Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress

Transcription

1 Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress Ronald O'Rourke Specialist in Naval Affairs February 7, 2012 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Congressional Research Service RL32665

2 Summary The planned size of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective affordability of the Navy s shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional defense committees for the past several years. In February 2006, the Navy presented to Congress a goal of achieving and maintaining a fleet of 313 ships, consisting of certain types and quantities of ships. In September 2011, the Navy began briefing congressional offices on a revised 313-ship plan that altered planned numbers for certain ship categories while staying within the overall total of 313 ships. On January 31, 2012, the Navy announced that it had begun a force structure assessment, to be completed in several months, that could lead to a new force structure goal for the Navy. On January 26, 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) announced certain program decisions that are to be incorporated into DOD s proposed FY2013 budget. The proposed changes include the early retirement of nine Navy ships and the deferrals of certain ships in the Navy s shipbuilding plan. DOD also announced that it plans to maintain the current force of 11 aircraft carriers and 10 carrier air wings. The Navy s proposed FY2012 budget requested funding for the procurement of 10 new battle force ships (i.e., ships that count against the 313-ship goal). The 10 ships included two Virginiaclass attack submarines, one DDG-51 class Aegis destroyer, four Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), one LPD-17 class amphibious ship, one Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship (i.e., a maritime prepositioning ship), and one Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV). The Navy s five-year (FY2012- FY2016) shipbuilding plan, submitted to Congress in conjunction with the Navy s proposed FY2012 budget, included a total of 55 new battle force ships, or an average of 11 per year. Of the 55 ships in the plan, 27, or almost half, are relatively inexpensive LCSs or JHSVs. The Navy s FY year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan, submitted to Congress in late May 2011, does not include enough ships to fully support all elements of the Navy s 313-ship goal over the long run. Among other things, the Navy projects that the cruiser-destroyer and attack submarine forces would drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the 30-year plan. A June 2011 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report on the cost of the Navy s FY year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan estimates that the plan would cost an average of $18.0 billion per year in constant FY2011 dollars to implement, or about 16% more than the Navy estimates. CBO s estimate is about 7% higher than the Navy s estimate for the first 10 years of the plan, about 10% higher than the Navy s estimate for the second 10 years of the plan, and about 31% higher than the Navy s estimate for the final 10 years of the plan. Congressional Research Service

3 Contents Introduction... 1 Background... 1 Navy s 313-Ship Force Structure Plan of September January 2012 Announcement of New Force Structure Assessment... 3 Navy s FY2012 Five-Year and 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans... 3 Five-Year (FY2012-FY2016) Shipbuilding Plan Year (FY2012-FY2041) Shipbuilding Plan... 6 Navy s Projected Force Levels Under 30-Year (FY2012-FY2041) Shipbuilding Plan... 7 Late 2011 Press Reports About Possible Navy Force Structure and Procurement Reductions... 9 January 26, 2012, Announcement of FY2013 Budget Decisions Oversight Issues for Congress Future Size and Structure of Navy in Light of Changes in Strategic and Budgetary Circumstances Issues Relating to Current 313-Ship Force-Level Objective Sufficiency of FY Year Shipbuilding Plan Affordability of FY Year Shipbuilding Plan Legislative Activity for FY FY2012 Funding Request FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1540/P.L ) House (Committee Report) House (Floor Consideration) Senate (S. 1867)...20 Senate (S. 1253)...21 Conference FY2012 Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (H.R. 2055/P.L ) Conference FY2012 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 2219) House Senate Conference CRS Reports Tracking Legislation on Specific Navy Shipbuilding Programs Tables Table 1. Navy Ship Force Structure Plans Since Table 2. Navy FY2012 Five-Year (FY2012-FY2016) Shipbuilding Plan... 4 Table 3. Navy FY Year (FY2012-FY2041) Shipbuilding Plan... 7 Table 4. Projected Force Levels Resulting from FY Year (FY2012-FY2041) Shipbuilding Plan... 8 Table 5. Recent Study Group Proposals for Navy Ship Force Structure Congressional Research Service

4 Table 6. Navy and CBO Estimates of Cost of FY Year (FY2012-FY2041) Shipbuilding Plan Table B-1. Comparison of Navy s 313-ship goal, Navy Plan from 1993 BUR, and Navy Plan from 2010 QDR Review Panel Table C-1. Total Number of Ships in the Navy Since FY Table C-2. Battle Force Ships Procured or Requested, FY1982-FY Appendixes Appendix A. Using Past Ship Force Levels to Assess Proposed Force Levels Appendix B. Independent Panel Assessment of 2010 QDR Appendix C. Size of the Navy and Navy Shipbuilding Rate Contacts Author Contact Information Congressional Research Service

