Using clan control to manage teleworkers

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1 Using clan control to manage teleworkers Sebastiaan Hoogeveen Faculty of EEMCS, University of Twente ABSTRACT The fear of managers that they will lose control once their employees start teleworking is hindering acceptance and use of teleworking. As an alternative the concept of clan control can be used, which is a way to create a sharing of assumptions and goal congruence among a group of individuals. Since clan control does not require close monitoring it can easily be used in a teleworking context where this kind of monitoring is not available. This paper discusses the ways in which this type control could be implemented and what would be the implications in a telework context. Keywords telework, control, clan 1. INTRODUCTION While the technical posibilities to telework are increasing, many managers and employees are still reluctant to use telework on a fulltime basis (Suomi et al, 1998). Although the high level of flexibility and the potential of cost reduction are generally perceived as benefits of teleworking (Harris, 2003; Olson, 1982) for one example of this, companies are still reluctant to create teleworking arrangements for their employees. An important problem hindering the widespread introduction of teleworking is the fear of managers that they will lose control over their workers once these workers are physically removed from the direct environment of the managers (Kurland & Cooper, 2002), especially if the work process is of the clerical rather than the professional type (Tomaskovic-Devey & Risman, 1993). This perception of losing control could spring from the assumption that some types of control are very hard to exercise in a teleworking context. One example of this is a situation in which a control mechanism is used that depends heavily on the ability of the manager to monitor the behaviour of an employee. Once the employee and the manager are separated by physical boundaries this makes monitoring very hard to do, thus disturbing the control mechanism. While techniques to support behavioural or output control of teleworkers are being developed it can not be expected that using telework in an organisation will have no impact on the control mechanisms that are being used (Kurland & Egan, 1999; Kurland & Cooper, 2002; Olson, 1982). Ouchi (1979) describes three different types of control that are often found in organisations in different forms and Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission. 1st Twente Student Conference on IT, Enschede 14 June 2004 Copyright 2004, University of Twente, Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science combinations: market, bureaucracy and clan control. Market control depends on the ability to monitor worker s output, while bureaucracy depends on monitoring the worker s behaviour. Clan control does not require close monitoring of the employees by the responsible manager. Instead, shared values and beliefs are used to align the goals of the individual worker with those of the organisation. Since bureaucracy control relies on close monitoring of the employees this type of control is less suitable in thos situations in which the employee to be managed is not pyshically near their manager. Furthermore, when considering professional workers whose exact work process can not be described, market control might not be suitable either. The use of clan control on the other hand is not restricted to physical boundaries or by special knowledge about the work process itself. If clan control can be a suitable management control mechanisme in a teleworking context it would be interesting to see how this mechanism should be implemented to achieve an optimal result in terms of reaching organisational objectives. In this paper the concept of clan control and its applicability in a teleworking context will be further explored. The purpose of this is to provide a framework for implementation of clan control in a teleworking context. The purpose of this paper is to research the possibilities of the use of clan control to manage teleworkers, and what will be its implications on the work process. Since there is little known about the application of clan control in this specific context this study will be limited to a literature study. Due to the lack of validation of this study in a real life telework situation it should not be regarded as an implementation guide. In the next section the background of the research will be described and a number of concepts will be defined. After this the concept of clan control will be further explored and it will be discussed how clan control could be used to manage teleworkers. This paper ends with a short discussion on the potential value of clan control in a telework context. 2. BACKGROUND To understand how managerial control and teleworking could be linked using the concept of clan control, it is necessary to define what each of these concepts mean in the context of this paper. In this section, each concept will be explained and defined using existing literature on each topic. It is not the purpose of this section to provide general definitions. Instead, the concepts are modified where necessary to fit into the context of the other concepts. 2.1 Management control Berry, Broadbent & Otley (1995) define management control as [ ] primarily a process for motivating and inspiring people to perform organization activities that will further the organization s goal [sic; SH]. It is also a process for detecting and correcting unintentional performance errors and intentional irregularities, such as theft or misuse of resources. (Berry, Broadbent & Otley, 1994, p. 18).

