Index page... page 1. January... page 2. February... page 8. March... page 20. April... page 34. May... page 40. June... page 43. July...

Transcription

1 Researched and written by: MGySgt Jim Keely, USMC (Ret) The following was extracted from Battalion Command Chronologies along with personal observations. Index Index page... page 1 January... page 2 February... page 8 March... page 20 April... page 34 May... page 40 June... page 43 July... page 50 August... page 56 September... page 61 October... page 64 November... page 67 December... page 70 Page: 1 of 72

2 January 1968 On January 1, 1968 Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 3/1 was ashore for Operation Badger Tooth in the Hai Lang District, Quang Tri Province and in Huong Dien District, Thua Thien Provience. On January 2 nd at 0600H the BLT was afloat aboard Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) 76.5 shipping off the coast of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) awaiting further combat operations. On January 8 th an individual training schedule was issued to all units, which remained in effect until January 24 th. On January 11 th the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General L. F. CHAPMAN, visited the USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8); while aboard he awarded several medals to Marines for acts of bravery performed in previous operations. From January 13 th through 15 th 169 Marines from the BLT went to Danang to fire their M-16A1 s to obtain battle sights. The BLT remained aboard the ARG waiting further operations until January 23 rd at 1925H, at which time it went ashore commencing Operation BADGER CATCH in Quang Tri Province, RVN which lasted until January 26 th at 1400H. The BLT remained under the operational control (OPCON) of SLF, 9 th Marine Amphibious Brigade until January 26 th at 1400H when it was placed OPCON to the 1 st Amphibious Tractor Battalion, Third Marine Division (Rein) and began Operation SALINE. This operation is still in progress. Therefore many details of the details, which would normally be included in this Command Chronology, are not available at this time and will be included in the Command Chronology for February The BLT submitted recommendations for five Bronze Stars in January. During the Commandant of the Marine Corps visit to the USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8) on January 11, 1968, General L. F. CHAPMAN presented two Bronze Stars. Lieutenant General Cushman and Brigadier General Glick presented eighteen Purple Heart Medals to wounded personnel in sickbay aboard the USS VALLEY FORGE (LHP-8). There were five meritorious promotions to the grade of Corporal during this period. There were five meritorious combat promotions to the grade of Sergeant, Corporal and Lance Corporal. There were no regular quotas available. One Marine officer and eighty-nine Marine enlisted were transferred to other units or rotated to the Continental United States (CONUS). Seven Marine officers and seventy-two Marine enlisted reported to the BLT. No rest and relaxation (R&R) quotas were made available to the BLT. Combat After Action Report Operation BADGER TOOTH: Operation BADGER TOOTH took place during December 26, 1967 at 1100H to January 2, 1968 at 1100H. It took place in the Hai Lang District, Quang Tri Province and in the Huong Dien District, Thua Thien Province. Supporting Forces: A. As planned, the operation called for the BLT to be landed in landing zone (LZ) Finch and to advance in a southwesterly direction, crossing the Song O Lau River to objectives 1 3. As objectives 2 and 3 are 12,000 and 14,000 meters inland respectively and the anticipated route of advance was not trafficable to vehicles, it was decided to position Battery C, 1 st Battalion, 11 th Marines within range of all three objectives. Battery W, 2 nd Battalion, 11 th Marines was to be left aboard the USS VALLEY FORGE (LHH-8) in an on call status. Any required artillery support outside the range of Battery C was to be provided by a platoon on Army Republic of Vietnam Page: 2 of 72

3 (ARVN) 155mm Howitzers at Hai Lang. As the Song O Lau River was not crossed and operations were concentrated in the costal area, Battery C was not used in the operation; Battery W was landed the afternoon of D+1. Battery W and the ARVN 155mm Howitzer platoon provided required artillery support. B. Artillery: Fire support during the operation consisted of fourteen observed fire missions, nine of which were fired by Battery W and five by the ARVN 155mm Howitzer platoon. Fourteen harassment and interdiction (H&I) fires were fired by Battery W for a total round expenditure of 310 rounds. The effectiveness of the ARVN artillery was hampered because the missions were fired at extreme range and the volume of fire was inadequate because only one or two guns were available for support of the Battalion. C. Air Support: On D-Day no fixed wing support was requested for LZ preparation since the rules of engagement for the area prohibit its use. However it was on call for H and L-Hour. One flight of A-4 s was used for close air support (CAS) dropping twelve 500 lb bombs and several rounds of 20mm fire. On December 27 th three flights of A-4 s flew CAS missions in support of Company L between 1215H and 1406H dropping eight 500 lb bombs, eight 500 lb napalm bombs, 580 rounds of 20mm cannon fire and two four shot packs of 5 inch Zuni rockets. On December 28 th four flights of A-4 s and two flights of F-4 s flew CAS missions in support of the battalion between 0720H and 1015H dropping four 1,000 lb bombs, four 500 lb bombs, sixty 250 lb bombs, twenty-eight 500 lb napalm bombs and over 1,000 rounds of 20mm cannon fire. Due to weather restrictions no other fixed wing support was used in the operation. As many as eight UH-1E s were available and cover the slower and more vulnerable CH-46 s. However, no more than four UN-1E s were used at any one time. These UH-1E s were also used on several ground targets and knocked out at least one automatic weapon position with their M-60 s and 2.75-inch rockets. Helicopter Marine Medium (HMM) 262 provided CH-46 s for troop movement; medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and resupply missions and many of their missions were flown in marginal weather conditions. The 1 st Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) provided three C-117 s and one C-130 for flare drops on the evening of December 26 th and 27 th dropping over 380 flares. D. Naval Gunfire: Throughout Operation BADGER TOOTH naval gunfire support was provided by the USS O BANNON DD-450 firing in direct support of BLT 3/1. Initially USS O BANNON fired H&I s on the night of December 26 th expending fifty-nine rounds of 5-inch ammunition. The following day the USS O BANNON fired in support of Company L during the early stages of their action. At 1030H on the December 27 th the USS O BANNON fired on a target expending nine rounds of 5 inch and again at 1130H in support of Company L firing eighty-four rounds of 5 inch against enemy automatic weapons position. On the evening of December 27 th H&I s were fired along with an extensive mission against enemy positions expending 308 rounds of 5-inch ammunition. When flare ship illumination was exhausted the USS O BANNON provided thirty-nine rounds of illumination in the same target area. On December 28 th at 1100H the USS O BANNON fired fifty rounds of 5 inch in preparatory fire as Companies I and K moved into the same areas. In total the USS O BANNON fire 712 rounds of various types during Operation BADGER TOOTH. Enemy forces: A. The costal plains in and adjacent to the amphibious objective area (AOA) was the normal operating area of elements of the 800 th Main Force (MF) Battalion, 802 nd North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Battalion, 416 th NVA Battalion and the C.113 Local Force (LF) Company. The total strength of these units was estimated at 1,700 personnel. Page: 3 of 72