5 Introduction This report provides background information and presents potential issues for Congress concerning the Navy s ship force-structure goals and shipbuilding plans. The planned size of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective affordability of the Navy s shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional defense committees for the past several years. Decisions that Congress makes on Navy shipbuilding programs can substantially affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements, and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base. Background Navy s 313-Ship Force Structure Plan of September 2011 The Navy in February 2006 presented to Congress a goal of achieving and maintaining a fleet of 313 ships, consisting of certain types and quantities of ships. The Navy in subsequent years changed its desired quantities for certain ship types, and by mid-2011 the Navy s desired fleet appeared to have grown to a total of 328 ships. In September 2011, the Navy began briefing congressional offices on a revised 313-ship plan that incorporated some of the changes that the Navy made over the years to the 313-ship plan of February 2006 while staying within the overall total of 313 ships. Among other things, the revised 313-ship plan of September 2011 reduced the planned number of Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs) to 10, compared to a previously planned total of 21. Navy officials sometimes refer to the figure of 313 ships as a floor, meaning a minimum required number. The Navy stated that the revised 313-ship plan of September 2011 will provide the capability and capacity to meet projected future missions with acceptable risk. 1 Table 1 compares the revised 313-ship goal of September 2011 to earlier Navy ship force structure plans. 1 Source: Navy briefing slide on new (2011) 313-ship plan provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs on October 7, Congressional Research Service 1

6 Table 1. Navy Ship Force Structure Plans Since 2001 Revised Changes to February February Early-2005 Navy plan for fleet of ships Ship type 313-ship plan of September 2011 ship plan announced through mid Navy plan for 313- ship fleet 260-ships 325- ships Navy plan for 375-ship Navy a 2001 QDR plan for 310-ship Navy Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) 12 b 12 b Cruise missile submarines (SSGNs) 4 0 c or 4 d Attack submarines (SSNs) Aircraft carriers 11 e 11 e 11 f Cruisers and destroyers g Frigates Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) Amphibious ships h MPF(F) ships i 0 j 0 j 12 i 14 i 20 i 0 i 0 i Combat logistics (resupply) ships Dedicated mine warfare ships k 16 Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs) 10 l 21 l Other m n Total battle force ships or 312 Sources: Table prepared by CRS based on U.S. Navy data. Source for revised 313-ship plan of September 2011: Navy briefing slide on new (2011) 313-ship plan provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs on October 7, Note: QDR is Quadrennial Defense Review. a. Initial composition. Composition was subsequently modified. b. The Navy plans to replace the 14 current Ohio-class SSBNs with a new class of 12 next-generation SSBNs. For further discussion, see CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. c. Although the Navy plans to continue operating its four SSGNs until they reach retirement age in the late 2020s, the Navy does not plan to replace these ships when they retire, and the 328-ship presentation reflected the post-2020s force level of zero SSGNs. d. The report on the 2001 QDR did not mention a specific figure for SSGNs. The Administration s proposed FY2001 Department of Defense (DOD) budget requested funding to support the conversion of two available Trident SSBNs into SSGNs, and the retirement of two other Trident SSBNs. Congress, in marking up this request, supported a plan to convert all four available SSBNs into SSGNs. e. With congressional approval, the goal will temporarily be reduced to 10 carriers during 33-month period between the retirement of the carrier Enterprise (CVN-65) in November 2012 and the scheduled entry into service of the carrier Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) in September f. For a time, the Navy characterized the goal as 11 carriers in the nearer term, and eventually 12 carriers. g. The 94-ship goal was announced by the Navy in an April 2011 report to Congress on naval force structure and missile defense. h. The Navy acknowledges that meeting a requirement for being able to lift the assault echelons of 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) would require a minimum of 33 amphibious ships rather than the 31 ships Congressional Research Service 2

7 shown in the February 2006 plan. For further discussion, see CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. i. Today s Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships are intended primarily to support Marine Corps operations ashore, rather than Navy combat operations, and thus are not counted as Navy battle force ships. The MPF (Future) ships, however, would have contributed to Navy combat capabilities (for example, by supporting Navy aircraft operations). For this reason, the ships in the planned MPF(F) squadron were counted by the Navy as battle force ships. j. The Navy no longer plans to acquire an MPF(F) squadron. The Navy, however, has procured or plans to procure six ships that were previously planned for the MPF(F) squadron three modified TAKE-1 class cargo ships, and three Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships. These six ships are now included in the total shown for Other ships. k. The figure of 26 dedicated mine warfare ships includes 10 ships maintained in a reduced mobilization status called Mobilization Category B. Ships in this status are not readily deployable and thus do not count as battle force ships. The 375-ship proposal thus implied transferring these 10 ships to a higher readiness status. l. Totals shown include 5 ships transferred from the Army to the Navy and operated by the Navy primarily for the performance of Army missions. m. This category includes, among other things, command ships and support ships. n. The increase in this category from 17 ships under the February ship plan to 24 ships under the apparent 328-ship goal includes the addition of one TAGOS ocean surveillance ship and the transfer into this category of six ships three modified TAKE-1 class cargo ships, and three Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships that were previously intended for the planned (but now canceled) MPF(F) squadron. January 2012 Announcement of New Force Structure Assessment On January 31, 2012, the Navy announced that it had begun a force structure assessment, to be completed in several months, that could lead to a new force structure goal for the Navy. The Navy stated that the force structure assessment will reflect a new strategic guidance document released by the Administration on January 5, Navy s FY2012 Five-Year and 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans Five-Year (FY2012-FY2016) Shipbuilding Plan Table 2 shows the Navy s FY2012 five-year (FY2012-FY2016) shipbuilding plan. 2 Frank Oliveri, Navy Structure Study Could Alter Minimum Number of Ships Required, CQToday, February 1, 2012: 10; Mike McCarthy, Navy Evaluating 313-Ship Goal, Defense Daily, February 1, 2012; Michael Fabey, U.S. Navy Studies Force Structure, Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, February 1, 2012: 4; Megan Eckstein, Harvey: Force Structure Review Will Take Into Account Fewer Ships, Inside the Navy, February 6, See also Dan Taylor, Navy: No Decision On 313-Ship Floor Yet, Despite Cutbacks In Fleet, Inside the Navy, January 30, The strategic guidance document released on January 5, 2012, is Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21 st Century Defense, January 2012, 8 pp. For more on this document, see CRS Report R42146, In Brief: Assessing DOD s New Strategic Guidance, by Catherine Dale and Pat Towell. Congressional Research Service 3

