Europe eliminated (90 per cent reductions); Army, Marine Corps, surface and air components of Navy all denuclearized; NATO and Russia engaged in further discussions; legal agreement on tactical weapons called not possible because systems more difficult to verify No reference 1991 announcement of the early withdrawal, ahead of schedule, of Pluton surfaceto-surface missiles and AN-52 bombs No numbers We have practically completed our initiatives concerning non-strategic nuclear weapons reductions, except for eliminating the Army s nuclear weapons. Elimination of nuclear warheads of land-based tactical missiles, nuclear artillery shells and nuclear mines is pursued on the basis of technological capabilities of the nuclear weapon complex and actual financing. Review of INF Treaty All nuclear weapons of former Soviet Union returned to Russian territory. The last nuclear warhead pulled back from the territory of Ukraine to Russia was eliminated in October [M]ore than 50% of the total number of nuclear weapons for sea-launched, air-launched tactical missiles, air defense missiles and nuclear air bombs have been eliminated. Over the past decade the UK has achieved: the withdrawal and dismantling of our maritime tactical nuclear capability; the withdrawal and dismantling of the RAF s WE177 nuclear bomb; the termination of the nuclear Lance missile and artillery roles that we undertook with US nuclear weapons held under dual-key arrangements. 90% of US NSNW eliminated since fall of Berlin Wall Removed nuclear weapons from all surface ships and attack submarines Reduced the number of types of nuclear systems in Europe from 9 in 1991 to just 1 today Withdrawn more than 3,000 tactical nuclear warheads (artillery shells, short-range missiles, Navy depth bombs), the last of these dismantled in The number of storage sites in NATO for non-strategic nuclear weapons has been reduced by 80%. Transparency and Accountability 55

57 Tactical Reductions 2005 Tactical Reductions 2007 Affirmation of Article VI Commitments 2002 China France Russia UK US No reference No reference By now the Russian TNWs are deployed only within national territory and concentrated at central storage facilities of the Ministry of Defence. No reference Reduction of the number of weapons carried by the airborne component Reduction of the number of nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles (SSBNs) from 6 to 4 It is important to note that Russia s non-strategic nuclear arsenal has been reduced by four times as compared to what the Soviet Union possessed in We will further reduce the level of these weapons. This process will certainly be pursued with due account for the military and strategic situation and our national security interests. To date, Russia has eliminated its non-strategic nuclear weapons by three quarters against the arsenals handed down to us by the USSR. In total, in comparison with 1991, the total amount of nuclear weapons stockpiles has been reduced more than fivefold. Withdrawn and dismantled the RAF s WE 177 nuclear bomb so that Trident is our only nuclear system Since the Cold War withdrawal and dismantling of our maritime tactical nuclear capability; the withdrawal and dismantling of the RAF s WE177 nuclear bomb; and the termination of the nuclear Lance missile and artillery roles that we undertook with the United States of America under dual-key arrangements [W]e have reduced our non-strategic nuclear weapons by 90% since the end of the Cold War, dismantling over 3000 such weapons pursuant to the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and The US has removed nuclear weapons from all surface ships and attack submarines, and NATO has reduced the number of types of nuclear systems in Europe from five in 1991 to just one today. The number of NATO storage sites for NSNW has been reduced by 80 percent. The US has withdrawn worldwide and eliminated more than 3000 tactical nuclear warheads, consisting of artillery shells, warheads for short-range missile systems, and Navy depth bombs. Dismantled more than 3,000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons numbers, and reduced non-strategic weapons deployed in support of NATO in Europe by 90 per cent. In addition, the United States has removed all non-strategic nuclear weapons from surface ships and naval aircraft. 5. Affirmation of Article VI Commitments China France Russia UK US [F]irm and sacred aspiration to eliminate nuclear weapons ; NPT principles a global norm applicable to all states France has made clear its determination to contribute to systematically and progressively moving to reduce the global level of nuclear weapons with the ultimate goal of eliminating them altogether. Strong support for NPT, no reference to elimination of nuclear weapons [R]emains fully committed to the ultimate goal of verifiable global disarmament active in working towards creating the conditions necessary for the global elimination of nuclear weapons No reference to elimination of nuclear weapons The US generally agrees with the conclusions of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and will contribute to their implementation. 56 Transparency and Accountability