4 B. The enemy utilized a number of routes for the movement of rice from the rice growing area within the AOA. The area was heavily populated, with the majority of the population believed to be sympathetic to the enemy cause, either from political belief or fear of enemy terrorist activities. Prior to the operation, the enemy had harassed friendly lines of communications within the area, while strengthening his capability to move rice supplies. C. Enemy capabilities prior to the operation consisted of attacking friendly forces with up to one reinforced battalion while employing all organic weapons; defend at a time and place of his choosing up to one reinforced battalion; to evade major contact with friendly forces while conducting delaying actions utilizing small units, surprise firing devices or booby traps. D. The major enemy unit contacted during the operation was a force estimated at one NVA Battalion. Other contacts consisted of isolated incidents involving enemy units less that squad size, indicating the enemy had dispersed his major forces in the area in an effort to avoid contact with superior friendly forces. E. The enemy conducted a sustained defense of the village of Thon Tham Hhe, employing a defensive force estimated at one NVA Battalion armed with small arms, automatic weapons and mortars. The defensive was conducted from wellcamouflaged, fortified bunkers utilizing terrain features to good advantage in the selection and placement of fields of fire. Elsewhere in the AOA, the enemy conducted a more passive defense friendly actions consisting of sniper fire; surprise firing devices and bobby traps. Mission: The mission was to conduct an amphibious operation in the Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces to destroy/capture enemy forces and logistics caches, disrupt enemy routes of communication and supply, obtain intelligence and to prepare to conduct other operations as directed. Concept of Operations: The concept of operations was for BLT 31 to conduct a helicopter borne and waterborne assault landing one company by amphibious tractors to secure the landing zone and landing the remainder of the BLT by helicopter. The operation was to be conducted in four phases (1) Rapid buildup of the landing force ashore (2) Seach and destroy operations, conducting river crossing and securing of objective 1 (3) Be prepared to conduct other operations as directed (4) On order conduct an amphibious withdrawal. Due to unexpected enemy contact in the early part of the operation, phase 2 was not completed and phase 3 was omitted. Friendly losses were forty-eight killed in action and eighty-eight wounded in action. Enemy losses were: NVA/VC KIA (Confirmed) 31 NVA/VC KIA (Probable) 2 Detainees 13 Weapons captured 3 Ammunition Captured/Destroyed 10 Grenades 1,000 rounds of small arms ammunition 8 B-40 rockets 6 82mm fuzes Uniforms & Individual Equipment Fortifications Destroyed 50 Items 60 Bunkers 220 Fighting Holes 60 Shelter Type Bunkers Page: 4 of 72