2 Since performance errors and irregularities will not further the organisation s goals in any case the second part of this definition is not very relevant to this paper and will thus not be used any further. It is however important to realise that management control is a process, as opposed to being a mechanism. While the management control process will often use mechanisms (e.g. monitoring of employees, hierarchy, etc.) these mechanisms are not part of the control process itself. However, when no mechanisms are in place to support the control process this process would more or less be random and depending on the individuals that are exercising control. Furthermore, looking at the mechanisms that are being deployed is the most common way of defining control types (Ouchi, 1979; Simpson, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1985). Therefore it is not possible to talk about different types of management control without specifying the need for certain identifyable mechanisms that each type of control uses. When using mechanisms to define the type of control, it is now possible to define management control as as a process for motivating and inspiring people to perform organization activities that will further the organization s goals, using identifyable mechanisms to support this process. 2.2 Clan One of the types of managerial control that Ouchi (1979; 1980) identifies is clan control. Wilkins & Ouchi (1983) define a clan as a local culture that can occur in any social or organisational context. A clan should not be regarded as disorganized or loosely coupled by definition. Instead, a clan could display a very high level of discipline (Ouchi, 1980). Ouchi (1980) refers to Durkheim (1933) to define a clan as [ ] any occupational group which has organic solidarity [ ] Thus, a profession, a labor union, or a corporation may be a clan [ ] (Ouchi, 1980, p. 136). Solidarity is then explained by Ouchi as a union of objectives between the members of the clan which is caused by their dependence upon one another. In the context of this paper a clan will be regarded as a group with organic solidarity consisting of members that have at least one source of homogeneity, thus sharing a frame of reference or a common set of assumptions. Any common qualifier that could set the members of the group apart from the rest of the population can be regarded as a source of homogeneity. Examples of these qualifiers include the employing organisation, occupation, or type of work process of the members. While the number of sources of homogeneity should not be regarded being limited, choosing too much qualifiers will result in a clan that is too small to be effective. Japanese Theory Z companies, as described by Ouchi (1981) heavily use the clan concept in controlling their employees. Whenever in this paper a reference is made to a Theory Z company this should be read as a reference to a company that consists of an organisational clan, thus a clan of members that have the same employer. 2.3 Telework in a control context When defining telework in the context of managerial control three aspects of telework seem particularly relevant to the possibilities of applying certain control methods. First, there is a certain distance in time and/or place between the manager and the person actually doing the work within the organisation s primary process. This hinders the use of behavioural control since this requires close monitoring and supervision (Kurland & Cooper, 2002; Kurland & Egan, 1999). Because teleworkers are out of sight, supervisors need to rely on measures other than pyshical observation to control and monitor performance. (Kurland & Egan, 1999, p. 501). The second important characteristic is that the teleworker is working outside the regular organisational context. Instead of being at an office surrounded by colleagues working on the same or similar tasks the teleworker may be at home or in an extra-organisational telework center surrounded by people that do not share the same task environment. This could lower the level of social or occupational control, which is most relevant to professional teleworkers. This group, as opposed to clerical workers, generally relies more heavily on the mechanisms of occupational control (Simpson, 1985). The last relevant characteristic of telework is that is supported by information and communication technology (ICT). This enables the teleworker to communicate with his or her manager and colleagues using multiple channels, allowing for communication using instant messaging, video conferencing and . Using these applications it is possible for the teleworker to both coordinate the work process and keep connected socially with his or her co-workers. When the teleworker does not have access to this wide variety of communication options, or when coordination of the work process is not an issue, the work should be regarded as contract work rather than telework. Telework is defined in a control context by Depickere (1999) as [ ] an activity whereby people work at a distance from an employer (or an instructing organisation), using ICT to overcome that distance. (Depickere, 1999, p. 100). While this definition already covers much of the defining characteristics in the context of this paper, it does not regard seperation in time, nor does it imply that the work is done outside the regular organisational context. Therefore it is needed to extend this definition and define telework as an activity whereby people work at a spatial or temporal distance from an employer (or an instructing organisation) being physically removed from the regular context (e.g. an office), using ICT to overcome that distance. 