REPUBLIC OF COSTA RICA Government of Costa Rica Costa Rica

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1 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Project Name PROJECT INFORMATION DOCUMENT (PID) APPRAISAL STAGE Report No.: AB4016 Costa Rica Telecom Sector Modernization Project Region LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN Sector Telecommunications (100%) Project ID P Borrower(s) REPUBLIC OF COSTA RICA Government of Costa Rica Costa Rica Implementing Agency Ministry of Environment and Energy San Jose Costa Rica Tel: (506) , Ext.165 Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Publicos San Jose Costa Rica Tel: (506) Environment Category [ ] A [X] B [ ] C [ ] FI [ ] TBD (to be determined) Date PID Prepared July 9, 2008 Date of Appraisal July 16, 2008 Authorization Date of Board Approval March 26, Country and Sector Background Country Issues 1. Costa Rica had noticeable successes in poverty reduction in the past and it continues to stand out as a development success story. However, the future trajectory of development outcomes will largely depend on the course taken to spur competitiveness and broaden opportunities in the face of growing income inequality. In this process, it will be critical to link the poor to the modern information and knowledge economy, to allow them to take advantage of employment generation and enhancement opportunities that the new technologies allow, as described further below. 2. After well over a decade ( ) of very little change in poverty and unemployment levels, important reductions in both took place in 2007: in 2004, when the last Poverty Assessment (PA) report 1 was conducted, 23.9 percent of the population was still poor, and 6.5 percent was extremely poor. This stagnation is surprising given that Costa Rica experienced relatively consistent economic growth during the period, averaging 5% 1 The World Bank, Costa Rica Poverty Assessment: Recapturing Momentum for Poverty Reduction, June 2006.

2 throughout the 1990s. However, according to the latest INEC figures, the poverty rate decreased to 19 percent and extreme poverty fell to 3.7 percent in This decline in poverty is in part linked to the fast expansion of the Costa Rican economy over the previous 3 or so years, as reflected in unemployment figures which show a decline in jobless rates to 4.6 percent in 2007, considerably lower than their historical level of around 6 percent. 3. However, income inequality has been rising. While still relatively low by regional standards, inequality in Costa Rica, as measured by the gini coefficient, rose from 0.44 in 1989 to 0.48 in 2004, an increase that is economically significant, and a level that is higher than countries at similar income levels in other world regions. From a geographic point of view, inequalities are also high. In 2004, the poverty rate was as high as 43.4% in the Brunca region and 38.6% in the Chorotega region, compared to the national average of 23.9%. The PA report indicates that incidence of poverty is highest among households headed by women, especially those in rural areas, as well as those whose head works in the informal sector or in agriculture and those in rural areas in the two poorest planning regions, Brunca and Chorotega. 4. The PA report also identified several reasons for the lack of progress in reducing poverty over the decade. For one thing, growth in GDP as well as household income slowed down in the early part of the decade. Between 1994 and 2000, per capita household income grew at less than one-third of its rate, according to Costa Rica s national household survey, the EHPM; and since 2000, average per capita income barely changed. Moreover, while the benefits of growth were relatively evenly distributed between 1989 and 1994, an increasing share of the benefits has accrued to non-poor households since then. Indeed, poor and near-poor households actually experienced a decline in real income between 2000 and Additionally, changes in the world economy have led to a decline in relative demand for less skilled workers at the same time that the relative supply of low-skilled workers has increased. 2 In the area of education, particularly worrisome, in light of the economy s demand for higher skilled workers, is the fact that the country still lags behind the Latin America and upper-middle income country averages for access and attainment at the secondary school level, with a clear divide between the poor and the non-poor, which adversely affects their ability to participate in and benefit from economic growth. 6. As Costa Rica's economy has taken advantage of globalization and information age technologies, new employment opportunities have benefited only those with higher education. This growing mismatch between the education and skill levels of the poor and the demand for labor has resulted in increased earnings inequality, significant increase in unemployment among the poor, and an increase in part-time (as opposed to full-time) work among low-skilled and poor workers most strikingly among poor, single mothers. Average unemployment has not changed in the last 17 years (between 4% and 6%), though it has trended down to the lower part of the range in the past couple of years. Unemployment 2 Among other things, the share of high-school graduates declined during the 1990s and the share of high-school dropouts increased.

