Lt Col Raymond Lane Officer Commanding Ordnance School Defence Forces Training Center. Unclassified Releasable to NATO/PfP

Transcription

1 Lt Col Raymond Lane Officer Commanding Ordnance School Defence Forces Training Center

2 EOD Spectrum of Operations Explosive Ordnance Disposal Conventional Munitions Disposal C-IED/IEDD CBRNeIDD

3 International EOD Co-operation The Ordnance School has trained EOD/CIED/IEDD/CBRNe personnel (CIV-MIL) from the following countries: (Students from 33 Countries since 2010) Spain Denmark Germany Romania Malaysia USA Netherlands Luxembourg Italy Finland Russia Switzerland Kazakhstan Estonia Austria Canada Sweden Belgium Israel UAE Poland Turkey Jordan Checz Republic France Bulgaria Cyprus Portugal Norway Lithuania NATO/PFP unclassified United Kingdom Estonia Malta

4 C-IED core activities

5 Ireland/Germany/Netherlands/Estonia/Austria/Italy/Sweden/Belgium Multi-Agency/Multi-Disciplinary and Multi-National Comprehensive response - VNCF (Luxembourg) VNCF by Luxembourg

6 MTA - Terrorist(s) fully armed wants to inflict maximum casualties and wants to die

7 Course Objectives: Develop relevant operational/tactical knowledge involving MTA Threats (future proof) Prioritise effective and flexible responses to the MTA threat Develop dynamic/resilient CIV-MIL structures at the Strategic /Operational and Tactical levels to support the development of timely and effective Courses of Action (COA) Students/Staff Military (EOD, Air,SOF,Medical) Police (Firearms,SOF,Medical,Search) Fire Service, Airport police Course included academic/theoretical and operational inputs Detailed lessons learned process was undertaken throughout week

8 Marauding Terrorist Attack (MTA) Increasing frequency as a tactic by Terrorists Complex Assault Brussels, Belgium 22/3/16 Complex assault - Jakarta, Indonesia 14/1/16 Complex assault St Bernardino,USA - 2/12/15 Complex assault - Paris, France 13/11/15 Single shooter Sousse, Tunisia 2015 Twin shooter Paris, France 2015 Multiple shooters Westgate, Kenya 2013 Complex assault Mumbai, India 2008 Weapon options Simple acid, car, knife, fire Firearms pistol, SMG, assault rifle Explosives Grenades, RPG, IED (Suicide Belts -TATP), Tactical impact Dynamic situation difficult to coordinate, poor situational awareness Mass casualties catastrophic injuries, large crowds, panic/fear Media focus immediate and global, social media, political pressure

9 Probable components of MTA Well trained terrorists,tactically competent and willing to die (possibly drugged) Multiple attackers working in small tactical units Effective internal and external coordination Deliberate attack on first responders to inflict maximum casualties Use of fire (smoke) to complicate first responder operations and cause more damage Use of high powered military weapons and explosives (HME-TATP) and (suicide belts)

10 DVD

11 DVD

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14 Countering Adversary threat Networks(CAtN) From C-IED AtN Lessons Learned use similar approaches in Countering Adversary threat Networks IED Network C-IED AtN Evolution Narcoterrorism Piracy C-MTA Countering Adversary threat Networks Criminal Gangs Illicit Substances Illicit Arms Trade Human Trafficking

15 Intelligence Counter Adversary threat Network Strategy Prepare the Force (PtF) Doctrine, Training, Interoperability Attack the Networks (AtN) Predict, Prevent, Pursue Defeat the Marauding terrorists(c MTA) Protect

16 Planning Assumptions Develop Effective Interagency response (Synergies) MTA may cause many casualties Assault will have been planned and rehearsed Friendly Force Response tactics predicted Police tactics generally aimed at containment not neutralisation (not suppression) Difficult for emergency services to operate in semipermissive areas Delay to deploy SOF units for intervention Most casualties will die from blood loss within first minutes Terrorists will consider options for barricaded final action Prolonged operation for greater media/political impact Hostages/siege Drugs

17 Principles of War Civilian and Military Approach Requirement: To integrate holistically (Comprehensive Approach) Selection of the aim Maintain morale Offensive action Security Surprise Concentration of force (suppressing fire) Economy of effort Flexibility Coordination Sustainability Policing by consent Prevent crime & disorder Public respect Public cooperation Minimum force Impartiality Public relationship Persuasion Legal actions Unobtrusive

18 Counter Terrorism Capability Relationships Comprehensive Approach Conventional response may be ineffective due to threat from Small Arms, IEDs, CBRN and Fire Public and private sector need information, training and emergency equipment to improve survivability Public Police Emergency Services Military Hybrid Military support to the Police will enable effective emergency service response and provide a tactical capability for extreme situations

19 Requirement to develop a coordinated Inter-Agency Resilient Task Force response with following components recommended: Unified Command and Control structure Tactical/Operational SOF (Military/Police) capability (incl: Search) Tactical /Operational Medical capability (10-15 minutes) to include medical treatment for possible PBIED perpetrator Tactical/Operational EOD Capability( IED Defeat/assault) Tactical/Operational Fire fighting response (Fire used as tactic by terrorists) Force protection Significant Lessons Learned (TAC-COM-MED)

20 Multi-agency Command and Control (Hot/Warm/Cold Zones) Unified Command (Police/Fire/Medical/SOF/Military/EOD Establish Incident priorities/ ROE Joint decision making Dynamic risk assessments Situational Awareness (Intelligence sharing) Dynamic operational groupings Interoperability Communications/equipment/TTPs

21 Incident Response Team(Scalable) No 1 - SOF Fire support No 2 - SOF Fire support No 3 - Assault IEDD Operator No 4 - Assault IEDD Operator No 5 - IRT Leader No 6 - Tactical Medical Operator No 7 - Tactical Fire Operator No 8 - SOF Force Protection

22 Significant Lessons Learned Whole of government and whole of society approach Public awareness programme (designed not to generate fear) - State/Government /Security apparatus must never lose confidence of their citizens/public during a crisis Private security sector engagement (first responder) - Must be integrated into the planning process from the start

23 Lessons learned - Use of less than Lethal technologies to attack PBIED e.g. Acoustic devices - Devices for Quick effective communications - Advanced situational awareness training - Dealing with MTA incident with addition of CBRN component - Forensic evidence collection from casualties at scene - Medical response in non permissive environment

24 Search/Assault IEDD What do we mean by IEDD assault Military/police role? Philosophy /MNT ROE TTPs Equipment

25 COMMENTS/RECOMMENDATIONS We need to be Pro Active as opposed to Reactive (CC-MTA developed over 14 months ago) Agile/Flexible response Very poor response to CC-MTA course from NATO/PFP nations? Possible future collaboration with EU? Develop CC MTA programme of work 2016 and beyond including LIKELY future threats -VNCF???

26 Developing a Resilient Response ACC-MTA - Ordnance School November 2016