8 Table 2. Navy FY2012 Five-Year (FY2012-FY2016) Shipbuilding Plan (Battle force ships i.e., ships that count against 313-ship goal) Ship type FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 Total Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier 1 1 Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarine Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship 1 1 LHA(R) amphibious assault ship 1 1 Fleet tug (TATF) 1 1 Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) TAO(X) oiler TAGOS ocean surveillance ship 1 1 TOTAL Source: FY2012 Navy budget submission. Notes: The FY2012-FY2016 shipbuilding plan also includes, in FY2012, an oceanographic ship that does not count against the 313-ship goal. Until FY2012, JHSVs were being procured by both the Navy and the Army. The Army was to procure its fifth and final JHSV in FY2012; this ship was included in the Army s FY2012 budget submission and is not shown in this table. In May 2011, the Navy and Army signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) transferring the Army s JHSVs to the Navy. In the FY2012 DOD Appropriations Act (Division A of H.R. 2055/P.L of December 23, 2011), the JHSV that was in the Army s FY2012 budget submission was funded through the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation account, along with the JHSV that the Navy had included in its FY0212 budget submission. Observations that can be made about the Navy s proposed five-year (FY2012-FY2016) shipbuilding plan include the following: The FY2012-FY2016 plan includes a total of 55 battle force ships, or 5 more than the FY2011-FY2015 plan. The net increase of five ships includes the addition of six ships and the subtraction of one previously planned ship. The six added ships include a second DDG-51 in FY2014, a fourth Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) in FY2012, three TAO(X) oilers in FY2014-FY2016, and a TAGOS ocean surveillance ship in FY2013. The ship that was subtracted was a second JHSV that was previously planned for FY2016. The FY2012-FY2016 plan includes an average of 11 battle force ships per year, making this the second year in a row that the Navy has presented a five-year shipbuilding plan showing an average of 10 or more battle force ships per year. Given the single-digit numbers of battle force ships that have were procured from FY1993 through FY2010, shipbuilding supporters for some time have wanted to increase the shipbuilding rate to 10 or more battle force ships per year. A rate of 10 battle force ships per year is above the steady-state replacement rate for a fleet of 313 ships with an average service life of 35 years, which is about 8.9 ships per year. The average shipbuilding rate since FY1993 has been substantially below 8.9 ships per year (see Appendix C). Congressional Research Service 4

9 Although LCSs and JHSVs account for about 21% of the ships in the Navy s planned force structure (65 of 313 ships), they account 49% of the ships in the FY2012-FY2016 shipbuilding plan (27 of 55 ships). In this sense, these relatively inexpensive ships are overrepresented in the five-year shipbuilding plan relative to their portion of the 313-ship goal, making it easier to procure an average of 11 ships per year within available resources. Starting a few years from now, when the LCS and JHSV programs are no longer overrepresented in the shipbuilding plan, and particularly when procurement of next-generation SSBN(X) ballistic missile submarines begins, procuring an average of 10 or more ships per year will become a considerably more expensive proposition. In this sense, the FY2012-FY2016 shipbuilding program s average of 11 ships per year does not necessarily imply that the Navy has solved the challenge it faces concerning the long-term affordability of its shipbuilding plans. The addition of the fourth LCS in FY2012 brings planned annual LCS procurement quantities into line with those called for in the dual-award acquisition strategy that Congress approved in December 2010 for the LCS program. 3 The San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship planned for FY2012 is to be the 11 th and final ship in the class. The 33-ship force-structure goal for amphibious ships includes 11 LPD-17s. 4 The FY2011-FY2015 plan requested the first of three planned Mobile Landing Platform ships (MLPs) in FY2011, and the second and third MLPs in FY2012 and FY2013. As part of its action on the FY2011 defense budget, Congress funded the procurement of two MLPs in FY2011 (i.e., one more than requested). Congress completed its action on the FY2011 budget after the Navy submitted its proposed FY2012 budget, and the FY2012 budget submission does not account for the funding of a second MLP in FY2011. The Navy states that since two MLPs were funded in FY2011, the Navy no longer plans to request an MLP in FY2013. The addition of the three TAO(X) oilers in FY2014-FY2016 reflects an acceleration of the start of this program from FY2017 to FY2014. This acceleration was one of a series of measures that the Navy announced on September 17, 2010, for sustaining the shipbuilding capability in Louisiana. 5 The Navy plans to compete the TAO(X), so it is not certain that the program will be awarded to a shipyard in Louisiana, such as the Avondale shipyard near New Orleans that forms part of Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII). National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO) of San Diego, CA, is generally considered to be a likely competitor for the program. 3 For further discussion, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 4 For further discussion, see CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 5 For the text of the Navy s announcement, see Avondale html. Congressional Research Service 5