58 Affirmation of Article VI Commitments 2003 Affirmation of Article VI Commitments 2004 China France Russia UK US China remains committed to nuclear disarmament and thorough elimination of nuclear weapons. China stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and the conclusion of an international legal instrument for this purpose. In order to advance the nuclear disarmament process, China submitted to the General Assembly at its 49 th session a proposal for a comprehensive and interlinked nuclear disarmament process, which called on the nuclearweapon states, inter alia, to negotiate immediately and sign a treaty on mutual no-first-use of nuclear weapons; to undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-weapon-free zones; to conclude and ratify CTBT; to negotiate and conclude FMCT; to negotiate, conclude and sign a convention on the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons. Stated its continued compliance with Article VI, but it will also continue to emphasise that nuclear disarmament presupposes a context of undiminished international stability and security for all. In other words, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles is a factor which may hold back disarmament. The NPT continues to be a vital instrument in the preservation of peace and international security. France wishes to reaffirm here its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and its conviction that there is no substitute capable of guaranteeing a comparable level of security for the international community. Our country not only declares its commitment as the ultimate goal to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and to the conclusion of a treaty on comprehensive and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, but also takes steps in the sphere of nuclear disarmament. Despite all the changes happening in the world, the NPT remains a major pillar of the international security system. The practical steps that Russia is taking demonstrate its continued commitment to strict compliance with its nuclear disarmament obligations, particularly those contained in Article VI of the Treaty. [T]he UK remains committed to verifiable global nuclear disarmament [and] has already taken significant steps towards this goal and continues to work actively to that end. The NPT is the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It retains the wholehearted support of the United Kingdom and the vast majority of the international community. US stated that it no longer supports all of the 13 Practical Steps: We think it is a mistake to use strict adherence to the 13 Steps as the only means by which NPT parties can fulfill their Article VI obligations. US stated that it continues to unambiguously support Article VI and the goal of nuclear disarmament. The United States supports the Non- Proliferation Treaty and is committed to its goals. The United States is meeting its Article VI obligations under the NPT. Transparency and Accountability 57

59 Affirmation of Article VI Commitments 2005 China France Russia UK US China strictly abides by the provisions of the NPT and has been making unremitting efforts in promoting the three NPT goals of: non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, progress in nuclear disarmament, and promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. France played a major role in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference at which it expressed its resolute commitment in favour of indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty. France promotes the preservation and universality of the NPT. It believes that the NPT is indispensable to maintenance of international peace and security. France attaches particular importance to the central role of the IAEA s system of safeguards, one of the pillars of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Under the system of safeguards, the implementation of an Additional Protocol, combined with that of a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, is essential to obtain complete assurance of adherence to non-proliferation commitments. The Russian Federation is strictly committed to fulfilling its obligations under Article VI of the Treaty. The Russian Federation is convinced that the indefinitely extended NPT is a time-tested instrument and sound pillar of international security. During the 35 years after its entry into force the Treaty has proved to be viable and stood many difficult tests. It continues to successfully perform its role as the most important instrument preventing nuclear weapons proliferation, serve as a foundation for the progress towards irreversible nuclear disarmament and provide for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. To achieve universality Russia is actively working both in bilateral and multilateral formats to have India, Pakistan and Israel join the NPT as nonnuclear-weapon States. The United Kingdom firmly believes that the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty remains the fundamental underpinning of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The treaty is as necessary as it ever has been. We must ensure that States Parties respond effectively and with determination to the diverse range of contemporary challenges to the regime. The UK supports effective mechanisms to ensure full compliance with the obligations under the NPT. One of the most important issues facing this Review Conference is how we can verify compliance more effectively and therefore increase the disincentive of those who might consider noncompliance. The United States remains fully committed to fulfilling our obligations under Article VI. The United States provides world leadership in realising Article VI objectives through deep reductions in nuclear forces undertaken in START and the Moscow Treaty, assistance for Russian disarmament through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and other actions. The U.S. continues to be a leader in these areas and on many other fronts in support of the NPT. There can be no artificial timetables for progress in realising our common Article VI objectives. Details and dates cannot and should not be predicted or foreordained. 58 Transparency and Accountability

