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2 UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda Date of interview: 27 November, 3 Deeember 1998, 18 & 20 February 1999 Place of interview: Ministry of Justice and Hotel Résidence Albert in Brusse ls Language used in interview: French "4 WITNESS STATEMENT Naine of interviewers(shot): Kadri DODO and Moussa SANOGO Names of Legal Officers: Luc COTE and Josée D AOUST Naine of interpreters used in the interview: IDENTIFICATION OF WITNESS Last Naine: RUSATIRA First Name: Léonidas Nïekname: 2) Date ofbirth: 1 May 1944 Age: Sex: M 3) Religion: Catholie 4) Natïonality: Rwandan 5) Ethnie origin: Hutu 6) Occupation: In April 1994: Commander, Ëeole supérieure militaire Current: Unemployed, tel: r I Cel ule: Kirwa Cellule: r Cellule: Nyarugenge Nyarugenge Commune: ] Gatonde Ruhengeri Commune: Prefeet~ïe:... Commune:! Nyarugenge....,.» -., ~, -. PVK KO! I( Translated from Ftench 1

3 8) Parents Mother: Angeline PANYURWANI~ Father: Ruyange RWAMAKUBA 9) Marital status: Married K012761,~ ~ 0" 1:.9 7. ~ 1.:

4 UNITED NATIONS ~ NATIONS UNIES International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda WITNESS STATEMENT Date of interview: 27 November, 3 Deeember 1998, 18 & 20 February Place of interview: Ministry of Justice and Hotel Résidence Albert in Brusse ls Language used in interview: French Naine of interviewers(shot): Kadri DODO and Moussa SANOGO Names of Legal Officers: Luc COTE and Josée D AOUST Naine of interpreters used in the interview: IDENTIFICATION OF WITNESS Last Name: RUSATIRA First Name: Léonidas Nickname: 2) Date ofbirth: 1 May 1944 Age: Sex: M 3) Religion: Catholic 4) Nationality: Rwandan 5) Ethnie origin: Hum 6) Occupatiorï: In April 1994: Commander, Ecole supérieure militaire Current: Unemployed, tel: PLace of birth Current In April " I t J J [ [ " Cellule: Kîrwa Cellule:! Cellule: Nyarugenge ~ , [ Secteur: q Cyibumba Seeteur: Secteur: Nyarugenge Gatonde Commune: Nyarugenge [... _ -.. r Commune: I... Prefecture: Ruhengeri Prefeeture: _ Prefecture: PVK KO K Translated from French 1

5 8) Parents Mother: Angeline PANYURWANIKI Fath~: Ruyange RWAMAKUBA 9) Marital status: Married Naine of spouse: Catherine MUKARUSAGARA Number of ehildren: 3 10) Language(sho0 spoken: Kinyarwanda, Freneh, English 11) Language(shot) written: Kinyarwanda, Freneh, English KOi r276, «. 12) Past residence outside Rwanda: Period: Several stays abroad from 1967 to date Country: France, Belgium, USA, China, Japan, Germany, Canada... Reason: Training courses, Official missions... Remarks: 13) Member of social or political association: Naine: MRND when it was still a govemment party (until 1991) Function: Period: Remarks: 14) Name and address of a friend, relative or acquaintance: Naine: Alain FOURNIER Address: Rue du Noyer 225, 1030 Brussels Relationship: Friend «0r27«1~ KO K Translated from French 2

6 /~Wq In 1996, I met two investigators from the ICTR in Nairobi. They had promised to keep in touch with me but did hot do so. I had hot given any statement to those investigators. But I was interviewed by various Belgian Judieial Authorities and the Senatorial Committee in conneetion with the events that took place in Rwanda in April Ail the interviews foeused on the murder of the ten Belgian Blue Helmets. I was also contacted by Col. Théoneste BAGOSORA s lawyers. As regards the possibility of going to testify before the ICTR in Arusha, l~~c~~r~cb-to think about it and inform you later. In a written document which I submitted to the Belgian Senatorial Committee, I extended my analysis to the socio-political contëxt prevailing in Rwanda before the painful events of The explanation provided partiauy answered several questions which you wîll certainly ask me. I will make available to you a copy ofthis document and any otherelevant document which may help you ïn your investigation. Moreover, I ara prepared to answer any specific queries on any particular issues. Upon successive questioning, the witness made the fouowing statement: 1. Context: Four years of total war between 1990 and 1994 had created permanent and ever increasing tension in Rwanda over the years. The Arusha Accord signed between the HABYARIMANA government and the Rwandan Patrîotic Front were hardly implemented for the simple reason that none of the warring parties who signed the Accord really wanted to apply it. Sinceach party wanted to blame the other for the failure, the gaine played by the stakeholders obviously created serious problems and fear ofa large-scale massacre of the Tut.sis as had been the case on several occasions in the country (e.g. the massacre ofthe Bagogwes and the Kibilira Tutsis). I was certainly expecting massacres but I must confess that I was surprïsed by the scale and nature ofthe 1994 massacres. 2. Training of militiamen: The militiamen were an offshoot partyouth wings ereated in the wake of political liberalism. A clear distinction should however be made between the MRND, President HABYAR]MANA s party, and the others, because only members of the MRND lnterahamwe militia reeeived military training dispensed by the national army. The military training, to the best of my knowledge, was dispensed outside the military b~ks. To iuustrate my point abouthis training, I ara going to tell you aboutwo incidents: KO K Translated from Frenoh 3

