Ontario PROVINCIAL NUCLEAR EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN MASTER PLAN

Transcription

1 Ontario PROVINCIAL NUCLEAR EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN MASTER PLAN 2009 Prepared by Emergency Management Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services

2

3 FOREWORD The Province of Ontario s Nuclear Emergency Response Plan has been developed pursuant to Section 8 of the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E. 9 (hereafter referred to as the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act or EMCPA). The current edition of this plan supersedes and replaces all older versions which should be destroyed. Holders of the Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan are responsible for keeping them updated by incorporating amendments, which may be issued from time to time. This Plan is administered by the Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services of Ontario. All comments and suggestions relating to it should be directed to: Program Manager, Planning and Exercises Emergency Management Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services 77 Wellesley Street, Box 222 Toronto, Ontario, M7A 1N3 Phone : (416) Fax : (416) askemo@ontario.ca Website: A copy of this plan is available to the public for inspection and copying during business hours at the offices of Emergency Management Ontario.

4 ii EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND CIVIL PROTECTION ACT PROVINCIAL NUCLEAR EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN MASTER PLAN PROVINCIAL NUCLEAR EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN IMPLEMENTING PLANS MAJOR NUCLEAR SITES OTHER RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES TRANSBORDER EMERGENCIES MAJOR ORGANIZATION PLANS PROVINCIAL MINISTRIES, AGENCIES, BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS MUNICIPALITIES NUCLEAR ORGANIZATIONS OTHER PROCEDURES CHECKLISTS FIGURE I : NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING STRUCTURE

5 iii NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING STRUCTURE The structure for nuclear and radiological emergency response planning in Ontario, which is illustrated in the diagram on the previous page, consists of the following components: The Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act (EMCPA) requires and authorizes the formulation of the plan. The Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan (PNERP): Developed pursuant to Section 8 of the EMCPA and subject to Cabinet approval: - The Master Plan: sets out the overall principles, policies, basic concepts, organizational structures and responsibilities. - The Implementing Plans: the elements of the Master Plan are applied to each major nuclear site, transborder emergencies and other types of radiological emergencies, and detailed provincial implementing plans developed. The Major Organization Plans (as per Figure I on page ii) should be consistent with the requirements under these implementing plans. Major Organization Plans : Each major organization involved (provincial ministries, agencies, boards and commissions, municipalities, and nuclear organizations, etc.) develops its own plan to carry out the relevant role, responsibilities and tasks agreed to by them and consistent with their mandate. These plans are based on, and should be consistent with the PNERP and with the Provincial Implementing Plans. Procedures : Based on all of the above plans, procedures are developed for the various emergency centres to be set up and for the various operational functions required. Checklists : The culmination of the planning process is the development of checklists based on the requirements of the procedures, e.g, individual position or function-specific checklists. It is necessary that everyone involved in the preparation and implementation of the Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan employ common terminology. The terminology contained in the Glossary, Annex K, should be used for this purpose by all concerned. Words or phrases defined in the Glossary are italicized within the text of this document.

6 iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Response Planning Structure Acronyms and Abbreviations Page i iii viii CHAPTER 1 GENERAL AND LEGAL Aim of Planning and Plans Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies Declaration and Termination of an Emergency Responsibilities Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Their Scope Legislative Authority in a Nuclear Emergency and / or Radiological Emergency - Federal Legislative Responsibilities in a Nuclear and / or Radiological Emergency - Provincial Legislative Requirements in a Nuclear and/or Radiological Emergency - Municipal Responsibilities of Organizations Guiding Principles Administration of the Plan 14 CHAPTER 2 PLANNING BASIS AND CONCEPTS The Potential Hazards Protective and Precautionary Measures Basis of Planning Primary Zones and Sectors Nuclear Emergencies Contamination Zones Radiological Emergencies Population Groups Protective Action Levels Planning Times Nuclear Emergencies Concept of Operations - Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies Modification to Concepts 25 CHAPTER 3 PREPAREDNESS FOR NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL 31 EMERGENCIES 3.1 Goals for Preparedness Preparedness Responsibilities Emergency Management Coordinating Committees Components of Nuclear Emergency Preparedness 32

7 CHAPTER 4 EMERGENCY RESPONSE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS 34 v 4.1 General LGIC and Premier Cabinet Committee of Emergency Management Deputy Minister Community Safety, MCSCS Commissioner of Emergency Management (CEM) Emergency Information Section The Provincial Emergency Operations Centre Other Emergency Operations Centres Field Response 42 CHAPTER 5 OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES General Control of Operations Contingency Provisions Declaration and Termination of an Emergency Notification Systems Initial Offsite Response Public Alerting Public Direction Emergency Information Radiation Health Response Plan (RHRP) Thyroid Blocking Personal Monitoring and Decontamination Emergency Worker Safety Environmental Radiation Monitoring Responsibilities Liquid Emission Response Venting of Containment Traffic Control Reception and Care of Evacuees Protection and Care of Animals Procedures 57 CHAPTER 6 PROVINCIAL OPERATIONAL RESPONSE STRATEGY General Provincial Response Levels Activation of Emergency Plans Declaration and Termination of a Provincial Emergency Protective Action Decision-Making Protective Action Response Strategy Additional Operational Response Strategies Operational Conventions Transition from Response Phase to Recovery Phase Termination of Offsite Response 70

8 vi FIGURES AND TABLES Page I Nuclear Emergency Response Plan Structure ii 2.1 Protective Measures Primary Zone and Response Sectors Secondary Zone (Nuclear Emergency) Environmental Radiation Monitoring Zones (Radiological Emergencies) Concept of Operations - Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies Provincial Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Response Organization Provincial Emergency Operations Centre - Scientific Section Basic Operational Responsibilities 58 (Activation Response) ANNEXES A-K A Nuclear Installations and Designated Municipalities 72 B The Use Of Community Facilities During a Nuclear Emergency 73 C Public Education for Nuclear Emergencies 78 D Initial Notification and Response System for Nuclear Emergencies 81 Appendix 1 - Initial Provincial and Municipal Response Levels 84 E Protective Action Levels (Pals) 85 F Personal Monitoring 88 G Venting of Containment Nuclear Emergencies 91 H EMERGENCY WORKER SAFETY 93 Appendix 1 - Emergency Worker Safety Guidelines for Assigning Safety Status in a Nuclear Emergency 94 Appendix 2 - Emergency Worker Safety for a Nuclear Emergency 95 Appendix 3 - Emergency Worker Safety for a Radiological Emergency - Regulated Effective Doses 96 I RESPONSIBILITIES OF ORGANIZATIONS 97 - Minister of Agriculture Food and Rural Affairs 98 - The Attorney General Minister of Community and Social Services Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services Minister of Energy and Infrastructure 107