60 Affirmation of Article VI Commitments 2007 China France Russia UK US As a State Party to the NPT, China has all along committed itself to enhancing the authority, effectiveness and universality of the Treaty. China has faithfully fulfilled its obligations, and has been actively promoting the three goals of the Treaty. China attaches great importance to and actively participates in international efforts of non-proliferation, and has acceded to all relevant treaties and regimes. China has committed itself to multilateral and bilateral exchanges and cooperation on non-proliferation and is strictly implementing Resolution 1540 of the UN Security Council as well as other resolutions related to non-proliferation. The international community should advance with the times and seek a fair, reasonable and effective way to enhance the nuclear non-proliferation program regime through extensive consultations. France is working to implement the 1995 programme (Article VI). In 1996 it signed, and ratified in 1998, the CTBT. France was, along with the United Kingdom, the first NWS to ratify the CTBT. France dismantled its nuclear test facility in the Pacific. It announced, as long ago as 1996, a definitive halt to the production of fissile weapons material and closed down the relevant facilities for the production of fissile materials in Pierrelatte and Marcoule. The NPT, which was agreed forty years ago next year, is an invaluable instrument for collective security and it is our duty to preserve its integrity in the face of the challenges to which it is subject, notable since the previous review cycle. We must all be aware of the level of security it offers us by limiting the risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, by fostering nuclear disarmament within the framework of general and complete disarmament and by providing for mechanisms intended to allow access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy while at the same time avoiding the use for non-peaceful ends of nuclear goods and technologies intended for civil purposes. NPT remains at the core of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. It has successfully served the task of minimizing nuclear conflict. No matter how complicated the situation is, no one doubts that we need and can find ways to respond to the challenges and threats to the non-proliferation regime based on the NPT. With 189 member States the Treaty has become the universal one. The Russian Federation strictly abides by its obligations under the Treaty. Russia steadily pursues strengthening and universalization of the NPT. The United Kingdom remains committed to our nuclear disarmament obligations under article VI of the NPT and continues to make progress to this end. We believe that the NPT remains a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the framework for nuclear disarmament. It retains our wholehearted and unequivocal support. In the absence of further measures being agreed in 2005, the UK continues to implement the decisions taken in previous review cycles. We abided by the undertakings we have given to non-proliferation, to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to those on disarmament. The United States has made clear its commitment to nuclear disarmament and to the goal of general and complete disarmament since long before the adoption of the NPT. Indeed, the substantial progress of the United States towards the goals of article VI and the preamble, particularly in recent years, gives it an unsurpassed record in this regard. The United States is justifiably proud of its disarmament related record, and looks forward to discussing and explaining this record during the current NPT review cycle. The United States welcomes discussion of the subject of disarmament. Open and honest discussion of this subject is particularly important today, in light of the degree to which the United States record on enduring commitment to the goals expressed in article VI and the preamble of the NPT seems to be so poorly understood by many, and particularly because some have sought to make the ill-founded argument that an alleged lack of progress on nuclear disarmament excuses violations of the non-proliferation obligations of the NPT. Transparency and Accountability 59

61 Strategic Doctrine 2002 Strategic Doctrine Strategic Doctrine China France Russia UK US No-first-use commitment, arsenal kept at minimum level for self-defence Bases its policy of nuclear deterrence on the principle of strict sufficiency The logic of strict sufficiency has consistently dictated the format of its deterrent force, a key pillar of France s security. [P]repared to further reduce her nuclear arms down to minimum levels corresponding to requirements of strategic stability The UK has led the way in taking measures to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons to the minimum level necessary consistent with national security. New concept of deterrence not based on nuclear retaliation. The new US defense strategy increases the role of advanced conventional forces, missile defences, intelligence capabilities and the defense infrastructure. Adopting this new approach requires no changes in current policy, doctrine and strategy. Reiteration of no-first- use policy. [N]uclear disarmament presupposes a context of undiminished international stability and security for all. [T]he proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles is a factor which may hold back disarmament. Principle of strict sufficiency determines format of French nuclear arsenal [I]t is impossible to resolve problems of disarmament and strengthening non-proliferation regimes by military means. Nuclear weapons will be retained until it is safe to make reductions without endangering our security interests. Reported on the Nuclear Posture Review, called it less reliant on deterrence: [T]his New Triad will reduce our dependence on nuclear weapons for deterrence through modernization of conventional forces, the addition of missile defenses, and other measures.the result is an increase in the threshold for nuclear use. 60 Transparency and Accountability