3 among the extremely poor more than doubled (from 12% to 27%), most strikingly among poor, single mothers. 7. There is also evidence that Costa Rica s global competitiveness has lagged recently. Despite an important rise in trade (exports grew 25% and FDI doubled between 2000 and 2005), analysis of the Bank s Doing Business Reports reveals little overall change in business conditions. As highlighted in the CEM and ICA reports, the most pressing threat to the business climate is underinvestment in decaying and outmoded infrastructure. Though infrastructure coverage remains high, infrastructure investment has dropped since 2000 relative to GDP in real terms, as a result the quality of infrastructure services is suffering, increasing business costs. For example, in three sample export sectors, where logistical costs were measured as a percentage of product value in Costa Rica (as part of research done for the CEM) they were 13% to 15%, compared with only 10% in OECD countries. Fiscal reform is expected to boost infrastructure investment, but another key finding of the CEM is that greater private sector participation in Costa Rica s statedominated infrastructure and telecommunications sectors is also needed to augment investment while capturing efficiency and cost savings. 8. Due to this situation, the current World Bank Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for Costa Rica includes Improving Competitiveness under the first pillar devoted to promoting sustainable economic growth, in line with the government s development priorities. The current Administration promoted CAFTA as a vehicle to modernize Costa Rica s economy and boost growth through new export channels. At the same time, the Administration recognized that its potential trade gains would depend on enactment of a complementary agenda, including trade facilitation, institutional and regulatory reform and promoting business innovation and education for the labor force. To this end, the Administration has drafted and presented for approval in Parliament new telecommunications sector legislation, among other initiatives, as described below. Sector Issues 9. The Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) sector has followed a similar pattern as the one described above for the economy as a whole. Overall, the basic indicators for the telecommunications sector in Costa Rica reveal high penetration, particularly with regards to fixed-lines with over 30% teledensity, and the state-owned incumbent, ICE, is generally seen as a successful operator. 10. However, inequality in access to telecommunications services remains high, with only 30% of extremely poor households having access to a telephone line compared to the national average of over 60%. New technologies (notably, mobile networks and broadband Internet service) have been implemented primarily in major cities, aiming mostly at highincome urban households. Additionally, the quality of these new services is inadequate for a modern knowledge economy, mostly due to a lack of competition in the sector, as there is presently only one major service provider, the state-owned incumbent ICE. 11. Notwithstanding the commendable successes of the past, the Costa Rican telecommunications sector is currently at a pivotal point, as the government recognizes that

4 the accelerating pace of technological and market development requires new approaches for the country to keep up with its peers and competitors. In this light, the Government of Costa Rica (GoCR) has made the modernization of the telecommunications sector an explicit national policy, as one of the pillars of the country s efforts to increase its global competitiveness. 12. The GoCR s telecommunications sector modernization policy is based on a number of principles, enshrined in the Costa Rican tradition, which are summarized in the text of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) with the U.S., the Dominican Republic and Central America as follows: (i) gradual, selective and regulated liberalization without privatization; and (ii) benefit to the user in line with the social objectives of universality and solidarity. 13. CAFTA requires the approval of a new telecommunications legal and regulatory framework and a modernization law for the incumbent ICE, and contains the GoCR commitment to opening of the telecommunications sector to competition, through three key entry points: (i) private network services, (ii) Internet services (both were set to be open by January 1, 2006) and (iii) mobile wireless services (which were set to be open by January 1, 2007). 14. Costa Rica ratified CAFTA through referendum in October A General Telecommunications Law and a Law on Modernization and Strengthening of Public Institutions in the Telecommunications Sector, (or Modernization Law for short, formerly known as the ICE modernization law ), and underlying regulations, were prepared and presented to Parliament in October The General Telecommunications Law was approved by Parliament and signed into law in May The Modernization Law was approved by Parliament in July 2008 and was signed into law in early August Key implementing regulations have been drafted 3 and need to be put in place by January, which is when the extended deadline to comply with CAFTA is set to expire. 15. While the state monopoly in the telecommunications sector is set to expire with the approval of these key pieces of legislation, the state-owned Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) currently provides both telecommunications and electricity services within Costa Rica on an almost exclusive basis. ICE provides Internet access services through its wholly owned subsidiary RACSA, as well as directly, by means of ADSL technology. Cable TV providers are allowed to provide Internet services to their subscribers only through an agreement with RACSA. Mobile services are provided by ICE directly. 16. Of late, ICE has been investing heavily in its network and is expected to further ramp-up investments after the approval of the Modernization Law. In June 2007, ICE signed a new US$65 million contract with Ericsson for 300,000 GSM lines. It also plans to acquire 1.5 million lines of 3G WCDMA-based technology that it would roll out towards the end of In October 2005, ICE contracted for a next-generation national backbone network, in a deal valued at around US$61 million. This is now expected to be functional around These include the general regulatory decree accompanying the General Telecommunications Law, as well as 3 other key decrees on universal access and service, interconnection and access, competition in telecommunications.