9 vii - Minister of the Environment Minister of Health and Long-Term Care Minister of Labour Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing Minister of Natural Resources Minister of Northern Development and Mines 117 Minister of Transportation Nuclear Installations Nuclear Establishments Designated Municipalities (in nuclear installation Primary Zone) Designated Municipalities (acting as Host Municipality)) Health Canada Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Public Safety Canada 132 J Conversion Table - Radiological Units 133 K Nuclear / Radiological Glossary 134

10 viii ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS AECL - Atomic Energy of Canada Limited AIM - Abnormal Incident Manual ALARA - As low as reasonably achievable AMG - Assurance Monitoring Group BP - Bruce Power BPS - Bruce Power Site BWR - Boiling Water (nuclear) Reactor CANDU - The name of the Canadian developed nuclear power reactor system (from Canada Deuterium Uranium) CCEM - Cabinet Committee on Emergency Management CEMC - Community Emergency Management Coordinator CEM - Commissioner of Community Safety CESC - Corporate Emergency Support Centre CEOC - Community Emergency Operations Centre CEOF - Corporate Emergency Operations Facility CNSC - Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission CRC - Corporate Response Centre CRL - Chalk River Laboratories CZ - Contiguous Zone DNGS - Darlington Nuclear Generating Station EB - Emergency Bulletin ECI - Emergency Coolant Injection EFADS - Emergency Filtered Air Discharge System EMCPA - Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act EIC - Emergency Information Centre EMO - Emergency Management Ontario EOC - Emergency Operations Centre EPZ - Emergency Planning Zone ERAP - Emergency Response Assistance Plan ER - Emergency Response ERMG - Environmental Radiation Monitoring Group

11 ix FADS - Filtered Air Discharge System FDA - Food and Drug Administration FNEP - Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan GOC - Government Operations Centre GPMP - General Province-Wide Monitoring Plan GPMG - General Province Wide Monitoring Group Gy - Gray. See definition of Absorbed Dose in Glossary, Annex K HAZMAT - Hazardous Material HC - Health Canada IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency INES - International Nuclear Event Scale JTCC - Joint Traffic Control Centre JTCP - Joint Traffic Control Plan KI - Potassium Iodide km - Kilometre LGIC - Lieutenant Governor In Council LHDR - Laurentian Hills Deep River LHDRRNEPC- Laurentian Hills Deep River Regional Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Committee LOCA - Loss-of-Coolant Accident LOECI - Loss of Emergency Coolant Injection MCSCS - Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services MCSS - Ministry of Community and Social Services MDU - Monitoring & Decontamination Unit MEMC - Ministry Emergency Management Coordinator MEOC - Ministry Emergency Operations Centre Met - Meteorology, meteorological MMAH - Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing MNR - Ministry of Natural Resources MOE - Ministry of the Environment MEI - Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure MOHLTC - Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care MOL - Ministry of Labour

12 x msv - Millisievert MTO - Ministry of Transportation, Ontario NIG - Nuclear Incident Group NEMCC - Nuclear Emergency Management Coordinating Committee OMAFRA - Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs OPG - Ontario Power Generation OPP - Ontario Provincial Police PAL - Protective Action Level PNERP - Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan PNGS - Pickering Nuclear Generating Station PWR - Pressurized Water (nuclear) Reactor PHWR - Pressurized Heavy Water (nuclear) Reactor PEOC - Provincial Emergency Operations Centre PZ - Primary Zone rad - See definition of Absorbed Dose in Glossary, Annex K RAG - Regional Action Group RD - Radiological Device RDD - Radiological Dispersal Device rem - See definition of Equivalent Dose in Glossary, Annex K RHRP - Radiation Health Response Plan RNEMCC - Regional Nuclear Emergency Management Coordinating Committee SRP - Site Reference Plan SMC - Site Management Centre Sv - Sievert. See definition of Equivalent Dose in Glossary, Annex K SZ - Secondary Zone TRF - Tritium Removal Facility TLD - Thermoluminescent Dosimeter UTM - Universal Transverse Mercator WHO - World Health Organization

13 1 CHAPTER 1 GENERAL AND LEGAL 1.1 Aim of Planning and Plans Pursuant to Section 8 of the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act (EMCPA), the Lieutenant Governor In Council (LGIC) shall formulate an emergency plan for nuclear facility emergencies Pursuant to Section 8.1 of the EMCPA, the Solicitor General (Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services) may, if considered necessary or desirable in the interests of emergency management and public safety, formulate plans respecting other types of emergencies other than those arising in connection with nuclear facilities In accordance with the respective responsibilities of the federal and provincial governments, the Province of Ontario is primarily responsible for the off-site effects and response to a nuclear emergency, while the federal government is primarily responsible for the on-site effects and response to a nuclear emergency. In a nuclear emergency, therefore, the Province will take the leading role in managing the off-site response The provincial responsibility to lead the off-site response to a nuclear emergency will be carried out by supporting and coordinating the efforts of organizations with nuclear emergency responsibilities as set out in this Plan, the Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan (PNERP). The Province may issue operational directives 1 and emergency orders (in the event of a declared emergency), where warranted and appropriate, as further detailed in this Plan The aim of the Province of Ontario, in the event of a nuclear/radiological emergency, is the protection of the health, safety, welfare and property of the people of Ontario and the protection of the environment This PNERP provides the basis upon which offsite emergency management should be undertaken to achieve the above aim Nuclear and radiological emergency plans formulated by ministries, municipalities, nuclear installations, nuclear establishments, their operators, and other agencies and organizations should conform to the PNERP so as to contribute to the achievement of this aim. 1 Italicized words are defined in the Glossary (Annex K).