62 Strategic Doctrine 2004 China France Russia UK US China has pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances. Calls upon all nuclearweapon states to renounce the policy of nuclear deterrence Provides history of China s pursuit of a no-first-use agreement among NWS China s development of a limited nuclear force is purely for the purpose of self-defence. France has consistently defined the format of its nuclear arsenal at a level of strict sufficiency. [R]eductions have been possible because of the changed post- Cold War strategic climate Willing to reduce strategic weapons below SORT provisions in accordance with the idea of minimum sufficiency [T]he UK remains committed to working towards a safer world in which there is no requirement for nuclear weapons. The UK s nuclear policy remains minimum deterrence and has not changed. The only role for nuclear weapons in nuclear defence policy is political. Their purpose is to deter aggression, rather than to be used on the battlefield to gain military advantage. Nuclear weapons would only be used in extreme circumstances of sell defence and in accordance with international law. The United States has a new strategic deterrence concept, the New Triad : nuclear and non-nuclear offensive strike systems; active and passive defenses; a revitalized defense infrastructure that will provide new capabilities to meet emerging threats. The addition of defenses and nonnuclear strike forces means that the United States will be less dependent than before on nuclear weapons to provide deterrence. When developed, the advent of the New Triad will mean that nuclear weapons will play a smaller role in US security than at any other time in the nuclear age. US has had low-yield nuclear weapons in stockpile for decades, so a new low-yield weapon would not lower nuclear threshold Transparency and Accountability 61

63 Strategic Doctrine 2005 China France Russia UK US China will not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. China has been promoting the NWS to conclude a multilateral treaty on nofirst-use of nuclear weapons against each other. No efforts should be made to develop and deploy missile defence systems detrimental to the global strategic balance and stability, and no weapon systems should be deployed to outer space. As a NWS, France considers that the purpose of its deterrent forces is to guarantee that its vital interests will never be threatened by any other power. As such, the French deterrent is not directed against any particular country. French nuclear weapons form no part of any strategy based on the military use of such weapons and have never been considered by France to be war-fighting assets. The format of France s deterrent forces, the essential foundation of its security, is and always has been based on the principle of strict sufficiency. France has sought to maintain its nuclear arsenal at the lowest level required to ensure its own security, in the light of the strategic context. Russia has repeatedly stated that it would not be the first to deploy weapons of any kind in outer space. The 1998 Strategic Defence review and the 2003 White Paper affirmed that the UK remains committed to working towards a safer world in which there are no nuclear weapons. We believe that strengthening the international non-proliferation regime is an important element of our work towards this goal. However, the White Paper stated that the continuing risk from the proliferation of nuclear weapons due to nuclear proliferation meant that Trident was likely to remain a necessary element of our security. Decisions on whether to replace Trident are not needed in this UK Parliament but are likely to be required in the next one. We will therefore continue to take appropriate steps to ensure that the range of options for maintaining a minimum nuclear deterrent capability is kept open until that decision point. We have also reduced the role of nuclear weapons in our deterrence strategy and are cutting our nuclear stockpile almost in half, to the lowest level in decades. The end of the Cold War has provided the opportunity for the United States to move beyond old strategic doctrines that relied so heavily on nuclear weapons. [N]uclear deterrence remains a necessary fact of life. The NPR foresees the potential for a further reduced role for nuclear weapons. The US continues to make progress in creating a responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure as part of the new triad called for in the NPR. Responsive nuclear infrastructure refers to the ability of the US to respond to unanticipated events or emerging threats, anticipate innovations by an adversary, and counter them before the US deterrent is degraded. By ensuring that a responsive nuclear infrastructure is in place, the US can reduce the number of deployed nuclear warheads, and can further reduce non-strategic warheads. 62 Transparency and Accountability