5 Medical: A. First echelon medical care was provided in the field by corpsmen attached to each rifle company and supporting units. This consisted of treatment of minor ailments, first aid and initial evaluation of wounds, and the evaluation of casualties for evacuation by helicopter to the USS VALLEY FORGE LPH-8 for definitive treatment. B. Second echelon (Collecting and Clearing Platoon) and third echelon (Surgical Team) care was combined with the assistance of the battalion aid station (BAS) medical officers and corpsmen aboard the USS VALLEY FORGE LPH-8. Immediate treatment was provided for al casualties except those requiring the specialized skills of neurosurgey; eyes, nose and throat; ophthalmology and laboratory, X-ray facilities, a blood bank, two surgical suites and a holding capacity for 100 beds enabled the USS VALLEY FORGE LHP-8 to function as an independent hospital facility. C. On December 28 th at 1600H, it became necessary t suspend the receiving and treating of causalities because of the burden imposed on the medical team and facilities by a large of causalities received within the previous hours. Further casualties were re-routed to the USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2), which remained in the immediate vicinity. By 8:00 AM on December 29 th, the USS VALLEY FORGE LPH-8 resumed its function to receiving and treating casualties. D. The predominant wounds treated were thon inflicted by high velocity missiles. Command Analysis: A. Operation BADGER TOOTH called for a landing by air and waterborne means into an area adjacent to the Song O Lau River with a rapid river crossing and seizure of Special Landing Force (SLF) Objective 1. The river crossing was to be made by river craft or amphibious tractors. Once the river crossing was made and objective 1 secured, the BLT was to chop operational control (OPCON) to the 4 th Marines and continue search and destroy (S&D) operations to the southwest until Highway 1 was reached. Terrain analysis, and the assigned objectives dictated the types of combat support that would be used. The coastal plain were the initial waterborne landing and heliborne landing took place had good trafficability for all types of combat equipment. The coastal plain extends inland about 5,000 meters. The terrain across the Song O Lau River southwest to Highway 1 was completely inundated and trafficable only by foot or by use of riverine craft. Assigned objectives required crossing the Song O Lau River and traversing the inundated terrain discussed above. Objective 1 was located 4,000 meters from the landing zone (LZ) and approximately 2,500 meters from the planned river-crossing site. Objectives 2 and 3 were 3,500 and 5,000 meters from objective 1. Due to the terrain and the location of the assigned objectives and the plan for rapidly crossing the river, the decision was made to preposition the 105mm Howitzer Battery to support the attack on objective 1 and the 107mm Howtar Battery, the Tank Platoon, and the Ontos aboard ARG shipping on call. Tanks, Ontos, and Howtars could not ford the river and had the original concept been followed, they would have been ineffective in supporting the landing force. In addition, it was considered that there would be adequate fire support available from the air and naval gunfire for the initial phase of the amphibious operation. The concept for BADGER TOOTH was modified on D-Day to the extent that the landing force would conduct S&D operations in two villages, Thom Tham Khe and Thon Trung An located on the coast and then would continue with the river crossing and planned operations. This modification was the result of information provided to the SLF by a U. S. Army Liaison Officer working with Army Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces that possibly the ARVN had chased some enemy forces into those villages. Subsequently late in the afternoon of D-Day, Company L was assigned to the mission of sweeping the two villages. To carry out the mission, Page: 5 of 72

6 Company L was transported to the south end of Thon Tham Khe by amphibious tractors and commenced to move through the villages at 1735H. Company M was moved by amphibious tractors to support Company L. By 1900H Company L had swept both villages reporting no evidence of organized enemy units. As Company L swept through the villages very rapidly, it was decided to conduct a detailed search operation the next day. Company L was assigned Thon Tham Khe and Company M Thon Trung An. Company L became disoriented and their pre-dawn move and began searching Thon Trung An. When the mistake was realized Company L moved toward Thon Tham Khe from the northwest. As they entered the hamlet, they were taken under intense automatic weapons and mortar fire and sustained heavy casualties. Despite the use of close air support (CAS) and several attempts to assault the enemy position, Company L was unable to advance or pull back the remainder of the day. In an attempt to relieve Company L and successfully attack the village, Company M was ordered to move up on Company L s left flank. Company K was positioned at the south end of the village with a light section of tanks in direct support. Company M went through the attack and was taken under heavy fire at close range and was pinned down. When Company M was unable to advance, Company K was ordered to attack from the south. The use of supporting fires was hindered because of the proximity of friendly units and the closeness of contact with the enemy. After Company L s Commanding Officer was killed, communications with Company L were non-existent for a considerable period of time and when communications was regained, it was sporadic. Added to this was the inability of Company L to accurately find their position or to call fire missions giving correct coordinates. There were two alternatives the late afternoon of the attack. First, all available fire power could have been called on the objective and the remaining company, India, could have been committed against the eastern and western side of the village in an attempt to secure the objective. Second, we could have commenced extracting wounded and attempt to tie in a complete cordon around the village and seal the enemy from escape from the village, and at first light, following a thorough preparation from all available supporting arms, resume the attack. The confused situation of Company L, the close proximity of Companies, L, M and K to the enemy and oncoming darkness weighted against the first alternative and I decided on the second alternative and ordered all companies to commence extracting their dead and wounded and for Company I to a position on the south side of the village, and Company K on the west. This was done with ease. Company K was directed to swing around and tie in on the northwestern side of the village with Company L. The inability of Company L to rapidly extract their dead and wounded delayed completing the cordon for several hours and the western side of the perimeter remained open. It is my opinion that the bulk of the enemy made good their escape early in the evening in the gap between Company L and Company K. B. Intelligence. The fact that the enemy completely fortified a village with well constructed mutually supporting bunkers set up in an all around defense in depth in our tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) indicates the need for more extensive reconnaissance activities of greater frequency. C. Fire Support available to the BLT on Operation BADGER TOOTH was that available during the initial phases of any amphibious operation, that is air, naval gunfire and 81mm mortars. However, maximum utilization of supporting arms became impossible because Company L and ultimately Company M and Company K were in such close contact with the enemy and each other that to use air or naval gunfire would have jeopardized the lives of the Marines and Sailors of those companies. D. Of the five tanks in the BLT, only two saw action. One is undergoing repair at Page: 6 of 72