7 The first one is about the contingent of youths whom the commander of Kibungo Gendarmerie squad saw on his way from Mutara. The officer reportext this to his headquarters but he was told that was hot his business. K O. ]2 7~ ] 6 Shortly atter this first incident, on my way to Kabuga, one day on theroad between the Kanombe Airport junetion and Kabuga village, I saw a crowd of young people. This eaught my attention and I stopped ask them what they were doing there. One of thém told me they were a group ofboys scout. I went my way though I was not convineed, because they were hot dressed as boys scout. Before I reached Kabuga, I came across abouthree or four empty military trucks. Then on m~ way back to Kigali, I saw those military trucks again, earrying the saine youths towards Mutara. At that rime, the Arusha Accord forbade the reeruitment of new soldiers. Therefore, they could only be i, i " lnterahamwe militiamen und ergomg rmhtary trmmng m Mutara. I ana sure tha the soldiers who trained the Interahamwe must have received orders from the Axrny Headquarters to do the training. I ana saying this because the training was done with material and human resourees from the army, which only the Axmy Headquarters could provide. At any rate, the relationship between the Interahamwe and file President of the Republie, Commander-in-chief of the army, was well known. In a speech HABYARIMANA made at Ruhengeri Stadium, he had told the lnterahamwe that one day they would go to the field together. 3. The secret forces within the army: In practice, many orders were given verbally in the Rwandan Armed Forces. This made it possible to issue unsavoury orders while bypassing the offieial command. That is why, at tha time, knowing the offïcial structure was not enough to understaad w.h~ was happening within the Rwandan Army. In addition to the offieial structure, one needed to know the officers holding key positions, their native commune or alliances. As a matter of faet, I would sa), tha there was in the army a parauel unofficial controlling system. il Ofïïcers from the President s commune appeared more powerful, whatever their grades. As a general fuie, men from the President s region were the President s men. That applied to natives of some communes in Gisenyi, Ruhengeri and Byumbapréfectures. As I said earlier, the initial application ofthe Arusha Accord provoked unorthodox reaetions within the army. A tract was written by one or some officers who called themselves AMASASU. The tract was hot partieularly favourable to the Arusha Accord. I do not know who was hiding behind AMASASU but aecording to the content, the tract was written by a group ofofficers. The joumalist, Hassan NGEZE, reportedly elaimed he wrote KO K Traaslate, d from Frcnch 4

8 k is likely someone familiar with the ~ng of some omcers expressed those thoughts on their behalf in the tract. At any rate, some oftïcers were more highly-placed and more committed than others but wha thcy had in common was tha they were mainly from the north or had close ries with the Prcsldent" s fami ly. These oflïcers, whose centcr of gravity, was. Col. BAGOSORA, did hot make lif easy for the opposition parties. Among them, I can mention: - Lt. Col. Anatole NSENGIYUMVA - Major MPmANV~ K Major NTABAKUZE While he was Minister ofdefence, I aceompanîed James GASANA during lais first visi to Kanombe Camp. I notieed that the Minister was not well reeeived by Col. BAGOSORA who was then the Camp Commander. I think BAGOSORA was later appointed Directeur de Cabinet in the Ministry of Defence so as to make lire generally impossible for the civilian ministers who knew little or rîothing abouthe rtmning of the army. Minister GASANA was unaware of so many things beëause orders were issued verbauy. The distribution of weapons by BAGOSORA to ivilians in Gisenyi without lais knowledge is a glaring example. At that rime, the extremists were blackmailing everybody, even the army Calling an officer, whatever lais rank, a traitor an "lnyenzi" was enough at that rime to destabilise him. You had to do everything to make sure you were not elassified with the traitors. The appointment of Major CYIZA into the BAGOSORA Commission and the subsequent appointment of GATSINZI as the Rwandan Chief of Army Staff dudng the war, was intended to drag credible officers who were not weu seen in the corridors of power into dangerous deeisions. 4. Distribution of Weapons: The Minister of Defenee, James GASANA, informed of the distribution of weapons in Gisenyi area. He held Col.BAGOSORA responsible for this. I do not seë any reason why weapons were distrïbuted exeept for kiuing eivilians, more so thathis was being done far away from the front. I believe it was not possible to distribute weapons of war. withouthe knowledge of the Army Headquarters. Ithen strongly advised Minister GASA_NA to order the withdrawal ofthe weapons distributed by BAOeSORA to the eivilians in Gisenyi who were far away from the front. There was no objective KOI K Translated from French 5