64 Strategic Doctrine 2007 China France Russia UK US China unconditionally undertakes not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and in any circumstances, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear-weapons-freezones. China will always be a firm supporter and active promoter to the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons. Our doctrine has been adapted taking account of the new threats and our international commitments: faced with a major power, to be able to inflict damage of any kind, and, faced with a regional power, to exercise our response on its centres of power and capacity to act so that the risk of unacceptable damage deters any potential aggressor. We strongly believe that no State, whatever powerful and influential it is, can solve the task of preserving and strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime, moreover, by relying on force. The negative developments can only be prevented by joint efforts using political and diplomatic means and proven mechanisms of the United Nations, first and foremost, its Security Council. We have withdrawn and dismantled our tactical maritime and airborne capabilities. We have terminated the nuclear Lance missile and artillery roles that we undertook with US nuclear weapons held under dual-key arrangements. As a consequence we have reduced our reliance on nuclear weapons to one system, submarine-based Trident. We are the only nuclear weapon State to have done this. We have also significantly reduced the operational status of our nuclear weapons system our Trident submarines are normally at several days notice to fire. Their missiles are not targeted at any country. The United States is also moving to reduce its reliance upon nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. As announced in the Posture review of 2001, the United States is moving away from the cold war nuclear Triad as the cornerstone of its strategic posture. Pursuant to this plan, strategic deterrence no longer relies exclusively upon nuclear weapons. Instead, to maintain and enhance deterrence, the United States relies upon a combination of nuclear and non-nuclear offensive striking capabilities (including ballistic missile defenses), and a robust and responsive defense industrial structure. Transparency and Accountability 63

65 Security Assurances 2002 Security Assurances Security Assurances China France Russia UK US [U]ndertaken unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States or NWFZ [U]ndertaken not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear-weapons states or nuclear-weapon-free-zones at any time and in any situation Commitments made in declaration of 6 April 1995 remain valid; endorsed NWFZ Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, and Pelindaba France has given negative security assurances in conventional form to over one hundred countries [and] to all States Party to the NPT. France has made absolutely no change to its policy in this area. The assurances given in 1995 are fixed in the military doctrine of the Russian Federation Support also expressed for NWFZs Russia still attaches an exclusive importance to an unconditional implementation of negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapons states that nuclear weapon states provided in This provision is fixed in the military doctrine of the Russian Federation. Commitments made in April 1995 remain valid, policy has not changed; agreements with NWFZ provide additional security assurances There has been no change in US negative security assurances policy toward NPT non-nuclear-weapon states. No reference There has been no change in US negative security assurance policy. In addition, the US does not target any country on a day-to-day basis. Reiterates commitment to NWFZ and willingness to sign relevant protocols Qualified that States in breach of their commitments on nonproliferation cannot invoke the benefit of those safeguards 64 Transparency and Accountability

66 Security Assurances 2004 China France Russia UK US China has undertaken unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear-weapon states and nuclear-weapon-free zones. In 1995 China issued a statement reaffirming its unconditional negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon states and its commitment to offering positive security assurances. China has signed and ratified the relevant protocols to nuclearweapon-free zone treaties that have been open to signature and assumed the relevant obligations. A special statement and working paper on security assurances were submitted. It is legitimate and reasonable for non-nuclearweapon states to claim assurances that they be free from threat of nuclear weapons while giving up the nuclear weapon option, and that such assurances be affirmed in a legallybinding form ratification of the Protocols of the Treaties of Rarotonga and Pelindaba NWFZs are an effective instrument and France is party to the protocols of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, and Pelindaba, and is awaiting progress in SE Asia NWFZ, and supports plan for Central Asia NWFZ. Through the protocols France has given negative security assurances to more than one hundred countries in a conventional form. It has also given negative security assurances to all of the States parties to the NPT, through a unilateral declaration on April 6, 1995, as noted by the Security Council in its Resolution 984. This commitment is consistent with the natural right of legitimate self-defense, [and] states that violate their nonproliferation commitments cannot claim protection under these assurances. Supports NWFZs and looking for progress in all of them Supports NSAs. Russia has already provided such assurances to more than 100 states that joined the relevant nuclear-weapon-free zone agreements. We are also in favour of developing a global negative security assurances agreement provided it contains reservations concerning cases in which nuclear weapons may be used. It is time to restore the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances within the CD framework with a negotiating mandate. The UK continues to support the principle of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones. Reference to support for Central and SE Asian zones, as well as ME zone. Our position on NSAs has not changed. We remain committed to our negative security assurances as we gave it in 1995, as noted in UN SC Res Also gave NSAs through NWFZs and since 2000 has ratified protocols to Rarotonga and Pelindaba zones. We believe that these commitments already give Non- Nuclear Weapons States the assurances they seek. We affirm that there has been no change in the US policy toward negative security assurances (NSA) and positive security assurances (PSA). The substantial initiatives of the P-5 in 1995 led to national declarations and the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 984. These actions reflect a strong response to the concerns of NPT non-nuclear-weapon states. Of course, these assurances are applicable only to NPT non-nuclearweapon states in compliance with the Treaty. Given the changes in the global security situation, and the threats from N. Korea and NPT violations by Iran, In this security environment, it is apparent that NSAs by the NPT nuclear weapon states are of diminishing importance as a possible remedy to the security concerns of NPT non-nuclear-weapon states. Transparency and Accountability 65