10 30-Year (FY2012-FY2041) Shipbuilding Plan The Navy did not submit an FY year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan in February 2011, in conjunction with the proposed FY2012 budget. 6 At the request of the House Armed Services Committee, the Navy submitted the FY year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan in late May Table 3 shows the Navy s proposed FY year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan. The first five years of this plan include the same ships as those in the FY2012 five-year (FY2012-FY2016) shipbuilding plan shown in Table 2. The FY year (FY ) plan includes a total of 276 ships. 8 6 Section 1023 of the FY2011 defense authorization act (H.R. 6523/P.L of January 7, 2011) amended the law (10 U.S.C. 231) that had required DOD to submit a 30-year shipbuilding plan each year. As amended by Section 1023, 10 U.S.C. 231 now requires DOD to submit a 30-year shipbuilding plan once every four years, in the same year that DOD submits a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Regarding the three years between each QDR, the joint explanatory statement of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on H.R stated: The committees expect that, following the submission of the President s budget materials for a fiscal year, the Secretary of the Navy, at the written request of one of the congressional defense committees, will promptly deliver the Navy s long-term shipbuilding plan used to develop the President s budget request for that fiscal year, as well as a certification from the Secretary of the Navy that both the President s budget request for that fiscal year and the budget for the future-years defense program is sufficient to fund the construction schedule provided in that plan. The committees expect that such a plan would include the quantity of each class of ship to be constructed in that fiscal year and the nine following fiscal years. 7 The Navy s cover letter for the plan is dated May 23, CRS received the plan on May 24, The Navy s cover letter states that the plan was submitted in response to a letter dated February 15, 2011, from Representative Todd Akin, the chairman of the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, requesting a 30-year plan. 8 The total of 276 ships includes a Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship in FY2013. The Navy says that, as a result of Congress funding two MLPs in FY2011, or one more than the Navy requested for FY2011, the Navy no longer plans to request an MLP in FY2013. Subtracting this MLP from the plan would leave a total of 275 ships. Congressional Research Service 6

11 Table 3. Navy FY Year (FY2012-FY2041) Shipbuilding Plan FY CVN LSC SSC SSN SSBN AWS CLF Supt Total Source: U.S. Navy data provided to CRS on May 24, Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; LSC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers); SSC = small surface combatants (i.e., Littoral Combat Ships [LCSs]); SSN = attack submarines; SSGN = cruise missile submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; AWS = amphibious warfare ships; CLF = combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; Supt = support ships. Navy s Projected Force Levels Under 30-Year (FY2012-FY2041) Shipbuilding Plan Table 4 shows the Navy s projection of force levels for FY2012-FY2041 that would result from implementing the FY year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan shown in Table 3. Congressional Research Service 7

12 Table 4. Projected Force Levels Resulting from FY Year (FY2012-FY2041) Shipbuilding Plan CVN LSC SSC SSN SSGN SSBN AWS CLF Supt Total Goal in 313-ship plan FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY Source: U.S. Navy data provided to CRS on May 24, Note: Figures for support ships include five JHSVs transferred from the Army to the Navy and operated by the Navy primarily for the performance of Army missions. Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; LSC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers); SSC = small surface combatants (i.e., frigates, Littoral Combat Ships [LCSs], and mine warfare ships); SSN = attack submarines; SSGN = cruise missile submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; AWS = amphibious warfare ships; CLF = combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; Supt = support ships. Congressional Research Service 8