9 reason why guns should be givçn only to Hum civilians if the purpose was not to use them against Tutsi civilians. I ana making a distinction between the distribution donc by BAGOSORA and the previous one at the request of D ogratias NSABIMANA, who was at that time the commander of operations in M~t~a. K The distribution of weapons by a commander of operations could be justified it was mean to reïnforce his defence of the civilian population subjeeted to enemy attaeks in a combat zone. But no threat justified the distribution made by BAGOSORA in Gisenyi. 5. The Kibilira Massacres of 1990: The massacres were committed by some armed civilians instigated against other civilians by a secret organisation. 6. The BAGOSORA Commission: The commission was set up during an officers meeting chaired by President HABYARIMANA. During the meeting, the issue of: "how to identify the enemy in order to better fight him" was addressed. Two schools ofthought emerged: some offieersconsideredtheenemyastherpf troops while others had a wider view. President HABYARLMANA did not make any decision between the two schools of thought. In the course ofthe meeting, he set up a commission to be headed by CoI.BAGOSORA. If my memory serves me right, I think Anatole NSENGIYUMVA, CYIZA, ~ABAKUZE, KARANGWA, GATSINZI, MUBERUKA and BAHUFITE were members of the cotmnission. BAGOSORA was o,,, t,he commander of Kanombe Camp wher ethe eommlsslons meetmgs were held; the Commîssion carried out the comprehensive assignment of defining the enemy and mapping out the strategy to fight him. When NSABIMANA was appointed Chief of Staff, he eirculated an exeerpt of this document on the def mition of the enemy. I did not see the entire report of the commission, I only saw the excerpt published by NSABIMANA. I had a different view abouthe definition ofthenemy given in the report. The hard-liners prevailed over the moderate members of the commission who, however, had to keep a low profile for their own safety. KO K Translated from Frcnch 6

10 7, The Death Squad. f~ q~ ~O I think the squad is an ill-defined, nebulous and non-structured entity in the corridors of power. 8. Lists of persons to be killed: A ist was round in NSABIMANA s car during a traffic accident before the 1994 events. At that rime, some people speculated that it was the list of persons to be killed. Later, Jean Berckn~.as BIRARA reported that General NSABIMANA had once told him of a list ofpersons tobe kalled. As for NSABIMANA, he once spoke of the existence of a list of people to kill. The meeting at the Army Headquarters. K0t~27619,. Inthe night of 6 to 7 April, around 1 a.m., General NDINDILIYIMANA telephoned me and asked me to report at the Army Headquarters. I went there immediately and discovered that a meeting of officers on the prevailing situation had just ended. General NDINDILIYIMANA gave a succinct summary of the meeting and informed me that Colonel BAGOSORA had let with General DALLAIRE to sec Mr. Roger BOBO, the Special Representative ofthe Secretary General of the Unîted Nations. The matter hand was that atter the death ofthe President ofthe Republie and the Chief of Staff, the Army should take over the reins of power in the country. I immediately expressed my disagreement with thi solution, advancing the idea that the government in place be supported and suggesting that a meeting extended to include ail military chiefs be eonvened the following day, to bring the matter before them. When I expressed my disagreement with this veiled coup d Etat, NDINDILYIMANA seeme divided between my view and that of the offieers who were fighting him, including Lt. Col. KAYUMBA and RUHORAHOZA. He informed me that Colonel GATSINZI had been appointed interim Chief ofarmy Staff. The meetings The first ESM meeting. On 7 April 1994, the officers met in the ESM lecture hall. The meeting was chaired by BAGOSORA. The following oflïeers attended the meeting: -Colonel BAGOSORA -General NDINDILIYIMANA -Commanders of operational secteurs KO K Translated from French 7

11 -Camp Commanders -The Commanders of ESM -Chiefs of Army Staff -The Préfet of Kigali, Thareisse RENZAHO -Heads of Departmenls, Ministry of Deïence -Commanders of Special Units, excepthe commander of the Presidential Guard... Colonel BAGOSORA repeated what had been said the night before and gave the floor to participants. I suggested that the Army should ensure security and assisthe Govemment in place continue ils work. I mean the government of Agathe UWILINGIMANA. In particular, I was supported by NTABAKUZE and NKUNDIYE. I later realized before the meeting ended that Agathe had been assassinated. I feel that these two offieers from BAGOSORA s barracks pretended to support me whereas they probably knew then tha the Prime Minister had been assassinated. The meeting was interrupted by the sound of gunshots, which came from areas around Kigali barracks. Lt. Colonel NUBAHA, Commander of this military barracks came to BAGOSORA and spoke to him. I think that happened before General DALLAIRE a/rived. The meeting adopted my position and appoînted members to a erisis eommittee that was to ensure the implementation of these decïsions. The meeting of the afternoon of 7 April 1994 As planned, the crisis committee held a meeting at the ESM in the evening to eleet ils chairman. It was a stormy meeting because I maintained that BAGOSORA, who had already retired, eould hot head a eommittee of soldiers still in active service. He beeame angry, saying that I wanted to strip him of ail his powers in spire of the facthathe idea of setting up the committee was lais. General NDINDINILYIMANA was appointed president of the erisis eommittee and BAGOSORA lefthe room visibly angry. The meeting of 8 April 1994 On 8 April 1994, the crisis committee met MRND political leaders. The meeting was introduced by BAGOSORA, but ehaired by General NDINDILIYIMANA. BAGOSORA introdueed the KOI K Translated from French 8