2.4 Professional workers According to Thomaskovic-Devey & Risman (1993) some studies [ ] do suggest that telecommuting [or telework; SH] tends to be organized very differently for professional and clerical labor forces (Thomaskovic-Devey & Risman, 1993, p. 368). While the authors do not provide a definition of clerical and professional workers, they argue that the managerial goals of using teleworking in the work process of members of each group are different. For professionals, the main goal would be to increase capacity. On the other hand, the goal of teleworking for clerical workers is a reduction of cost, resulting in a work process that [ ] tends to be subcontract or piece rate work done totally at home and with the loss of benefits packages. (Thomaskovic-Devey & Risman, 1993, p. 368). Work that can be subcontracted or done at a piece rate will very likely be controlled using a market-type control process. The management of clerical teleworkers is therefore not regarded in this paper. Depickere (1999) argues that with regard to the dynamics of control and commitment [ ] it is most interesting to consider these issues for more highly skilled employees who belong to the core of the organisation and whose capacities and knowledge are considered to be valuable production factors for the organisation. The commitment of these employees to the organisation is of vital importance for the performance of the organisation as a whole and more specifically for managerial

3 control. (Depickere, 1999, p. 100). This paper will focus on this important group of employees that can be considered professional workers. A definition of a professional worker will then be a highly skilled employee who belongs to the core of the organisation and whose capacities and knowledge are considered to be valuable production factors for the organisation. The classification of whether a particular worker is a professional merely depends on the perception of the controlling manager. 3. EXPLORING CLAN CONTROL In the previous section a number of concepts was described, including the concept of clans. These clans can now be used to employ a control mechanism as was described by Ouchi (1979; 1980) and Wilkins & Ouchi (1983). In this section it will be explored what are the social, cultural and technical prerequisites for the effective use of clans and how clans might influence the organisation and the work environment for its members. Long history. Absence of institutional alternatives. Traditions and myths. Sharing of assumptions Great degree of social understanding. Effective governing by clan control Stable membership. Link disparate units. Professional clans. Selective staffing. Interaction among members. Goal congruence Slow evaluation cycle. Collective responsibilities. Decision by consensus. Perception of long-term equity. Figure 1. Prerequisites for effective clan control According to Wilkins & Ouchi (1983) effective clan control [ ] requires the development of shared knowledge in two areas: (1) a general paradigm that helps participants determine what is in the best interest of the collective; and (2) the perception of goal congruance [ ] (Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983, p. 475). The general paradigm as mentioned by the authors can be understood as a common frame of reference, a set of assumptions on which all members agree. This paradigm helps the members to understand what is in the best interest of the clan. Wilkins & Ouchi (1983) warn that goal congruence should not be interpreted as the individuals sharing goals with the organisation. Individuals are still expected to perform in accordance with their self-interest, reaching equity in the long term. For this to work two assumptions must exist when using clan control, namely (1) that joint effort is the best way to achieve individual self-interest; and (2) that in the long run both honest and dishonest people will be discovered and dealt with accordingly. (Wikins & Ouchi, 1983, p. 476). This fairness in the long term is also called long-term equity (Ouchi, 1980). To reach both a general paradigm and goal congruence a number of prerequisites are necessary. While most of these factors merely encourage (or discourage) effective clan control, some of these are required to be able to employ clan control in a way that has sense and can be effective. A conceptual overview of effective clan control is provided in Figure 1. The prerequisites that are most important and should usually be met for clan control to be effective are emphasized. The other prerequisites are not real requirements perse, but could encourage the creation of clans. In the next paragraphs, the social/cultural and technical prerequisites with regard to the development of clans within an organisation will be discussed. 