14 2 1.2 Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies For the purposes of this plan, a nuclear emergency occurs when there is an actual or potential hazard to public health and property or the environment from ionizing radiation whose source is a major nuclear installation within or immediately adjacent to Ontario. Such a hazard will usually be caused by an accident, malfunction, or loss of control involving radioactive material For the purposes of this plan, a radiological emergency would occur when there is an actual or potential hazard to public health, property and/or the environment from ionizing radiation resulting from sources other than a major nuclear installation. Such a hazard will usually be caused by an accident, malfunction, or loss of control involving radioactive material Where a radiological emergency (as defined in above) arises onsite at a nuclear installation, the response shall be undertaken pursuant to the Implementing Plan for that nuclear installation Nuclear and radiological emergencies can arise in Ontario under the following circumstances, among others (though not all such events would necessarily lead to such an emergency): a) Accidents or occurrences at nuclear installations, including some outside Ontario. b) Accidents or occurrences at nuclear establishments. c) Accidents or occurrences during the transportation of radioactive material. d) Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) e) Radiological Device (RD) f) Satellite re-entry g) Nuclear weapon detonation The following types of nuclear and radiological emergencies would normally not need to be dealt with under the PNERP: a) An accident in which the effects, both actual and potential, are expected to be confined within the boundaries of the nuclear facility. b) An accident in which the effects are so localized that their impact can be satisfactorily dealt with by local emergency response personnel (police, fire, etc.) with possibly some outside technical assistance.

15 When the PNERP is implemented to deal with the consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency, the Province, through the Provincial Emergency Operations Centre (PEOC), may undertake certain measures, pursuant to this plan, before or in the absence of an emergency declaration made by the Lieutenant Governor In Council The Province may issue operational directives for certain measures that are to be implemented, pursuant to the policy and guidance provided in this plan. This may include protective actions such as sheltering and/or evacuation, or operational measures such as ground or aerial monitoring. Such action will be taken in order to protect public health and safety and the environment If the Lieutenant Governor In Council (LGIC) declares an emergency (section 1.3 below), emergency orders may be issued pursuant to section of the EMCPA that address the subject of operational directives that may have already been issued. 1.3 Declaration and Termination of a Provincial Emergency The EMCPA sets out provisions for emergency declarations, as follows: a) The LGIC has the authority to declare a provincial emergency. b) A declaration of a provincial emergency may also be made by the Premier if the urgency of the situation requires that it be made immediately The following criteria must be met to declare a provincial emergency: (a) The emergency requires immediate action to prevent, reduce or mitigate the dangers posed by the emergency. (b) A threefold test: i. The resources normally available to the government (including legislative authorities) cannot be relied upon without risk of serious delay; ii. iii. The resources normally available to the government may be insufficiently effective to address the emergency; or It is not possible, without the risk of serious delay, to ascertain whether the resources normally available can be relied upon Termination of a Declaration: a) A declaration lasts for 14 days unless previously terminated. This declaration can be renewed for one further period of 14 days, as long as it meets the test of the declared emergency.

16 1.4 Responsibilities 4 b) The Legislative Assembly may by resolution extend the length of an emergency for additional periods of no more than 28 days, for as many times as required. c) An emergency declaration made by the Premier lapses after 72 hours, unless confirmed by the LGIC. Responsibilities of the following organizations for both nuclear emergency response and for the purposes of implementing this plan, are described in Annex I: a) Nuclear Installations b) Designated (Primary Zone) Municipalities c) Designated (Host) Municipalities d) Specified Ministries e) Federal Departments 1.5 Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Their Scope Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan (PNERP) a) The PNERP is a Cabinet approved document. b) The PNERP Master Plan sets out the principles, concepts, organization, responsibilities, policies, functions and interrelationships, which will govern all nuclear and radiological emergency management in Ontario. c) The PNERP Implementing Plans apply the principles, concepts and policies contained in the Master Plan, in order to provide detailed guidance and direction for dealing with a specific nuclear or radiological emergency. i) Response Plans for Site Specific Nuclear Emergencies Separate response plans have been developed to deal with accidents at the Pickering, Darlington and Bruce Power nuclear generating stations as well as for the Chalk River Laboratories and the Fermi 2 installation in Monroe, Michigan. ii) Response Plan for Transborder Nuclear Emergencies This Plan deals with a nuclear emergency caused by any nuclear accident or event occurring outside Ontario that could affect the

17 5 Province, including one at a number of specified nuclear installations in the U.S.A. These are combined in one document since many of the features will be the same for all such potential emergencies. iii) Response Plan for Other Radiological Emergencies Major Organization Plans a) Ministry Plans This Plan provides generic guidance on dealing with radiological emergencies caused by sources not covered by the other Implementing Plans. It would be applicable to accidents at nuclear establishments, transportation (of radioactive goods) accidents, satellite (containing radioactive material) re-entry, radiological dispersal devices (RDD), radiological devices (RD) and nuclear weapon detonation. Provincial ministries, agencies, boards and commissions shall develop their own plans and procedures to fulfil the responsibilities as outlined in the appendices to Annex I. b) Municipal Plans i. Pursuant to sections 3 and 8 of the EMCPA, municipal nuclear emergency response plans prepared by the designated municipalities in respect of nuclear installation emergencies (Annex A) shall conform to this PNERP and, shall address the agreed-to responsibilities outlined in Appendices 15 and 16 to Annex I. ii. iii. iv. Municipalities in close proximity to, or with nuclear establishments within their boundaries should include, in their emergency response plans, the measures they may need to take to deal with a radiological accident. This would include details on the relevant notifications to/from the involved organizations (see PNERP Implementing Plan for Other Radiological Emergencies). Other municipalities which have a radiological incident identified as one of their potential risks within their Hazard Identification & Risk Assessment should include, within their municipal emergency response plans, the measures they may be required to undertake to deal with such an emergency (see PNERP Implementing Plan for Other Radiological Emergencies). All municipal emergency response plans should provide for the development of plans and procedures involving local boards