12 I«ç~r polïtical leaders. It was decided that a govemment should be pro in place. When I pointed out that the RPF was absent, one ofthe participants explained to me that it was the Govemment to be put in place that was to negotiate with the RPF. Two schools ofthought emerged from the meeting. We wanted the fundamental law to be applied while the other, in the majofity, wanted the Constitution tobe applied outside the Arushà Peace Accords. From then, I no longerecognized the government as legitimate beeause ofthis and my future initiatives lined up with this idea. ~ 0 ~ Threats of attack against ESM From 8 April, rumours reached me through soldiers tha the ESM was to be attacked because Faustin TWAGIRAMUNGU was hiding there. This suspicion was attributable to the fact that Faustin received a cordial welcome when, in Iris capaeity as Prime Minister-designate under the Arusha Accords, he was invited by the Minister of Defense to diseuss with FAR oflïcers. ï learnt tha the threats ofattacks came from some soldiers in Kigali barracks. I telephoned Minister BIZIMUNGU and informed him. Eventually, this attaek whieh was certainly the wish ofextremists was not launehed. In the sarne vein, it was also said that I had a transmitter-receiver at the ESM with whieh I communicated with the RPF. I suspecthat BAGOSORA was behînd this destabilization campaign for he considered me an enemy, as I did not share lais views. 11- BAGOSORA s programme on 7 Aprii I do not think BAGOSORA ate the meal prepared for participarlts.of the 7 April meeting by Major Jeanne NDAMAGE, $40ftïeer at the ESM. What I ara saying is that he did not stay on at ESM after the meeting. It might be better to ask Jeanne NDAMAGE who was in charge of the meal on 7 Aprïl. 12 Incidents at ETO on 10 andll April 1994 On 10 April 1994, I went to ETO to look for a family who unfortunately was not there. However, I found Mr. Boniface NGUNRUNZIZA (sic) the Minister of Foreign Affairs designate there. asked me if I could corne back the following day and go with him to colleet lais passport. He was living in Gasharu, between SONATUBES and the Brigade de la Gendarmerie. I went baek to ETO the followîng day to sec NGUNRUNZIZA (sic) who explained to me that he was no longer going to collect his passport for he had leamthat Rwandan passports were no longer valid. KO K Tnmslated from French

13 Lt. LEMAIRE ofthe UNAMIR Belgian detachment who was on guard at the ETO ac~ompanied me and asked me if I could eommunicate with the Gendarmerie and ask them to take over if UNAMOE had to leave ETO. As the phones in Kicukiro had broken down since 8 Apdl 1994, I went to town from where I caued NDINDILIYIMANA and told him there were refugees of ail ethnic groups at ETO and that UNAMIR wanted gendarmes to be sent there because it could leave ETO. General NDINDILIYIMANA told me that he would take eare of the situation~ 0 ] That aftemoon, I tried to save the family of Alexis KANYARENGWE, the RPF chairman, by sending them initiauy to ETO. However, the family and their eseort came baek to my residenee in Kigalï. The driver told me tha the refugees in Kîeukiro had been transferred somewhere else and that there were no more refugees at ETO. I therefore went to ETO (Kieukiro) around 2 p.m., to ask Lt. LEMAIRE exactly where the refugees had been taken, so that I eould take the KANYARENGWE family there. I took the Shell station road in Gikondo that led to the Kieukir 0 eentre. As I approaehed ETO, from the main road, I saw smoke in the neighbourhood and the refugees were no longer there. The lnterahamwe, armed with bladed weapons were stiu in the neighbourhood. I therefore decided to go and see my mother near the ETO, whom I had left with some refugees, so that I could reassure them. Then Ileft immediately for town to try and get in touch with NDINDILIYIMANA and find out if he had been able to send gendarmes to the ETO. Unfortunately, I did not see him until Radio RTLM started announeing the death of NGURUNZIZA (sic) General NDINDILIYIMANA told others that he had sent some gendarmes. This was later confirmed to me. I do not remember seeing FAR soldiers at ETO during this visit. However, it is important to note that as some RPF elements infiltmted, they passed by the ETO fenee and from 8 or 9 April 1994, no vehicles plied the Gikondo-Kanombe road via SONATUBES beeause heavy RPF weapons were controlling this road: one was at the CND and the other near the APAPER primary school, Remera. In ortier to get to Kanombe, one had to take the road between Gikondo and Kieukîro without passing by the Kîeukiro junetion (SONATUBES) Regarding what was written on page 132 ofthe book entitled: "10 Commandos die in Rwanda" that Major NTABAKUZE arrested four hundred refugees at ETO and delivered them to the Interahamwe KO K Tnmslatexl from Freneh I 0