3.1 Social and cultural prerequisites To create a general paradigm a relatively great degree of social understanding is required, [ ] specific to the organization, about the general objectives, methods, and values of the collective that it clearly may be thought of as control or governance by means of a local culture [or clan; SH] that is analogous to the paradigmatic anthropological culture. (Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983, p. 472). This social understanding should legitimate authority and create shared values and beliefs, which will help create the general paradigm. Furthermore, it should employ a norm of reciprocity, which will help creating a perception of long-term equity and goal congruance (Ouchi, 1979; 1980). Since it is not thought to be possible to impose a culture upon an individual (Alvesson & Lindkvist, 1993) a process of selective staffing and socialisation is required (Ouchi, 1979). This process is also described by Adami (1999), who takes a human resources approach to identify input control mechanisms. According to Adami (1999) these controls [ ] are important as strategic-minded organisations choose new members who have the requisite capabilities and values to perform well and fit in. (Adami, 1999, p. 134). Organisations can simplify the selection process by drawing from external sources that match the organisational culture, for example by recruiting employees from a particular university (Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983) or by hiring professionals that already belong to a professional or occupational clan. Control inside these type of clans is described as social or occupational control (Simpson, 1985). A long history and stable clan membership will cause older members of the clan to pass on knowledge to new members. Wilkins & Ouchi (1983) say that this provides the image of histority that Berger and Luckman (1967) [ ] claimed is the beginning of the institutionalization of social knowledge. They claimed that when a second generation comes on the scene, what had been the ad hoc conceptions and social routines of the first generation now become historic institutions, apparently objective social facts, inherent in the situation. (Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983, p. 473). Furthermore, Wilkins & Ouchi (1983) argue that culture in organizations will more likely develop when contradictory social institutions are absent or discounted. (Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983, p. 473). Thus, the absence of these institutional alternatives would encourage the development of a strong clan. According to Wilkins & Ouchi (1983) it is necessary to increase interaction among members of a clan to prehibit the formation of smaller groups of people that would inhibit the development of the clan as a whole. Following practices of Theory-Z companies as described by Ouchi (1981) organisations should link disparate units within the organisation using individuals

4 who had worked in these units. Furthermore, the organisation should encourage individuals to offer their opinions on decisions, instead of having single individuals make decisions. According to Wilkins & Ouchi (1983) Such collective decision making may be seen as another means of encouraging the continued reinforcement and development of shared knowledge about the social world through member contact. (Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983, p. 474). 3.2 Technical prerequisites Since an organisation s goals are usually defined as the reaching of strategic long-term goals it is necessary that the performance of each individual within the organisation is measured on a long term as well. If assessments of these longterm objectives are fair and the organisations has an adequate long serial memory [ ] capable of keeping account of, and distinguishing between, the efforts of individuals (good, bad and opportunistic) for lengthy periods. (Alvesson & Lindkvist, 1993, p. 433), members of the clan will have the perception of being treated fair. Ouchi (1980) calls this perception of longterm equity. This focus on long-term equity prevents the members of the clan from employing opportunism that in the short run may reward the employee but in the long run may cause damage to the organisation (Alvesson & Lindkvist, 1993; Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983). See the case study of Woodward & Woodward (2001) for an example of a situation in which there was inadequate focus on long-term equity, resulting in damage to the employing organisation. Alvesson & Lindkvist (1993) define three types of clans, namely the cognitive-utilitarion form with its calculating and co-operating individuals could be termed economic-cooperative control. The form in which individuals possess to a greater extent internal social and emotional ties can be defined as communion or social-integrative control [ ] The lastmentioned form [a clan in which family relationships play an important role; SH] could be referred to as kinship clan control. (Alvesson & Lindkvist, 1993, p. 443). The authors argue that in a social clan the reaching of long-term equity is perceived to be of small importance. This seems to be related to the claim of uniqueness assumption of Wilkins & Ouchi (1983). However, one can say that the social-integrative and kinship clans are both as focussed on equity as is the eceonomic-co-operative clan, but that the form in which equity is reached differs. It then would be possible to reach equity not only in monetary terms, but also by values that can not easily be measured. Examples of these values include social status or the ability of doing work that directly supports the personal convictions of the clan member (e.g. as with religious organisations). 