18 6 (defined pursuant to the Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c. 25) and police services operating in the area to provide necessary support and assistance required by such plans, or that which may be needed in an emergency. c) Nuclear Installation Plans The emergency plans and procedures of nuclear installations deal with their onsite responsibilities. They should also include the measures required to discharge offsite responsibilities in accordance with the Nuclear Safety and Control Act and Regulations and with the responsibilities outlined in Appendix 13 to Annex I. d) Nuclear Establishment Plans Nuclear establishments have plans/procedures for the control of radioactive material and for the notification of offsite authorities in the event of an accident, in accordance with the Nuclear Safety and Control Act, and its associated regulations, and with the agreed to responsibilities outlined in Appendix 14 to Annex I. e) Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan (FNEP) The FNEP is the plan of the Government of Canada under which it will respond to a major nuclear emergency with interprovincial and/or international implications. This plan contains an Ontario Annex, which provides for liaison with Ontario, the provision of federal assistance, and provisions for obtaining international assistance, should any be requested by Ontario. f) Canada /United States Joint Radiological Emergency Response Plan This is a plan jointly developed and adopted by the federal governments of Canada and the United States for early notification, coordination of activities and provision of mutual assistance between the two countries in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency in North America with transboundary implications. 1.6 Legislative Authority in a Nuclear and / or Radiological Emergency - Federal Federal Roles and Responsibilities a) Health Canada administers the Federal Nuclear Emergency Plan (FNEP), which can be activated to manage and coordinate federal response activities for a nuclear emergency requiring a multijurisdictional or multi-departmental off-site response. Health Canada has agreed to the responsibilities outlined in Appendix 17 to Annex I.

19 7 b) The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), an independent agency of the Government of Canada, is the national regulator for the nuclear industry in Canada which includes any actions taken in response to the radiological or nuclear aspects of an emergency. In the event of a radiological or nuclear emergency, the CNSC will monitor and evaluate the on-site response of the licensee, or in the case of an event with no identified licensee, the CNSC will oversee and regulate the response activities of the responding organizations to ensure compliance with the Nuclear Safety and Control Act and Regulations, and ensure the health, safety and security of the response staff, the public and the environment, as well as maintain compliance with Canada s international obligations. In either case, the CNSC will implement the CNSC Emergency Response Plan CAN2-1 November The CNSC has agreed to the responsibilities as outlined in Appendix 18 to Annex I. c) In the event of a nuclear emergency, the federal government will liaise with the provinces and territories as well as with neighbouring countries and the international community as outlined in Appendix 19 to Annex I. The federal government will also manage nuclear liability issues and coordinate Canada s response, should Canadians be affected by a nuclear emergency in a foreign country Constitution Act, 1867 The regulation of nuclear energy has been deemed to be a matter of national concern that goes beyond local or provincial interests. Therefore, the federal government maintains exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of nuclear energy in Canada. The province has exclusive jurisdiction for matters of property and civil rights in the province and for all matters that affect the public health, safety and environment of the province Emergencies Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.22 (4 th Supp.) Pursuant to section 6, the federal Governor in Council can declare a public welfare emergency, which includes an emergency caused by a real or imminent accident, pollution resulting in danger to life or property, social disruption or breakdown in the flow of essential goods and services, so serious as to be a national emergency. Pursuant to section 14, the Governor in Council must consult the provinces that are affected by the emergency before issuing a declaration of public welfare emergency. However, where the emergency is confined to one province, the Governor in Council may only issue a declaration of public welfare emergency or take other steps when the Lieutenant Governor of the province has indicated to the federal Governor in Council that the emergency exceeds the capacity of the province to deal with it.

20 8 Pursuant to section 8, while a declaration of a public welfare emergency is in effect, the Governor in Council may make necessary orders or regulations that are necessary to deal with the emergency. The orders or regulations made by the Governor in Council should not unduly impair the ability of the province to take measures, under provincial legislation, for dealing with the emergency Emergency Management Act, R.S.C. 2007, c.15 This act assigns responsibility to the Minister of Public Safety for the coordination of emergency management activities including the development and implementation of federal civil emergency plans in cooperation with other levels of government and the private sector. Federal authorities also coordinate or support the provision of assistance to a province during or after a provincial emergency. Assistance could include financial assistance where the emergency has been declared to be of concern to the federal government and the province has requested assistance Nuclear Safety and Control Act, R.S.C. 1997, c.9 This Act establishes the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, which is responsible for regulating activities related to nuclear energy including the construction and operation of nuclear facilities, and response to emergencies with radiological and/or nuclear aspects. The Commission is given exceptional powers including the power to make any order in an emergency that it considers necessary to protect the environment or the health and safety of persons or to maintain national security and compliance with Canada s international obligations. [see section 47 (1) of the Act] Nuclear Safety and Control Act Regulations P.C May 2000 Licensed nuclear facilities are required to demonstrate proposed measures to prevent or mitigate the effects of accidental releases, including: Assisting offsite authorities in planning and preparing to limit effects Notification of offsite authorities Reporting information to offsite authorities during and after release Assisting offsite authorities in dealing with effects of accidental releases

21 1.6.7 Nuclear Liability Act (R.S.C., 1985, c N-28) 9 Compensation to third parties for injury or damage caused by a nuclear incident, as defined in the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act, would be assessed and paid under the provisions of this Act Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act (S.C.1992, c.34) This legislation governs the transportation of dangerous goods (including radioactive goods) and the accidental release of ionizing radiation exceeding limits established by the Nuclear Safety and Control Act. 1.7 Legislative Responsibilities in a Nuclear and/or Radiological Emergency - Provincial Provincial Roles and Responsibilities a) The provincial government has jurisdiction over public health and safety, property and the environment within its borders. In the event of a nuclear and/or radiological emergency, the province will be primarily responsible for managing the off-site consequences of the emergency, by supporting and coordinating the offsite response, and for directing the off-site response to those emergencies as detailed in this Plan. b) The provincial response to a nuclear and/or radiological emergency will be coordinated through the PEOC. c) All activities, actions and/or decisions regarding possession, handling, transport or storage of radioactive/nuclear material associated with the off-site response must meet the requirements of the Nuclear Safety and Control Act and Regulations, or receive CNSC approval prior to possession, handling, storing or transporting such material Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act R.S.O 1990, Chapter E.9 a) The legislative authority for emergency management, planning and response for Ontario is the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act (EMCPA). b) The PNERP is formulated by the Lieutenant Governor in Council (LGIC) under section 8 of the EMCPA. c) Emergency Orders i. Once a provincial declaration of emergency has been made (see section 1.3 above), the LGIC has the power to make emergency orders and may delegate these powers to a Minister