14 ~qs 6 milifia who took them to Nyanza wher they were killed along with others, this information needs to be deeply examine& In my opinion, itis clear that UNAMIR, the FAR, the lnterahamwe and the RPF ail had a hand in what happened to the civilian population Nyanza:UNAMIR, for they abandoned these people to dïe, the FAR and the militia becatu RPF for not assisting people in danger.. ~ eivilians and the Stïll on 11 April, when I was transporting the KANYARENGWE family to an UNAMIR detaehment near the Belgian sehool, I spoke on the radio to Colonel MARCHAL, Commander ofthe UNAMIR Belgian contingent. I asked him to help the KANYARENGWE famîly beeause they were threatened. He told me to brîng them to the saine location 7 p.m. When we retumed in the evening, there was no one there. I wento file Belgian Ambassador s residenee with the family, from where the family was eventually taken to the RPF side. [ must draw your attention to the fac that I wem to ETO one last rime beeause I wanted to try and take the KANYARENGWE family to the new location to whieh refugees evacuated from ETO had been taken. KANYAENRENGWE was the RPF ehairman and you ean imagine how the people in power viewed him during the early days ofthe genoeide. Managing this problem almost rendered me sïck. So, ail in ail, I wen to ETO three times: once on I 0 April and twiee on 11 April. In the evening of I 1 April, the people hiding inmy house panieked when they heard what happened at Kicukiro on radio RTLM. Insplte" of the incident, we remmned" there until the following day. Seeing how precarious our situation had beeome, Jean Bosco IYAKAREMYI and François KAYIBANDA said they were endangering my lire. 13. l2 Apri194 In the moming of 12 April, an offieer informed that the governmem was going to leave Kigaii and the movement of the people was such that I deeided to transfer the tens ofcivilians who were at my bouse somewherelse. I took an ONATRACOM bus, whieh was at the ESM with other vehicles, and put my family and ail the refugees who were in my bouse in them. When we arrived at Gïtïk3nyoni, ajeep overtook me and stopped. It was my seeretary who had eome to informe that KO I( Translated from Ft~meh 1l

15 the Minister of Defense wanted to sec me. I continued with my PEOPLE up to Oihara in the Gitarama hills overlooking the Nyabarongo Bridge. From there, I retumed to Kigali to answer the Minister s call. I retumed to my office and telephoned the Minister. He told me he no longer needed me. He had wanted to send me abroad to purchase weapons but the problem had been solved. When I arrived in Kabgayi, my wife telephoned me to warn me that soldiers.had arrested them at ~ Gifikinyioni. My family s vehicle " was the last " m the convoy I led. Th e soldiers who stopped. the convoy after I had lefî said to my family: I hope you said goodbye to ~o~r ~a~ ~I~ passed by here with the lnkotanyt ~" In the evening, I had a telephone conversation with Major CYIZA who later came to my house. It emerged from our conversation that it would be better to seek negotiations with the RPF in order to stop the massacres and the hostilities. I went to the Army Headquarters where I found Mareel GATSINZI the Army Chief of Staff. I wanted to ask him to initiate negotiations with the RPF so as to stop the massacres of eivilians. He agreed with this initiative. We entered the operations room ofthe Army Headquarters and a group of offïcers there agreed with this proposal. There were ten senior oftïcers. It was these ten senior offieers who signed the communiqué that was draf~ed. The communiqué ealled for an end to the massacres of innocent civilians and hostilities, and for a truce beginning at 1 p.m. the following day. For the first rime, we deplored the murder of the ten Belgian blue berets This communiqué was broadcast withou the knowledge of the Interim Government which immediately reacted by saying that it would negotiate with the RPF in our place. The Interim government unofficially condemned riais communiqué of 12 April though it wanted to take advantage of it. After the communiqué was aired on the radio, a non-commissioned ofïïcer with the Presidential Guard, a native of Ruhengeri and one of my close friends Sergeant RWAMAKUBA, telephoned me and said the following: "Be eareful for we are eoming for you in the evening." I immediately contaeted my neighbour, the Chargé d Affaires of the Chinese Embassy, who was a good friend. asked if I could take refuge at lais residence for a while. He agreed and I laid in his house for three days. When the soldiers came to my house, eertainly soldiers of the Presidenfial Guard, the Ambassador told me about it for one could sec what was going on in my bouse from his residenee. KO K Translated from French 12