5 New forward-looking management put in place at ICE in 2007 by the Arias Administration is already making great strides towards improving ICE s performance and preparing it for competition. 17. Only niche segments of the market (paging, trunking and several Internet content and services segments) are currently being actively served by competitive private operators. Such an institutional setting is unique to Costa Rica, not only in the Latin American context, but almost certainly worldwide. 18. However, this monopolistic situation is likely to change very soon, given the recent approval of the General Telecommunications Law, which creates a fully competitive environment for these services. New licenses for wireless services will require additional regulations and a competitive selection process; however, Internet services are now fully open and the impact of this will soon start being felt in the market. 19. ARESEP, the multi-sector regulatory authority, has traditionally seen its role limited to regulating ICE as a monopoly operator with regards to its tariffs and quality of service. However, the new legislation will transform the agency into a modern regulatory authority capable of regulating a diverse and competitive telecommunications sector, through a new entity, Superintendencia de Telecomunicacions (SUTEL), to be created under ARESEP. At the same time, the new legislation will establish the policy making function firmly within the Executive, and the Ministry designated to that effect is the Ministry of Environment and Energy, renamed as Ministry of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications, MINAET. The radio spectrum management and monitoring office (Dirección Nacional de Control de Radio DNCR), housed for historical reasons in the Ministry of Interior (Gobernación), has extremely limited human, technical and financial resources, so de facto this function has been performed by ICE, which is hoarding close to 70% of the commercial radio spectrum. The new legislation sets the framework for the transfer of DNCR s functions and staff to SUTEL and MINAET, in their respective capacities. 20. As alluded to above, the basic indicators for the telecommunications sector in Costa Rica reveal high penetration and an overall level of development beyond what could be expected given Costa Rica s other macroeconomic indicators, for which the country must be commended. Costa Rica displays a strong performance in terms of fixed line teledensity, which stood in 2007 at 32.2%. The number of fixed phone lines increased from 339,000 in 1992 to almost 1.4 million in 2007 as a result of ICE s strategy to boost fixed line density. 21. Nevertheless, with regards to mobile telephony and high speed Internet services, the country s level of development is lower than its peers. Despite increasing its number of mobile lines from 3 per 100 inhabitants in 1998 to 33.8 by year end 2007, Costa Rica still lags behind other comparable countries, such as Chile (83.9%), Ireland (114.9%) and El Salvador (89.5%). Moreover, a simple regression analysis of infrastructure outcomes and GDP per capita among low and middle income countries shows that Costa Rica s fixed teledensity was 66 percent higher than expected for a country with Costa Rica s GDP per capita, but that mobile teledensity was 50 percent lower. The spread of mobile telephony had been restricted in Costa Rica mainly due to the incumbent's historical restrictions as a public entity. In mid-2007, ICE s mobile network covered 80% of metropolitan areas and