22 10 or to the Commissioner of Emergency Management (CEM) 2. All emergency orders must be consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. ii. iii. iv. A Minister to whom powers have been delegated, may in turn delegate any of his/her powers to the CEM. Emergency orders are made only if they are necessary and essential, and they would alleviate harm and damage and are a reasonable alternative to other measures. Emergency orders must only apply to those areas where they are necessary and should be in effect only for as long as necessary. d) Reporting Requirements i. During an emergency, the Premier or a minister (delegated) is required to regularly report to the public with respect to the emergency. ii. The Premier is required to submit a report in respect of the emergency to the Assembly within 120 days following the termination of the emergency. If the Assembly is not in session at that time, the Premier is required to submit a report within 7 days of the Assembly reconvening. e) Liability For Action i. Pursuant to section 11(1) of the EMCPA, Ministers of the Crown, Crown employees, members of municipal councils and municipal employees are protected from personal liability for doing any act done in good faith under the Act or pursuant to an Order made under the Act. ii. Emergency plans authorize crown and municipal employees to take action under those plans where an emergency exists but has not yet been declared to exist (section 9 of the EMCPA). f) The authority, responsibilities, functions and tasks assigned in the PNERP and its implementing plans shall carry the following implications: i. In the case of those agreed upon by an organization, it should be the responsibility of the operational/administrative head of the organization to ensure their implementation. 2 Pursuant to the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act (EMCPA).

23 ii. 11 In the case of those assigned to a position, implementation should also be the responsibility of any substitute, alternate or the person next in line of authority if the permanent incumbent of that position is absent or otherwise unable to take the necessary action Order In Council The LGIC assigns responsibilities for formulating emergency plans in respect of specific types of emergencies to ministers (section 6 of the EMCPA). In addition to the obligation of Cabinet to formulate this plan, nuclear and radiological emergencies are assigned to the Minister of Community Safety & Correctional Services. 1.8 Legislative Requirements in a Nuclear and/or Radiological Emergency- Municipal Municipal Roles & Responsibilities a) Designated Municipalities - Nuclear i. Pursuant to section 3(4) of the EMCPA, municipalities have been designated to prepare plans in respect of nuclear emergencies. ii. Designated municipalities preparing plans in respect of a nuclear emergency include: - municipalities located within nuclear primary zones. - municipalities acting as a host community. iii. Designated municipalities are listed in Annex A. iv. Appendices 15 & 16 to Annex I address the main responsibilities of the designated municipalities. b) Radiological i. Municipalities in close proximity to, or with nuclear establishments within their boundaries, should include in their emergency response plans the measures they may need to take to deal with the off-site consequences of a radiological accident. This would include details on the relevant notifications to/from the involved organizations (see PNERP Implementing Plan for Other Radiological Emergencies). ii. Other municipalities which have a radiological incident identified as one of their potential risks, within their Hazard Identification & Risk Assessment (pursuant to Section 2 (3) of the EMCPA), should include, within their municipal emergency

24 1.8.2 Legislative Authority a) Nuclear 12 response plans, the measures they may need to undertake to deal with such an emergency (see PNERP Implementing Plan for Other Radiological Emergencies). Pursuant to section 3 (4) of the EMCPA, the designated municipalities shall formulate plans to deal with the off-site consequences of nuclear emergencies caused by the corresponding nuclear installation (Annex A). These plans should also contain, where applicable, arrangements for the provision of services and assistance by county departments, local police services, fire services, EMS, hospitals and local boards. As required by section 8 of the EMCPA, municipal nuclear emergency response plans shall conform to the PNERP and be subject to the approval of the Solicitor General (this function is fulfilled by the Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services). The Solicitor General may make such alterations as considered necessary for the purpose of coordinating the plan with the Province s plan. As required by section 5 of the EMCPA, plans of lower-tier municipalities shall conform to the plans of their upper tier municipality. b) Radiological Pursuant to sections 2(3) and 3(4) of the EMCPA, every municipality, in developing their emergency management program, must identify and assess the various hazards and risks to public safety that could give rise to emergencies. Where a municipality identifies radiological risks (as per PNERP Implementing Plan for Other Radiological Emergencies), the emergency plan for that municipality must include provisions to deal with such an emergency Upper Tier Municipal Involvement Where the upper tier municipality is not the designated municipality under this PNERP it may, with the consent of its designated municipalities, coordinate the nuclear emergency plans for those municipalities Support Municipalities a) In the event of a declared emergency, the LGIC or the Premier may order a municipality to provide support or assistance to designated

25 13 municipalities or to affected municipalities. Such orders, if made, would be authorized by sections 7.0.2(4) or of the EMCPA. b) Support and assistance may include, but shall not be limited to, personnel, equipment, services and material. 1.9 Responsibilities of Organizations The responsibilities of provincial ministries, municipalities, federal departments and organizations, nuclear installations and their operators for nuclear emergency response and for the purposes of implementing this plan, are given in Annex I Guiding Principles The following principles underlie the PNERP and, through it, guide all offsite nuclear and radiological emergency management in the Province of Ontario: a) The Province of Ontario, through its ministries. agencies, boards and commissions, has primary responsibility for the health, safety and welfare of all inhabitants of the province, and the protection of property and the environment. b) The Province shall support and coordinate the response to the off-site consequences of a nuclear emergency and may, where warranted and appropriate, issue operational directives and, emergency orders (in the event of a declared emergency) under the EMCPA. c) In the event of a radiological emergency, the Province s role may vary from providing assistance/support to coordinating/directing the provincial response. d) Even though nuclear facilities are designed and operated according to stringent safety standards, emergency preparedness and response must operate on the basis that mechanical failure, human error, extreme natural events or hostile action can lead to nuclear or radiological emergencies. e) All plans should be so devised as to be able to deal effectively with a broad range of possible emergencies. f) An appropriate balance should be struck between risk and cost when assessing the level of emergency preparedness required. g) Exposure to radiation should be kept as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) within the context of the risks and costs of such avoidance. h) As much preparedness as is practicable should be done in advance to enable a rapid, effective and efficient response to a nuclear or radiological emergency.