7 Danang, one was not brought ashore and one was submerged on landing. The remaining two received some water damage on the landing and had no communication. These two operable tanks were extremely valuable even though lacking communication. Had the four tanks that landed were in operational condition, their impact on the battle would have been significant. E. HMM-262 helicopter support was outstanding. There were no delays in MEDEVAC and resupply flights in spite of intense fire and marginal weather. F. Naval gunfire provided by the USS O BANNON during the entire operation was excellent. All fires were extremely accurate and responsive to the needs of the BLT. Lessons learned: A. The landing of an amphibious force to conduct non-amphibious operations is a faulty and wasteful concept. As no significant contact was expected prior to conducting search and destroy operations in an inland area, the landing was designed to facilitate inland operations. Tanks, Ontos and the 107mm Mortar Battery were not initially landed as the area of principal concern was not suitable for their use. Battery C was prepositioned inland, out of range of the beach area and the logistical support activity (LSA) was planned for an inland area. When heavy contact was made in the beach area, valuable time was wasted landing Tanks and the Mortar Battery. Critically needed 81mm mortar ammunition was late in arriving because of difficulties encountered at the forward LSA. If the mission is not an amphibious mission, it should not be assigned to an amphibious force. B. Every defendable position must be assumed to be defended in strength by the enemy. The VC/NVA has the remarkable ability to conceal his presence in an area when it is to his advantage to do so. Company L swept through Thon Tham Khe hamlet at 1730H on December 26 th seeing no evidence of enemy activity. Eighteen hours later a large force from pre-constructed positions defended the same area. Extreme care must be exercised in approaching defendable areas particularly across open ground. In areas where rules of engagement prohibit preparatory fires and reconnaissance by fire, small reconnaissance units should move well ahead of the main body ensuring the area is clear before the main body is within small arms range. Squads or platoons can be reached to secure approaches to dangerous areas during darkness prior to arrival of the main body after daylight. Under no circumstances should commanders allow themselves to be pinned down on unfavorable terrain. C. The wide spread practice of attaching crew served weapons to rifle platoons is not always advisable. Units of the BLT lost machine guns an rocket launchers early in the battle because they were attached to platoons, which were pinned down under close range of fire. Had these weapons been in general support, they would have been in the rear and could have been positioned to provide effective support. It must be remembered that the M-60 machine gun has a significantly longer range than the M-16 or the medium velocity automatic weapons used by the enemy. They should be employed to utilize this advantage. D. Naval gunfire support ships can be relied on to provide illumination. The number of rounds available in greater that is usually available to artillery units. Personal observations: Kilo Company unit diaries reflected that the company sustained three Marines killed in action, and 16 Marines wounded in action. Headquarters and Service Company unit diaries reflected that Corpsmen sustained three killed in action, one was attached to Kilo Company, and seven wounded in action. Page: 7 of 72

8 February 1968 On February 1, 1968 at 0600H, Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 3/1 was ashore in Quang Tri Province, Republic of Vietnam (RVN), taking part in Operation SALINE. This operation s primary aim was to keep the Cua Viet River open for supplies enroute to Dong Ha Combat Base, and was under the control of the 1 st Amphibious Tractor Battalion, 3 rd Marine Division (Rein). On February 17, 1968 the S-1 Section, the Disbursing Office, the Records Department of the Battalion Aid Station (BAS), the Casualty and Clearing (C&C) Platoon, the S&C files and the Postal Office debarked to Dong Ha Combat Base while the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) 76.5 sailed to Subic Bay, Philippines for repairs. These sections re-embarked on March 5, Operation SALINE remained in effect until February 29, 1968 at 0600H, when the BLT passed under operational control (OPCON) of the 3 rd Marine Regiment, 3 rd Marine Division and began Operation NAPOLEON/SALINE whose objective were the same as those for Operation SALINE. This operation was still in progress as of the end of this reporting period. BLT 3/1 during the period February 1-18, 1968 participated in OPERATION BADGER CATCH. During the period February 18 28, 1968 the BLT participated in Operation SALINE. During the period February 29, 1968 March 3, 1968 the BLT participated in Operation SALINE/NAPOLEON. During the period of January 23, 1968 March 3, 1968 the BLT sustained 75 Marines killed in action, 371 Marines wounded in action, 7 Corpsmen killed in action and 12 Corpsmen wounded in action. During the period of January 23, 1968 March 3, 1968 casualties inflicted on the enemy were North Vietnamese Army (NVA) killed in action (confirmed) 512, NVA prisoners of war (POW) 26 and Viet Cong (VC) suspects detained 23. The Navy Commendation Medals were received from the Commanding General, 9 th Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) to be awarded as soon as conditions permit. The BLT recommended three Silver Star Medals and ten Bronze Star Medals as of this writing and many more will follow as soon as the combat situation permits. Mail delivery has been as good as possible under the combat conditions present. Mail was re-routed twice when the BLT staff sections moved ashore to Dong Ha while the ARG was in the Philippines. Lack of space available for the sorting and storing of mail continues to be a problem. The BLT did not receive its rest and relaxation (R&R) quotas for February until the February 18 th, however it used all possible quotas since none had been available since December 1, The quotas were 7 for Bangkok, 10 for Hawaii, 6 for Hong Kong, 2 for Kuala Lumpur, 5 for Sidney, 5 for Taipei, 3 for Tokyo, and 1 each for Manila, Penang, Singapore and Okinawa. There were 75 regular promotions for Corporal, 64 for Lance Corporal and 15 for Private First Class (PFC) during this period. There was one meritorious promotion to Sergeant, as well as two combat meritorious promotions to both Sergeant and Corporal. There were 16 promotions to First Lieutenant and one to Captain. All men in the field were given an opportunity to send pay to their next of kin by endorsed Page: 8 of 72