6 only 20% of rural areas. According to local press, there was a waiting list of 50,000 people wanting a mobile phone in September The lack of competition also has the effect of reducing service reliability, which is lower in Costa Rica than in regional peers. According to data from the ICS (table below), about 21.9 percent of firms experienced service interruptions in their fixed phone lines. The average firm experienced 4.3 interruptions in service in the previous year, and was without service approximately 71 hours per year. In the case of mobile phones, the service reliability appears to be worse than that of fixed lines: the average firm experienced 11 interruptions in services in the previous year, and was without service for about 143 hours. Table A1.1 Incidence, Length and Impact of Telephone Cuts Country % who had Phone cuts Avg. times Phone cuts a Total hours Phone cuts a % Sales lost Phone cuts a Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nicaragua Peru n.a. Brazil Ecuador a - All firms, regardless whether or not subjected to cuts Source: Investment Climate Surveys 23. Costa Rica has experienced a significant increase in the use of Internet and personal computers over the last decade, performing better than comparator countries. In 2007, Costa Rica had the highest density in the use of Internet among regional economies (33.6 users per 100 inhabitants, which represent an increase of eighteen times since 1998). 24. However, the availability in Costa Rica of more advanced services such as broadband Internet is extremely limited, and well below that in peer economies. In 2007, there were only 2.93 broadband subscribers per every 100 Costa Ricans. This is a very low level of broadband penetration, compared to countries such as Chile (7.2 per 100 inhabitants), Lithuania (15.0 per 100 inhabitants), or South Korea, with an impressive rate of 30.6 subscribers per 100 inhabitants. 25. While the last few years have seen the entry of converged services into Costa Rica, the regulatory environment is uncertain in its response. A major development has been the success of voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services. As of early 2005, ICE estimated that about 20% of international calls were made using VoIP, resulting in financial losses to the company. There is some doubt about the regulatory status of VoIP services, especially as a competitive alternative to ICE. A confused or passive regulatory response can have a restrictive effect on service providers plans, cutting benefits to consumers. 4 Budde Telecom Market Analysis, December 2007.

7 26. A number of important issues such as the low quality of service, the delay in technological and market innovation (pre-paid mobile services are not yet available, though expected to be launched in late 2008), the moderate pace of investment in the sector, and the uncertainty in the efficient allocation of scarce resources, notably spectrum, underscore the need for a shift in the current market structure towards a more competitive one. 27. The move to competition is a positive step in enabling Costa Rica s ICT sector to expand and drive economic growth. Experience over the past two decades has shown, around the world that liberalization of the sector has led to growth in terms of both the number of subscribers and the coverage of services, and also in terms of total revenues and quality of service Objectives 28. The project s development objective is to promote the universal accessibility of a wide range of quality modern telecommunications services provided by multiple service providers in a well-regulated competitive environment, contributing to economic growth, competitiveness and social cohesion. This will be achieved through: a. the modernization of the legal, regulatory and institutional framework, b. the introduction of fair competition and private participation, c. the modernization of ICE, and d. the promotion of investment in the provision of service to rural and isolated poor areas and vulnerable groups. 3. Rationale for Bank Involvement 29. The World Bank has been providing technical assistance to the government for the past few years, including through PPIAF and other donor-funded activities. World Bank support was limited to bringing best international practices to bear on the government s efforts to develop a telecommunications sector modernization strategy and the drafting of legislation and regulations for the telecommunications sector. 30. The project was included in the CPS Progress Report of 2006 and is included in the new CPS of The GOCR sees reforms to and investment in telecommunications as a primary driver for increasing Costa Rica s competitiveness and creating jobs for poverty reduction. 5 See, for example, Carlo Maria Rossotto, Bjorn Wellenius, Anat Lewin, Carlos R. Gomez, Competition in International Voice Communications, World Bank Working Papers, World Bank Publications, October 2004

8 31. The GOCR values the broad experience that the World Bank has in the area of establishing modern regulatory and institutional frameworks for a competitive telecommunications sector, as well as in the implementation of rural telecommunications strategies, including the establishment of universal service programs. 4. Description 32. The proposed project has four main interrelated components aimed at achieving the project development objective. Component 1: Telecommunications Solidarity Program ($12.6 million) 33. To ensure continuity with Costa Rica s tradition of equitable development, and to guarantee that the benefits of competition reach rural areas and low-income users, a detailed universal service/access strategy and a funding approach through the National Telecommunications Fund (FONATEL), managed by SUTEL, will be put in place with the help of this component. 34. The activities involved in this component will include technical assistance and capacity building support for the start-up of FONATEL, the identification of needs and adequate projects that may justify public financial aid, as well as the competitive tendering and financing of subsidies for the provision of rural broadband telecommunications services through Output-Based Aid (OBA) mechanisms similar to those that will be utilized by FONATEL. This component can be considered as seed capital to accelerate the implementation of the fund. 35. Additionally, this component is expected to also finance a pilot Digital City project in at least one urban area, following similar OBA mechanisms, as well as to help create a Government Virtual Private Network or Intranet that will benefit all public institutions nationwide. 36. Overall, it is expected that the majority of investments through this component will be dedicated to the deployment of broadband services for disadvantaged regions and for specific social needs, such as for schools and universities, as well as hospitals and clinics, on the basis that they are not commercially attractive and hence a competitive market is unlikely to reach out to these areas and users even in the medium term. 37. This component will thus include four sub-components as further described in Annex 4: (a) Universal service strategy, regulations and bidding documents ($0.3 million). (b) Seed capital for the National Telecommunications Fund ($8.0 million). (c) Digital City Pilot Project ($1.3 million). (d) Government Virtual Private Network (Intranet) ($3.0 million).