13 Late 2011 Press Reports About Possible Navy Force Structure and Procurement Reductions Press reports in September and October 2011 stated that the Navy, in response to anticipated reductions in planned levels of defense spending, was examining options for maintaining a fleet with considerably fewer than 300 ships; for retiring certain ships in the near term, well before the ends of their expected service lives; and for deferring or cancelling certain planned ship procurements. 9 The Administration s January 26, 2012, announcement of selected program decisions for the FY2013 budget (see next section) suggests that at least some of these options were scaled back or not implemented. 9 A September 1, 2011, press report stated that the Navy was considering the following options, among others: reducing the Navy to a 250-ship fleet that includes 10 aircraft carriers or a 240-ship fleet that includes 8 aircraft carriers (a fleet with 9 carriers is another option); retiring (rather than performing a nuclear-refueling overhaul on) the aircraft carrier George Washington (CVN-73), which would be one measure for reducing the size of the carrier force; delaying the procurement of the aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy (CVN-79) by two years, to FY2015 (an option that was first reported in July 2011 ); eliminating six aircraft squadrons; retiring at least some of the Navy s 22 Ticonderoga (CG-47) class Aegis cruisers; reducing the planned number of next-generation Ohio replacement ballistic missile submarines (SSBN[X]s) by two boats, from 12 to 10, and consequently delaying the procurement of the first SSBN(X), perhaps by two years; and maintaining funding for procurement of two Virginia-class submarines per year, and for Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class Aegis destroyers and Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs). (Christopher J. Castelli, Navy Of Tomorrow Could Have Fewer Cruisers, Aircraft Carriers, Inside the Pentagon, September 1, 2011.) An October 6, 2011, press report similarly stated that the Navy was examining the option of retiring the rather than performing a mid-life refueling on the aircraft carrier George Washington (CVN-73). (Christopher P. Cavas, U.S. Navy May Cut Carrier s Life In Half To Save Money, DefenseNews.com, October 6, 2011.) Implementing this option would reduce the Navy s carrier force a few years from now from 11 ships to 10. An October 14, 2011, press report stated that the Navy is considering retiring four Aegis cruisers in FY2013, another five Aegis cruisers in FY2014, and three Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry (LSD-41/49) class amphibious ships in FY2014. The report also mentioned the option of retiring rather than performing a mid-life refueling on the aircraft carrier George Washington (CVN-73), the option of delaying the procurement of the John F. Kennedy (CVN-79) to FY2015, and the option of shifting carrier procurement generally to seven-year intervals. (Carlo Munoz, Navy Delays Carrier, Cuts Cruisers, Amphibs In Draft Budget, AOL Defense ( October 14, 2011.) A blog entry identified the four cruisers that would be retired in FY2013 as Normandy (CG-60), Anzio (CG-CG-68), Vicksburg (CG-69), and Cape St. George (CG-71), the five cruisers that would be retired in FY2014 as Princeton (CG-59), Cowpens (CG-63), Gettysburg (CG-64), Chosin (CG-65), and Hue City (CG-66), and the four amphibious ships that would be retired in FY2014 as Whidbey Island (LSD-41), Fort McHenry (LSD-43), and Tortuga (LSD-46). ( ALT POM Early Decommission Plans, Information Dissemination ( diseemination.net), October 17, 2011.) In a December 2011 journal article, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the Chief of Naval Operations, stated that the Navy in 2025 may be smaller than [it is] today as a result of fiscal constraints and that Budget limitations over the next 10 to 15 years may constrain the number of ships and aircraft the Navy can buy. (Jonathan Greenert, Navy, 2025: Forward Warfighters, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 2011: 19 and 22.) Congressional Research Service 9

14 January 26, 2012, Announcement of FY2013 Budget Decisions On January 26, 2012, the Administration issued a 16-page document outlining selected program decisions that will appear in the Department of Defense s (DOD s) proposed FY2013 budget. The document states the following in part: The focus on the Asia-Pacific region places a renewed emphasis on air and naval forces while sustaining ground force presence. The Middle East has been dominated by ground force operations over the last decade; however, as we gradually transition security in Afghanistan and reestablish peacetime ground force presence, this region will also become increasingly maritime. Therefore we:... Maintained the aircraft carrier fleet at 11 ships and 10 [carrier] air wings Maintained the big-deck amphibious fleet Budgeted to forward station Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore and patrol craft in Bahrain Funded development of a new afloat forward staging base that can be dedicated to support missions in areas where ground-based access is not available, such as countermine operations For these forces to remain capable, we had to invest in capabilities required to maintain our military s continued freedom of action in the face of new technologies designed to frustrate access advantages. Consequently, we increased or protected investment in capabilities that preserve the U.S. military s ability to project power in contested areas and strike quickly from over the horizon, including:... Design changes to increase cruise missile capacity of future Virginia-class submarines 11 Design of a conventional prompt strike option from submarines 12 Upgraded radars for tactical aircraft and ships To ensure sufficient resources to protect these strategic priorities, we will reduce the number of ships by slowing the pace of building new ships and by accelerating the retirement of some existing ships. These include: Retiring 7 cruisers early 6 did not have ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability, and the seventh with BMD capability is in need of costly hull repairs This is a reference to the Navy s inventory of LHA- and LHD-type amphibious assault ships. These ships, which resemble medium-sized aircraft carriers, are often referred to as big-deck or large-deck amphibious ships because their flight decks are much larger than those of the Navy s smaller (i.e., LPD- and LSD-type) amphibious ships. 11 This appears to be a reference to a plan to build future Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines to a lengthened design that includes an additional mid-body section, called the Virginia Payload Module (VPM) containing four largediameter vertical launch tubes for firing cruise missiles and other payloads. For more on the VPM, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 12 This appears to refer to a new, fast-flying weapon that would be launched from submarines. 13 The Navy currently has 22 Ticonderoga (CG-47) class Aegis cruisers; retiring seven early would reduce the (continued...) Congressional Research Service 10