9 government checks. In addition, all Marines and Sailors being transferred, going home on emergency leave or filling R&R quotas were paid prior to their departure. Post Exchange facilities were very limited due to combat operations. However, sundry packs were issued to meet most health and comfort needs. During this reporting period battle losses were 5 Marine officers, 165 Marine enlisted and 8 Navy enlisted. Administrative losses were 7 Marine officers, 136 Marine enlisted. Replacements consisted of 11 Marine officers, 272 Marine enlisted and 5 Navy enlisted. During the first two and one-half weeks of February the BAS and the C&C Platoon remained on the USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8) handling casualties resultant from BLT 3/1 s operations ashore. On February 12, 1968 it was decided to setup a BAS ashore. The Battalion Surgeon along with one-half of the BAS corpsmen excluding the casualty reporting section joined the BLT ashore at this time. The personnel remaining aboard ship continued to function as before. On February the remainder of the BAS along with two doctors and 10 corpsmen from the C&C Platoon offloaded and proceeded to Delta Company, 3 rd Medical Battalion at Dong Ha to reinforce that facility. The remainder of the C&C Platoon stayed aboard the USS VALLEY FORGE to render continuing care to the patients already hospitalized. It was subsequently decided to setup a rear area BAS at the mouth of the Cua Viet River in the 1 st Amphibious Tractor Battalion cantonment. The Assistant Battalion Surgeon and a contingent of BAS corpsmen did this on February 20, Combat After Action Report Operation BADGER CATCH: Operation BADGE CATCH began on January 23, 1968 and was terminated on February 18, 1968: A. Phase I of Operation BADGER CATCH lasted from 1630H January 23, 1968 until 1400H February 26, 1968 and was under the control of Commander Task Group (CTG) B. Phase II began at 1400H January 26, 1968 with BLT 3/1 passing control to 3 rd Marine Division and continued basically the mission under the control of the 1st Amphibious Tractor Battalion with code name of SALINE. For BLT 3/1 this phase continues as of the end of this reporting period. C. The mission assigned to BLT 3/1 was to clear the north bank of the Cua Viet River and adjacent areas of enemy forces. The mission has remained unchanged throughout the operation. The exact boundaries of the area of operation were adjusted numerous times; however BLT 3/1 activities were conducted within 10,000 meters of the mouth of the Cua Viet River. Enemy strength, mission and tactics during the operation: A. The amphibious objective area (AOA) was the normal operating area of elements of the 803rd and 812 th Regiments of the 324 th North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Division. In addition, Viet Cong (VC) units of up to company size were believed operating in the general area of Mai Xa Thi and Vinh Quanh Ha near the Cua Viet River. Interrogation of POW s taken during the operation confirmed that the enemy units contacted during the early phases of the operation in My Loc, Xuan Khanh and Le Xuyen were subordinate to the 803 rd NVA Regiment. The heaviest contacts were with elements of the 3 rd Battalion, 803 rd Regiment, but POW s were also taken from units of the 1 st and 2 nd Battalions, 803 rd Regiment, as well as one POW who claimed to be from the 4 th Battalion, 270 th Regiment. The primary mission of enemy units in Page: 9 of 72

10 the AOA was to harass and interdict waterborne traffic on the Cua Viet River between the Cua Viet port facility and the Dong Ha Combat Base. Prior to, and at various times during the operation the enemy conducted attacks by fire on river traffic utilizing small arms, automatic weapons, rocket launchers and mortars. To accomplish his primary mission the enemy had moved units up to company size into hamlets that fronted the Cua Viet River and had set up fortified defensive positions. The enemy established fortified defensive lines on the edges of the hamlets, with defensive positions in depth running back into the center of the hamlets. In many instances he converted the family type bomb shelters that had been had been constructed by the civilian population into fortified position for his own use. He defended his positions with tenacity and skill and did not attempt to break contact until after dark in the apparent belief that the friendly forces would pull back and establish defensive positions as darkness attacked. He was largely unsuccessful in this tactic because BLT 3/1 continued the attack throughout the night when necessary and extensive use of illumination to light the battle area and to deny the enemy access to escape routes. Enemy units contacted during the operation were armed with normal small arms, heavy and light machine guns, recoilless rifles, 60mm and 82mm mortars. Extensive use was made of the rocket-propelled grenade (RPG)-2 and RPG-7 rocket launchers against friendly tanks, ontos and amphibious tractors. Anti-tank mines were placed in likely avenues of tracked vehicle approach and were successful in disabling several tracked vehicles. Noteworthy was neither the almost complete absence of booby traps and other surprise firing devices in the captured hamlets, indicating that the enemy believed he could hold these areas against friendly attack and had not anticipated the direction nor intensity of friendly actions. The enemy displayed the ability to direct and adjust artillery fire on maneuvering friendly units as well as on friendly defensive positions. However, his artillery fires were of short duration and largely ineffective. Relatively few friendly casualties and equipment damage were the direct result of enemy artillery fires. Both field radios and field telephones were captured during the operation, indicating the enemy s communication capabilities. In Lam Xuan, the enemy s battalion command post (CP) was located; wire communications had been laid from a central bunker to a number of outlying bunkers for command and control coordination. Among the items taken from one radio operator s field pack in the area was a map with one of the friendly thrust points marked on it. However, the thrust points had been changed several days earlier due to a suspected compromise. B. The large amounts of captured weapons and equipment taken during this operation as well as a number of classified documents, diaries, etc. also support the belief that the enemy intended to hold his positions and was only force by intense friendly pressure to segment his units and attempt to withdrawal. C. In summary, the main enemy tactic during the operation was to attempt to defend and hold in his fortified hamlet positions, in order to utilize his locations to interdict traffic on the Cua Viet River. The only large-scale aggressive action he attempted was in the early morning hours of February 2 nd when he conducted a battalion size attack on the night defensive positions of Company K. However, intelligence developed from documents and POW s taken several days earlier in the operation had indicated such an attack was imminent. In light of this intelligence Company K had moved their defensive position several hundred meters just after dark. The enemy s preparatory artillery and mortar fire was directed harmlessly on the previously vacated positions. When he launched his ground assault, he was exposed to intense friendly artillery and naval gunfire attack, as well as small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire from the new Company K positions. Page: 10 of 72