16 During those few days ofmy disapp mmlce, Colonel BAGOSORA toldthe Interim Govemment that I had ler the country. I leamt abouthis from politicians in Gitamma who were surpfised te sec me; they told me BAGOSORA had confirmed te them that I had loti the country. This was a confirmation te me that BAGOSORA was aware of the operation of the Presidential Guard;against m~. go ,5 In reality, OATSINZI was appointed FAR Chief of Army Staff while he was away from Kigali. When he arrived in Kigali two days later, he aceepted sign the communiqu6 calling for the cessation of massacres and hostilities. When he took over, the army was in disarray. There was a parallel system of command. GATSINZI no longer commanded the army for he was net one of the President s men; those he had put in charge ofthe key units. Those who appointed GATSINZI knew that he would be trappe& There were more oflîcers from the north than from anywhere else and they met according to afymity. There was a sort of concentric and esoterie circle whose functioning was difficult to explain. For example, I called MPRANYIA on 7 April but he refused to take the call. If it were BAGOSORA who had ealled him, his reaction would bave been different. On 9 April, I did not attend the swearing ceremony of the Government. When I heard the names of the various ministers, I realized that Iike KABANDA who was working for the govemment for the firstime, most of them were novices. There were not many leanings within the govemment, The majority were from the MRND with hardliners from opposition parties. There were very few moderates in the government. In Murambi, I found a group ofpolitieians whom I told to stop the massacres or face arrest. Justin MUGENZI reacted by saying: "Ifyou give us 10,000 guns, we will exterminate ail ofthem". I learnthat the Minister of Youth, Callixte NZABONIMANA, had battalions of militiamen in Gitarama. I had to intervene on several other occasions to save people like the chïldren in Nyundo. Regarding these children, with the help of Phillipe GAILLARD of the ICRC, I asked the Minister of Social Affairs of the Interim Government to do something. I obtained a helieopter for him and he authorized the departure of 530 children from the Nytmdorphanage. I took several people to centres sueh as the Centre Pastoral Saint Paul where Father Celestirî helped, Saint Michelou where KO K Translat d from Frcnch 13

17 Father KALIBUSHt saved many people, Hotel des Milles Collines with Father KALIBUSHI. I undertook several other operations, parti Eularly in Kigembe (ç_fikongoro), where I saved several survivors from Murambi, and a bishop together with lais family. I leamt of my promotion to the rank of General on 16 April 1994, while in a meeting with GATSINZI at file ESM. I do not remember the purpose of that meeting, but a new Chier of Staffwas appointed at the saine time. ~ During GATSINZI s rime: I attended meetings at the Army Headquarters when GATSINZI was there, The main coneem of the Arrny Headquarters was to stop the massacres before they spread to the eountryside. It b.ad also been decided that in order to stop the massacres of eivilians, the Presidential Guard be dissolved and its personnel be relocated to other units. But file Army Headquarters was incapable of eontrolling the Presîdential Guard at that rime. Durïng BIZIMIJNGU s rime: Putting an end to the massacres was conditional upon the stopping of hostilities. During a meeting at the Army Headquarters, Colonel KANYANDEKWE came and reported that he had seen injured people whom the Interahamwe had off loaded from a vehiele and decapitated. BIZIMUNGU was cross with this officer, who should have first saved the victims lives and then make Iris report thereafter. BIZIMUNGU was hot the top authority. Ifhe had given instructions to stop the massacres, nobody would have listened. A Govemment statement earried more weighthan a battalion of soldiers. BIZIMUNGU had the will to stop the massacres. To the best of my knowledge, he did not sanction the Presidential Guard soldiers. I think the Gendarmerie would bave been able to save a lot of people. I attended some ofthe meetings at the Anuy Headquarters. Some other oiïicers and I raised the issue of the masses being massaered. Once again, it was deeided to dissolve the Presidential Guard and to bave its personnel relocated to other units. Officers from departments of the Army Headquatters and from the Gendarmerie, depending on the eireumstances, and sometimes those from subdepartments, would attend the Army Headquarters meetings. G40ffieer Lt. Col. Augustin RWAMANGWA and G10ffieer Joseph lvpdrasampongo are reserved people. During the meetings I attended, their contribution was limited to only questions of KO K Translated from Freneh 14

18 technic~ nature relating to theirespective fields. On one occasion, BIZIMUNGU was sent away by the Interahamwe when he had accompanied some people who had opted to cross from Mille Collines to the RPF Zone. This is to show that BIZIMUNGU was notin real control ofthe situation. He was an oitîcer who had corne dîrecfly from the fronfline. He was a good operational commander, but he lacked the necessary expefience to be able to manage the complex mechanisms of the Army Headquarters where he had never worked belote. BIZIMUNGU once told me that when the Amedcan State Department rang him asking him to stopthe massacres, he stretched out lais telephone so tha the person the other end eould hem,.. the RPF shelling. He then told him that ifhe could stop the shelling, (BIZIMUNGU) could also try to stop the massacres. ~ O Gratien KABILIGI: In practice, he was BIZIMUNGU s Assistant. He was a G30fîïcer and a General. Theoretically, and from the operational point of view, he was capable of giving orders to the Presidential Guard. He did hot attend meetings regularly because he was in the field. I sometimes attended meetings wit him at the Army Headquarters. was respected and authoritative. But, in my opinion, he is not a crïminal, but a military commander. 18. NDINDILIYIMANA: Many ofhis units were under the army command. As far as I know, hedid not give any instructions to kïlt. MUBERUKA: Colonel MUBERUKA is not an extremist. Major MPIRANYA of the Presidential Guard: Following the meeting ofthe Unit Comm~ders at the ESM on 7 April 1994 whic he did not attend, I telephoned Major MPIRANYA and asked him to corne and see me regarding the massacre of civilians in town, which were being attributed to lais Unit. He told me that he would hot tome and that he was busy with lais Unit. In my opinion, Major MPIRANYA eannot unilaterauy take the decision to ensure the security of some politieal leaders in his barracks and then kill some others. In any case, Colonel BAGOSORA, who chaired the very f trst offieers meetings afier the death of President HABYARIMANA, appointed the Army Chiefof Staff, signed the radio announcements and promised the two Belgian KO K Translated from Fronch 15