15 Slipping a large deck amphibious ship (LHA) by 1 year 14 Slipping 1 new Virginia class submarine outside the FYDP [Five Year Defense Plan] Reducing Littoral Combat Ships by 2 ships in the FYDP 15 Reducing Joint High Speed Vessels by 8 in the FYDP 16 Retiring 2 smaller amphibious ships (LSD) early and moving their replacement outside the FYDP This strategic precept puts a premium on self- and rapidly-deployable forces that can project power and perform multiple mission types. This reinforces the need to maintain existing numbers of aircraft carriers, large-deck amphibious ships, and bombers. Furthermore, as the Marine Corps withdraws from the ground in Afghanistan, it will return to afloat posture, with the capability to rapidly respond to crises as they emerge. These choices are consistent with our strategic emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East, but are applicable anywhere on the globe where U.S. national security or vital interests are threatened... Under the new strategic guidance, we will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent... However, we will delay the new Ohio submarine replacement by two years without undermining our partnership with the UK. 18 While this delay will create challenges in maintaining current at-sea presence requirements in the 2030s, we believe this risk can be managed... Because we will continue to be engaged in counter terrorism operations around the globe, we protected key components of the force that are adept in executing this mission:... Sea-based unmanned intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems such as Fire Scout important ISR assets where ground basing is not available Our ability to project power is a key component of our strategic guidance. We protected... aircraft carriers, surface combatant modernization... We also protected capabilities that allow us to project power in denied environments. In addition to those discussed earlier, such (...continued) inventory of these ships to Under the FY2012 budget submission, the next LHA-type ship was to be procured in FY2016; the deferral would thus appear to be FY This may be a deferral of the procurement of two LCSs, but not a reduction in the planned total LCS procurement of 55 ships. 16 This may reflect a reduction in the JHSV force-level goal from 21 ships to The Navy currently operates 12 LSD-type amphibious ships; retiring two early would reduce the inventory to 10. The planned replacement for these LSDs is a new ship class called the LSD(X). The Navy had previously announced that the first LSD(X) was to be procured in FY2017; the new announcement here suggests that the procurement date for this ship has been deferred to a later year. 18 Under the FY2012 budget submission, the first Ohio Replacement ballistic missile submarine was to be procured in FY2019; the announcement suggests that the procurement date for this ship has been deferred to FY2021. The United States is cooperating with the UK on the design of a common missile compartment to be used on both the Ohio Replacement boats and a new class of UK ballistic missile submarines. 19 The Fire Scout is an unmanned helicopter that can be operated from Navy ships. Congressional Research Service 11

16 as... increasing the cruise missile capacity of future submarines, we protected anti-submarine warfare and counter-mine capabilities... In support of the strategic guidance s tenet of reversibility, this budget plan sustains, where possible, these segments of the industrial base... For example, adding the afloat forward staging base addresses urgent operational shortfalls and will help sustain the shipbuilding industry in the near-term and mitigate the impact of reducing ship procurement in the FYDP. 20 Oversight Issues for Congress Future Size and Structure of Navy in Light of Changes in Strategic and Budgetary Circumstances Changes in strategic and budgetary circumstances have led to a broad debate over the appropriate future size and structure of the military, including the future size and structure of the Navy. Changes in strategic circumstances include, among other things, the winding down of U.S. combat operations in Iraq, the planned winding down of such operations in Afghanistan, and the growth of China s military capabilities. 21 Changes in budgetary circumstances center on reductions in planned levels of defense spending resulting from the Budget Control Act of 2011 (S. 365/P.L of August 2, 2011). On January 5, 2012, the Administration announced that, in light of the winding down of U.S. combat operations in Iraq, the planned winding down of such operations in Afghanistan, and developments in the Asia-Pacific region, U.S. defense strategy in coming years will include a stronger focus on the Asia-Pacific region. 22 Since the Asia-Pacific region is to a significant degree a maritime and aerospace theater for the United States, this shift in strategic focus is expected by many observers to result in a shift in the allocation of DOD resources toward the Navy and Air Force. As mentioned earlier (see January 2012 Announcement of New Force Structure Assessment in Background ), on January 31, 2012, the Navy announced that it had begun a force structure assessment, to be completed in several months, that could lead to a new force structure goal for the Navy. Some study groups have made their own proposals for Navy ship force structure. Table 5 shows some of these proposals. For purposes of comparison, Table 5 also shows the Navy s 313-ship goal of September Department of Defense, Defense Budget: Priorities and Choices, January 2012, pp. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, For more on the growth in China s military (particularly naval) capabilities and its potential implications for required U.S. Navy capabilities, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 22 Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21 st Century Defense, January 2012, 8 pp. For more on this document, see CRS Report R42146, In Brief: Assessing DOD s New Strategic Guidance, by Catherine Dale and Pat Towell. Congressional Research Service 12