4. CLAN CONTROL ON TELEWORKERS In this section the use of clans to manage teleworkers will be discussed. In the first subsection it will be discussed how a clan could be created to include teleworkers. Then the prerequisites of effective control within these clans will be discussed, after which the implications of clan control on the work process itself will be examined. 4.1 Teleworkers as a clan When regarding the professional teleworkers that are the subject of this paper there are three common qualifiers for this group of people. These qualifiers are the employing organisation, the occupation and the work process of teleworking. These qualifiers can be combined to create a clan consisting of a group that is homogeneous with regards to these aspects. The smallest clan that can be formed within this framework is that of teleworkers of a particular occupation within a particular organisation. Since this type of clan will usually be too small to be effective, only clans that have one or two sources of homogeneity will be examined. Clans of which all members share the same employer are already known as organisational clans, and are described by Ouchi (1980; 1981) and Wilkins & Ouchi (1983). A type of clan that also is already described by Simpson (1985) is the occupational or professional clan in which all members have the same professional background. Both of these types of clans will not be discussed here any further, since they are already welldocumented. However, the prerequisites and implications of effective clan control of teleworkers that are discussed in the next subsections also apply to these types of clans. A clan that consists of teleworkers that have a particular occupation might prove to be too small to be effective. Since an organisation usually consists of employees that have different occupations this type of clan would not allow for effective clan control of teleworkers inside a particular organisation. Instead, the great number of clans within the organisation might actually worsen managerial control (Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983). Therefore this option will not be examined any further. If an organisation does not yet consist of an organisational clan, it might be effective to create a clan within the organisation consisting of teleworking employees. This is much like the use of professional clans within existing organisation as described by Wilkins & Ouchi (1983). Membership of this clan could be related to the membership of a special workgroup or other consultative body that would set standards and create a perception of long-term equity among its members. Representatives of this intra-organisational telework clan could negotiate with the rest of the organisation when necessary. This type of clan would set the teleworkers further apart from the rest of the organisation, which might be undesirable and could in fact alienate the members of the clan from the organisational objectives. This would become a problem if the objectives of the clan would diverge with those of the organisation. The last clan that is possible within the framework is a clan that consists of members that are all teleworkers, but do not have a particular occupation or employer. This can be regarded as a kind of occupational clan (Simpson, 1985) in which the members do not share competences that are related to the contents of the work itself, but instead share competences that are related to the work process of teleworking. This clan could be implemented by creating a certifying organisation for teleworkers that is being recognized by employing organisations as being authoritive. While the goals of this clan would obviously not necessarily be congruent with the different organisational goals, it is also not very likely that objectives would conflict. The objectives of this inter-organisational telework clan could be the promotion of telework within organisation, by means of conforming to the different organisational objectives, thus indirectly reaching goal congruence. To be effective, this type of clan would need to be a closed group of people that require a certification of its members. Lack of this certification could lead to ineffectiveness of clan control, as was documented by Woodward & Woodward (2001) in an illustrative case study. 4.2 Implications Using clan control to manage teleworkers obviously will have some implications with regards to the work process and