67 Security Assurances 2005 China France Russia UK US China has pledged unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones. China is the only state among the five nuclearweapon states that has done so. China supports the re-establishment of an ad-hoc committee on NSA at the CD and the immediate commencement of substantive work and negotiation. Among NWS, France is party to the greatest number of protocols to treaties establishing nuclear weapon free zones. France is party to the protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Treaty of Rarotonga and the Treaty of Pelindaba. As of 2005, the Treaty of Bangkok remains the subject of consultations between NWS and members of ASEAN, as is the draft treaty to establish a NWFZ in Central Asia. France, like other NWS, has committed itself to refrain from deploying explosive nuclear devices in these treaties areas of application, from conducting nuclear tests there or from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against States Parties to such treaties or against those territories in the zone belonging to the States Parties to the relevant protocol. In June 1982, for the first time, France gave negative security assurances to all NNWS in a statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the United Nations General Assembly. On 6 April 1995, France reaffirmed and clarified these negative assurances and, for the first time, gave positive security assurances to all NNWS parties to the NPT. The Russian Federation will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the Russian Federation, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or on a State towards which it has security commitments, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in association or alliance with a nuclear weapon State. Russia has consistently supported non-nuclear weapon States seeking to obtain legally binding guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We confirm our commitments arising from the UN Security Council resolution 984 (1995). Russia has provided the legally binding security assurances to all states, which acceded to the respective NWFZ agreement. We intend to follow the same pattern as new nuclear weapon-free zones are established. We do not object to the establishment at the CD in Geneva of an Ad Hoc Committee with the mandate to negotiate the agenda item titled Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, provided that the position stated in the military doctrine of Russia in relation to cases when such weapons may be used will be taken into account. We remain fully committed to the negative security assurances we have given to non-nuclear weapon States in our letter to the Secretary- General in 1995, subsequently noted in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 984. We recognise the great importance of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones as regional initiatives that can build stability and support wider international objectives of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As a NWS we have ratified the relevant Protocols to the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, and Pelindaba. Many states are currently benefiting from the additional security assurances offered by these Protocols. No reference. 66 Transparency and Accountability