17 In assessing proposals for the future size and structure of the Navy, Congress may consider various factors, such as potential future defense spending levels, U.S. interests and potential threats to those interests, the value of naval forces in defending those interests, and the relative cost-effectiveness of various ship types for performing various missions. 23 Table 5. Recent Study Group Proposals for Navy Ship Force Structure Ship type Navy s 313- ship goal of September 2011 Heritage Foundation (April 2011) Cato Institute (September 2010) a Independent Panel Assessment of 2010 QDR (July 2010) Sustainable Defense Task Force (June 2010) Center for a New American Security (CNAS) (November 2008) Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) (2008) b Submarines SSBN c SSGN SSN Aircraft carriers CVN CVE Surface combatants Cruiser 22 n/a Destroyer 65 n/a Frigate 0 14 n/a e 28 d LCS 55 4 n/a SSC n/a f Amphibious and Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF[F]) ships Amphibious ships n/a MPF(F) ships n/a n/a 0 3 g LSD station ships n/a n/a n/a 7 h Other: Mine warfare (MIW) ships; Combat logistics force (CLF) ships (i.e., at-sea resupply ships), and support ships MIW CLF ships n/a Support ships n/a 31 TOTAL battle force ships i 23 Another possible method for assessing proposals for the future size and structure of the Navy is to compare them to historical figures for total Navy fleet size. As discussed in Appendix A, however, historical figures for total fleet size might not be a reliable yardstick for assessing the appropriateness of proposals for the future size and structure of the Navy, particularly if the historical figures are more than a few years old, because the missions to be performed by the Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are available to Navy ships for performing missions all change over time. Congressional Research Service 13

18 Source: Table prepared by CRS based on the following sources: For Heritage Foundation: A Strong National Defense[:] The Armed Forces America Needs and What They Will Cost, Heritage Foundation, April 5, 2011, pp For Cato Institute: Benjamin H. Friedman and Christopher Preble, Budgetary Savings from Military Restraint, Washington, Cato Institute, September 23, 2010 (Policy Analysis No. 667), pp. 6, 8-10, and additional information provided by Cato Institute to CRS by on September 22, For Independent Panel Assessment: Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, co-chairmen, et al., The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America s National Security Needs In the 21 st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, Washington, 2010, Figure 3-2 on pages For Sustainable Defense Task Force: Debt, Deficits, and Defense, A Way Forward[:] Report of the Sustainable Defense Task Force, June 11, 2010, pp For CNAS: Frank Hoffman, From Preponderance to Partnership: American Maritime Power in the 21 st Century. Washington, Center for a New American Security, November p. 19 (Table 2). For CSBA: Robert O. Work, The US Navy[:] Charting a Course for Tomorrow s Fleet. Washington, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, p. 81 (Figure 5). Notes: n/a is not addressed in the report. SSBN is nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine; SSGN is nuclear-powered cruise missile and special operations forces submarine; SSN is nuclear-powered attack submarine; CVN is large nuclear-powered aircraft carrier; CVE is medium-sized aircraft carrier; LCS is Littoral Combat Ship; SSC (an acronym created by CRS for this table) is small surface combatant of 1,000+ tons displacement a ship similar to late-1990s Streetfighter concept; MPF(F) is Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ship; LSD is LSD-41/49 class amphibious ship operating as a station ship for a formation like a Global Fleet Station (GFS); MIW is mine warfare ship; CLF is combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ship. a. Figures shown are for the year 2020; for subsequent years, reductions from these figures would be considered. b. Figures shown are for the year c. The report calls for a force of 280 SLBMs, which appears to equate to a force of 14 SSBNs, each with 20 SLBM tubes. d. The report calls for a force of 28 small surface combatants, and appears to use the term small surface combatants the same way that the Navy does in the 30-year shipbuilding plan as a way of collectively referring to frigates and LCSs. The small surface combatants (SSCs) called for in the November 2008 CNAS report are separate from and smaller than the LCS. e. Maritime Security Frigates. f. Plan includes 28 patrol craft (PCs) of a few hundred tons displacement each, as well as 29 boat detachments and seven riverine squadrons. g. Plan shows three Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships that the Navy currently plans for the MPF(F) squadron, plus 16 existing current-generation maritime prepositioning force (MPF) ships and 17 existing prepositioning ships for Army and other service/agency equipment. Plan also shows 67 other DOD sealift ships. h. T-LSDs, meaning LSDs operated by the Military Sealift Command (MSC) with a partly civilian crew. i. The CSBA report shows a total of 488 units by including 162 additional force units that do not count toward the 313-ship goal under the battle force ships counting method that has been used since the early 1980s for public policy discussions of the size of the Navy. These 162 additional force units include 16 existing current-generation maritime prepositioning force (MPF) ships and 17 existing prepositioning ships for Army and other service/agency equipment, 67 other DOD sealift ships, 28 PCs, 29 boat detachments, and certain other small-scale units. The CSBA report proposes a new counting method for naval/maritime forces that includes units such as these in the total count. Issues Relating to Current 313-Ship Force-Level Objective Sufficiency of FY Year Shipbuilding Plan One potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the sufficiency of the FY year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan. As shown in Table 4, the plan does not include enough ships to fully support all elements of the 313-ship goal over the long run: Congressional Research Service 14