5 environment of the individual teleworker and her or his direct manager. To allow for institutionalisation of standards and rules for teleworking the clan should have a long history and membership must be stable. This implies that the creation of a clan will not solve any difficulties with regards to the control of teleworkers in a short term. The supporters of the clan should be willing and able to make a large investment in the creation and maintenance of the clan (Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983) while results should not be expected within a short term. This support could be offered by parties that do have a direct profit of an increase in teleworking. Another way of setting standards is by educating and rigorous examinations (Woodward & Woodward, 2001) of individuals who want to join the clan. This could be done by the offering telework courses at the employer or by education offered by an association of telework professionals. Selective staffing of teleworking employees could be facilitated in two ways. First, a checklist or some other kind of normative device could be used to measure the ability of an individual to telework. Second, the employer could use a trial period to further observe the personal characteristics of the new member and find out whether the member could perform well in a teleworking context. However, due to the fact that the focus inside clans should be on long-term equity it is undesirable to evaluate the actual work done by the individual, the focus of the evaluation should be on measuring her or his ability to telework. Changing the focus to long-term equity can be done by employing a slow evaluation cycle. This would mean that the teleworker might not get any extra benefits after a very long period of evaluation. This will constitute a problem in an environment where other organisations exist that do reward short-term success. This presence of institutional alternatives should be compensated by other benefits, such as being able to work independently at home and the influence of employees on the decisions made within the organisation. A last important aspect of clan control that will have its implications on telework arrangement is the desired interaction among members and linking of disparate units. While interaction at the office is common, interaction of teleworkers will require special tools. To let the members communicate effectively it is recommended that standards are laid out for the use of certain communication tools. These tools should not only allow delayed communication (e.g. ) but also the use of direct interaction (e.g. via chat or video conferencing). There should be no monitoring of the use or contents of these tools, since this type of monitoring is not possible nor desirable in a non-teleworking situation as well. 5. CONCLUSION Managing teleworkers as members of an already existing organisational or professional clan is not hindered by distance or a difference in pyshical environment, as long as the organisational context and objectives are shared among all members. Clan control is therefore a suitable type of control to manage teleworkers in these cases. For managing teleworkers as members of a new teleworking clan, either intra-organisational or inter-organisational, a framework of standards and rules would need to be institutionalised. This process could be supported by explicitation of telework as a work process, the creation of an organisation or organisational sub unit consisting of teleworkers, and the use of rigorous examiniation and certification of potential teleworkers before joining the clan. Organisations should realize that the creation and maintenance of clans induce considerate costs. When clan control is applied to only a subset of employees the benefits might not be big enough to justify the costs of creating a clan. However, once the clan is in place and has existed long enough to build up a sufficient history and thus institutionalisation of rules and standards, clan control is a very effective way of controlling employees without any need for direct monitoring. As a result of this, letting members of a clan work at home or another location using teleworking would no longer create problems with regards to monitoring and control. 6. DISCUSSION While this paper argues that clan control would be an effective way of managing teleworkers, it is not said that this type of control should be the preferable method. In this section it will be discussed why clan control may be a more appropriate control method than the market and bureaucracy types of control as identified by Ouchi (1979; 1980). While there is a considerate amount of literature on the item of management control most studies measuring the effectiveness of control do this from the point of view of the controlling manager. Thus, instead of measuring the amount of control, the perception of control by the manager is measured. See for examples of this Kurland & Cooper (2002) and Tomaskovic- Devey & Risman (1993). While the perception of control will probably have a strong relationship with its effectiveness, managers may just fear change when they say that the introduction of teleworking would decrease control. Most managers are used to employing mechanisms like behavioural or output control