19 and Canadian oflieers to maintain peace and security in the country, was the one in charge. NTIWIRAGABO: While on a visito Naïrobi affer flac war, he accusexi me of being a traitor for having joined the RPF army. But I did not obtain any information on him to be able to incrimïnate him. t{ Major Emmanuel NERETSE: He falls in flae saine category as Lt. Colonel SETAKO and Lt. Colonel BARANSALITSE, who are known extremists. I do not possess any proofto flac effect that he participated in flac massacres. The meeting af MINADEF (Ministry of Defence) between BAGOSORA, BIZIMUNGU and the former Préfet of Ruhengeri: BIZIMUNGU informed by telephone flaat he had attended a meeting with BAGOSORA and the former Préfet of Ruhengeri, during whieh BAGOSORA assigned him the duty of eliminating me. I had gone to flac Army Headquarters affer being summoned by BIZIMUNGU, who eonfirmed this information to me. I therefore took cover up to the end ofmay wherî I left Kigali under instructions from the Ministry ofdefence to transfer the ESM from Butare to Nyanzand to reeruit one hundred offlcer-cadets. 19 Aprïl 1994: The Presidential Guard (GP) in Butare: It is lîkely thathe Presidential Guard soldiers wento Butare after the visit offlae Interim President, but I do not think they used big planes, since the army did not have any. It had small aircraft capable of carrying a maximum of ten men. The Radio Transmission Station at the ESM: We had a two-post Radio Transmission Station the Staff College, one for the Army Headquarters and flac other for the Gendarmerie. I could listen to messages from these two Chiefs of Staff. I saw messages from the Army (;bief of Staffinstructing the troops to put an end to the massacres between 7 and 16 April for GATSINZI, and after the appointment of BIZIMUNGU. There were more messages relating to the operations than to the massacres. Massacre of soldiers: Major François KAMBANDA: KO K Tmmlate41 from Fren h 16

20 The only case involving the killing ofa soldier that I came to know about was that of Major François KAMBANDA, a close relative of Colonel RUHASHYA. He was a Tutsi and had been dismissed from the army, then re-absorbed by the multi-party Govemment. He came to my house wit his family to seek refuge on 7 April. Fro my house, he was called to the Army Headquarters. In spire of out apprehension, reported there and subsequently got posted to the Bugesera Sector. He tried to go thïoughnyabugogo and Gitarama to get to lais duty station in Bugesera. Before leaving Kigali, while still at the Nyabarongo roadbloek, Radio RTLM referred to him as being an "Inyenzi. He then took refuge in General NDINDOEIYIMANA s armoured vehicle. I later leam that he was killed in Nyanza (Butare), while dressed in mufti. ~ ad Lt. MUDENGE: In the case of 2~d Lt. MUDENGE whom you are asking me about, ail I know is that he was also detained at thî saine rime ets Colonel HABYAR]MANA in1990, on accusations ofbeing an accomplice. He was latereleased and re-admitted into the army with the coming ofmultiparty politics. Colonel RUHASHYA s request: RUHASHYA telephoned me and asked ifi could secure him a laissez,passer from the préfecture. I got him ie document. He never asked me for an escort, but he later told me that he feared the roadblocks on the way between Kigali and the South. [ was able to send him two of my own escorts, but I ana sure he could not be able to go far with thesescorts in light of what was happening. I think he himself understood this and opted to remain at home until the end. Request addressed to radio stations: A group ofofficers including myself and General NDINDILIYIMANA as our leader, summoned the people in charge of the two radio stations, Radio Rwandand Radio RTLM, and urged them to tone clown the language used by their stations. There was Jean-François NSENGIYUMVA for Radio Rwanda and Gaspard GAHIGI from RTLM. Meeting with the Advisor at the United States Embassy: During the 1994 events, I eontaeted Mrs. Leader of the United States Embassy in Kigali and the State Department in Washington. I told them that the situation was then in the hands of some uncontrollable officers. I gave them telephone contacts for Colonel BAGOSORA and General BOE~GU. The Ameriean State Department wanted to talk to people capable ofnegotiating with KO K Translated from French 17