26 14 i) Preparedness should include a program of public education for people who might be affected, to inform them of plans, and to help them cope with a nuclear emergency. j) As far as is practicable, operational measures (especially alerting and notification systems) and protective measures should be devised and implemented to avoid significant radiation exposure. k) A policy of truth and openness should be followed in providing information to the public and media during a nuclear or radiological emergency Administration of the Plan Pursuant to section 8 of the EMCPA, the approval authority for the PNERP is the LGIC The PNERP shall be reviewed at least every four years. Applicable amendments shall be brought forward for LGIC approval, as required The PNERP is administered by the Minister of Community Safety and Correctional Services The review process for the PNERP shall include appropriate consultations with stakeholders (per section 1.4) to ensure that these plans reflect current emergency response directives, changes to legislation and/or other changes to address best practice emergency management methodologies.

27 15 CHAPTER 2 PLANNING BASIS AND CONCEPTS 2.1 The Potential Hazard In all of the emergencies covered by this plan, the hazard could arise either from a nuclear reactor accident or from a radioactive source which has undergone an accident or over which control has been lost, resulting in the potential for, or the occurrence of: (a) (b) Radiation exposure Radioactive contamination of people (internal and external) and the environment The most likely radiation exposure pathways are: (a) (b) (c) (d) Contamination of skin and clothing (external contamination); Direct radiation from a source (exposure); Inhalation of airborne radioactive material (internal contamination); Ingestion of contaminated foodstuffs or water (internal contamination) The primary health effect of chronic low doses of radiation could be the induction of various types of cancers, typically with a latency period of 4 to 20 years Radiological and nuclear emergencies carry a real or potential health threat and as such, the MOHLTC s (Ministry of Health & Long Term Care) Radiation Health Response Plan will come into effect, together with, and as a complement to this PNERP. 2.2 Protective and Precautionary Measures The body can be protected from radiation exposure and external contamination by preventing or minimizing its exposure to the radiation source. This can be achieved by creating distance, by limiting the duration of exposure, and/or by shielding Internal contamination can be minimized or eliminated by preventing ingestion and inhalation of radioactive material. Once radioactive material enters the body, internal contamination decreases in accordance with the radioactive decay and biological elimination of such material.

28 A special method of protection is possible for the thyroid gland, which absorbs and stores iodine. If there is a risk of radioiodine entering the body, the thyroid s capacity to absorb it can be reduced or eliminated by taking a compound of stable iodine before, or even shortly after, the radioiodine enters the body. This is known as thyroid blocking Specific protective measures available for minimizing the radiation hazard in a nuclear or radiological emergency are: (a) Entry Control To prevent or discourage non-essential persons from entering the affected area. (b) Use of Protective Equipment Protective equipment will usually be available for any emergency workers who may need it. (c) Thyroid Blocking Through the use of stable iodine compounds as described in paragraph above. (d) Sheltering Remaining indoors with doors and windows closed and external ventilation turned off or reduced. (e) Evacuation Leaving an area or location that is, or may become, affected by radiation. (f) Decontamination Removal of deposited radioactive material. (g) Food Chain Protection Preventing radioactive material from entering the food chain at any stage. (h) Food and Water Control Preventing the consumption of contaminated food and water.

29 In planning the application of these protective measures, it is convenient to group them into two categories (see Table 2.1): (a) Exposure Control Measures Measures which protect against external contamination and radiation exposure (as a result of a radioactive cloud or plume or deposited contamination). (b) Ingestion Control Measures Measures which protect the food chain from radioactive contamination, and prevent the ingestion of contaminated food and water When considering the application of the protective measures which fall into the two categories in above, it should be borne in mind that they are complementary to each other, and should be applied in combinations appropriate to each stage of the developing situation (Table 2.1) Precautionary Measures 2.3 Basis of Planning Precautionary measures facilitate the application and effectiveness of protective measures, and include: a) Closing of beaches, recreation areas, etc. b) Closing of workplaces and schools. c) Suspension of non-critical patient admissions in hospitals. d) Entry control. e) Clearing milk storages of dairy farms. f) Banning consumption of any item of food or water that may have been exposed outdoors. g) Banning consumption and export of locally produced milk, meat, produce, and milk-and meat-producing animals. h) Removing milk-and meat-producing animals from outside pasture and exposed water sources Nuclear and radiological emergency response plans must be able to deal with a wide range of possible emergencies. However, because resources are not available to make full preparations for dealing with all possible events, a judicious choice must be made to select the optimum basis for emergency management Radiological Emergencies The types of radiological emergencies covered by this plan include:

30 18 (a) Accidents or occurrences at a nuclear establishment 3 (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) Accidents or occurrences during the transportation of radioactive material Satellite re-entry Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) Radiological Devices (RD) Nuclear Weapon detonation Nuclear Emergencies (a) (b) The main challenge that Ontario faces in this area would arise from an emergency at a nuclear installation 4. Formal risk analysis of nuclear reactor accidents shows that there is generally an inverse relationship between the probability of occurrence of an accident and the severity of its likely consequences. The planning basis selected must strike an appropriate balance in considering these two factors. Taking the above into consideration, as well as the various types of nuclear accidents that could potentially occur in Ontario, a basic offsite effect has been selected to serve as the main basis for nuclear emergency management. The basic offsite effect could generally be characterized by one or more of the following: i. A warning period would usually exist before the offsite effects occur. ii. iii. iv. The main hazard to people would be from external exposure to, and inhalation of radionuclides. Doses would be low. (For planning purposes it can be assumed that the individual dose to the most exposed person at the facility boundary will not exceed 250 msv (25 rem).) Environmental contamination would be limited to very low levels. v. Low-level radioactive emissions to the environment could continue for some time (i.e., days or weeks). 3 4 A nuclear establishment is a facility that uses, produces, processes, reprocesses, stores or disposes of a nuclear substance (as defined in the federal Nuclear Safety and Control Act), but does not include a nuclear installation. A nuclear installation is a facility containing a nuclear reactor.