and perceive the lose of these control methods as a loss of control, while it might be possible that the new work process only requires a different form of control that is no less effective. Often, clan control is thought of as a last resort if measurement of output is not possible or costly and the desired behaviour can not be described in detail (Ouchi, 1979). This preference is fed by the assumption that clan control involves higher transaction costs than output or behavioural control. However, each mode of control has a specific set of prerequisites which are shown in Table 1 (next page). Table 1. Social and informational prerequisites of control (adopted from Ouchi 1979; 1980) Type of control Social requirements Informational requirements Market Norm of reciprocity Prices Bureaucrac Norm of reciprocity Rules y Legitimate authority Clan Norm of reciprocity Legitimate authority Shared values and beliefs Traditions Ouchi (1979) says that While a Clan is the most demanding and the Market the least demanding with respect to social underpinnings, the opposite is true when it comes to information. (Ouchi, 1979, p. 838). This would especially be relevant in a teleworking context since the exchange of information among teleworkers could end up being more costly than the social requirements of the clan. Thus, instead of

6 dismissing alternatives if market or bureaucracy control is possible, organisations should look at the costs that are involved with both the social and the informational requirements of each type of control. Further research would be needed with regards to measuring control and the costs that are involved with both the social and informational requirements of each type of control. While the topic of management control will probably never be an exact science, it should not stay dependend on the gut feeling of the controlling managers. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank Diana Limburg and the students of track D (E-work) of the first TC&R conference for their valuable comments and inspiration with regards to a wide range of telework-related topics. I would also like to thank Roel Pieper who inadvertently inspired me on the topic of this paper by suggesting that organisations should rate their employees performance on the value that they add in the long term. REFERENCES Adami, L.M. (1999). Autonomy, control and the virtual worker. In P.J. Jackson. Virtual Working: Social and organisational dynamics. 1 st edition. London, UK: Routledge, pp Alvesson, M. & L. Lindkvist (1993). Transaction costs, clans and corporate culture. Journal of Management Studies 30 (3), pp Berger, P.L. & T. Luckman (1967). The Social Construction of Reality. Garden City NY, USA: Anchor Books. Berry, A.J., J. Broadbent & D. Otley (1995). Approaches to control in the organisational literature. In A.J. Berry, J. Broadbent & D. Otley (Eds.). Management Control: Theories, Issues and Practices. 1 st edition. London, UK: MacMillan Press Ltd. Depickere, A. (1999). Managing virtual working: between commitment and control? In P.J. Jackson (Ed.). Virtual Working: Social and organisational dynamics. 1 st edition. London, UK: Routledge, pp Durkheim, E. (1933). The Division of Labor in Society. Transscript. New York NY, USA: Free Press. Eisenhardt, K.M. (1985). Control: Organizational and economic approaches. Management Science 31 (2), pp Harris, L. (2003). Home-based teleworking and the employment relationship: Managerial challenges and dilemmas. Personnel review 32 ( 4), pp Kurland, N.B. & C.D. Cooper (2002). Manager control and employee isolation in telecommuting environments. The Journal of High Technology Management Research 13, pp Kurland, N.B. & T.D. Egan (1999). Telecommuting: Justice and Control in the Virtual Organization. Organization Science 10(4), pp Olson, M.H. (1982). New Information Technology and Organizational Culture. MIS Quarterly 6 (special issue: 1982 Research Program of the Society for Management Information Systems), pp Ouchi, W.G. (1979). A Conceptual Framework for the Design of Organizational Control Mechanisms. Management Science, 25 ( 9), pp Ouchi, W.G. (1980). Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans. Administrative Science Quarterly 25(1), pp Ouchi, W.G. (1981). Theory Z: How American Business Can Meet the Japanese Challenge. Reading MA, USA: Addison- Wesley. Simpson, R.L. (1985). Social Control of Occupations and Work. Annual Review of Sociology 11, pp Suomi, R. et al (1998). Telework the critical management dimension. In P.J. Jackson & J.M. van der Wielen (Eds.). Teleworking: international perspectives. 1 st edition. London, UK: Routledge. pp Tomaskovic-Devey, D. & B.J. Risman (1993). Telecommuting Innovation and Organization: A Contingency Theory of Labor Process Change. Social Science Quarterly 74 (2), pp Wilkins, A.L. & W.G. Ouchi (1983). Efficient Cultures: Exploring the Relationship Between Culture and Organizational Performance. Administrative Science Quarterly 28 (3), pp Woodward, D. & T. Woodward (2001). The Efficacy of Action at a Distance as a Control Mechanism in the Construction Industry When a Trust Relationship Breaks Down: an Illustrative Case Study. British Journal of Management 12, pp