21 the RPF with a view to saving human lives. BIZIMUNGU later told me that when he managed to talk to the State Department, he had stretched out lais telephone receiver so thathe person he was talking to could hear the shelling. He confessed to me having told him: "Iî you ean stop these guns,! will stop 1 Trïps to Murambi: I went to Murambi twice. I remember it was after my promotion to the rank of General and the Defenee Minister had told me:"i appomted" you so that you can contribute" to the improvement of the morale of the troops". On another occasion, I traveled to Mummbi with the Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie, General NDINDILIYIMANA. Upon the initiative of the Army Chief of Staff, General BIZIMUNGU, we met political leaders whom we implored to stop the massacres. Each ofthe parties represented in the Government had a representative the meeting. I ana convinced that if the Interim Govemment had asked the population to stop the killings, the Rwandans, who are very obedient to the authority, would have obeyed. But that was not the case. In order to convince them even fmther, I told them tha the ldllings had even spread to the families of soldiers and tha this had affeeted their morale, and that an army whose momie is eroded is likely tobe defeated. I actually knew that several soldiers had known tha their familieg had been wiped out by the lnterahamwe. I remember having met the following officiais, among others: KAREMERA Donat MUREGO MBONAMPEKA The ESM af Kigembe: I was asked to retrait only one hundred cadet officers, but out of the six hundred candidates, I retained rive hundred who underwent a three-weeks" tmining. I stayed with these students at Kigembe not far from Gikongoro. The bourgmestre of Maraba came to the entrance of my bivouac looking for one ofmy escorts ealled Gaspard BAYINGANA whose family he had massaered. This soldier was an eseort for Jeanne NDAMAGE and is now in Kigali. The Deelaration of 7 July 1994: We signed the Kigembe Declaration because we had seen that the people were eontinuing to surfer and also beeause we did hot have any other solution. It was also in the saine reasoning the communiqué of 12 April 1994 belote the killings degenerated into full scale genoeide. I received a 0 KO10-O547- K Trmtslated from Foeneh 18

22 message announcing my dismissal from the FAR and one ofthe signatories fo the Declarafion was appointed Director of the College. Jeanne NDAMAGE, who was in charge oflogistics at the College, had some of ber family members ïn the area. In the moming of 13 July, she told me that she had been informed by.the residents that they had seen soldiers who were not part of our Unit roaming around our camp. I did hot believe the story until some Freneh soldiers came and told me tbat my camp was going robe attaeked. These Freneh soldiers evaeuated me and took me to Zaire, where I stay~t[t~ Rwanda on the 29th ofthe same month. and retumed to Dttring my stay at Kigembe, I leamthat the lieutenant in charge ofthe Groupement de Gendarmerie of Gikongoro was involved file killing of several eivilians during the events. Corpses: In Kigali, I saw eorpses ai only two roadblocks. At Nyabugogo, I saw the body ofa soldier in uniform at a roadblock nexto the traffie lig.hts. I saw two or thrce bodies ai Kimisagara. In Gikongoro, I saw graves on the roadside in Mudasomwa and Nyamagabe communes. I do not know the sizcs of these graves and, as a result, thc nurnbcr ofbodies that wcre inside. Bukavu: I arrived in Bukavu from Kavumu on 18 July. Because thc FAZ soldiers used to corne frequently to ask my narne, I went to the military commander of the area together with GATSINZI. The commander told us that we were traitors wanted by our Govemment. By accident, we met the RPF area chairman and we asked him whether it was safe for us to retum to Rwanda, since we did not feel guîlty of the massacres whichad taken place. From Bukavu, the RPF chairman accompanied us to Gama, Gisenyi and then Kigali. Thus, we came back to Rwanda on 27 July Joseph NZIRORERA: To answer your question, I think NZIRORERA would not bave accepted to meet us, because he was an extrernist and he did not like me personally. We are both from Ruhengeri, but we were different. Banque Nationale du Rwanda (The Rwanda Central Bank): If KO K Translate, d from Freneh 19

23 .. ~~7~ I did not wimess any transfer of funds from the Banque Nationale du Rwanda, but I heard from some ofrefugees t~hat some officiais used it to enrich themselves. 1( ~2 The course given by the Americans on the Law of War: Following the signing of the Axusha Peace Agreements, the Amedcans organised two sessions of a seminar on the Law of War, to facilitate a rapprochement between the two armies, the FAR and the RPF. Both armiesent officers to attend. I think the ICRC also gave some lectures on the Law of Waro Only officers frona the FAR attended these lectures. I ana no longer in position to give a list ofthe ofticers who attended these seminars. I think, as you have said, tlmt Major NERETSE attended these seminars. Document G-144: I bave no knowledge of this G-144. However, Rule 00 is a document ofthe FAR Headquarters on the organisation ofthe Rwandan army. It is modeled on the Belgian texts eoneerning the organisation and responsibilities within the army. This document is taught during lessons to company commanders at the StaffCollege. Letter of 3 December 1993: I think people jumped to a conclusion by accusing me of being the author of this letter. I do not bave a single idea on who wrote it. It could even have emanated from the RPF. (The original Freneh document contains 18 pages) KO I( Translated from Freneh 20