31 vi. 19 The impact would mainly be confined to a limited area around the nuclear installation (i.e., the Primary Zone; see section 2.4 below). (c) (d) Detailed planning and preparedness shall be carried out in Ontario for dealing effectively with the basic offsite effect of a nuclear installation accident. The aim of this is to ensure, to the extent possible, that no person offsite will be exposed to intolerable levels 5 of radiation as a result of such an accident. An accident or event could occur which could result in a more severe offsite effect, though the probability of such an occurrence is very low. One or more of the following defines the more severe offsite effect: i. The time between the accident and any release of radioactivity may be generally limited. ii. iii. iv. Radiation doses could be high (greater than 250 msv [25 rem] for the most exposed person at the facility boundary). Radioiodines and particulates could form a component of the radioactive emission. Environmental contamination could be quantitatively significant in both extent and duration. v. The area affected could be larger than that for the basic offsite effect. (e) Appropriate additional planning and preparedness shall be carried out to deal with the less probable but more severe offsite effects outlined in paragraph (d) above: i. Timely public alerting and direction; ii. Priorizing evacuations for those closest to the hazard; iii. Radiation monitoring and, if necessary, decontamination; iv. If needed, medical assessment, treatment and counselling. (f) Detailed planning and preparedness will establish an effective basis to deal with an emergency caused by any type of nuclear installation accident. 5 The term intolerable is one used by the UK to denote radiation levels at which protective measures should be undertaken. These levels are not absolute but are relative to the risk and cost involved in adopting various measures to avoid radiation dose. The levels chosen for Ontario are defined in the Protective Action Levels (section 2.7 below).

32 Contamination of the environment by radioactive material could occur in a nuclear and/or radiological emergency. This requires planning and preparedness to enable detection and assessment of environmental contamination, protection of the food chain from contamination, and prevention of the ingestion of contaminated food and water This PNERP contains and prescribes the detailed planning that shall be carried out to deal effectively with any nuclear or radiological emergency that may affect Ontario. The preparedness required to effectively implement this Plan (and associated plans/procedures) is outlined in Chapter Primary Zones and Sectors Nuclear Emergencies The area around the boundary of a nuclear installation for which a nuclear emergency response plan is made shall be divided into the following zones: (a) Contiguous Zone The zone immediately surrounding the nuclear installation. Priority evacuations, if necessary, shall be undertaken within this area because of its proximity to the source of the potential hazard. (b) Primary Zone The zone around the nuclear installation within which detailed planning and preparedness shall be carried out for measures against exposure to a radioactive plume. (The Primary Zone includes the Contiguous Zone). (c) Secondary Zone A larger zone within which it is necessary to plan and prepare measures to prevent ingestion of radioactive material. (The Secondary Zone includes both the Primary and Contiguous Zones) The approximate or nominal radii of the zones for the designated nuclear installations in Ontario (listed in Annex A), as measured from the venting or release stacks, shall be: Zones Pickering, Chalk River Fermi 2 Darlington, Bruce Laboratories Contiguous Zone 3 km none none Primary Zone 10 km 9 km 23 km Secondary Zone 50 km 50 km 80 km

33 The Primary Zone around a designated nuclear installation shall be divided into a number of Response Sectors. All emergency response measures, both operational and protective, shall be planned and implemented in terms of these sectors The desirable pattern of Response Sectors in a Primary Zone is illustrated in Figure 2.2. Response Sectors will lie within up to three rings around the nuclear installation: an inner ring (which is the Contiguous Zone), a middle ring and an outer ring. Within each ring it is desirable to have as few sectors as possible, while maintaining the need for flexibility and practicability in the application of the operational response strategy The actual demarcation of Response Sectors shall be carried out so that, as far as possible, their boundaries lie along clearly recognizable features, such as roads and railway tracks. Other factors to be taken into account shall be municipal boundaries, population densities, and availability of appropriate evacuation routes The Secondary Zone shall be divided into four concentric sub-zones the Primary Zone, and sub-zones A,B and C: (a) (b) (c) (d) Sub-zone A lies between the Primary Zone boundary and a 20 km radius circle. Sub-zones B and C lie between the 20 km and 30 km circles, and the 30 km and 50 km circles, respectively. Sub-zones A, B and C will each be sub-divided into eight standard zonal sectors. The portion of each zonal sector lying within a sub-zone shall be a sub-sector. These divisions are illustrated in Figure The actual zones and response sectors for each designated nuclear installation are shown in the relevant implementing plan. 2.5 Contamination Zones Radiological Emergencies Field monitoring will result in the delineation of zones to be used as the basis for protective measures in a radiological incident (Note: contamination zones for radiological incidents arising onsite at a nuclear installation shall be delineated pursuant to section 2.4 above): (a) (b) The Restricted Zone is the area within which exposure control measures are likely to be required. The Buffer Zone provides a buffer area beyond the Restricted Zone where limited measures of radioactivity are detected. This is the area within which ingestion control measures may be necessary.

34 Table 2.1 lists the exposure and ingestion control measures that could be applied. 2.6 Population Groups A decision on the need for a protective measure shall take into account the projected dose to the most exposed individual in the Critical Group. This is a group, which, by virtue of age, sex or dietary habits, is expected to receive the highest projected dose. For full definition, see Glossary, Annex K When implementing protective measures, municipalities should consider that certain groups within the general population might need special consideration: (a) Vulnerable Group A group which, because it is more vulnerable to radiation, may require protective measures not considered necessary for the general population; examples are children, and pregnant women. (b) Special Group 2.7 Protective Action Levels A group for which special constraints arise in the application of a protective measure, such as intensive care patients in hospitals, bedridden residents in nursing homes, handicapped persons and prison inmates Protective Action Levels (PALs) serve as aids in planning and decisionmaking during an emergency, providing technical guidance on the need to take specific protective measures PALs are expressed in terms of projected radiation doses for exposure control measures of evacuation, sheltering and KI and are laid down as a lower and upper level: (a) Lower Level Below this level, the protective measure would not normally be justified. At or above this level, the protective measure should be applied unless valid reasons exist for deferring action. (b) Upper Level At or above this level, the protective measure shall be implemented, unless implementation clearly entails greater risks for the people involved than those from the projected radiation dose.