11 The most prominent terrain feature within the AOA was the Cua Viet River running southwest to northeast. A belt of sandy barren soil extends about 5,000 meters on both the north and south banks of the Cua Vie River. This area has some hamlets, cultivated fields and paddies but large areas are barren and uninhabited. An extensive paddy area borders on the sandy area. It is heavily populated with numerous hamlets and is a rich growing area. Tree lines along the river and within the hamlets are composed mostly of a species of pine tree and bamboo, which provided the enemy excellent concealment and ideal locations for his fortifications. Extensive paddy areas prohibited the use of wheeled vehicles and in many cases proved difficult for tracked vehicles. Execution: A. Concept. It was known that NVA forces had occupied positions on the north bank of the Cua Viet River and from these positions had begun to interdict river traffic between the mouth of the Cua Viet River and Dong Ha Combat Base. Recent Army Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) attacks on these positions had produced uncertain results and enemy strength in the area was unknown. BLT 3/1 landed at the mouth of the Cua Viet and began search and clear operations in the hamlets along the north bank. The direct support artillery battery was positioned within the 1 st Amphibian Tractor Battalion Combat Base to provide necessary fire support. NVA units were forced from positions along the river and when necessary BLT 3/1 would occupy strategic positions to prevent reoccupation by the enemy. B. Operations: BLT 3/1 found that the NVA still occupied strategic locations along the north bank despite recent ARVN operations. Five separate attacks were launched from January 23, 1968 to February 3, 1968 to secure enemy held positions. A combat base was established at My Loc to protect Battery W and the 81mm mortar platoon. On February 14 th BLT 3/1 was directed to move to the south bank of the Cua Viet and to sweep the heavily populated rice growing area adjacent to the river. Operations in this area continue as of the end of the reporting period with one engagement so far at Vinh Lai. C. Major engagements: A summary of engagements involving units of a company size or greater follows: 1. My Loc, January 25, 1968: Company K attacked prior to dawn on a narrow front. Rules of engagement applied and preparatory fires were not used. One platoon moved around to the right flank to block. The blocking platoon came under intense close in small arms fire. Tanks reinforced Company K and assisted in the evacuation of wounded. Tanks exchanged fire at very close range with enemy anti-tank weapons. Despite 5 RPG hits, no tanks were lost. Company K withdrew and enemy positions were shelled with artillery, Naval gunfire and close air support (CAS). Company K assaulted again in the afternoon and was able to sweep through the enemy positions with little resistance as the enemy had withdrawn. The hamlet was occupied and a combat base established. This site was selected because of its strategic location relative to river traffic. Company K sustained 6 killed in action and 9 wounded in action. The enemy sustained 20 killed in action, 1 POW and 2 Viet Cong Suspects (VCS). 2. Lam Xuan (1), January 26, 1968: Company I assaulted Lam Xuan from east to west on the afternoon of January 26 th. Initially there was no resistance. As Company I reached the first tree line of the hamlet, they came under heavy small arms fire. Snipers opened up from the scrub area to the rear of Company I s lines inflicted moderate casualties and causing the attack to bog down. Casualties were evacuated with the aid of tanks, but only with difficulty. The attack was discontinued because of darkness. Company I Page: 11 of 72

12 sustained 8 killed in action and 29 wounded in action. The enemy sustained 17 killed in action and 2 POW s. 3. Lam Xuan (2), January 28, 1968: Company L attacked with ontos and two platoons for tanks in direct support. Three tanks were knocked out by mines moving into the attack position. Company L made contact at the first tree line of the hamlet. The advance was slow and deliberate to ensure no enemy was by-passed. During the afternoon Company K moved up online and attacked with Company L. As darkness approached then enemy began to break. The attack continued well into the night under illumination. This was the first time the NVA displayed their often-repeated tactic of withdrawing at dusk. Companies L and K sustained 8 killed in action and 41 wounded in action. The enemy sustained 69 killed in action and 2 POW s. 4. Mai Xa Thi (East), January 31, 1968: Company M moved into the attack position under cover of darkness. Company K moved one platoon down from the north to conduct a diversionary attack on the opposite side of the hamlet. Surprise was achieved; however, the enemy rapidly adjusted his defenses. Company M attacked throughout the day. A section Landing Vehicle Track Howitzer (LVTH)-6 s arrived in direct support of Company M about 0930H. Good progress was made on he left but none on the right. Company I moved up by Landing Vehicle Track (LVT) on the left to allow Company M to concentrate on the right flank. Company L moved up to assist Company M and Company I. Throughout the operation the enemy delivered effective mortar, artillery, and recoilless rifle (RR) fire from their positions across the river in the western part of the hamlet. At dusk the enemy broke. Company M and Company I moved forward continuing the attack under illumination. Night defensive positions were established about 2300H. The remainder of the position was occupied the next morning. Among weapons captured were a 82mm mortar and a 12.7mm machine gun. Companies I, K and M sustained 12 killed in action and 46 wounded in action. The enemy sustained 44 wounded in action and 2 POW s. 5. Lam Xuan (3), February 2, 1968: The third battle at Lam Xuan was enemy initiated. Initially Company K occupied a defensive position within the hamlet. The company shifted its position 200 meter to the East after darkness in response to an intelligence report that predicated an attack. The enemy launched his attack from the north just before 0400H. Company K s listening post s (LP) gave warning of the enemy s approach. An intense enemy mortar barrage fell on Company K s old position, completely missing Company K. All supporting fires and illumination were brought to bear on the enemy and his attack became confused and short of Company K s position. Despite heavy losses, large numbers of the enemy remained close to Company K s positions after daylight. The used positions left over from previous battles. Company M with tanks was brought up to assist Company K. It took all day to drive the remaining enemy for the hamlet. A hasty body count was made and weapons collected before withdrawing south at darkness. Companies K and M sustained 8 killed in action and 37 wounded. This attack cost the enemy 141 dead and 7 POW s and well as the loss of a large number of individual and crew served weapons. 6. Vinh Lai, February 16, 1968: This engagement resulted from sweep operations south of the Cua Viet. After clearing adjacent villages Company L encountered heavy small arms fire as they entered Vinh Lai from the northeast. Tanks and ontos were in direct support but terrain hindered their effectiveness. Company I moved to a position on the west side of the hamlet Page: 12 of 72