68 Security Assurances 2007 Fissile Material Control 2002 China France Russia UK US China unconditionally undertakes not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and in any circumstances, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear-weapons-freezones. No reference. We raise no objection to working out a global agreement on providing non-nuclear weapon States with security assurances that would exclude use or threat of use of nuclear weapons taking into account cases stipulated in defence doctrines of the nuclear weapon States when such a weapon could be used. Russia is ready to embark on such work. Establishing NWFZ is an effective measure of strengthening nuclear non-proliferation regime and enhancing regional and international security. Russian initiative proposing to concentrate nuclear weapons within the national territories of the nuclear weapon States remains highly relevant. Its implementation would result in maximal expansion of geographical scope of areas completely free of nuclear weapons. The United Kingdom reaffirms its support for Nuclear Weapon Free Zones. These zones promote non-proliferation and reinforce regional stability. The UK has now signed and ratified protocols in respect of 3 Nuclear Weapon Free Zones and has as a consequence, agreed treaty-based negative security assurances to over 100 countries. In addition to security assurances made in connection with Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, we remain committed to the security assurances we gave to nuclear weapons states in 1995, as noted in UNSCR 984. No reference 8. Fissile Material Control China France Russia UK US [A]ctively participated in amending the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Stated support for negotiation of FMCT in CD according to the Shannon Mandate No reference to stockpiled material Stated commitment to immediately resume negotiations of FMCT in CD; is continuing the dismantling of its facilities for producing fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons Supports beginning of negotiations on the FMCT; production of uranium for nuclear weapons discontinued; cooperative program with US to stop industrial uranium-graphite reactors that produce weapons-grade Plutonium; 2000 agreement to dispose of 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium; MOX research and joint project to use uraniumplutonium fuel in CANDU reactors In 1995 production of fissile material for nuclear weapons ceased: We call upon those who have not yet done so to follow our example. Endorsed CD negotiations on FMCT, according to Shannon Mandate: should not be held hostage to other issues Bush Administration reaffirmed US efforts to dispose of fissile material; US-Russia agreements total more than 700 tons (most subject to transparency measures); converting plutonium into reactor fuel; support for program to convert 500 tons of Russian weapons-grade uranium for sale to US utilities; expanding programs to secure Russian stockpile; supports negotiation of FMCT Transparency and Accountability 67

69 Fissile Material Control 2003 Fissile Material Control 2004 China France Russia UK US Stated its commitment to negotiations in the CD of the FMCT; described its nuclear materials security system to protect nuclear materials Stated support for negotiations of FMCT at the CD on basis of the Shannon Mandate; has completely ceased production of fissile materials at Pierrelatte and Marcoule and dismantling of facilities underway. Commitment to safeguards, export controls, and the IAEA s efforts to curb illicit trafficking; little detail about specific initiatives to control stockpiled material Commitment to transparency regarding stockpiled material; IAEA safeguards applied; Additional Protocol pending entry into force with other EU states; begun national historical accounting study for fissile material produced for defence purposes; commitment to FMCT negotiations in CD Extensive detail about cooperation with Russia to reduce proliferation risk of stockpiled fissile material by destroying 700 tons, and converting Russian HEU into non-weaponsgrade reactor fuel (30-33 tons to be converted by 2007); 1996 Trilateral Initiative in force; IAEA verification of reductions, including safeguards China supports the conclusion of a multilateral, non-discriminatory and verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices (FMCT). Provides history of Chinese support of Shannon Report, Five Ambassadors Proposal, and GA resolutions. [A]s early as 1996 [France] announced the cessation of production of weapons fissile materials and shut down the corresponding fissile materials production plants at Pierrelatte and Marcoule, which are now being dismantled cessation of production of plutonium for nuclear weapons 1996 cessation of production of highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons France came out in favour of the launch of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty at the Conference on Disarmament. At the earliest possible beginning, within the framework of the CD, negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effective internationally verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives. Together with the United States we are working toward shutting down the Russian industrial uranium-graphite reactors for the weapongrade plutonium production. The material produced by those facilities is not used for military purposes. The production of uranium in Russia for manufacturing nuclear weapons was terminated long ago. We attach great importance to the earliest start of disposition by Russia and the United States of 34 tons of weapon-grade plutonium for each side that is no longer required for defensive purposes. This would ensure the start of the process of the irreversible transformation of excessive amounts of weapon-grade plutonium into forms unusable for manufacturing nuclear weapons. In 1995 [UK] announced that we had stopped the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devises. In 1998 we were the first NWS to declare the total size of these stocks. We then voluntarily placed all our fissile material no longer required for defence purposes under international safeguards where they are liable to inspection by the IAEA. Plutonium historical accounting record Support FMCT and call upon others to join us in a moratorium on production We believe that global nuclear disarmament is a process, and that an FMCT is the next step in that process. All US plutonium production reactors at Hanford and Savannah River have been shut down. The Oak Ridge K-25 plan was completely shut down in The United States ceased HEU production for any purposes at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in The US has not produced highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons since The US halted the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons in The US has removed 174 tons of highly enriched uranium from its military stockpile, placed some of this material under IAEA safeguards, and converted significant quantities of this material to civil reactor fuel. The Administration has sought funds in its FY2005 budget to begin construction of US facilities for disposing of plutonium so that it is no longer usable for nuclear weapons. Verification of nuclear warheads work. In 1997 US and Russia reached a bilateral agreement to permanently shut down reactors producing plutonium for military purposes. 68 Transparency and Accountability