35 PALs for banning the consumption of affected foods and water are expressed as levels of radionuclide concentrations When the time available for making decisions is limited, it would be entirely appropriate to use only PALs as the technical criteria for indicating the need for the application of any protective measure. However, when such urgency does not exist (i.e., during the later stages of the response phase and during the recovery phase [paragraph 2.9.2) and when dealing with low doses over long periods of time, it would be preferable to also consider other technical factors such as collective dose and its likely health impact The specific Protective Action Levels to be used in Ontario are prescribed in Annex E. 2.8 Planning Times Nuclear Emergencies The timing of any release of radioactivity into the environment following an accident at a nuclear reactor depends both on the characteristics of the accident and the response of the containment system. Containment systems are specifically designed to prevent releases in the event of an accident, and it is only if the system fails to operate as designed or is bypassed, that the possibility of a significant early (i.e. within a few hours) release arises An early release can occur if the accident involves both a rapid release from the fuel together with a failure of containment to isolate automatically or, if there is some other form of impairment, creating a pathway for the release of radioactivity to the environment Containment systems vary in design between different types of reactor and this also affects planning times The containment design for Ontario s CANDU reactors involves the use of a negative-pressure (vacuum building) concept which can prevent an uncontrolled release even in the presence of an impairment. Over time the vacuum becomes depleted at a rate depending on the rate of air in leakage, requiring a controlled, filtered discharge to the atmosphere resulting in a sustained or intermittent emission. For planning purposes, the sequence of events and hold-up times to be used in the case of the CANDU reactors are generally as follows : (a) (b) Typically, there will be a short interval after a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) before containment is isolated (i.e., before box-up ). During this interval, there may be an initial release of radioactivity (known as a puff release) of short duration. The interval between any initial puff and the start of a sustained emission could be as short as about one hour (impaired containment) but can be contained for a minimum of 2 days (Pickering), 2½ days (Bruce), or 7 days (Darlington).

36 24 (c) The duration of an emission (whether sustained or intermittent) could be several weeks. The largest release of radioactivity would most likely occur during the first few days In the case of the NRU reactor at Chalk River Laboratories, which is a relatively small reactor with only a limited containment capability, radioactivity would be emitted to the atmosphere commencing at the time of the accident and would likely cease within one hour, depending on the nature of the accident The containment system in the Fermi 2 reactor is of a high-pressure, lowleakage design intended to prevent any release of radioactivity following an accident. A release would only occur if containment were impaired or bypassed, and in such cases would likely commence within a few hours of the onset of the accident. The duration of such a release would depend on the nature of the accident, but is unlikely to exceed 24 hours. 2.9 Concept of Operations - Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies Operations to deal with a nuclear or radiological emergency shall be conducted in two successive phases (see Figure 2.5) The Response Phase The Response Phase requires urgent action to deal with the immediate effects of radiation. Such action may be based on prearranged plans, procedures and preparedness, when there is insufficient time to plan a response. This phase begins with the first warning that a significant problem exists and should normally be ended when the radiation threat has ended. This phase could last for several weeks. During this phase the following types of emergency management and response operations would generally be required: (a) Exposure Control All necessary measures designed to avoid or limit exposure to the source of radiation (and surface deposits from it) would be undertaken. (b) Ingestion Control Initially, ingestion control is imposed as a precaution to minimize contamination of the food chain and prevent consumption of food and water that may have been contaminated. As Exposure Control operations wind down, more effort and attention will be focused on Ingestion Control operations as a protective measure.

37 25 (c) Restoration If appropriate, rescinding of some or all of the protective measures in force may be considered, including, the return of evacuees to their homes The Recovery Phase The recovery phase is when action is required to restore conditions to normal. During this phase the following types of emergency management and response operations would take place : (a) Ingestion Control Assessment of the food chain and water sources for possible contamination, and taking measures to deal with it, including banning the consumption of contaminated commodities. (b) Restoration Measures to restore conditions to normal, as far as possible Distinction Between Phases Since emergency response operations may occur in both phases, and since planning for the recovery phase should commence as soon as practicable during the response phase, there will not normally be a sharp distinction between phases. The Response Phase of this PNERP will likely end when attention begins to focus on the hazard from contamination of the environment Long-Term Rehabilitation In the unlikely event of large-scale contamination of the environment and/or the displacement of a large number of people, it will be necessary to undertake a long-term rehabilitation operation Modifications to Concepts The basic operational and organizational concepts described in this Plan may need to be modified under special circumstances. These modifications will be made in the specific implementing plan that relates to it.

38 26 EXPOSURE CONTROL MEASURES INGESTION CONTROL MEASURES Entry Control Sheltering Evacuation Thyroid Blocking Use of Protective Equipment Decontamination Milk Control Water Control Pasture Control Produce and Crop Control Livestock Control Food Control Land Control Environmental Decontamination Table 2.1: PROTECTIVE MEASURES Note - These measures are defined in the Glossary, Annex K. Normally applicable only to Recovery Phase

39 OUTER RING 8 11 MIDDLE RING INNER RING * 14* 15* * Lake/River Sectors FIGURE 2.2 : PRIMARY ZONE AND RESPONSE SECTORS (Nuclear Emergency) (Diagrammatic - Not to Scale)

40 28 North (360 ) Sector 8 Sector 1 Subsector C Subsector Sector 7 B1 Sector 2 Subsector A1 West East (270 ) (90 ) Sector 6 Sector Sector 5 Sector 4 South (180 ) LEGEND PRIMARY ZONE (10 km ) SUB-ZONE A (10-20 km) SUB-ZONE B (20-30 km) SUB-ZONE C (30-50 km) FIGURE 2.3 SECONDARY ZONE DIVISIONS (Nuclear Emergency)

41 29 Incident Site Restricted Zone Buffer Zone FIGURE 2.4: ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION MONITORING ZONES (Radiological Emergency)

42 30 PHASE OPERATION RESPONSE RECOVERY EXPOSURE CONTROL EXPOSURE CONTROL MAIN HAZARDS: Radiation Exposure, Internal and External Radioactive Contamination PROTECTIVE ACTION: Precautionary Measures, Entry Control, Evacuation, Sheltering, Thyroid Blocking MAIN FOCUS: Primary Zone, Restricted Zone INGESTION CONTROL PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES INGESTION CONTROL MAIN HAZARDS: Ingestion of Contaminated Milk/Food/Water, Surface Contamination, Resuspension PROTECTIVE ACTION: Pasture Control, Milk Control, Food & Produce Control, Drinking Water Control, Livestock Control, Land Control MAIN FOCUS: Affected Areas of the Secondary Zone, Buffer Zone RECOVERY RESCINDING OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES (as appropriate) RECOVERY HAZARDS: Contamination, Unplanned Reentry, societal disruption, Psychological Trauma, etc. RECOVERY ACTIONS: Monitoring, Decontamination, Planned Re-entry. Health Checks, Counselling, Compensation MAIN FOCUS: Primary Zone, Restricted Zone FIGURE 2.5 : CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS - NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES