Pakistani nuclear forces, 2016

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1 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: Pakistani nuclear forces, 2016 Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris To cite this article: Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris (2016) Pakistani nuclear forces, 2016, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 72:6, , DOI: / To link to this article: Published online: 31 Oct Submit your article to this journal Article views: View related articles View Crossmark data Citing articles: 1 View citing articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at Download by: [ ] Date: 25 November 2017, At: 08:50

2 BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 2016 VOL. 72, NO. 6, NUCLEAR NOTEBOOK Pakistani nuclear forces, 2016 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris ABSTRACT Pakistan has a nuclear weapons stockpile of warheads and appears to have plans to increase its arsenal further. With several delivery systems in development, four plutonium production reactors, and expansion of uranium enrichment facilities, the country s stockpile will likely increase over the next 10 years, but by how much will depend on many things. Two key factors will be how many nuclear-capable launchers Islamabad plans to deploy, and how much the Indian nuclear arsenal grows. Based on Pakistan s performance over the past 20 years and its current and anticipated weapons deployments, the authors estimate that its stockpile could potentially grow to warheads by 2025, making it the world s fifth-largest nuclear weapon state. Pakistan s deployment of short-range, so-called tactical nuclear weapons is causing considerable concern in South Asia and in the US Government about warhead security and lowering of the threshold for nuclear weapons use. Pakistan continues to expand its nuclear arsenal with more warheads, more delivery systems, and a growing fissile materials production industry. Analysis of a large number of commercial satellite images of Pakistan army garrisons and air force bases shows what appear to be mobile launchers and underground facilities that might be related to nuclear forces. We estimate that Pakistan now has a nuclear weapons stockpile of warheads (see Table 1). This stockpile exceeds the projection made by the US Defense Intelligence Agency in 1999 that Pakistan by 2020 would have warheads (US Defense Intelligence Agency 1999, 38). With several delivery systems in development, four plutonium production reactors, and its uranium enrichment facilities expanding, however, Pakistan has a stockpile that will likely increase further over the next 10 years. The size of that increase will depend on many factors. Two key factors will be how many nuclear-capable launchers Pakistan plans to deploy, and how much the Indian nuclear arsenal grows. Speculations that Pakistan may become the world s third-largest nuclear weapon state with a stockpile of some 350 warheads a decade from now are, we believe, exaggerated, not least because that would require a buildup two to three times faster than growth over the past two decades. We estimate that its stockpile could more realistically grow to warheads by 2025, if the current trend continues. If that happens, it would make Pakistan the world s fifth-largest nuclear KEYWORDS Defense; India; missiles; MRBM; nuclear weapons; Pakistan; SRBM weapon state. But unless India significantly expands its arsenal or further builds up its conventional forces, it seems reasonable to expect that Pakistan s nuclear arsenal will not continue to grow indefinitely but might begin to level off as its current weapons programs are completed. Nuclear policy developments Pakistan is modifying its nuclear posture with new short-range nuclear-capable weapon systems to counter military threats below the strategic level. The efforts seek to create a full-spectrum deterrent that is designed not only to respond to nuclear attacks but to counter an Indian conventional incursion onto Pakistani territory. 1 This development has created considerable concern in other countries, including the United States, who fear that the development lowers the threshold for nuclear use in a military conflict with India. The National Command Authority (NCA), which includes all government agencies involved in the nuclear mission, met on 24 February 2016 under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif to review a study of the growing conventional and strategic weapons development around Pakistan. The NCA pledged to take all possible measures to make national security robust including effectively respond to the threats to national security without indulging in arms race (Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations 2016). CONTACT Hans M. Kristensen hkristensen@fas.org 2016 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