70 Fissile Material Control 2005 China France Russia UK US The negotiations on FMCT should be commenced as early as possible. China supports the early negotiation of a FMCT. In 1993, China supported the UNGA resolution on concluding a nondiscriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Since then, China has voted in favour of the resolution on FMCT at each session of the UNGA. In August of 2003, in order to facilitate the early negotiation of the FMCT China took a flexible position and was ready to join the consensus on the five ambassadors proposal on the CD working program. France favours the resumption of work relating to the negotiation of a FMCT. While awaiting the entry into force of such a Treaty, France calls for strict compliance with a moratorium on production. In 1996, France became the first state to decide on, and begin, the process of dismantling its facilities for the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons at Pierrelatte and Marcoule. Russia reaffirms its commitment to dispose 34 tones of weapon-grade plutonium in accordance with the bilateral Agreement with the United States of September 1, Russia has taken steps to begin implementation of the programme of plutonium disposition. Sufficient multilateral funding of the Russian programme remains an important prerequisite for the beginning of deposition. Russia carries out an irreversible and large-scale conversion of highly enriched uranium, left after the nuclear arms reduction, into reactor fuel low enriched uranium, that is in non-weapon form. Since 1995 we have converted 230 tons of highly enriched uranium into fuel fit for nuclear power stations. The UK made clear in 1995 that it had ceased the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. All our fissile material no longer required for defence purposes is now under international safeguards. We have long supported a FMCT to halt the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and would like to see the immediate commencement of negotiations at the CD in Geneva. [W]e have called upon the Conference on Disarmament to initiate negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). We believe that an FMCT would help to promote nuclear non-proliferation by establishing the universal norm that no state should produce fissile material for weapons. For its part, the United States ceased production of fissile material for weapons purposes nearly two decades ago. Today we reiterate the call we issued last year at the CD for all nations committed to the FMCT to join us in declaring a moratorium on fissile material production for weapons purposes until a binding FMCT has been concluded and entered into force. Transparency and Accountability 69

71 Fissile Material Control 2007 China France Russia UK US China attaches great importance to the recent proposals submitted by parties concerned regarding the program of work of the CD. It is our hope that all parties can reach consensus on it on the basis of board consultation, so as to break the deadlock, create conditions for the commencement of negotiations as well as substantive work on the FMCT. We are ready to initiate, without preconditions, negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclearweapons at the Disarmament Conference. Announced, as long ago as 1996, a definitive halt to the production of fissile weapons material and closed down the relevant facilities for the production of fissile materials in Pierrelatte and Marcoule. France was the first State to take and implement a decision to dismantle its facilities for the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. It is high time for the CD in Geneva to start negotiations on elaboration of the FMCT. We reaffirm our support for this idea. The sooner the deadlock situation at the CD is broken and the programme of work is agreed, the earlier it could undertake negotiating the FMCT. The United Kingdom remains committed to abide by its moratorium on nuclear testing, and its moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. The United Kingdom continues to work towards the entry into force of the CTBT as soon as possible. We hope too that the recent positive indicators that a 10 year long blockage at the Conference on Disarmament may be broken herald a new phase of consensus building in that forum. In the first instance we would like to see the early negotiation, of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty an issue that would represent an important and concrete step towards disarmament and one that is ripe and ready to be taken forward. We urge a spirit of compromise to be displayed by Member States in the CD to allow this work to commence. The United States is a staunch advocate of a treaty to ban any further production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive purposes. Indeed, in May 2006, the United States became the first (and so far, the only) nation to introduce a draft fissile material cut-off treaty at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. 70 Transparency and Accountability

72 PROJECT PLOUGHSHARES 57 Erb Street West Waterloo, Ontario N2L 6C2 Canada Fax