9 Component 2: Institutional development of SUTEL to promote competition and market opening ($11.7 million) 38. This component will be dedicated to supporting the implementation and institutional strengthening of the Superintendency of Telecommunications (SUTEL), the regulatory authority for the sector to be created under ARESEP, as a semi-autonomous subsidiary; as well as to promoting competition in the sector. 39. The component will provide technical assistance and capacity building support in the start-up of SUTEL, building its capacity in telecom-specific matters, supporting the transition of technical staff and capacity, as required from ARESEP to SUTEL, and also supporting the competition aspects of SUTEL, through the creation of mechanisms for the coordination of competition regulation between the two regulators (SUTEL/ARESEP and the competition authority, COPROCOM). 40. An important element of the institutional development of SUTEL will be its technical capacity. This component will therefore also aim at improving the efficiency of the use of scarce resources, including the radio spectrum and the national numbering plan. Technical assistance and capacity building support will be provided for updating the country s national frequency allocation table, the national numbering plan, and related regulations, as well as financing for the implementation of specialized systems, including a radio spectrum management and monitoring system and the national number portability system. The component will also provide assistance for the implementation of a spectrum re-farming program to reclaim unused bands, if required, as well as evaluating the potential use of market-based mechanisms for the allocation and transfer of spectrum. 41. Finally, one crucial role of SUTEL will be the licensing of new operators. This component will provide technical assistance and capacity building support for the implementation of a market opening strategy, through conducting tenders for the selection and licensing of new operators, in line with the needs of the country, while keeping in mind the CAFTA commitments. 42. This component will therefore include four sub-components as further described in Annex 4: (a) Regulatory authority implementation and capacity building ($2.0 million). (b) Radio spectrum management and monitoring system ($3.9 million). (c) Establishing a National Number Portability System ($5.3 million). (d) Tenders for the selection of new telecom operators ($0.5 million). Component 3: Modernization of the policy and regulatory environment for the telecommunications sector ($2.2 million) 43. This component will support technical assistance and capacity building for the finalization of key complementary pieces of the regulatory framework, in accordance with the new legal framework for the sector, as well as building institutional capacity in the Ministry, through the start-up of a Telecommunications Viceministry to provide policy guidance to the regulatory authority, particularly with regards to the market opening and

10 universal service programs. Finally, this component will include technical assistance and capacity building support for the preparation of additional legislation and regulation for the Information Society, as needed in the future, as well as financing for equipment that may be required for implementation of said legislation and regulations. 44. This component will thus include three sub-components as further described in Annex 4: (a) Drafting and finalization of regulatory decrees, norms and standards ($0.6 million). (b) Supporting the Telecommunications Viceministry in the line ministry and capacity building ($0.9 million). (c) Legislation and regulation for the Information Society ($0.7 million). Component 4: ICE modernization ($1 million) 45. This component will mainly consist of high quality training programs in strategic planning, telecommunications regulation (notably cost accounting, tariffs and interconnection) and latest technologies for mobile and IP-networks. Additionally, this component will include a number of technical assistance and capacity building activities aimed at supporting ICE s transformation, notably on developing cost-based tariffs and interconnection rates, strengthening internal controls and enabling accounting separation. 46. While the political economy of Costa Rica does not favor currently any steps towards eventual privatization of ICE, the government is aware of the need for an important transformation of the incumbent in order for to operate on a commercial basis, and hence be able to viably compete and promote competition. Assistance to ICE will be jointly executed with MINAET, in its role as policy-maker for the sector, aimed at ensuring that ICE s strategic repositioning and transformation into a modern operator, will be done in such a was as to promote, rather than hinder, the development of a healthy competitive environment. It is likely that an important portion of this component will be co-financed with ICE s own funds. 5. Financing Source: ($m.) Borrower.5 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 27 Total Implementation 47. The Telecommunications Superintendency (SUTEL) will be the implementing agency for components 1 and 2 of the project, while the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications (MINAET) will be the implementing agency for components 3 and 4. In the early stages of project implementation, while SUTEL establishes its fiduciary capacity acceptable to the Bank, a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) will be established in