3 BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 369 Table 1. Pakistani nuclear forces, Number of launchers Year deployed Range 1 (km) Warhead x yield (kt) 3 Number of warheads 2 Type NATO designation Aircraft F-16A/B ~ bomb ~24 Mirage III/V ~ bomb (or Ra-ad) ~12 Subtotal: ~36 ~36 Land-based ballistic missiles Abdali (Hatf-2) n.a. (2017) low kt n.a. Ghaznavi (Hatf-3) ~ kt ~16 Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4) ~ kt ~16 Shaheen-1A (Hatf-4) (2017) kt n.a. Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6) ~ kt ~12 Shaheen-3 (Hatf-10?) (2018) kt n.a. Ghauri (Hatf-5) ~ kt ~24 NASR (Hatf-9) ~ low kt ~24 5 Subtotal: ~92 ~92 Cruise missiles Babur (Hatf-7) ~ kt ~12 8 Ra ad (Hatf-8) (2017) kt n.a. Subtotal: ~12 ~12 Total ~140 1 Range listed is unrefueled combat range with drop tanks. 2 There may be more missiles than launchers but since each missile is dual capable, this table assigns an average of one warhead per launcher unless noted otherwise. 3 Yield estimate is based on the range of yields measured in the 1998 nuclear tests. It is possible that Pakistan since has developed warheads with lower and higher yields. 4 After six test launches, the Abdali might be in the process of introduction with the army. 5 Each NASR launcher has up to four missile tubes. But since NASR is a dual-capable system and the primary mission probably is conventional, this table counts only one warhead per launcher. 6 For unknown reasons, the Babur has not been test launched since The Pakistani government claims the Babur range is 700 km, twice the 350-km range reported by the US intelligence community. 8 Each launcher has three missile tubes. But since Babur is a dual capable system and the primary mission is probably conventional, this table counts only once warhead per launcher. The NCA also reviewed the security and safety mechanism of the nuclear arsenal and expressed deep satisfaction with Pakistan s existing security of weapons and installations. Furthermore, the NCA expressed full confidence in the reliability of the nuclear weapons command and control system and satisfaction with the high standard of operational preparedness of the nuclear arsenal (Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations 2016). The meeting praised nuclear deterrence as the factor of stability in South Asia and the NCA pledged to maintain Full Spectrum Deterrence, in line with the policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence. At the same time,the NCA reemphasized a desire for establishing a Strategic Restraint Regime in South Asia and the inescapable need of a meaningful and sustained comprehensive dialogue process for resolution of all outstanding disputes... (Pakistani Inter Services Public Relations 2016). The NCA s statement on security and safety was, in part, a response to international concern that Pakistan s evolving arsenal and particularly its growing inventory of short-range nuclear weapon systems raise questions about warhead management and command and control of the weapons. Satellite images show that security perimeters around many bases and military facilities have been upgraded over the past five years, possibly in response to terrorist attacks. Over the past decade, the US assessment of nuclear weapons security in Pakistan appears to have changed considerably from confidence to concern, particularly as a result of the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons. In 2007, a US State Department official told Congress that, we re, I think, fairly confident that they have the proper structures and safeguards in place to maintain the integrity of their nuclear forces and not to allow any compromise (Boucher 2007). In stark contrast, the US Statement Department assessment in 2016 was: We have been very concerned about Pakistan s deployment of battlefield nuclear weapons. Battlefield nuclear weapons, by their very nature, pose [a] security threat because you re taking battlefield nuclear weapons to the field where, as you know, as a necessity, they cannot be made as secure. So we re really quite concerned about this, and we have made our concerns known, and we will continue to press them about what we consider to be the destabilizing aspects of their battlefield nuclear weapons program (Economic Times 2016).