13 and was able to effectively block the enemy s escape attempts. Supporting arms including air were used effectively and by nightfall Company L was within the hamlet. Company I with one tank in support killed many of the enemy as they tried to flee at dusk. Company I mobbed into the hamlet and setup a defensive position in conjunction with Company L. Companies I and L sustained 2 killed in action and 14 wounded in action. The enemy sustained 47 killed in action and 2 POW s. Supporting Arms: A. General: The quality and amount of available fire support was outstanding. In addition to BLT 3/1 s two attached batteries, fire support was available from the LVTH-6 battery supporting the 1 st Amphibious Tractor Battalion, 3 rd Marine Division artillery, naval gunfire ships and air. Tanks, ontos and LVTH-6 s delivered direct fire in close support of attacking infantry. Extensive use of all available supporting fire made it possible to maintain a favorable casualty ratio against a determined and well dug-in defender. B. Artillery: Artillery support consisted on 375 observed fire missions, 3 time on target (TOT) and numerous battery, 1 harassment and interdiction (H&I) and other unobserved missions. An approximate total of 18,000 rounds of 105mm, 6,000 rounds of 107mm and 300 rounds of 155mm and 8 inch were expended. The heavy schedule of H&I fires was delivered on areas of known enemy activity and in response to intelligence information passed from higher echelons. Close-in missions were fired as close as 50 to 100 meters in front of advancing infantry units and were instrumental in weakening enemy resistance. Firing units were cooperative and responsive. Communication difficulties were minimal. Overall, artillery support was utilized to its maximum with excellent results. C. Naval gunfire: Naval gunfire (NGF) was used extensively in support of BLT 3/1 during operation BADGER CATCH. A total of 14 different ships were used for close supporting, counter battery, saturation and H&I type missions. Ships delivered 1,170 rounds of close supporting fires during actions at Lan Xuan (2) and Lan Xuan (3). The attack fire of Mai Xa Thi (west) for February 4 th to the 14 th was supported with 5,363 rounds of naval gunfire. NGF White Phosphorus proved especially effective for producing fires to burn the cover from enemy positions. In all a total of 10,143 rounds of NGF was expended in support of BLT 3/1 during this operational period. In addition NGF units under the control of 3 rd Marine Division provided suppressive fire against artillery batteries whenever the BLT received incoming rounds. Good availability of ships and ammunition enabled enabled NGF to provide a valuable service in conjunction with the BLT s organic supporting arms. D. Close air support (CAS): BLT 3/1 used 36 two-plane flights consisting of Marine A- 4 s, A-6 s, F-4B s and F-8 s; Navy A-4 s and Air Force F-4C s. These planes dropped lb bombs, lb bombs and expended thousands of 20mm rounds and several 2.75inch rockets. Reported battle damage was 75 structures destroyed, 400 meters of trench line damaged, 20 bunkers destroyed, 11 secondary explosions, 28 NVA KIA confirmed and 11 NVA KIA probable. The amount of CAS available was adequate considering the prevailing bad weather prevented CAS on most days. On occasions when weather permitted use of CAS, its effectiveness was minimized by a failure to adhere to schedule and the inability if the supporting arms control center (SACC) to predict the time of arrival on station. For this reason CAS was reduced to the roll of a supplemental supporting arm, to be used when available, but not to be dependent upon. Once close support aircraft arrived and established communications with ground and/or air controllers, their performance was excellent providing accurate and effective close support for ground troops. Page: 13 of 72