19 The Navy projects that if the 30-year shipbuilding plan were fully implemented, the fleet would grow from 290 ships in FY2012 to a peak of 325 ships in FY2022-FY2023, decline to 296 ships in FY2032-FY2034, and then increase back to 305 ships by FY2041. The Navy projects that the attack submarine and cruiser-destroyer forces will drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the 30-year plan. The projected number of cruisers and destroyers drops below the required level of 94 ships in 2025, reaches a minimum of 68 ships in FY2034, and remains below 94 ships through FY2041. The projected number of attack submarines drops below the required level of 48 boats in FY2024, reaches a minimum of 39 boats in FY2030, and remains below 48 boats through There would also be shortfalls in certain years in small surface combatants (i.e., frigates and LCSs) and amphibious ships. The projected shortfalls in cruisers and destroyers, attack submarines, and other ships could make it difficult or impossible for the Navy to fully perform its projected missions, particularly during the latter years of the 30-year plan. In light of the projected shortfalls in cruisers-destroyers and attack submarines, policymakers may wish to consider two options: increasing planned procurement rates of destroyers and attack submarines, perhaps particularly in years prior to the start of SSBN(X) procurement, and extending the service lives of older destroyers to 40 or 45 years, and refueling older attack submarines and extending their service lives to 40 or more years. Regarding the second option above, possible candidates for service life extensions include the first 28 DDG-51 destroyers (i.e., the Flight I/II DDG-51s), the final 23 Los Angeles (SSN-688) attack submarines (i.e., the Improved 688s), and the 3 Seawolf (SSN-21) class attack submarines. Whether such service life extensions would be technically feasible or cost-effective is not clear. Feasibility would be a particular issue for the attack submarines, given limits on submarine pressure hull life. Extending the service lives of any of these ships could require increasing funding for their maintenance, possibly beginning in the near term, above currently planned levels, so that the ships would be in good enough condition years from now to remain eligible for service life extension work. Such funding increases would be in addition to those the Navy has recently programmed for ensuring that its surface ships can remain in service to the end of their currently planned service lives. Affordability of FY Year Shipbuilding Plan Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the prospective affordability of the FY year (FY2012-FY2041) shipbuilding plan. In assessing this issue, a key factor to consider is the estimated cost to implement the plan. In recent years, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated that the Navy s 30-year shipbuilding plan would cost more to implement than the Navy has estimated, and this is again the case for the Navy s FY year shipbuilding plan. A June 2011 CBO report on the cost of the Navy s FY year (FY2012- FY2041) shipbuilding plan estimates that the plan would cost an average of $18.0 billion per year in constant FY2011 dollars to implement, or about 16% more than the Navy estimates. CBO s estimate is about 7% higher than the Navy s estimate for the first 10 years of the plan, about 10% Congressional Research Service 15

20 higher than the Navy s estimate for the second 10 years of the plan, and about 31% higher than the Navy s estimate for the final 10 years of the plan. 24 Some of the difference between CBO s estimate and the Navy s estimate, particularly in the latter years of the plan, is due to a difference between CBO and the Navy in how to treat inflation in Navy shipbuilding. Table 6 summarizes the Navy and CBO estimates of the FY year shipbuilding plan, as presented in the June 2011 CBO report. Table 6. Navy and CBO Estimates of Cost of FY Year (FY2012-FY2041) Shipbuilding Plan Funding for new-construction ships, in billions of constant FY2011 dollars First 10 years (FY2012-FY2021) Next 10 years (FY ) Final 10 years (FY2032-FY2041) Entire 30 years (FY2012-FY2041) Navy estimate CBO estimate % difference between Navy and CBO estimates 7% 10% 31% 16% Source: Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy s Fiscal Year 2012 Shipbuilding Plan, June 2011, Table 2 (Page 9). The June 2011 CBO report also estimates the cost of a revised 30-year shipbuilding plan created by CBO that would fully meet the various force-level goals in the apparent 328-ship force-level objective of mid Compared to the Navy s FY year plan, this revised 30-year plan would include 24 additional destroyers, 5 additional attack submarines, and 2 additional largedeck (i.e., LHA-type) amphibious assault ships. CBO estimated the cost of implementing this revised plan at an average of $19.7 billion per year in constant FY2011 dollars, including an average of $19.1 billion per year for the first 10 years of the plan, an average of $21.3 billion per year for the second 10 years of the plan, and an average of $18.6 billion per year for the final 10 years of the plan. 25 As mentioned earlier, the Navy was able to assemble a five-year (FY2012-FY2016) shipbuilding plan with a total of 55 ships, or an average of 11 per year, within available resources in part because almost half of those ships are relatively inexpensive LCSs and JHSVs. Starting a few years from now, when the LCS and JHSV programs are no longer overrepresented in the shipbuilding plan, and particularly when procurement of next-generation SSBN(X) ballistic missile submarines begins, procuring an average of 10 or more ships per year will become a considerably more expensive proposition. The Navy wants to procure 12 SSBN(X)s, and is working to reduce the estimated unit procurement cost of ships 2 through 12 in the program to $4.9 billion in FY2010 dollars. 26 To help pay for the SSBN(X)s without reducing other shipbuilding programs, the shipbuilding 24 Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy s Fiscal Year 2012 Shipbuilding Plan, June 2011, Table 2 (page 9). 25 Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy s Fiscal Year 2012 Shipbuilding Plan, June 2011, Table 2 (page 9). 26 For more on the SSBN(X) program, see CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke Congressional Research Service 16