4 370 H.M.KRISTENSENANDR.S.NORRIS Pakistani officials reject such concerns and insist that nuclear weapons security is adequate. Samar Mubarik Mund, the former director of the National Defense Complex, explained in 2013 that a Pakistani nuclear warhead is assembled only at the eleventh hour if [it] needs to be launched. It is stored in three to four different parts at three to four different locations. If a nuclear weapon doesn t need to be launched, then it is never available in assembled form (World Bulletin 2013). As for the unique effect of tactical nuclear weapons, other Pakistani officials insist that the weapons are neither destabilizing nor lowering the nuclear threshold. In 2015, General Khalid Kidwai, a member of Pakistan s NCA, explained: Pakistan opted to develop a variety of short-range, low-yield nuclear weapons, also dubbed tactical nuclear weapons, as a defensive, deterrence response to an offensive doctrine by India (A Conversation With Gen. Khalid Kidwai 2015, 4 5). Kidwai said the NASR short-range weapon, specifically, was born out of a compulsion of this thing that I mentioned about some people on the other side [India] toying with the idea of finding space for conventional war, despite Pakistan nuclear weapons. Pakistan s understanding of India s Cold Start strategy was, he said, that it envisioned launching quick strikes into Pakistan within two to four days with eight to nine brigades simultaneously (A Conversation With Gen. Khalid Kidwai 2015, 8, 9). Such an attack force might involve roughly 32,000 36,000 troops. I strongly believe that by introducing the variety of tactical nuclear weapons in Pakistan s inventory, and in the strategic stability debate, we have blocked the avenues for serious military operations by the other side, Kidwai concluded (A Conversation With Gen. Khalid Kidwai 2015, 4 5). After Kidwai s statement, Pakistan s Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry publicly acknowledged the existence of Pakistan s low-yield, tactical nuclear weapons, apparently the first time a top government official has done so (India Today 2015). But the New York Times reported that although an unknown number of the tactical weapons had been built, they had not yet been deployed with warheads in the field (Sanger 2015). In September 2016, an attack on Indian military barracks in Kashmir triggered widespread rumors in India that Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja M. Asif, in an interview on Geo News, had threatened use of tactical nuclear weapons in response. But the interview was aired the day before the attack and mentioned potential use of tactical nuclear weapons in general terms. We are always pressured time and again that our tactical (nuclear) weapons, in which we have a superiority, that we have more tactical weapons than we need. It is internationally recognized that we have a superiority and if there is a threat to our security or if anyone steps on our soil and if someone s designs are a threat to our security, we will not hesitate to use those weapons for our defense (Scroll 2016). Nuclear weapons production complex Pakistan has a well-established and diverse fissile material production complex that is expanding. This includes the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant to the east of Islamabad, which appears to be under expansion, and probably a second enrichment plant at Gadwal to the north of Islamabad. Four heavy-water plutonium production reactors appear to have been completed at what is normally referred to as the Khushab Complex some 33 km (20 miles) to the south of Khushab. Three of the reactors at the complex have been added in the past 10 years. To reprocess spent fuel and extract plutonium, the New Labs Reprocessing Plant at Nilore to the east of Islamabad has been expanded and supplemented by possible completion of a second reprocessing plant located at Chashma in the northwestern part of Punjab Province (Albright and Kelleher-Vergantini 2015). Development and production of nuclear-capable missiles and their mobile launchers are done at the National Defence Complex (sometimes called National Development Complex) facilities in the Kala Chitta Dhar mountain range to the west of Islamabad. The complex is divided into two sections. The western section, south of Attock, appears to be involved in development, production, and test launching of missiles and rocket engines. The eastern section north of Fateh Jang is involved in production and assembly of road-mobile Transporter Erector Launchers (TELs) designed to transport and fire missiles. Satellite images show the presence of launchers for Shaheen I and Shaheen II ballistic missiles and Babur cruise missiles. The Fateh Jang section has been expanded significantly over the past 10 years with several large launcher assembly buildings. Other launcher and missile-related production and maintenance facilities may be located near Tarnawa and Taxila. Little is known about the production of warheads, but the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) near Wah to the northwest of Islamabad have been suspected for many years to serve a role. One of the factories to the northeast of Wah is located near a unique facility with six earth-covered bunkers inside a multilayered safety

5 BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 371 perimeter. The security perimeter was expanded significantly between 2005 and Estimating the size of the Pakistani nuclear warhead stockpile is fraught with uncertainty. A frequent mistake is to derive the estimate directly from the amount of weapons-grade fissile material produced. As of late 2015, the International Panel on Fissile Materials estimated that Pakistan had an inventory of approximately 3100 kg of weapon-grade (90% enriched) highly enriched uranium (HEU) and at least 190 kg of weapon-grade plutonium (International Panel on Fissile Materials 2015: 16, 25, 27). This material is theoretically enough to produce warheads, assuming that each warhead s solid core uses either kg of weapon-grade HEU or 4 6 kg of plutonium. 2 However, calculating stockpile size based solely on fissile material inventory is an incomplete methodology that tends to produce inflated warhead estimates. Instead, warhead estimates must take into account several factors, including: the amount of weapongrade fissile material produced, warhead design proficiency, warhead production rates, numbers of operational nuclear-capable launchers, how many of those launchers are dual capable, nuclear strategy, and statements by government officials. At their outset, estimates must take into account that not all of a country s fissile material ends up in warheads. Like other nuclear weapon states, Pakistan probably maintains a reserve of fissile material. Moreover, Pakistan simply lacks enough nuclear-capable launchers to accommodate warheads; furthermore, all of Pakistan s launchers are thought to be dual capable, which means that some of them, especially the shorter-range systems, presumably are assigned to nonnuclear missions as well. Finally, official statements often refer to warheads and weapons interchangeably, without making it clear whether it is the number of launchers or the warheads assigned to them that are being discussed. Despite these uncertainties, Pakistan is clearly engaged in a significant buildup of its nuclear forces and has been for some time. In 2008, Peter Lavoy, then a US National Intelligence Officer for South Asia, told NATO that Pakistan at that time was producing nuclear weapons at a faster rate than any other country in the world (US NATO Mission 2008). Six years later, in 2014, Lavoy described the purpose of the expansion of Pakistan s nuclear weapons program to include efforts to significantly increase fissile material production to design and fabricate multiple nuclear warheads with varying sizes and yields, to develop, test and ultimately deploy a wide variety of delivery systems with a wide range to include battle field range ballistic delivery systems for tactical nuclear weapons as they are often called 3 (Voice of America, 2014) (Emphasis added). Today, Kidwai acknowledged in March 2015, Pakistan possesses a variety of nuclear weapons, in different categories. At the strategic level, at the operational level, and the tactical level (A Conversation With Gen. Khalid Kidwai 2015, 6). How far Pakistan plans to go in terms of its development of a full-spectrum deterrent posture is unclear. It has provided no public statements about its intent. In 2015, however, Kidwai stated that the program is not open ended. It started with a concept of credible minimum deterrence, and certain numbers [of weapons] were identified, and those numbers, of course, were achieved not too far away in time. Then we translated it, like I said, to the concept of full spectrum deterrence in response to India s Cold Start doctrine. As a result, the numbers were modified. Now those numbers, as of today, and if I can look ahead for at least 10 to 15 more years, I think they are going to be more or less okay. In terms of the required size of Pakistan s nuclear arsenal, Kidwai said, we re almost 90, 95% there in terms of the goals that we had set out to achieve 15 years ago (A Conversation With Gen. Khalid Kidwai 2015, 6, 12). We estimate that Pakistan currently is producing sufficient fissile material to build new warheads per year (International Panel on Fissile Materials 2013), although we estimate that the actual warhead increase in the stockpile is probably closer to an average of 10 warheads per year. Nuclear-capable aircraft Pakistan probably assigns a nuclear strike mission to select F-16A/B and Mirage III/V fighter squadrons. The F-16 was probably the first aircraft in the nuclear role, but the Mirage quickly joined the mission. The F-16A/Bs were supplied by the United States between 1983 and After 40 aircraft had been delivered, the US State Department told Congress in 1989: None of the F-16s Pakistan already owns or is about to purchase is configured for nuclear delivery and Pakistan will be obligated by contract not to modify additional F-16s without the approval of the United States (Schaffer 1989). Yet, there were multiple credible reports at the time that Pakistan was already modifying US-supplied F-16s for nuclear weapons, including West German intelligence officials reportedly