11 ARESEP, given its existing capacity for project administration, and will later be transferred to SUTEL. 48. An overall project oversight committee will be formalized consisting of the Minister and the Presidents of ARESEP and ICE, the latter only intervening in the activities directly related to ICE. At the technical level, a project coordination team already exists, with parttime participation of key staff from all three institutions. 49. It is expected that most of the project management overhead would constitute an in-kind contribution by the GoCR. However, through the capacity building assistance provided to both the Ministry and ARESEP, some support to project management will be provided. 7. Sustainability 50. The risk of the project not being sustainable is negligible. As a result of the project, a modern regulatory framework will be in place, and ARESEP will have better trained personnel working in a more effective organization. The GOCR should expect higher revenues from the sector as it grows under the new regulatory environment, attracting newcomers and fostering competition. 51. The strengthening of ICE should prepare the company for competition in a liberalized environment. Moreover, having a modern and well-performing operator should in turn attract new entrants and new investments, promoting further competition in the sector. This should also represent higher revenues for the government compared to what the company would have generated without the assistance from the project. 52. Finally, the rural access component of this project will not impose additional financing requirements on the Government beyond those implied by the loan, as they are based on an Output-Based Aid (OBA) mechanism. The major infrastructure needs for rural areas in Costa Rica should be covered by the end of the project, and the universal service fund to be created should be then used for additional future OBA tenders, which will also be designed to be sustainable. 8. Lessons Learned from Past Operations in the Country/Sector 53. The largest component of this project the Universal Service and Universal Access Program is based on lessons learned from previous projects dealing with universal access funds. Particularly, a recent study conducted for the Forum of Latin American Regulators (REGULATEL) analyzes the performance of existing funds and draws some very important conclusions on the design and new approaches that universal access funds should consider nowadays. This component has been designed additionally considering previous projects involving universal service funds for other Latin American countries such as Colombia, Chile and Peru. 54. This project incorporates lessons learned from other projects involving Internet access initiatives, including:

12 a b c d e that one of the greatest bottlenecks to increased Internet access is high costs, especially in rural areas; that in some countries this is due in part to lack of competition among nationwide backbone networks; that in order for the Internet to become and effective tool for economic development users must have access to higher speed networks rather than simply dial-up services; that universal service initiatives aimed at increasing Internet access will be most effective if they first improve the quality, speed and reach, while lowering the costs of the Internet backbone and Internet access networks rather than focusing on building a large number of telecenters; and that Internet access projects should be closely related to other government initiatives (such as education, health and e-government, among others). 55. Finally, regarding the strengthening of ARESEP, other restructuring projects in the sector have proved that a clear and predictable regulatory framework is a prerequisite to attracting investment in the sector. In these projects, an independent, technical, and selffinanced regulator has proved to be more efficient. 9. Safeguard Policies (including public consultation) Safeguard Policies Triggered by the Project Yes No Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01) [x] [ ] Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4.04) [x] [ ] Pest Management (OP 4.09) [ ] [x] Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4.11) [x] [ ] Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12) [ ] [x] Indigenous Peoples (OP/BP 4.10) [x] [ ] Forests (OP/BP 4.36) [x] [ ] Safety of Dams (OP/BP 4.37) [ ] [x] Projects in Disputed Areas (OP/BP 7.60) * [ ] [x] Projects on International Waterways (OP/BP 7.50) [ ] [x] 10. List of Factual Technical Documents 1. General Telecommunications Law 2. Law on Strengthening and Modernization of Public Institutions in the Telecommunications Sector. * By supporting the proposed project, the Bank does not intend to prejudice the final determination of the parties claims on the disputed areas

13 11. Contact point Contact: Juan Navas-Sabater Title: Telecom. Spec. Tel: (202) Fax: (202) For more information contact: The InfoShop The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, D.C Telephone: (202) Fax: (202) pic@worldbank.org Web: