Headquarters U.S. Air Force

Transcription

1 Headquarters U.S. Air Force Acquisition in the Era of Affordability Air Armament Symposium Lt Gen Charles R. Davis Military Deputy Office of the Asst Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 17 Oct

2 160.0 $162.5B The Air Force Budget FY12 Enacted - FY13 PB Request $154.3B NON-BLUE OCO $115.2B Blue Baseline $110.1B Blue Baseline MILPERS PROCUREMENT 0.0 FY12 Enacted FY13 PB Air Force blue baseline declined 12% in real terms from FY09 I n t e g enacted r i t y - S to e FY13 r v i c PB e - request E x c e l l e n c e O&M MILCON, BRAC & MFH RDT&E Numbers may not add due to rounding 2

3 FY13 (only) PB AF Top 10 Major Programs 1. F-35 JSF (Lockheed-Martin) $ 5.0B 2. Classified + LRS (Various) $ 4.0B 3. S&T (Various) $ 2.2B 4. KC-46A Tanker (Boeing) $ 1.8B 5. EELV (Boeing/Lockheed-Martin) $ 1.7B 6. C-5 RERP (Lockheed-Martin) $ 1.2B 7. MQ-9 Reaper (General Atomics) $ 1.0B 8. SBIRS (Lockheed-Martin) $.9B 9. F-22 (Lockheed-Martin) $.8B 10. GPS 3 (Lockheed-Martin) $.8B 54.2% of Total Spend $19.4B 3

4 Continuing Resolution Sequestration n Six Month CR signed - Stopgap funding through 27 Mar 2013 n No new starts n No funds used to retire, divest, realign or transfer aircraft n Much of the Force Structure we divested is coming back n $500M+ in FY14 n Sequestration: OMB released report on impact of Sequestration n Under Sequestration Air Force funding reduced to FY04 levels n Sequester Amount based on proposed Continuing Resolution baseline n AF Aircraft Procurement, 9.4%; $2.010B n AF Ammunition Procurement, 9.4%, $68M n AF Missile Procurement, 9.4%, $668M n AF Other Procurement, 9.4%, $2.226B n AF RDT&E, 9.4%, $2.717B

5 Future UAS Priorities n Align command and control (C2) architectures n Implement UAS C2 Initiative (UCI) into UAS Squadron Ops Centers n Open standards and simplified processes enable data exchange between UAS ground stations n Leverages acquisition efficiencies across UAS enterprise n Improve sensors, communications and processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) 5

6 F-16 Combat Avionics Programmed Extension Suite (CAPES) n Provides all weather Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses (DEAD) capability and enhanced air-to-air combat capability to include better precision targeting n Provides large, high resolution display with SAR images, target pod video, stored data & electronic flight instruments Integrates multiple intelligence broadcasts into a system of systems Provides single-point access for automated or hands-on Electronic Warfare (EW) system control Based on mature, low risk technology that meets USAF requirements AESA radar modernization; demonstrated prototypes CDU integration based on pre-block aircraft efforts ALQ-213 integration based on continually enhanced system for preblock aircraft Integrated Broadcast Service (IBS) integration based on similar systems installed on other USAF platforms; First IBS integration in single-seat cockpit

7 F-15 Modernization n F-15C/D Mission: Augments the F-22 in the Air Superiority role n F-15E Mission: Global Strike; All-Weather Deep Interdiction n Major Upgrades F-15C/D and F-15E: n Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars n New Mission Computer Allows full use of AESA radar capability n New Electronic Warfare suite will replace the current operationally obsolete 1970 s era system n Other Upgrades: Satellite communications and a long range visual ID capability to the F-15C/D to support Homeland Defense missions

8 F-22 Modernization n F-22 mission: Air Superiority/Global Strike enabling ground, air and sea forces freedom of movement in A2/AD environments n Current capabilities include supersonic JDAM, AIM-9C/120D, enhanced stand-off and attack of multiple ground targets, electronic attack of enemy integrated air defenses n Future capabilities include integration of upgraded radar, electronic protection, electronic attack, AIM-9X/120D, enhanced net-centric warfare and ISR 8

9 Top Three Weapon Related Needs 1. Diminishing Manufacturing Sources for weapons programs n Low annual procurement quantities and production programs stretching across many years cause problems with obsolescence and subcontractors n Help us look for ways to minimize this problem; block upgrades, or? 2. Reliable solid rocket motors for advanced combat weapon systems n Motor requirements for modern missiles are very demanding (range, power, burn time, etc.), and drive complex motor designs n Right now, production results are not consistent; need to do this better 3. Ability to deliver precision weapons in a contested environment n GPS guidance is both an aid and a weakness; we may not always have this type of reliable precision guidance n Alternatives could include inertial navigation, more spoofing-resistant GPS guidance, or other guidance modes

10 The Problem n Our acquisition system drives Materiel Development Decisions before thorough review of the cost effectiveness and FYDP affordability of the system. n Programs with questionable or unsupportable strategies often reach key milestones before senior leaders develop a consensus of support n We no longer compare the operational effectiveness with the incremental cost of requirements n AoAs do not address this issue n JROC often drives requirements before AF senior leader review n We then attempt to fit the program in the POM and realize we cannot make it fit 10

11 Programs Set On a Challenging Path Very Early in Their Development n Joint Strike Fighter n Expeditionary Combat Support System n Miniature Air Launched Decoy Inc 2 n Presidential Airlift n Tanker 1 and 2 n JASSM n T-X Serious Case To Be Made That the Fate of Many Programs is Sealed Before the First Contract Is Signed 11

12 Affordability Requirement n We should not ask, Do the alternatives support the requirement? n We should ask Is the operational effectiveness of the requirement worth the cost? n Questions to consider: n Does this system have a role in the National Military Strategy? n Is it needed to support an AF Core Function? n How much are we will to pay for it? n Can we accept exiting, proven technology? n If not, does the cost of new development support the incremental gain in ops effectiveness? n Set criteria that may drive more substantive reviews that continually question the need to allow the program to continue n Either reaffirm support, restructure, or cancel

13 Long Range Strike Bomber n Leverage mature technologies n Constrain requirements by making informed capability/cost trades and considering capabilities of other systems n Put emphasis on affordability, uses a realistic cost target to inform trades n Make capability tradeoffs as necessary to hold procurement unit costs at estimated target n Hold unit costs to ensure sufficient production and a sustainable inventory over the long term (~ aircraft)

14 What I am Seeing Today n Short of the new bomber, there is no desire to start new programs with costly production tails even when the system is truly needed n RFPs & source selection plans are getting unprecedented level of scrutiny n Acquisition programs that mix new development with proven off- theshelf technology are becoming more prevalent n but they present challenges n We lost much of the talent needed to design our own systems n Very much just an oversight community n No X-plane mentality

15 What I Am Seeing Today n Focus is shifting from the War on Terrorism growing emphasis on systems to support anti-access/area denied operations n Is our acquisition system structured for this? n Gen Welsh has a strong emphasis on innovation and will be more involved with our business n Disconnect between testing and fiscal responsibility n Still struggling to develop an effective Cyber acquisition system

16 Implications for Future Programs.as Well as Those of Today n The Economy, Potential Administration Change, On-going Operations, Severe Force Structure Reset Shortfalls, Recapitalization of Ancient Fleets, No Growth in Defense Spending As a Percent of GDP.Sequestration.so where do we focus n Our investment strategy is diffuse n Few Air Force strategic level roadmaps or system architectures to guide a long term investment strategy n Program must start with an affordability target and a bounded performance objective n LRS-B is a great example n Learn the F-22/F-35 lessons

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