6 372 H.M.KRISTENSENANDR.S.NORRIS telling Der Spiegel that Pakistan had already developed sophisticated computer and electronic technology to outfit the US F-16s with nuclear weapons (Associated Press 1989). Delivery of additional F-16s, including the more modern F-16C/D version, were delayed by concern over Pakistan s emerging nuclear weapons program and withheld by the United States in the 1990s. But the policy was changed by the George W. Bush administration, which supplied Pakistan with the more modern F-16s. The F-16A/Bs are based with the 38th Wing at Mushaf (formerly Sargodha) Air Base, 160 km (100 miles) northwest of Lahore. Organized into the 9th and 11th Squadrons ( Griffins and Arrows, respectively), these aircraft have a range of 1600 km (extendable when equipped with drop tanks) and most likely are equipped to each carry a single nuclear bomb on the centerline pylon. Security perimeters at the base have been upgraded since Nuclear bombs are probably not stored at the base itself but kept at the Sargodha Weapons Storage Complex 10 km to the south. In a crisis, the bombs could be flown in or the F-16s could disperse to bases near underground storage facilities to pick up the weapons. The newest F-16C/Ds are based with the 39th Wing at Shahbaz Air Base outside Jacobabad. The wing upgraded to F-16C/D from Mirage in 2011, and so far has one squadron: the 5th Squadron (known as the Falcons ). The base has been under significant expansion, with numerous weapons bunkers added since There are also F-16s visible at Minhas (Kamra) Air Base northwest of Islamabad, although that might be related to industry at the base. Some of the Mirage III and/or Mirage V aircraft apparently have been equipped for nuclear weapons and have been used in test-launches of the nuclearcapable Ra ad air-launched cruise missile. The Pakistani Air Force is adding aerial refueling capability to the Mirage, a capability that would greatly enhance a nuclear strike mission. The Mirage fighter-bombers are focused at two bases. Masroor Air Base outside Karachi houses the 32nd Wing with three Mirage squadrons: 7th Squadron ( Bandits ), 8th Squadron ( Haiders ), and 22nd Squadron ( Ghazis ). A possible nuclear weapons storage site is located five kilometers (three miles) northwest of the base (Kristensen 2009), and since 2004, unique underground facilities have been constructed at Masroor that could potentially be designed to support a nuclear strike mission. This includes a large underground facility within a high-security area and a possible alert hangar with underground weapons-handling capability. 4 The other Mirage base is Rafiqui Air base near Shorkot, which is home to the 34th Wing with two Mirage squadrons: the 15th Squadron ( Cobras ) and the 27th Squadron ( Zarras ). There are also rumors that Pakistan intends to make the Chinese-supplied JF-17 fighter nuclear-capable. According to the Pakistani Senate Defense Committee on National Defence, the pursuit of the JF-17 program was partially triggered by the US military export sanctions in response to Pakistan s nuclear program, including the withholding of F-16 aircraft. With spares for its top-of-the-line F16s in question, and additional F-16s removed as an option, Pakistan sought help from its Chinese ally for the JC-17/FC-1 jet (Senate Committee on National Defense 2016). Ballistic missiles Pakistan appears to have six currently operational nuclear-capable ballistic missiles: the short-range Abdali (Hatf-2), Ghaznavi (Hatf-3), Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4) and NASR (Hatf-9), and the medium-range Ghauri (Hatf-5) and Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6). At least two other nuclear-capable ballistic missiles are under development: the medium-range Shaheen-1A and Shaheen-3. The Pakistani road-mobile ballistic missile force has undergone significant development and expansion over the past decade. This includes four or five possible missile garrisons along the Indian border for shortrange systems (Babur, Ghaznavi, Shaheen-1, NASR) and three other garrisons further inland for mediumrange systems (Shaheen-2 and Ghauri). 5 The short-range, solid-fuel, single-stage Abdali (Hatf-2) has been in development for a long time. The Pentagon reported in 1997 that the Abdali appeared to have been discontinued, but flight-testing resumed in 2002 and it was last test launched in The 180-km (111-mile) missile has been displayed at parades several times on a four-axel road-mobile TEL. The three-year gap in flight testing indicates the Abdali program may have encountered technical difficulties. After the 2013 test, the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) stated that Abdali carries nuclear as well as conventional warheads and provides an operationallevel capability to Pakistan s Strategic Forces. ISPR said the test launch consolidates Pakistan s deterrence capability both at the operational and strategic levels (ISPR 2013). The short-range, solid-fuel, single-stage Ghaznavi (Hatf-3) was likely derived from the Chinese M-11 missile, of which Pakistan acquired approximately 30 in the early 1990s. In 1996 two years before

7 BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 373 Pakistan s nuclear tests a classified US National Intelligence Estimate on China s missile-related assistance to Pakistan concluded that the latter probably had developed nuclear warheads for the M-11 (Smith 1996). The Ghaznavi was test launched twice in After the second test on May 8, 2014, the ISPR said the Ghaznavi was capable of delivering nuclear and conventional warheads, and that the test was the culminating point of the Field Training Exercise of Army Strategic Forces Command which was aimed at testing the operational readiness of a Strategic Missile Group besides up gradation [sic] of various capabilities of Weapon Systems (ISPR 2014a). Its short range of 290 km (180 miles) the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) reports the range to be 250 km (155 miles) means that the Ghaznavi cannot strike Delhi from Pakistani territory, and Army units equipped with the missile are probably based relatively near the Indian border. 6 The Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4) is a single-stage, solid-fuel, dual-capable, short-range ballistic missile with a maximum range of 750 km (466 miles) that has been in service since The Shaheen-1 may be a reverseengineered Chinese M-9 missile and is carried on a four-axle, road-mobile TEL similar to the one used for the Ghaznavi. Since 2012, Shaheen-1 test-launches have involved an extended-range version widely referred to as Shaheen-1A. The Pakistani Government, which has declared the range to be 900 km (560 miles), has used both designations: Shaheen-1A in 2012 (ISPR 2012a) and Shaheen-1 in 2013 (ISPR 2013). Potential Shaheen- 1 deployments locations include Gujranwala, Okhara, or Pano Aqil. 7 One of the most controversial new nuclear-capable missiles in the Pakistani arsenal is the NASR (Hatf-9), a short-range, solid-fuel missile with a range of only 60 km (37 miles). With a range too short to attack strategic targets inside India, NASR appears intended solely for battlefield use against invading Indian troops. 8 According to the Pakistani Government, the NASR carries nuclear warheads of appropriate yield with high accuracy, shoot and scoot attributes and was developed as a quick response system to add deterrence value to Pakistan s strategic weapons development program at shorter ranges in order to deter evolving threats (ISPR 2011b). The four-axle, roadmobile TEL appears to use a snap-on system that can carry two or more launch-tube boxes. The most recent test on September involved launching four missiles from a road-mobile quadruple box launcher. The US intelligence community has listed the NASR as a deployed system since 2013 (NASIC 2013), but because there have been just four test events, involving launch of a total of 12 missiles, we estimate that operational deployment of the nuclear version may still be in its early stages. Potential deployment locations include Gujranwala, Okhara, or Pano Aqil. 9 The medium-range, two-stage, solid-fuel Shaheen-2 (Hatf-6) appears to be operational after many years of development. Pakistan s National Defense Complex has assembled Shaheen-2 launchers at least since 2004 or 2005 (Kristensen 2007), and a 2013 US intelligence community report said that the Shaheen-2 probably will soon be deployed (National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) 2013). The Pakistani Government described the most recent Shaheen-2 test-launch, in November 2014, as a training launch marking the culminating point of the Field Training Exercise of Army Strategic Forces Command which was aimed at ensuring operational readiness of a Strategic Missile Group (ISPR 2014b). The US NASIC has several times set the Shaheen-2 s range at 2000 km (1243 miles), but after the November 2014 test the Pakistani Government reported the range as only 1500 km (932 miles). The Shaheen-2 is carried on a six-axle, road-mobile TEL. Pakistan conducted two test launches of the medium-range Shaheen-3 in The Pakistani Government said the missile was capable of delivering a nuclear or conventional warhead to a range of 2750 km (1709 miles). Since the range exceeded the north-to-south length of Pakistan, the Shaheen-3 testlaunch had an impact point in the Arabian Sea (ISPR 2015a). The Shaheen-3 is carried on an eight-axle TEL supplied by China and was displayed publicly for the first time at the 2015 Pakistan Day Parade. The Shaheen-3 will still require several more test launches before it becomes operational. The range of the Shaheen-3 is sufficient to target all of mainland India from launch positions in most of Pakistan to the south of Islamabad. But apparently, the missile was developed to do more than that. According to Gen. Kidwai, the range of 2750 km was determined by a need to be able to target the Nicobar and Andaman Islands in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean that are developed as strategic bases where India might think of putting its weapons (A Conversation With Gen. Khalid Kidwai 2015, 10). But for a 2750-km range Shaheen- 3 to reach the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, it would need to be launched from positions in the very Eastern parts of Pakistan, close to the Indian border. If deployed in the Western parts of the Balochistan province, the range of the Shaheen-3 would for the first time bring Israel within range of Pakistani nuclear missiles.

8 374 H.M.KRISTENSENANDR.S.NORRIS Pakistan s oldest nuclear-capable medium-range ballistic missile, the road-mobile, single-stage, liquid-fuel Ghauri (Hatf-5), was test launched on April The government said the launch was conducted by a Strategic Missile Group of the Army Strategic Forces Command for the purpose of testing the operational and technical readiness of Army Strategic Forces Command (ISPR 2015b). The extra time needed to fuel the missile before launch makes the Ghauri more vulnerable to attack than solid-fuel missiles, so it is possible that the longer range versions of the Shaheen may eventually replace the Ghauri. 10 Potential deployment areas include the Sargodha Central Ammunition Depot area. 11 Cruise missiles Pakistan is developing two new nuclear-capable cruise missiles, the ground-launched Babur (Hatf-7) and the air-launched Ra ad (Hatf-8). There are rumors that the Babur is also being converted for use on ships or submarines. According to the Pakistani Government, the Babur and Ra ad both have stealth capabilities and pinpoint accuracy, and each is described as a low-altitude, terrain-hugging missile with high maneuverability (ISPR 2011a, 2011c).TheyarebothmuchslimmerthanPakistan s ballistic missiles, suggesting success with warhead miniaturization based on plutonium instead of uranium. The Babur is a ground-launched, subsonic, dualcapable cruise missile that looks similar to the US Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile, the Chinese DH-10 ground-launched cruise missile, and the Russian air-launched AS-15. The Babur has been test launched 11 times (last in 2014) and is probably operational with the armed forces. Its road-mobile launcher appears to be a unique five-axle TEL with a three-tube box launcher that is different than the quadruple box launcher used for static display. The Pakistani Government normally reports the range as 700 km (435 miles) (ISPR 2012b, 2012c), but the US intelligence community sets the range much lower, at 350 km (217 miles) (National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) 2013). Babur TELs have been fitting out at the National Defense Complex for several years and have recently been seen at the Akro garrison northeast of Karachi. The garrison includes a large enclosure with six garages that have room for 12 TELs and a unique underground facility that is probably used to store the missiles. 12 The second cruise missile under development, the air-launched, dual-capable Ra ad (Hatf-8), has been test-launched six times, most recently in February 2016, and might be entering service soon. The test launches have been conducted from a Mirage III fighter-bomber. The Pakistani Government states that the Ra ad can deliver nuclear and conventional warheads with great accuracy (ISPR 2011c) to a range of 350 km, and complementing Pakistan s deterrence capability by achieving strategic standoff capability on land and at sea (ISPR 2016). A potential deployment site for the Ra ad is Masroor Air Base outside Karachi, which is home for several Mirage squadrons and includes unique underground facilities that might be associated with nuclear weapons storage and handling. 13 There are also indications that Pakistan is developing a nuclear weapon initially probably a nuclearcapable cruise missile for deployment on submarines. In 2012, the Pakistani navy established Headquarters Naval Strategic Forces Command (NSFC) for the development and deployment of a sea-based strategic nuclear force. The government said that this command would be the custodian of the nation s 2nd strike capability to strengthen Pakistan s policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence and ensure regional stability (ISPR 2012d). It is possible that the naval weapon will be a modified version of the Babur ground-launched cruise missile. Kidwai in 2015 publicly acknowledged the need for a sea-based second-strike capability. Although a land-based capability can also provide a secondstrike capability, that is not assured. The assured second strike capability comes from being sea based, he explained. Therefore, without calling it a specific nuclear submarine, or something, broadly speaking a second-strike capability, a limited second-strike capability, a modern second-strike capability for Pakistan, I think will be helpful (A Conversation With Gen. Khalid Kidwai 2015, 15). Kidwai confirmed that the technologies needed to acquire a sea-based nuclear capability are being developed. I can say with confidence that we are not too far away from it. So, comprehensively speaking I think this capability will come into play in the next few years (A Conversation With Gen. Khalid Kidwai 2015, 16). In 2015, the Pakistani Ministry of Defence Production reported a new contract for the indigenous development of 1 [one] ship-borne system with 1 [one] Land Attack Missile to be completed by October 2018 (Government of Pakistan [2014] 2015).

9 BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 375 Notes 1. For insightful analysis of Pakistan s nuclear policy, see: Siddique and Faisal (2016); Dalton and Krepon (2015). 2. These amounts of fissile material per warhead are conservative estimates and may be less (Cochran and Paine 1995, 9). 3. Gul (2014); One year after providing this description of the Pakistani nuclear warhead program, Lavoy was appointed as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for South Asia at the National Security Council. 4. For analysis of possible nuclear facilities at Masroor Air Base, see: 5. For analysis of possible missile facilities, see: 6. For analysis of possible missile facilities, see: 7. For analysis of possible missile facilities, see: 8. For en excellent analysis of the doctrine and Pakistan s potential use of battlefield nuclear weapons, see: Nayyar and Mian (2010). 9. For analysis of possible missile facilities, see: 10. The Ghauri MRBM is based on North Korea s No Dong missile. 11. For analysis of possible missile brigade locations, see: 12. For analysis of possible missile brigade locations, see: 13. For analysis of possible nuclear facilities at Masroor Air Base, see: Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors. Funding This research was carried out with grants from the New Lands Foundation and the Ploughshares Fund. Notes on contributors Hans M. Kristensen is the director of the Nuclear Information Project with the Federation of American Scientists in Washington, DC. His work focuses on researching and writing about the status of nuclear weapons and the policies that direct them. Kristensen is a coauthor of the world nuclear forces overview in the SIPRI Yearbook (Oxford University Press) and a frequent adviser to the news media on nuclear weapons policy and operations. Inquiries should be directed to FAS, 1725 DeSales St NW, Sixth Floor, Washington, DC, 20,036 USA; +1 (202) Robert S. Norris is a senior fellow with the Federation of American Scientists in Washington, DC. His principal areas of expertise include writing and research on all aspects of the nuclear weapons programs of the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China, as well as India, Pakistan, and Israel. He is the author of Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie R. Groves, the Manhattan Project s Indispensable Man (2002). He has coauthored the Nuclear Notebook column since May References A Conversation With Gen. Khalid Kidwai Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Transcript, 4 5, March Albright, D., and S. Kelleher-Vergantini Pakistan s Chashma Plutonium Separation Plant: Possibly Operational. Institute for Science and International Security. February pdf Boucher, R. A Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, Testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Pakistan. (U.S. Government Printing Office: December 6, 2007), 31. Cochran, T. B., and C. E. Paine The Amount of Plutonium and High-Enriched Uranium Needed for Pure Fission Nuclear Weapons. Natural Resources Defense Council, April fissionweapons.pdf Dalton, T., and M. Krepon A Normal Nuclear Pakistan. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace/ Stimson Center. August. default/files/file-attachments/normalnuclearpakistan.pdf The Godfather of Pakistan s Nuclear Program Has Denied a Recent BBC Report that Saudi Arabia Had Helped Fund the Nuclear Program World Bulletin. November /haber Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Defence Production. [2014] Yearbook /modp/userfiles1/file/Year%20Book% pdf Gul, A As Pakistan Expands Nuclear Program, China Seen as Most Reliable Partner. Voice of America, May International Panel on Fissile Materials Countries: Pakistan. International Panel on Fissile Materials Global Fissile Material Report gfmr15.pdf ISPR. 2011a. Press release No. PR40/2011-ISPR. February date=2011/2/10 ISPR. 2011b. Week view No. PR94/2011-ISPR. April 19. se&date=2011/4/19

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