14 E. TPQ-10 s: Extensive used was made of the TPQ-10 directed aircraft for dropping bombs on suspected enemy locations and supply routes. Some difficulty was encountered on several occasions when bombs were dropped off target endangering friendly troops. F. Flare ships: Flare ships were used on several occasions to support attacks continuing past dark. Some difficulty was encountered because SACC was unable to predict when the aircraft would arrive on station. After adjusting the flares on target illumination was outstanding. G. Aerial Observers (AO): BLT 3/1 had the services of AO s in 0-1, 0-2 and Huey (UH- 1E) aircraft. 0-1 and 0-2 aircraft proved more satisfactory due to their greater endurance on station and better availability from in-country sources. H. Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC): Marine Helicopter Medium (HMM) 165 provided helicopters for MEDEVAC throughout the reporting period. The MEDEVAC flights provided excellent support often flying into hot landing zones (LZ) and flying while the weather was below minimum. Logistics: A. The landing support activity (LSA) was established aboard the USS VALLEY FORGE (LPH-8) on D-Day and remained aboard until February 2, 1968 at which time it was transferred to Dong Ha Combat Base for a two-day period. The LSA was reestablished aboard the LPH-8 on February 4 th and remaining so through February 16 th. Moving ashore on February 16 th, the LSA established one detachment at Dong Ha Combat Base and one at 1 st Amphibious Tractor Battalion Combat Base. The LSA remains in these two positions as of the end of the reporting period. B. HMM-165 provided helicopters for resupply from January 28, 1968 through February 16, After this period resupply was staged at Dong Ha Combat Base and moved to the 1 st Amphibious Tractor Battalion Combat Base by landing craft mechanized (LCM) for distribution to BLT units by LVTP-5. C. The major problem encountered during this reporting was the non-availability of certain Class V resupply items, such as 81mm ammunition, at the Dong Ha Combat Base during the period of February 2 nd to the 4 th. Results: A. Friendly: 1. Personnel: 44 killed in action, 244 wounded in action. 2. Equipment: 3 tanks damaged by anti-tank mines, 1 tank damaged by antitank fire and 1 submerged and destroyed during combat operations LVTP-5 s destroyed by anti-tank mines. B. Enemy: 1. Personnel: 376 NVA killed in action (confirmed), 22 NVA POW s and 23 VC Suspects detained. 2. Weapons captured: 64 AK-47 s, 28 SKS carbines, 15 RPD light machine guns, 11 RPG-2 rocket launchers, 6 RPG-7 rocket launchers, 4 SG mm machine guns plus 2 spare barrels, 2 RP-46 company size machine gun, 2 82mm mortars, 2 60mm mortars (U. S. type), 1 75mm recoilless gun, mm (DSHK) heavy machine gun with AA mounts and tripods plus 2 spare barrels. 3. Grenades and Mines captured: 412 Chi Com grenades, 22 M-26 grenades, 16 Soviet fragmentation grenades, 6 Chi Com claymore mines, 2 U. S. claymore mines, 4 satchel charges, 10 anti-tank missiles and 4 NVA bangalore torpedoes, 4. Ammunition captured by rounds: mm mortar, 42 75mm recoilless gun, Page: 14 of 72

15 168 60mm mortar, 4 57mm recoilless rifle, 33 RPG-7, 58 RPG-2, 45, mm, cal carbine and 6, mm/50 cal. 5. Gas masks captured: 108 NVA type, 4 U.S. type and 33 VC type. 6. Miscellaneous equipment captured: 3 field radios, 2 field phones, 221 AK-47 magazines, 1 keying device, 3 large boxes of medical supplies, 10 82mm wrenches, assorted documents and 782 gear. Commander s Analysis: A. Fire Support Coordination: Delays in coordinating supporting fires in the SACC were unacceptable. Most of the difficulty resulted from artillery and naval gunfire being checked for aircraft far in advance of the aircraft entering the danger area. Difficulty with CAS resulted from a combination of the ship s inadequate communications and the in-country control agency s ability to predict the arrival of aircraft on station. Difficulty with check fires in connection with resupply and MEDEVACS resulted for the SACC s attempt to check all supporting fires as soon as the helicopters left the ship without regard to gun-target lines or the tactical situation. In this operation, terrain features and gun-target lines were such that easily followed flight lanes were available that did not require a check fire until the landing zone was reached. While SACC was controlling supporting fires, check fires in excess of fifteen minutes resulted from MEDEVACS. After passage of control ashore, they rarely exceeded four minutes. Instances of unnecessary check fires occurred throughout January 25 th during the attack on My Loc. On January 26 th, excessive check fires resulted from MEDEVAC flights. In one instance BLT 3/1 was told that no MEDEVAC helicopters would leave the ship until all fires were checked. This occurred during a extremely tight situation, showing a complete disregard by SACC of the tactical situation ashore. Basic principles are being forgotten. Fire support coordination should be conducted at the lowest echelon possible. The communications capability in the BLT fire support coordination center (FSCC) was at least as good if not better than that of the SACC. The BLT supporting arms coordinators were certainly in better position to monitor the tactical situation. It must be also remembered that the coordination of air support involves more than checking surface fires when aircraft take off. In many cases helicopters can be vectored around surface fires without any check fire at all. In other instances aircraft can be held outside the impact area while surface fire missions are completed. Only the BLT Air Liaison Officer is sufficiently aware of all aspects of the situation to effect coordination of this type. B. Helicopter Support: HMM 165 provided outstanding helicopter support during the period in which helicopters were available. The squadron s policy of treetop flying was ideal for the BLT. Low flying reduced the time for landing and takeoff and minimized the time for check fires. This policy also prevented long-range enemy observation of landing zones and minimized the instances when long-range artillery fires were brought to beat on the landing zones. Lessons Learned: A. Use of LVTH-6: The LVTH-6 was found to be an effective substitute for delivering direct fires in areas where water barriers preclude tank use. The 105mm howitzer was more effective than the 90mm gun for reducing dirt and log fortifications and fighting holes. Care must be exercised to protect the LVTH-6 from close in anti-tank fires. The thin skin and high silhouette make it an easy target. Another factor increasing its vulnerability is he necessity to turn the turret to the side for maximum depression thereby exposing the side of the vehicle to enemy fire. B. Use of Direct Fire Weapons: The use of direct fire from tanks, ontos and LVTH-6 s is Page: 15 of 72